THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE (TEN ARTICLES)
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to
investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning
this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?
(2) Whether it is a science?
(3) Whether it is one or many?
(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in
different senses?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of
any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above
reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22).
But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical
science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is
superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing
can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything
that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God Himself; so
that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine
science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides
philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired
of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in
justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical
science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful
that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e.
inspired of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be
a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by
human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an
end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O
God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for
Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to
direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for
the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should
be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths
about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that
man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God
such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that
after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's
whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this
truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought
about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be
taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary
that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a
sacred science learned through revelation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may
not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are
revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text
continues, "For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of
man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the sacred science consists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the various means
through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist
both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, is
round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. abstracting from
matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no
reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science,
so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us
by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology
included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is
part of philosophy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacred doctrine is a science?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science
proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from
articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not
admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thess. 3:2). Therefore
sacred doctrine is not a science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred
science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone
belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and
strengthened." But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine.
Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic
and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles
known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective
proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from
principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a
science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of
a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just
as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the
mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The principles of any science are either in themselves
self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and
such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not
because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced
rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral
sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through
whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is
based, has come down to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacred doctrine is one science?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according
to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which treats only of
one class of subjects." But the creator and the creature, both of whom
are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one
class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical
sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or
habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect,
but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For
example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being
colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because
Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being
divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one
precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is
included under sacred doctrine as under one science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures
equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are
referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this
science is not impaired.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being
differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit
as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its
more universal formality, as the object of the "common sense" is whatever
affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible.
Hence the "common sense," although one faculty, extends to all the
objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the
subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of
by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as
they can be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine
bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and
simple, yet extends to everything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a
practical science is that which ends in action according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action: "Be
ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore
sacred doctrine is a practical science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law.
But law implies a moral science which is a practical science. Therefore
sacred doctrine is a practical science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human
operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
practical but a speculative science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each
the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through
divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one
is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine
includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself
and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it
is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does
treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the
perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a
sufficient answer to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences;
for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes.
But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be
more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles---namely, articles
of faith---can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a
higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a
sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his
Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books with
the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what
more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural
learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one:
"Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly
practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason
of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its
subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other
speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other
sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason,
which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of
divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of
its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things
which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences
consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the
practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further
purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the
good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of
this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as
to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed.
Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other
sciences.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain
may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our
intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the
owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the
fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the
uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human
intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the
highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained
of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical
sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to
make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other
sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not
depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as
of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use
of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military
science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or
insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more
easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed
the other sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the
teachings of this science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no
doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom;
seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But
this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other
sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic.
vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences.
Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is
acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of
the Holy Spirit (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in
the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise
and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood
and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the
foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the
prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting
end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he who
considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God,
is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of
divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine
essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause---not only so far
as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew
Him---"That which is known of God is manifest in them" (Rm. 1:19)---but
also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence
sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human
knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the
highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The principles of other sciences either are evident and
cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other
science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through
revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to
prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them.
Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this
science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and every height
that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2 Cor. 10:4,5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of
judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by
inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what
concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the
virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In
another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might
be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the
virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom
which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man
judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii):
"Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine
things." The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is
acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the object of this science?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every
science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot
presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv):
"It is impossible to define the essence of God." Therefore God is not the
object of this science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be
comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach
conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things,
such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of
this science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the
object of this science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a
science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and
its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is
the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of
sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect
of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God
as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth
the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of
this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The
object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since
the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some,
however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the
aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this
science to be something other than God---that is, either things and
signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and
members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so
far as they have reference to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of
God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of
nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is
treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical
sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by
taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred
science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents
but as in some way related to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose
says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought." But in
this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are written
that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a
matter of argument.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either
from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems
unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form
of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because,
according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those things of
which human reason brings its own experience." Therefore sacred doctrine
is not a matter of argument.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths
in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to
prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ
argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is
to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the
inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of
them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles,
if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede
nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his
objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself,
can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent
admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation;
thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against
those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our
opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any
means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of
answering his objections---if he has any---against faith. Since faith
rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never
be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith
cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove
what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from
articles of faith to other truths.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from
authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we
ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has
been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for
although the argument from authority based on human reason is the
weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is
the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not,
indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an
end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this
doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it,
natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will
ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity
every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence
sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those
questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as
Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For
we are also His offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine
makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but
properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an
incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as
one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith
rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the
canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made
to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only
those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to
hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way
in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in
their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and
written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that
which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science,
which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of
various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the
sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use
of such similitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear.
Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that explain
me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes
truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths by likening
them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to
the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God,
this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures,
and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied visions,
and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets." But to put
forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore
this sacred science may use metaphors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it
is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy
Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We cannot
be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the
covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is
proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise and to the
unwise I am a debtor" (Rm. 1:14)---that spiritual truths be expounded by
means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even
the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may
be able to understand it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation,
for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred
doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the
sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of
those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but
raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the
revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these
matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of
Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of
truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a
defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words "Give
not that which is holy to dogs" (Mt. 7:6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that
divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of
nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men's
minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that
these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might
have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of
nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler
than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of
God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than
what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from
God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may
say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the
better hidden from the unworthy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses,
historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and
deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only
fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy
Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore
in it there cannot be several senses to a word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old
Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and
allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is
not one of these four.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by
things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things
signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the
spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now
this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says
(Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of future glory." Again,
in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to
do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of
the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in
Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what
we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what
relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the
literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of
Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect,
it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according
to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce
equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses
are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because
the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other
things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are
founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any argument be
drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis.
48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this,
since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense
which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are grouped
under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds
(Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology
when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses
allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the hardness of
men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of
Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four,
allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St.
Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the
allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the historical, the
allegorical, and the tropological.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[1] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by
words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure
itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture
speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member,
but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence
it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of
Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] Out. Para. 1/4
TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] Out. Para. 2/4
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns
the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of
creatures from Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] Out. Para. 3/4
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists?
(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of
His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His
knowledge, will, power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] Out. Para. 4/4
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those
things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is
naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles.
But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is
naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is
self-evident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known
as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii)
says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the
nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that
every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of
the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by
this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be
conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than
that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word
"God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists
actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever
denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if
truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is
true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is
truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning
the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the
proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his
heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not
self-evident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the
one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because
the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an
animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the
essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition
will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first
principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no
one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such
like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate
and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself,
but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject
of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the
title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some
mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal
substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God
exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown
(Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the
proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by
things that are more known to us, though less known in their
nature---namely, by effects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is
implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man
naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be
naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God
exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to
know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is
approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which
is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in
something else.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands
it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing
that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone
understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which
nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore
follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually,
but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually
exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than
which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted
by those who hold that God does not exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the
existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it
is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be
demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge;
whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be
demonstrated that God exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we
cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does
not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot
demonstrate that God exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could
only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him,
since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite
and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be
demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the
existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20).
But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated
through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of
anything is whether it exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the
cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior
absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from
every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so
long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect
depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.
Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us,
can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God,
which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are
preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even
as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can
be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot
grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself
is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an
effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in
proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to
God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is
necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its
essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its
existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects;
consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we
may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect
knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the
existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God exists?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the
word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted
for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that
everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles,
supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one
principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one
principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to
suppose God's existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
3:14)
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/6
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in
motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to
be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible
that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in
the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually
hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously
potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and
in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it
should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in
motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in
motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that
by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there
would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the
hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion
by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 3/6
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case
known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be
the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which
is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to
infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first
is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause
of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only
one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if
there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is
possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause,
neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient
causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit
a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 4/6
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We
find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they
are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are
possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to
exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one
time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything
to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already
proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate
the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.
This all men speak of as God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 5/6
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like.
But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as
they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as
a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that
which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something
best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost
being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being,
as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause
of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of
all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all
beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection;
and this we call God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 6/6
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot
to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by
whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the
highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless
His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of
evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow
evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the
direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be
traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that
are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable
and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the
Article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] Out. Para. 1/4
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] Out. Para. 2/4
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] Out. Para. 3/4
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1)
we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and
because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of
something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity;
(4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] Out. Para. 4/4
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is a body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the
three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to
God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do?
He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is
longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8,9). Therefore
God is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a
quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written:
"Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is
called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His
glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (Heb. 1:3).
Therefore God is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture
attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (Job
40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps. 33:16); and "The
right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps. 117:16). Therefore God
is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which
supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord
sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13). Therefore
God is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term
"wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a
local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be
enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart
from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore God is a
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it
be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already
proved (Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.
Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first
being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For
although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality,
the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is
in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in
actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It
is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But
every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is
divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a
body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is
impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be
either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler
than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation
depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on
the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than
the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As we have said above (Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ puts before
us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things.
Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the
comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus,
by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the
transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His
existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius
(Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of
His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by
breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under
His protection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards
his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence,
when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is
added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on
account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For
instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God
signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on
with the other parts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to
God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of
His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His
power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is
everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that
same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw
signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever
has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of
the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in
Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith;
but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God
is composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite.
But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding
angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter
and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God
seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He
is composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body
as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of
matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q[2], A[3]) that
God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything
composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form;
therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates
the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is not a
participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of
matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the
manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent.
Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be
primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is
the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not
composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the
acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence
what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a
similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an
angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by
matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first
underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else
prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be
received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely
because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence
it does not follow that matter exists in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For
nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God---i.e. the
Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the
same as His essence or nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent
produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence
or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the
species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of
man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity
signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with
all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of
the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or
whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore
this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this
particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are
included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has
something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man
are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part
of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded
as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the
other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to
"this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita."
Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then
is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own
Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like
the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in
speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence,
because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use
abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that
Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way
in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition
in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only
as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely
because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things;
consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them
"suppositum" is not the same as nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For
if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to
which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all
things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be
predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the
incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God's
existence is not His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (Q[2],
A[2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not
the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God
is His existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent principles
of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused in water
by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence,
this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its
essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be
caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the
sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused.
Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have
its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because
we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in
God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is
that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity
are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God
there is no potentiality, as shown above (A[1]), it follows that in Him
essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His
existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not
itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but
is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own
essence, as shown above (A[3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence
He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore
be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence,
and not merely His own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds.
Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of
the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may
understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence
does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus
animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in
general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the
divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas
universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act
of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by
the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first
sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in
the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God
when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (Q[2],
A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is contained in a genus?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a
being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God.
Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own
genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is
the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x).
Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not
in any genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely
and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible
to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are
reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and
all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither
way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be
shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and
difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species
is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as
actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from
sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has
a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual
nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to
potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since
in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He
should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God
is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being",
because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the
essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that
being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from
its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for
non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a
genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence
of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ
in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the
same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do
not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that
God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain
that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of
Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a
definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration
is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its
principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus
does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of
continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God
is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus
as its principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists of
itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body
of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property
of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this existence,
however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the
genus of substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must
be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure
proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things,
in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in God there are any accidents?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be
an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an
accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved
that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an
accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are
accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are
accidents.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are
many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these
genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than
God---which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as
potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by
its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown
(Q[2], A[3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius
says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to
it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have
something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless
absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is
essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute
primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have
any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential
accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent
principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since
He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us
univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as
there are in us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles
of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that
which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of
substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every
genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is altogether simple?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from
God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from
the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing
is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us
that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus,
chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the
parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is
altogether simple.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways.
First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither
composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor
composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His
"suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him
composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident.
Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether
simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component
parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown
above (Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for
things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Q[2], A[3]), since He is
the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there
must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for
either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are
potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be
predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole
made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of
the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts,
although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of
a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be
predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of
water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is
not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not
belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is
nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather
absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this
argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made
up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things
that are dim."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate
the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort
composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as
will be shown hereafter, (Q[4], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: With us composite things are better than simple things,
because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple
thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found
in one simple thing (Q[4], A[1] and Q[6], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things,
for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that
which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters
into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the
composition of other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each
other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way
differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter
are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them,
as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ.
Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who
assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have
said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the
theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant,
who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these
contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into
the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle.
First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause
is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only
specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither
numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the
former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly,
because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him
primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with
anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite
so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire
warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not
even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every
compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely
posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q[3], A[1]):
while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as
that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so
likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is
posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that
God is absolutely primal being (Q[2], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their
efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part
of a compound.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this
is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their
differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not
differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate,
it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are
absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something."
Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but
are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the
same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] Out. Para. 1/2
THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is perfect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a
thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to
be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings
of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and
vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as shown above (Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is existence.
But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and
receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mt. 5:48).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the
ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material
principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely
potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and
thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in
the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as
matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state
of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most
actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion
to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks
nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can
only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which is not
made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things
are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into
actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in
actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The material principle which with us is found to be
imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something
perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced
through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came.
Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is
actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some
being already actual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is
compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing
has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which
actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to
other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the
received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man,
or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle,
and as something received; and not as that which exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For
God is simple, as shown above (Q[3], A[7]); whereas the perfections of
things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are
not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things
are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific
difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and
"species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists;
and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more
perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God
is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and
knowledge, and other similar perfections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of
as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be
seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists
in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same
formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or in
a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent---thus in the sun is
the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain
that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although
to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a
more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as
such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is
to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since
therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of
all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies
the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that
He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all."
Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of
itself subsistent (Q[3], A[4]). Consequently, He must contain within
Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot
thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not
participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were
self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it.
Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection
of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included
in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as
they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the
perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too,
is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)),
while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first
and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse
qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural unity
pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in
themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury
to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although
existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are
considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more
perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and
intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does
not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence
need not participate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God's
existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the
perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any creature can be like God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Ps.
85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all
creatures the most excellent are those which are called participation
gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither can
there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is no
"genus," as shown above (Q[3], A[5]). Therefore no creature is like God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form.
But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence
and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is
like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like
some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you
likened God?" (Is. 40:18).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him"
(1 Jn. 3:2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form.
Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form
according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and
these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two
things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the
most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which
communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according
to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less
white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect
likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which
communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as
we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so
far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its
form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If
therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there
will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is
made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces
man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same
species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of
the same species; as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some
sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of
the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore
if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still
more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things,
so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal
principle of all being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares
that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him.
For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as
they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be
imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely
in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of
that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement,
specifically or generically.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a
different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the
principle of all "genera."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of
agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or
species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential
being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort
like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because,
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between
things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is
caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so
also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that
God is like a creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] Out. Para. 1/2
OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goodness differs really from being?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius
says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are
good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and
being really differ.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good
which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De Causis.
Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more
or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all
desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is
actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear
from the foregoing (Q[3], A[4]; Q[4], A[1]). Hence it is clear that
goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect
of desirableness, which being does not present.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that
something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality;
a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it
is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and
this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its
substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any
further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white
implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of
simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can
receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is
desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has
ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the
ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all
actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor
good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its
primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be
good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its
complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good
simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), "I perceive that in
nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is
another," is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having
being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and
even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies
complete actuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a
thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are
arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the
names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst
the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being.
Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But
goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div.
Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing;
whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness
is in idea prior to being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it
is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born"
(Mt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge,
and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a
particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore,
absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of
created things is being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the
thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is
prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first
thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable
only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of
the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is
primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as
implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from
creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the
aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of
which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some
end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called
the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is
the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine
causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists,
who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that
matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than
being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for
all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is
presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends
to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may
be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so
far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause
them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things
which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For
goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find
their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are
not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a
formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does
not extend save to those things which are actual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be
removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be
desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being.
Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively,
inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be
deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as
they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is
desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently
nothing is good except being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every being is good?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something
superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is added to
being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness
limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and
good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not
every being is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does
not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary
matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every
being is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics
goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there
would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest good.
Therefore every being is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as
is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in
them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this
sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of
desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind
of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but
only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he
lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the
power to see well.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only
potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter
may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to
it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness,
viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be
desirable is not its property, but to desire.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because
they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only
logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and
matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the
aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in
some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea
of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding
article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but
rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
"Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal
cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But
to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore
goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist
because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the efficient
cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which
something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since
this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the
aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea
of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what
is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first
of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire
follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end
come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of
the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that
which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be
first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its
effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect
when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv);
thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic
principle of its perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally;
for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and
consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically,
for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all
things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite
being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty
relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which
please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses
delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own
kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive
faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates
to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that
an end is said to move.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a
good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we
may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding;
but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper
object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to
the final cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode,
species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is
written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and
order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of
everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and
stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore
if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then
every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be
the case with species and order in endless succession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But
evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be
spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order.
Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and
order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and
measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good
thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It
is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and
measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above AA[1],3). Now a
thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of
its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since
the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things
necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must
have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form.
Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its
principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the
mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form
itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its
species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for
definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number,
changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which
is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order.
Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection,
consists also in mode, species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it is
perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be
beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it
is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they
have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken
of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but
as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a
being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something
else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every
being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode,
species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according
to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort
of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it
does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow
upon the being of sight.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode,
is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But an evil
mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to
be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore
they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without number,
weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal
things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things;
inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change,
i.e. the heavens.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and
the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as
fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous,
the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten
predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the
useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore
goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do
not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness
is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by
opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and
Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only
one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is
pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against
the pleasant and the virtuous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we
consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of
view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as
such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of
the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from
a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a
natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the
means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a
thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of
that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or
form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the
appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite
relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is
called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely
terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for
its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous
is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
called the pleasant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided
by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its
proper formality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite
aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other
formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being
sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to
such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as
helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the
virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as something
univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something
analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and
posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the
pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] Out. Para. 1/1
THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is good?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness
consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to
God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore
to be good does not belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do
not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is
desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own
perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain
likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the
agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing
which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore,
since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that
the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient
cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of
caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to
Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three
things are in God as in their cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God
Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many
similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (Q[4]
, A[3]). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is
Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some
participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible
knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being
directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the supreme good?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good
adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But
everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing:
therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as
was shown above (Q[3], A[7]). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of
all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also
from what is said (Lk. 18:19): "None is good but God alone." But we use
the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used
in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the
supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same
genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less
than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good
things, as appears above (Q[3], A[5]; Q[4], A[3]) it seems that God
cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing
in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was
said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow
from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as
from a univocal agent, as shown above (Q[4], A[2]); but as from an agent
which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the
likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in
the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun
more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in
the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him
in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing,
but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality
in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what
is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends
on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not
necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only
that other things are deficient in comparison with it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be
understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that
whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is
good but God alone," this is to be understood of essential goodness, as
will be explained in the next article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to
each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is
not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other
genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus;
and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of
comparison the supreme good implies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God
alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said
above (Q[5], A[1]). But every being is one essentially, as appears from
the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is
desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything
is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if
there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say
that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since
it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness,
the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either
proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any
other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore
everything is good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold:
first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in
respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect
operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something
else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire
consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form;
its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the
like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple
perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God
only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents;
since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially;
as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated
above (Q[3], A[6]); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end,
but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God
alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He
Himself alone is good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of
indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now
the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and
potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually;
and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good
essentially, as was shown above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the
essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow
that a creature is good essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but
something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added
perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus
added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called
being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being
through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because
by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other
goodness whereby it is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For
Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this
and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God,
good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But everything
is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good
which is God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called
good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of
the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but
by their own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q[84], A[4]) of all
things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in
the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according
to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of
man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so
likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these
he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of
these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute
being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is
convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good,
from whom all things are called good by way of participation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle argues
in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something
which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as
appears from what is shown above (Q[2], A[3]), and Aristotle agrees with
this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything
can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way
of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears
from the above (Q[4], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness,
whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one
goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] Out. Para. 1/2
THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is
imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as
is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and
infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is
not a body, as was shown above (Q[3], A[1]). Therefore it does not belong
to Him to be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is
finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way
as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is
this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is
not infinite in substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the
first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a
consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they
asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that
some infinite body was the first principle of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is
not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by
matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before
it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving
a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by
matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but
when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular
thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite;
therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something
imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form
is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and
hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by
matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal
of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]).
Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but
He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q[3], A[4]), it is
clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in
the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind
of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of
matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said
above, in this article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not
received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be
distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him.
Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very
fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from
every other whiteness existing in a subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that something else besides God can be essentially
infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now
if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite.
Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power
is known by its effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence.
Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the
universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things.
Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown
above (Q[3], A[8]). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something
besides God can be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys.
iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle.
Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not
absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it
is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus
its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as
existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many
accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite;
as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it
is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite
number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form,
it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are
absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms
are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is
the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such
kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But
because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own
being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a
determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to
be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence
it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite.
Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to
be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at
the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in
a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in
matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic
substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any
organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it
is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something
concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a
potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its
potentiality extends only to natural forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie
in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics
uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his
demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not
impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree
with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but
rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of
quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is
defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii.
But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since
therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to
diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity.
Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived
from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv.
But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite,
since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both
a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of
magnitude to be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to
a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in
magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence,
because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and
confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises
that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire
whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity
only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For
every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore
the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that
determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among
these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or
smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body
to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural
body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have
any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by
a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not
happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus
every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move
circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the
body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and
this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two
lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre,
the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite,
the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could
never occupy the place belonging to any other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form,
because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of
quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so
would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually
infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts
whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of
it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what
is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there
cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to
matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as
parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole
which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the
addition of magnitude, but only in division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively;
hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an
actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and
does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the
totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in
potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it
is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be
multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite
multitude actually to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be
made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an
infinite number of actual figures is possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each
other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be
many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for
others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an
actual infinite number of things is possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite
multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite
absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may
exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something
dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an
infinite medium.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in
the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely,
art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing
that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would
never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of
causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and
another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that
many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many
are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an
infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally
infinite multitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong
to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be
reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite;
for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for
there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or
accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything
created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no
agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a
certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite
multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite
multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the
division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater
number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found
potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the
infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of
being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at
once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another
multitude to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number.
Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not
all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the supposition of some things does not preclude
the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is
opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for
an actually infinite multitude to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] Out. Para. 1/1
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and
in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is in all things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all
things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm
(Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is
not in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not
contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is
not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog.
Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any
place."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its
action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action
can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary
that He should be in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for
there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor. 6:14).
Therefore God is not in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
all things, according to Is. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our
works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God
is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as
long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has
being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But
being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all
things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as
was shown above (Q[7], A[1]). Hence it must be that God is in all things,
and innermostly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His nature;
nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all
things; as was shown above in this article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in
that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those
things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God
is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to
corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as
they are contained by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at
a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of
God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from
Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be
distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He
is above all by the excellence of His own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and
also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to
be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the
addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in
their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is everywhere?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means
to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to
Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things,"
as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not
everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the
relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or
movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one
indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now
the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in
many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no
parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer. 23:24).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood
in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one thing is
said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place
are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in
a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and
this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them
being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it
existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch
as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body,
for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence
of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby
excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the
things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive
quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the
continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place,
or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement,
forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be
in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the
whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances,
like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of
indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as
touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself
to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is
in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part
is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are
called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called
parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity
is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity,
cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed
is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no
totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence
is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary
for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at
all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have
accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of
the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the
surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it
has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On
the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of
themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of
their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so
is God whole in all things and in each one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not
properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by
essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in
things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it
ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and
power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from
it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that
He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all
things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is
superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence
and power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so
He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said
that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He
present by His power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a
thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is
said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that
according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's
existence in things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation
is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul,
according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing
desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the
rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And
because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as
will be shown later (Q[12]). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 2/5
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by
his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said
to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly,
a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in
which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said
that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power;
but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a
contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that
God is in all things by His power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 3/5
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh
about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things
[*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (Job 22:14).
Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His
presence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 4/5
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that
He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others.
Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His
essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 5/5
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are
subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things
are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence,
inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by
the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but
by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the
cause of their being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its
sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this
article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by
essence and by presence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be
in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by
knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But
power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is
related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be
said to be present to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to substance,
renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore
only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There
is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union,
which will be treated of in its own place (TP).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For
the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere,
and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is
everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said
above (Q[3]). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is
constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21).
Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is
thus everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et
Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place
outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside
of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not
appear to belong to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole
in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if
there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and
thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it
sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees
as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the
entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is
everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call
the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always
is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts
in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as
what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it
primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not
to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it
does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on
some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing
that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be
everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere;
and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be
supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already
exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for
nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and
absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number
of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a
part of Him, but as to His very self.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed
everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist
in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in
each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is
primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not
primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to
its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that
other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but
according to its parts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere
primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be
taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the
act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true
that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same
way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or
exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act
passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood
according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding
from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees,
there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and
thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] Out. Para. 1/1
THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is altogether immutable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves
itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii,
20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place."
Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all
things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself;
therefore God is movable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these
are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to
you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in
any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that
it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because
everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in
part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as
to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of
composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Q[3], A[7]) that in
God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is
manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is
moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not
attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself
all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything
new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended
previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the
ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first
principle was immovable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said
that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement,
even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called
movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that
respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and
change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of
change and movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as
it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can
exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind
of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also
works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same
way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees
from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to
the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is
said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to
things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as
the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i)
expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation
comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically.
For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its
rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from
us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For
the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is
moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and
souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God
alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore
has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some
creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed
in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are
invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence
consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to
God alone to be immutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature
is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be
called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by
another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any
created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power
alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the
production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so
likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He
does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence;
hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced
to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as
it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in
themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in
themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power
of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are
producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence
to non-existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as
regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with
privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental
being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as,
for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can
therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident
to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then
the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence
the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for
example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is
not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the
whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable
as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence
in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds
of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created
substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are
incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a
twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and
in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good
to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place,
inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh
places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all
places, as was shown above (Q[8], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of
these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as regards
substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such
movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment of
immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be
subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them
their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as
they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject
of being, but because through them something has being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] Out. Para. 1/1
THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one
eternity?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole
and perfect possession of interminable life"?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De
Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and
perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is
a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this
does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the
word "interminable" ought not to be found.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But
duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life"
ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word
"existence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity
which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at
once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said,
"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (Micah
5:2); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery
hidden from eternity" (Rm. 16:25). Therefore eternity is not
omni-simultaneous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing,
therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a
kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of
compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means
of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and
"after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part
comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in
movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure
of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement,
which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the
idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement;
so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of
movement, consists the idea of eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there
is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable
can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal
is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being
simultaneously whole.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a
point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the
negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first
apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple
things except by removing the opposite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living;
and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the
protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to
being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but
because it is wanting in nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture
metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which
is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the
expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and
the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly;
therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we
use the word "possession."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is eternal?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not
measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before
eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord
shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (Ex.
15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since
it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But
words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of
time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as
God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal.
Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other
being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His
own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own
eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity
according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in
us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the
apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now"
standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity,"
this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates
His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For
God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that
"intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The Lord
shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as
another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond
eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind
of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is
said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to
mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the
movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would
still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not
called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of
measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind
alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God, because
His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered
through present, past and future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For
it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as
stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (Dan.
12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities.
Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay:
'everlasting'] fire" (Mt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many
necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and
all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal.
Therefore God is the only one eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Q[9],
A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they
share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way
of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it
standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal
in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are
in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the hills are called "eternal" and
we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (Dt. 33:15). Some again,
share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they
possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation;
like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards
that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have
eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they
may know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many
share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never
ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the
words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (Job 24:19).
Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to
the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in
this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the
eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not
follow that anything beside God is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether eternity differs from time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering
hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of
which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is
not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it,
it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing
from eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of
time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity
seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of
time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is
not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not
substantially different from time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of
every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of
the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of
the first being---that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the
measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured
by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever,
there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there
is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which
has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens
lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of
its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the
measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in
time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole,
but that time is not so.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity
were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when
we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and
eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the
whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time
corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and
the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in
aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise
the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity
remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity
is not the same as the "now" of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so
time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being
recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes
from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things
corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but
by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also
things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also
measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is
not actually in motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
The difference of aeviternity and time
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through
time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances.
Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after";
but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown
above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is
written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it
is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it is
the same as time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it
follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being,
having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal
things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to
be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as
to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it
follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible.
Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation
and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since "before" and
"after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has "before"
and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of
aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus
innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if
they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would
follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it
has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing
measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is clear
from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither
inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and
consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say
then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far
as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity.
Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is
subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured
by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things
corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch
as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or
potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being
of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have
changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an
unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards
choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections
and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by
aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that
is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change.
In this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such
at all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and
intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by
affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity;
whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not
eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there
is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental
change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken
in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which
apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of
time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something,
which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power.
Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence,
since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely
is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel
not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have
been, after he has been.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is
not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a
creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one aeviternity?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is
written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are
with Thee, O Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But some
aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies;
and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there
is not only one aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is
one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal
things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as
appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not
only one aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have
one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all
temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some
way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on
each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there
is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which
of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for
we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch
as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a
sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing
numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be
continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the
number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in
the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for
different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the
principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all
durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are
many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the
influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary
matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of
movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons,
however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle,
or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but
accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found
in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple,
all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that
movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to
other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing
measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one
separate measure many things can be measured.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in
a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of
them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances
proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual
substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one
order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that
there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first
degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say
that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured
by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of
all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first
aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the
first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown
later (Q[47], A[2]); we concede at present that there is only one
aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of
a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in
the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being,
and are thus measured by aeviternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless
there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by
time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of
the first, though all did not begin together.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[10] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that
the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the
rest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] Out. Para. 1/1
THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is
in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all
"genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of
number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something to
"being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to
it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore "one" is an
addition to "being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call
"being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call
being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not
an addition to "being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a
negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the very
reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple
or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and
potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are
divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that
the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that
everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is
the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into
contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one"
convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but
signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same
applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number
is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of
all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one"
which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of
"being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of
quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a
reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however,
is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance.
For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its substance, since
this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another
thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the
former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is
convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the
"one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being,"
belonging to the genus of quantity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is
divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number,
may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way
"one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided,
either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though
it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one
in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually,
and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in
parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"
accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and
divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in
idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one"
accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one"
in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and by "many";
as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude
itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way
contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that
"there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are
many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in
accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in
species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are
many in processions, are one in principle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is
"one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no
opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" is in
a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore
"one" is not opposed to "multitude."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But
"multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to
"multitude."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is
opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the
undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to
habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that
"one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it; whereas, on the
contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious
circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and
"many" are not opposed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility;
and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and
"many" are opposed to each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
"one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which is
number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the
idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by "one,"
as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being"
is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided is to the
thing divided.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing,
inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the
Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some
being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of
being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of
special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what
applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible
with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise
the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that
multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being
is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of
opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for
what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e.
actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is
non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way,
what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what
is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous,
composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of
dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of
parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water
is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of
its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting
in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house
is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind
of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the
multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of
not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as
they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so
far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by
the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense
it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess,
in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are
many but not in the second sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the
idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity,
not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For
we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a
point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line."
"Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not understand
divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we
attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of
"multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the definition of "one."
But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so
what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that
being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes
the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is one?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be
many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated
of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can
"one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it
imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot
apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one
Lord" (Dt. 6:4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one.
First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any
singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes
him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there
could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God
Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Q[3], A[3]). Therefore, in
the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it
therefore that many Gods should exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was
shown above (Q[4], A[2]) that God comprehends in Himself the whole
perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily
differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did
not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would
not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be
without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the
ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted
an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such
principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that
exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But
things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they
are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one
better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many
are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way
one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so "per se"
and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into
one order should be only one. And this one is God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped
many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were
gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds:
"Our God is one," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of
God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of number
belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and
abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is convertible with
being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its
being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the
mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and
remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should
not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and
infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is supremely one?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called
from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less.
Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is
actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a
thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore
God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is "one."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore
what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being is
essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every
being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any
other being is "one."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now
both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His
being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He
is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely
undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by
any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above
(Q[3], A[7]). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme
degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive
of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or
less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and
less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible,
either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or
supremely, "one."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not
supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence
neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be
supremely "one," because of the difference within it of accident and
subject, so neither can an accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[11] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every
such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of
some things is compound and of others simple.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to
consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning
which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own
natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to
see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all
things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God.
For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No man hath
seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor
archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is
increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is
infinite, as was shown above (Q[7], A[1]). Therefore in Himself He is
unknown.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For
what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now
God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
above all intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the
known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion
exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite
distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the
essence of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 2:2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself
supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be
knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the
intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which
is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess
of light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the
ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function,
which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created
intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude,
or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is
opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is
to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is
perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion
is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire
to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder
in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so
far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain
vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and
comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown
in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity
of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is
Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was
said above (Q[7], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist
at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is
His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at
all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is
not comprehended.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain
relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one
thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a
proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as
the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way
the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an
image?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the
created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He shall appear,
we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He
is" (1 Jn. 3:2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some
likeness of God is made in us."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as
sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as
sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is
seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some
similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to
see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but
is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is
not seen through a similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for
intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in
a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the
thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision
is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if
the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the
same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both
the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power,
and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective
power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is
some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect.
Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an
intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether
this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded
of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some
similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the
intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object
seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God
cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things,
the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the
essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can
the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly,
because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above
(Q[3], A[4]), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created
form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer.
Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in
itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the
created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any
created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some
aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing.
Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the
divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the
Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God,
however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine
essence itself as it really is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by
participation of the light of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other
intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the
intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is
informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created
intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act
by and of itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal
eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God,"
and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now
my eye seeth Thee."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes"
(namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of sight, not
so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of
eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures,
they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things."
Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God.
Therefore the glorified eye can see God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
etc. (Is. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the
imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a
vision of sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has
ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as
visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
shown later (Q[78]). Now act is proportional to the nature which
possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things.
For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q[3], A[1]). Hence He cannot
be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not
mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man
existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the
words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of the mind's eye,
as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in
the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened"
(Eph. 1:17,18).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This
appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have an
altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see
that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this, saying: "It is
very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven
and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present,
governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of
God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we
live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not
believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified
eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is
not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the
indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at
once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the
divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of,
and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes---viz. from the
perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory
infused into the body after its renovation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine
things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine
essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by
its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "An angel is a
pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole
beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen.
Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it
seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by
reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic
intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely
intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so
to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by
his own natural power, much more can he understand God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the
essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows
that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all.
But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A[1]). Therefore
it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine
essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
(Rm. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in
the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of
every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode
of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that
the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now the
mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in
this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting
natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own
existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called
angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being.
Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally,
forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter.
Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a
corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual
matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of
cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the
act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows
natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such
individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the
considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the
intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is
beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows
natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the
intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is
to the body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is
natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural
power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence,
forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created
intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites
Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely,
to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to
know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as
was shown above (A[2]). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know
the essence of God by his own power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken
to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have.
But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is
defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the
excellence which is in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be
raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect,
inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised
up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that
sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for
in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature;
whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows
concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in
matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and
it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect
of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature,
still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it
knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another.
Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of
apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by
way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to
know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the
essence of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created
light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in
sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen.
Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is
intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created
light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His
essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium.
Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a
light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature
would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore
it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light
in order to see the essence of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature,
must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example,
if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some
disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the
essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form
of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power
of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence
of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the
power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase
of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect,
as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of
illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Apoc.
21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the
blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made "deiform"---i.e.
like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn.
2:2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence of God,
not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself
intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the
same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light
is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium
actually transparent, and susceptible of color.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a
similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,
strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is
to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which
He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to
the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a
creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible.
But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in
this article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than
another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not
see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "We shall
see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen
by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly
by one and less perfectly by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One
person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another."
But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for
God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (A[3]
). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more
clearly than another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can
happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the
part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may
so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that
is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does
not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect
seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then
that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according
to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the
one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly;
and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as
their beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true
God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal
life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the
Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a
more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not
spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect
will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty
of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect
naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes
the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said
above, in the preceding article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light
of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater
charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he
who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will
be the more beatified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction
"as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so
that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall
see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the
mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that
the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's
existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than
another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does
not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the
object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz. the
essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the
object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of
the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty,
but the glorified faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God.
For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may by any
means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in
vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at an
uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others
also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
comprehend."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is
comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden
from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and
nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore
whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the
mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the
essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees
Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect
will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see
the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the
Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in
thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend
God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly
known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be
known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is
held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not
comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific
demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles,
he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable
opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to
comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect
mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created
intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine
intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus
appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God,
whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Q[7]) is infinitely
knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in
proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since
therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect
cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to
know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should
comprehend God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken
strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be
included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him
infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take
comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more largely
as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to
comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is
comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I
will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood
the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this
way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the soul,
responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to
charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or
possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they
are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy
what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because
such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and
quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they
see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to
see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate
fulfilment of desire.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him
is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of
being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable
reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either
the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as
perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his
definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is
seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when
its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of
a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge
of it is attained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that
the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the
object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's
essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely
knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the
knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a
probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself
does not know it as demonstrated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in
God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, who see Him
Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see
God see all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the
mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a
mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God,
sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the
least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are
less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand
all that God does, or can do.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all
things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its
natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not
be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know
all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior angels
are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are
ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this
knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of
God, does not know all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does
not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things
are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as
effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in
God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more
perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For
whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle
is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this
is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained
to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a
cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it
comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God
wholly, as shown above (A[7]). Therefore no created intellect in seeing
God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend
His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the
more, the more perfectly it sees God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,
namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all
things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things,
for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see
all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror
itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things else,
still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in
Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or
the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that
the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less
perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know
everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the
species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who
sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars,
their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the
created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things;
neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but
which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the
fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the
natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the
seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v):
"Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth
not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And
whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for
Thee alone."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen
through any similitude?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine
essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge
comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus
the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in
act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a
similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color.
Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence
understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing
the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the
Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered
many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: "I have
heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (2 Cor.
12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he
remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually
saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he
actually saw in it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God
not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their
intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the
one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are
like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty
can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is
assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a
similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when
informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the
knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its
likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the
knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their
likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their
own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in
God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two
kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are
known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself
not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to
the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to
what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in
which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from
those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images
of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and
the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms
the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we
can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus
Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine
essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the
divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see
the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by
this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are
seen in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the
same time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all
they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but
only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood; for God
is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in
Him at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves
the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence and
affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for
time means succession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see
all we know at one glance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at
the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all
at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But
our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the
same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different
shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one
idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are
understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is
understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one
idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown
above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own
similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are
seen simultaneously, and not successively.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one
idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know
things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding
according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at
the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For
Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see Him
face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see
now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor.
13:12).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth,
and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (Num.
12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to
see the essence of God in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we
judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all
things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that
what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I
ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in
the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De
Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things according to the divine
truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of
these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas;
which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable."
Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those
things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual
vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by
similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit.
xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it
follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen
by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being,
except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as
was said above (A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the
nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has
its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a
form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident
that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material
things. For it was shown above (AA[2],9) that the knowledge of God by
means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence
it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of
God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted
from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract
intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses
divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more
clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life
should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the
divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in
the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in
the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in
part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face,"
this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God.
And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God
seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained
(SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that
Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation,
above the ordinary state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does
supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some
living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His
own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the
teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will
be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things are
judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and
judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul
by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus
God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by
presence, essence and power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life.
For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple
form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Q[3], A[7]
). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without
the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who
is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and
evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God
belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye
of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by
the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:19), "That which is known of God,"
namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But
our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God;
because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as
their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power
of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But
because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led
from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of
Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is
not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not
removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He
superexceeds them all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what
it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His
effects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs
only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong
to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting
what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God
who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered
that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by
natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained
than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that
whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to
one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless
obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But
to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is," comes about also
by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by
natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural
reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the
knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is
impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round
about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God
more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But
faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.)
that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge."
Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from
them intelligible conceptions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion
of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human
imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better
than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in
prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are
divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the
Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father
was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mt. 3:17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot
know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown;
still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His
effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some
things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach,
as, for instance, that God is Three and One.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the images either received from sense in the natural
order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more
excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is
in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller
knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[12] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is
determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to
one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the
vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of
vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for
science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and
understanding of first principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] Out. Para. 1/2
THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or
equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by
nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a name can be given to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found
of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of
His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete
names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names
belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting
thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs
and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with
demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for
He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt,
so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as
relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles,
or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above (Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of
God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way
of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us
from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses
the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence
of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by
manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the
definition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above
being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about
God, and signify in word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we
attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the
knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is
perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete
subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows
that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must
have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names
given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as
that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that
whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we
attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete
names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds
of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect
does not know Him in this life as He is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the
"suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His
subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time.
For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of
compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by
way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to
compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to
God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can
only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns,
participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can
He be signified by relative pronouns.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies
not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses
some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of
holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and
praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus
the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished
according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the
procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names
applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it.
But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore
neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the
being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of
this kind signify the divine substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation
to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather
express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to
something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise,"
and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have
said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively,
nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion
from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him.
Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is
not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other
names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names
applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the
words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things;
and the same rule applies to other names.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names
more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of
bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if
the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of
good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body,
inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body
implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter.
Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be
said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is
secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of
the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly,
because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in
saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the
cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved
thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now
since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as
creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Q[4], A[2]) that God
prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself
simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and
is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him
not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling
principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some
kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent
the power of the sun. This was explained above (Q[4], A[3]), in treating
of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the
divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent
it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God
is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is,
"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a
more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good,
because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is,
forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is;
but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures
represent Him imperfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name is
derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as
for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it
hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that
which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body;
otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers
to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no place in
English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed
from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions
of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although
in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God
according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are
not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God
lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the
principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although
it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or
signified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He
really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in
the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify
Him in that manner only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names
which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above
(A[1]). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as
when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are
applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it
should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as
"good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given
to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none
of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical
sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind
of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and
composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are
applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which
express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are
applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some
which are said of Him in their literal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God
is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which
perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our
intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends
them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to
God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and
the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified
by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they
belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards
their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to
God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are some names which signify these perfections
flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very
signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being,
and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical
sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely,
without any such mode of participation being part of their signification
as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can
be literally applied to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God
for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the
ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence
Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply
corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names.
For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these
names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the
goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore
these names are entirely synonymous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing
in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which
no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are
many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain
notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one
than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one.
Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and
thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus
they are synonymous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is
Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would
be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or
to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow
that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of
God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what
was said above (A[2]), that these names signify the divine substance,
although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said
(AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the
name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the
name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to
understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing
from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and
simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and
multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures,
there corresponds one simple principle represented by different
perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the
various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds
one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,
imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God
signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and
different aspects, they are not synonymous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms
signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different
aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing;
because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the
intellectual conception, as was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for
there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them
in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold
and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it
comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because
our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent
Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of
them?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are
univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many
are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the
barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some
agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the
sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first
agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and
thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore
as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of
Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems
that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God
is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with
creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same
name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name
belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for
instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is
said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from
each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are
not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated
univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be
applied to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the
sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in
all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article,
all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist
in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a
creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other
perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we
signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from
his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His
essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to
man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified;
whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the
thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of
the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the
same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence
no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a
purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it
follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about
God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of
equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many
things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible
things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are
made" (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of
God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are
proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine
and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the
former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is
proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal,
since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way
some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a
purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only
from creatures (A[1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is
said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and
cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this
mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple
univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one
and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term
which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to
some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of
animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same
health.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to
univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the
whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of
all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause
of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it
is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this
individual which it places under the species by way of participation.
Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal
agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But
this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not
altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness,
but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal
predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical
predication, which is being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it
does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q[4], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured;
hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same
genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not
prove that they are predicated equivocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather
than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since
"names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know
creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are
predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are
applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De
Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is
applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of
animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore
these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather
than to creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all
are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this
one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that
expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the
definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others
according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for
instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of
"healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause
of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which
is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign
of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are
applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of
God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling"
applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its
flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate
likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God
manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that
applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what
is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a
metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God
as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is
good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's
goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its
meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to
creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A[2]), these names
are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the
words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of
wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way.
Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied
primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow
from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they
are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above
(A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other
names, as said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied
to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy"
is applied to medicine.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God
temporally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not
predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine
substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that
this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and
"Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the
divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are
not applied to God temporally, but eternally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God
temporally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying
relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply
relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation
of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved
the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an
everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying
relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from
eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that
relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot
be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would
be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and
nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be
something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is
above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance
lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of
lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is
not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature,
one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without
the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative
things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in
nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature
even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord"
and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied
to God temporally, and not from eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Body Para. 2/5
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the
very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual
order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of
reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason
apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a
certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations
between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending
"non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon
an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Body Para. 3/5
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half,
and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies
to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the
movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Body Para. 4/5
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to
sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are
realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and
intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation
exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the
sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves
are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to
science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends
them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch
as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them.
Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless
it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not
really in the column, but in the animal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] Body Para. 5/5
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no
real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as
creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these
names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God
temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the
change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without
change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative
habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and
the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse].
But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain
habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that
has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental
[secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine
names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord,"
and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly,
in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion
presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the
divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God,
which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far
as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as
signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in
our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in
idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art
become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the
operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action
of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those
following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking
to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour,"
"Creator," and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God
temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in
creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated
from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite
relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the
sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the
creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that
the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to
it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that
the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is
real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but
in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the
creature is subject to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[7] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or
otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which
they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in
its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by
nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in
its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous
by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object
knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or
as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists
before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is
simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such
unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still
because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice
versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous
by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so called from the
{theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the
{aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice;
or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these
names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His
operation and not His nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine
nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the
divine nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are
not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties
and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its
property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for
instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is
not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance.
The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat,
cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as
regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His
universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend
to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and
goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to
signify the divine nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the
source of the signification of the name "God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of
its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know
what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies
the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone,
by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the
definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we
cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but
only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as
stated above (Q[12], A[12]). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine
nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all
things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for
those who name God intend to signify all this.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "God" is communicable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever
shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But
this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to
others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most
great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made
partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pt. 1:4). Therefore this name "God"
can be communicated to others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name
"God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the
fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are
gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But
other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable;
as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is
communicable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore
this name "God" is incommunicable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically.
To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider
that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is
individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human
nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of
the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the
nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by
abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in
many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea
of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,
from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence
every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both
in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot
be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any
individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of
similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles"
metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties
of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are
individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as
being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could
not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way
of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to
understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand
them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in
the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature
existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same
rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things
as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as
stated above (A[8]), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as
shown above (Q[11], A[3]), it follows that this name "God" is
incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same
way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of
those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served
them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, "Gods not
in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is
communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by
way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by
likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to
His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something,"
that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps
the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to
the sun as signifying this individual thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the
participation of some similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper
name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God
Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not
follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it
is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of
the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from
the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify
the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves
absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But
this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we
experience continually, to signify the divine nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by
participation, and according to opinion?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by
nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse
signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and
negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is
God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the
enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in
truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed
happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name "God" is
applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea.
Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name
God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen
understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore this name
"God" is applied univocally to both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in
the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a
true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name
"God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied
equivocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does
not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not
signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true
Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is
not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God
according to opinion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is
taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing,
but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a
word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the
same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is
applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of being as applied to
"accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition
of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of
health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by
participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true
God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand
and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that
the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the
other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the
predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man,"
of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated
in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to
signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this
name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same
name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic
saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is
God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For
when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning
God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics
sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of
the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from
its various significations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal
is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a
large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is
predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally
of different predicaments.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[10] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God
as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of
causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q[12], A[12]). So a pagan can take
this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the
Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite
ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps,
as we use names the meaning of which we know not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of
God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO
IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
the most proper name of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good
excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially
belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore
this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures,
for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS
imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
the most applicable to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should
say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (Ex.
3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for
three reasons:
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Body Para. 2/4
First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but
simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence
itself, which can be said of no other (Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that
among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is
denominated by its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Body Para. 3/4
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either
less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at
least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now
our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it
is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it
understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in
Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more
universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to
God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the
principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself,
it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of
substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined,
whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is
indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of
substance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] Body Para. 4/4
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence;
and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not
past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than
this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards
the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as
regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper,
as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is
the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself,
incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as
He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely
comes before the idea of cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should import
relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some
perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is
existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about
God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are
true; but affirmations are vague."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot
be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]
): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an
affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an
affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing
otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as
shown above (Q[3], A[7]). Therefore since every affirmative intellect
understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative
proposition about God cannot be made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is
omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To
prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the
predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality,
and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in
propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have
an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the
same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing,
and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an
animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the
same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is
called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called
man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to
"suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one
same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies,
inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the
subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of
the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that
"predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this
diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject,
while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the
composition itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,
yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot
see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him
under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object
corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and
subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents
the unity by composition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague
or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name
can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as
they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things
in which there is something taken as subject and something that is
inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and
attributes something else to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[13] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything
otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly
as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the
part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands.
Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and
the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is
otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present
case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does
not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as
referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the
mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the
thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it
understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding
is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself,
it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite
manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus
our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] Out. Para. 1/2
OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to
treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent,
and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat
first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the
intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of
the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to
the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after
treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood.
Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as
existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration
of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?
(2) Whether God understands Himself?
(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?
(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?
(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?
(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?
(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?
(12) Whether He knows the infinite?
(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?
(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?
(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a
habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between
potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of
knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles.
But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God
there is no universal or particular (Q[3], A[5]). Therefore in God there
is not knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the
wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rm. 11:33).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove
this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from
non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form;
whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form
of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower.
Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more
contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a
greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima
iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of
the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Q[7], A[1])
forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to
a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a
thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of
immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii
that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is
cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the
intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from
matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in
the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q[7], A[1]), it
follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in
a higher state in God Himself (Q[4], A[2]), whenever a name taken from
any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its
signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to
creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but
substance and pure act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in
God simply and unitedly (Q[13], A[4]). Now man has different kinds of
knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has
"intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science"
as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he
knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he
knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of
knowledge, as will be shown (A[7]). Hence the simple knowledge of God can
be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be
removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication,
everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses
perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is
wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows;
for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower.
Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of
creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of
created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or
potential, or existing according to any such mode.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God understands Himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by
the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence,
returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His
own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own
essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of
assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection
of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by
itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own
likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we
are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi).
But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other
things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself
only so far perchance as He understands other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "The things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof
it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external
effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists
outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the
operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the
operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is
actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the sensible in
act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act."
For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our
intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible
species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is
distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in
potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act,
His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither
is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect
when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ
from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our
intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species
itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself
through Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists
in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it
existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to
itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive
faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not
know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those
cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is
said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it
supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this
mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to
understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De
Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of
something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act,
existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the
intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to
it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality;
because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ
from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the
intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and
makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On
the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is
not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto,
but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter,
which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our
passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as
primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as
regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning
intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible
species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an
intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest
that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act
of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God
is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of
intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God comprehends Himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as
regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not
comprehend Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself,
it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it
is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then
God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid
down above (Q[7], A[1]). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that
"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God
understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved.
A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it
is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it
is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended
when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some
probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly
as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the
mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is
in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph.
ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in
existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all
matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA[1],2).
Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable;
and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one
thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything
comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But
God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His
intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and
included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of
negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not
contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be
comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from
Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is
comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be
understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He
has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite
has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite
to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something
finite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something
proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not
His substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to
understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and
but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of
understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our
act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be
something great.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding
something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not
distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He
understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's
intellect is not His substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the
same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's
existence is His substance, as shown above (Q[3], A[4]). Therefore the
act of God's intellect is His substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His
substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance,
then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the
act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance
would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether
impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of
the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down
above (A[2]), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic;
for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as
existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence
follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the
intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something
other than His existence, as shown above (Q[3]). Hence as His essence
itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His
act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the
object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of
understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be
understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the
operator, but remaining in him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is
understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our
act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the
divine understanding which is subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine
understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not
another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God knows things other than Himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all
other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri.
Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself."
Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who
understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself,
something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He;
which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the
intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the
intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood.
But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands
anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something
else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand
things other than Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "All things are naked and open to His
eyes" (Heb. 4:13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it
is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of
understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of
necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything
can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since
therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that
it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the
aforesaid (Q[2], A[3]), God must necessarily know things other than
Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every
existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of
understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first
cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him
according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is
in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must
consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A
thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate
to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a
man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains
it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or
when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any
other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself
through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in
Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other
than Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees
nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw
nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He
does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one
understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which
it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De
Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those
things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the
essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does
not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other
than the divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood
in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things
are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object,
inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual
operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its
principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual
operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the
intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing
understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all
images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the
divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything
else than the divine essence itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by
proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A[5]), God knows things other than
Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as
in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their
first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by
proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general,
and not by proper knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But
the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above
(Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the
divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He
does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it
is," which is to have proper knowledge of it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its
proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that
He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be
the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a
proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things
otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general
knowledge of them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to
the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither
is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For
as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as
they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being,
knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are
beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when
it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and
confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as
proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i.
If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is
only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding
would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be
perfect; and this is against what was said above (Q[4], A[1]). We must
therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper
knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far
as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe
that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring
forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself,
it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew
itself, it would know all colors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards
universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that
multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as
regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards
that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused
by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous
medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is
caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of
diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper
knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise.
For it was shown above (Q[4], A[2]) that whatever perfection exists in
any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling
manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to
their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other;
as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are
distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the
non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in
its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God,
not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what
distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all
perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other
essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to
numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as
perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six,
a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is
manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in
general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a
man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number
six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know
in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to
each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine
perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He
knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others.
Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew
all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with
proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be
understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of
knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false.
For the knower does not always know the object known according to the
existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone
according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the
stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its
existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the
object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower,
the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence
outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the
intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that
it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own
nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode (of
knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only
the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for
the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is
the mode of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own
nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God as
the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot
sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather
the converse.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the
ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures.
Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to
the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate
it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the
knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the
Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many
things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a
time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown
above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but
discourses from one to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its
cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known)
through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it.
But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go
discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the
same applies to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all
things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof
of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion:
one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood
anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other
mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles
we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion
cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession
if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see
them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the
whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in
one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together,
and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be
applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes
the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions
does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to
proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the
first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known
not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning
is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the
effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God
sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not
discursive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Altogether there is only one act of understanding in
itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as
shown above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were
previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and
hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes
themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that
the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the
created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not
discursive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.
For Origen says, on Rm. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified,"
etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but
because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it
exists."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge
of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of
things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its
measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and
measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the
cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,
does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows
them, therefore they are."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the
knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer
is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the
cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer
works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the
principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless,
we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to
which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as
it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form
does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one
who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect,
which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form
has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates
to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were
determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect,
since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must
be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the
knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge
of approbation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to
which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to
it, as is said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because
they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are
in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity
of things is the cause why God knows them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as
things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in
the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it
does not follow that creatures are eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and
our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God
is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge
are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God
is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance,
a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and
the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the
house already built.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For
the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are
convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that
are not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the
thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to
God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by
Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that
is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are
not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that
are not as those that are" (Rm. 4:17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now
it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a
certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things
which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a
creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of
thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever.
Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as
also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are
not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of
things that are not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those
things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act
now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these
with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which
is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without
succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends
over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects
present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the
creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as
regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple
intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have
distinct being outside the seer.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they
are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as
such they are known by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it
participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it
participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God,
although they are not in act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of
things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was,
or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or
permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be,
but that they be possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God knows evil things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher
(De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does
not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine
says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in
potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2]
), it seems that God does not know evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known,
or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil,
nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by
its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is
clear from the foregoing (A[5]). Now the divine essence neither is the
likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence
there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God
does not know evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is
imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must
be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely,
through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for
the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction are
before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can
be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption
by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things
perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in
the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that
it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He
knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of
darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning
that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation
by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said
previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by
privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are
in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they
actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is
thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore
knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite
good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the
cause of the good whereby evil is known.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which
is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He
knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[10] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to
imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the
privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except
by good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God knows singular things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine
intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human
intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things;
but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with
universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know
singular things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which
receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God
things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.
Therefore God does not know singular things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some
likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are
singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is
matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike
God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man are
open to His eyes."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in
creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing (Q[4], A[2]). Now to know singular things is part of our
perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to
God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii)
that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the
perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and
unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and
immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things,
nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Body Para. 2/4
Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular
things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing,
that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of
an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and
can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not
enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms
and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not
individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates
because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because
of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this
particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know
singular things in their singularity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Body Para. 3/4
On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will
not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he
first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason
of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above (A[8]), His knowledge extends as
far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends
not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to
matter, as we shall prove further on (Q[44], A[2]), the knowledge of God
must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For
since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the
likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the
sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the
universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the
knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and
not only of the form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the
individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on
that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the
intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle
of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether
principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it
God knows not only universal, but also singular things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its
being has no material conditions like the images received in the
imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and
material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from
likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it
retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can know infinite things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite,
as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who
measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii)
that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the
comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary.
Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite
in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the
infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is
traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable
either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi.
Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the
infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which
is infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known.
But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured.
Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot
number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
knowledge has no bounds."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things
possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A[9]), and as
these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things.
Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that
are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we
do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement
will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet,
if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite
things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts
and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as
rational creatures go on for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of
every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle
of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one
individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But
the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as
regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite
particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a
certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each
other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason
is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of
man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the
species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine
intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or
can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards
the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that
the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from
each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of
parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the
infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot
be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always
remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or
infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all
things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (A[7]). Hence
there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence
it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the
infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said
to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it
is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the
infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the
knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not
quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure;
but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything
has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the
knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted,
however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an
infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an
infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that
these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being
would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be
measurable as regards the knowledge of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent
things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the
knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (A[8]).
Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be
necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is
absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For
the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion:
and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as
is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If
God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God
is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is
absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified
as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore
whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of
contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because
even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the
knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent
things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known
by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts
of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men.
Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will.
Therefore God knows future contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since as was shown above (A[9]), God knows all things;
not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and
since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God
knows future contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act:
and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither
is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms,
but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the
object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when
I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing
can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered
as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch
as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense
a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence,
whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a
conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only
as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in
their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His
knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity
being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Q[10], A[2]
). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity,
not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some
say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as
they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent
things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the
divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent
things in relation to their own causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be
contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the
germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on
account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is
the first cause, is necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to
be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is
past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not
remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future,
must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the
other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a
compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent,
"Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we
say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here
only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the
proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the
necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or
false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I
said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the
consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But
this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its
antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent
effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will
grow."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken
not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a
thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul.
For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this
is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not
as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will
be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine
knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary,
as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be
necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively
in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence
to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent
things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding
is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not
see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a
height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us
must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent
in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be
necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine
knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their
own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must
necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the
thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and
false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If
understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is,
"This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with
regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It
is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the
saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can
become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be
true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this
distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be
white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is
inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known.
This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known"
implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an
act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in
itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so
far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is
attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch
as it is known.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God knows enunciable things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know
enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides.
But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does
not know enunciable things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness.
But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is
altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men.
Therefore God knows enunciable things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that
of creatures, as said above (A[9]), it follows of necessity that God
knows all enunciations that can be formed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] Body Para. 2/2
Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things
simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of
enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or
division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence,
by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact
that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be
predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which
discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible
species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another.
Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand
other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one,
according to a certain succession. On this account the things we
understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or
division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things.
Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things,
and also whatever can be accidental to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things
after the manner of enunciable things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a
thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is
related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the
creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the
variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable
according to the variation of creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make
more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His
knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know
now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the
future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the
knowledge of God is variable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow
of alteration" (James 1:17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear
from the foregoing (A[4]), just as His substance is altogether immutable,
as shown above (Q[9], A[1]), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether
invariable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to
creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God
imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because
everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who
understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while
they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator"
and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are
understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in
themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously,
according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and
the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood
to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence
from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow
that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the
knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things
which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows
some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be
which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather
that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed
which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His
knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or
can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore
from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that
it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God
can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that
first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[15] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to
say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same
thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ.
Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows;
because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as
that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because
the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of
enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is
true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher
lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates
sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore,
it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew
He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this,
it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is
without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same
thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation
in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is
sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would
be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by
composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge
varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either
as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change
we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as
if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that
he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For
the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above (A[8]). But
speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore
the knowledge of God is not speculative.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things;
which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of
God is not speculative.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in
three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for
instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and
considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable;
for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the
resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles.
Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its
end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For
the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas
the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence
if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this
to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be
only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it
concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by
reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which
is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is
simply practical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Body Para. 2/3
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But
of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He
has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know
speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much
more perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] Body Para. 3/3
Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has
not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical
from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some
period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not
operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good
things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also
sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch
as he cures them by his art.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself,
but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things
that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of
others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are
never made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does
not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in
so far as it is human.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[14] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect
knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so
far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in
every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as
such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this
does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as
He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself
speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he
possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] Out. Para. 1/1
OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)
After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are ideas?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing
else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no
ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already
said (Q[14], A[5]). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither
therefore other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge
and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing
and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is
the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are
understood."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For
the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood
the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the
form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of
two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form,
or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the
forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either
case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any
generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form,
except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may
happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made
pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their
nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in
other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to
intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the
likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may
be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his
house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not
made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later
(Q[46], A[1]), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness
of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God does not understand things according to an idea
existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion
of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence,
yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of
Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other
things; though not with respect to Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His
essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ideas are many?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His
essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating,
so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms.
Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to
their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary
that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but
creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in
God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity,
the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied
only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it
follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of
Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i,
10), who says, in God all things are one, except "ingenerability,
generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas
are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things,
they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing
always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence.
Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet
we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or
decay, and all that actually does so."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof
of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is
the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is
the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in
things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher
clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is
properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a
succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that
God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the
second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was
produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first
created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was
created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of
the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole,
unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is
made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has
the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the
divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine
says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God
according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the
divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not
repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a
work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not
as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the
intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder,
is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the
house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine
mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its
simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images.
Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as
can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He
knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be
known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by
creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has
its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree
in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His
essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the
particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards
other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular
types of things and these are many ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is
that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or
that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are
understood through the self-same essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands;
but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many
things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but
also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the
several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to
understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter.
But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from
the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby
understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God
understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He
understands many things by His essence. And this means that He
understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His
intellect as understood by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused
not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its
own essence with these things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things,
but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the
Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He
knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that
evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are
not ideas of all things that God knows.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have
been, as has been said above (A[9]). But of such things there are no
ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will
are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are
not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea,
since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also
genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these,
according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of
all things known by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of
all things known by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative
knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything
made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it
has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be
in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type,
in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through
the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far
as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things
which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to
these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar"
but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not
created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause
with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though
not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the
idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be
known.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[15] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in
so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in
some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably
accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their
subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special
idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the
accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded
to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing,
are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to
Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular
things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be
uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of
nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them
the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not
merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q[22], A[3]
).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] Out. Para. 1/1
OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of
the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but
rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition
of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones
hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are
not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it
appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it
would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it.
Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then,
that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then,
truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as
it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who
said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual
contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same
time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more
so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the
fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or
false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth
resides rather in things than in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any
knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is
in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards
the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the
object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the
intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is
related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from
the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called
good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so
far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true
must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also
the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation
to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an
intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially
to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but
accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say
that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect,
but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are
said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect.
In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they
express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a
stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone,
according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth
resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according
as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently
there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and
Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and
this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the
truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have
Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme
likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition
(De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for
that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's
definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of
the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that
"Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under
either aspect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and
excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for
what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural
things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance.
But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were
compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect.
From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the
Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say
that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing,
yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more
than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the
animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of
health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of
the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence
the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that
a thing is, not because a thing is true."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as
the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so
is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and
division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a
thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the
equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to
complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple
things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is.
Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and
dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is
to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has
the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison
which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends
concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the
intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing
"what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to
the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and
expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every
proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by
the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows
that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it
knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth.
This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth
therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing
is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the
knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the
intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides
in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in
the intellect knowing "what a thing is."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
And thus the Objections given are solved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For
the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (A[1]); but being
is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for
it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the
true and being are not convertible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority
and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be
prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of
the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is
related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far
is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in
some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good
adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said
before (A[1]). But the true that is in things is convertible with being
as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to
the nature of truth, as has been said already (A[1]). It may, however, be
said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the
true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth
and being differ in idea.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known;
yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the
true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being,
apprehended, that is, by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except
under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the
one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of
the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other
way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of
the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be
apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is
included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the
intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless
being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its
intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is
true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether good is logically prior to the true?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is
more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the
good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good,
namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above (A[2]). But that which is in things
is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically
prior to the true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic.
iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib.
Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is
prior to the true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true
is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics.
Therefore the true is prior to good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while
the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way
perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards
knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in
idea to the good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another:
for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect
to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will,
are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely.
Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal,
and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible
things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a
kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things
desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the
intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly,
it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that
it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second,
and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general,
but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed
and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a
particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he
is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth
exists in other things (A[1]). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in
man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we
cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is truth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and
division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is
a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a
principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first
cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and
His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God,
all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore
this will be from God; which is evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"
(Jn. 14:6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As said above (A[1]), truth is found in the intellect
according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as
they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest
degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His
intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of
understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every
other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that
He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges
of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in
His intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity
with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives
knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with
their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said,
properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is
appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine
truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative
must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of
Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can
be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
dissimilar to His intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but
only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the
intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely
from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from
God", is a fallacy of Accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all
things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is
greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the
mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in
fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its
own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other
truth but God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation
of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But
there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only
one truth, by which all things are true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one,
and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that
when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in
each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each
species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things
analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper
nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is
predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only
in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called
healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called
healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither
in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the
one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (A[1]) that
truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things,
according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we
speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper
nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even
in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known.
Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children
of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a
mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if
we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one
primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own
entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet
the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all
things are said to be true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of
truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in
the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the
understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater
than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our
intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree,
in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be
greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater
than the rational soul, except God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are
said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether created truth is eternal?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle,
and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a
created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are
always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth,
which is the most universal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was
to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the
present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the
future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But
the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth
had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not,
and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it
began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it
follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true
that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Q[10], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself:
but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth,
according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of
any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine
is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of
an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said
that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no
intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the
divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it
follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth
of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three
make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood
in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to
all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and
always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any
place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has
one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner
all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as
universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however,
follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one
exists that is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was;
because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were
removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is
alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what
now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the
sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth
of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a
beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say
that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect,
wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth
did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is
now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For
this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of
itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true
to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being
as preceding its being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth is immutable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib.
Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise
truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary
matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all
generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after
every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore
truth is immutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes
mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For
truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in
so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning
it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine
mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same
signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the
proposition in no way changes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect.
But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions,
"Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same.
But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of
these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any
other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect,
as said before (A[1]); but things are called true in virtue of the truth
residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in
its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in
two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two
extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect,
from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in
itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed,
but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to
false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no
alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape,
in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear
from what has been said before (Q[14], A[15]). Hence the truth of the
divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable;
not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our
intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called
mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to
which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
immutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so
far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys.
i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because
that truth does not remain which was before.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said
to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the
design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth
in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect,
which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this
disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth
of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is
true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so
far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of
signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates
rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[16] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of
the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates
sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results,
varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning
present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the
three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] Out. Para. 1/1
CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether falsity exists in things?
(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether falsity exists in things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine
says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be
concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to
the contrary."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things
do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show
nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the
divine intellect, as stated above (Q[16]). But everything, in so far as
it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture
of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity."
But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore
in all things falsity exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to
it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per
se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect,
to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the
divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial
things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they
fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce
a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place
in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps
in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to
withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil
of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the
Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love vanity,
and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are
called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine
intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light"
(Jn. 3:21).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be
false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say
that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true
tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be
called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a
thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to
be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate
in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes
its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external
accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things
other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things;
thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this,
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear
to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,
34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as
they are not, or what they are not." In this way a man is called false as
delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent
them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called
false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in
respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence,
"The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As,
therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things
that are is found a degree of falseness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident.
For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things
which they actually are not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as
it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to
be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the
resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any
one case, but in the majority of instances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is falsity in the senses?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity
is not in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is
not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false,
but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to
the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the
senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth
is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses
know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as
said above (Q[16], A[2]), and this takes place through the senses
apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists
in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be
otherwise than they really are.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence
of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in
the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own
nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other
sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not
primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other
sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither
primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is
the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to
the colored object to be a man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except
accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does
not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects
because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the
agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy
tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of
sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a
false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but
accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from
the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not
deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation.
Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object,
it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus
we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of
sensation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is
not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is
said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false."
Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness
of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the
likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from
such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph.
v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch
as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as
in that which knows the true and the false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether falsity is in the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in
which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in
so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in
the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the
intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there
is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But
such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist
in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence,
as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by
their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities,
even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so
the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the
likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something
consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said
(A[2]) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about
common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental
objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness
of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence
of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a
thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and
denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of
which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon
it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as
regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or
accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as
before mentioned regarding truth (Q[16], A[2]), that falsity can exist in
the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that
knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not
exist as known, as stated above (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with
the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in
that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing,
in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can
take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one
thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man.
Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another
way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For
thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself.
A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this
kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some
reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason
the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it
is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the
intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it
to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in
demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's
words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that
wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever
deceived in any operation of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intellect is always right as regards first principles;
since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not
deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are
known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the
predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether true and false are contraries?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and
false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is
and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and
false are not contrary things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity
is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian
would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore
true and false are not contraries.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary
to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But
falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie,
"They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as
a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false
opinion is contrary to a true one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as
some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be
considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any
subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance
not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it
determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in
Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose
nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and
determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity
asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it
is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate
apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is
clear that true and false are contraries.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is
apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To
apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God
is good," is, "God is not good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to
it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but
in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true
and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every
privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is
founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are
by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing
contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His
goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false.
But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion
concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed
to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is
contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] Out. Para. 1/1
THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the
divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About
this, four points of inquiry arise:
(1) To whom does it belong to live?
(2) What is life?
(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?
(4) Whether all things in God are life?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the
Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life
possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things
participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves
a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is
naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay,
as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural
bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that
all natural bodies live.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less
perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters."
Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of
life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is
life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants.
Therefore they have not life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it
does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis
i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish
living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which
animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested
first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it
begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so
long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement
of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to
fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things
are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement,
whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect
being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement
in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as
understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are
said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of
any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot
be called living, unless by a similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of
the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the
movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life,
as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not
attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is
in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart,
whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural
movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the
operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one
animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as
some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of
all natural bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not
belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural
conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the
place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants
and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the
disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by
receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far
do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are
moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form,
or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move
themselves, as do living bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous current:
for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing
source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a
similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them
look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real
sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the
cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of
other heavy and light bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether life is an operation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except
into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations,
as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes
four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and
understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the
contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the
active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is
clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, "Now this is eternal life, that they
may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living
things, to live is to be."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q[17], A[3]), our
intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper
object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are
external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the
knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in
accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already
been said (Q[13], A[1]), so from external properties names are often
imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken
strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is
their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the
properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the
word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of
their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of
quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain
external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify
this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application
of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live,
accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and
life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
denotes "to run" in the abstract.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.
Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from
which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)
that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation
of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and
the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the
existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live
is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable
of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the
four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds
of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more
than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and
generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case
of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further
power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as
quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher
faculty of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles are
within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such
operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such
natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but
something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a
second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations
become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in
which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent
in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the
life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence,
others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is
distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life
eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether life is properly attributed to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things
are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated
(A[2]). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4)
that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God
has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist
among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal
things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof
of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so
far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more
perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life
of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is
found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal
agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so
through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of
the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action.
Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any
form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the
executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the
action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are
plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with
regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only
with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form,
the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this
kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally
implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is
their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as
have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of
expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of
plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to
recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from
themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement.
Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form
that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of
themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement;
for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct
they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence
such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves
propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and
intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end
and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect
degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of
self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and
the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and
these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we
see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the
art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only
concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and
the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to
some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its
very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined
by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and
hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes
(Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life
most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always
in act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of
one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense
and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action
is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved;
whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because
movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far
as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this
similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of
this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the
imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is
an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De
Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is
movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in
this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the
sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is
He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of
life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible
nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to
preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below
apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with
incorruptible natures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things are life in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said
(Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in
God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things
modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have
life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that
things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be
false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by
God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be
made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by
Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are
life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was
life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are
life in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated (A[3]).
In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are
one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very
living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been
made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things
in Him are the divine life itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one
way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power;
even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures
are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In
this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In
Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are
themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God,
as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their
proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence.
Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the
divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing
in God in this manner are not movement, but life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the
form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another
kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the
form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and
intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind,
material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not
existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine
existence in that mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things,
then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine
mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in
fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man
as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter
enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things
have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves,
because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a
created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for
example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine
mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as
existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being
in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a
house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former
is actual, the latter only potential.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being
comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known
by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad
things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called
life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as
they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle
of operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] Out. Para. 1/1
THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to
His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to
His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine
will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is will in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is
the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore
there is not will in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is
directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be
imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the
will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and
Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not
will in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 12:2): "That you may prove what
is the will of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by
their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible
form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that
when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at
rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a
natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called
natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude
as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when
possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which
pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will,
just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there
must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His
intellect is His own existence, so is His will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself
is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His
essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q[6], A[3]): for
the end has the aspect of good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although
named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does
not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does
possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good
which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His
essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside
itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is
His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His
essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in
the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This
is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For
the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is
impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing
beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies
His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number
of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from
Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and
consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible.
Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (A[1]).
For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own
proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest
therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far
as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect
and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of
the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed;
and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all
perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things,
in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much
more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its
own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself
to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things
as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that
other things should be partakers therein.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet
they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding
them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said
(Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other
object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore,
although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things
apart from Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason
for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as
most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He
who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than
health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes
a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the
sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills
things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own
goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except
His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by
understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by
willing His own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine
will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but
rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too,
the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very
knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in
the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing
the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He
wills, He wills necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He
wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for
God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as
above shown (Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever
He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as
stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible
not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not
necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to
will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will.
And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things,
and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the
other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or
the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in
Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to
anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another;
and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the
divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the
counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not
will necessarily whatever He wills.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be
absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely
necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely,
though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he
must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things
willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute
necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will
has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper
object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our
own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary
relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to
color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart
from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their
end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce
to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them;
as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to
cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the
end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on
foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other
means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without
other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it
follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely
necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He
wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot
change.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He
wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
supposition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does
not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can
exist without other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those other things
that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or
contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to
an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause.
Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent
events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in
the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way,
that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does
not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to
the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God
can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by
some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary,
determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the
divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a
necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing
willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist
in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in
themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch
as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in
themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God
knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily
whatever He wills.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so,
thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by
its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His
essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will.
Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such"
a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause
of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a
house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the
cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things
is the knowledge of God, as said before (Q[14], A[8]). Therefore the will
of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure, if
Thou wouldst not?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things;
and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a
necessity of His nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means
predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite
movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the
intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by
nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by
intellect and will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which
the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates
in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the
nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as
long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that
nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the
Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection
of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless
He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that
this is impossible has been already shown (Q[7], A[2]). He does not,
therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects
proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination
of His will and intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects
pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the
Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the
mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode.
Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His
inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to
the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude
election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things,
but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from
the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the
mode of intellect and will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore,
"Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the
reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is
knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and
will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is
not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the
will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation.
But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the
immediate principle of operation. But in God all these things are one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made
all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of
operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some
cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose
will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by
the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all
things, as has been already shown (A[4]). If, then, there is no cause of
His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the
divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks
to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we
must assign some cause to the divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause,
depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause,
it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no
other cause. But this also is not admissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which
we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there
is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is
a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case
with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion
are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss
is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive
the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the
other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion
would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot
be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would
understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the
same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same
relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion
with regard to the understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one
act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all
things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not
the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect
in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing
the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore,
He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account
of that.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to
God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on
account of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes,
for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to
seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be
unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as
dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute
contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the
cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects
that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of
God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the
divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to
have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he
might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for
the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other
created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of
God; but the others on the order of other causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and to
come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore
the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of
the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good.
But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not
exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent
according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with
formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall
short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form.
For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being,
yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active
causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active
cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all
particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its
effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause,
which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an
effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in
corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is
hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in
corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be
referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the
first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all
things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its
effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin
falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back
into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be
saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed.
sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are
saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but
because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29),
they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent
will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will
itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the
things willed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional
circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may
be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and
that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a
particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society,
to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a
just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently
wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills
all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His
justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but
rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to
things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under
particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we
will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is
what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just
judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner
he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will.
Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although
what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing
known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed
to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature
of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist
in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all
good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually
exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency
in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause,
including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way
escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of God is changeable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says
(Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of
what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down,
and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also
will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7,8)
Therefore God has a changeable will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not
always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be
observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said
before (A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing.
But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable
substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place,
is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one
should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what
he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change
either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the
willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to
will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and
this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold
weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so
before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is
good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in
order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that
both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable
(Q[9], A[1]; Q[14], A[15]). Therefore His will must be entirely
unchangeable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we
repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without
change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time
intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by
way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He
destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause,
does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain
effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to
the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and
will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the
case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes
might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but looking at the divine
first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills
both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall
happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or
He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares
that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of
inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not
being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to
Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live"
(Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was
otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is
unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God
changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will.
When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be
understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not
fulfill what they have threatened.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a will
that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things
willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except
whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it;
for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect
necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature
always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the
will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rm. 9:19): "Who
resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being
compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to
the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity.
For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes
to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows
therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is
hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can
hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the
distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred
only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine
intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say
that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when
a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not
only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of
being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a
child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its
manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it
follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but
also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some
things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering
of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects
He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others
defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects.
Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the
effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared
contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen
contingently.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in
things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the
conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be,
is necessarily true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it
follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but
that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according
to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will
have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute
or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God wills evils?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God
wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good,
yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil
things." Therefore God wills evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce
to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says
(Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty
of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered
and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more
pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all
that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is
what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of
another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much
less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is
said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is
not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil
makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as
said before (Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is
impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite,
either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the
will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it
accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural
agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is
annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one
thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a
stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his
object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil
that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never
therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the
good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which
the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His
own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way
wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the
divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will,
by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing
justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the
natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He
wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a
good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said
because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this
order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be
done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself
ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the
sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the
intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth
from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an
ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that
evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which
appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of
the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the
universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not,
are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil
to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either
is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it
not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God has free-will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily
on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not
liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be
inclined to either side."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by
which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been
said (A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth
unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the
will, not in obedience to necessity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other
things not necessarily, as shown above (A[3]), He has free will with
respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only
as regards the inclination to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the
divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide
ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet
He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a
thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can
will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished
in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom.
But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no
expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind
of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions
assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are
false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of
God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2:
"Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills."
Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others
by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q[13], A[3]).
When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically,
this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is
in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under
the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to
punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore
punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is
attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression
of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when
anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept
obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will
of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven"
(Mt. 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger,
that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary
meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly.
Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and
will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called
the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of
expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless
through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will
to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being
signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment
is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him,
from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition,
precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to
the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept
or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that
He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be
enumerated as distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture
says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will
of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the
will of expression.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in
common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all.
But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only.
Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one
order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens
in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not
right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in
the case of good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we
are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he
wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it
by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and
accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in
that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it
indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an
impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression
is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he
orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as
necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion,
which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes
itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the
divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and
prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Mt.
6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and
operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion
95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done,
either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,
permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.
Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to
good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about
the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the
same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be
the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or
permission.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will,
properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will
what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent
the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the
will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good
pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former
regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the
former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as
fulfilled by means of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for
this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned
to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act
voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the
divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned
with these.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[19] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in
being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil,
only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand,
good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are
good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that
goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by
which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of
counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the
obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] Out. Para. 1/1
GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of
God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both
the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of
the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall
first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy.
About the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love exists in God?
(2) Whether He loves all things?
(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love exists in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no
passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided
against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God,
unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and
binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple.
Therefore love does not exist in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn. 4:16).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because
love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.
For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend
towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is
essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite,
whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to
good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good
must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance,
joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is
always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more
universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is
first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite
that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard
good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as
yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed
or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite;
for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as
their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in
anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of
hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that
sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their
first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there
must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is
also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q[19], A[1]),
and hence we must attribute love to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the
medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason
moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima
iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it
is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in
us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies.
Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive
appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the
Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of
movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch
as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions;
whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and
delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective
appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are
in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an
operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves
without passion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be
distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily
change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the
appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the
heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the
formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as
in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is
about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes
sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no
imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on
their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even
on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except
metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Q[3], A[2]
, ad 2; Q[19], A[11]). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection,
such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without
attributing passion to Him, as said before (Q[19], A[11]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good
that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a
person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves,
we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So
love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying
composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than
Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Q[6], AA[1],3). And
by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus
he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the
good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force,
since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own.
And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills
good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God loves all things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and
causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is
not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes
into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves
things other than Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God
are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is
no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the
love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the
love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the
love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational
creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does
not love all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of
iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God
does not love all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that
are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things,
in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is
itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has
been shown above (Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of all
things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any
kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing
thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is
nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God
loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will
is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its
object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of
its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary,
calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good
it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we
direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into
the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and
works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make
bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His
abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence
for all existing things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except
in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known
them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved
them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing
in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures,
who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in
the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the
changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly
speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God,
nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives.
Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with
the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far
as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is
not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His
goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a
thing for others as well as for ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under
one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far
as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from
Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but
fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this
aspect, they are hated by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God loves all things equally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He
hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence over things
comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all
things equally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does
not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not
therefore love some things more than others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His
knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more
than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does
He love some things more than others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all
things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of
these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold
way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the
act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God
does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things
by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In
another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the
beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for
whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this
way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For
since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said
(A[2]), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will
greater good for one than for another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His
care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all
things with a like wisdom and goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part
of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that
God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there
is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not
include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be
said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's
love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God always loves more the better things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things.
For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being
God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for
it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all"
(Rm. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man:
"Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6). But God
loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He
take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb.
2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more.
Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son
of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than
He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon,
son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished
from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved
him more than the rest." Therefore God does not always love more the
better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since
repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after
shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He
rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there
shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than
upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God
does not always love more the better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the
predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He
wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always
love more the better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from
(Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing
is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
loved by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before,
that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (AA[2],3),
that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His
willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of
goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than
others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that
He loves more the better things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole
human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because
He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above
all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His
excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation
of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror:
"The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to Is. 9:6.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in
the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature
is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But
speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic,
the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since
according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same.
Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men,
and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an
angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature
because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of
man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly
delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound
health.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in
various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative
signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries
of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed
from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative
life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active
life does, with the life of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was
loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the
Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more
by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others
say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of
charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to
a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved
more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been
more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ
showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity.
While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent
gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence,
absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a
certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it
may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord"
and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and
exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and
better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is
the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over
the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from
sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these
words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the
soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than
him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more
as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred
on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds
[marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the
goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the
time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According
therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to
the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although
according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to
some time he is neither good nor bad.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] Out. Para. 1/1
THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and
mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is justice in God?
(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?
(3) Whether there is mercy in God?
(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is justice in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided
against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither
therefore does justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not
work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all
things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11). Therefore
justice cannot be attributed to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no
man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot
belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the
essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of
intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business.
This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first
given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rm. 11:35). The other
consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a
ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the
proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude
evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe,
which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows
forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We
must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all
existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves
the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong
to it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the
passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q[20], A[1]
), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On
the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving
and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these
reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is
nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in
civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His
political virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the
will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom
approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with
which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His
will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But
whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is
directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the
servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In
the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of
the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be
considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to
another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things
whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are
ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two
ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays
what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures
what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In
this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He
renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created
thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man
to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God
exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its
nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since
what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the
divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet
He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other things,
but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes
spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the
reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog.
10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with
their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just;
since it befits Thy goodness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its
being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a
thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard
act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but
also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De
Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the
special.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the justice of God is truth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice
resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a
rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not
appertain to truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a
virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the
idea of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each
other": where truth stands for justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said
above (Q[16], A[1]). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is
related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case
with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore
things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the
equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according
as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or
false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists
in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist
is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related
to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which
establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom,
which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also
in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason
or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed
according to the law, it resides in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this
passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such
as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the
thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule:
as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mercy can be attributed to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a
kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no
sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit
what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we
believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He
would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words.
Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious
Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in
its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must
be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as
being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with
sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it
follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it
were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the
misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to
Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name.
Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of
goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q[6]
, A[4]). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections
appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice,
liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of
perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
above (Q[6], AA[1],4); in so far as perfections are given to things in
proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
said (A[1]); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but
only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as
perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection
of passion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His
justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays
another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred,
does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case
is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in
remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls
remission a forgiving: "Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you"
(Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but
in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth
itself above judgement" (James 2:13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For
some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the
ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it
is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (James
2:13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to
justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rm. 15). Therefore
not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is
unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of
mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something
in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in
creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are
mercy and truth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works,
if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every
defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a
rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to
happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt
paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some
creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of
God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and
goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due
to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done
according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of
justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of
divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded
thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something
pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature,
it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot
go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the
goodness of the divine will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for
instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational
soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his
being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God,
viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows,
the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as
the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second
causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow
upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate
to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of
justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures
and God's goodness there can be no proportion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others
to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others
mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which,
though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing
short of what is deserved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits
sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that
love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she
hath loved much" (Lk. 7:47).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of
the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the
conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the
Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made
to the fathers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in
this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and
they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this
Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world
force us to go to God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet
it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the
idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in
a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea
of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from
non-existence to existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] Out. Para. 1/1
THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now
proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the
will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination
and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect
especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of
morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of
prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God's
providence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?
(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?
(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?
(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence,
according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence,
since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good
counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He
should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not
anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not
eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there
is no providence in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems
to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the
will. Therefore providence is not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest
all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth
it.']."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all
the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown
above (Q[6], A[4]). In created things good is found not only as regards
their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine
goodness (Q[21], A[4]). This good of order existing in things created, is
itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His
intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should
pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Q[19], A[4]), it
is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end
should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered
towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief
part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed---namely,
remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as
from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is
present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to
prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other
things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, a
man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of
life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or
kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise
servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way
prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God
Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last
end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God
called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that
"Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which
disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of
the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts
in the whole.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence
is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly
counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. FS, Q[57], A[6]]. Whence,
though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that
counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to
give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right
reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. 148:6:
"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both
prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may
be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in
God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of
the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it
is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will"
(Eph. 1:11).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the
"reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the
execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is
eternal, and the second is temporal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the
act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an
end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral
virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards
good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the
divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine
simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same
thing, as we have said above (Q[19]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For
nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by
God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would
disappear; which is against common opinion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as
he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils
existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent
concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things
happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the
providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in
accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him
in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly in
reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of
their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to
divine providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care for
oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of
other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of
divine providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to
end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world
was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were
subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual
selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are
incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job 22:14): "The clouds
are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about
the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the
generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the
intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers
corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence,
not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad
evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of
effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first
agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent
something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the
effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the
agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all
being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to
the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but
also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever
manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle
says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers
that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.'
St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo
sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (Rm. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence
of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an
end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as
they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
providence. It has also been shown (Q[14], AA[6],11) that God knows all
things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be
compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects
of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all
things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is a difference between universal and particular
causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the
order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular
cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other
particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning,
by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included
under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take
place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect
escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or
fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal
cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be
foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to
them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their
master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place, in such a way
that the one knows not about the other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular
thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as
he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect
to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence,
corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some
particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal
nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of
another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the
generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in
existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it
belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular
effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for
if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe.
A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and
there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical
persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in
no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and
so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was
on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that
some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual and evil
things---as removed from the care of divine providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things
in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does
not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine
providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature.
Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course
of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to
the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not
mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has
not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in
the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed
by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they
directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the
possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make
a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own
counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a
cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise
of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence
is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a
universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a
certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents
anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them
that love God, all things work together unto good" (Rm. 8:28). But from
the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is
said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence
from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not
preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had
weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human
affairs concerning which we take counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will,
control over its actions, as was said above (Q[19], A[10]), it is subject
to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed
to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly
something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle
withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual
irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the
opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God has immediate providence over everything?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things.
For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to
God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have
ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects.
Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end.
Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it
appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every
active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God
were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes
would be withdrawn.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to
be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things":
and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is
better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence
over bad and vile things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed
over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On
which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the
world which He Himself hath made."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the
order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this
order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has
immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the
types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns
to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects.
Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His
mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's
providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of
any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness;
so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus
Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is
exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to
the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual
things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and
universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of
all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities
who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which
move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over
human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers
placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2:
viii, 14).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who
execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those
things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For
every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the
particular things with which its action is concerned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude
the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as
was said above (Q[19], AA[5],8).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things,
because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the
thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not
hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and
whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things
foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or
past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the
Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it
is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for
divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence
imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest
it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the
stability of necessity to things provided.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the
immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by
the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that
providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt
nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any
necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not
upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to
order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an
extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is
the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades
of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to
produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things
necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent
causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of
their proximate causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that things
should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or
by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen
infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that
happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives
to happen from contingency.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain,
so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether
from necessity or from contingency.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[22] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius
speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to
produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain
to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking
'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence
the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight
of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight
of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of
predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?
(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the
predestined?
(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?
(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to
say, the predestined are chosen?
(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or
reprobation, or election?
(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will
infallibly be saved?
(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are predestined by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but
does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us,
but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us,
forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that
pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and
thus man's predestination is done away.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine
providence, as was said above (Q[22], AA[1],2). But other creatures are
not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But
predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was
any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De
praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See
Q[22], A[3]]. Therefore men are not predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the
Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor.
2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit
that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God."
Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a
benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each
predestined; which is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He
also called."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all
things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q[22], A[2]).
Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was
also said (Q[22], AA[1],2). The end towards which created things are
directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty
of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Q[12],
A[4]). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to
which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature.
Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it
must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the
archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature,
capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God.
The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of
the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be
providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done,
is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type
of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life
eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send.
Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part
of providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity,
after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one
end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He
compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which
exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said
to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any
other end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men,
although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its
species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it
matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who
is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters
nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is
predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it
may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due
pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (Q[21], AA[3],4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination were
revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to
everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair;
and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the
predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the
predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc.
(Rm. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who
is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but
the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one
who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But
predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says
(De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the
predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity.
But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of
predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the
present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not
anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and
not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that
"predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But
foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who
foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines,
and not in the predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but
only in the person who predestines. We have said above that
predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in
the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as
was proved above (Q[22], A[1]). But the execution of providence which is
called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an
active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a
kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation,
existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in
a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of
predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle
(Rm. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called,
them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves
passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so
actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said
above (Q[14], A[2]; Q[18], A[3], ad 1). Predestination is an action of
this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the
predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has
an effect in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to
a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually
existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a
person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a
thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said
that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of
life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not
exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it
implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in
whatsoever way destination is accepted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to
passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action,
and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an
agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it
preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity
prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some
towards salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Grace does not come into the definition of predestination,
as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination
implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its
object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything
temporal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God reprobates any man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what
he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis. 11:25): "Thou
lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast
made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for
reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination
has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation
of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of
the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Osee 13:9):
"Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not,
then, reprobate any man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot
avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said
(Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom
He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he
to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but
have hated Esau."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A[1])
that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it
belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to
providence, as was said above (Q[22], A[2]). Thus, as men are ordained to
eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that
providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called
reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard
to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of
providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence
reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as
does providence, as was said above (Q[22], A[1]). Therefore, as
predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also
reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to
impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes
them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far,
therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal
life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination.
This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by
the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this
life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is
in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God.
It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely,
eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person
who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the
prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the
power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the
reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying
absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said
above (Q[19], A[3]), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet
a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of
choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace,
nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from
the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays
upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of
God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation
of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His
grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination
from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some
are predestined without election.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all
men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains
men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the
foundation of the world."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of
reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that
predestination, as stated above (A[1]), is a part of providence. Now
providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect
directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above
(Q[22], A[2]). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for
that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal
salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their
salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as
He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is
to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q[20], AA[2],3):---election,
inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He
reprobates some, as stated above (A[3]). Election and love, however, are
differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in
loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which
already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election
in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by
which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good
possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes
predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and
love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be
considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as
there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we
said above (Q[6], A[4]). But if we consider the communication of this or
that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He
gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus
in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a
choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice
must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our
choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q[20], A[2]). Thus, as
Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do
not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will,
which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
will, which is to will simply.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He
also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rm. 9:15: "I will have
mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I
foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the
foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by
no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have
mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no
other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits.
Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rm. 9:14). Now it would
seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal
as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises
from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not
prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless
through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of justice
which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He
saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore,
foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above
(A[4]), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way
as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (Q[19], A[5]
), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the
act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things
willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of
divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this
is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any
cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He
would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any
merits.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination
was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former
life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men
were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their
works different states were assigned to them in this world when united
with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says
(Rm. 9:11,12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or
evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The
elder shall serve the younger."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the
beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so
that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one,
and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing,
whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of
ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined
previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that
anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives
grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows
beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to
give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it.
But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from
grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot
come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the
effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of
predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination.
Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it
will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction
between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as
there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and
from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through
the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Q[22], A[3]).
Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We
must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered
in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no
reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause
of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as
its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the
subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition
of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on
account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory.
In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in
general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us;
because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all
included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for
grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help,
according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in
regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which
the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from
which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of
conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as
regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects,
however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation
of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to
have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness
might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness,
which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways
in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the
simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe
there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high
and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades
may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things
should never happen, as was said above (Q[22], A[2]). Let us then
consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe.
God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He
predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of
others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them.
This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the
Apostle refers, saying (Rm. 9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His
wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power
known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the
vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim. 2:20):
"But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but
also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto
dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has
no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in
Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge,
if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a
reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why
one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of
fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of
species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is
under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the
simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends
that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the
plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that
place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God,
if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be
altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of
predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things
which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he
pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any
infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take
what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I
will?" (Mt. 20:14,15).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether predestination is certain?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words
"Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (Rev 3:11),
Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless
this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of
predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination
cannot be certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows.
But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin and then
be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of
predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore
predestination is not certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He
could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is
able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect
should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A[1]), that
predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to
providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency,
according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence
has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible,
as was shown above (Q[22], A[4]). So also the order of predestination is
certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of
predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about
the divine knowledge and will (Q[14], A[13]; Q[19], A[4]) must also be
taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in
things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways;
first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown:
secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is
ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person
receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place.
For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according
to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make
others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of
the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is
substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of
the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other
has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by
himself or by others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated
considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it
does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated
above (A[4]): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary
on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of
the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be
said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able
not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a
composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or
not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a
number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be
an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is
written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands,"
and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him."
Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by
God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by
God cannot be certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of
nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved
than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mt. 7:13,14: "For wide is the
gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are
who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that
leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of
those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of
the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said
that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say
that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not
however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of
predestination; of which we spoke above (A[6]). Therefore we must say
that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally,
but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the
predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge,
because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way
the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God);
but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further
evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make
something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we
treated of the infinite (Q[7], AA[2],3). Now whosoever intends some
definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the
essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the
perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not
principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select
any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such
numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a
builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the
definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and
definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select
a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are
sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we
consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His
effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the
universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that
universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in
perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how
many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not
ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a
secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through
them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the
number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se";
but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the
preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature
is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such
incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness,
since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of
the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also
by way of a principal pre-ordination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rm. 8:28).
Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men
will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left;
others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however,
better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for whom is
reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro
vivis et defunctis.']"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to
those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present
righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the
number of the predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged
from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why
He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined
so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the
good of the whole universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of
nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority.
The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the
minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the
majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and
those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish;
but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a
very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal
happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of
nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the
corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In
this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen
some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the
common course and tendency of nature fall short.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers
of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal;
and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something
else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers
of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to
become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of
defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?
[*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His
counsellor?" (Rm. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by
the prayers of the saints.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But
predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be
furthered by anything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers
of the saints.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers
were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because
whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and
the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this
opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer
and other good works.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought
that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated
by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of
Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare
and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kgs. 15:29); and that "the gifts
and the calling of God are without repentance" (Rm. 11:29).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to
be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards
the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is
predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be
helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because
providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with
secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary
causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided
by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about
those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so
the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that
whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of
predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or
other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to
salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and
prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly
fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you
may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pt. 1:10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by
the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one
way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to
understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one
is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as
a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as
we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are God's
co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God,
but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of
order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate
to creatures the dignity of causality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[23] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first
universal cause, as has been said above (Q[19], A[6]), indeed, they
execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by
creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] Out. Para. 1/1
THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of
life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his
good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs
seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore
the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the
book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book
of death, as there is a book of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God,
by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense,
according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men
that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book;
as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called
"conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (Q[23], A[4])
that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This
conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A
thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when
it is firmly held in the memory, according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My
Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them
in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material
books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He
firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to
be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be
brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation
of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one
sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now
speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those
things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this
also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New
Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus
that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be
recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may
be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of
those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or
relates the deeds of soldiers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected,
but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding
to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Predestination and the book of life are different aspects
of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the
predestined?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of
glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life.
But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book
of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to
the life of the predestined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the
life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen
to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I
chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (Jn. 6:71). But the book
of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1]
). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as
stated above (A[1]). But predestination does not regard the life of
grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not
predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life
altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen
for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to
which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not
chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is
the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of
glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above (Q[23], A[1]).
Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is
natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to
possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of
something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to
the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to
glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory,
are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not
said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to
say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to
have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot
be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the
foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can
anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and
immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a
temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody
can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can
he be blotted out.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book
of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is
customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes
known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as
men think they are written therein, on account of the present
righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in
this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of
righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss
explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the
living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed
among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall
overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot
his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is promised to
holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can
therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the
book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the
reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those
ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources;
namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace;
for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life.
This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed by possessing
grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal
sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through
divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply,
because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such
are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are
ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through
grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply, but
relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in
itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be
blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred
to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to
the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to
eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life
as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but
as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves
they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the
book of life refers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[24] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book
of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either
in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation
towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the
knowledge of God, although not anew.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] Out. Para. 1/1
THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About
this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is power in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to
power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter,
considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first
agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better
than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action
than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what
is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (Q[3]
, A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine
power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of
the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it was shown above (Q[14], A[8]; Q[19], A[4]) that God's
knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle
of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to
God; but only knowledge and will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and
is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is
passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown
above (Q[3], A[2]; Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is pure act, simply and in
all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it
most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way
whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active
principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the
principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the
principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power
in the highest degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon
it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is
contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential.
Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler
than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are
His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence.
Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than
His power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of action,
but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained,
inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a
principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except,
perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine
essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in
created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or
under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the
notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an
effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct
from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically;
inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution
what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in
God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God,
according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power
contained in it. Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God
precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the
operation and effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the power of God is infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything
that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii,
6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it
would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could
produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the
power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous
movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves
the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and
time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is
not infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as
is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the
divine essence (Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active
power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its
power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power
has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were
its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which
God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (Q[7], A[1]) it follows that
His power likewise is infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard
to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity.
But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (Q[7], A[1]); and
consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is
imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its
effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more
than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly
manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the
power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an
animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a
univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in
genus, as was shown above (Q[3], A[5]; Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows
that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary,
therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to
produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect,
the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual
which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the
power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather,
it is the end of the effect produced by it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had
infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that
the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an
infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that
the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time;
not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is
that one body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it follows
that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then
the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move;
the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would
move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An
incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not
necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so
as to move without time; and especially since it moves in accordance with
the disposition of its will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is omnipotent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness
belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is
immovable, as was said above (Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor
"deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence
"especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after
Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to
spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than
sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the
like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this
world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this
world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to
be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that
nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior
causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the
divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be
possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the
impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily
exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at
all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an
impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (Lk.
1:37).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase,
"God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do
all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be
omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is
said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus
whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man.
Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms
stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through
being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the
divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that
God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His
power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His
power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent,
because He can do all that He is able to do.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms
stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with
the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the
predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance,
that a man is a donkey.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in
God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being;
but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent.
Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore,
that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to
the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine
omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not
because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the
nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does
not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible
things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever
implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine
omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it
is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do
them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word
shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction
cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active
power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A[1]). Whence the fact
that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be
able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to
omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His
omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God
can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a
condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if
we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no
reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the
antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man
is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God
can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did
them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common
manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or
Mercury.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and
having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme
power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound
by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because
by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the
participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the
divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q[21], A[4]), the effect of
the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing
is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him
gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly
made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference either
to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But
the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to
its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to
do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the
like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those
things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes
are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is
according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has
contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is
it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is
impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear
that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their
impossibility and necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is
impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only
impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as
to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much
more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not
to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be
running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a
thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not
lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he
should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did
not run.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But
God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity.
Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been
corrupt.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do
all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was said above (Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall under
the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now
that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it
implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not
sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that
he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not
sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not
have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If
God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does
not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what
is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely,
to make undone the things that have been done."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to
have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the
running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as
past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself,
but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more
impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing
contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some
power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do
come beneath the scope of divine power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine
power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His
power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard
the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do
now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility,
whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of
possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to
do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a
woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be
removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned
or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can do what He does not?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God
cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do.
But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except
what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right
to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right
that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He
does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting
creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be
otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father,
and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (Mt.
26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to
refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there
could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that
which now is. But we showed above (Q[19], A[3]) that God does not act
from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor
is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things.
Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God
from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others,
however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course
of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without
which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence,
is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that
there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the
divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the
divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which
order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q[21], A[2]), is
not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be
restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the
whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is
taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things
made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite
order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion
things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any
particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore
we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from
will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from
justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just
will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and
intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be
nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in
His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined
from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition,
as was said above (Q[19], A[3]), neither are the wisdom and justice of
God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing
prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not
will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in
things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as
commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed
to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in
accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which
has the nature of being, as was said above (A[3]). What is, however,
attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution
the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary
power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His
absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do.
But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not
foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual
doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His
power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He
wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but
from His nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said
that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than
that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But
these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in
direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted
to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is
said in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do nothing
except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly
with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and
then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused
and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God
cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and
just."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now
exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which
now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can do better than what He does?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God
does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the
better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God
cannot do anything better than He does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God
could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious."
For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has
done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy
is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He
cannot therefore make anything better than He does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says
(Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all
together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous
beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be
made better by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the
Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better.
And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and
so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things
better than He has made them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all things
more abundantly than we desire or understand."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the
essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than
it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as
He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were
greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition
of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the
addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness
is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is
to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make
better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make
something else better than each thing made by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than He
makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true.
For He can always make something else better than each individual thing:
and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in
another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken
as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make
anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater
wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He
can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a
better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as
regards the substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his
father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of
anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence
the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot
be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God;
in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were
bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string
were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be
destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the
present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[25] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to
the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition
of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of
God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is
God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just
as there cannot be anything better than God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence,
we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?
(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of
intellect?
(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?
(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether beatitude belongs to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude
according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the
aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no
place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to
God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show,
who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For
nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the
perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that
it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is
competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own
actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God,
namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude
belongs to God in the highest degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of
composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is
manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (Q[4], A[2]; Q[13], A[4]),
in simplicity and unity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be
the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to
be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it
passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not
begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His
intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in
God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which
is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore
beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to
His intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the
object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to
be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who
whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory,
however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in
respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said
to be in God in respect of His intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (A[1]), is the perfect good of
an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the
perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be
happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the
intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything.
Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in
understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same
thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude
must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to
the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation
to His beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not
that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will;
now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in
our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the
will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect;
and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For
God is the supreme good, as was said above (Q[6], AA[2],4). But it is
quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is
clear from what has been said above (Q[11], A[3]). Therefore, since it is
of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems
that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to
be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the
beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another,
according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory." But
nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different
from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an
act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the
object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself
which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of
the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this
sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of
Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he
know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is
a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it
is an uncreated thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good
absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their
supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature
can participate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as
the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself"
and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition.
Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the
thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather
fruition, of the thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other
beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be
in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other
beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in
things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of
these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (Q[4], A[2]
). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole
universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches,
power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He
possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of
riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by
riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the
government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the
admiration of all creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it
falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But
whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of
it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal
manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[26] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the
divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)
THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us
to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the
relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is procession in God?
(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation.
(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?
(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is procession in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For
procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it
proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity.
Therefore in God there is no procession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature
of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above
(Q[2], A[3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some
have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause;
so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His
primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the
Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the
Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (1 Jn.
5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members
are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple
is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause
proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on
it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the
Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the
Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature,
and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning,
when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself do anything" (Jn.
5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the
Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these
opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them
affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession
always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession
corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an
inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent.
This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which
remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very
fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a
conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our
intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This
conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of
the heart signified by the word of the voice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in
the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be
understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement
or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for
instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to
be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the
intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In
that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the
sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to
an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we
have explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily
distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is
one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a
thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception
joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the
very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus,
as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (Q[14],
A[2]), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source
whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside
and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a
first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an
intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when
we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a
principle is included that of his art; and it would be included in the
idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the
house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to
things created as the architect is to things designed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation.
For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed
to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this
belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible
mode, as above explained (A[1]). But such a process is not called
generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its
generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no
derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine
existence is self-subsisting (Q[3], A[4]), it follows that no generated
existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation
in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation.
In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning:
one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which
sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence.
In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which
sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living
principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that
kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what
proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of
generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a
similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated
from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it
has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there
should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature;
as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living
things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and
animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there
is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act,
procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of
generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to
living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is
generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a
vital operation:---from a conjoined principle (as above described):---by
way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness
of the object conceived:---and exists in the same nature, because in God
the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above
(Q[14], A[4]). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called
generation; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in the
first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in
which sense it is not found in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the
substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within
us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source
whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and
fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very
substance itself of the one who understands (Q[14], A[4]). The Word
proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is
properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which
denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of
the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the
person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was
already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth." (Prov. 8:24).
In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to
signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the
thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in
another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of
created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives
its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were
received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the
divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received,
we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not,
however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For in the
perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word
intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever
belongs to His perfection (Q[4], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the
generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another
procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to
infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and
hold that there exists only one procession in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from
their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the
divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (Q[11], A[4]
), it follows that only one procession exists in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession
of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love,
which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is
identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as
the will in God is the same as His intellect (Q[19], A[1]). Therefore in
God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26);
and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My
Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in
God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the
Word, and another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only
according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but
remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is
that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by
way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within
ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the
object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the
object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence,
besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another
procession called the procession of love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine
processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in
an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All that exists in God, is God (Q[3], AA[3],4); whereas the
same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is
communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not
apply to other natures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions
belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession
of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since
nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect.
So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He
proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept
are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the
same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed
only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order
between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the procession of love in God is generation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation.
For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is
said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love
proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to
the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what
proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it
belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its like"
(Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of
likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if
there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name
besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable
but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who
proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son,
not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called
generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and
the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the
object understood residing according to its own likeness in the
intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the
object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the
thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of
similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its
own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude,
but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or
as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain
vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved
or impelled by love to perform an action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence
the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is
distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the
proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of
one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the
will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the
proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify
what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as
love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to
love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object
understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but
it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but
because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that
love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We can name God only from creatures (Q[13], A[1]). As in
creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature,
procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of
generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained
without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the
procession of the Spirit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As
knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two
processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must
also be a third procession of power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of
procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must
be a procession of goodness in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us.
But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are
many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love
proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed---the
Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the
actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual,
and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence
and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation
within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it
be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for
the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object
upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but
the procession of the Word, and of Love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another.
Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power
does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the
procession therefrom of creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the
essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[27] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As above explained (Q[14], A[5]; Q[19], A[5]), God
understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills
all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from
Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word,
and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] Out. Para. 1/1
THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether there are real relations in God?
(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?
(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each
other?
(4) The number of these relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are real relations in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For
Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards
the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated
relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him.
Therefore no real relation exists in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the
Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the
relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a
logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two
terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are
formed only by the mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in
God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to
the other relations in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible
word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are
logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent
upon generation, are only logical relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the
Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but
only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may
consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the
apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus;
forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and
proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in
its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard
to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things
which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a
mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations;
as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and
hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the
centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this
regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the
apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a
logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to
animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a
principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source
of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations
to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of
the same nature, as above explained (Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations,
according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its
proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper
meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but
only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to
exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be
predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the
strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical
relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a
relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards
the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof.
The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not
numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the
divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but
only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these
relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature,
God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to
the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature
by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above
explained (Q[14], AA[3],4; Q[19], A[8]). Therefore there is no real
relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real
relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order,
and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the
divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel
exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in
the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason
observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind.
Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect,
and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source
whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real
relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and
are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a
corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally.
Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the
divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that is
said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively,
as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the
substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative
expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a
man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there
must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His
essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself
a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection
of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting
(Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine
essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria;
contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the distinction of
the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this
point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said
that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the
nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which
commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the
essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the
proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that
of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the
genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is
called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of
substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to
that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we
consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect
they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in
this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends
from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as
an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in
it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its
opposite term.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as
in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed
in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence
do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any
other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the
divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of
substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation.
So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other
predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in
their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in
God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is
spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's
supreme simplicity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only
a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to
God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and
beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else
besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both
are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word
"relation," as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that
term. For it was above explained (Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine
names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence
than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there
exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the
various names imposed by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is signified
by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus
related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were
contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom," it would not
in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine
essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does not follow,
if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something
imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the
divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus
(Q[4], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the
same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really
the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really
distinguished from each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished
from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this
kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine
goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction
of paternity and filiation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin.
But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the
relations are not really distinguished from each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if
the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would
be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error
of Sabellius.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God
there is a real relation (A[1]), there must also be a real opposition.
The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there
must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is
absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and
simplicity---but according to that which is relative.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument
holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are
identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for
instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence
in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and
likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are
the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which"
there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as
of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just
as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless
these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite
respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their
respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or
proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed
according to the procession of one from another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation,
spiration, and procession?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must
be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent
agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object
willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above
specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the
intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations are
infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an
infinite series of real relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q[15], A[1]); and are only
distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as
above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and
they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are
eternal in God than the above named.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer
relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there is
the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from
the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not four
relations in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation
is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and
passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and
the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is
great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that
a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are
not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession,
forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him
(Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be
understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are
internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two
only, as above explained (Q[27], A[5]), one derived from the action of
the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action
of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these
processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of
the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of
the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in
the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now
the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is
called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the
principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper
name of its own (Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations
a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this
procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding
is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions
or origins themselves, and not to the relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In those things in which there is a difference between the
intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can be a
real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the
object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and
the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other
things; and the same applies to His will and the object that He wills.
Hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real; as
neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation
to the word is a real relation; because the word is understood as
proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For
when we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the
thing understood, is called the word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely
multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another
act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another,
understands that he understands this; thus the acts of understanding are
infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood.
This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He understands all things by one
act alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does
not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God; but
that God knows these many relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but
are only logical relations (Q[42], A[3], ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[28] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the
same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we
cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as
that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of something
absolute, if there were such between them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] Out. Para. 1/4
THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] Out. Para. 2/4
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively
as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in
common; and then singly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] Out. Para. 3/4
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points:
(1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) the number of the
persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed
thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs
to our knowledge of the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] Out. Para. 4/4
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The
definition of "person."
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
The definition of "person"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De
Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an individual
substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to
definition. But "person" signifies something singular. Therefore person
is improperly defined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person,
is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the former, the
word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance is individual
substance; if it stands for second substance, the word "individual" is
false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are
the "genera" or "species." Therefore this definition is incorrect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal" would
not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and
"species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name
of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word
"individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly into the
definition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those
things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as Aristotle
says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and
in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter into the
definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the
rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly
defined as above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to
the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it
exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the
individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over
their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but
which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore
also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even
among other substances; and this name is "person."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet
what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; and so
the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of
first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the
definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis;
nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch as by the
name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of
part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis,
nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where "individual" is
added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human
nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater---that
is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is
here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when
"individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least
unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in
the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a
simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of
substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of
intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things
which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is placed in the
definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to
particular substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word
"nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things, which
is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an
intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic
principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature"
(Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or
material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the
essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything,
signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature
is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature
is the specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the
specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the
special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means
the singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use the term
"nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is
most common.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although
it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of
unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the
hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part
of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
"subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that "the
Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name
hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore "person" is
altogether the same as "hypostasis."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say
there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and
"subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and "subsistence"
mean the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek {ousia},
which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now
that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance
called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore all the aforesaid names seem
to have the same meaning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and
species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but
also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as
substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since
genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same
as subsistences.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called
hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence. But
neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs
from the others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is
twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its
definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a
thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia}, what we
may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject or
"suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in
a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and
thus it is called "suppositum." It is also called by three names
signifying a reality---that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and
"hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance
thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called
"subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist in
themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is
called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance, this particular man is a
human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called
"hypostasis," or "substance." What these three names signify in common to
the whole genus of substances, this name "person" signifies in the genus
of rational substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the strict
interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus
substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of
the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three
subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the word
"substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to
"hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes
means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any
occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use "subsistence" for
hypostasis, rather than "substance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the
definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species,
but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and
form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but
what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the
species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature
of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature
of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature
of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual
principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the
essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when
treating of divine simplicity (Q[3], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as
it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they
belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance,
but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the
opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted
separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the
same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside
the essence of genera and species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in
relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says
(De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is
derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the
things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it
subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes
hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or subsistence, to the form,
because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the
principle of subsisting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the word "person" should be said of God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or think
anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has
been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name "person" is
not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is
not to be applied to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to
be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and
tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a
greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These
"persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they were placed on
the face and covered the features before the eyes." This, however, can
apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word "person" is
only applied to God metaphorically.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis"
does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it
signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God.
Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word hypostasis, poison
lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined
is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given above,
does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive
knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above (Q[14], A[12]
); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also
because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle
of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the
subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word
"person" ought not to be attributed to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as
His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is fittingly
applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a
more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to
creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the
names of God (Q[13], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in
Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word
signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as
that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly
intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms
themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about
God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The
urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to
express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be
shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray
from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane
novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God as
regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to
God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in
comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those who
held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to
be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is given as
"hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because subsistence in a
rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the
rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity of the divine
nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person"
pre-eminently belongs to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its
source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to
Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the
subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word," forasmuch as
before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term
to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they
profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word "substance," which
corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean
essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason
be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an
intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense
that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which
implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense
of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the
definition of Boethius, quoted above (A[1]), is not a definition of
person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore
Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that "Person" in
God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this word "person" signifies relation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God, does
not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii,
6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but
the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and
not in regard to the Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as
Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven,
the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what?
the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word
is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated. Therefore
"person" signifies substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but
something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would
bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers
to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more
strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person"
signifies relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word
"person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the
Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence;
nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express
relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise";
but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree
that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the
plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we
say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of
the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute
or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation;
for, if this word "person," by force of its own signification, expresses
the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three
persons," so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more
reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person"
in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said
that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly,
forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and
unity belongs to the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation
indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as
relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary,
that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as
in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly;
and these come nearer to the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in
the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man,"
and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to ask the
meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the
animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of
this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of "person"
as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual
substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided,
but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies
what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this
flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles
of a man, and which, though not belonging to "person" in general,
nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
(Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a
subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for
the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the
divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify
relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis
subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in
the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say
that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence
indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way
of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and
indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the
hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the
relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the
person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word
"person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics.
Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But
afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that
signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use
and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own
proper signification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to
another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a
substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it
signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the
hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by
the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal
rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the "suppositum," as when we ask,
What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three
what? we answer, Three persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In God the individual---i.e. distinct and incommunicable
substance---includes the idea of relation, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[29] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The different sense of the less common term does not
produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have
their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in
animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it
does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification
of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the
word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied
univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures
(Q[13], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] Out. Para. 1/1
THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several persons in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For
person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then there
are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which
appears to be heretical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there
is no plurality but of relations (Q[28], A[3]). Therefore there cannot be
several persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is truly
one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore there
are not several persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in
God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part in God;
which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father, and
the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above (Q[29], A[4]) that this word
"person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature.
It was also established (Q[28], A[1]) that there are several real
relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several
realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that there are
several persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as
meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by the
addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed to
say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences or
natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and
wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really
distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is, several
persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist,
although they are really distinguished from each other, as whiteness and
sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in God subsist, and
are really distinguished from each other (Q[28], A[3]). Hence the
plurality of persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind
of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because
relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import
composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius teaches in
the same book.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and
four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and two
horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there
is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and thus number
in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded
apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if number be
taken as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in
creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of
two men, and two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the
Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall show
further on (Q[42], AA[1], 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For
the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative
properties as stated above (A[1]). But there are four relations in God as
stated above (Q[28], A[4]), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and
procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from
His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as love;
and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds
from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from His
nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three
persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not
only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the
intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an
infinite number of persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He
communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine person. But
also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost
produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for
number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we say in the
Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy
Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not contained within the
number three.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those
who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4),
"Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons
in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real
distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative
opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to
the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite
relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the
subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting
filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not
opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person:
hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or
one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now,
procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them;
for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in
God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived, would
issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are
derived, if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from
the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Q[27]
, AA[3],4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person
of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no
relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently
that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of
the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained.
Therefore only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,
spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son,
but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a
property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a
personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three
relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is
the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,
proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way of
nature; thus, as above explained (Q[27], A[3]), the procession of the
divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, as
such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds;
although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the
procession of love is not called generation in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more
intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real
operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions
was above explained (Q[27], AA[1],4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed
another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if the
Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also
would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same
goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the
personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived
from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its
communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the
relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of
another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons
who are in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing
in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a number of
things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no
place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same (Q[42],
AA[1],4), and the same is not measured by the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in
God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is
unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the
essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God
in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote
something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality
is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows
that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the
truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the
numeral terms denote something real in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness and
of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God, unity
excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God." Hence we
see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and
not to denote anything positive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 2/5
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and is
division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species
of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material things which
have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is
effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results
in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental
in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of
multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 3/5
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but
remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict
sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is
no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper sense
of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 4/5
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a
metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in
a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the
many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being" is
related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being,
except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine
unity (Q[11], A[1]); for "one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever
we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, "one"
applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In
the same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter
sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 5/5
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added
to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that number.
Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are
said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24);
in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say,
the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and
when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and
when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their
individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature of multitude that
it should be composed of units.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general
than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence in God
it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still,
the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond
substance and relation; as was explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a
species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike
transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it
is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which
logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, but
division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This
was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q[11], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is
excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not
follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness
is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not
signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to the
three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But
the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears from
the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q[29], A[3], ad 4).
Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is
common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise
the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically;
otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is neither
universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above
(Q[3], A[5]). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term
"person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when we
say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is
clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were
common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the
three, as also one essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those
who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of
exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word
"incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of intention, as
the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that
to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations,
however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a name of
exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore
resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is common by a
community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual
thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to
signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those
common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or "species." The vague
individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with the
determinate mode of existence of singular things---that is, something
self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a designated
singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing;
as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is
this difference---that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the
individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of
singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the
individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that
nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that each of
them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this
name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of
incommunicable existence can be common to many.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[30] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it
does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or genus,
or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of
person the same as community of genus or species; and because the divine
persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other
universal are predicated of many which differ in being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] Out. Para. 1/1
OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";
(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be
joined to an essential name in God?
(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is trinity in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God
signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does not signify
the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the
persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name
that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be applied
to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it
signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the unity
of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists
the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity" does not apply
to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither
is there trinity in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine
essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in
God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there
would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated
of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father. But the
Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities
in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word trinity is not
to be applied to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified
by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to
signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity may
mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather
signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we
cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons.
Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather
the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the
word in itself does not express regard to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of
the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For "people" is a
multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense,
this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but in the second
sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is
there unity of order, but also with this there is unity of essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies
the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a proportion of
inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to
Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but
Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and
the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do not place
number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but
we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the "supposita"
of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say
"Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in its "supposita."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the number
implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself; since
the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which it is
spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; otherwise
it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three
"supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it follows
that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For
"other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If, then, the
Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which
is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of
three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way
from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, it
follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose
says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in Godhead; nor is
there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But the
Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that "in
the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing
separable." Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et
aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is
another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart
from the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the
Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another;
although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more
toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of the Trinity, we
must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between
them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of substance with
the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of
person with the unity of essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of essence:
we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative
opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or "difference"
of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or
"difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and
singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms "separation"
and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided:
and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term "disparity":
and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and
"discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the
Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary,
as quoted above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence Hilary
says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the
Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective "only" [unici]
lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same
book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness."
Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is no plurality of
Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity is common to
several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away from the Persons
the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): "What is one
is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is no
difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided, lest we take away
the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We
confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a
distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the Son
is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of the
divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing, refers
to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason for using it,
where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person.
But diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus
we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is
another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form
in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form of God"
(Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not properly apply to
God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De Fide Orth.
i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the divine persons, as meaning
that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says
that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but
according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken for
"distinction," as above stated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and dissimilar;
which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and therefore we say
that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that He is anything
"alien."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is
formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is
properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine
and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature.
Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer,
Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if we ask, What
is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God
distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the
Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while conversely we
say that they are one thing, but not one person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term
in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to
be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher
(Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But God is with
the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God
is alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be
predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons together;
for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a
wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone."
Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential
term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or
the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to
say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor, again, can
it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God
alone creates," it would follow that the "Father alone creates," as
whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false,
as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be
joined to an essential term in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible,
the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term,
or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which
ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above
stated (A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the
predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; and
likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the
predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not mean
that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing,
though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term
"alone" being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the
predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal,"
because nothing but God is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always
with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He
would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association
with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be
alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the
garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men
were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him.
Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute
solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in
reference to a predicate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect
the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
"suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either
to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that is, no
one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"---that is, he does nothing
else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or the
Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the
predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who alone is God." In
that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is
God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the
"suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone,
but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might
explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the only God," as
applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential
term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two things,
because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then
it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation
only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found
also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to
say God alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the Father alone
creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the
term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term
cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for
instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we
cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the
personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking
to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true God" (Jn.
17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Mt.
11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the
Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into
the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude
the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say
"Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white," or
that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as
the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when
we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy
Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus
Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two
assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides
the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is
another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, The
Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude in
the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a
syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways. For
if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the
sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with no other is
the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De
Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from
the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father
together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of speaking,
unless we understand another implication, as though we said "He who alone
is called the Father is God." But in the strict sense the exclusion
affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes
another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter
sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another
thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction
"alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude
another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is
not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded,
whenever we find it in an authentic work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand
it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as
Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of
the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of
essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above
explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to
the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the
unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the
term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the
Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of
speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the
concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in
"suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs in "suppositum"
from the Father; and so there is no parity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[31] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High;
but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God
the Father."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] Out. Para. 1/1
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
(3) The number of the notions?
(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known
by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not
otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things
about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i,
2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring ourselves to
acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all things created." And
Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in their works, not in so
many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,"
and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We
read, moreover, in a gloss on Rm. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of
Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as regards knowledge of a
third person---i.e. of the Holy Ghost ---and thus it is clear that they
knew at least two persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a
monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the
generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be
indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by
natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe
without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for
any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some have
brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who
communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons;
while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing can be
joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x,
4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the
word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this (Q[27]
, AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known
by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine tradition
of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be
known by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach
the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says (De
Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind
fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of the divine persons is
distinguished by origin of generation and procession (Q[30], A[2]).
Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that
for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity
of persons cannot be known by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q[12], AA[4],12), man
cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from
creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do
to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that
only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of things, and we
have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above (Q[12],
A[12]). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity;
and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to the
distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what
belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the
distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of
persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as
regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being
concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the
Apostle says that "faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and
the same Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not
the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak
the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly,
as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in
the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not
cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they
suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such
grounds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists the
word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of
the word"---i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of
the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity,
filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words, "We speak
the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world"---i.e. the
philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless, they knew some of the
essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father,
wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear.
So, when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it as
if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that
the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on
account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic
books also we find, "In the beginning was the word," not as meaning the
Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made
all things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew
these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to have
failed in the third sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person,
because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost,
in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rm. 1); or,
because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom
they also declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently
maintained the existence of another substance beneath him, which they
called "mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all
things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however,
assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond
to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son
differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this
followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad,"
etc., this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the
procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For one
God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point:
firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some
principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought
to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity.
Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof
of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by
showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of
eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby
the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not,
however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory
might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and
the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when
assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think
that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This
becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of
God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an
act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite
goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from
God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive
the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of
good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having
perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to
have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an
adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in
God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in
Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the divine
persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of
creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word
excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because
of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own
goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light," to manifest
the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was good," to
show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works
of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly
concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate
Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are notions in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God but what is
taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture does not say
anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the essence
or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern the unity
of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what
belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do
not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the
persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say that paternity
begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there do not exist
notions in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as
principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for they
are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple.
Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize
difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three properties; i.e.
in the paternal, the filial, and the processional." Therefore we must
admit properties and notions in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons,
said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever there
were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we
are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i.e. you who are
kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 2/6
But, as shown above (Q[3], A[3], ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract
names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity;
forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our
intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence,
considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and
names divine things, according to its own mode, that is in so far as
they are found in sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In
these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to
signify subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify
divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their
simplicity; whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we
use concrete names.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 3/6
But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the
same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and
Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 4/6
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: "Whereby
are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we answer that
They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be some abstract
terms whereby we may answer that the persons are distinguished; and these
are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity
and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as "What"; and
the person as "Who"; and the property as "Whereby."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 5/6
The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and
the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation;
otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be
related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation
alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy
Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that
as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to
Him in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son
and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the
Father by two relations. For, since the very specific idea of a relation
is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not
specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them.
For the relation of lord and father must differ according to the
difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to
God as His creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy
Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation.
Hence there is no parity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 6/6
Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature (Q[28], A[1],3); while there is no reason against our admitting
in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must be a real
relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the
two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they are related
to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He
is related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only
one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be
separately signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by
properties and notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture,
yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, as the
abstract is contained in the concrete.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In God the notions have their significance not after the
manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are
known; although in God these notions or relations are real, as stated
above (Q[28], A[1]). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or
personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch as this is
against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity
begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials,
however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created
conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say
that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on account
of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential,
can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is God,
and that paternity is the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the persons are simple, still without prejudice to
their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly
signified, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are five notions?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions
proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished
from each other. But the relations in God are only four (Q[28], A[4]).
Therefore the notions are only four in number.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one
God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the Trine
God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called
quinary; which cannot be allowed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God,
there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the person of
the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration.
Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they really differ,
it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things.
But if they differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be
predicated of another, so that we can say that as the divine goodness is
the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common
spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are
not five notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the
Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of
innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in
this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the
Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from
the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son,
so there ought to be one notion common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine
Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin:
and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of
someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a person can be
known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact
that He is from another; but by the fact that He is from no one; and thus
the notion that belongs to Him is called "innascibility." As the source
of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him,
the Father is known by the notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost
is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common spiration." The Son can
be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and
also by another person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He
is known in the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration."
The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from
others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that
another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility," "paternity,"
"filiation," and "procession." Of these only four are relations, for
"innascibility" is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear
later (Q[33], A[4], ad 3). Four only are properties. For "common
spiration" is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three
are personal notions---i.e. constituting persons, "paternity,"
"filiation," and "procession." "Common spiration" and "innascibility" are
called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain
further on (Q[40], A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be
admitted, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise
the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are signified
as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity
of essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is not
quinary by the five notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative
opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are not
relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are
they predicated of each other, because they are different ideas of the
persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of
knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (Q[19], A[3]
) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no
person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity, as it
belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode
of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in
one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which
a notion is based must be something special; thus no parity of reasoning
exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary
opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3): "No error is
more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which mystery the
notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some way
erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the
notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no contrary
opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can
there be about the notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore
different opinions of the notions are permissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any
truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning
these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it
be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it
involves as a consequence something against faith; as for instance if
anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it follows that
the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may
have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has been
considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and
particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and
especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against
faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many
things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so
considered, as their consequences are now more manifest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the
notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith.
If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions,
knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, he
would lapse into heresy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
By what has been said all the objections may be solved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father,
concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?
(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name
"Father"?
(3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said
essentially?
(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of
the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are the same,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the
Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the
principle of the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing
principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that
the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears
false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God
there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in
speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the
Principle of the whole Deity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word "principle" signifies only that whence another
proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a
principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another
proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle"
indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use
the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because "principle"
is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common than "element."
For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the
principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable
it is to use as regards God (Q[13], A[11]), because the more special
terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature.
Hence this term "cause" seems to mean diversity of substance, and
dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word
"principle." For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found
between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power:
whereas we use the term "principle" even in things which have no such
difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say
that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the
first part of a line is the principle of a line.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and
the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom with our
Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of
authority by reason of His being the principle, still we do not attribute
any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost,
to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix):
"By authority of the Giver, the Father is the greater; nevertheless the
Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although this word principle, as regards its derivation,
seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, but
origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are
not the same thing, as stated above (Q[13], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the name of
a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation. Moreover
"person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not
properly a name signifying a Person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father
begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more
properly applied to God, as stated above (Q[13], A[11]). Therefore the
more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone.
But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and
consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father.
Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God
first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures
before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who
proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by
relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from
generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): "He shall cry out to me: Thou
art my Father."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the
person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul
belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man
belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is
this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity
which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons.
Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is the proper
name of the person of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name
"father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a
person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in
God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting person.
Hence, as above explained (Q[29], A[4]), this name "person" in God
signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a
thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now
generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas
paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the name
"Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or
begettor.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is
not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something
subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not
metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other terms
properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the
thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also
the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ,
from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (Eph. 3:14).
This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its
species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the
nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is
the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal,
for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like
itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the
form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in
creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows
that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before
creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the
Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth
of the divine generation and paternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to God,
firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common precedes the
particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name, belongs to the
person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is common to the
whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the whole Trinity. Therefore
"Father" comes first as an essential name before its personal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no
priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of the
same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the
whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since, according to Basil
(Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son.
Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an essential name before it is
taken personally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a
common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason of
filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image of the
invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore paternity
taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same concept as,
paternity taken essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the
Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature
in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as
regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained
its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only
partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind
of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the
name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence
this name "lion" is applied first to the animal containing the whole
nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is applied
to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength,
or the like; and of whom it is said by way of similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Q[27], A[2]; Q[28], A[4]), that
the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the
Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the
Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation
to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have
not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more
perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is
called the Father of some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for
instance of irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the
father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the
rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His
image, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and
made, and created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of
grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the
heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received,
according to Rm. 8:16,17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our
spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He
is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have
obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rm. 5:2: "We
glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain
that "paternity" is applied to God first, as importing regard of one
Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our
intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the
understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of
the person of the Father, God is understood; but not conversely. But
common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper
terms which import personal relations; because the person proceeding in
God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the
word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed
from the artist before the thing designed, which is produced in likeness
to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the
Father before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as
it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words of
Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the
image of His Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and to
the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote
similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the
authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among many
brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son
of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of singularity above
others, in having by nature what He receives, as Basil also declares
(Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18): "The
only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto
us."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be
unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is
the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only
removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a
negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can
be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the
divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence;
thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative
sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is
the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is
imperfect; which cannot be.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it
is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; therefore
unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is
begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the
Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then,
there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is nothing
to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the
Father is not alone unbegotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten,
so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his opposition to
the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it
follows that it is proper to Him also to be unproceeding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one ---that is,
the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by the property in each one
respectively of innascibility and origin."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before or
after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father;
and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way
as the first "principle," by reason of its having a relation to what
proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first"
principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the
Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the
persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a
principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this
belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word
"begotten."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the
word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative term
only, but either that it means both these things together---namely, that
the Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of others; or
that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source
of all. This, however, does not seem true, because thus innascibility
would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration; but would
include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and
authority signify in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must
therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports
the negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the
same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not
the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are
notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what has
no part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense only,
and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is unbegotten," that
is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of
privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For privation can
be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally
belongs to another, even though it is not of its own nature to have it;
as, for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life,
which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation
is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some
members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a
third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have;
in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may
be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain person of
the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature
is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to
the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father
alone, it must be further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs
to a divine person as the principle of another person; so that it be
understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally
in God. Or that there be understood in the term "unbegotten" that He is
not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from
another by way only of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten"
does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by
procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine
essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy
Ghost from another---namely, from the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), "unbegotten"
in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus it applies to
the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the
uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, and in
this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the
genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to the genus of substance,
and "not white" to the genus of quality. Hence, since "begotten" implies
relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not
follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the
Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is
denied of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the
divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from another,
and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to suppose
the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence Hilary says (De
Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And
this especially because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from
the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition:
therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[33] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another,
is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than
by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the
procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as stated above (Q[27],
A[4], ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the
generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is
begotten, although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a
consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy
Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but
proceeds from the person begotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to
the Son---namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is gathered
from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and
Image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?
(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Word in God is a personal name?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For
personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son.
But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1),
"In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word is
knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To speak is
to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But knowledge and
thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a
personal term in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to
Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is
intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the
Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is
spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and
not in a personal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is
something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which
do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is
related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But
the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so
also is Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is
a personal name, and in no way an essential name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its
proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken
improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it
is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an
interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word---that
is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For,
according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the
concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the
signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, text 90. The
vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word:
wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it
signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that,
first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word;
secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is
so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a
word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i,
17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect,
whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;"
which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not
pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the
third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"---that is, the
messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used
in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a
word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which
the king has commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word
either by way of assertion or of command.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the
intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can
understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before
thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some
likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word."
The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from
something other than itself---namely, from the knowledge of the one
conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God,
signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature
of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are
distinguished by origin (Q[27], AA[3],4,5). Hence the term "Word,"
according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not
essentially, but personally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son
differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain
that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood
in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel
them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the
Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who
pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said
metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For
if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of
some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it
is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word
whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly
manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in
as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may
also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be
sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit
Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God
personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which
emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is
the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by
the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of
understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to
actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act
going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent.
Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not
mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands
for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says
(De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing
but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called
"begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in God
"to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of
the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to
the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we
speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe
that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word,
now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless."
For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has
no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it
does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm
(Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and
not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is not
common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not
alone in God, but as being with that very Word, without which, forsooth,
He would not be speaking." On the other hand, "to be spoken" belongs to
each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing
understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one
person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word
is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being
understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the
Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all
other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that
thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all
creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act
of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak"
improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from
each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the
intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of
origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect;
forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing
understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God
the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was
proved above (Q[14], AA[4],5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the
habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a
word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing
understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who
understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in
God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently
is spoken by the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing
signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said
to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained
from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone is said to do the
word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the
king's word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For
the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a
subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the
proper name of the person of the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered.
Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father,
by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears
from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of
that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it
signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more
properties in God than those above mentioned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of
understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to
the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all things by
the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the
Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the
Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we
understand the Son alone."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used
personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it
signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in
God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this
procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q[27], A[2]).
Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence
that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature.
But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the
Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs
to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent;
for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is substantial and has a
hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the
soul."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians
pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as
Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of
utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Haeres.
xi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in the
name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and Son express
the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is
signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express
His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as
the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is
called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the
Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word.
All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it
belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially,
as stated above (Q[14], AA[2],4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not
God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but
as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not
differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the
principle of the Word only by relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word
of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word.
Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as
by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also
by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being.
Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost;
in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be
called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the
Son's Word, because He manifests the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to
creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said
of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally.
Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in
time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from eternity.
Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds.
Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the
Word proceeds from the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various
relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures,
it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only
be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only;
He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to
non-beings; which appears to be false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name
Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to
those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing
Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is
representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are
in ourselves different words for the different things which we
understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all
things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of
all creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as
regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God
is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive
and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9): "He
spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied the operative
idea of what God makes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the
person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature.
Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation,
does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what
belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying
relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning:
for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly
belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this
way the name Word imports relation to creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names import
the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of
God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern;
and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation
which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect,
but abides in the agent---as to know and to will: such are not applied to
God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the
name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation
of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are
applied in time which import relation following on the action of God
passing into exterior effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from
the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not
necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word
is expressive of creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to
creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it
is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to
signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as
God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there
is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[34] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about
non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than
does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is
expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)
We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?
(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether image in God is said personally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For
Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead of the
Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one." Therefore
Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like species of
that which it represents." But species or form is said of God
essentially. Therefore so also is Image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies "before"
and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before" and "after."
Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd
than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore the Image in
God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any
kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude
of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the
specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species
of different animals are of different figures; but not of different
colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not
called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. Further, neither
the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which
requires also the idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of another, because it is not
derived from it." Therefore for a true image it is required that one
proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific
sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the
persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in
likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is
properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the
image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of Image in this
sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the
Image to whom man was made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of
image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense
image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated
to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only
assimilation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son;
because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost is the
Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an
image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to the
Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the
Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not belong to the Son
alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1 Cor.
11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the
glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the
Image of the Father."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the
Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors attribute
the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical
Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words, "Who is the
Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" (Col. 1:15) and
again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His
substance." (Heb. 1:3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not
in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy
Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.
This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason
of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God,
as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we
consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say
that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there
cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because again the
image must be immediately related to that which it is the image; and the
Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son; nor again is He the
Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be one image of
two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no
way an Image. But this is no proof: for the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on (Q[36], A[4]
). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father
and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of
the whole Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the
Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the
Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be
"born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not
called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential
to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this
does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to that love
which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the
term image as meaning a perfect similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son,
still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[35] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways.
In one way it is found in something of the same specific nature; as the
image of the king is found in his son. In another way it is found in
something of a different nature, as the king's image on the coin. In the
first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man
is called the image of God; and therefore in order to express the
imperfect character of the divine image in man, man is not simply called
the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a certain movement of
tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the Son of God is "to
the image," because He is the perfect Image of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who
is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God.
Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine
Person?
(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds
from the Father and the Son?
(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?
(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper
name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the three
persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of 'Holy
Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the old
English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense of
"breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial
substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),
"The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled
gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and "Oure
wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre"
(More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern expression of
"giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not specially to the third
Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was the worde
and the goste of Good." (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common to the three
persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit of God"
sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: "The Spirit of
the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In
the Spirit of God I cast out devils" (Mt. 12:28), showing that He cast
out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy
Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of My Spirit over
all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a
divine person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as
Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a relative
term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot
be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken of as of
this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to Moses, I
will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17) and also "The
Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kgs. 2:15). Therefore "Holy
Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): "There are three who bear
witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As
Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three
persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these, the
procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above (Q[27]
, A[4], ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession
are without a name (Q[28], A[4]): for which reason the Person proceeding
in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated
by the usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when
we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense
more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations; so to
signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy
Ghost" is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The
appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the
fact that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in common
with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11),
"Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that
properly which both are called in common. For the Father also is a
spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is
holy." Secondly, from the proper signification of the name. For the name
spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we
call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of
love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved.
Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore
because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is
loved, that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is
applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the immateriality of
the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and
has but little matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and
invisible substances. And by adding the word "holy" we signify the purity
of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus
that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to
signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love,
for the reason above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a
relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it is
accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation
only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation, if we
understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which is
of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in the
name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in
the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power. But to no
creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but
rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our Father," and "our Spirit";
but we cannot say "our Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything
concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely
expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred Scripture we
are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He
proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26: "The Spirit of
truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
proceed from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii)
we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, who
proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and
glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our Creed that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to
be worthy of anathema.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the Holy
Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the Father; but
we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the
Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the
Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the
Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew:
"Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in
His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding
from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does
not proceed from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus]
does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore the Holy
Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father.
Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things
perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is
possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He
did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir. Sancti, ii):
"The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in
a different way; one by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are
thus distinct from one another." And further on he says: "For even if for
no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone
would suffice." Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son,
without proceeding from Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and
the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For
if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished
from Him; as appears from what has been said above (Q[28], A[3]; Q[30],
A[2]). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished
from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there
would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is
spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence.
Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from
each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish
the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which
appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which
He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these
are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons,
but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son
and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them
were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each
other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is
related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would
follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one,
having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this
is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the
Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite
relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each
other, except relations of origin, as proved above (Q[28], A[44]). And
opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle,"
and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it
is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no
one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this
conclusion. For it was said above (Q[27], AA[2],4; Q[28], A[4]), that the
Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by
way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not
love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also
in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature
itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without
order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance
one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with
no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a
material distinction we always find that some order exists in the
multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the
beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of
the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must
be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the
order of their nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot
be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a
way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in
them a material distinction; which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the
Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost
is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father "through the
Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is from the Son"; or
that "He flows from the Son," but not that He proceeds; which seems to
come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth
will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly
applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to
describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a
point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in
everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way
from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not found
in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not
find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds
from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially
where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, "He will glorify Me,
because He shall receive of Mine" (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy
Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son,
although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what
belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are
distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, "No one knoweth
the Son, but the Father," the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not
excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone,
the Son would not thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being
the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed
to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and
the other is the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been
drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that
time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new
symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol
was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in
the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who
were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down
the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything
wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together
at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the
matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error
of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had
not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that
point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, another council
[*Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter
was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose
authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed.
Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the
Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that
the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian
creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by
Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was
also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held.
Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not
confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of
his express a denial thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it
does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son also is
said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also
the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides
in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason
of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and
remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (Jn. 1:33).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the
vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would
then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word,
whence proceeds love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds from the
Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power
belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from the
Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of
filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the
Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as
the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the
difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from
the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; for
otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as
explained above, and in Q[27].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the
Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another,
does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately; which seems
to be unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the
Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father.
But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Therefore He
proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the
Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is
first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the
procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said
conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff, so it
can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can
never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father.
Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost
through the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this
expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely
Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may
deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this
preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or
principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and
the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition
"through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and
in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final
cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final
cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of
gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It
is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of
another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition
"through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing
done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet,
for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts,
but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan,
and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is
sometimes said that this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct
authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and
sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through
the king.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost
through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through
the Son, which has the same meaning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the
"suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance,
fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the
power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this is
one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves
spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from
the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from
Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from
the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from
Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his
mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a
material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the
divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct
power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would
be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would
proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary,
the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and
therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes
He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because
the Son has this power from the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter
(and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the
procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the
Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; but each of the
operations is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse
proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet works
through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through
the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of
his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made
to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is,
however, said to act through the king, although this preposition
"through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is prior in
action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect,
inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its
effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the
demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium
according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said to work
through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is
said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives
the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between
Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the
Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle
of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father
and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy
Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with
Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it
is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the
Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one
another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity, because
in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we
designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason
of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost,
similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two
principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted.
Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy
Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle as regards
any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we
cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father,
it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father,
it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say
that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one principle of
the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for
this word "principle" stands either for the person of the Father, or for
the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this
proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle
of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and
the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are
the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant
that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator,
because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and
the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees
also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy Ghost is to be
confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the
Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the
Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever
there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy
Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they declare,
since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify
"person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch
as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot
properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the
Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should
be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way. But then
it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the
Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say
that, although this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so
after the manner of a substantive, as do the words "father" and "son"
even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it
signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son
are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this
word "God"; so they are one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the
unity of the property that is signified in this word "principle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds
from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which
in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see
later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two
"supposita" that possess one common nature. But if we consider the
"supposita" of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from
them as the unitive love of both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the
form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of
the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for
this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of
similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence,
as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so
likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy
Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one
principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the
Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to
assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are
one principle, this word "principle" has not determinate supposition but
rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence there is
a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the argument concludes from the
indeterminate to the determinate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: This proposition is also true:---The one principle of the
Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word "principle" does
not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as
above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and the
Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[36] A[4] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of the
distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating, because acts
refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name "Creator";
because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two
distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from
the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It
seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and
spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two
spirating, by reason of the plurality of the "supposita" but not two
spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive
their number from the "supposita" but substantives from themselves,
according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy
ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be
explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.
