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ST. AUGUSTIN

ON TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS.
[DE DUABUS ANIMABUS CONTRA MANICHAEOS.](1)

[Translated by Albert H. Newman, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Church History
and Comparative Religion, in Toronto Baptist (Theological) College,
Toronto, Canada.]


CHAP. I.--BY WHAT COURSE OF REASONING THE ERROR OF THE MANICHAEANS
CONCERNING TWO SOULS, ONE OF WHICH IS NOT FROM GOD, IS REFUTED. EVERY SOUL,
INASMUCH AS IT IS A CERTAIN LIFE, CAN HAVE ITS EXISTENCE ONLY FROM GOD THE
SOURCE OF LIFE.

   1. Through the assisting mercy of God, the snares of the Manichaeans
having been broken to pieces and left behind, having been restored at
length to the bosom of the Catholic Church, I am disposed now at least to
consider and to deplore my recent wretchedness. For there were many things
that I ought to have done to prevent the seeds of the most true religion
wholesomely implanted in me from boyhood, from being banished from my mind,
having been uprooted by the error and fraud of false and deceitful men.
For, in the first place, if I had soberly and diligently considered, with
prayerful and pious mind, those two kinds of souls to which they attributed
natures and properties so distinct that they wished one to be regarded as
of the very substance of God, but were not even willing that God should be
accepted as the author of the other; perhaps it would have appeared to me,
intent on learning, that there is no life whatsoever, which, by the very
fact of its being life and in so far as it is life at all, does not pertain
to the supreme source and beginning of life,(2) which we must acknowledge
to be nothing else than the supreme and only and true God. Wherefore there
is no reason why we should not confess, that those souls which the
Manichaeans call evil are either devoid of life and so not souls, neither
will anything positively or negatively, neither follow after nor flee from
anything; or, if they live so that they can be souls, and act as the
Manichaeans suppose, in no way do they live unless by life, and if it be an
established fact, as it is, that Christ has said: "I am the life,"(3) that
all souls seeing that they cannot be souls except by living were created
and fashioned by Christ, that is, by the Life.

CHAP. 2.--IF THE LIGHT THAT IS PERCEIVED BY SENSE HAS GOD FOR ITS AUTHOR,
AS THE MANICHAEANS ACKNOWLEDGE, MUCH MORE. THE SOUL WHICH IS PERCEIVED BY
INTELLECT ALONE.

   2. But if at that time(4)  my thought was not able to bear and sustain
the question concerning life and partaking of life, which is truly a great
question, and one that requires much calm discussion among the learned, I
might perchance have had power to discover that which to every man
considering himself, without a study of the individual parts, is perfectly
evident, namely, that everything we are said to know and to understand, we
comprehend either by bodily sense or by mental operation. That the five
bodily senses are commonly enumerated as sight, hearing, smell, taste,
touch, than all of which intellect is immeasurably more noble and
excellent, who would have been so ungrateful and impious as not to concede
to me; which being established and confirmed, we should have seen how it
follows, that whatsoever things are perceived by touch or sight or in any
bodily manner at all, are by so much inferior to those things that we
comprehend intellectually as the senses are inferior to the intellect.
Wherefore, since all life, and so every soul, can be perceived by no bodily
sense, but by the intellect alone, whereas while yonder sun and moon and
every luminary that is beheld by these mortal eyes, the Manichaeans
themselves also say must be attributed to the true and good God, it is the
height of madness to claim that that belongs to God which we observe
bodily; but, on the other hand, to think that what we receive not only by
the mind, but by the highest form of mind,(1) namely, reason and
intellect,(2) that is life, whatsoever it may be called, nevertheless life,
should be deprived and bereft of the same God as its author. For if having
invoked God, I had asked myself what living is, how inscrutable it is to
every bodily sense, how absolutely incorporeal it is, could not I have
answered? Or would not the Manichaeans also confess not only that the souls
they detest live, but that they live also immortally? and that Christ's
saying: "Send the dead to bury their dead,"(3) was uttered not with
reference to those not living at all, but with reference to sinners, which
is the only death of the immortal soul; as when Paul writes: "The widow
that giveth herself to pleasure is dead while she liveth," (4) he says that
she at the same time is dead, and alive. Wherefore I should have directed
attention not to the great degree of contamination in which the sinful soul
lives, but only to the fact itself that it lives. But if I cannot perceive
except by an act of intelligence, I believe it would have come into the
mind, that by as much as any mind whatever is to be preferred to the light
which we see through these eyes, by so much we should give to intellect the
preference over the eyes themselves.

CHAP, 3.--HOW IT IS PROVED THAT EVERY BODY ALSO IS FROM GOD. THAT THE SOUL
WHICH IS CALLED EViL BY THE MANICHAEANS IS BETTER THAN LIGHT.

   They also affirm that the light is from the Father of Christ: should I
then have doubted that every soul is from Him? But not even then, as a man
forsooth so inexperienced and so youthful as I was, should I have been in
doubt as to the derivation not only of the soul, but also of the body, nay
of everything whatsoever, from Him, if I had reverently and cautiously
reflected on what form is, or what has been formed, what shape is and what
has been endued with shape.

   3. But not to speak at present concerning the body, I lament concerning
the soul, concerning spontaneous and vivid movement, concerning action,
concerning life, concerning immortality; in fine, I lament that I,
miserable, should have believed that anything could have all these
properties apart from the goodness of God, which properties, great as they
are, I sadly neglected to consider; this I think, should be to me a matter
of groaning and of weeping. I should have inwardly pondered these things, I
should have discussed them with myself, I should have referred them to
others, I should have propounded the inquiry, what the power of knowing is,
seeing there is nothing in man that we can compare to this excellency? And
as men, if only they had been men, would have granted me this, I should
have inquired whether seeing with these eyes is knowing? In case they had
answered negatively, I should first have concluded, that mental
intelligence is vastly inferior to ocular sensation; then I should have
added, that what we perceive by means of a better thing must needs be
judged to be itself better. Who would not grant this? I should have gone on
to inquire, whether that soul which they call evil is an object of ocular
sensation or of mental intelligence? They would have acknowledged that the
latter is the case. All which things having been agreed upon and confirmed
between us, I should have shown how it follows, that that soul forsooth
which they execrate, is better than that light which they venerate, since
the former is an object of mental knowledge, the latter an object of
corporeal sense perception. But here perhaps they would have halted, and
would have refused to follow the lead of reason, so great is the power of
inveterate opinion and of falsehood long defended and believed. But I
should have pressed yet more upon them halting, not harshly, not in puerile
fashion, not obstinately; I should have repeated the things that had been
conceded, and have shown how they must be conceded. I should have exhorted
that they consult in common, that they may see clearly what must be denied
to us; whether they think it false that intellectual perception is to be
preferred to these carnal organs of sight, or that what is known by means
of the excellency of the mind is more excellent than what is known by vile
corporeal sensation; whether they would be unwilling to confess that those
souls which they think heterogenous, can be known only by intellectual
perception, that is, by the excellency itself of the mind; whether they
would wish to deny that the sun and the moon are made known to us only by
means of these eyes. But if they had replied that no one of these things
could be denied otherwise than most absurdly and most impudently, I should
have urged that they ought not to doubt but that the light whose worthiness
of worship they proclaim, is viler than that soul which they admonish men
to flee.

CHAP. 4.--EVEN THE SOUL OF A FLY IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE LIGHT.

   4. And here, if perchance in their confusion they had inquired of me
whether I thought that the soul even of a fly(1) surpasses that light, I
should have replied, yes, nor should it have troubled me that the fly is
little, but it should have confirmed me that it is alive. For it is
inquired, what causes those members so diminutive to grow, what leads so
minute a body here and there according to its natural appetite, what moves
its feet in numerical order when it is running, what regulates and gives
vibration to its wings when flying? This thing whatever it is in so small a
creature towers up so prominently to one well considering, that it excels
any lightning flashing upon the eyes.

CHAP. 5.--HOW VICIOUS SOULS, HOWEVER WORTHY OF CONDEMNATION THEY MAY BE,
EXCEL THE LIGHT WHICH IS PRAISEWORTHY IN ITS KIND.

   Certainly nobody doubts that whatever is an object of intellectual
perception, by virtue of divine laws surpasses in excellence every sensible
object and consequently also this light. For what, I ask, do we perceive by
thought, if not that it is one thing to know with the mind, and another
thing to experience bodily sensations, and that the former is incomparably
more sublime than the latter, and so that intelligible things must needs be
preferred to sensible things, since the intellect itself is so highly
exalted above the senses?

   5. Hence this also I should perchance have known, which manifestly
follows, since injustice and intemperance and other vices of the mind are
not objects of sense, but of intellect, how it comes about that these too
which we detest and consider condemnable, yet in as much as they are
objects of intellect, can outrank this light however praiseworthy it may be
in its kind. For it is borne in upon the mind subjecting itself well to
God, that, first of all, not everything that we praise is to be preferred
to everything that we find fault with. For in praising the purest lead, I
do not therefore put a higher value upon it than upon the gold that I find
fault with. For everything must be considered in its kind. I disapprove of
a lawyer ignorant of many statutes, yet I so prefer him to the most
approved tailor, that I should think him incomparably superior. But I
praise the tailor because he is thoroughly skilled in his own craft, while
I rightly blame the lawyer because he imperfectly fulfills the functions of
his profession. Wherefore I should have found out that the light which in
its own kind is perfect, is rightly to be praised; yet because it is
included in the number of sensible things, which class must needs yield to
the class of intelligible things, it must be ranked below unjust and
intemperate souls, since these are intelligible; although we may without
injustice judge these to be most worthy of condemnation. For in the case of
these we ask that they be reconciled to God, not that they be preferred to
that lightning. Wherefore, if any one had contended that this luminary is
from God, I should not have opposed; but rather I should have said, that
souls, even vicious ones, not in so far as they are vicious, but in so far
as they are souls, must be acknowledged to be creatures of God.

CHAP. 6.--WHETHER EVEN VICES THEMSELVES AS OBJECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
APPREHENSION ARE TO BE PREFERRED TO LIGHT AS AN OBJECT OF SENSE PERCEPTION,
AND ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOD AS THEIR AUTHOR. VICE OF THE MIND AND
CERTAIN DEFECTS ARE NOT RIGHTLY TO BE COUNTED AMONG INTELLIGIBLE THINGS.
DEFECTS THEMSELVES EVEN IF THEY SHOULD BE COUNTED AMONG INTELLIGIBLE THINGS
SHOULD NEVER BE PUT BEFORE SENSIBLE THINGS. IF LIGHT IS VISIBLE BY GOD,
MUCH MORE IS THE SOUL, EVEN IF VICIOUS, WHICH IN SO FAR AS IT LIVES IS AN
INTELLIGIBLE THING. PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE ARE ADDUCED BY THE MANICHAEANS TO
THE CONTRARY.

   At this point, In case some one of them, cautious and watchful, now
also more studious than pertinacious, had admonished me that the inquiry is
not about vicious souls but about vices themselves, which, seeing that they
are not known by corporeal sense, and yet are known, can only be received
as objects of intellectual apprehension, which if they excel all objects of
sense, why can we not agree in attributing light to God as its author, but
only a sacrilegious person would say that God is the author of vices; I
should have replied to the man, if either on the spur of the moment, as is
customary to the worshippers of the good God, a solution of this question
had darted like lightning from on high, or a solution had been previously
prepared. If I had not deserved or was unable to avail myself of either of
these methods, I should have deferred the undertaking, and should have
confessed that the thing propounded was difficult to discern and arduous. I
should have withdrawn to myself, prostrated myself before God, groaned
aloud asking Him not to suffer me to halt in mid space, when I should have
moved forward with assured arguments, asking Him that I might not be
compelled by a doubtful question either to subordinate intelligible things
to sensible, and to yield, or to call Himself the author of vices; since
either of these alternatives would have been absolutely full of falsehood
and impiety. I can by no means suppose that He would have deserted me in
such a frame of mind. Rather, in His own ineffable way, He would have
admonished me to consider again and again whether vices of mind concerning
which I was so troubled should be reckoned among intelligible things. But
that  I might find out, on account of the weakness of my inner eye, which
rightly befell me on account of my sins, I should have devised some sort of
stage for gazing upon spiritual[ things in visible things themselves, of
which we have by no means a surer knowledge, but a more confident
familiarity. Therefore I should straightway have inquired, what properly
pertains to the sensation of the eyes. I should have found that it is the
color, the dominion of which the light holds. For these are the things that
no other sense touches, for the motions and magnitudes and intervals and
figures of bodies, although they also can be perceived by the eyes, yet to
perceive such is not their peculiar function, but belongs also to touch.
Whence I should have gathered that by as much as yonder light excels other
corporeal and sensible things, by so much is sight more noble than the
other senses. The light therefore having been selected from all the things
that are perceived by bodily sense, by this [light] I should have striven,
and in this of necessity I should have placed that stage of my inquiry. I
should have gone on to consider what might be done in this way, and thus I
should have reasoned with myself: If yonder sun, conspicuous by its
brightness and sufficing for day by its light, should little by little
decline in our sight into the likeness of the moon, would we perceive
anything else with our eyes than light however refulgent, yet seeking light
by reason of not seeing what had been, and using it for seeing what was
present? Therefore we should not see the decline, but the light that should
survive the decline. But since we should not see, we should not perceive;
for whatever we perceive by sight must necessarily be seen; wherefore if
that decline were perceived neither by sight nor by any other sense, it
cannot be reckoned among objects of sense. For nothing is an object of
sense that cannot be perceived by sense. Let us apply now the consideration
to virtue, by whose intellectual light we most fittingly say the mind
shines. Again, a certain decline from this light of virtue, not destroying
the soul, but obscuring it, is called vice. Therefore also vice can by no
means be reckoned among objects of intellectual perception, as that decline
of light is rightly excluded from the number of objects of sense
perception. Yet what remains of soul, that is that which lives and is soul
is just as much an object of intellectual perception as that is an object
of sense perception which should shine in this visible luminary after any
imaginable degree of decline. And so the soul, in so far as it is soul and
partakes of life, without which it can in no way be soul, is most correctly
to be preferred to all objects of sense perception. Wherefore it is most
erroneous to say that any soul is not from God, from whom you boast that
the sun and moon have their existence.

   7. But if now it should be thought fit to designate as objects of sense
perception not only all those things that we perceive by the senses, but
also all those things that though not perceiving by the senses we judge of
by means of the body, as of darkness through the eyes, of silence through
the ears,--for not by seeing darkness and not by hearing silence do we know
of their existence,--and again, in the case of objects of intellectual
perception, not those things only which we see illuminated by the mind, as
is wisdom itself, but also those things which by the illumination itself we
avoid, such as foolishness, which I might fittingly designate mental
darkness; I should have made no controversy about a word, but should have
dissolved the whole question by an easy division, and straightway I should
have proved to those giving good attention, that by the divine law of truth
intelligible subsistences are to be preferred to sensible subsistences, not
the decline of these subsistences, even though we should choose to call
these intelligible, those sensible. Wherefore, that those who acknowledge
that these visible luminaries and those intelligible souls are
subsistences, are in every way compelled to grant and to attribute the
sublimer part to souls; but that defects of either kind cannot be preferred
the one to the other, for they are only privative and indicate
nonexistence, and therefore have precisely the same force as negations
themselves. For when we say, It is not gold, and, It is not virtue,
although there is the greatest possible difference between gold and virtue,
yet there is no difference between the negations that we adjoin to them.
But that it is worse indeed not to be virtue than not to be gold, no sane
man doubts. Who does not know that the difference lies not in the negations
themselves, but in the things to which they are adjoined? For by as much as
virtue is more excellent than gold, by so much is it more wretched to be in
want of virtue than of gold. Wherefore, since intelligible things excel
sensible things, we rightly feel greater repugnance towards defect in
intelligible than in sensible things, esteeming not the defects, but the
things that are deficient more or less precious. From which now it appears,
that defect of light, which is intelligible, is far more wretched than
defect of the sensible light, because, forsooth, life which is known is by
far more precious than yonder light which is seen.

   8. This being the case, who will dare, while attributing sun and moon,
and whatever is refulgent in the stars, nay in this fire of ours and in
this visible earthly life, to God, to decline to grant that any souls
whatsoever, which are not souls except by the fact of their being perfectly
alive, since in this fact alone life has the precedence of light, are from
God. And since he speaks truth who says, In as far as a thing shines it is
from God, would I speak falsely, mighty God, if I should say, In so far as
a thing lives it is from God? Let not, I beseech thee, blindness of
intellect and perversions of mind be increased to such an extent that men
may fail to know these things. But however great their error and
pertinacity might have been, trusting in these arguments and armed
therewith, I believe that when I should have laid the matter before them
thus considered and canvassed, and should have calmly conferred with them,
I should have feared lest any one of them should have seemed to me to be of
any consequence, should he endeavor to subordinate or even to compare to
bodily sense, or to those things that pertain to bodily sense as objects of
knowledge, either intellect or those things that are perceived (not by way
of defect) by the intellect. Which point having been settled, how would he
or any other have dared to deny that such souls as he would consider evil,
yet since they are souls, are to be reckoned in the number of intelligible
things, nor are objects of intellectual perception by way of defect? This
is on the supposition that souls are souls only by being alive. For if they
were intellectually perceived as vicious through defect, being vicious by
lack of virtue, yet they are perceived as souls not through defect, for
they are souls by reason of being alive. Nor can it be maintained that
presence of life is a cause of defect, for by as much as anything is
defective, by so much is it severed from life.

   9. Since therefore it would have been every way evident that no souls
can be separated from that Author from whom yonder light is not separated,
whatever they might have now adduced I should not have accepted, and should
rather have admonished them that they should choose with me to follow those
who maintain that whatever is, since it is, and in whatever degree it is,
has its existence from the one God.

CHAP. 7.--HOW EVIL MEN ARE OF GOD, AND NOT OF GOD.

   They might have cited against me those words of the gospel: "Ye
therefore do not hear, because ye are not of God;" "Ye are of your father
the devil."(1) I also should have cited: "All things were made by Him and
without Him was not anything made,"(2) and this of the Apostle: "One God of
whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all
things,"(1) and again from the same Apostle: "Of whom are all things,
through whom are all things, in whom are all things, to Him be glory."(2) I
should have exhorted those men (if indeed I had found them men), that we
should presume upon nothing as if we had found it out, but should rather
inquire of the masters who would demonstrate the agreement and harmony of
those passages that seem to be discordant. For when in one and the same
Scriptural authority we read: "All things are of God,"(3) and elsewhere:
"Ye are not of God," since it is wrong rashly to condemn books of
Scripture, who would not have seen that a skilled teacher should be found
who would know a solution of this problem, from whom assuredly if endowed
with good intellectual powers, and a "spiritual man," as is said by divine
inspiration(4)  (for he would necessarily have favored the true arguments
concerning the intelligible and sensible nature, which, as far as I can, I
have conducted and handled, nay he would have disclosed them far better and
more convincingly); we should have heard nothing else concerning this
problem, except, as might happen, that there is no class of souls but has
its existence from God, and that it is yet rightly said to sinners and
unbelievers: "Ye are not of God." For we also, perchance, Divine aid having
been implored, should have been able easily to see, that it is one thing to
live and another to sin, and (although life in sin may be called death in
comparison with just life,(5) and while in one man it may be found, that he
is at the same time alive and a sinner) that so far as he is alive, he is
of God, so far as he is a sinner he is not of God. In which division we use
that alternative that suits our sentiment; so that when we wish to insist
upon the omnipotence of God as Creator, we may say even to sinners that
they are of God. For we are speaking to those who are contained in some
class, we are speaking to those having animal life, we are speaking to
rational beings, we are speaking lastly--and this applies especially to the
matter in hand--to living beings, all which things are essentially divine
functions. But when our purpose is to convict evil men, we rightly say: "Ye
are not of God." For we speak to them as averse to truth, unbelieving,
criminal, infamous, and, to sum up all in one term--sinners, all of which
things are undoubtedly not of God. Therefore what wonder is it, if Christ
says to sinners, convicting them of this very thing that they were sinners
and did not believe in Him: "Ye are not of God;" and on the other hand,
without prejudice to the former statement: "All things were made through
Him," and "All things are of God?" For if not to believe Christ, to
repudiate Christ's advent, not to accept Christ, was a sure mark of souls
that are not of God; and so it was said: "Ye therefore hear not, because ye
are not of God;" how would that saying of the apostle be true that occurs
in the memorable beginning of the gospel: "He came unto his own things, and
his own people did not receive him?"(6) Whence his own if they did not
receive him; or whence therefore not his own because they did not receive
him, unless that sinners by virtue of being men belong to God, but by
virtue of being sinners belong to the devil? He who says: "His own people
received him not" had reference to nature; but he who says: "Ye are not of
God." had reference to will; for the evangelist was commending the works of
God, Christ was censuring the sins of men

CHAP. 8.--THE MANICHAEANS INQUIRE WHENCE IS EVIL AND BY THIS QUESTION THINK
THEY HAVE TRIUMPHED. LET THEM FIRST KNOW, WHICH IS MOST EASY TO DO, THAT
NOTHING CAN LIVE WITHOUT GOD. CONSUMMATE EVIL CANNOT BE KNOWN EXCEPT BY THE
KNOWLEDGE OF CONSUMMATE GOOD, WHICH IS GOD.

   Here perchance some one may say: Whence are sins themselves, and whence
is evil in general? If from man, whence is man? if from an angel, whence is
the angel? When it is said, however truly and rightly, that these are from
God, it nevertheless seems to those unskillful and possessed of little
power to look into recondite matters, that evils and sins are thereby
connected, as by a sort of chain, to God. By this question they think
themselves triumphant, as if forsooth to ask were to know;--would it were
so, for in that case no one would be more knowing than myself. Yet very
often in controversy the propounder of a great question, while
impersonating the great teacher, is himself more ignorant in the matter
concerning which he would frighten his opponent, than he whom he would
frighten.

   These therefore suppose that they are superior to the common run,
because the former ask questions that the latter cannot answer. If
therefore when I most unfortunately was associated with them, not in the
position in which I have now for some time been, they had raised these
objections when I had brought forward this argument, I should have said: I
ask that you meanwhile agree with me, which is most easy, that if nothing
can shine without God, much less can anything live without God. Let us not
persist in such monstrous opinions as to maintain that any souls whatsoever
have life apart from God. For perchance it may so happen that with me you
are ignorant as to this thing, namely whence is evil, let us then learn
either simultaneously or in any order, I care not what. For what if
knowledge of the perfection of evil is impossible to man without knowledge
of the perfection of good? For we should not know darkness if we were
always in darkness. But the notion of light does not allow its opposite to
be unknown. But the highest good is that than which there is nothing
higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God therefore
is the highest good. Let us therefore together so recognize God, and thus
what we seek too hastily will not be hidden from us. Do you suppose then
that the knowledge of God is a matter of small account or desert. For what
other reward is there for us than life eternal, which is to know God? For
God the Master says: "But this is life eternal, that they might know Thee
the only and true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."(1) For the
soul, although it is immortal, yet because aversion from the knowledge of
God is rightly called its death, when it is converted to God, the reward of
eternal life to be attained is that knowledge; so that this is, as has been
said, eternal life. But no one can be converted to God, except he turn
himself away from this world. This for myself I feel to be arduous and
exceedingly difficult, whether it is easy to you, God Himself would have
seen. I should have been inclined to think it easy to you, had I not been
moved by the fact, that, since the world from which we are commanded to
turn away is visible, and the apostle says: "The things that are seen are
temporal, but; the things that are unseen are eternal,"(2) you ascribe more
importance to the judgment of these eyes than to that of the mind,
asserting and believing as you do that there is no shining feather that
does not shine from God; and that there are living souls that do not live
from God. These and like things I should either have said to them or
considered with myself, for even then, supplicating God with all my bowels,
so to speak, and examining as attentively as possible the Scriptures, I
should perchance have been able either to say such things or to think them,
so far as was necessary for my salvation.

CHAP. 9.--AUGUSTIN DECEIVED BY FAMILIARITY WITH THE MANICHAEANS, AND BY THE
SUCCESSION OF VICTORIES OVER IGNORANT CHRISTIANS REPORTED BY THEM. THE
MANICHAEANS ARE LIKEWISE EASILY REFUTED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIN AND THE
WILL.

   But two things especially, which easily lay hold upon that unwary age,
urged me through wonderful circuits. One of these was familiarity,
suddenly, by a certain false semblance of goodness, wrapped many times
around my neck as a certain sinuous chain. The other was, that I was almost
always noxiously victorious in arguing with ignorant Christians who yet
eagerly attempted, each as he could, to defend their faith.(3) By which
frequent success the ardor of youth was kindled, and by its own impulse
rashly verged upon the great evil of stubbornness. For this kind of
wrangling, after I had become an auditor among them, whatever I was able to
do either by my own genius, such as it was, or by reading the works of
others, I most gladly devoted to them alone. Accordingly from their
speeches ardor in disputations was daily increased, from success in
disputations love for them [the Manichaeans]. Whence it resulted that
whatever they said, as if affected by certain strange disorders, I approved
of as true, not because I knew it to be true, but because I wished it to
be. So it came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a long
time I followed men that preferred a sleek straw to a living soul.

   12. So be it, I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern
sensible from intelligible things, carnal forsooth from spiritual. It did
not belong to age, nor to discipline, nor even to any habit, nor, finally,
to any deserts; for it is a matter of no small joy and felicitation: had I
not thus been able at length even to grasp that which in the judgment of
all men nature itself by the laws of the most High God has established?

CHAP.  10.--SIN IS ONLY FROM THE WILL. HIS OWN LIFE AND WILL BEST KNOWN TO
EACH INDIVIDUAL. WHAT WILL IS.

   For let any men whatever. if only no madness has broken them loose from
the common sense of the human race, bring whatever zeal they like for
judging, whatever ignorance, nay whatever slowness of mind, I should like
to find out what they would have replied to me had I asked, whether a man
would seem to them to have sinned by whose hand while he was asleep another
should have written something disgraceful? Who doubts that they would have
denied that it is a sin, and have exclaimed against it so vehemently that
they might perchance have been enraged that I should have thought them
proper objects of such a question? Of whom reconciled and restored to
equanimity, as best I could do it, I should have begged that they would not
take it amiss if I asked them another thing just as manifest, just as
completely within the knowledge of all. Then I should have asked, if some
stronger person had done some evil thing by the hand of one not sleeping
but conscious, yet with the rest of his members bound and in constraint,
whether because he knew it, though absolutely unwilling, he should be held
guilty of any sin? And here all marvelling that I should ask such
questions, would reply without hesitation, that he had absolutely not
sinned at all. Why so? Because whoever has done anything evil by means of
one unconscious or unable to resist, the latter can by no means be justly
condemned. And precisely why this is so, if I should inquire of the human
nature in these men, I should easily bring out the desired answer, by
asking in this manner: Suppose that the sleeper already knew what the other
would do with his hand, and of purpose aforethought, having drunk so much
as would prevent his being awakened, should go to sleep, in order to
deceive some one with an oath. Would any amount of sleep suffice to prove
his innocence? What else than a guilty man would one pronounce him? But if
he has also willingly been bound that he may deceive some one by this
pretext, in what respect then would those chains profit as a means of
relieving him of sin? Although bound by these he was really not able to
resist, as in the other case the sleeper was absolutely ignorant of what he
was then doing. Is there therefore any possibility of doubting that both
should be judged to have sinned? Which things having been conceded, I
should have argued, that sin is indeed nowhere but in the will,(1) since
this consideration also would have helped me, that justice holds guilty
those sinning by evil will alone, although they may have been unable to
accomplish what they willed.

   13. For who could have said that, in adducing these considerations, I
was dwelling upon obscure and recondite things, where on account of the
fewness of those able to understand, either fraud or suspicion of
ostentation is accustomed to arise? Let that distinction between
intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little: let me not be found
fault with for following up slow minds with the stimuli of subtle
disputations. Permit me to know that I live, permit me to know that I will
to live. If in this the human race agrees, as our life is known to us, so
also is our will. Nor when we become possessed of this knowledge, is there
any occasion to fear lest any one should convince us that we may be
deceived; for no one can be deceived as to whether he does not live, or
wishes nothing. I do not think that I have adduced anything obscure, and my
concern is rather lest some should find fault with me for dwelling on
things that are too manifest. But let us consider the bearing of these
things.

   14. Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will. But our
will is very well known to us; for neither should I know that I will, if I
did not know what will itself is. Accordingly, it is thus-defined: will is
a movement of mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for
obtaining something.(1) Why therefore could not I have so defined it then?
Was it difficult to see that one unwilling is contrary to one willing, just
as the left hand is contrary to the right, not as black to white? For the
same thing cannot be at the same time black and white. But whoever is
placed between two men is on the left hand with reference to one, on the
right with reference to the other. One man is both on the right hand and on
the left hand at the same time, but by no means both to the one man. So
indeed one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it
cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and
the same thing. For when any one unwillingly does anything; if you ask him
whether he wished to do it, he says that he did not. Likewise if you ask
whether he wished not to do it, he replies that he did. So you will find
him unwilling with reference to doing, willing with reference to not doing,
that is to say, one mind at the same time having both attitudes, but each
referring to different things. Why do I say this? Because if we should
again ask wherefore though unwilling he does this, he will say that he is
compelled. For every one also who does a thing unwillingly is compelled,
and every one who is compelled, if he does a thing, does it only
unwillingly. It follows that he that is willing is free from compulsion,
even if any one thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who
willingly does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled,
either does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaims these
things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the boy
even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the wise,
why then should I not have seen that in the definition of will should be
put, "no one compelling," which now as if with greater experience most
cautiously I have done. But if this is everywhere manifest, and promptly
occurs to all not by instruction but by nature, what is there left that
seems obscure, unless perchance it be concealed from some one, that when we
wish for something, we will, and our mind is moved towards it, and we
either have it or do not have it, and if we have it we will to retain it,
if we have it not, to acquire it? Wherefore everyone who wills, wills
either not to lose something or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are
clearer than day, as they are, nor are they given to my conception alone,
but by the liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I
not have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one
compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something?

CHAP. II.--WHAT SIN IS.

   Some one will say: What assistance would this have furnished you
against the Manichaeans? Wait a moment; permit me first also to define sin,
which, every mind reads divinely written in itself, cannot exist apart from
will. Sin therefore is the will to retain and follow after what justice
forbids, and from which it is free to abstain.(2) Although if it be not
free, it is not will. But I have preferred to define more roughly than
precisely. Should I not also have carefully examined those obscure books,
whence I might have learned that no one is worthy of blame or punishment
who either wills what justice does not prohibit him from willing, or does
not do what he is not able to do? Do not shepherds on mountains, poets in
theatres, unlearned in social intercourse, learned in libraries, masters in
schools, priests in consecrated places, and the human race throughout the
whole world, sing out these things? But if no one is worthy of blame and
condemnation, who either does not act against the prohibition of justice,
or who does not do what he cannot do, yet every sin is blameworthy and
condemnable, who doubts then that it is sin, when willing is unjust, and
not willing is free. And hence that definition is both true and easy to
understand, and not only now but then also could have been spoken by me:
Sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining, what justice forbids, and
whence it is free to abstain?

CHAP. 12.--FROM THE DEFINITIONS GIVEN OF SIN AND WILL, HE OVERTHROWS THE
ENTIRE HERESY OF THE MANICHAEANS. LIKEWISE FROM THE JUST CONDEMNATION OF
EVIL SOULS IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY ARE EVIL NOT BY NATURE BUT BY WILL. THAT
SOULS ARE GOOD BY  NATURE, TO WHICH THE PARDON OF SINS IS GRANTED.

   16. Come now, let us see in what respect these things would have aided
us. Much every way, so that I should have desired nothing more; for they
end the whole cause; for whoever consulting in the inner mind, where they
are more pronounced and assured, the secrets of his own conscience, and the
divine laws absolutely imposed upon nature, grants that these two
definitions of will and sin are true, condemns without any hesitation by
the fewest and the briefest, but plainly the most invincible reasons, the
whole heresy of the Manichaeans. Which can be thus considered. They say
that there are two kinds of souls, the one good, which is in such a way
from God, that it is said not to have been made by Him out of any material
or out of nothing, but to have proceeded as a certain part from the very
substance itself of God; the other evil, which they believe and strive to
get others to believe pertains to God in no way whatever; and so they
maintain that the one is the perfection of good, but the other the
perfection of evil, and that these two classes were at one time distinct
but are now commingled. The character and the cause of this commingling I
had not yet heard; but nevertheless I could have inquired whether that evil
kind of souls, before it was mingled with the good, had any will. For if
not, it was without sin and innocent, and so by no means evil.(1) But if
evil in such a way, that though without will, as fire, yet if it should
touch the good it would violate and corrupt it; how impious it is to
believe that the nature of evil is powerful enough to change any part of
God, and that the Highest Good is corruptible and violable! But if the will
was present, assuredly there was present, no one compelling, a movement of
the mind either towards not losing something or obtaining something. But
this something was either good, or was thought to be good, for not
otherwise could it be earnestly desired. But in supreme evil, before the
commingling which they maintain, there never was any good. Whence then
could there be in it either the knowledge or the thought of good? Did they
wish for nothing that was in themselves, and earnestly desire that true
good which was without? That will must truly be declared worthy of
distinguished and great praise by which is earnestly desired the supreme
and true good. Whence then in supreme evil was this movement of mind most
worthy of so great praise? Did they seek it for the sake of injuring it? In
the first place, the argument comes to the same thing. For he who wishes to
injure, wishes to deprive another of some good for the sake of some good of
his own. There was therefore in them either a knowledge of good or an
opinion of good, which ought by no means to belong to supreme evil. In the
second place, whence had they known, that good placed outside of
themselves, which they designed to injure, existed at all. If they had
intellectually perceived it, what is more excellent than such a mind? Is
there anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth
except the knowledge of that supreme and sincere good? What therefore is
now scarcely conceded to a few good and just men, was mere evil, no good
assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls bore bodies and saw
the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what hearts, what
intellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those eyes, with which the
minds of just men can scarcely be compared? How great good things we find
in supreme evil! For if to see God is evil, God is not a good; but God is a
good; therefore to see God is good; and I know not what can be compared to
this good. Since to see anything is good, whence can it be made out that to
be able to see is evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds
brought it about, that the divine essence could be seen by them, brought
about a great thing and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But
if it was not brought about, but it was such in itself and eternal, it is
difficult to find anything better than this evil.

   17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy
things which by the reasonings of the Manichaeans they are compelled to
have, I should have asked, whether God condemns any or no souls. If none,
there is no judgment of rewards and punishments, no providence, and the
world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or rather is not
administered at all. For the name administration must not be given to
chances. But if it is impious for all those that are bound by any religion
to believe this, it remains either that there is condemnation of some
souls, or that there are no sins. But if there are no sins, neither is
there any evil. Which if the Manichaeans should say, they would slay their
heresy with a single blow. Therefore they and I agree that some souls are
condemned by divine law and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is
that justice? If evil, are they so by nature, or by will? But by nature
souls can in no way be evil. Whence do we teach this. From the above
definitions of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil,
and that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin
without will, is great craziness, and to hold any one guilty of sin for not
doing what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity and insanity.
Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by nature not by will,
that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind free both for doing and
not doing, if finally no power of abstaining from their work is conceded to
them; we cannot hold that the sin is theirs.(1) But all confess both that
evil souls are justly, and souls that have not sinned are unjustly
condemned; therefore they confess that those souls are evil that sin. But
these, as reason teaches, do not sin. Therefore the extraneous class of
evil souls of the Manichaeans, whatever it may be, is a non-entity.

   18. Let us now look at that good class of souls, which again they exalt
to such a degree as to say that it is the very substance of God. But how
much better it is that each one should recognize his own rank and merit,
nor be so puffed up with sacrilegious pride as to believe that as often as
he experiences a change in himself it is the substance of that supreme
good, which devout reason holds and teaches to be unchangeable! For behold!
since it is manifest that souls do not sin in not being such as they cannot
be; it follows that these supposititious souls, whatever they may be, do
not sin at all, and moreover that they are absolutely non-existent; it
remains that since there are sins, they find none to whom to attribute them
except the good class of souls and the substance of God. But especially are
they pressed by Christian authority; for never have they denied that
forgiveness of sins is granted when any one has been converted to God;
never have they said (as they have said of many other passages) that some
corrupter has interpolated this into the divine Scriptures. To whom then
are sins attributed? If to those evil souls of the alien class, these also
can become good, can possess the kingdom of God with Christ. Which denying,
they [the Manichaeans] have no other class except those souls which they
maintain are of the substance of God. It remains that they acknowledge that
not only these latter also, but these alone sin. But I make no contention
about their being alone in sinning; yet they sin. But are they compelled to
sin by being commingled with evil? If so compelled that there was no power
of resisting, they do not sin. If it is in their power to resist, and they
voluntarily consent, we are compelled to find out through their [the
Manichaean] teaching, why so great good things in supreme evil, why this
evil in supreme good, unless it be that neither is that which they bring
into suspicion evil, nor is that which they pervert by superstition supreme
good?

CHAP.13.--FROM DELIBERATION ON THE EVIL AND ON THE GOOD PART IT RESULTS
THAT TWO CLASSES OF SOULS ARE NOT TO BE HELD TO. A CLASS OF SOULS ENTICING
TO SHAMEFUL DEEDS HAVING BEEN CONCEDED, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THESE ARE
EVIL BY NATURE, THAT THE OTHERS ARE SUPREME GOOD.

   19. But if I had taught, or at any rate had myself learned, that they
rave and err regarding those two classes of souls, why should I have
thenceforth thought them worthy of being heard or consulted about anything?
That I might learn hence, that these two kinds of souls are pointed out,
which in the course of deliberation assent puts now on the evil side, now
on the good? Why is not this rather the sign of one soul which by free will
can be borne here and there, swayed hither and thither? For it was my own
experience to feel that I am one, considering evil and good and choosing
one or the other, but for the most part the one pleases, the other is
fitting, placed in the midst of which we fluctuate. Nor is it to be
wondered at, for we are now so constituted that through the flesh we can be
affected by sensual pleasure, and through the spirit by honorable
considerations. Am I not therefore compelled to acknowledge two souls? Nay,
we can better and with far less difficulty recognize two classes of good
things, of which neither is alien from God as its author, one soul acted
upon from diverse directions, the lower and the higher, or to speak more
correctly, the external and the internal. These are the two classes which a
little while ago we considered under the names sensible and intelligible,
which we now prefer to call more familiarly carnal and spiritual. But it
has been made difficult for us to abstain from carnal things, since our
truest bread is spiritual. For with great labor we now eat this bread. For
neither without punishment for the sin of transgression have we been
changed from immortal into moral. So it happens, that when we strive after
better things, habit formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in
some way begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our way, some
foolish persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another
kind of souls which is not of God.

   20. However even if it be conceded to them that we are enticed to
shameful deeds by another inferior kind of souls, they do not thence make
it evident that those enticing are evil by nature, or those enticed,
supremely good. For it may be, the former of their own will, by striving
after what was not lawful, that is, by sinning, from being good have become
evil; and again they may be made good, but in such manner that for a long
time they remain in sin, and by a certain occult suasion traduce to
themselves other souls. Then, they may not be absolutely evil, but in their
own kind, however inferior, they may exercise their own functions without
any sin. But those superior souls to whom justice, the directress of
things, has assigned a far more excellent activity, if they should wish to
follow and to imitate those inferior ones, become evil, not because they
imitate evil souls, but because they imitate in an evil way. By the evil
souls is done what is proper to them, by the good what is alien to them is
striven after. Hence the former remain in their own grade, the latter are
plunged into a lower. It is as when men copy after beasts. For the four-
fooled horse walks beautifully, but if a man on all fours should imitate
him, who would think him worthy even of chaff for food? Rightly therefore
we generally disapprove of one who imitates, while we approve of him whom
he imitates. But we disapprove not because he has not succeeded, but for
wishing to succeed at all. For in the horse we approve of that to which by
as much as we prefer man, by so much are we offended that he copies after
inferior creatures. So among men, however well the crier may do in sending
forth his voice, would not the senator be insane, if he should do it even
more clearly and better than the crier? Take an illustration from the
heavenly bodies: The moon when shining is praised, and by its course and
its changes is quite pleasing to those that pay attention to such things.
But if the sun should wish to imitate it (for we may feign that it has
desires of this sorts), who would not be greatly and rightly displeased.
From which illustrations I wish it to be understood, that even if there are
souls (which meanwhile is left an open question(2)) devoted to bodily
offices not by sin but by nature, and even if they are related to us,
however inferior they may be, by some inner affinity, they should not be
esteemed evil simply because we are evil ourselves in following them and in
loving corporeal things. For we sin by loving corporeal things, because by
justice we are required and by nature we are able to love spiritual things,
and when we do this we are, in our kind, the best and the happiest.(3)

   21. Wherefore what proof does deliberation, violently urged in both
directions, now prone to sin, now borne on toward right conduct, furnish,
that we are compelled to accept two kinds of souls, the nature of one of
which is from God, of the other not; when we are free to conjecture so many
other causes of alternating states of mind? But that these things are
Obscure and are to no purpose pried into by blear-eyed minds, whoever is a
good judge of things sees. Wherefore those things rather which have been
said regarding the will and sin, those things, I say, that supreme justice
permits no man using his reason to be ignorant of, those things which if
they were taken from us, there is nothing whence the discipline of virtue
may begin, nothing whence it may rise from the death of vices, those things
I say considered again and again with sufficient clearness and lucidity
convince us that the heresy of the Manichaeans is false.

CHAP. 14.--AGAIN IT IS SHOWN FROM THE UTILITY OF REPENTING THAT SOULS ARE
NOT BY NATURE EVIL. SO SURE A DEMONSTRATION IS NOT CONTRADICTED EXCEPT FROM
THE HABIT OF ERRING.

   22. Like the foregoing considerations is what I shall now say about
repenting. For as among all sane people it is agreed, and this the
Manichaeans themselves not only confess but also teach, that to repent of
sin is useful. Why shall I now, in this matter, collect the testimonies of
the divine Scriptures, which are scattered throughout their pages? It is
also the voice of nature; notice of this thing has escaped no fool. We
should be undone, if this were not deeply imbedded in our nature. Some one
may say that he does not sin; but no barbarity will dare to say, that if
one sins he should not repent of it. This being the case, I ask to which of
the two kinds of souls does repenting pertain? I know indeed that it can
pertain neither to him who does ill nor to him who cannot do well.
Wherefore, that I may use the words of the Manichaeans, if a soul of
darkness repent of sin, it is not of the substance of supreme evil, if a
soul of light, it is not of the substance of supreme good; that disposition
of repenting which is profitable testifies alike that the penitent has done
ill, and that he could have done well. How, therefore, is there from me
nothing of evil, if I have acted unadvisedly, or how can I rightly repent
if I have not so done? Hear the other part. How is there from me nothing of
good, if in me there is good will, or how do I rightly repent if there is
not? Wherefore, either let them deny that there is great utility in
repenting, so that they may be driven not only from the Christian name, but
from every even imaginary argument for their views, or let them cease to
say and to teach that there are two kinds of souls, one of which has
nothing of evil, the other nothing of good; for that whole sect is propped
up by this two-headed or rather headlong (2) variety of souls.

   23. And to me indeed it is sufficient thus to know that the Manichaeans
err, that I know that sin must be repented of; and yet if now by right of
friendship I should accost some one of my friends who still thinks that
they are worthy of being listened to, and should say to him: Do you not
know that it is useful, when any one has sinned, to repent? Without
hesitation he will swear that he knows. If then I shall have convinced you
that Manichaeism is false, will you not desire anything snore? Let him
reply what more he can desire in this matter. Very well, so far. But when I
shall have begun to show the sure and necessary arguments which, bound to
it with adamantine chains, as the saying is, follow that proposition, and
shall have conducted to its conclusion the whole process by which that sect
is overthrown, he will deny perhaps that he knows the utility of repenting,
which no learned man, no unlearned, is ignorant of, and will rather
contend, when we hesitate and deliberate, that two souls in us furnish each
its own proper help to the solution of the different parts of the question.
O habit of sin! O accompanying penalty of sin! Then you turned me away from
the consideration of things so manifest, but you injured me when I did not
discern. But now, among my most familiar acquaintances who do not discern,
you wound and torment me discerning.

CHAP. 15.--HE PRAYS FOR HIS FRIENDS WHOM HE HAS HAD AS ASSOCIATES IN ERROR.

   24. Give heed to these things, I beseech you, dearly beloved. Your
dispositions to have well known. If you now concede to me the mind and the
reason of any sort of man, these things are far more certain than the
things that we seemed to learn or rather were compelled to believe. Great
God, God omnipotent, God of supreme goodness, whose right it is to be
believed and known to be inviolable and unchangeable. Trinal Unity, whom
the Catholic Church worships, as one who have experienced in myself Thy
mercy, I supplicate Thee, that Thou wilt not permit those with whom from
boyhood I have lived most harmoniously in every relation to dissent from me
in Thy worship. I see bow it was especially to be expected in this place
that I should either even then have defended the Catholic Scriptures
attacked by the Manichaeans, if as I say, I had been cautious; or I should
now show that they can be defended. But in other volumes God will aid my
purpose, for the moderate length of this, as I suppose, already asks to be
spared.(3) Augustin and Fortunatus are at variance with reference to the
subject for discussion, the former having proposed to dispute about
doctrine, the latter preferring to vindicate his party through the
testimony of Augustin from the slanderous accusations that are current
among the Catholics. Fortunatus makes a confession of his faith, in which
he confesses to believe that God is incorruptible, lucid, unapproachable,
intenible, impassible; and expresses his adherence to a doctrine of the
Trinity somewhat like that held by Orthodox Christians. Augustin shows that
the Manichaean God is subject to necessity, corruptible, violable, liable
to suffering, etc., and presses upon Fortunatus the question, Why God sent
a portion of his substance to combat the race of darkness, and so to become
involved in corruption and misery? Fortunatus attempts, without success, to
show the consistency of his confession of faith with the Manichaean view of
two eternally existing antagonistic principles, and the conflict between
the two resulting in the mingling of good and evil in the present order of
things by quoting freely from the Christian Scriptures. Knowing the
deceitfulness of Fortunatus in his use of Scripture, Augustin insists that
the discussion be conducted on rational grounds. The audience take sides
with Augustin, and raise a clamor that results in the suspension of the
discussion, and after they have expressed horror at Fortunatus' assertion
that the Word of God is lettered in the race of darkness, the meeting is
closed.


Taken from "The Early Church Fathers and Other Works" originally published
by Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. in English in Edinburgh, Scotland, beginning in
1867. (LNPF I/IV, Schaff). The digital version is by The Electronic Bible
Society, P.O. Box 701356, Dallas, TX 75370, 214-407-WORD.

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