In July of 1832, President Andrew Jackson vetoed a
bank bill. In his comment on exercising that right to
veto a decision made by Congress, Jackson wrote:
There are no necessary evils in
government. Its evils exist only
in its abuses. If it would confine
itself to equal protection, and, as
Heaven does its rains, shower its
favors alike on the high and the
low, the rich and the poor, it
would be an unqualified blessing.
A Statement such as that presents a truly high
ideal for government. Yet equal protection for all is
a consummation devoutly to be wished. I suppose that
if ever legislator, judge and executive (as well as the
citizens who put them in office) were perfect, then it
would be a reality.
Alas, both the governed and the governing being
all imperfect human beings, they will all have their
own axes to grind. We might even be justified in
suspecting that they will be tempted to use those same
axes on each other when it comes to chopping out a
niche for the protection of their own "rights" as
opposed to those of others.
No one can deny that there may be room for honest
disagreement at times as to just who is in the right.
That leads to debate (with or without the axes) and
eventually, one would hope, to resolution or at least
compromise. This may be the case even in issues that
are vital and essential. There may be honest
differences of conscience as well as of opinion -- and
even perfectly justifiable compromises.
In a democratic system, the elected official is
one person whose position can be very precarious. And
I am thinking here of far more than just the struggle
to get elected and then stay in office for more than a
term. I am thinking more of the responsibilities of
office and the decisions of conscience which may attend
the proper exercise of those responsibilities.
The politician has a conscience of his own, but he
also represents a constituency formed of any number of
people with any number of opinions and positions of
conscience. It is by that group that he hopes to be
elected and re-elected. It is to them that he must
answer -- at least on election day. But they are not
the only ones to whom he must answer, because he is
more than just an elected official. He is also a human
being and a child of God, and so he must answer to
humanity (which, of course, is an abstraction) and to
God (who is absolutely not an abstraction). His
election, his reputation and his salvation may all
depend on the choices he makes about very public
matters.
How does he reconcile himself to the fact that he
represents a group which may include people whose ideas
of basic moral right and wrong may differ from or even
be in conflict with his own?
The problem, of course, is all the more complex in
that anyone who runs for office must count on pleasing
the people, if he intends to stay in office. It sounds
like an almost impossible balancing act, and one would
expect that it would make most officials quite happy to
get out of office. Yet, as Voltaire remarked, "The
pleasure of governing must certainly be exquisite, if
we may judge from the vast numbers who are eager to be
concerned with it."
There is, of course, more than that to it. The
politician has the potential of doing enormous good,
and may be in government for just that purpose. Can it
be done without loss of integrity? We will begin
looking at that next time.
Article #79
MORAL DECISIONS Fudge, Anyone?
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
An all too frequent part of the political diet is
fudge. Fudging the issues is an act practiced to
perfection by many who hold office and intend to stay
there. We are constantly being served whole trays of
fudge when it comes to governmental stands on questions
of "reproductive rights" (a patriotic sounding phrase
which usually refers to making sure that reproduction
is stopped dead in its tracks). There can be no doubt
that such questions are matters of conscience. They
are of essential interest to the Church and to those
who have honestly examined the issues. They should be
every bit as essential to government and politicians.
One problem that every person must at some time
face -- and the politician perhaps more than most -- is
just how far compromise can be taken before it comes to
the point of real abnegation of conscience. There is a
boundary beyond which lies loss of integrity and moral
self-destruction. For the politician, even very early
in a career, this may become an acute problem.
We need good government and we will never have it
unless we have good men and women in office. To get
there, they must be elected. How they go about that
will be crucial to the amount of good that they can
later be able to accomplish. Even those whose honest
intent is to do good may be tempted to compromise on
almost any issue, no matter how important, in order to
achieve the political success of attainment at length
to an office in which it is possible finally to "do
some real good."
The problem with that approach is that what really
gets compromised most of all is the person doing the
compromising. If a candidate is willing to compromise
on even the most basic issues in order "to do some
good," then that is a candidate who should not be in
office at all. How much faith are you really willing
to put in a person who has no conscience or, having
one, does not follow it?
Of course there are matters of policy in which
people may agree on the results to be attained and yet
disagree on just how to attain them. Compromise may
mean finding a way to cooperate to the satisfaction of
both without violating the conscience of either. Both
the end and the means to it may be good. It may even
be a matter of practical action and not a question of
conscience at all. Issues like these are no problem.
But what, for example, of the candidate who deals
with so basic an issue as legal abortion, who claims to
be morally opposed to it personally, but who will not
be opposed to it as a public official. It's enough to
make you wonder if this stuff he's passing out is even
fudge.
No candidate is worth electing if he is not honest
with his constituents and honest to his own moral
principles. Honesty demands that you speak the truth
about what you hold in conscience and that you live it
both in private and in public. If that costs the
election, then so be it. This is a hard choice, but it
is the only right choice. If you try to live
otherwise, then you will soon have no conscience left.
As Samuel Butler said, "Conscience is thoroughly well-bred and soon leaves off talking to those who do not
wish to hear it." The man willing to compromise his
own conscience on one issue would also do so on others.
I would not want him to represent me. I could not
trust him.
The bitter loss of conscience may, for a time, be
sweetened with that bit of fudge. The question of the
right to life, however, is so basic that there is
little room, if any, for compromise.
Article #80
MORAL DECISIONS Isn't Death Wonderful?
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Do you realize how often our culture proposes
death as the answer to problems? Is a child
inconvenient? Kill it. Is it going to be deformed?
Kill it. Are you faced with cancer or Alzheimers?
Kill yourself. Will this patient never regain
consciousness? Kill him. How altruistic we can be in
recommending the death of someone else. Wouldn't he or
she be better off dead rather than unwanted, deformed
or incapacitated?
The failure to protect life is the beginning of
the end for any society. Once we accept the precedent
that any group of persons can be killed, then, like it
or not, that same treatment can be extended to any
other group too small or too helpless to defend itself.
That is precisely what happened in Nazi Germany when
rights were denied to Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, the
insane, the retarded and anyone else who could be
declared less than human. Every atrocity was soon
perfectly legal.
It happened in the United States when our own
Supreme Court decided that slaves had no rights they
were less than fully human. It happened again in Roe
v. Wade when the unborn were declared less than human.
It is the direction many would like to take in regard
to the aged, the retarded, the deformed, the
unconscious, the disabled newborn and anyone else who
does not meet some arbitrary standard of "full" human
life.
Anyone elected to public office in this country
will need to face a problem of conscience that deals
with the most basic values of human life itself.
Legislation is being or will be contemplated and
promoted in everyone of the areas that I mentioned.
The person who runs for office will have to face the
fact that election may well depend on positions that
are literally matters of life and death. What does a
candidate do if popular opinion runs contrary to the
voice of true conscience?
For the moment I would like to limit my
consideration to this question of the Catholic
candidate. Of course, the same or similar problems of
conscience will exist for any other candidate
Catholic or not when he finds himself having to frame
or interpret civil laws which run contrary to the
truth. However, some problem areas may seem more
clearly delineated for the Catholic candidate.
The Catholic Church has a clearly defined
hierarchial structure and teaching authority. Its
moral positions have been stated clearly and publicly.
In many very basic moral issues both candidates and
voters will have little or no doubt about just what the
position of the Church is.
In some difficult areas the question themselves
are so complex that no candidate can or should give a
flat yes or no as representative of his position. For
example, the problems related to legal norms for
treatment of terminal patients or even for the feeding
of various types of unconscious patients are
sufficiently complex that various situations may demand
varied responses. The politician should not be
expected to offer a simple answer to a question filled
with both ethical and medical complexities. Answers
will need explanation. That, however, is far different
from the tack taken by politicians who purposely
respond with ambiguity, thus disguising their own
positions while attempting to woo voters on both sides
of an issue without satisfying the doubts of either.
One issue that is not nearly so complex is whether
the intentional killing of the unborn is right or
wrong. And, if one says that it is truly wrong, then
is it not just as wrong for government to legalize it
and even promote it by offering funds to supply it?
These answers may demand explanation to show why a
position is as it is, but they can be answered without
hedging, fudging, hiding or ambiguity. We have a right
to that sort of clarity before we vote for someone and
we have a right to know whether a candidate, who
presents himself as Catholic, will in practice follow
the conscience to which he lays claim.
Article #81
MORAL DECISIONS A Rare Bird
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
How much have we heard in past decades of "single
issue" candidates or "single issue" voters? Of course
it is foolish generally to run or to vote on one and
only one issue since there are many things in
government which demand considerable attention. Often
enough, however, that issue has been the question of
abortion and those who want to know a candidate's clear
position on it are accused of a "single issue"
mentality, when in fact it is the candidate who makes
it a single issue by being willing to come clean on all
the issues but that one. Abortion gets sidestepped,
clouded over or purposely fudged.
It is a rare candidate who tries to tell the
public not only what his position is on a given issue,
but how and why he has come to hold it. It is a rare
bird indeed who would try to do so on a really hot
issue such at that of abortion. On September 13, 1984,
in a talk given at Notre Dame University, Governor
Mario M. Cuomo of New York proved himself to be one of
those rarest of birds.
He entitled his lecture, "Religious Belief and
Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective."
His position was basically this: A Catholic public
official can, in good conscience and remaining faithful
to the teaching of his Church, be personally and
conscientiously opposed to abortion, and yet be able to
vote in favor of legislation which provides funding for
the performance of abortions.
I can hear many saying, "1984? That's ancient
history! Why go into it all at this late date?" First
of all, it still remains the one coherent effort by a
Catholic politician to make a clear and cogent
statement on this topic. Secondly, the Governor
himself never treated it as ancient, but referred back
to it often enough to justify later actions and
statements and, in doing so, was setting a tone for
other Catholic politicians as well. Third, since it
does represent a position easily adopted by others, it
deserves a response to warn others of how it misleads.
In this article and the next eight or nine as
well I will look at what the Governor has to say and
I will offer a response. I am in no way implying that
the Governor was dishonest or deceitful in what he
said. The fact is that he was quite clear and
forthright. But I am just a fully convinced that his
arguments are full of serious flaws and that he is dead
wrong in the position he describes and supports.
I am encouraged to respond in view of the fact
that in his presentation Governor Cuomo said: "I hope
that this public attempt to describe the problems as I
understand them, will give impetus to the dialogue in
the Catholic community and beyond, a dialogue which
could show me a better wisdom than I've been able to
find so far." And so (as the correspondents of the
last Century used to say), I take pen (or word
processor) in hand to offer my thoughts on the topic.
The arguments to which I will respond in the next
articles are those of the Governor, and I will at times
remind you of that. Yet I have no intention of saying
what I have to say as though it were addressed to the
Governor personally. It is not. That sort of
discussion would serve little purpose and would simply
reduce matters to some sort of contention with one
person. I have no reason to doubt his honesty, no
reason to doubt his sincerity and certainly no reason
to doubt his intelligence. There is no question of
personality in what I have to say. In fact, from what
I have read of the Governor and what I have heard him
say in interviews or speeches, I would say his
personality is quite engaging and his ability to
present his case quite impressive.
His arguments are not all rhetoric. They are
serious and well thought out. They deserve equally
serious and well thought out response and that is
what I shall offer. Clear as they are, his
suppositions are frequently wrong, and his conclusions
just as wrong also.
Article #82
MORAL DECISIONS A Good Beginning
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
An old English proverb holds that "A good
beginning makes a good ending." It is equally true to
say that a bad beginning makes a bad ending and may
even send you off on the wrong journey. If all of our
space exploration had started out with the old
geocentric theory that the sun revolves around the
earth, none of our space exploration would ever have
gotten off the ground. Or, even if it did, it would
certainly not have ended up in the right place.
When Governor Mario Cuomo began his 1984
presentation of thoughts on the question of the
Catholic politician and abortion legislation, he set
off from a beginning that took the whole journey in a
totally wrong direction. Yet, what he says seems at
first to make eminent sense.
"To be a Catholic is to say 'I believe' to the
essential core of dogmas that distinguishes our faith."
Yet we live in a pluralistic society and the Catholic
who holds public office "bears special responsibility.
He or she undertakes to help create conditions under
which all can live with a maximum of dignity and with a
reasonable degree of freedom; where everyone who
chooses may hold beliefs different from specifically
Catholic ones sometimes contradictory to them." All
who assume public office take an oath to preserve the
Constitution which guarantees this freedom. In fact,
to assure our own freedom, we must allow others the
same freedom. "We know that the price of seeking to
force our beliefs on others is that they might someday
force theirs on us."
The constitutional amendment which forbids the
establishment of a State Church also "affirms my legal
right to argue that my religious belief would serve
well as an article of universal public morality." Even
the public office holder has this right and must be
allowed to attempt to convince others of the rightness
of his position. "And surely, I can, if so inclined,
demand some kind of law against abortion not because my
Bishops say it is wrong but because I think that the
whole community, regardless of its religious beliefs,
should agree on the importance of protecting life..."
"I accept the Church's teaching on abortion. Must I
insist you do? By law? By denying you Medicaid
funding? By a constitutional amendment? If so, which
one? Would that be the best way to avoid abortions or
to prevent them?"
These questions constitute the beginning of the
Governor's approach. But it is in that very beginning
that the problem lies, and it will necessarily send us
off to a bad conclusion. He, like so many others,
reduces the whole problem to religious beliefs versus
religious freedom. However, that is not the case.
Yes, it is true that the Catholic Church argues
against abortion, but it is absolutely not a matter of
"specifically Catholic" belief. The moral position is
that human life has value and deserves to be protected
by the State. That is certainly not peculiar to
Catholics. Nor is it a peculiarly Catholic teaching
that the unborn child deserves that protection. The
evidence of science leaves no doubt that the fertilized
ovum, the embryo, is new life, individual life, human
life. There is no doubt or question of its humanity
that can claim scientific support.
To begin with the notion that this is a
specifically Catholic position is to make a very bad
beginning indeed. The whole line of thought is then
colored by a basic error which, intentionally or not,
fudges the whole issue and avoids the real question.
Article #83
MORAL DECISIONS The Meaning of Words
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Quite some time ago I ordered and received a copy
of the transcript of arguments in the famous Roe v.
Wade case the case in which the Supreme Court opened
the door to the wanton abortion of infants on demand.
One of the things which I found most intriguing was the
use of words. Among them was the very important word,
"person." Those who argue that the court based its
decision on the ground that the unborn child is not a
person, might be in for a surprise if they were to read
what actually took place in the presentation of the
case.
Those who support abortion differ in their views.
There are, indeed, some who would say that the embryo
is a person, but that the woman's right to kill it
takes precedence over its right to life. However, even
the judges who made the Roe v. Wade decision were not
having any of that. In fact, in the course of the
hearing, one of the Justices said that the acceptance
of such a position should then logically lead to the
legal acceptance of the killing of a husband because he
was in some way a threat to his wife's health.
Instead, they made their ruling on the ground that the
fetus is not a person.
What is interesting, is that their words might not
really mean quite what think. Their position was not
really in terms of the true humanity or real personhood
of the unborn child. It was based, instead, on the
fact that the fetus, even if a real person, was not a
legal person (i.e., a citizen with rights to be
preserved), because the Fourteenth Amendment extended
such rights only to those who are born or naturalized
as citizens. In that sense, it was a decision based on
the rankest sort of legalism.
Mrs. Sarah R. Weddington, the counsel for "Jane
Roe," argued that a law which accepted the rights of
the fetus was merely a statutory and not a
constitutional protection (since to be a citizen
deserving of the full protection of the Constitution,
you must be born). In her words, "You do not balance
constitutional rights of one person against mere
statutory rights of another." Even she is clearly
speaking of both mother and unborn child as persons,
but not both as citizens!
There are others, of course, who support abortion
on the ground that a fetus is not a person, by which
they mean person in a real sense and not only in a
legal sense. The problem with their position, however,
is that it has to fly in the face of every shred of
observable scientific evidence from which the inference
of personhood could and should be drawn.
In other words, the real question at the heart of
the matter is not a question of religious belief, but
of evidence observable and producible by scientific
procedure. It is from this evidence that the inference
of personhood of the fetus follows immediately. It
would not even be questioned, were it not for the
desire to abort.
To act in favor of abortion is to act contrary to
science and reason. For the Catholic, of course, it
also happens to mean acting against his Church as well.
But the Church is making no demand for an act of blind
faith in a dogmatic position. Rather, the Church, with
its authority, simply supports what one can see as
truth even without an act of faith.
The problem involved in the abortion issue is not
one of Church versus State. It is a problem of truth
versus error. What the Church adds to the discussion
is that the life of the unborn is sacred as well as
valuable.
Article #84
MORAL DECISIONS Pluralism
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
One of the battle cries of the abortionists is
that we live in a pluralistic society a society in
which there is the freedom for multiple opinions and
beliefs to live side by side. A society in which no
one is to be coerced into acting against what he holds
to be the truth. (Of course, that is not totally true.
There are those who can and should be coerced. What,
for example, would you do with Satanists who advocated
infant sacrifice?) However, we can and should accept a
pluralism which recognizes the need for freedom, when
that freedom is not detrimental to and destructive of
basic human rights which still leaves quite a bit of
room for discussion at times.
There is a problem, however, when we begin to
think of pluralism as meaning that we are all entitled
to our opinions, that every opinion is a good every
other one and that we never have a right to contradict
what another says. There is an even deeper problem
when use the word "opinion" but are really talking
about things that are far more than mere matters of
opinion.
To live in a pluralistic society does not mean
that we have to hold back from stating and supporting
what we hold as truth. Even if the abortion issue were
completely a matter of religious belief (and it is
not), we would have every right to attempt to persuade
others to accept and see the truth of our position.
Please note, I say persuade and not coerce or impose
upon. But let us not fool ourselves into thinking that
we can be persuasive if we say one thing but do
another.
In the last century slaveowners who argued against
slavery could hardly have been very convincing. In
Nazi Germany in the 1940's a legislator who argued
against killing Jews, while still voting funding for
better crematoria, could hardly have been a powerful
voice for the truth. So it is even now.
The Catholic office holder who says that he is
personally opposed to abortion and then votes to fund
it for others is offering no persuasion at all and I
would begin to doubt the sincerity of his own
convictions. To fund abortions while saying that it is
the taking of human life means either that one does not
really believe this or that one does not really mind
murder.
Real pluralism means the freedom both to state and
to live by what I believe, and to do otherwise is
simply to mislead. For the Catholic legislator it also
means the freedom to state his position in conscience
and to vote by that position as well. To do less is
not pluralism. It is sad neglect.
We might note, however, that the real coercion is
not on the side of the pro-life advocates. It is the
pro-abortionists who have been the guilty parties. Is
it not a perfect example of coercion for me to be
forced, under penalty of law, to pay taxes which
legislators are then going to use to pay for abortions
which both faith and reason tell me are immoral? I am
forced to act against my conscience.
I am of the opinion that the mere passing of laws
against abortion is not the final answer to the
problem. We need to bring about changes in more than
legal structure. There is a need for change in minds
and hearts. This does not mean that a change in the
law is useless or negligible, but even a change of
legislation in our country will not come about without
a change in the outlook of the majority. But isn't
that what persuasion is all about? And it cannot be
emphasized enough that we will never persuade anyone if
we say one thing and do another.
Article #85
MORAL DECISIONS The Famous Right to Privacy
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Whenever we enter into the realm of civil
legislation, we are faced with real questions of
individual rights, and those rights should not be taken
lightly. Much has been said in these last few years
about the "right to privacy" guaranteed by the
Constitution. In fact, no such right is mentioned in
that document. The courts, however, have construed it
as being implied in the Ninth Amendment, which says:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
The implied "right to privacy" would mean that the
State cannot intervene in the life of the individual in
areas which are that person's business and should not
be the concern of the State. There are, of course,
some obvious limits to that right when it interferes
with the legitimate rights of others. If I steal or
murder, then I cannot claim that it is my business and
the State should stay out of it.
In abortion, however, precisely that claim is
being made. It is the woman's "right" to decide if she
shall or shall not end her pregnancy by killing her
child. It is justified on the grounds that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not recognize her child as a
citizen with constitutional rights. If ever a legal
situation demanded change, this is it!
When Governor Cuomo addressed this, he did so in
terms of the notion that "the values derived from
religious belief will not and should not be
accepted as part of the public morality unless they are
shared by the pluralistic community at large, by
consensus." That would, of course, place the question
into the realm of private religious opinion and the
"right to privacy" should apply. The flaw, of course,
is in the assumption that we are dealing with values
derived from one particular set of religious beliefs.
We are not.
The Governor, like many others, does not seriously
take up the question of the evidence for the humanity
of the unborn child. Perhaps we cannot blame him. He
says that he is a lawyer and politician and not a
theologian or a philosopher although, as one might
expect, he does deal in his talk with theological and
philosophical concepts. Neither is he a doctor or an
embryologist, but he had better with those issues as
well. It is as easy for a politician as it is for
anyone else to be misled by the pro-abortionists who do
not want us to look at embryology at all. Instead,
they will try in every instance to insist that this is
a Church-State issue. It is not.
The fact that so many religious people and
religious leaders (and they are not all by any stretch
of the imagination Catholic) are opposed to abortion
makes it easy, perhaps, for many to discount what they
say as being just "religious stuff." That is as
ridiculous as taking the comments of Governor Cuomo or
any other politician as just "political stuff" or
"legal stuff." Applying a derogatory name does not
negate the reality of the issue.
The Governor spoke of those "who say there is a
simple answer to all these questions; they say that by
history and practice of our people we were intended to
be and should be a Christian country in law" and
therefore we should impose purely Christian norms. He
rightfully rejects that concept. But that is not what
the question is about. (In fact, I might find it
terribly hard to pin down very much evidence at all to
prove that the country is Christian.) The problem is
that a basic human right is being discounted under the
guise of being no more than a religious squabble.
Article #86
MORAL DECISIONS Settling for a Wet Hen
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
In reference to compromise, Time, in 1958, quoted
Nikita Khrushchev as having said: "If you cannot catch
a bird of paradise, better take a wet hen." I suppose
there are some areas in which you should be willing to
settle for less than you bargained for. But that does
not make much sense in matters of life and death.
It may well be a temptation for those in
government to think that they have done enough provided
that they have at least reached a compromise. That is
not always true.
In 1984 Governor Mario Cuomo spoke of the fact
that what we believe to be best cannot always be put
into effect and that even the modes of political
persuasion vary and are not at all a matter of faith.
In reference to the abortion issue, this was taken to
imply that even if new laws were the best way to
proceed, and even if our faith demanded that we look
toward such laws, faith would not be able to supply for
everyone the best way in which to work toward such a
goal. He said: "That is, while we always owe our
Bishops' words respectful attention and careful
consideration, the question whether to engage the
political system in a struggle to have it adopt certain
articles of our belief as part of public morality, is
not a matter of doctrine: it is a matter of prudential
political judgement."
Furthermore, "on divorce and birth control,
without changing its moral teaching, the Church abides
the civil law as it now stands without making much of
a point of it that in our pluralistic society we are
not required to insist that all our religious values be
the law of the land."
These statements sound like the basis for some
sort of justifiable compromise even on abortion, but
they are not. There is still the same basic false
supposition that we are dealing merely with the belief
of a particular religion. That is not the case. The
reality is that we are legally killing millions of
people each year because of a legalism that fails to
look at the truth. What is at issue is not a matter of
Catholic theology, but a matter of the most basic human
right to life.
It may seem both easy and reasonable to speak of
the Church's tolerance of civil law in regard to birth
control or divorce, and then equate these with the
issue of abortion. The argument then proceeds: Just as
the Church does not propose a political plan to bring
about laws on divorce or birth control, so it should
leave to individual politicians decisions on the best
political plan to do something about abortion.
From one point of view, that makes eminent sense.
The Church does not dictate to Catholic politicians the
way in which they should go about their political
efforts to achieve the greatest good for their citizens
(apart, of course, from the concern of the Church that
what they do should be moral and honest).
From another point, however, our conclusions must
be quite different. The Catholic politician who says
that he is opposed in conscience to abortion, but then
votes for its legality and even for its funding, is
speaking out of both sides of his mouth. He cannot
claim that he is merely finding the best political way
in which to do something about abortion. He is,
whether he admits it or not, advocating abortion and
offering it his active support. He is not only
settling for the wet hen. He is making sure that the
bird of paradise will not even survive.
Article #87
MORAL DECISIONS Dreams and Reality
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
The Church does teach that artificial birth
control is wrong, but it does not invoke the need for
civil sanctions against those who do it. Yet it does
promote the need for legal restrictions in regard to
abortion.
In the Roe v. Wade hearing of October, 1972, Mr.
Robert C. Flowers, the attorney for the State of Texas,
quoted from an earlier case in which judges had argued
from the fact that the state allows birth control to
the fact that it could therefore not rule against
abortion. A dissenting judge had written in the
minority opinion: "In other words, in their view no
distinction can be made between prohibiting the use of
contraceptives and prohibiting the destruction of fetal
life, which, as explained above, can be construed to be
a human life. I find this assertion incredible.
Contraception prevents the creation of new life;
abortion destroys the existing life. Contraception and
abortion are as distinguishable as thoughts and dreams
are distinguishable from a reality."
Abortion is a far greater evil than either divorce
or birth control. It destroys life. Even then, if it
occurred but rarely, one might not demand a general law
against it. But in the United States it happens on the
average of 4000 times each day. Someone had better do
something about it!
Governor Cuomo argued that it is not the function
of the Church to define a particular political plan to
achieve such goals. "There is no Church teaching that
mandates the best political course for making our
belief everyone's rule, for spreading this part of our
Catholicism. There is neither an encyclical nor a
catechism that spells out a political strategy for
achieving legislative goals." That sounds good, but it
is wrong. It is not simply a matter of "part of our
Catholicism." It is a matter of killing innocent
persons.
The Governor also argues that legal prohibition of
abortion by civil government is not a "plausible
possibility." It wouldn't work. It would be
"'prohibition' revisited, legislating what couldn't be
enforced and in the process creating a disrespect for
law in general." "Nor would a denial of medicaid
funding for abortion achieve our objectives." "The
hard truth is that abortion isn't a failure of
government. No agency or department of government
forces women to have abortions, but abortion goes on...
Collectively we Catholics apparently believe and
perhaps act little differently from those who don't
share our commitment." He says that we could
accomplish more by good example and lack of hypocrisy.
I could hardly argue with that. We must both say and
do what is right.
Beneath all the rhetoric, however, is the real
crux of the issue. The Church cannot and should not
mandate one precise political plan as though such a
plan were a matter of faith. In fact, I am not aware
that it has done so or ever showed signs of doing so.
But it has tried to make it quite clear that no one can
live with two heads in disagreement with each other and
still claim to be one person.
It is ridiculous to say, "I am personally opposed
to abortion," while at the same time saying, "I will
pay for abortion and I will do nothing to stop it."
The great political plan of doing something about
abortion while keeping it legal and paying for it is
the ultimate hypocrisy.
Article #88
MORAL DECISIONS Political Credibility
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
When a politician speaks in support of the "right"
that a woman has to abortion and then even helps to
fund the carrying out of that "right," he cannot then
claim even a shred of personal or political credibility
when he says that he is personally opposed to abortion.
Some politicians would like to create the
impression that they are opposed to abortion as a
personal belief, but that they are law abiding citizens
who are not able to do anything to stop it. Many of
them really mean that they will not attempt to stop it.
Of course, there are real limits to what any
single legislator or judge or executive may do. The
very least that can be done, however, is not to promote
it.
The legislator who votes for pro-abortion bills or
funding is doing wrong no matter what he says. He may,
in good conscience and with good political reasons,
vote for a bill which places further restrictions on
abortion, even if it does not completely prohibit it,
since that may be the best that can be accomplished at
a given time. An executive may sign such legislation
into law for the same reason.
The executive is in a particularly crucial
position if he has the power to veto. He can veto
bills that offer funding for abortions and should do
so. Of course, they may be later passed over his veto;
that is also part of the process of government. The
executive cannot change that; but if he fails to use
his own power properly, then he should be honest enough
to admit that he does indeed favor abortion and its
funding. Otherwise, he acts to preserve his job, but
he can no longer claim to be really opposed to the
killing of the unborn.
Governor Cuomo introduced still another argument
into this discussion. It is his contention that, in
spite of Roe v. Wade, there is still much that we can
do. He said: "While we argue over abortion, the United
States' infant mortality rate places us sixteenth among
the nations of the world. Thousands of infants die
each year because of inadequate medical care. Some are
born with birth defects that, with proper treatment,
could be prevented. Some are stunted in their physical
and mental growth because of improper nutrition...
there is enough work for all of us. Lifetimes of it."
What he states are, indeed, facts deplorable
facts. They are all problems which need to be
addressed and which we keep putting off or attempting
to solve in dreadfully inadequate ways. It is almost
as sad a situation as one can imagine to think that
thousands of children die needlessly each year when our
efforts might have saved many or most of them. It is
frighteningly sadder still to realize that there are
also 1,600,000 children purposely murdered each year
before they have a chance to draw the first breath.
It is ridiculous even to suggest that we should
satisfy ourselves with caring for the terrible needs
suggested above, while ignoring or even being asked
to pay for the millions of murders made legal by the
courts and legislators. Of course, we must care for
all of these problems and do what we can to solve them.
But let us not fool ourselves into thinking we can
ignore the one in favor of the other. It would be as
unrealistic as it would have been for German
politicians to fund Hitler's atrocities while pointing
at the same time to the prosperity that his government
could and did bring about.
Article #89
MORAL DECISIONS The Litmus Test
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Do you remember litmus paper from high school
chemistry? You dipped it into a fluid and it turned
blue or pink depending on whether the fluid was an acid
or not. One touch of the test paper, and you had the
answer.
Politicians in the past few years have frequently
referred to the dreaded litmus test of their positions.
They feared that a direct answer to a question on
abortion would be the litmus test of fidelity to their
constituents and their religion.
Governor Cuomo said: "Abortion has a unique
significance but not a preemptive significance...
Approval or rejection of legal restrictions on abortion
should not be the exclusive litmus test of Catholic
loyalty." He is, of course, right. It should not be
the only test, but it is one real test. I cannot claim
that I am living a good life on the ground that I keep
all of the commandments but one. The commandments are
not multiple choice.
How should the Church and its Bishops act in
regard to Catholic politicians who clearly act in favor
of abortion on demand, while claiming that they are
personally opposed to it? How should they react to
those who make an issue of their Catholicism to get
elected while, at the same time, making it clear that
no one need fear them when it comes to restricting
abortion?
Bishops are pastors of souls with a most serious
obligation to teach and to care for those entrusted to
their care. They are obliged to care enough about
those politicians to point out to them just how wrong
they are. This care can be exercised through local
pastors and it can be exercised in private, without
becoming a public issue.
But what if those politicians will not change?
What if they do indeed make an issue of their
Catholicism, even creating the impression that their
pro-abortion position is not in conflict with their
religion? The pastor of souls cannot stand by in
silence and allow others to be misled. He may be
required to state clearly and publicly that this person
is not living out the truth and is not living out the
teaching of his own Church.
Do you recall the uproar of a few years ago, when
one of the Auxiliary Bishops of New York made a
perfectly correct pastoral statement? He said that
politicians who act in favor of abortion should be
concerned about their own salvation. He was accused of
consigning them to hell, which, indeed, he was not
doing. But he was calling them to look at their own
conduct in the light of conscience and not to be
satisfied with adopting a politically expedient
position.
This is not a retreat into fundamentalism, nor a
dreadful abuse of authority nor is it even a position
which will settle for nothing less than full civil
implementation of its own views. It is the care of a
pastor for his flock.
The prophet Ezekiel said: "If I say to the wicked,
'You shall surely die,' and you fail to warn him if
you say nothing to warn the wicked man from his wicked
way, in order to save his life he being wicked shall
die for his iniquity, but his blood will I require at
your hand. If, however, you warn the wicked man, and
he turn not away from his wicked conduct and his wicked
way, he shall die for his iniquity, but you will have
saved yourself."
The matter of abortion is not simply a
specifically Catholic issue; but it is a matter so
important and so basic that the Church would be remiss
if it did not teach the truth and teach it with
authority.
Article #90
MORAL DECISIONS Patriotic Funerals
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
We have probably all been to the funerals of
veterans and seen the American flag draped over the
coffin. It is a sign of respect and of patriotism, a
meaningful tribute to the person.
In July of 1989 the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services. The decision did not undo Roe v. Wade, but
it did accept the right of the individual states to set
limits on abortions. The limits were small, but they
were at least some effort to lessen the wholesale
slaughter of the unborn.
Governor Cuomo, in his famous 1984 speech, pointed
to the oath of elected officials to preserve the
Constitution, and said that part of that preservation
consisted in not denying funding for women to have
abortions. This he based on Roe v. Wade as an
authentic interpretation of the Constitution. "Given
Roe v. Wade it would be nothing more than an attempt to
do indirectly what the law says cannot be done
directly..." Yet he says that he is personally opposed
to abortion.
You might expect that the Webster decision would
have given the Governor some relief. It at least
allows for some limits which can be imposed legally and
with approval of the Supreme Court the authentic
interpreter of the Constitution.
The Webster decision was handed down on July 3,
1989. Three days later Governor Cuomo announced his
intention to reject any legislation that would limit
abortion in the ways set forth by the Court's decision!
Of course, the Governor does not make the laws himself,
so what he is saying is this: Even if a majority of New
York legislators drew up a law totally in accord with
the decision of the Supreme Court, he would veto it!
In the same speech he spoke of another decision
handed down on the same day in which the Court held
that "no law could prohibit political protestors from
burning the American flag." The Governor affirmed that
he would find a way to ban flag-burning. This seems to
me a seriously distorted sense of priorities.
He will do his all to save the flag, while drawing
no limit on abortion in a state which in 1985 (the last
year for which statistics were available at the time of
this writing) allowed the legal murder of 195,000
babies. This attitude put the flag over a whole host
of coffins, but with no attention to respect or
patriotism or meaningful tribute to the dead.
I cannot judge the internal state of Governor
Cuomo or of anyone else. But I can describe my
rightful expectations. We have a right to expect our
elected officials to act in accord with conscience. We
have a right to expect them not to have two
consciences, one public and one private. That division
leads to ruin and chaos.
If a person's conscience says that abortion is
wrong, then this should be evident in words and
actions. If it says that abortion is acceptable, then
words and actions should say the same. No one should
hide behind one or the other in order to garner votes.
I could not vote for a person of such divided
conscience to represent me. I would never be able to
be certain just how much evil the public conscience
could tolerate. In a society which has the freedom to
determine its laws and which allows its public
officials to follow their consciences, it is a false
patriotism which hides behind a court decision in order
to justify setting aside personal conscience in favor
of the expediency of the moment.
Article #91
MORAL DECISIONS Blind Justice
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Although I have never gone there personally to
observe it for myself, I have read that atop the Old
Bailey (the criminal court of London) there is a large
statue of Justice. In one hand she holds a balance to
show that evidence will be weighed. In the other is a
sword the threat of legitimate government to enforce
its rule. Over her eyes is a blindfold to show that
she will judge by the weight of evidence and not by her
view of the person who comes before her.
The statue is a symbol of the fairness of the
application of law in the courts. To bring that symbol
into the realm of reality is no easy task. The judge
and jury, with all their human weaknesses, are expected
in some fashion to bring an ideal to life.
The place of the judge is crucial. Blind as
justice may be, the judge who hears a case must keep
both eyes and ears wide open to the evidence. His mind
must also be just as open. If he judges on the basis
of his own biases, preconceptions or even
misconceptions then he does not do justice. If he
does not, cannot or will not grasp the meaning of
issues and evidence, then he will be blind to the truth
and that is the one thing to which justice cannot be
blind.
The fact is that we do not live in an ideal world
and any judge even a justice of the Supreme Court
can be afflicted with blindness. The issue of abortion
provides an all too clear example.
In 1989 there was a case Webster v. Human
Reproductive Services in the course of which some of
the Justices of the Court most distressingly exhibited
that blindness. Fortunately, at least in that case,
they were in the minority. Yet what they said is so
blatantly blind that it deserves our attention. It is
the typical sort of blindness that comes from
preconception and misconception.
Webster v. Human Reproductive Services was a case
that emerged from a Missouri law which was intended to
set some limit on abortion. That limit was modest
enough. In 1973 the Roe v. Wade decision of the
Supreme Court allowed for abortion from the moment of
conception up to the moment of birth. That decision
stupid as it was did, however, allow that the states
do have some right to attempt to protect the unborn.
On the arbitrary and sadly unscientific basis of
the division of the nine months of pregnancy into three
periods of three months each (referred to as
"trimesters"), they made distinctions. In the first
trimester the unborn had no rights and so the state
could do little or nothing to offer protection. In the
second trimester it might have some power to act. But
it was only in the last three months that the state
might try to make some serious effort to limit
abortion.
In that third trimester the unborn child is
viable. That means that the child is capable then of
living outside the womb. The Missouri law tried to
save at least some babies by demanding that the
abortion clinic run tests to see if the child marked
for killing was viable. The pro-abortionists, of
course, contested even that much protection.
In the end, the Supreme Court upheld the law, but
not unanimously. Dissenting opinions were written by
Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Harry Blackmen
(concurred in by Justice William Brennan and Justice
Thurgood Marshall). These dissenting opinions were
perfect examples of just the sort of blindness that is
so deplorable. In coming columns I will address what
they had to say. A statue of blind Justice points to an
ideal. The blindness of these Justices points to
disaster.
Article #92
MORAL DECISIONS The Legal Scale
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
In 1978, in a speech at Harvard, Alexander
Solzhenitsyn said: "A society without any legal scale
is a terrible one indeed. but a society with no other
scale but the legal one is not quite worthy of man
either." In some areas of our legal system we are
clearly on our way to this unworthy position. Saddest
of all we are getting there in the most basic areas of
human life.
What does it mean to have no scale but the legal
one? It means that morality and legality are taken to
be the same thing. Things are considered morally right
simply because they are legal. In other words, the law
does not try to support what is good and prohibit what
is evil. Instead, it tries to make things good merely
by proclaiming then to be legal.
If you want an example of what this implies, then
you can look back to Nazi Germany in the 1930's and
1940's. The law made it right to kill Jews, gypsies,
homosexuals and political undesirables. The goodness
or badness of death camps was measured only in terms of
their efficiency with no reference to the morality of
murder. The law made it all right.
You could also look back a little further right
here in the United States. Prior to 1865 slavery was
perfectly legal and quite constitutional. Indeed, in
1857 the Supreme Court declared it so. It was legal
and therefore right to buy and sell human beings as
though they were cattle. The law made it all right.
Even a little thought should tell us there is
something wrong here. Yet it took a civil war (and a
constitutional amendment) in the United States and the
Nuremburg war trials in Germany to point out the
stupidity of laws that were, in fact, immoral. The law
must be in accord with morality. It does not create
it.
Yet here we are at the end of the Twentieth
Century and we have still not learned the lesson of
that history. It is perfectly legal to kill unborn
children even though it is absolutely immoral. As in
the two examples already mentioned, even now the
helpless who cannot defend themselves are destroyed for
the benefit of others.
In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court took a
step which it is difficult to imagine any court doing.
Abortion, which until then had been a crime, was now
proclaimed to be a constitutional right! How could
this have happened?
The answer is actually quite simple. The case was
judged on "no other scale but the legal one." They
ignored moral norms. They ignored scientific evidence.
They looked only at the law and that led to disaster.
The law in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution said that the rights of citizens could
not be abridged by any state, and it defined citizens
as those who become such by birth or naturalization.
The unborn child is not yet born and therefore not yet
a citizen. Therefore it has no constitutional rights
and so its mother exercising her rights can kill
her own child.
Ironically, that same amendment says that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." The amendment was clearly never intended to
justify abortion. If anything, it is more obviously a
rejection of it. But a purely legalistic court
declared the unborn child a non-person legally, even if
that same child is truly a person in any other sense.
A judgment based on "no other scale but the legal one"
has turned out to be more deadly even than the court's
decision in favor of slavery. And it is every bit as
bad as the death-dealing legality of the Nazis.
Article #93
MORAL DECISIONS History Repeats Itself
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
History repeats itself. That's one of those
adages so old that we are likely to forget how true it
really is.
In 1857 a case came the Supreme Court of the
United States. Dred Scott, a Missouri slave, was taken
by his master to Illinois in 1834, then to the
Louisiana territory north of Missouri and then back to
Missouri in 1838 where he was sold to a man named
Sandford. Later Scott claimed his freedom on the
grounds of his sojourn in the free state of Illinois.
The circuit court of St. Louis county decided in his
favor. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed
that decision.
Scott then went to a federal circuit court for
damages due to violence Sandford had done to him, his
wife and his two children. Sandford claimed the court
had no jurisdiction since Scott was a slave and
therefore no citizen. The court said that it did have
jurisdiction, but it also ruled that Scott was still
Sandford's slave.
In 1856 the case came before the Supreme Court.
At first the court was going to refuse to adjudge
Sandford's claim that they had no jurisdiction and
merely uphold the Missouri decision as being in accord
with the laws of the state. However, after the
decision was already in process of being written, the
justices decided to broaden their response and write a
decision which would once and for all support the
presence of slavery in the Constitution and the
subsequent Missouri Compromise of 1820. Slavery would
become a matter of inviolable law.
The Missouri Compromise was an act of Congress
which set limits on slavery. It was allowed in those
states already allowing it, in the area of the
Louisiana Purchase as far north as latitude 36�30' and
in Missouri. This compromise had been agreed upon in
Congress, but those who opposed slavery saw it as
totally wrong.
In 1847 Salmon P. Chase (who later became Chief
Justice) had written: "If courts will not overthrow
[the pro-slavery construction of the Constitution], the
people will, even if it be necessary to overthrow the
courts also." His prophecy was more than fulfilled in
the American Civil War. But in 1857, when the court
made its decision on Dred Scott, the justices were
determined that they would restore harmony and remove
all opposition by making a decision that would uphold
the slavery clauses of the Constitution and the
Missouri Compromise.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney wrote the majority
opinion in the 7-2 split decision. He wrote that
Blacks were "a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the government
might choose to grant them."
A decision so shallow, based on ignorance and
bias, was certainly no source of harmony and hastened
the start of civil war.
That decision ignored the humanity of a whole
race. On the basis of legal force and blissful
ignorance, it imposed upon everyone the selfish
interests of the minority. It did not succeed and we
can look back now and applaud its failure while we
marvel at its stupidity.
And then came January 1973, when another court in
the case of Roe v. Wade again tried to impose upon
everyone the ignorance and selfishness of the few. It
too voted 7-2 in favor of the oppression and even
death of the most defenseless in society. It reduced
persons to non-persons. It made immorality legal. It
too may take a constitutional amendment to undo. In
any case, let us hope that history does not repeat
itself to extent of needing a civil war.
Article #94
MORAL DECISIONS Where Slavery Is, Liberty Cannot Be
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Charles Sumner, in a speech given in 1864 said,
"Where Slavery is, there Liberty cannot be; and where
Liberty is, there Slavery cannot be."
In the last article, I wrote about the 1857 Dred
Scott decision. In it the Supreme Court upheld slavery
not claiming to uphold an evil, but under the guise
of securing for slave owners a fundamental freedom to
ownership of property. The seven justices who
supported the decision did not see themselves as
callous buyers and sellers of human flesh. Rather,
they said that blacks were "a subordinate and inferior
class of beings." They were less human than whites and
could be disposed of at will. Their oppression could
not stand in the way of the "freedom" of their
persecutors.
Could anyone now look at that decision and find it
fair, impartial and objective? Could anyone truly say
that it was a day of glory for the 1857 Court when, in
the name of freedom, it reduced human beings to the
level of commodities to be bought, sold, used, killed
and disposed of? What then of a 1973 Court which in
Roe v. Wade did exactly the same thing to the unborn
child?
Indeed what of certain members of the Supreme
Court in 1989? The court, by a vote of 5-4, upheld a
Missouri law which offered the most minimal of
protections to unborn children once they were viable.
Four of the Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan,
Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens refused to
support even that much protection, for fear that it
would lead to the overturning of Roe v. Wade. That, of
course, would undermine every mother's basic freedom to
kill her own child.
Justice Blacksmun, who wrote a minority opinion,
must have been fully aware of the parabllels between
Dred Scott v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade. He would no
doubt agree that Dred Scott needed to be reversed and
was reversed, not only by constitutional amendment, but
by implication in every subsequent Supreme Court
decision in the area of civil rights. Yet he argues
that changing Roe v. Wade would upset the "aspirations
and settled understanding of American women." No doubt
the overturning of Dred Scott would also have upset the
aspirations and settled understanding of slave owners.
If he was really serious about his position, then all
black Americans should be happy that he never got to
vote on an effort to reverse Dred Scott.
Justice Blackmun also fears that the effort of the
majority of the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade would be
"profoundly destructive of this court as an
institution. To overturn a constitutional decision is
a rare and grave undertaking. To overturn a
constitutional decision that secured a fundamental
personal liberty to millions of persons would be
unprecedented in our 200 years of constitutional
history."
This argument seems much like what you might
scoop up with a shovel after a bull has passed by. The
murder of unborn children is no more a "fundamental
personal liberty" than was the ownership of slaves.
Nor would the Court destroy itself by admitting its
earlier error. In fact, that admission could earn it a
great deal of respect.
A decision that is so blatantly wrong deserves to
be overturned at the earliest opportunity. Such was
Dred Scott v. Sandford and such is Roe v. Wade. Both
supported the reduction of of millions of human beings
to disposable property. In fact, Roe v. Wade turned
unborn children into disposable tissue available for
death, experiment and the raw material for lucrative
businesses in clinics and laboratories.
The Justice, of course speaks of freedom for
women. He ignores their helpless offspring and will
not even open his eyes to the fact that they too are
persons. Where there is slavery there is no liberty.
Where there is legal murder there is no freedom.
Article #95
MORAL DECISIONS Ignoring Facts
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
"Practical politics consists in ignoring facts"
(Henry Brook Adams). Cynical as that may sound, it has
its grain of truth. It is a sad state of affairs,
however, when we find Supreme Court Justices ignoring
the facts even if they do it out of ignorance.
Such is the case with the dissent of Justice Harry
Blackmun from the Court's decision in Webster v.
Reproductive Heath Services. The Missouri law made it
illegal for a physician to abort a viable fetus. It
also said that when the unborn child's age had reached
20 weeks, the physician could be required to perform
tests to show whether the unborn child was viable or
not. Viability occurs at 23� 24 weeks gestational age,
but it is not at all uncommon for doctors' estimates
(without tests) to be off by as much as four weeks.
Justice Blackmun was unhappy with this. He wrote:
"By mandating tests to determine fetal weight and lung
maturity for every fetus thought to be more than 20
weeks gestational age, the statute required physicians
to undertake procedures, such as amniocentesis, that,
in the situation presented have no medical
justification, impose significant additional health
risks on both the pregnant woman and the fetus, and
bear no rational relation to the state's interest in
protecting fetal life. As written, section 188.029 is
an arbitrary imposition of discomfort, risk and
expenses, furthering no discernible interest except to
make the procurement of an abortion as arduous and
difficult as possible."
Justice Blacksmun in this same opinion also wrote:
"No one contests that under the Roe framework the
state, in order to promote its interest in potential
human life may regulate and even proscribe [i.e.,
forbid] non-therapeutic abortions once the fetus
becomes viable." The Missouri law intended to exercise
that right to protect the viable unborn. It should
protect them even before that, but Roe v. Wade prevents
that.
Blackmun's contention that the tests serve no
purpose is ridiculous. The viable child in question is
in the womb of a mother who would like to kill it. She
and her child are being examined by a physician who
makes his living murdering children. The state would
be as foolish as Blackmun if it did not require tests!
The word of the participants is highly suspect.
It is also a fact that the tests mentioned in the
law are not extraordinary at all. They are the same
ones to be used by an honest doctor to determine
viability if he were trying to save a child who had to
be delivered prematurely. Age, weight and lung
maturity are essential elements for viability, and
amniocentesis is the way to determine the presence of
surfactants which prove lung maturity.
As to Justice Blackmun's fears that the tests
would be dangerous to mother and fetus, they are
nonsense. The risks to the mother at this stage would
be minimal apart from risks caused by a sloppy
abortionist. In fact, the risk to the fetus is, at
this stage, far less than it would be earlier.
However, the real stupidity of the Justice's
remarks is in his total disregard of still one more
fact. His other statements may have been based on
ignorance of medicine, but he abandoned all logic when
he expressed his concern that the fetus would run a
risk in the tests. He knew full well that without the
test it would be killed. The risk of the amniocentesis
is nothing compared to the danger posed by the mother
and her abortionist.
It is sad and yet it seems all too true that the
Justice has made up his mind about abortion and that he
has no desire to clutter up his judgement with facts.
Article #96
MORAL DECISIONS Wrong Rights
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
When Justice Harry Blackmun argued against the
majority decision of the Supreme Court in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services (1989), he offered not
only rather doubtful arguments, but also a very
emotional plea as well.
At one point he says: "Thus, 'not with a bang,
but a whimper,' the plurality discards a landmark case
[Roe v. Wade] of the last generation and casts into
darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in this
country who had come to believe that the Constitution
guarantees her the right to exercise some control over
the ability to bear children. The plurality does so
either oblivious or insensitive to the fact that
millions of women, and their families have ordered
their lives around the right to reproductive choice,
and that this right has become vital to the full
participation of women in the economic and political
walks of American life."
He makes it sound so sad, but what does it all
mean? Does the Constitution guarantee a woman the
right to exercise some control over her ability to bear
children? I should hope so! It should not force her
to have any certain number of children. Nor should it
forbid her the right to have any at all. Indeed, her
control over her ability to bear children should have a
great deal to do with her own choice and her common
sense. She should make conscious choices in the proper
and responsible use of her own sexual faculties.
The primary point of responsibility in the process
of becoming pregnant is at the point of intercourse.
In our present society, this responsibility is
consistently ignored. People are thoroughly
irresponsible and unrealistic when they look at sex as
recreational and totally ignore the fact that its most
obvious purpose is procreational. They want to have
"fun" with no regard for the fact that they are doing
something whose goal, by its very nature, is geared
toward the start of a new human life.
Does the Constitution guarantee a woman the right
to choose to kill someone in order to undo the result
of her own irresponsibility? I should hope not! That
would be of no benefit to the woman or to society. It
is most clearly no benefit to the child, whose life is
to be squashed out. The failure to accept the first
responsibility in the process is not going to be
corrected at all by now encouraging an even greater
abnegation of responsibility.
Justice Blackmun denounces the majority of the
Court as oblivious or insensitive. His reason for this
accusation is that millions of women and their families
have ordered their lives around their guarantee of
reproductive choice. He sees this "right" as essential
to insuring the place of women in America's political
and economic life. All the while, of course, the
Justice remains both oblivious and insensitive to the
child who will be put to death to assure these "noble"
economic and political goals.
To deny that women have "reproductive choice"
sounds so oppressive and "unamerican." However,
responsible choice should certainly not include the
choice to kill the innocent in order to further one's
own goals. No one has that right. Justice Blackmun
merely ignores the reality of the life of the unborn
child. He sounds quite sensitive to rights, but he
remains thoroughly oblivious to reality. The majority
decision did not go far enough, but it does head in the
right direction. Justice Blackmun rights no wrong and
proclaims the wrong right.
Article #97
MORAL DECISIONS Transcendental Chatter
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
You must lie upon the daisies and discourse
in novel phrases of your complicated
state of mind.
The meaning doesn't matter if it's only idle
chatter of a transcendental kind.
And everyone will say as you walk your mystic way,
"If this young man expresses himself in terms too
deep for me, Why, what a very singularly deep
young man this deep young man must be."
It was Sir William S. Gilbert who in 1881 penned
those words for the lyrics of Patience. Depth of a
thought is more than the obscurity of its expression.
Even a shallow puddle can appear deep if its water is
too muddy to let you see the bottom.
Language should be a means of expressing the
truth. We can all too easily turn it into a tool of
obscurity simply by using rich vocabulary to disguise
poverty of thought. Think how glorious the humble
shovel becomes when an army manual refers to it as an
"individual personnel entrenchment tool." Yet there is
something far more truthful in simply calling a spade a
spade. Doesn't a "pre-owned" car sound somehow better
than a "used" one, even when it's still just someone
else's lemon? "Removal of the intrauterine products of
conception" sounds much better than "abortion" and ever
so much better than "killing a baby."
Can you imagine what it would be like to live
under a government which said that it had no interest
in protecting or preserving human life? Of what value
would such a government be? In fact, I am not aware
that any such government has ever existed. The
Communists in their heyday did not fail to present
themselves as defenders of human life although they
were all too willing to suppress the individual human
being in favor of the goals of some sort of abstract
"humanity." Even Hitler justified his death camps on
the grounds that those who died were somehow less than
human and so not worth the interest of the state.
How then can our own government escape the fact
that in legalizing abortion it is giving up its
interest in human life? It does it by words, by "novel
phrases" of its "complicated state of mind," by a
constant use of "chatter of a transcendental kind."
The courts have taken to speaking of the unborn child
not as having human life, but as having "potential
human life."
What does that phrase mean? What do we mean when
we see a dangerous situation and speak of it as a
"potential disaster"? We mean that there is no
disaster yet, but there could be one. What do we mean
when we say that some exotic new discovery could be a
"potential benefit to humanity"? We mean that it is
not yet beneficial, but perhaps it will be.
What do we mean when we say that the unborn child
in the womb of its mother is "potential human life"?
The statement should mean that it is not yet human, but
could be. Or it is not yet alive, but it could be.
But that is simply not true. The unborn child is
already alive! Do dead things grow? Its life has
never been in doubt. It is not potential life, it is
real life. Or do they mean that it is not yet human?
If not, then what is it? Do pregnant women live in
fear that they may have puppies or kittens? Of course
it is human! The only reason people even call it into
question is so that they can justify the killing.
"The meaning doesn't matter if it's only idle
chatter..." But it isn't. It's language totally
shallow and pretending to depth. It's the babble of
the ignorant, the misinformation of the uninformed and
the lies of the dishonest. It is the language of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Article #98
MORAL DECISIONS Words Like Leaves
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
"Words are like leaves; and where they most
abound,
Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found."
So wrote Alexander Pope (1688-1744) in An Essay on
Criticism. The leafiest trees frequently bear the
least fruit and what fruit there is may be completely
hidden. That's what pruning is all about.
Words are important. What we say should serve a
purpose. It should express truth and communicate
reality. But have you ever noticed that it usually
takes fewer and words when you are sure of what say and
you know that what you are saying is true? When you
are not comfortable with what you are saying or when
you are trying to make the unbelievable sound
believable you tend to use bigger words and more
complex sentences.
When Justice Harry Blackmun wrote his dissent from
the Webster decision, he said: "With respect to the
Roe framework, the general constitutional principal,
indeed the fundamental constitutional right, for which
it was developed, is the right to privacy... a species
of 'liberty' protected by the due process clause, which
under our past decisions safeguards the right of women
to exercise some control over their own role in
procreation... [F]ew decisions are 'more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy' or more appropriate to
that 'certain private sphere of individual liberty'
that the Constitution reserves from the intrusive reach
of government than the right to make the uniquely
personal, intimate and self-defining decision whether
to end a pregnancy... It is this general principle, the
'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to
others or to society as a whole...' that is found in
the Constitution."
The Justice is referring back to earlier cases,
such as Roe v. Wade and Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. That seems to give
added weight of authority until you realize that he
also wrote those decisions, and is merely quoting
himself. No wonder that his present dissent is so much
in argreement with previous decisions. Of course he
agrees with the dubious application of the manufactured
"right to privacy," since he was himself one of its
manufacturers.
His description of a woman's "right" to abort her
child calls it "basic to individual dignity and
autonomy." There is no hint of recognition of dignity
or autonomy of the unborn child who is to be killed.
How can he see a mother's choice to kill her child as
an act of dignity? Our autonomy is never so absolute
as to include the right to kill an innocent person.
Individual autonomy is always tempered by the rights
and dignity of others.
He speaks of the decision to "end a pregnancy."
That is a perfect example of leafy words without fruit.
They sound better than "abort" or "kill." Yet that is
what they mean. Bland words do not change the horrible
reality.
He describes that decision to abort as "uniquely
personal, intimate and self-defining." So indeed it
is. But that does not make it right nor should it
exempt it from the concern of the government.
Any decision to take an innocent life is uniquely
personal and intimate. It is frighteningly so.
Abortion is a decision to stop a life before it has had
all but the barest chance to begin. The decision to
abort is surely "self-defining." That does not by any
means make it right or good. Quite the opposite. It
is a choice to define oneself as the killer of one's
own child. It is one of the saddest and most self-destructive sorts of self-definition.
Don't be fooled by a foliage of words which, in
the end, are not even real leaves, but just a glossy
cover for the barren branches of a dead tree.
Article #99
MORAL DECISIONS I Couldn't Give It Up
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Robert Benchley remarked, "It took me fifteen
years to discover that I had no talent for writing, but
I couldn't give it up because by that time I was too
famous."
What he says in humor may be all too real for many
people. You can get into a job, spend years at it and
learn that you don't like it. But you can't easily get
out of it. You can get into the habit of acting in a
nasty way and find it hard to change. You can make a
bad decision and then find that pride makes it almost
impossible to admit how wrong you were. We build
things we don't like and then find it impossible to
tear them down again.
This is the case with the Supreme Court and Roe v.
Wade. The former Justices made a dreadful mistake and
the present Justices find it hard to undo the original
error.
In the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services in 1989 they had the chance to look again at
Roe, but they did not overturn it. In fact, they chose
to leave it essentially in place while still affirming
the right of the States to set limits on abortion.
They accepted the States' interest in defending and
preserving the life of the unborn, while leaving intact
a woman's "right" to choose to abort her child.
This does not resolve the issue, it does a minimum
of good, but still does not face head on the real issue
that abortion is a crime and not a right. It leaves
open a situation in which the abortion "right" can only
be removed by taking one case after another and piece
by painful piece admitting that limits can be set on
killing the unborn.
You may be wondering if what I am saying here is
indeed the case. I can offer some serious support for
my claim. In the Webster case Justice Antonin Scalia
concurred with the decision, but did not concur with
its being so limited. He held that the Court should
have faced Roe squarely and explicitly. He saw the
Webster decision as inadequate. It recognized the
right of each State to set limits, but left it up to
trial and error to discover what those limits might be.
Justice Scalia spoke of the harm that many States
have seen in unrestricted abortion and he said: "That
will continue to occur if the states have the
constitutional power to prohibit it and would do so,
but we skillfully avoid telling them so." He says of
the Court: "...we should decide now and not insist that
we be run into a corner before we grudgingly yield up
our judgment."
He added: "It thus appears that the mansion of
constitutionalized abortion law, constructed overnight
in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled doorjamb by
doorjamb and never entirely brought down no matter how
wrong it may be."
Is it pride and not conviction that stops the
Court from overturning Roe? In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Court
again looked at Roe and again made limited judgment.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter delivered the
majority opinion and expressed their fears that
overruling Roe could "overtax the country's belief in
the Court's good faith."
They said it would be unwise to change Roe, since
this could make it appear that they acted under
pressure (although there is more organized and
influential pressure from the pro-abortionists). They
sadly conclude: "A decision to overrule Roe's
essential holding under the existing circumstances
would address error, if error there was, at the cost of
both profound and unnecessary damage to the court's
legitimacy..." However, I for one would have a great
deal more respect for a court which was willing to face
and correct its previous mistakes.
Article #100
MORAL DECISIONS Confusion of Facts
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
"My mind is made up, don't confuse me with facts."
Not many of us would actually say that seriously, but
all of us at one time or other act on it. We have set
our minds and hearts on something and we don't want to
face a fact which could dissuade us. Of course, the
facts remain facts, whether we want them to or not and
our purposeful ignoring of them can lead only to pain,
heartache or disaster. In the end, it is only the
truth which can set us free, no matter how much we may
prefer not to face it.
When, in 1989, the Supreme Court dealt with the
case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, one of
the dissenting opinions was written by Justice John
Paul Stevens. His opinion is a clear example of the
refusal to allow facts to interfere with a mind already
made up.
Justice Stevens' opinion is a marvel of its kind.
In the space of just a few pages he is able to dance
away from more facts than most people could in a whole
volume. Of course, he begins with full support for
abortion; and if he were to accept the facts, he would
have to change his mind a mind clearly already made
up.
He begins by expressing his displeasure at one of
the findings in the Missouri law. (A "finding" is a
statement of a fact which the legislators accept as
true and upon which they are willing to establish
certain actions.) What first disturbs him is the
legislature's finding that the "life of each human
being begins at conception." The law then goes on to
say that "unborn children have protectable interests in
life, health and well-being." That all seems rather
evident. Life does indeed begin at conception and that
life is protectable even though so many choose not to
protect it and are furiously opposed to anyone who
would find it worth protecting. If we say that life
does not begin at conception then what in the world is
that fertilized ovum? It is growing, it if forming
organs. It is doing this even before implantation. It
is beyond all doubt alive and, if allowed to live, will
grow to adulthood. If that is not life, what is it?
Justice Stevens is annoyed to some extent because
he does not think that conception occurs when the egg
is fertilized! His ideas on this are so peculiar and
wrong that I will treat them in a separate article.
What so displeases the Justice is that the
Missouri statute then goes on to command "that state
laws shall be construed to provide the maximum
protection to 'the unborn child at every stage of
development.'" He agrees with the District Court that
"obviously, the purpose of this law is to protect the
potential life of the fetus, rather than to safeguard
maternal health." He puts it into terms which make it
seem a dreadful thing, an imposition on the mother's
freedom.
First of all, Justice Stevens seems to reject any
notion that the unborn child could be a person. For
him it has no rights at all. That is probably one
preconception that makes it so hard for him to look at
reality. He cannot even accept the fact that a human
fetus has human life. The needs of a fetus mean
nothing to him and are totally outweighed by his
concern for maternal health.
Perhaps he overlooks one more fact: 99% of the
abortions performed every year have nothing to do with
maternal health. This means that in all of those cases
the protection of the unborn child will not in any way
conflict with safeguarding the mother's health. The
laws may get in the way of what she wants to do, but
they will have no adverse affect on her health.
It seems never to occur to the Justice that a law
could try to care for both mother and child. But that,
of course, is one more fact and facts are not what
seem to interest Justice Stevens. As you will see in
the next few articles, every time a fact raises its
head the Justice tries to knock it down again.
Article #101
MORAL DECISIONS Pigs and Parakeets
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
In 1657 Thomas Middleton wrote, "How many honest
words have suffered corruption since Chaucer's days!"
And that corruption of words still goes on.
In 1984 the U.S. State Department announced that,
in future reports on violations of human rights around
the world, it would no longer refer to "killing" but
to "unlawful deprivation of life." The U.S. Army
refers to the killing of the enemy as "servicing the
target." In 1977 one of the major airlines referred to
a crash of a plane as an "involuntary conversion of a
727." None of these statements come from ignorance.
They are all willful efforts to deceive.
Justice Stevens' poorly written dissent in the
Webster case of 1989 also corrupts language. More, I
should imagine, from ignorance than from willful
malice. He does this in a number of areas. In
general, he seems to be a fund of misinformation on
physiology, embryology, religion and theology. The
problem, of course, is that he, and judges who act on
the same misinformation, can do incalculable harm. In
this article I will look at the physiology and
embryology errors, and will consider the others later.
The Justice expresses his distress that the
Missouri law "defines conception as 'the fertilization
of the ovum of a female by the sperm of a male.'" You
may well ask why that should bother him. It is a
perfectly accurate definition of conception. But the
Justice does not want that to be the meaning of
conception. He says that "standard medical texts
equate conception with implantation in the uterus,
occurring about six days after fertilization." He is
wrong and he is corrupting an honest word to make it
mean something else better suited to his purposes.
There are doctors and medical texts which do
equate implantation with the start of pregnancy. I
have never, however, come across any who make the
mistake of equating conception with implantation.
The Justice offers a footnote to explain his
position, but when you turn to the footnote you find
that it does not do so. It merely explains that
implantation occurs a few days after conception. That
should come as no news to anyone except perhaps to
Justice Stevens.
I looked in the Merck Manual a standard and up-to-date medical reference, issued every five years. I
found no confusion at all. Conception and implantation
are clearly distinct from each other. Conception was
defined as the moment of fertilization. This was true
in the 15th edition of 1985 (page 1743) and in the 16th
edition of 1992 (pages 1836-1837).
Why does the Justice want to change the
definition? He makes it quite evident. If he can
define conception as though it meant implantation,
then he can also define contraception to mean
"prevention of implantation" rather than "prevention of
conception." He prefers this, as do some others,
because then they can say that intrauterine devices and
"morning after pills" are contraceptive rather than
abortifacient. However the fact still remains that
they are abortifacient. This you can verify simply by
looking them up in the current issue of The Physicians'
Desk Reference the standard doctors' manual for drugs
and various devices.
The Justice may prefer to call implantation
conception. That does not make them the same thing.
He might even prefer to call a pig a parakeet but
that won't make it sit on shoulder and talk in his ear.
His statements in this areas are ridiculous and have no
relationship to reality.
Article #102
MORAL DECISIONS Weeding Out Prejudice
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
Jonathan Swift once wrote: "Some men, under the
notion of weeding out prejudices, eradicate virtue,
honesty, and religion." Prejudice refers, of course,
to pre-judging; that is, prejudice sets up its own
judgement before and, sometimes, even in spite of the
evidence. This is something that no real judge should
do. Yet it is hard for anyone to set prejudice aside,
since most of us never realize that we are pre-judging.
Still, it can happen even in a court of law, including
our own Supreme Court. The dissenting opinion of
Justice John Paul Stevens in the Webster case of 1989
is a perfect example.
The Justice argued that the 1965 decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut had overturned a Connecticut
law which made illegal the sale of contraceptives. He
then argued that the preamble to the Missouri law in
the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
must be unconstitutional, because it spoke of
protection for the unborn after the moment of
conception. This would then open the way to further
consideration of rules about intrauterine devices (IUD)
and the "morning after pill." Neither one of them
prevents conception and both kill by preventing
implantation. But, says the Justice, since both of
them are referred to by many as contraceptives, the
Missouri law must be wrong.
This is truly a stupid argument. Life does begin
at conception; the IUD and the morning after pill are
abortifacient and do not prevent conception. While
Justice Stevens might want reality to be different,
reality does not change to accommodate his preferences.
He writes that since Griswold allows devices
"preventing conception," this may interfere with a
woman's right to the IUD or the morning after pill. He
then tries to shift the argument to religious grounds.
He writes: "There is unquestionably a theological
basis for such an argument, just as there was
unquestionably a theological basis for the Connecticut
statute that the Court invalidated in Griswold. Our
jurisprudence, however, has consistently required a
secular basis for valid legislation... Because I am
not aware of any secular basis for differentiating
between contraceptive procedures that are effective
immediately before and those that are effective
immediately after fertilization, I believe it
inescapably follows that the preamble to the Missouri
statute is invalid under Griswold and its progeny."
What a strange argument! He speaks of a
theological basis for distinguishing prevention of
conception from prevention of implantation. He offers a
footnote, but all it says is: "Several amici state
that 'the sanctity of human life from conception and
opposition to abortion are, in fact, sincere and deeply
held religious beliefs!" So what? On that ground you
could equally well say that laws against murder, theft
and rape should all be overthrown because all of them
are sincere and deeply held religious beliefs. Things
which are matters of religious belief may at the very
same time be matters of plain common sense.
He denies a secular basis for distinguishing
"contraceptives" that work before and after
fertilization. Part of his problem comes from the fact
that he has "redefined" conception to be the same as
implantation. The proper definition secular or
theological is that conception is identical to
fertilization. Procedures which prevent fertilization
are contraceptive. Those which prevent the fertilized
egg from implanting are not contraceptive. They do not
prevent conception. They are abortifacient.
This information does not come from theology. It
comes from science. It is quite clearly stated in the
product descriptions in the Physicians Desk Reference.
Justice Stevens would prefer that it were different.
It is not! That's reality and Justice Stevens'
arguments are based on his own rather uninformed
prejudgment and not on reality.
Article #103
MORAL DECISIONS Facts and Purposes
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
During the Stalin regime in Russia there were
areas of science which were completely stifled. This
happened, not because knowledge and facts were
unavailable to Russian scientists, but because they
were not allowed to use certain facts. Strange,
wouldn't you say? The reason was that there were facts
accepted by scientists worldwide, but they did not
agree with Communist philosophy and were ignored
because they did not suit communist purposes.
When Justice John Paul Stevens wrote his pro-abortion minority opinion in the Webster case of 1989,
he quite incorrectly stated that conception occurs not
at the time of fertilization but a few days later at
the time of implantation. Why would he say something
so clearly contrary to scientifically observable facts?
He tells us why.
He writes: "Indeed I am persuaded that the
absence of any secular purpose for the legislative
declarations [in the Missouri law] that life begins at
conception and that conception occurs at fertilization
makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid
under the establishment clause of the First Amendment
to the federal Constitution. This conclusion does not,
and could not, rest on the fact that the statement
happens to coincide with the tenets of certain
religions..., or on the fact that the legislators who
voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious
considerations... Rather it rests on the fact that the
preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious
tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths,
serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact
alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates
the establishment clause."
Justice Stevens claims that the Missouri law's
preamble is a sectarian theological statement because
it coincides with particular religious beliefs. Yet he
realizes and clearly states that the mere fact that
it coincides with religious belief would not be a
reason for the state to reject it. If it were
sufficient reason, then the state should also reject
laws that forbid murder or theft or rape because all
of those laws also coincide with religious beliefs.
That is why he adds his other argument the secular
purpose of the law.
Laws on murder, theft and rape may coincide with
religious belief, but they also serve the state's
purpose of protection of life, property and personal
integrity. He sees no state interest in preserving the
life of the unborn. His reasons for this I will talk
about in future columns. Right now, however, I will
look at one basic and essential flaw which undermines
all that he later says.
When he talks about a secular purpose, he surely
means the goal of a law in terms of what the state has
obligations to protect or defend. That makes sense.
It is not the function of the state, for example, to
try to decide a theological dispute between various
churches or sects.
The problem is, however, that he is not dealing
here with a theological dispute. He is dealing with a
simple question of fact. A fertilized egg is alive, it
is human. This is fact. It is based not on theology,
but on clear, indisputable scientific evidence. He is
arguing that because he sees no secular purpose in laws
against abortion (at least in the early months of
pregnancy), he can therefore deny the clear and simple
fact that conception, fertilization and the beginning
of life are all the same event. Purposes do not change
facts.
Indeed, if he opened his eyes to the facts, he
should have no trouble in seeing the secular purpose of
laws against abortion. If there is no secular purpose
in preserving the most basic good of life itself, then
the state serves little purpose indeed. Let him face
the facts first and then look at purpose.
Article #104
MORAL DECISIONS The Devil and Scripture
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
It was Shakespeare, in The Merchant of Venice, who
wrote: "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose."
I was reminded of this when I read Justice John Paul
Stevens' minority opinion in the 1989 Webster case. To
my surprise I found him using the writings of St.
Thomas Aguinas to support his position.
Justice Stevens speaks of certain aspects of the
writings of St. Thomas which may seem quite unusual to
us. Thomas takes up the question of just when in the
process of pregnancy the human soul begins to exist.
It may surprise you to learn that Thomas says that for
a male fetus it happens at about 40 days of pregnancy
and for a female at 80 days. He also speaks of the
"unformed" and "formed" stages of pregnancy before
and after the fetus looks human. When he considers
abortion, he treats it as homicide (full murder) only
after it is "formed."
The Justice then points out that what Thomas wrote
was the general understanding of the majority of people
in the Middle Ages. He then says: "If the views of St.
Thomas were held as widely today as they were in the
Middle Ages and if a state legislature were to exact a
statute prefaced with a 'finding' that female life
begins 80 days after conception and male life begins 40
days after conception, I have no doubt that this court
would promptly conclude that such an endorsement of a
particular religious tenet is violative of the
establishment clause. In my opinion the difference
between that hypothetical statute and Missouri's
preamble reflects nothing more than a difference in
theological doctrine."
In other words, Thomas' opinion of ensoulment at
40 or 80 days and the Missouri "finding" that human
life begins at conception represent two differing
theological doctrines. The Supreme Court, however, is
not and should not be in the business of settling
theological disputes. Therefore, the Court should not
give it approval to either one.
That all sounds logical and hard to refute. In
fact, it is neither. Justice Stevens has made a
mistake so elementary that it could only have come from
stupidity (and he is certainly not stupid) or a very
basic misunderstanding of his evidence, (I suspect) is
the case.
Neither Thomas' idea of ensoulment at 40 and 80
days nor the Missouri "finding" of the beginning of
life at conception are theological doctrines, nor have
they ever been. Both are secular, scientific
statements. One, however, is based on scientific
progress of the Thirteenth Century and the other on
scientific progress of the Twentieth Century.
No one can directly observe the soul or the
presence of humanity. We can observe the facts and
actions which reveal that presence. To the naked eye
which was all the Thirteenth Century scientists had
the fetus does not look human until about the fortieth
day. Because of the way sex organs develop, to the
naked eye all fetuses appear to be male until about 80
days. Before the fortieth day the already complex
internal organic structure of the fetus cannot be
observed unaided. In our day, however, not only can we
see that structure, we can also examine the genetic
structure of the cells. Science in our Century can
have no doubt that the fetus is and has been human from
the moment of conception.
Saint Thomas never approved of abortion at any
stage. He did suggest that on the basis of the
science of his time the crime of abortion might have
been less than homicide in the first few weeks.
Science knows better now. The Missouri law recognized
the value of that new scientific knowledge. It seems a
shame that Justice Stevens is so unaware of this.
Maybe he wants to be.
Article #105
MORAL DECISIONS Catch Arguments
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
In his second annual message to Congress, in 1862,
Abraham Lincoln said: "If ever there could be a time
for mere catch arguments, that time surely is not now.
In times like the present, men should utter nothing for
which they would not willingly be responsible through
time and in eternity."
The catch argument the catchy, clever idea
which may or may not be true but easily fools the
listener, had no place in the crisis which Lincoln
faced. Neither has it any place in our present
concerns about the legal murder of the unborn. In his
dissenting opinion in the Webster case, Justice John
Paul Stevens did not avoid the catch arguments which
seem to make sense, but when examined prove to be
rather stupid.
He said, for example, that the state has little
interest in protecting the life of the unborn child
except, perhaps, in the last stages of pregnancy. He
argues: "There can be no interest in protecting the
newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental
anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does
not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however,
that interest is valid."
Of course, he also favors the killing of viable
unborn children if that be the mother's decision, but
he does allow the state some minimal right to
intervene. Yet this argument, based on the capacity to
feel pain, is a poor argument.
Is the state's interest in protecting life
applicable only when the victim is capable of
experiencing pain or anguish? If so, then it ought to
be allowable to commit murder, provided the person
being killed is properly anesthetized. What of the
comatose or unconscious patient who feels neither pain
nor anguish? Can we kill him? The stupidity of the
Justice's argument is clear in the stupidity of its
logical conclusions. It leads inevitably to wide-ranging legal murder. Perhaps the Justice thinks that
this should be the case.
This is certainly very much at the center of
movements to remove life support systems from patients
who are not terminally ill even though unconscious.
They are not conscious. They cannot react or respond.
They are not conscious. They cannot react or respond.
They have not even the capacity to feel those human
emotions of mental pain and anguish. Furthermore, they
are a burden to those who must care for them. Why not
let them starve? And, if that seems cruel, why not
just kill them outright? Why should the state have any
interest in them?
How far can such an argument be taken? What about
the very severely retarded? To be sure, they do feel
physical pain, but do they experience anguish in the
fully human way in which the non-retarded do? Perhaps
not. So why not death in their case too? Why should
the state have any interest in them?
In fact, it would probably be possible to take
almost any group and find for it a reason the state
should have no interest in preserving the lives of its
members. That was the route followed by Hitler, by
Stalin and by one dictator after another. That is just
why the state should take an interest in preserving the
life of each member of society. The alternative is
dehumanization and death for any group deemed
undesirable. Indeed the state should take the deepest
interest in the most helpless. It is then that the
state becomes what it is meant to be and does not
become the accomplice in the murder of its own
citizens.
Article #106
MORAL DECISIONS The Big Lie
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
"The great masses of the people... will more
easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one."
So wrote Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf and he put that
principle infamous to use. It worked then and it works
now. Why?
I suspect that the big lie works best when it
appeals to something that people already want to be
true. In Germany, after World War I, people were
burdened by defeat and by an economy that kept them in
poverty. They needed someone to blame for both
afflictions and Hitler offered the Jews. He made them
the scapegoat for all of society's ills and then said
they were subhuman as well. That justified ridiculing
them, persecuting them, taking their property and in
the end killing them.
We have our own big lie to contend with. It is
this: "The unborn child is not human, not valuable,
not worth protecting. Kill it, if you want to." What
appeal does this lie hold for so many? We are
constantly bombarded with the notion that sex is for
fun and that children are its undesirable side-effect.
We are told that we need money and possessions to be
happy. More children mean less money and less
possessions. Children are not a gift, they are an
inconvenience. Birth control should protect us from
them but birth control doesn't always work. What
then? Well, if we can proclaim the unborn to be also
unhuman, then we can kill them. It's a lie that all
too many want to believe.
We support the lie when we begin to refer to
living unborn children as "potential" life. Science,
of course, disproves that. Yet, even when we make so
much of scientific progress everywhere else, we are
willing to ignore it in this area.
This wilful blindness does not affect only the
"uneducated." It works as well on those who should
know better and have no excuse for their ignorance. It
can even happen to a Justice of the Supreme Court. You
can see it for yourself simply by reading the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in the 1989
Webster case.
He argues that the purpose of the Missouri law is
to protect the potential life of the fetus rather than
to safeguard maternal health. He accuses the Missouri
legislature of "trying to protect the potential human
life of non-viable fetuses by making the abortion
decision more costly." He says that the state has no
possible interest in protecting the "fertilized egg"
(which, of course, is the new person) because it can
feel no pain anyway. He even argues that in some whole
categories of cases it is national policy to prevent
"potential life." (Of that I shall say more in the
next column.)
He simply ignores all scientific evidence and goes
blithely on his way. Instead of accepting hard facts,
he pretends it is all a matter of "theological"
dispute. He makes the incredible argument that what
the life of the unborn child is comes down to no more
than a question of what its mother happens to believe
it to be what she wants it to be. Would he make so
stupid an argument in any other area? Perhaps so I
don't know enough about him to say but I suspect not.
I do not call Justice Stevens "the big liar," but
he surely does what he can to promote "the big lie."
Perhaps he is himself one of its victims. In any case,
what he says is wrong. If his dissenting argument were
a piece of cheese, it would surely be Swiss. Its holes
are its most evident feature.
Article #107
MORAL DECISIONS Tragedy and Statistics
By Reverend Monsignor James J. Mulligan
It is Joseph Stalin who is reputed to have said,
"A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a
statistic." He did not mouth empty phrases. He put it
into practice. The Russian army, just before World War
II, suffered more casualties than have ever been
suffered by any army in history. About 43,000 officers
and 3,000,000 soldiers were all killed. No enemy was
responsible for this horror. It was ordered, instead,
by their commander-in-chief, Stalin himself. It was
the result of his policy of death as his way of
"purging" the military. It was one more statistic.
When it comes to statistics of death as a policy,
however, poor Stalin was a piker. In his last twenty
years the policies of our own government have allowed
the legal murder of 32,000,000 innocent, helpless
unborn children. There are, of course, those who would
say that our own situation is quite different from that
of Stalin. He had a policy of killing. We do not make
it a policy, even though our laws do allow it to
happen.
The frightening reality, however, is that we do
have a policy of murder or so, at least, says Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens. In the Missouri case
he seemed incapable of finding any reason why the state
should protect the unborn. One of his arguments for
his own position is what he sees as a policy of the
government and the Court. He says: "There have been
times in history when military and economic interests
would have been served by an increase in population.
No one argues today, however that Missouri can assert a
societal interest in increasing its population as its
secular reason for fostering potential life. Indeed,
our national policy, as reflected in legislation the
court upheld last term, is to prevent the potential
life that is produced by 'pregnancy and childbirth
among unmarried adolescents.'"
His argument is almost incredible. The state has
no interest in increasing the population, and so it
finds it logical to support abortion as a way of
controlling its numbers. Our country, with all of its
flaws and failings, was at least founded on the
intention to protect the lives and welfare of its
citizens. The ideal of the American Revolution had at
its heart the promotion of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness." That war was fought with the
hope that each individual could find a fulfilling life
and not be subordinated to a government willing to
preserve itself at the expense of the justifiable and
necessary freedom of the individual.
If Justice Stevens is serious about his inability
to find a "secular" reason for the wrongness of
abortion, then he has not looked very carefully. Here
it is, staring him in the face. The individual is not
a cog in the machinery of the state. The individual
has a unique and personal value which the state should
be pledged to uphold and protect. Has the Justice no
awareness of the value of the individual as the most
obvious reason for protecting life right from the
start? Indeed, if the state has no obligation to
protect and preserve the life of the individual aprt
from that individuals value for the state, then our
whole concept of government has been perverted from the
intention of its founders. If Justice Stevens truly
thinks that governmental policy on population includes
the right to kill the unborn, then he has no business
being on the Supreme Court.
