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not completely corrected. EWTN has corrected all discovered errors.)


ST. AUGUSTIN

ON LYING. [DE MENDACIO.]

[Translated by the Rev. H. Browne, M.A., of Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge, late principal of the Diocesan College, Chichester.]


   1. THERE is a great question about Lying, which often arises in the
midst of our every day business, and gives us much trouble, that we may not
either rashly call that a lie which is not such, or decide that it is
sometimes right to tell a tie, that is, a kind of honest, well-meant,
charitable lie. This question we will painfully discuss by seeking with
them that seek: whether to any good purpose, we need not take upon
ourselves to affirm, for the attentive reader will sufficiently gather from
the course of the discussion. It is, indeed, very full of dark corners, and
hath many cavern-like windings, whereby it oft eludes the eagerness of the
seeker; so that at one moment what was found seems to slip out of one's
hands, and anon comes to light again, and then is once more lost to sight.
At last, however, the chase will bear down more surely, and will overtake
our sentence. Wherein it there is any error, yet as Truth is that which
setteth free from all error, and Falsehood that which entangleth in all
error, one never errs more safely, methinks, than when one errs by too much
loving the truth, and too much rejecting of falsehood. For they who find
great fault say it is too much, whereas peradventure Truth would say after
all, it is not yet enough. But whoso readest, thou wilt do well to find no
fault until thou have read the whole; so wilt thou have less fault to find.
Eloquence thou must not look for: we have been intent upon things, and upon
dispatch in putting out of hand a matter which nearly concerns our every
day life, and therefore have had small pains, or almost none, to bestow
upon words.

   2. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted
lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood
of the joker a most evident indication that he means no deceit, although
the thing he utters be not true: touching which kind of discourse, whether
it be meet to be used by perfect minds, is another question which we have
not at this time taken in hand to clear; but setting jokes apart, the first
point to be attended to, is, that a person should not be thought to lie,
who lieth not.

   3. For which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not every one who
says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he
says. Now between believing and opining there is this difference, that
sometimes he who believes feels that he does not know that which he
believes, (although he may know himself to be ignorant of a thing, and yet
have no doubt at all concerning it, if he most firmly believes it:) whereas
he who opines, thinks he knows that which he does not know. Now whoever
utters that which he holds in his mind either as belief or as opinion, even
though it be false, he lies not. For this he owes to the faith of his
utterance, that he thereby produce that which he holds in his mind, and has
in that way in which he produces it. Not that he is without fault, although
he lie not, if either he believes what he ought not to believe, or thinks
he knows what he knows not, even though it should be true: for he accounts
an unknown thing for a known. Wherefore, that man lies, who has one thing
in his mind and utters another in words, or by signs of whatever kind.
Whence also the heart of him who lies is said to be double; that is, there
is a double thought: the one, of that thing which he either knows or thinks
to be true and does not produce; the other, of that thing which he produces
instead thereof, knowing or thinking it to be false. Whence it comes to
pass, that he may say a false thing and yet not lie, if he thinks it to be
so as he says although it be not so; and, that he may say a true thing, and
yet lie, if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true, although in
reality it be so as he utters it. For from the sense of his own mind, not
from the verity or falsity of the things themselves, is he to be judged to
lie or not to lie. Therefore he who utters a false thing for a true, which
however he opines to be true, may be called erring and rash: but he is not
rightly said to lie; because he has not a double heart when he utters it,
neither does he wish to deceive, but is deceived. But the fault of him who
lies, is, the desire of deceiving in the uttering of his mind; whether he
do deceive, in that he is believed when uttering the false thing; or
whether he do not deceive, either in that he is not believed, or in that he
utters a true thing with will to deceive, which he does not think to be
true: wherein being believed, he does not deceive though it was his will to
deceive: except that he deceives in so far as he is thought to know or
think as he utters.

   4. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all
will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus, put the case that a
person shall speak a false thing, which he esteems to be false, on the
ground that he thinks he is not believed, to the intent, that in that way
falsifying his faith he may deter the person to whom he speaks, which
person he perceives does not choose to believe him. For here is a person
who tells a lie with studied purpose of not deceiving, if to tell a lie is
to utter any thing otherwise than yon know or think it to be. But if it be
no lie, unless when something is uttered with wish to deceive, that person
lies not, who says a false thing, knowing or thinking it to be false, but
says it on purpose that the person to whom he speaks by not believing him
may not be deceived, because the speaker either knows or thinks the other
will not believe him. Whence if it appear to be possible that a person
should say a false thing on purpose that he to whom it is said may not be
deceived, on the other hand there is this opposite case, the case of a
person saying the truth on purpose that he may deceive. For if a man
determines to say a true thing because he perceives he is not believed,
that man speaks truth on purpose that he may deceive: for he knows or
thinks that what is said may be accounted false, just because it is spoken
by him. Wherefore in saying a true thing on purpose that it may be thought
false, he says a true thing on purpose to deceive. So that it may be
inquired, which rather lies: he who says a false thing that he may not
deceive, or he who says a true thing that he may deceive? the one knowing
or thinking that he says a false thing, and the other knowing or thinking
that he says a true thing? For we have already said that the person who
does not know the thing to he false which he utters, does not lie if he
thinks it to be true; and that that person rather lies who utters even a
true thing when he thinks it false: because it is by the sense of their
mind that they are to be judged. Concerning these persons therefore, whom
we have set forth, there is no small question. The one, who knows or thinks
he says a false thing, and says it on purpose that he may not deceive: as,
if he knows a certain road to be beset by robbers, and fearing lest some
person for whose safety he is anxious should go by that road, which person
he knows does not trust him, should tell him that that road has no robbers,
on purpose that he may not go by it, as he will think there are robbers
there precisely because the other has told him there are none, and he is
resolved not to believe him, accounting him a liar. The other, who knowing
or thinking that to be true which he says, says it on purpose that he may
deceive: for instance, if he tells a person who does not believe him, that
there are robbers in that road where he really knows them to be, that he to
whom he tells it may the rather go by that road and so fall among robbers,
because he thinks that to be false, which the other told him. Which then of
these lies? the one who has chosen to say a  false thing that he may not
deceive? or the  other who has chosen to say a true thing that he may
deceive? that one, who in saying a false thing aimed that he to whom he
spake should follow the truth? or this one,  who in saying a true thing
aimed that he to whom he spake should follow a falsehood?  Or haply have
both lied? the one, because he wished to say a false thing: the other,
because he wished to deceive? Or rather, has neither lied? not the one,
because he had the will not to deceive: not the other, because he had the
will to speak the truth? For the question is not now which of them sinned,
but which of them lied: as indeed it is presently seen that the latter
sinned, because by speaking a truth he brought it about that a person
should fall among robbers, and that the former has not sinned, or even has
done good, because by speaking a false thing he has been the means of a
person's avoiding destruction. But then these instances may be turned the
other way, so that the one should be supposed to wish some more grievous
suffering to the person whom he wishes not to be deceived; for there are
many cases of persons who through knowing certain things to be true, have
brought destruction upon themselves, if the things were such as ought to
have continued unknown to them: and the other may be supposed to wish some
convenience to result to the person whom he wishes to be deceived; for
there have been instances of persons who would have destroyed themselves
had they known some evil that had really befallen those who were dear to
them, and through deeming it false have spared themselves: and so to be
deceived has been a benefit to them, as to others it has been a hurt to
know the truth. The question therefore is not with what purpose of doing a
kindness or a hurt, either the one said a false thing that he might not
deceive, or the other a true thing that he might deceive: but, setting
apart the convenience or inconvenience of the persons spoken to, in so far
as relates to the very truth and falsehood, the question is, whether both
of them or neither has lied. For if a lie is an utterance with will of
uttering a false thing, that man has rather lied who willed to say a false
thing, and said what he willed, albeit he said it of set purpose not to
deceive. But if a lie is any utterance whatever with will to deceive; then
not the former has lied, but the latter, who even in speaking truth willed
to deceive. And if a lie is an utterance with will of any falsity, both
have lied; because both the former willed his utterance to be false, and
tire latter willed a false thing to be believed concerning his utterance
which was true. Further, if a lie is an utterance of a person. wishing to
utter a false thing that he may deceive, neither has lied; because both the
former in saving a false thing had the will to make a true thing believed,
and the latter to say a true thing in order that he might make a false
thing believed. We shall be clear then of all rashness and all lying, if,
what we know to be true or right to be believed, we utter when need is, and
wish to make that thing believed which we utter. If, however, either
thinking that to be true which is false, or accounting as known that which
is to us unknown, or believing what we ought not to believe, or uttering it
when need is not, we yet have no other aim than to make that believed which
we utter; we do not stand clear indeed of the error of temerity, but we do
stand clear of all lying. For there is no need to be afraid of any of those
definitions, when the mind has a good conscience, that it utters that which
to be true it either knows, or opines, or believes, and that it has no wish
to make any thing believed but that which it utters.

   5. But whether a lie be at some times useful, is a much greater and
more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, when a person has
no will to deceive, or even makes it his business that the person to whom
he says a thing shall not be deceived although he did wish the thing itself
which he uttered to be false, but this on purpose that he might cause a
truth to be believed whether, again, it be a lie when a person willingly
utters even a truth for the purpose of deceiving; this may be doubted. But
none doubts that it is a lie when a person willingly utters a falsehood for
the purpose of deceiving: wherefore a false utterance put forth with will
to deceive is manifestly a lie. But whether this alone be a lie, is another
question. Meanwhile, taking this kind of lie, in which all agree, let us
inquire, whether it be sometimes useful to utter a falsehood with will to
deceive. They who think it is, advance testimonies to their opinion, by
alleging the case of Sarah,(1) who, when she had laughed, denied to the
Angels that she laughed: of Jacob questioned by his father, and answering
that he was the elder son Esau:(2) likewise that of the Egyptian midwives,
who to save the Hebrew infants from being slain at their birth, told a lie,
and that with God's approbation and reward:(3) and many such like instances
they pick out, of lies told by persons whom you would not dare to blame,
and so must own that it may sometimes be not only not blameworthy, but even
praiseworthy to tell a lie. They add also a case with which to urge not
only those who are devoted to the Divine Books, but all men and common
sense, saying, Suppose a man should take refuge with thee, who by thy lie
might be saved from death, wouldest thou not tell it? If a sick man should
ask a question which it is not expedient that he should know, and might be
more grievously afflicted even by thy returning him no answer, wilt thou
venture either to tell the truth to the destruction of the man's life, or
rather to hold thy peace, than by a virtuous and merciful lie to be
serviceable to his weak health? By these and such like arguments they think
they most plentifully prove, that if occasion of doing good require, we may
sometimes tell a lie.

   6. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie, plead much
more strongly, using first the Divine authority, because in the very
Decalogue it is written "Thou shall not bear false witness;"(4) under which
general term it comprises all lying: for whoso utters any thing bears
witness to his own mind. But lest any should contend that not every lie is
to be called false witness, what will he say to that which is written, "The
mouth that lieth slayeth the soul:"(5) and lest any should suppose that
this may be understood with the exception of some liars, let him read in
another place, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing."(6) Whence with
His own lips the Lord saith, "Let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay;
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."(7) Hence the Apostle
also in giving precept for the putting off of the old man, under which name
all sins are understood, says straightway, "Wherefore putting away lying,
speak ye truth."(8)

   7. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from
the Old Testament which are alleged as examples of lies: for there, every
incident may possibly be taken figuratively, although it really did take
place: and when a thing is either done or said figuratively, it is no lie.
For every utterance is to be referred to that which it utters. But when any
thing is either done or said figuratively, it utters that which it
signifies to those for whose understanding it was put forth. Whence we may
believe in regard of those persons of the prophetical times who are set
forth as authoritative, that in all that is written of them they acted and
spoke prophetically; and no less, that there is a prophetical meaning in
all those incidents of their lives which by the same prophetic Spirit have
been accounted worthy of being recorded in writing. As to the midwives,
indeed, they cannot say that these women did through the prophetic Spirit,
with purpose of signifying a future truth, tell Pharaoh one thing instead
of another, (albeit that Spirit did signify something, without their
knowing what was doing in their persons:) but, they say that these women
were according to their degree approved and rewarded of God. For if a
person who is used to tell lies for harm's sake comes to tell them for the
sake of doing good, that person has made great progress. But it is one
thing that is set forth as laudable in itself, another that in comparison
with a worse is preferred. It is one sort of gratulation that we express
when a man is in sound health, another when a sick man is getting better.
In the Scripture, even Sodom is said to be justified in comparison with the
crimes of the people Israel. And to this rule they apply all the instances
of lying which are produced from the Old Books, and are found not
reprehended, or cannot be reprehended: either they are approved on the
score of a progress towards improvement and hope of better things, or in
virtue of some hidden signification they are not altogether lies.

   8. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the
figurative pre-significations used by our Lord, if thou consider the life
and manners of the Saints, their actions and sayings, nothing of the kind
can be produced which should provoke to imitation of lying. For the
simulation of Peter and Barnabas is not only recorded, but also reproved
and corrected.(1) For it was not, as some suppose,(2) out of the same
simulation that even Paul the Apostle either circumcised Timothy, or
himself celebrated certain ceremonies(3) according to the Jewish rite; but
he did so, out of that liberty of his mind whereby he preached that neither
are the Gentiles the better for circumcision, nor the Jews the worse.
Wherefore he judged that neither the former should be tied to the custom of
the Jews, nor the Jews deterred from the custom of their fathers. Whence
are those words of his: "Is any man called being circumcised let him not
become uncircumcised. Is any called in uncircumcision? let him not be
circumcised. Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but
the keeping of the commandments of God. Let every man abide in the same
calling wherein he was called."(4) How can a man become uncircumcised after
circumcision? but let him not do so, saith he: let him not so live as if he
had become uncircumcised, that is, as if he had covered again with flesh
the part that was bared, and ceased to be a Jew; as in another place he
saith, "Thy circumcision is become uncircumcision."(5) And this the Apostle
said, not as though he would compel either those to remain in
uncircumcision, or the Jews in the custom of their fathers: but that
neither these nor those should be forced to the other custom; and, each
should have power of abiding in his own custom, not necessity of so doing.
For neither if the Jew should wish, where it would disturb no man, to
recede from Jewish observances, would he be prohibited by the Apostle,
since the object of his counselling to abide therein was that Jews might
not by being troubled about superfluous things be hindered from coming to
those things which are necessary to salvation. Neither would it be
prohibited by him, if any of the Gentiles should wish to be circumcised for
the purpose of showing that he does not detest the same as noxious, but
holds it indifferently, as a seal,(6) the usefulness of which had already
passed away with time; for it did not follow that, if there were now no
salvation to be had from it, there was destruction to be dreaded therefrom.
And for this reason, Timothy, having been called in uncircumcision, yet
because his mother was a Jewess and he was bound, in order to gain his
kindred, to show them that he had not learnt in the Christian discipline to
abominate the sacraments of the old Law, was circumcised by the Apostle;(7)
that in this way i they might prove to the Jews, that the reason why the
Gentiles do not receive them, is not  that they are evil and were
perniciously observed by the Fathers, but because they are no longer
necessary to salvation after the advent of that so great Sacrament. which
through so long times the whole of that ancient Scripture in its
prophetical prefigurations did travail in birth withal. For he would
circumcise Titus also, when the Jews urged this,(8) but that false
brethren, privily brought in, wished it to be done to the intent they might
have it to disseminate concerning Paul himself as a token that he had given
place to the truth of their preaching, who said that the hope of Gospel
salvation is in circumcision of the flesh and observances of that kind, and
that without these Christ profiteth no man: whereas on the contrary Christ
would nothing profit them, who should be circumcised because they thought
that in it was salvation; whence that saying, "Behold, I Paul say unto you,
that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.(9) Out of this
liberty, therefore, did Paul keep the observances of his fathers, but with
this one precaution and express declaration, that people should not suppose
that without these was no Christian salvation. Peter, however, by his
making as though salvation consisted in Judaism, was compelling the
Gentiles to judaize; as is shown by Paul's words, where he says, "Why
compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?(10) For they would be
under no compulsion unless they saw that he observed them in such manner as
if beside them could be no salvation. Peter's simulation therefore is not
to be compared to Paul's liberty. And while we ought to love Peter for that
he willingly received correction, we must not bolster up lying even by the
authority of Paul, who both recalled Peter to the right path in the
presence of them all, lest the Gentiles through him should be compelled to
judaize; and bare witness to his own preaching, that whereas he was
accounted hostile to the traditions of the fathers in that he would not
impose them on the Gentiles, he did not despise to celebrate them himself
according to the custom of his fathers, and therein sufficiently showed
that this has remained in them at the Coming of Christ; that neither to the
Jews they are pernicious, nor to the Gentiles necessary, nor henceforth to
any of mankind means of salvation.(1)

   9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the
ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have
been done or said in a figurative sense, or be it because good men are not
challenged to imitate that which in bad men, beginning to amend, is praised
in comparison with the worse; nor yet from the books of the New Testament,
because Peter's correction rather than his simulation, even as his tears
rather than his denial, is what we must imitate: then, as to those examples
which are fetched from common life, they assert much more confidently that
there is no trust to be given to these. For first they teach, that a lie is
iniquity, by many proofs of holy writ, especially by that which is written,
"Thou, Lord, hatest all workers of iniquity, thou shall destroy them that
speak leasing."(2)  For either as the Scripture is wont, in the following
clause it expounds the former; so that, as iniquity is a term of a wider
meaning, leasing is named as the particular sort of iniquity intended: or
if they think there is any difference between the two, leasing is by so
much worse than iniquity as "thou wilt destroy" is heavier than "thou
hatest." For it may be that God hates a person to that degree more mildly,
as not to destroy him, but whom He destroys He hates the more exceedingly,
by how much He punisheth more severely. Now He hateth all who work
iniquity: but all who speak leasing He also destroyeth. Which thing being
fixed, who of them which assert this will be moved by those examples, when
it is said, suppose a man should seek shelter with thee who by thy lie may
be saved from death? For that death which men are foolishly afraid of who
are not afraid to sin, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord
teacheth in the Gospel; whence He charges us not to fear that death:(3) but
the mouth which lies kills not the body but the soul. For in these words it
is most plainly written, "The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul."(4) How
then can it be said without the greatest perverseness, that to the end one
man may have life of the body, it is another man's duty to incur death of
the soul? The love of our neighbor hath its bounds in each man's love of
himself. "Thou shall love," saith He, "thy neighbor as thyself."(5) How can
a man be said to love as himself that man, for whom that he may secure a
temporal life, himself loseth life eternal? Since if for his temporal life
he lose but his own temporal life, that is not to love as himself, but more
than himself: which exceeds the rule of sound doctrine. Much less then is
he by telling a lie to lose his own eternal for another's temporal life.
His own temporal life, of course, for his neighbor's eternal life a
Christian man will not hesitate to lose: for this example has gone before,
that the Lord died for us. To this point He also saith, "This is my
commandment, that ye love one another as I have loved you. Greater love
hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."(6)
For none is so foolish as to say that the Lord did other than consult for
the eternal salvation of men, whether in doing what He hath charged us to
do, or in charging us to do what Himself hath done. Since then by lying
eternal life is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told.
And as to those who take it ill and are indignant that one should refuse to
tell a lie, and thereby slay his own soul in order that another may grow
old in the flesh; what if by our committing theft, what if by committing
adultery, a person might be delivered from death: are we therefore to
steal, to commit whoredom? They cannot prevail with themselves in a case of
this kind: namely, if a person should bring a halter and demand that one
should yield to his carnal lust, declaring that he will hang himself unless
his request be granted: they cannot prevail with themselves to comply for
the sake of, as they say, saving a life. If this is absurd and wicked, why
should a man corrupt his own soul with a lie in order that another may live
in the body, when, if he were to give his body to be corrupted with such an
object, he would in the judgment of all men be held guilty of nefarious
turpitude? Therefore the only point to be attended to in this question is,
whether a lie be iniquity. And since this is asserted by the texts above
rehearsed, we must see that to ask, whether a man ought to tell a lie for
the safety of another, is just the same as asking whether for another's
safety a man ought to commit iniquity. But if the salvation of the soul
rejects this, seeing it cannot be secured but by equity, and would have us
prefer it not only to another's, but even to our own temporal safety: what
remains, say they, that should make us doubt that a lie ought not to be
told under any circumstances whatsoever? For it cannot be said that there
is aught among temporal goods greater or dearer than the safety and life of
the body. Wherefore if not even that is to be preferred to truth, what can
be put in our way for the sake of which they who think it is sometimes
right to lie, can urge that a lie ought to be told?

   10. As concerning purity of body; here indeed a very honorable regard
seems to come in the way, and to demand a lie in its behalf; to wit, that
if the assault of the ravisher may be escaped by means of a lie, it is
indubitably right to tell it: but to this it may easily be answered, that
there is no purity of body except as it depends on integrity of mind; this
being broken, the other must needs fall, even though it seem intact; and
for this reason it is not to be reckoned among temporal things, as a thing
that might be taken away from people against their will. By no means
therefore must the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body,
which it knows remaineth incorrupt if from the mind itself incorruptness
depart not. For that which by violence, with no lust foregoing, the body
suffereth, is rather to be called deforcement than corruption. Or if all
deforcement is corruption, then not every corruption hath turpitude, but
only that which lust hath procured, or to which lust hath consented. Now by
how much the mind is more excellent than the body, so much the more heinous
is the wickedness if that be corrupted. There, then, purity can be
preserved, because there none but a voluntary corruption can have place.
For assuredly if the ravisher assault the body, and there is no escaping
him either by contrary force, or by any contrivance or lie, we must needs
allow that purity cannot be violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no
man doubts that the mind is better than the body, to integrity of body we
ought to prefer integrity of mind, which can be preserved for ever. Now who
will say that the mind of him who tells a lie hath its integrity? Indeed
lust itself is rightly defined, An appetite of the mind by which to eternal
goods any temporal goods whatever are preferred. Therefore no man can prove
that it is at any time right to tell a lie, unless he be able to show that
any eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since each man departs from
eternity just in so far as he departs from truth, it is most absurd to say,
that by departing therefrom it is possible for any man to attain to any
good. Else if there be any eternal good which truth compriseth not, it will
not be a true good, therefore neither will it be good, because it will be
false. But as the mind to the body, so must also truth be preferred to the
mind itself, so that the mind should desire it not only more than the body,
but even more than its own self. So will the mind be more entire and
chaste, when it shall enjoy the immutability of truth rather than its own
mutability. Now if Lot,(1) being so righteous a man that he was meet(2) to
entertain even Angels, offered his daughters to the lust of the Sodomites,
to the intent, that the bodies of women rather than of men might be
corrupted by them; how much more diligently and constantly ought the mind's
chasteness in the truth to be preserved, seeing it is more truly preferable
to its body, than the body of a man to the body of a woman?

   11. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a
person to tell a lie for another is, that he may live the while, or not be
offended in those things which he much loveth, to the end he may attain
unto eternal truth by being taught: that man doth not understand, in the
first place, that there is no flagitious thing which be may not upon the
same ground be compelled to commit, as has been above demonstrated; and in
the next place, that the authority of the doctrine itself is cut off and
altogether undone if those whom we essay to bring thereunto, are by our lie
made to think that it is somewhiles right to lie. For seeing the doctrine
which bringeth salvation consisteth partly in things to be believed, partly
in things to be understood; and there is no attaining unto those things
which are to be understood, unless first those things are believed, which
are to be believed; how can there be any believing one who thinks it is
sometimes right to lie, lest haply be lie at the moment when he teacheth us
to believe?  For how can it be known whether he have at that moment some
cause, as he thinks, for a well-meant(3) lie, deeming that by a false story
a man may be frightened and kept from lust, and in this way account that by
telling a lie he is doing good even in spiritual things? Which kind of lie
once admitted and approved, all discipline of faith is subverted
altogether; and this being subverted, neither is there any attaining to
understanding, for the receiving of which that discipline nurtureth the
babes: and so all the doctrine of truth is done away, giving place to most
licentious falsehood, if a lie, even well-meant, may from any quarter have
place opened for it to enter in. For either whoso tells a lie prefers
temporal advantages, his own or another's, to: truth; than which what can
be more perverse? or when by aid of a lie he wishes to make a person fit
for gaining the truth, he bars the approach to truth, for by wishing when
he lies to be accommodating,(1) it comes to pass that when he speaks the
truth, he cannot be depended upon. Wherefore, either we must not believe
good men, or we must believe those whom we think obliged sometimes to tell
a lie, or we must not believe that good men sometimes tell lies: of these
three the first is pernicious, the second foolish; it remains therefore
that good men should never tell lies.

   12. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated;
and still it is not easy to pass sentence: but we must further lend
diligent hearing to those who say, that no deed is so evil, but that in
avoidance of a worse it ought to be done; moreover that the deeds of men
include not only what they do, but whatever they consent to be done unto
them. Wherefore, if cause have arisen that a Christian man should choose to
burn incense to idols, that he might not consent to bodily defilement which
the persecutor threatened him withal, unless he should do so, they think
they have a right to ask why he should not also tell a lie to escape so
foul a disgrace. For the consent itself to endure violation of the person
rather than to burn incense to idols, this, they say, is not a passive
thing, but a deed; which rather than do, he chose to burn incense. How much
more readily then would he have chosen a lie, if by a lie he might ward off
from a holy body so shocking a disgrace?

   13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be
questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether
that is to be called consent which hath not approbation: or whether it be
approbation, when it is said, "It is expedient to suffer this rather than
do that;" and whether the person spoken of did right to burn incense rather
than suffer violation of his body; and whether it would be right rather to
tell a lie, if that was the alternative proposed, than to burn incense? But
if such consent is to be accounted as a deed, then are they murderers who
have chosen rather to be put to death than bear false witness, yea, what is
worse, they are murderers of themselves. For why, at this rate, should it
not be said that they have slain themselves, because they chose that this
should be done to them that they might not do what they were urged to do?
Or, if it be accounted a worse thing to slay another than himself, what if
these terms were offered to a Martyr, that, upon his refusing to bear false
witness of Christ and to sacrifice to demons, then, before his eyes, not
some other man, but his own father should be put to death; his father
entreating him that he would not by his persevering permit that to be done?
Is it not manifest, that, upon his remaining steadfast in his purpose of
most faithful testimony, they alone would be the murderers who should slay
his father, and not he a parricide into the bargain? As therefore, in this
case, the man would be no party to this so heinous deed, for choosing,
rather than violate his faith by false testimony, that his own father
should be put to death by others, (yea, though that father were a
sacrilegious person whose soul would be snatched away to punishment;) so
the like consent, in the former case, would not make him a party to that so
foul disgrace, if he refused to do evil himself, let others do what they
might in consequence of his not doing it. For what do such persecutors say,
but, "Do evil that we may not?" If the case were so, that our doing evil
would make them not to have done it, even then it would not be our duty by
doing wickedness ourselves to vote them harmless; but as in fact they are
already doing it when they say nothing of the kind,(2) why are they to have
us to keep them company in wickedness rather than be vile and noisome by
themselves? For that is not to be called consent; seeing that we do not
approve what they do, always wishing that they would not, and, as much as
in us lies, hindering them that they should not do it, and, when it is
done, not only not committing it with them, but with all possible
detestation condemning the same.

   14. "How," sayest thou, "is it not his doing as well as theirs, when
they would not do this, if he would do that?" Why, at this rate we go
housebreaking with house-breakers, because if we did not shut the door,
they would not break it open: and we go and murder with highwaymen, if it
chance we know that they are going to do it, because if we killed them out
of hand, they would not kill others. Or, if a person confess to us that he
is going to commit a parricide, we commit it along with him, if, being
able, we do not slay him before he can do the deed when we cannot in some
other way prevent or thwart him. For it may be said, word for word as
before, "Thou hast done it as well as he; for he had not done this, hadst
thou done that." With my good will, neither ill should be done; but only
the one was in my power, and I could take care that this should not be
done; the other rested with another, and when by my good advice I could not
quench the purpose, I was not bound by my evil deed to thwart the doing. It
is therefore no approving of a sinner, that one refuses to sin for him; and
neither the one nor the other is liked by him who would that neither were
done; but in that which pertains to him, he hath the power to do it or not,
and with that he perpetrateth it not; in that which pertains to another, he
hath only the will to wish it or not, and with that he condemneth. And
therefore, on their offering those terms, and saying, "If thou burn not
incense, this shalt thou suffer;" if he should answer, "For me, I choose
neither, I detest both, I consent unto you in none of these things:" in
uttering these and the like words, which certainly, because they would be
true, would afford them no consent no approbation of his, let him suffer at
their hands what he might, to his account would be set down the receipt of
wrongs, to theirs the commission of sins. "Ought he then," it may be asked,
"to suffer his person to be violated rather than burn incense?" If the
question be what he ought, he ought to do neither. For should I say that he
ought to do any of these things, I shall approve this or that, whereas I
reprobate both. But if the question be, which of these he ought in
preference to avoid, not being able to avoid both but able to avoid one or
other: I will answer, "His own sin, rather than another's; and rather a
lighter sin being his own, than a heavier being another's." For, reserving
the point for more diligent inquiry, and granting in the mean while that
violation of the person is worse than burning incense, yet the latter is
his own, the former another's deed, although he had it done to him; now,
whose the deed, his the sin. For though murder is a greater sin than
stealing, yet it is worse to steal than to suffer murder. Therefore, if it
were proposed to any man that, if he would not steal he should be killed,
that is, murder should be committed upon him; being he could not avoid
both, he would prefer to avoid that which would be his own sin, rather than
that which would be another's. Nor would the latter become his act for
being committed upon him, and because he might avoid it if he would commit
a sin of his own.

   15. The whole stress, then, of this question comes to this; whether it
be true universally that no sin of another, committed upon thee, is to be
imputed to thee, if, being able to avoid it by a lighter sin. of thine own,
thou do it not; or whether there be an exception of all bodily defilement.
No man says that a person is defiled by being murdered, or cast into
prison, or bound in chains, or scourged, or afflicted with other tortures
and pains, or proscribed and made to suffer most grievous losses even to
utter nakedness, or stripped of honors, and subjected to great disgrace by
reproaches of whatsoever kind; whatever of all these a man may have
unjustly suffered, no man is so senseless as to say that he is thereby
defiled. But if he have filth poured all over him, or poured into his
mouth, or crammed into him, or if he be carnally used like a woman; then
almost all men regard him with a feeling of horror, and they call  him
defiled and unclean. One must conclude then that the sins of others, be
they what they may, those always excepted which defile  him on whom they
are committed, a man must not seek to avoid by sin of his own, either for
himself or for any other, but rather he must put up with them, and suffer
bravely; and if by no sins of his own he ought to avoid them, therefore not
by a lie: but those which by being committed upon a man do make him
unclean, these we are bound to avoid even by sinning ourselves; and for
this reason those things are not to be called sins, which are done for the
purpose of avoiding that uncleanness. For whatever is done, in
consideration that the not doing it were just cause of blame, that thing is
not sin. Upon the same principle, neither is that to be called uncleanness
when there is no way of avoiding it; for even in that extremity he who
suffers it has what he may do aright, namely, patiently bear what he cannot
avoid. Now no man while acting aright can be defiled by any corporal
contagion. For the unclean in the sight of God is every one who is
unrighteous; clean therefore is every one who is righteous; if not in the
sight of men, yet in the sight of God, Who judges without error. Nay, even
in the act of suffering that defilement with power given of avoiding it, it
is not by the mere contact that the man is defiled; but by the sin of
refusing to avoid it when he might. For that would be no sin, whatever
might be done for the avoiding of it. Whoever therefore, for the avoiding
of it, shall tell a lie, sinneth not.

   16. Or, are some lies, also, to be excepted, so that it were better to
suffer this than to commit those? If so, then not every thing that is done
in order to the avoiding of that defilement ceases to be sin; seeing there
are some lies to commit which is worse than to suffer that foul violence.
For, suppose quest be making after a person that his body may be
deflowered, and that it be possible to screen him by a lie; who dares to
say that even in such a case a lie ought not be told? But, if the lie by
which he may be concealed be one which may hurt the fair fame of another,
by bringing upon him a false accusation of that very uncleanness, to suffer
which the other is sought after; as, if it should be said to the inquirer,
"Go to such an one," (naming some chaste man who is a stranger to vices of
this kind,) "and he will procure for you one whom you will find a more
willing subject, for he knows and loves such;" and thereby the person might
be diverted from him whom he sought: I know not whether one man's fair fame
ought to be violated by a lie, in order that another's body may not be
violated by lust to which he is a stranger. And in general, it is never
right to tell a lie for any man, such as may hurt another, even if the hurt
be slighter than would be the hurt to him unless such a lie were told.
Because neither must another man's bread be taken from him against his
will, though he be in good health, and it is to feed one who is weak; nor
must an innocent man, against his will, be beaten with rods, that another
may not be killed. Of course, if they are willing, let it be done, because
they are not hurt if they be willing that so it should be: but whether,
even with his own consent, a man's fair fame ought to be hurt with a false
charge of foul lusts, in order that lust may be averted from another's
body, is a great question. And I know not whether it be easy to find in
what way it can be just that a man's fair fame, even with his consent,
should be stained with a false charge of lust, any more than a man's body
should be polluted by the lust itself against his will.

   17. But yet if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn
incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that, if he
wished to avoid that, he should violate the fame of Christ by some lie; he
would be most mad to do it. I say more: that he would be mad, if, to avoid
another man's lust, and not to have that done upon his person which he
would suffer with no lust of his own, he should falsify Christ's Gospel
with false praises of Christ; more eschewing that another man should
corrupt his body, than himself to corrupt the doctrine of sanctification of
souls and bodies. Wherefore, from the doctrine of religion, and from those
utterances universally, which are uttered on behalf of the doctrine of
religion, in the teaching and learning of the same, all lies must be
utterly kept aloof. Nor can any cause whatever be found, one should think,
why a lie should be told in matters of this kind, when in this doctrine it
is not right to tell a lie for the very purpose of bringing a person to it
the more easily. For, once break or but slightly diminish the authority of
truth, and all things will remain doubtful: which unless they be believed
true, cannot be held as certain. It is lawful then either to him that
discourses, disputes, and preaches of things eternal, or to him that
narrates or speaks of things temporal pertaining to edification of religion
and piety, to conceal at fitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed:
but to tell a lie is never lawful, therefore neither to conceal by telling
a lie.

   18. This being from the very first and most firmly established,
touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence
we must also see that all lies must be kept aloof which hurt any man
unjustly: because no man is to have a wrong, albeit a lighter one is done
to him, that another may have a heavier kept from him. Nor are those lies
to be allowed, which, though they hurt not another, yet do nobody any good,
and are hurtful to the persons themselves who gratuitously tell them.
Indeed, these are the persons who are properly to be called liars. For
there is a difference between lying and being a liar. A man may tell a lie
unwillingly; but a liar loves to lie, and inhabits in his mind in the
delight of lying. Next to such are those to be placed who by a lie wish to
please men, not that they may do Wrong or bring reproach upon any man; for
we have already before put away that kind; but that they may be pleasant in
conversation. These, differ from the class in which we have placed liars in
this respect, that liars delight in lying, rejoicing in deceit for its own
sake: but these lust to please by agreeable talk, and yet would rather
please by saying things that were true, but when they do not easily find
true things to say that are pleasant to the hearers, they choose rather to
tell lies than to hold their tongues. Yet it is difficult for these
sometimes to undertake a story which is the whole of it false; but most
commonly they interweave falsehood with truth, where they are at a loss for
something sweet. Now these two sorts of lies do no harm to those who
believe them, because they are not deceived concerning any matter of
religion and truth, or concerning any profit or advantage of their own. It
suffices them, to judge the thing possible which is told, and to have faith
in a man of whom they ought not rashly to think that he  is telling a lie.
For where is the harm of believing that such an one's father or grandfather
was a good man, when he was not? or that he has served with the army even
in Persia, though he never set foot out of Rome? But to the persons who
tell these lies, they do much harm: to the former sort, because they so
desert truth as to rejoice in deceit: to the latter, because they want to
please people better than the truth.

   19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned,
next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which
is commonly attributed to well-meaning and good people, when the person who
lies not only does no harm to another, but even benefits somebody. Now it
is on this sort of lies that the whole dispute turns, whether that person
does harm to himself, who benefits another in such sort as to act contrary
to the truth. Or, if that alone may be called truth which illustrateth the
very minds of men with an intimate and incommutable light, at least he acts
contrary to some true thing, because although the bodily senses are
deceived, yet he acts contrary to a true thing who says that a thing is so
or not so, whereof neither his mind nor senses nor his opinion or belief
giveth him any report. Whether therefore he does not hurt himself in so
profiting another, or in that compensation not hurt himself in which he
profiteth the other, is a great question. If it be so, it should follow
that he ought to profit himself by a lie which damages no man. But these
things hang together, and if you concede that point, it necessarily draws
in its train some very embarrassing consequences. For should it be asked,
what harm it does to a person rolling in superfluous wealth, if from
countless thousands of bushels of wheat he lose one bushel, which bushel
may be profitable as necessary food to the person stealing it; it will
follow that theft also may be committed without blame, and false witness
borne without sin. Than which, what can be mentioned more perverse? Or
truly, if another had stolen the bushel, and thou sawest it done, and wert
questioned, wouldest thou tell a lie with honesty for the poor man, and if
thou do it for thine own poverty wilt thou be blamed? As if it were thy
duty to love another more than thyself. Both then are disgraceful, and must
be avoided.

   20. But haply some may think that there is an exception to be added;
that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some
man, excepting those by which crimes are screened and defended: so that the
reason why the aforesaid lie is disgraceful, is that, although it hurt no
man, and profit the poor, it screens a theft; but if it should in such sort
hurt nobody and profit somebody as not to screen and defend any sin, it
would not be morally wrong. As, put the case that some one should in thy
sight hide his money that he/night not lose it by theft or violence, and
thereupon being questioned thou shouldest tell a tie; thou wouldest hurt no
man, and wouldest serve him who had need that his money were hidden, and
wouldest not have covered a sin by telling a lie. For it is no sin if a man
hide his property which he fears to lose. But, if we therefore sin not in
telling a lie, for that, while covering no man's sin, we hurt nobody and do
good to somebody, what are we about as concerning the sin itself of a lie?
For where it is laid down, "Thou shalt not steal," there is also this,
"Thou shall not bear false witness."(1) Since then each is severally
prohibited, why is false witness culpable if it cover a theft or any other
sin, but if without any screening of sin it be done by itself, then not
culpable, whereas stealing is culpable in and by itself, and so other sins?
Or is it so that to hide a sin is not lawful; to do it, lawful?

   21. If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so, that there is no
"false witness," but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against
some man, or to hide some man's crime, or in any way to oppress any man in
judgment? For a witness seems to be necessary to the judge for cognizance
of the cause. But if the Scripture named a "witness" only so far as that
goes, the Apostle would not say, "Yea, and we are found false witnesses of
God; because we have testified of God that He raised up Christ: whom He
raised not up."(2) For so he shows that it is false witness to tell a lie,
yea, in falsely praising a person.

   Or peradventure, doth the person who lies then utter false witness when
he either invents or hides any man's sin, or hurts any man in whatever way?
For, if a lie spoken against a man's temporal life is detestable, how much
more one against eternal life? as is every lie, if it take place in
doctrine of religion. And it is for this reason that the Apostle calls it
false witness, if a man tell a lie about Christ, yea, one which may seem to
pertain to His praise. Now if it be a lie that neither inventeth or hideth
any man's sin, nor is answered to a question of the judge, and hurteth no
man, and profits some man, are we to say that it is neither false witness,
nor a reprehensible lie?

   22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see
where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by
him who seeks, in order to bring to punishment a man, the slayer of man? Is
he to tell a lie? For how does he not hide a sin by lying, when he for whom
he lies has been guilty of a heinous sin? Or is it because he is not
questioned concerning his sin, but about the place where he is concealed?
So then to lie in order to hide a person's sin is evil; but to lie in order
to hide the sinner is not evil? "Yea, surely:" says some one: "for a man
sins not in avoiding punishment, but in doing something worthy of
punishment. Moreover, it pertaineth to Christian discipline neither to
despair of any man's amendment, nor to bar against any man the way of
repentance." What if thou be led to the judge, and then questioned
concerning the very place where the other is in hiding? Art thou prepared
to say, either, "He is not there," when thou knowest him to be there; or,
"I know not, and have not seen," what thou knowest and hast seen? Art thou
then prepared to bear false witness, and to slay thy soul that a manslayer
may not be slain? Or, up to the presence of the judge wilt thou lie, but
when the judge questions thee, then speak truth that thou be not a false
witness? So then thou art going to slay a man thyself by betraying him.
Surely the betrayer too is one whom the divine Scripture detesteth. Or
haply is he no betrayer, who in answer to the judge's interrogation gives
true information; but would be a betrayar, if, unasked, he should delate a
man to his destruction? Put the case with respect to a just and innocent
man, that thou know where he is in hiding, and be questioned by the judge;
which man, however, has been ordered to be taken to execution by a higher
power, so that he who interrogates is charged with the execution of the
law, not the author of the sentence? Will it be no false witness that thou
shall lie for an innocent man, because the interrogator is not a judge, but
only charged with the execution? What if the author of the law interrogate
thee, or any unjust judge, making quest of an innocent man to bring him to
punishment? What wilt thou do? wilt thou be false witness, or betrayer? Or
will he be a betrayer, who to a just judge shall ultroneously delate a
lurking homicide; and he not so, who to an unjust judge, interrogating him
of the hiding-place of an innocent man whom he seeks to slay, shall inform
against the person who has thrown himself upon his honor? Or between the
crime of false witness and that of betrayal, wilt thou remain doubtful and
unable to make up thy mind? Or by holding thy peace or professing that thou
wilt not tell, wilt thou make up thy mind to avoid both? Then why not do
this before thou come to the judge, that thou mayest shun the lie also?
For, having kept clear of a lie, thou wilt escape all false witness;
whether every lie be false witness, or not every: but by keeping clear of
all false witness in thy sense of the word, thou wilt not escape all lying.
How much braver then, how much more excellent, to say, "I will neither
betray nor lie?"

   23. This did a former Bishop of the Church of Thagasta, Firmus by name,
and even more firm in will. For, when he was asked by command of the
emperor, through officers sent by him, for a man who was taking refuge with
him, and whom he kept in hiding with all possible care, he made answer to
their questions, that he could neither tell a lie, nor betray a man; and
when he had suffered so many torments of body, (for as yet emperors were
not Christian,) he stood firm in his purpose. Thereupon being brought
before the emperor, his conduct appeared so admirable, that he without any
difficulty obtained a pardon for the man whom he was trying to save. What
conduct could be more brave and constant? But peradventure some more timid
person may say, "I can be prepared to bear any torments, or even to submit
to death, that I may not sin; but, since it is no sin to tell a lie such
that you neither hurt any man, nor bear false witness, and benefit some
man, it is foolish and a great sin, voluntarily and to no purpose to submit
to torments, and, when one's health and life may haply be useful, to fling
them away for nothing to people in a rage." Of whom I ask; Why he fears
that which is written, "Thou shall not bear false witness,"(1) and fears
not that which is said unto God, "Thou wilt destroy all them that speak
leasing?"(2) Says he, "It is not written, Every lie: but I understand it as
if it were written, Thou wilt destroy all that speak false witness." But
neither there is it said, All false witness. "Yes, but it is set there,"
saith he, "where the other things are set down which are in every sort
evil." What, is this the case with what is set down there, "Thou shalt not
kill?(3) "If this be in every sort evil, how shall one clear of this crime
even just men, who, upon a law given, have killed many? "But," it is
rejoined, "that man cloth not himself kill, who is the minister of some
just command." These men's fear, then, I do accept, that I still think that
laudable man who would neither lie, nor betray a man, did both better
understand that which is written, and what he understood did bravely put in
practice.

   25. But one sometimes comes to a ease of this kind, that we are not
interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him,
if he is hidden in such manner, that he cannot easily be found unless
betrayed: but we are asked, whether he be in such a place or not. If we
know him to be there, by holding our peace we betray him, or even by saying
that we will in no wise tell whether he be there or not: for from this the
questioner gathers that he is there, as, if he were not, nothing else would
be answered by him who would not lie nor betray a man, but only, that he is
not there. So, by our either holding our peace, or saying such words, a man
is betrayed, and he who seeks him hath but to enter in, if he have the
power, and find him: whereas he might have been turned aside from finding
him by our telling a lie. Wherefore if thou know not where he is, there is
no cause for hiding the truth, but thou must confess that thou knowest not.
But, if thou know where he is, whether he be in the place which is named in
the question or elsewhere; thou must not say, when it is asked whether he
be there or not, "I will not tell thee what thou askest," but thou must
say, "I know where he is, but I will never show." For if, touching one
place in particular thou answer not and profess that thou wilt not betray,
it is just as if thou shouldest point to that same place with thy finger:
for a sure suspicion is thereby excited. But if at the first thou confess
that thou know where he is, but will not tell, haply the inquisitor may be
diverted from that place, and begin now to: ply thee that the place where
he is may be betrayed. For which good faith and humanity whatever thou
shall bravely bear, is judged to be not only not culpable, but even
laudable; save only these things which if a man suffer he is said to suffer
not bravely, but immodestly and foully. For this is the last description of
lie, concerning which we must treat more diligently.

   25. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled
from, which is done in doctrine of religion; to which lie a man ought by no
consideration to be induced. The second, that he should hurt some man
unjustly: which is such that it profits no man and hurts some man. The
third, which so profits one as to hurt another, but not in corporal
defilement. The fourth, that which is done through only lust of lying and
deceiving, which is an unmixed lie. The fifth, what is done with desire of
pleasing by agreeableness in talk. All these being utterly eschewed and
rejected, there follows a sixth sort which at once hurts nobody and helps
somebody; as when, if a person's money is to be unjustly taken from him,
one who knows where the money is, should say that he does not know, by
whomsoever the question be put. The seventh, which hurts none and profits
some: except if a judge interrogate: as when, not wishing to betray a man
who is sought for to be put to death, one should lie; not only a just and
innocent, but also a culprit; because it belongs to Christian discipline
neither to despair of any man's amendment, nor to bar the way of repentance
against any. Of which two sorts, which are wont to be attended with great
controversy, we have sufficiently treated, and have shown what was our
judgment; that by taking the consequences, which are honorably and bravely
borne, these kinds also should be eschewed by brave and faithful and
truthful men and women. The eighth sort of lie is that which hurts no man,
and does good in the preserving somebody from corporal defilement, at least
that defilement which we have mentioned above. For even to eat with
unwashen hands the Jews thought defilement. Or if a person think this also
a defilement, yet not such that a lie ought to be told to avoid it. But if
the lie be such as to do an injury to any man, even though it screen a man
from that uncleanness which all men abhor and detest; whether a lie of this
kind may be told provided the injury done by the lie be such as consists
not in that sort of uncleanness with which we are now concerned, is another
question: for here the question is no longer about lying, but it is asked
whether an injury ought to be done to any man, even otherwise than by a
lie, that the said defilement may be warded off from another. Which I
should by no means think: though the case proposed be the slightest wrongs,
as that which I mentioned above, about a single measure of wheat; and
though it be very embarrassing whether it be our duty not to do even such
an injury to any man, if thereby another may be defended or screened from a
lustful outrage upon his person. But, as I said, this is another question:
at present let us go on with what we have taken in hand: whether a lie
ought to be told, if even the inevitable condition be proposed that we
either do this, or suffer the deed of lust or some execrable pollution;
even though by lying we do no man harm.

   26. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for
consideration, if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be
diligently discussed: for if these give no place, we vainly seek a
loophole; for we are bound to keep in every way the command of God, and the
will of God in all that through keeping His command we may suffer, it is
our duty with an even mind to follow: but if by some relaxation any outlet
be allowed, in such a case we are not to decline a lie. The reason why the
Divine Scriptures contain not only God's commands, but the life and
character of the just, is this: that, if haply it be hidden in what way we
are to take that which is enjoined, by the actions of the just it may be
understood. With the exception, therefore, of those actions which one may
refer to an allegorical significance, although none doubts that they really
took place, as is the case with almost all the occurrences in the books of
the Old Testament. For who can venture to affirm of any thing there, that
it does not pertain to a figurative foretelling? Seeing the Apostle,
speaking of the sons of Abraham, of whom of course it is most easily said
that they were born and did live in the natural order of propagating the
people, (for not monsters and prodigies were born, to lead the mind to some
presignification,) nevertheless asserteth that they signify the two
Testaments;(1) and saith of that marvellous benefit which God bestowed upon
His people Israel to rescue them out of the bondage in which they in Egypt
were oppressed, and of the punishment which avenged their sin on their
journey, that these things befell them in a figure:(2) what actions wilt
thou find, from which thou mayest set aside that rule, and take upon thee
to affirm that they are not to be reduced to some figure? Excepting
therefore these, the things which in the New Testament are done by the
Saints, where there is a most evident commending of manners to our
imitation, may avail as examples for the understanding of the Scriptures,
which things are digested in the commands.

   27. As, when we read in the Gospel, "Thou hast received a blow in the
face, make ready the other cheek."(3) Now as an example of patience can
none be found than that of the Lord Himself more potent and excellent; but
He, when smitten on the cheek, said not, Behold here is the other cheek,
but He said, "If I have spoken ill, bear witness of the evil; but if well,
why smitest thou Me?"(4) Where He shows that the preparation of the other
cheek is to be done in the heart. Which also the Apostle Paul knew. for he,
too, when he was smitten on the face before the high priest, did not say,
Smite the other cheek: but, "God," saith he, "shall smite thee, thou whited
wall: and sittest thou to judge me according to law, and contrary to law
commandest me to be smitten?"(5) with most deep insight beholding that the
priesthood of the Jews was already become such, that in name it outwardly
was clean and fair, but within was foul with muddy lusts; which priesthood
he saw in spirit to be ready to pass away through vengeance of the Lord,
when he spake those words: but yet he had his heart ready not only to
receive other blows on the cheek, but also to suffer for the truth any
torments whatever, with love of them from whom he should suffer the same.

   28. It is also written, "But I say unto you, Swear not at all." But the
Apostle himself has used oaths in his Epistles.(6) And so he shows how that
is to be taken which is said, "I say unto you, Swear not at all:" that is,
lest by swearing one come to a facility in swearing, from facility to a
custom, and so from a custom there be a downfall into perjury. And
therefore he is not found to have sworn except in writing, where there is
more wary forethought, and no precipitate tongue withal. And this indeed
came of evil, as it is said, "Whatever is more than these is of evil:"(7)
not however from evil of his own, but from the evil of infirmity which was
in them, in whom he even in this way endeavored to work faith. For that he
used an oath in speaking, while not writing, I know not that any Scripture
has related concerning him. And yet the Lord says, "Swear not at all:" for
He hath not granted license thereof to persons writing. Howbeit, because to
pronounce Paul guilty of violating the commandment, especially in Epistles
written and sent forth for the spiritual life and salvation of the nations,
were an impiety, we must understand that word which is set down, "At all,"
to be set down for this purpose, that as much as in thee lies, thou affect
not, love not, nor as though it were for a good thing, with any delight
desire, an oath.

   29. As that, "Take no thought for the morrow," and, "Take therefore no
thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put
on."(8) Now when we see that the Lord Himself had a bag in which was put
what was given,(9) that it might be kept for necessary uses as the time
should require; and that the Apostles themselves made much provision for
the indigence of the brethren, not only for the morrow, but even for the
more protracted time of impending dearth, as we read in the Acts of the
Apostles;(1) it is sufficiently clear that these precepts are so to be
understood, that we are to do nothing of our work as matter of necessity,
through love of obtaining temporal things, or fear of want.

   30. Moreover, it was said to the Apostles that they should take nothing
with them for their journey, bat should live by the Gospel.(2) And in a
certain place too the Lord Himself signified why He said this, when He
added, "The laborer is worthy of his hire:"(3) where He sufficiently shows
that this is permitted, not ordered; lest haply he who should do this,
namely, that in this work of preaching the word he should take aught for
the uses of this life from them to whom he preached, should think he was
doing any thing unlawful. And yet that it may more laudably not be done is
sufficiently proved in the Apostle Paul: who, while he said, "Let him that
is taught in the word, communicate unto him, that teacheth in all
things,"(4) and showed in many places that this is wholesomely done by them
to whom he preached the word, Nevertheless," saith he, "I have not used
this power."(5) The Lord, therefore, when He spake those words, gave power,
not bound  men by a command. So in general, what in words we are not able
to understand, in the  actions of the Saints we gather how it is meet to be
taken, which would easily be drawn to the other side, unless it were
recalled by an example.

   31. Thus then what is written, "The mouth that lieth, slayeth the
soul;"(6) of what mouth it speaketh, is the question. For in general when
the Scripture speaks of the mouth, it signifies the very seat of our
conception(7) in the heart, where is approved and decreed whatever also by
the voice, when we speak the truth, is uttered: so that he lieth with the
heart who approveth a lie; yet that man may possibly not lie with the
heart, who uttereth other than is in his mind, in such sort that he knows
it to be for the sake of avoiding a greater evil that he admitteth an evil,
disapproving withal both the one and the other. And they who assert this,
say that thus also is to be understood that which is written, "He that
speaketh the truth in his heart:(5) because always in the heart truth must
be spoken; but not always in the mouth of the body, if any cause of
avoiding a greater evil require that other than is in the mind be uttered
with the voice. And that there is indeed a mouth of the heart, may be
understood even from this, that where there is speech, there a mouth is
with no absurdity understood: nor would it be right to say, "Who speaketh
in his heart," unless it were right to understand that there is also a
mouth in the heart. Though in that very place where it is written, "The
mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul," if the context of the lesson be
considered, it may peradventure be taken for no other than the mouth of the
heart. For there is an obscure response there, where it is hidden from men,
to whom the mouth of the heart, unless the mouth of the body sound
therewith, is not audible. But that mouth, the Scripture in that place
saith, doth reach to the hearing of the Spirit of the Lord, Who hath filled
the whole earth; at the same time mentioning lips and voice and tongue in
that place; yet all these the sense permitteth not to be taken, but
concerning the heart, because it saith of the Lord, that what is spoken is
not hidden from Him: now that which is spoken with that sound which
reacheth to our ears, is not hidden from men either. Thus, namely, is it
written: "The Spirit of wisdom is loving, and will not acquit an evil-
speaker of his lips: for of his reins God is witness, and of his heart a
true searcher, and of his tongue a hearer. For the Spirit of the Lord hath
filled the whole earth, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge
of the voice. Therefore he that speaketh unrighteous things cannot be hid:
but neither shall the judgment when it punisheth pass by him. For in the
thoughts of the ungodly shall there be interrogation; and the hearing of
his words shall come from the Lord, to the punishment of his iniquities.(9)
For the ear of jealousy heareth all things, and the tumult of murmurings
will not be hid. Therefore keep yourselves from murmuring, which profiteth
nothing, and from backbiting refrain your tongue: because an obscure
response will not go into the void.(10) But the mouth that lieth, slayeth
the soul."(11) It seems then to threaten them who think that to be obscure
and secret, which they agitate and turn over in their heart. And this, it
would show, is so clear to the ears of God, that it even calls it "tumult."

   32. Manifestly also in the Gospel we find the mouth of the heart: so
that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the
body and of the heart, where he saith, "Are ye also yet without
understanding? Do ye not yet understand, that whatsoever entereth in at the
mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught? but those
things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart, and they
defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders,
adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies: these are the
things which defile a man."(1) Here if thou understand but one mouth, that
of the body, how wilt thou understand, "Those things which proceed out of
the mouth, come forth from the heart;" since spitting also and vomiting
proceed out of the mouth? Unless peradventure a man is but then defiled
when he eateth aught unclean, but is defiled when he vomits it up. But if
this be most absurd, it remains that we understand the mouth of the heart
to have been expounded by the Lord, when He saith, "The things which
proceed out of the mouth, come forth from the heart." For being that theft:
also can be, and often is, perpetrated with silence of the bodily voice and
mouth; one must be out of his mind so to understand it as then to account a
person to be contaminated by the sin of theft, when he confesses or makes
it known, but when he commits it and holds his peace, then to think him
undefiled. But, in truth, if we refer what is said to the mouth of the
heart, no sin whatever can be committed tacitly: for it is not committed
unless it proceed from that mouth which is within.

   33. But, like as it is asked of what mouth the Scripture saith, "The
mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul," so it may be asked, of what lie. For
it seems to speak of that lie in particular, which consists in detraction.
It says, "Keep yourselves from murmuring, which profiteth nothing, and from
detraction refrain your tongue." Now this detraction takes place through
malevolence, when any man not only with mouth and voice of the body doth
utter what he forgeth against any, but even without speaking wisheth him to
be thought such; which is in truth to detract with the mouth of the heart;
which thing, it saith, cannot be obscure and hidden from God.

   34. For what is written in another place, "Wish not to use every
lie;"(2) they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any
lie. Therefore, when one man shall say, that according to this testimony of
Scripture we must to that degree hold every sort and kind of lie in
detestation, that even if a man wish to lie, yea, though he lie not, the
very wish is to be condemned; and to this sense interpreteth, that it is
not said, Do not use every lie, but, "Do not wish to use every lie;" that
one must not dare not only to tell, but not even to wish to tell, any lie
whatever: saith another man, "Nay, in that it saith, Do not wish to use
every lie, it willeth that from the mouth of the heart we exterminate and
estrange lying: so that while from some lies we must abstain with the mouth
of the body, as are those chiefly which pertain to doctrine of religion;
from some, we are not to abstain with the mouth of the body, if reason of
avoiding a greater evil require; but with the mouth of the heart we must
abstain utterly from every lie." Where it behoveth to be understood what is
said, "Do not wish:" namely, the will itself is taken as it were the mouth
of the heart, so that it concerneth not the mouth of the heart when in
shunning a greater evil we lie unwillingly. There is also a third sense in
which thou mayest so take this word, "not every," that, except some lies,
it giveth thee leave to lie. Like as if he should say, wish not to believe
every man: he would not mean to advise that none should be believed; but
that not all, some however, should be believed. And that which follows,
"For assiduity thereof will not profit for good," sounds as if, not lying,
but assiduous lying, that is, the custom and love of lying, should seem to
be that which he would prohibit. To which that person will assuredly slide
down,(3) who either shall think that every lie may be boldly used (for so
he will shun not that even which is committed in the doctrine of piety and
religion; than which what more abominably wicked thing canst thou easily
find, not among all lies, but among all sins?) or to some lie (no matter
how easy, how harmless,) shall accommodate the inclination of the will; so
as to lie, not unwillingly for the sake of escaping a greater evil, but
willingly and with liking. So, seeing there be three things which may be
understood in this sentence, either "Every lie, not only tell thou not, but
do not even wish to tell:" or, "Do not wish, but even unwillingly tell a
lie when aught worse is to be avoided:" or, "Not every," to wit, that
except some lies, the rest are admitted: one of these is found to make for
those who hold that one is never to lie, two for those who think that
sometimes one may tell a lie. But yet what follows, "For assiduity thereof
will not profit to good," I know not whether it can countenance the first
sentence of these three; except haply so, that while it is a precept for
the perfect not only not to lie, but not even to wish; assiduity of lying
is not permitted even to beginners. As if, namely, on laying down the rule
at no time whatever not merely to lie but so much as to have a wish to lie,
and this being gainsaid by examples, in regard that there are some lies
which have been even approved by great authority, it should be rejoined
that those indeed are lies of beginners, which have, in regard of this
life, some kind of duty of mercy; and yet to that degree is every lie evil,
and by perfect and spiritual minds in every way to be eschewed, that not
even beginners are permitted to have assiduous custom thereof. For we have
already spoken concerning the Egyptian midwives, that it is in respect of
the promise of growth and proficiency to better things that they while
lying are spoken of with approval: because it is some step towards loving
the true and eternal saving of the soul, when a person doth mercifully for
the saving of any man's albeit mortal life even tell a lie.

   35. Moreover what is written "Thou wilt destroy all that speak
leasing:"(1) one saith that no lie is here excepted, but all condemned.
Another saith: Yea verily: but they who speak leasing from the heart, as we
disputed above; for that man speaketh truth in his heart, who hateth the
necessity of lying, which he understands as a penalty of the moral life.
Another saith: All indeed will God destroy who speak leasing, but not all
leasing: for there is some leasing which the Prophet was at that time
insinuating, in which none is spared; that is, if refusing to confess each
one his sins, he defend them rather, and will not do penance,(2) so that
not content to work iniquity, he must needs wish to be thought just, and
succumb not to the medicine of confession: as the very distinction of the
words may seem to intimate no other, "Thou hatest all that work
iniquity;"(3) but wilt not destroy them if upon repenting they speak the
truth in confession, that by doing that truth they may come to the light;
as is said in the Gospel according to John, "But be that doeth truth cometh
unto the light.(4) Thou wilt destroy all who" not only work what Thou
hatest, but also "speak leasing;"(5) in holding out before them false
righteousness, and not confessing their sins in penitence.

   36. For, concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten
commands of the Law, it can indeed in no wise be contended that love of
truth may at heart be preserved, and false witness brought forth to him
unto whom the witness is borne. For, when it is said to God only, then it
is only in the heart that the truth is to be embraced: but when it is said
to man, then must we with the mouth also of the body bring forth truth,
because man is not an inspector of the heart. But then, touching the
witness itself, it is not unreasonably asked, to whom one is a witness? For
not to whomsoever we speak unto are we witnesses, but to them to whom it is
expedient and due that they by our means should come to know or believe the
truth; as is a judge, that he may not err in judging; or he who is taught
in doctrine of religion, that he may not err in faith, or by very authority
of the teacher waver in doubt. But when the person who interrogates thee or
wishes to know aught from thee seeks that which concerneth him not, or
which is not expedient for him to know, he craveth not a witness, but a
betrayer. Therefore if to him thou tell a lie, from false witness
peradventure thou wilt be clear, but from a lie assuredly not. So then with
this salvo, that to bear false witness is never lawful, the question is,
whether it be lawful sometimes to tell a lie. Or if it be false witness to
lie at all, it is to be seen whether it admit of compensation, to wit, that
it be said for the sake of avoiding a greater sin: as that which is
written, "Honor father and mother,"(6) under stress of a preferable duty is
disregarded; whence the paying of the last honors of sepulture to a father,
is forbidden to that man who by the Lord Himself is called to preach the
kingdom of God.

   37. Likewise, touching that which is written, "A son which receiveth
the word shall be far from destruction: but receiving, he receiveth it for
himself, and no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth:"(7) some one may
say, that what is here set down, "A son which receiveth the word," is to be
taken for no other than the word of God, which is truth. Therefore, "A son
receiving the truth shall be far from destruction," refers to that which is
written, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing." But when it follows,
"Receiving he receiveth for himself," what other doth this insinuate than
what the Apostle saith, "But let every man prove his own work, and then he
shah have glorying in himself and not in another?"(1) For he that receiveth
the word, that is, truth, not for himself, but for men-pleasing, keepeth it
not when he sees they can be pleased by a lie. But whoso receiveth it for
himself, no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth: because even when the
way to please men is to lie, that man lieth not, who receiving the truth
not thereby to please them but to please God, hath received it for himself.
Therefore there is no reason why it should be said here He will destroy all
who speak leasing, but not all leasing: because all lies, universally, are
cut off in this saying, "And no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth." But
another saith, it is to be so taken as the Apostle Paul took our Lord's
saying, "But I say unto you, Swear not at all."(2) For here also all
swearing is cut off; but from the mouth of the heart, that it should never
be done with approbation of the will, but through necessity of the weakness
of another; that is, "from the evil" of another, when it shows that he
cannot otherwise be got to believe what is said, unless faith be wrought by
an oath; or, from that "evil" of our own, that while as yet involved in the
skins of this mortality we are not able to show our heart: which thing were
we able to do, of swearing there were no need. Though moreover in this
whole sentence, if the saying, "A son receiving the word shall be far from
destruction," be said of none other than that Truth,(3) by Whom all things
were made, which remaineth ever incommutable; then, because the doctrine of
Religion strives to bring men to the contemplation of this Truth, it may
seem that the saying, "And no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth," is
said to this purpose, that he speaketh no falsehood that pertaineth to
doctrine. Which sort of lie is upon no compensation whatever to be gone
into, and is utterly and before all to be eschewed. Or if the saying, "No
falsehood," is absurdly taken if it be not referred to every lie, the
saying, "From his mouth," should, as was argued above, be taken to mean the
mouth of the heart, in the opinion of him who accounts that sometimes one
may tell a lie.

   38. Certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side,
some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting
divine testimonies: others gainsaying, and even in the midst of the very
words of the divine testimonies seeking place for a lie; yet no man can
say, that he finds this either in example or in word of the Scriptures,
that any lie should seem a thing to be loved, or not had in hatred; howbeit
sometimes by telling a lie thou must do that thou hatest, that what is more
greatly to be detested may be avoided. But then here it is that people err;
they put the precious beneath the vile. For when thou hast granted that
some evil is to be admitted, that another and more grievous may not be
admitted; not by the rule of truth, but by his own cupidity and custom
cloth each measure the evil, accounting that to be the more grievous, which
himself more greatly dreads, not which is in reality more greatly to be
fled from. All this fault is engendered by perversity of loving. For being
there are two lives of ours; the one eternal, which is promised of God; the
other temporal, in which we now are: when a man shall have begun to love
this temporal more than that eternal, for the sake of this which he loveth
he thinks all things right to be done; and there are not any, in his
estimation, more grievous sins than those which do injury to this life, and
either take away from it any commodity unjustly and unlawfully, or by
inflicting of death take it utterly away. And so thieves, and robbers, and
ruffians, and torturers, and slayers, are more hated of them than
lascivious, drunken, luxurious men, if these molest no man. For they do not
understand or at all care, that these do wrong to God; not indeed to any
inconvenience of Him, but to their own pernicious hurt; seeing they corrupt
His gifts bestowed upon them, even His temporal gifts, and by their very
corruptions turn away from eternal gifts: above all, if they have already
begun to be the Temple of God; which to all Christians the Apostle saith
thus: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of
God dwelleth in you? Whoso shall corrupt God's temple, God will corrupt
him. For the temple of God is holy: which temple are ye."(4)

   39. And all these sins, truly, whether such whereby an injury is done
to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and
hurt none against his will: all these sins, then, even though they seem to
mean well by this temporal life to the procuring of any delight or profit,
(for no man commits any of these things with any other purpose and end;)
yet in regard of that life which is forever and ever, they do entangle and
in all ways hinder. But there are some of these that hinder the doers only,
others likewise those on whom they are done. For as to the things which
people keep safe for the sake of utility to this life, when these are taken
away by injurious persons, they alone sin and are hindered from eternal
life who do this, not they to whom they do it. Therefore, even if a person
consent to the taking of them from him, either that he may not do some
evil, or that he may not in these very things suffer some greater
inconvenience; not only does he not sin, but in the one case he acts
bravely and laudably, in the other usefully and unblameably. But as to
those things which are kept for the sake of sanctity and religion, when
injurious persons wish to violate these, it is right, if the condition be
proposed and the means given, to redeem them even by sins of lesser moment,
yet not by wrongs to other men. And then do these things thenceforth cease
to be sins, which are undertaken in order to the avoidance of greater sins.
For as in things useful, for instance in pecuniary or any other corporal
commodity, that is not called a loss which is parted with in order to a
greater gain; so in things holy, that is not called sin which is admitted
lest a worse be admitted. Or if that is called toss, which one foregoes
that he may not forego more; let this also be called sin, while however the
necessity of undertaking it in order to the eschewing of a greater is no
more to be doubted, than that, in order to avoid a greater loss, it is
right to suffer a smaller one.

   40. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity's sake are
these: pudicity of body, and chastity of soul,(1) and verity of doctrine.
Pudicity of body, without consent and permission of the soul, doth no man
violate. For, whatever against our will and without our empowering the same
is by greater force done upon our body, is no lewdness. Howbeit, of
permitting there may be some reason, but of consenting, none. For we
consent, when we approve and wish: but we permit even not willing, because
of some greater turpitude to be eschewed. Consent, truly, to corporal
lewdness violates also chastity of mind. For the mind's(2) chastity
consists in a good will and sincere love, which is not corrupted, unless
when we love and desire that which Truth teaches ought not to be loved and
desired. We have therefore to guard the sincerity of love toward God and
our neighbor; for in this is chastity of mind sanctified: and we must
endeavor with all the strength in our power, and with pious supplication,
that, when the pudicity of our body is sought to be violated, not even that
outermost sense of the soul,(3) which is entangled with the flesh, may be
touched with any delight; but if it cannot this, at least the mind and
thought(4) in not consenting may have its chastity preserved entire. Now
what we have to guard in chastity of mind,(5) is, as pertaining to the love
of our neighbor, innocence and benevolence; as pertaining to the love of
God, piety. Innocence is that we hurt no man; benevolence, that we also do
good to whom we can; piety, that we worship God. But as for verity of
doctrine, of religion and piety, that is not violated unless by a lie;
whereas the highest and inmost Verity Itself, Whose that doctrine is, can
in no wise be violated: which Truth to attain unto, and in It on every wise
to remain, and to It thoroughly to cleave, will not be permitted, but when
this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have
put on immortality. But, because all piety in this life is practice by
which we tend to that life, which practice hath a guidance afforded unto it
from that doctrine, which in human words and signs(6) of corporal
sacraments cloth insinuate and intimate Truth herself: for this cause this
also, which by lying is possible to be corrupted, is most of all to be kept
incorrupt; that so, if aught in that chastity of mind be violated, it may
have that wherefrom it may be repaired. For once corrupt authority of
doctrine, and there can be none either course or recourse to chastity of
mind.

   41. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which
doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence,
nor benevolence, may on behalf of pudicity of body be admitted. And yet if
any man should propose to himself so to love truth, not only that which
consists in contemplation, but also in uttering the true thing, which each
in its own kind of things is true, and no otherwise to bring forth with the
mouth of the body his thought than in the mind it is conceived and beheld;
so that he should prize the beauty of truth-telling honesty, not only above
gold and silver and jewels and pleasant lands, but above this temporal life
itself altogether and every good thing of the body, I know not whether any
could wisely say that that man errs. And if he should prefer this and prize
it more than all that himself hath of such things; rightly also would he
prefer it to the temporal things of other men, whom by his innocence and
benevolence he was bound to keep and to help. For he would love perfect
faith, not only of believing aright those things which by an excellent
authority and worthy of faith should to himself be spoken, but also of
faithfully uttering what himself should judge right to be spoken, and
should speak. For faith hath its name in the Latin tongue, from that the
thing is done which is said:(1) and thus it is manifest that one doth not
exhibit when telling a lie. And even if this faith be less violated, when
one lies in such sort that he is believed to no inconvenience and no
pernicious hurt, with added intention moreover of guarding either one's
life or corporal purity; yet violated it is, and a thing is violated which
ought to be kept safe in chastity and sanctity of mind. Whence we are
constrained, not by opinion of men, which for the most part is in error,
but by truth itself, truth which is eminent above all, and alone is most
invincible, to prefer even to purity of body, perfect faith. For chastity
of mind is, love well ordered, which does not place the greater below the
smaller. Now it is less, whatever in the body than whatever in the mind can
be violated. For assuredly when for corporal chasteness a man tells a lie,
he sees indeed that his body is threatened with corruption, not from his
own, but from another's lust, but is cautious lest by permitting at least,
he be a party. That permission, however, where is it but in the mind? So
then, even corporal chasteness cannot be corrupted but in the mind; which
not consenting nor permitting, it can by no means be rightly said that
corporal chasteness is violated whatever in the body be perpetrated by
another's lust. Whence it is gathered, that much more must the chastity of
the mind be preserved in the mind, in the which is the guardianship of the
pudicity of the body. Wherefore, what in us lies, both the one and the
other must by holy manners and conversation be walled and hedged round,
lest from another quarter it be violated. But when both cannot be, which is
to be slighted in comparison of which, who doth not see? when he seeth
which to which is to be preferred, the mind to the body, or the body to the
mind; and which is more to be shunned among sins, the permitting of
another's deed, or the committing of the deed thyself.

   42. It clearly appears then, all being discussed, that those
testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at
all tell a lie: seeing that not any examples of lies, worthy of imitation,
are found in the manners and actions of the Saints, as regards those
Scriptures which are referred to no figurative signification, such as is
the history in the Acts of the Apostles. For all those sayings of our Lord
in the Gospel, which to more ignorant minds seem lies, are figurative
significations. And as to what the Apostle says: "I am made all things to
all men, that I might gain all;"(2) the right understanding is, that he did
this not by lying, but by sympathy; so that he dealt with them in
liberating them with so great charity, as if he were himself in that evil
from which he wished to make them whole. There must therefore be no lying
in the doctrine of piety: it is a heinous wickedness, and the first sort of
detestable lie. There must be no lying of the second sort; because no man
must have a wrong done to him. There must be no lying of the third sort;
because we are not to consult any man's good to the injury of another.
There must be no lying of the fourth sort, that is, for the lust of lying,
which of itself is vicious. There must be no lying of the fifth sort,
because not even the truth itself is to be uttered with the aim of men-
pleasing, how much less a lie, which of itself, as a lie, is a foul thing?
There must be no lying of the sixth sort; for it is not right that even the
truth of testimony be corrupted for any man's temporal convenience and
safety. But unto eternal salvation none is to be led by aid of a lie. For
not by the ill manners of them that convert him is he to be converted to
good manners: because if it is meet to be done towards him, himself also
ought when converted to do it toward others; and so is he converted not to
good, but to ill manners, seeing that is held out to be imitated by him
when converted, which was done unto him in converting him. Neither in the
seventh sort must there be any lying; for it is meet that not any man's
commodity or temporal welfare be preferred to the perfecting of faith. Not
even if any man is so ill moved by our right deeds as to become worse in
his mind, and far more remote from piety, are right deeds therefore to be
foregone: since what we are chiefly to hold is that whereunto we ought to
call and invite them whom as our own selves we love; and with most
courageous mind we must drink in that apostolic sentence: "To some we are a
savor of life unto life, to others a savor of death unto death; and who is
sufficient for these things?"(3) Nor in the eighth sort must there be
lying: because both among good things chastity of mind is greater than
pudicity of body; and among evil things, that which ourselves do, than that
which we suffer to be done. In these eight kinds, however, a man sins less
when he tells a lie, in proportion as he emerges to the eighth: more, in
proportion as he diverges to the first. But whoso Shall think there is any
sort of lie that is not sin, will deceive himself foully, while he deems
himself honest as a deceiver of other men.

   43. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men's minds, that to
them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins; but they
must needs pronounce it to be sin in some things if we refuse to lie: and
to such a pass have they been brought by defending lying, that even that
first kind which is of all the most abominably wicked they pronounce to
have been used by the Apostle Paul. For in the Epistle to the Galatians,
written as it was,  like the rest, for doctrine of religion and piety, they
say that he has told a lie, in the passage where he says concerning Peter
and: Barnabas, "When I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the
truth of the Gospel."(1) For, while they wish to defend Peter from error,
and from that pravity of way into which he had fallen; the very way of
religion in which is salvation for all men, they by breaking and mincing
the authority of the Scriptures do endeavor themselves to overthrow. In
which they do not see that it is not only lying, but perjury that they lay
to the charge of the Apostle in the very doctrine of piety, that is, in an
Epistle in which he preaches the Gospel; seeing that he there saith, before
he relates that matter, "What I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie
not."(2) But it is time that we set bounds to this disputation: in the
consideration and treatment whereof altogether there is nothing more meet
to be, before all else, borne in mind and made our prayer, than that which
the same Apostle saith: "God is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be
tempted above that ye are able to bear, but will with the temptation make
also a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it."(3)


Taken from "The Early Church Fathers and Other Works" originally published
by Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. in English in Edinburgh, Scotland, beginning in
1867. (LNPF I/III, Schaff). The digital version is by The Electronic Bible
Society, P.O. Box 701356, Dallas, TX 75370, 214-407-WORD.

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