(NOTE: The electronic text obtained from The Electronic Bible Society was
not completely corrected. EWTN has corrected all discovered errors.)


LACTANTIUS

A TREATISE ON THE ANGER OF GOD
[Translated by the Rev. William Fletcher, D.D.]

ADDRESSED TO DONATUS.(1)

CHAP. I.--OF DIVINE AND HUMAN WISDOM.

   I HAVE often observed, Donatus, that many persons hold this opinion,
which some philosophers also have maintained, that God is not subject to
anger; since the divine nature is either altogether beneficent, and that it
is inconsistent with His surpassing and excellent power to do injury to any
one; or, at any rate, He takes no notice of us at all, so that no advantage
comes to us from His goodness, and no evil from His ill-will. But the error
of these men, because it is very great, and tends to overthrow the
condition of human life, must be refuted by us, lest you yourself also
should be deceived, being incited by the authority of men who deem
themselves wise. Nor, however, are we so arrogant as to boast that the
truth is comprehended by our intellect; but we follow the teaching of God,
who alone is able to know and to reveal secret things. But the
philosophers, being destitute of this teaching, have imagined that the
nature of things can be ascertained by conjecture. But this is impossible;
because the mind of man, enclosed in the dark abode of the body, is far
removed from the perception of truth: and in this the divine nature differs
from the human, that ignorance is the property of the human, knowledge of
the divine nature.

   On which account we have need of some light to dispel the darkness by
which the reflection of man is overspread, since, while we live in mortal
flesh, we are unable to divine by our senses. But the light of the human
mind is God, and he who has known and admitted Him into his breast will
acknowledge the mystery of the truth with an enlightened heart; but when
God and heavenly instruction are removed, all things are full of errors.
And Socrates, though he was the most learned of all the philosophers, yet,
that he might prove the ignorance of the others, who thought that they
possessed something, rightly said that he knew nothing, except one thing--
that he knew nothing. For he understood that that learning had nothing
certain, nothing true in itself; nor, as some imagine, did he pretend, to
learning that he might refute  others, but he saw the truth in some
measure. And he testified even on his trial (as is related by Plato) that
there was no human wisdom. He so despised, derided, and cast aside the
learning in which the philosophers then boasted, that he professed that
very thing as the greatest learning, that he had learnt that he knew
nothing. If, therefore, there is no human wisdom, as Socrates taught, as
Plato handed down, it is evident that the knowledge of the truth is divine,
and belongs to no other than to God. Therefore God must be known, in whom
alone is the truth. He is the Parent of the world, and the Framer of all
things; who is not seen with the eyes, and is scarcely distinguished by the
mind; whose religion is accustomed to be attacked in many ways by those who
have neither been able to attain true wisdom, nor to comprehend the system
of the great and heavenly secret.

CHAP. II.--OF THE TRUTH AND ITS STEPS, AND OF GOD.

   For since there are many steps by which the ascent is made to the abode
of truth, it is not easy for any one to reach the summit. For when the eyes
are darkened by the brightness of the truth, they who are unable to
maintain a firm step fall back to the level ground.(3) Now the first step
is to understand false religions, and to throw aside the impious worship of
gods which are made by the hand of man. But the second step is to perceive
with the mind that there is but one Supreme God, whose power and providence
made the world from the beginning, and afterwards continues to govern it.
The third step is to know His Servant and Messenger,(4) whom He sent as His
ambassador to the earth, by whose teaching being freed from the error in
which we were held entangled, and formed to the worship of the true God, we
might learn righteousness. From all of these steps, as I have said, there
is a rapid and easy gliding to a downfall,(1) unless the feet are firmly
planted with unshaken stedfastness.

   We see those shaken off from the first step, who, though they
understand things which are false, do not, however, discover that which is
true; and though they despised earthly and frail images, do not betake
themselves to the worship of God, of whom they are ignorant. But viewing
with admiration the elements of the universe, they worship the heaven, the
earth, the sea, the sun, the moon, and the other heavenly bodies.

   But we have already reproved their ignorance in the second book of the
Divine Institutes.(2) But we say that those fall from the second step, who,
though they understand that there is but one Supreme God, nevertheless,
ensnared by the philosophers, and captivated by false arguments, entertain
opinions concerning that excellent majesty far removed from the truth; who
either deny that God has any figure, or think that He is moved by no
affection, because every affection is a sign of weakness, which has no
existence in God. But they are precipitated from the third step, who,
though they know the Ambassador of God, who is also the Builder of the
divine and immortal temple,(3) either do not receive Him, or receive Him
otherwise than faith demands; whom we have partly refuted in the fourth
book of the above-named work.(4) And we will hereafter refute more
carefully, when we shall begin to reply to all the sects, which, while they
dispute,(5) have destroyed the truth.

   But now we will argue against those who, falling from the second step,
entertain wrong sentiments respecting the Supreme God. For some say that He
neither does a kindness to any one, nor becomes angry, but in security and
quietness enjoys the advantages of His own immortality. Others, indeed,
take away anger, but leave to God kindness; for they think that a nature
excelling in the greatest virtue, while it ought not to be malevolent,
ought also to be benevolent. Thus all the philosophers are agreed on the
subject of anger, but are at variance respecting kindness. But, that my
speech may descend in order to the proposed subject, a division of this
kind must be made and followed by me, since anger and kindness are
different, and opposed to one another. Either anger must be attributed to
God, and kindness taken from Him; or both alike must be taken from Him; or
anger must be taken away, and kindness attributed to Him; or neither must
be taken away. The nature of the case admits of nothing else besides these;
so that the truth, which is sought for, must necessarily be found in some
one of these. Let us consider them separately, that reason and arrangement
may conduct us to the hiding-place of truth.

CHAP. III.--OF THE GOOD AND EVIL THINGS IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND OF THEIR
AUTHOR.

   First, no one ever said this respecting God, that He is only subject to
anger, and is not influenced by kindness. For it is unsuitable to God, that
He should be endowed with a power of this kind, by which He may injure and
do harm, but be unable to profit and to do good. What means, therefore,
what hope of safety, is proposed to men, if God is the author of evils
only? For if this is so, that venerable majesty will now be drawn out, not
to the power of the judge, to whom it is permitted to preserve and set at
liberty, but to the office of the torturer and executioner. But whereas we
see that there are not only evils in human affairs, but also goods, it is
plain that if God is the author of evils, there must be another who does
things contrary to God, and gives to us good things. If there is such a
one, by what name must he be called? Why is he who injures us more known to
us than He who benefits us? But if this can be nothing besides God, it is
absurd and vain to suppose that the divine power, than which nothing is
greater or better, is able to injure, but unable to benefit; and
accordingly no one has ever existed who ventured to assert this, because it
is neither reasonable nor in any way credible. And because this is agreed
upon, let us pass on and seek after the truth elsewhere.

CHAP. IV.--OF GOD AND HIS AFFECTIONS, AND THE CENSURE OF EPICURUS.

   That which follows is concerning the school of Epicurus; that as there
is no anger in God, so indeed there is no kindness. For when Epicurus
thought that it was inconsistent with God to injure and to inflict harm,
which for the most part arises from the affection of anger, he took away
from Him beneficence also, since he saw that it followed that if God has
anger, He must also have kindness. Therefore, lest he should concede to Him
a vice, he deprived Him also of virtue? From this, he says, He is happy and
uncorrupted, because He cares about nothing, and neither takes trouble
Himself nor occasions it to another. Therefore He is not God, if He is
neither moved, which is peculiar to a living being, nor does anything
impossible for man, which is peculiar to God, if He has no will at all, no
action, in short, no administration, which is worthy of God. And what
greater, what more worthy administration can be attributed to God, than the
government of the world, and especially of the human race, to which all
earthly things are subject?

   What happiness, then, can there be in God, if He is always inactive,
being at rest and un-moveable? if He is deaf to those who pray to Him, and
blind to His worshippers? What is so worthy of God, and so befitting to
Him, as providence? But if He cares for nothing, and foresees nothing, He
has lost all His divinity. What else does he say, who takes from God all
power and all substance, except that there is no God at all? In short,
Marcus Tullius relates that it was said by Posidonius, (1) that Epicurus
understood that there were no gods, but that he said those things which he
spoke respecting the gods for the sake of driving away odium; and so that
he leaves the gods in words, but takes them away in reality, since he gives
them no motion, no office. But if this is so, what can be more deceitful
than him? And this ought to be foreign to the character of a wise and
weighty man. But if he understood one thing and spoke another, what else is
he to be called than a deceiver, double-tongued, wicked, and moreover
foolish? But Epicurus was not so crafty as to say those things with the
desire of deceiving, when he consigned these things also by his writings to
everlasting remembrance; but he erred through ignorance of the truth. For,
being led from the beginning by the probability (2) of a single opinion, he
necessarily fell into those things which followed. For the first opinion
was, that anger was not consistent with the character of God. And when this
appeared to him to be true and unassailable, (3) he was unable to refuse
the consequences; because one affection being removed, necessity itself
compelled him to remove from God the other affections also. Thus, he who is
not subject to anger is plainly uninfluenced by kindness, which is the
opposite feeling to anger. Now, if there is neither anger nor kindness in
Him, it is manifest that there is neither fear, nor joy, nor grief, nor
pity. For  all the affections have one system, one motion, (4) which cannot
he the case with God. But if there is no affection in God, because whatever
is subject to affections is weak, it follows that there is in Him neither
the care of anything, nor providence.

   The disputation of the wise man (5) extends thus far: he was silent as
to the other things which follow; namely, that because there is in Him
neither care nor providence, therefore there is no reflection nor any
perception in Him, by which it is effected that He has no existence at all.
Thus, when he had gradually descended, he remained on the last step,
because he now  saw the precipice. But what does it avail to have remained
silent, and concealed the danger?  Necessity compelled him even against his
will to  fall. For he said that which he did not mean, because he so
arranged his argument that he necessarily came to that point which he
wished to avoid. You see, therefore, to what point he comes, when anger is
removed and taken away from God. In short, either no one believes that, or
a very few, and they the guilty and the wicked, who hope for impunity for
their sins. But if this also is found to be false, that there is neither
anger nor kindness in God, let us come to that which is put in the third
place.

CHAP. V.--THE OPINION OF THE STOICS CONCERNING GOD; OF HIS ANGER AND
KINDNESS.

   The Stoics and some others are supposed to have entertained much better
sentiments respecting the divine nature, who say that there is kindness in
God, but not anger. A very pleasing and popular speech, that God is not
subject to such littleness of mind as to imagine that He is injured by any
one, since it is impossible for Him to be injured; so that that serene and
holy majesty is excited, disturbed, and maddened, which is the part of
human frailty. For they say that anger is a commotion and perturbation of
the mind, which is inconsistent with God. Since, when it fails upon the
mind of any one, as a violent tempest it excites such waves that it changes
the condition of the mind, the eyes gleam, the countenance trembles, the
tongue stammers, the teeth chatter, the countenance is alternately stained
now with redness spread over it, now with white paleness. But if anger is
unbecoming to a man, provided he be of wisdom and authority, how much more
is so foul a change unbecoming to God! And if man, when he has authority
and power, inflicts widespread injury through anger, sheds blood,
overthrows cities, destroys communities, reduces provinces to desolation,
bow much more is it to be believed that God, since He has power over the
whole human race, and over the universe itself, would have been about to
destroy all things if He were angry.

   Therefore they think that so great and so pernicious an evil ought to
be absent from Him. And if anger and excitement are absent from Him,
because it is disfiguring and injurious, and He inflicts injury on no one,
they think that nothing else remains, except that He is mild calm,
propitious, beneficent, the preserver. For thus at length He may be called
the common Father of all, and the best and greatest, which His divine and
heavenly nature demands. For if among men it appears praiseworthy to do
good rather than to injure, to restore to life (1) rather than to kill, to
save rather than to destroy, and innocence is not undeservedly numbered
among the virtues,--and he who does these things is loved, esteemed,
honoured, and celebrated with all blessings and vows,--in short, on account
of his deserts and benefits is judged to be most like to God; how much more
right is it that God Himself, who excels in divine and perfect virtues, and
who is removed from all earthly taint, should conciliate (2) the whole race
of man by divine and heavenly benefits! Those things are spoken speciously
and in a popular manner, and they allure many to believe them but they who
entertain these sentiments approach nearer indeed to the truth, but they
partly fail, not sufficiently considering the nature of the case. For if
God is not angry with the impious and the unrighteous, it is clear that He
does not love the pious and the righteous. Therefore the error of those is
more consistent who take away at once both anger and kindness. For in
opposite matters it is necessary to be moved to both sides or to neither.
Thus, he who loves the good also hates the wicked, and he who does not hate
the wicked does not love the good; because the loving of the good arises
from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise
from the love of the good. There is no one who loves life without a hatred
of death, nor who is desirous of light, but he who avoids darkness. These
things are so connected by nature, that the one cannot exist without the
other.

   If any master has in his household a good and a bad servant, it is
evident that he does not hate them both, or confer upon both benefits and
honours; for if he does this, he is both unjust and foolish. But he
addresses the one who is good with friendly words, and honours him and sets
him over his house and household, and all his affairs; but punishes the bad
one with reproaches, with stripes, with nakedness, with hunger, with
thirst, with fetters: so that the latter may be an example to others to
keep them from sinning, and the former to conciliate them; so that fear may
restrain some, and honour may excite others. He, therefore, who loves also
hates, and he who hates also loves; for there are those who ought to be
loved, and there are those who ought to be hated. And as he who loves
confers good things on those whom he loves, so he who hates inflicts evils
upon those whom he hates; which argument, because it is true, can in no way
be refuted. Therefore the opinion of those is vain and false, who, when
they attribute the one to God, take away the other, not less than the
opinion of those who take away both. But the latter, (3) as we have shown,
in part do not err, but retain that which is the better of the two; whereas
the former, (4) led on by the accurate method of their reasoning, fall into
the greatest error, because they have assumed premises which are altogether
false. For they ought not to have reasoned thus: Because God is not liable
to anger, therefore He is not moved by kindness; but in this manner:
Because God is moved by kindness, therefore He is also liable to anger. For
if it had been certain and undoubted that God is not liable to anger, then
the other point would necessarily be arrived at. But since the question as
to whether God is angry is more open to doubt, while it is almost perfectly
plain that He is kind, it is absurd to wish to subvert that which is
certain by means of an uncertainty, since it is easier to confirm uncertain
things by means of those which are certain.

CHAP. VI.-- THAT GOD IS ANGRY.

   These are the opinions entertained by the philosophers respecting God.
But if we have discovered that these things which have been spoken are
false, there remains that one last resource, in which alone the truth can
be found, which has never been embraced by philosophers, nor at any time
defended: that it follows that God is angry, since He is moved by kindness.
This opinion is to be maintained and asserted by us; for (5) this is the
sum and turning-point on which the whole of piety and religion depend: and
no honour can be due to God, if He affords nothing to His worshippers; and
no fear, if He is not angry with him who does not worship Him. (6)

CHAP. VII. --OF MAN, AND THE BRUTE ANIMALS, AND RELIGION.

   Though philosophers have often turned aside from reason through their
ignorance of the truth, and have fallen into inextricable errors (for that
is wont to happen to these which happens to a traveller ignorant of the
way, and not confessing that he is ignorant, --namely, that he wanders
about, while he is ashamed to inquire from those whom he meets), no
philosopher, however, has ever made the assertion that there is no
difference between man and the brutes. Nor has any one at all, provided
that he wished to appear wise, reduced a rational animal to the level of
the mute and irrational; which some ignorant persons do, resembling the
brutes themselves, who, wishing to give themselves up to the indulgence of
their appetite and pleasure, say that they are born on the same principle
as all living animals, which it is impious for man to say. For who is so
unlearned as not to know, who is so void of understanding as not to
perceive, that there is something divine in man? I do not as yet come to
the excellences of the soul and of the intellect, by which there is a
manifest affinity between man and God. Does not the position of the body
itself, and the fashion of the countenance, declare that we are not on a
level with the dumb creation? Their nature is prostrated to the ground and
to their pasture, and has nothing in common with the heaven, which they do
not look upon. But man, with his erect position, with his elevated
countenance raised to the contemplation of the universe, compares his
features with God, and reason recognises reason. (1)

   And on this account there is no animal, as Cicero says, (2) except man,
which has any knowledge of God. For he alone is furnished with wisdom, so
that he alone understands religion; and this is the chief or only
difference between man and the dumb animals. For the other  things which
appear to be peculiar to man, even if there are not such in the dumb
animals, nevertheless may appear to be similar. Speech is peculiar to man;
yet even in these there is a certain resemblance to speech. For they both
distinguish one another by their voices; and when they are angry, they send
forth a sound resembling altercation; and when they see one another after
an interval of time, they show the office of congratulation by their voice.
To us, indeed, their voices appear uncouth, (3) as ours perhaps do to them;
but to themselves, who understand one another, they are words. In short, in
every affection they utter distinct expressions of voice (4) by which they
may show their state of mind. Laughter also is peculiar to man; and yet we
see certain indications of joy in other animals, when they use passionate
gestures (5) with a view to sports, hang down (6) their ears, contract
their mouth, smooth their forehead, relax their eyes to sportiveness. What
is so peculiar to man as reason and the foreseeing of the future? But there
are animals which open several outlets in different directions from their
lairs, that if any danger comes upon them, an escape may be open for them
shut in; but they would not do  this unless they possessed intelligence and
re flection. Others are provident for the future, as

"Ants, when they plunder a great heap of corn, mindful of the winter, and
lay it up in their dwelling;" (7)

again, --

"As bees, which alone know a country and fixed abodes; and mindful of the
winter which is to come, they practise labour in the summer, and lay up
their gains as a common stock." (3)

   It would be a long task if I should wish to trace out the things most
resembling the skill of man, which are accustomed to be done by the
separate tribes of animals. But if, in the case of all these things which
are wont to be ascribed to man, there is found to be some resemblance even
in the dumb animals, it is evident that religion is the only thing of which
no trace can be found in the dumb animals, nor any indication. For justice
is peculiar to religion, and to this no other animal attains. For man alone
bears rule; the other animals are  subjected (9) to him. But the worship of
God is ascribed to justice; and he who does not embrace this, being far
removed from the nature of man, will live the life of the brutes under the
form of man. But since we differ from the other animals almost in this
respect alone, that we alone of all perceive the divine might and power,
while in the others there is no understanding of God, it is surely
impossible that in this respect either the dumb animals should have more
wisdom, or human nature should be unwise, since all living creatures, and
the whole system of nature, are subject to man on account of his wisdom.
Wherefore if reason, if the force of man in this respect, excels and
surpasses the rest of living creatures, inasmuch as he alone is capable of
the knowledge of God, it is evident that religion can in no way be
overthrown.

CHAP. VIII.--OF RELIGION.

   But religion is overthrown if we believe Epicurus speaking thus:--

"For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality
together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns;
since, exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own
resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favours nor
moved by anger." (10)

Now, when he says these things, does he think that any worship is to be
paid to God, or does he entirely overthrow religion? For if God confers
nothing good on any one, if He repays the obedience of His worshipper with
no favour, what is so senseless, what so foolish, as to build temples, to
offer sacrifices, to present gifts, to diminish our property, that we may
obtain nothing? (1) But (it will be said) it is right that an excellent
nature should be honoured. What honour can be due to a being who pays no
regard to us, and is ungrateful? Can we be bound in any manner to him who
has nothing in common with us? "Farewell to God," says Cicero, (2) "if He
is such as to be influenced by no favour, and by no affection of men. For
why should I say 'may He be propitious? (1) for He can be propitious to no
one." What can be spoken more contemptible with respect to God? Farewell to
Him, he says, that is, let Him depart anti retire, since He is able to
profit no one. But if God takes no trouble, nor occasions trouble to
another, why then should we not commit crimes as often as it shall be in
our power to escape the notice of men? and to cheat the public laws?
Wherever we shall obtain a favourable opportunity of escaping notice, let
us take advantage of the occasion: let us take away the property of others,
either without bloodshed or even with blood, if there is nothing else
besides the laws to be reverenced.

   While Epicurus entertains these sentiments, he altogether destroys
religion; and when this is taken away, confusion and perturbation of life
will follow. But if religion cannot be taken away without destroying our
hold of wisdom, by which we are separated from the brutes, and of justice,
by which the public life may be more secure, how can religion itself be
maintained or guarded without fear? For that which is not feared is
despised, and that which is despised is plainly not reverenced. Thus it
comes to pass that religion, and majesty, and honour exist together with
fear; but there is no fear where no one is angry. Whether, therefore, you
take away from God kindness, or anger, or both, religion must be taken
away, without which the life of men is full of folly, of wickedness, and
enormity. For conscience greatly curbs men, if we believe that we are
living in the sight of God; if we imagine not only that the actions which
we perform are seen from above, but also that our thoughts and our words
are heard by God. But it is profitable to believe this, as some imagine,
not for the sake of the truth, but of utility, since laws cannot punish
conscience unless some terror from above hangs over to restrain offences.
Therefore religion is altogether false, and there is no divinity; but all
things are made up by skilful men, in order that they may live more
uprightly and innocently. This is a great question, and foreign to the
subject which we have proposed; but because it necessarily occurs, it ought
to be handled, however briefly.

CHAP. IX. --OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD, AND OF OPINIONS OPPOSED TO IT.

   When the philosophers of former times had agreed in their opinions
respecting providence, and there was no doubt but that the world was set in
order by God and reason, and was governed by reason, Protagoras, in the
times of Socrates, was the first of all who said that it was not clear to
him whether there was any divinity or not. And this disputation of his was
judged so impious, and so contrary to the truth and to religion, that the
Athenians both banished him from their territories, and burnt in a public
assembly those books of his in which these statements were contained. But
there is no need to speak respecting his opinions, because he pronounced
nothing certain. After these things Socrates and his disciple Plato, and
those who flowed forth from the school of Plato like rivulets into
different directions, namely, the Stoics and Peripatetics, were of the same
opinion as those who went before them. (4)

   Afterwards Epicurus said that there was indeed a God, because it was
necessary that there should be in the world some being of surpassing
excellence, distinction, and blessedness; yet that there was no providence,
and thus that the world itself was ordered by no plan, nor art, nor
workmanship, but that the universe was made up of certain minute and
indivisible seeds. But I do not see what can be said more repugnant to the
truth. For if there is a God, as God He is manifestly provident; nor can
divinity be attributed to Him in any other way than if He retains the past,
and knows the present, and foresees the future. Therefore, in taking away
providence, he also denied the existence of God.  But when he openly
acknowledged the existence of God, at the same time he also admitted His
providence for the one cannot exist at all, or  be understood, without the
other. But in those later times in which philosophy had now lost its
vigour, (5) there lived a certain Diagoras of Melos, (6) who altogether
denied the existence of God, and on account of this sentiment was called
atheist; (7) also Theodorus (6) of Cyrene: both of whom, because they were
unable to discover anything new, all things having already been said and
found out, preferred even, in opposition to the truth, to deny that in
which all preceding philosophers had agreed without any ambiguity. These
are they who attacked providence, which had been asserted and defended
through so many ages by so many intellects. What then? Shall we refute
those trifling and inactive philosophers by reason, or by the authority of
distinguished men, or rather by both? But we must hasten onwards, lest our
speech should wander too far from our subject.

CHAP. X.--OF THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD, AND THE NATURE OF AFFAIRS, AND THE
PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

   They who do not admit that the world was made by divine providence,
either say that it is composed of first principles coming together at
random, or that it suddenly came into existence by nature, but hold, as
Straton (1) does, that nature has in itself the power of production and of
diminution, but that it has neither sensibility nor figure, so that we may
understand that all things were produced spontaneously, without any
artificer or author. Each opinion is vain and impossible. But this happens
to those who are ignorant of the truth, that they devise anything, rather
than perceive that which the nature of the subject (2) requires. First of
all, with respect to those minute seeds, by the meeting together of which
they say that the whole world came into existence, (3) I ask where or
whence they are. Who has seen them at any time? Who has perceived them? Who
has heard them? Had none but Leucippus (4) eyes? Had he alone a mind, who
assuredly alone of all men was blind and senseless, since he spoke those
things which no sick man could have uttered in his ravings, (5) or one
asleep in his dreams?

   The ancient philosophers argued that all things were made up of four
elements. (6) He would not admit this, lest he should appear to tread in
the footsteps of others; but he held that there were other first principles
of the elements themselves, which can neither be seen, nor touched, nor be
perceived by any part of the body. They are so minute, he says, that there
is no edge of a sword so flue that they can be cut and divided by it. From
which circumstance he gave them the name of atoms. But it occurred to him,
that if they all had one and the same nature, they could not make up
different objects of so great a variety as we see to be present in the
world. He said, therefore, that there were smooth and rough ones, and
round, and angular, and hooked. How much better had it been to be silent,
than to have a tongue for such miserable and empty uses! And, indeed, I
fear lest he who thinks these things worthy of refutation, should appear no
less to rave. Let us, however, reply as to one who says something. (7) If
they are soft s and round, it is plain that they cannot lay hold of one
another, so as to make some body; as, though any one should wish to bind
together millet into one combination, (9) the very softness of the grains
would not permit them to come together into a mass. If they are rough, and
angular, and hooked, so that they may be able to cohere, then they are
divisible, and capable of being cut; for hooks and angles must project,
(10) so that they may possibly be cut off.

   Therefore that which is able to be cut off and torn away, will be able
both to be seen and held. "These," he says, "flutter about with restless
motions through empty space, and are carried hither and thither, just as we
see little particles of dust in the sun when it has introduced its rays and
light through a window. From these there arise trees and herbs, and all
fruits of the earth; from these, animals, and water, and fire, and all
things are produced, and are again resolved into the same elements." This
can be borne as long as the inquiry is respecting small matters. Even the
world itself was made up of these. He has reached to the full extent of
perfect madness: it seems impossible that anything further should be said,
and yet he found something to add. "Since everything," he says, "is
infinite, and nothing can be empty, it follows of necessity that there are
innumerable worlds." What force of atoms had been so great, that masses so
incalculable should be collected from such minute elements? And first of
all I ask, What is the nature or origin of those seeds? For if all things
are from them, whence shall we say that they themselves are? What nature
supplied such an abundance of matter for the making of innumerable worlds?
But let us grant that he raved with impunity concerning worlds; let us
speak respecting this in which we are, and which we see. He says that all
things are made from minute bodies which are incapable of division.

   If this were so, no object would ever need the seed of its own kind.
Birds would be born without eggs, or eggs without bringing forth; likewise
the rest of the living creatures without coition: trees and the productions
of the earth would not have their own seeds, which we daily handle and sow.
Why does a corn-field arise from grain, and again grain from a corn-field?
In short, if the meeting together and collecting of atoms would effect all
things, all things would grow together in the air, since atoms flutter
about through empty space. Why cannot the herb, why cannot the tree or
grain, arise or be increased without earth, without roots, without
moisture, without seed? From which it is evident that nothing is made up
from atoms, since everything has its own peculiar and fixed nature, its own
seed, its own law given from the beginning. Finally, Lucretius, as though
forgetful of atoms, (1) which he was maintaining, in order that he might
refute those who say that all things are produced from nothing, employed
these arguments, which might have weighed against himself. For he thus
spoke: --

"If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of anything; nothing
would require seed." (2)

Likewise afterwards: --

"We must admit, therefore, that nothing can come from nothing, since things
require seed before they can severally be born, and be brought out into the
buxom fields of air." (3)

Who would imagine that he had brain when he said these things, and did not
see that they were contrary to one another? For that nothing is made by
means of atoms, is apparent from this, that everything has a definite (4)
seed, unless by chance we shall believe that the nature both of fire and
water is derived from atoms. Why should I say, that if materials of the
greatest hardness are struck together with a violent blow, fire is struck
out? Are atoms concealed in the steel, or in the flint? Who shut them in?
Or why do they not leap forth spontaneously? Or how could the seeds of fire
remain in a material of the greatest coldness?

   I leave the subject of the flint and steel. If you hold in the sun an
orb of crystal filled with water, fire is kindled from the light which is
reflected from the water, even in the most severe cold. Must we then
believe that fire is contained in the water? And yet fire cannot be kindled
from the sun even in summer. If you shall breathe upon wax, or if a light
vapour shall touch anything -- either the hard surface s of marble or a
plate of metal --water is gradually condensed by means of the most minute
drops. Also from the exhalation of the earth or sea mist is formed, which
either, being dispersed, moistens whatever it has covered, or being
collected, is carried aloft by the wind to high mountains, and compressed
into cloud, and sends down great rains. Where, then, do we say that fluids
are produced? Is it  in the vapour? Or in the exhalation? Or in the wind?
But nothing can be formed in that which is neither touched nor seen. Why
should I speak of animals, in whose bodies we see nothing formed without
plan, without arrangement, without utility, without beauty, so that the
most skilful and careful marking out (6) of all the parts and members
repels the idea of accident and chance? But let us suppose it possible that
the limbs, and bones, and nerves, and blood should be made up of atoms.
What of the senses, the reflection, the memory, the mind, the natural
capacity: from what seeds can they be compacted? (7) He says, From the most
minute. There are therefore others of greater size. How, then, are they
indivisible?

   In the next place, if the things which are not seen are formed from
invisible seeds, it follows that those which are seen are from visible
seeds. Why, then, does no one see them? But whether any one regards the
invisible parts which are in man, or the parts which can be touched, and
which are visible, who does not see that both parts exist in accordance
with design? (8) How, then, can bodies which meet together without design
effect anything reasonable? (9) For we see that there is nothing in the
whole world which has not in itself very great and wonderful design. And
since this is above the sense and capacity of man, to what can it be more
rightly attributed than to the divine providence? If a statue, the
resemblance of man, is made by the exercise of design and art, shall we
suppose that man himself is made up of fragments which come together at
random? And what resemblance to the truth is there in the thing produced,
(10) when the greatest and most surpassing skill (11) can imitate nothing
more than the mere outline and extreme lineaments (12) of the body? Was the
skill of man able to give to his production any motion or sensibility? I
say nothing of the exercise of the sight, of hearing, and of smelling, and
the wonderful uses of the other members, either those which are in sight or
those which are hidden from view. What artificer could have fabricated
either the heart of man, or the voice, or his very wisdom? Does any man of
sound mind, therefore, think that that which man cannot do by reason and
judgement, may be accomplished by a meeting together of atoms everywhere
adhering to each other? You see into what foolish ravings they have fallen,
while they are unwilling to assign to God the making and the care of all
things

   Let us, however, concede to them that the things which are earthly are
made froth atoms: are the things also which are heavenly? They say that the
gods are without contamination, eternal, and blessed; and they grant to
them alone an exemption, so that they do not appear to be made up of a
meeting together of atoms. For if the gods also had been made up of these,
they would be liable to be dispersed, the seeds at length being resolved,
and returning to their own nature. Therefore, if there is something which
the atoms could not produce, why may we not judge in the same way of the
others? But I ask why the gods did not build for themselves a dwelling-
place before those first elements produced the world? It is manifest that,
unless the atoms had come together and made the heaven, the gods would
still be suspended through the midst of empty space. By what counsel, then,
by what plan, did the atoms from a confused mass collect themselves, so
that from some the earth below was formed into a globe, and the heaven
stretched out above, adorned with so great a variety of constellations that
nothing can be conceived more embellished?  Can he, therefore, who sees
such and so great objects, imagine that they were made without any design,
without any providence, without any divine intelligence, but that such
great and wonderful things arose out of fine and minute atoms? Does it not
resemble a prodigy, that there should be any human being who might say
these things, or that there should be those who might believe them--as
Democritus, who was his hearer, or Epicurus, to whom all folly flowed forth
from the fountain of Leucippus? But, as others say, the world was made by
Nature, which is without perception and figure. (1) But this is much more
absurd. If Nature made the world, it must have made it by judgment and
intelligence; for it is lie that makes something who has either the
inclination to make it, or knowledge. If nature is without perception and
figure, how can that be made by it which has both perception and figure,
unless by chance any one thinks that the fabric of animals, which is so
delicate, could have been formed and animated by that which is without
perception, or that that figure of heaven, which is prepared with such
foresight for the uses of living beings, suddenly came into existence by
some accident or other, without a builder, without an artificer? (2)

   "If there is anything," says Chrysippus, "which effects those things
which man, though he is endowed with reason, cannot do, that assuredly is
greater, and stronger, and wiser than man." But man cannot make heavenly
things; therefore that which shall produce or has produced these things
surpasses man in art, in design, in skill, and in power. Who, therefore,
can it be but God? But Nature, which they suppose to be, as it were, the
mother of all things, if it has not a mind, will effect nothing, will
contrive nothing; for where there is no reflection there is neither motion
nor efficacy. But if it uses counsel for the commencement of anything,
reason for its arrangement, art for its accomplishment, energy for its
consummation, and power to govern and control, why should it be called
Nature rather than God? Or if a concourse of atoms, or Nature without mind,
made those things which we see, I ask why it was able to make the heaven,
but unable to make a city or a house? (3) Why it made mountains of marble,
but did not make columns and statues? But ought not atoms to have come
together to effect these things, since they leave no position untried? For
concerning Nature, which has no mind, it is no wonder that it forgot to do
these things. What, then, is the case? It is plain that God, when He
commenced this work of the world,--than which nothing can be better
arranged with respect to order, nor more befitting as to utility, nor more
adorned as to beauty, nor greater as to bulk,--Himself made the things
which could not be made by man; and among these also man himself, to whom
He gave a portion of His own wisdom, and furnished him with reason, as much
as earthly frailty was capable of receiving, that he might make for himself
the things which were necessary for his own uses.

   But if in the commonwealth of this world, so to speak, there is no
providence which rules, no God who administers, no sense at all prevails in
this nature of things. From what source therefore will it be believed that
the human mind, with its skill and its intelligence, had its origin? For if
the body of man was made from the ground, from which circumstance man
received his name; (4) it follows that the soul, which has intelligence,
and is the ruler of the body, which the limbs obey as a king and commander,
which can neither be looked upon nor comprehended, could not have come to
man except from a wise nature. But as mind and soul govern everybody, so
also does God govern the world. For it is not probable that lesser and
humble things bear rule, but that greater and highest things do not bear
rule. In short, Marcus Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations, (5) and in his
Consolation, says: "No origin of souls can be found on earth. For there is
nothing, he says, mixed and compound (6) in souls, or which may appear to
be produced and made up from the earth; nothing moist or airy, (7) or of
the nature of fire. For in these natures there is nothing which has the
force of memory, of mind and reflection, which both retains the past and
foresees the future, and is able to comprise the present; which things
alone are divine. For no source will ever be found from which they are able
to come to man, unless it be from God." Since, therefore, with the
exception of two or three vain calumniators, it is agreed upon that the
world is governed by providence, as also it was made, and there is no one
who ventures to prefer the opinion of Diagoras and Theodorus, or the empty
fiction of Leucippus, or the levity of Democritus and Epicurus, either to
the authority of those seven ancient men who were called wise, (1) or to
that of Pythagoras or of Socrates or Plato, and the other philosophers who
judged that there is a providence; therefore that opinion also is false, by
which they think that religion was instituted by wise men for the sake of
terror and fear, in order that ignorant men might abstain from sins.

   But if this is true, it follows that we are derided by the wise men of
old. But if they invented religion for the sake of deceiving us, and
moreover of deceiving the whole human race, therefore they were not wise,
because falsehood is not consistent with the character of the wise man. But
grant that they were wise; what great success in falsehood was it, that
they were able to deceive not only the unlearned, but Plato  also, and
Socrates, and so easily to delude Pythagoras, Zeno, and Aristotle, the
chiefs of the greatest sects? There is therefore a divine providence, as
those men whom I have named perceived, by the energy and power of which all
things which we see were both made and are  governed. For so vast a system
of things? such arrangement and such regularity in preserving the settled
orders and times, could neither at first have arisen without a provident
artificer, or have existed so many ages without a powerful inhabitant, or
have been perpetually governed without a skilful and intelligent (3) ruler;
and reason itself declares this. For whatever exists which has reason, must
have arisen from reason. Now reason is the part of an intelligent and wise
nature; but a wise and intelligent nature can be nothing else than God. Now
the world, since it has reason, by which it is both governed and kept
together, was therefore made by God. But if God is the maker and ruler of
the world, then religion is rightly and truly established; for honour and
worship are due to the author and common parent of all things.

CHAP. XI. --OF GOD, AND THAT THE ONE GOD, AND BY WHOSE PROVIDENCE THE WORLD
IS GOVERNED AND EXISTS.

   Since it is agreed upon concerning providence, it follows that we show
whether it is to be believed that it belongs to many, or rather to one
only. We have sufficiently taught, as I think, in our Institutions, that
there cannot be many gods; because, if the divine energy and power be
distributed among several, it must necessarily be diminished. But that
which is lessened is plainly mortal; but if He is not mortal, He can
neither be lessened nor divided. Therefore there is but one God, in whom
complete energy and power can neither be lessened nor increased. But if
there are many, while they separately have something of power and
authority, the sum itself decreases; nor will they separately be able to
have the whole, which they have in corn-moN with others: so much will be
wanting to each as the others shall possess. There cannot therefore be many
rulers in this world, nor many masters in one house, nor many pilots in one
ship, nor many leaders in one herd or flock, nor many queens in one swarm.
But there could not have been many suns in heaven, as there are not several
souls in one body; so entirely does the whole of nature agree in unity.But
if the world

     "Is nourished by a soul,
   A spirit whose celestial flame
   Glows in each member of the frame,
     And stirs the mighty whole," (4)

it is evident from the testimony of the poet, that there is one God who
inhabits the world, since the whole body cannot be inhabited and governed
except by one mind. Therefore all divine power must be in one person, by
whose will and command all things are ruled; and therefore He is so great,
that He cannot be described in words by man, or estimated by the senses.
From what source, therefore, did the opinion or persuasion s respecting
many gods come to men? Without doubt, all those who are worshipped as gods
were men, and were also the earliest and greatest kings; but who is
ignorant that they were invested with divine honours after death, either on
account of the virtue by which they had profited the race of men, or that
they obtained immortal memory on account of the benefits and inventions by
which they had adorned human life? And not only men, but women also. And
this, both the most ancient writers of Greece, whom they call theologi, (6)
and also Roman writers following and imitating the Greeks, teach; of whom
especially Euhemerus and our Ennius, who point out the birthdays,
marriages, offspring, governments, exploits, deaths, and tombs (1) of all
of them. And Tullius, following them, in his third book, On the Nature of
the Gods, destroyed the public religions; but neither he himself nor any
other person was able to introduce the true one, of which he was ignorant.
And thus he himself testified that that which was false was evident; that
the truth, however, lay concealed. "Would to heaven," he says, "that I
could as easily discover true things as refute those that are false!" (2)
And this he proclaimed not with dissimulation as an Academic, but truly and
in accordance with the feeling of his mind, because the truth cannot be
uprooted from human perceptions: that which the foresight of man was able
to attain to, he attained to, that he might expose false things. For
whatever is fictitious and false, because it is supported by no reason, is
easily destroyed. There is therefore one God, the source and origin of all
things, as Plato both felt and taught in the Timoeus, whose majesty he
declares to be so great, that it can neither be comprehended by the mind
nor be expressed by the tongue.

   Hermes bears the same testimony, whom Cicero asserts (3) to be reckoned
by the Egyptians among the number of the gods. I speak of him who, on
account of his excellence and knowledge of many arts, was called
Trismegistus; and he was far more ancient not only than Plato, but than
Pythagoras, and those seven wise men. (4) In Xenophon, (5) Socrates, as he
discourses, says that "the form of God ought not to be inquired about:" and
Plato, in his Book Laws, (6) says: "What God is, ought not to be the
subject of inquiry, because it can neither be found out nor related."
Pythagoras also admits that there is but one God, saying that there is an
incorporeal mind, which, being diffused and stretched through all nature,
gives vital perception to all living creatures; but Antisthenes, in his
Physics, said that there was but one natural God, although the nations and
cities have gods of their own people. Aristotle, with his followers the
Peripatetics, and Zeno with his followers the Stoics, say nearly the same
things. Truly it would be a long task to follow up the opinions of all
separately, who, although they used different names, nevertheless agreed in
one power which governed the world. But, however, though philosophers and
poets, and those, in short, who worship the gods, often acknowledge the
Supreme God, yet no one ever inquired into, no one discussed, the subject
of His worship and honours; with that persuasion, in truth, with which,
always believing Him to be bounteous and incorruptible, they think (7) that
He is neither angry with any one, nor stands in need of any worship. Thus
there can be no religion where there is no fear. (8)

CHAP. XII.--OF RELIGION AND THE FEAR OF GOD.

   Now, since we have replied to the impious and detestable wisdom, (9) or
rather senselessness of some, let us return to our proposed subject. We
have said that, if religion is taken away, neither wisdom nor justice can
be retained: wisdom, because the understanding of the divine nature,  in
which we differ from the brutes, is found in  man alone; justice, because
unless God, who  cannot be deceived, shall restrain our desires,  we shall
live wickedly and impiously. Therefore, that our actions should be viewed
by God, pertains not only to the usefulness of common  life, but even to
the truth; because, if religion and justice are taken away, having lost our
reason, we either descend to the senselessness (10) of  the herds; or to
the savageness of the beasts, yea, even more so, since the beasts spare
animals of their own kind. What will be more savage, what more unmerciful,
than man, if, the fear of a superior being taken away, he shall be able
either to escape the notice of or to despise the might of the laws? It is
therefore the fear of God alone which guards the mutual society of men, by
which life itself is sustained, protected, and governed. But that fear is
taken away if man is persuaded that God is without anger; for that He is
moved and indignant when unjust actions are done, not only the common
advantage, but even reason itself, and truth, persuade us. We must again
return to the former subjects, that, as we have taught that the world was
made by God, we may teach why it was made.

CHAP. XllI. -- OF THE ADVANTAGE AND USE OF THE WORLD AND OF THE SEASONS.

   If any one considers the whole government of the world, he will
certainly understand how true is the opinion of the Stoics, who say that
the world was made on our account. For all the things of which the world is
composed, and which it produces from itself, are adapted to the use of man.
Man, accordingly, uses fire for the purpose of warmth and light, and of
softening his food, and for the working of iron; he uses springs for
drinking, and for baths; he uses rivers for irrigating the fields, and
assigning boundaries to countries; he uses the earth for receiving a
variety of fruits, the hills for planting vineyards, the mountains for the
use of trees and firewood, (1) the plains for crops of grain; he uses the
sea not only for commerce, and for receiving supplies from distant
countries, but also for abundance of every kind of fish. But if he makes
use of these elements to which he is nearest, there is no doubt that he
uses the hear-en also, since the offices even of heavenly things are
regulated for the fertility of the earth from which we live. The sun, with
its ceaseless courses and unequal intervals, (2) completes its annual
circles, and either at his rising draws forth the day for labour, or at his
setting brings on the night for repose; and at one time by his departure
farther towards the south, at another time by his approach nearer towards
the north, he causes the vicissitudes of winter and summer, so that both by
the moistures and frosts of winter the earth becomes enriched for
fruitfulness, and by the heats of summer either the produce of grass (3) is
hardened by maturity, or that which is in moist places, being seethed and
heated, becomes ripened. The moon also, which governs the time of night,
regulates her monthly courses by the alternate loss and recovery of light,
(4) and by the brightness of her shining illumines the nights obscure with
gloomy darkness, so that journeys in the summer heat, and expeditions, and
works, may be performed without labour and inconvenience; since

   "By night the light stubble, by night
   The dry meadows are better mown." (5)

The other heavenly bodies also, either at their rising or setting, supply
favourable times (6) by their fixed positions. (7) Moreover, they also
afford guidance to ships, that they may not wander through the boundless
deep with uncertain course, since the pilot duly observing them arrives at
the  harbour of the shore at which he aims. (8) Clouds  are attracted by
the breath of the winds, that the fields of sown grain may be watered with
showers, that the vines may abound with produce, and the trees with fruits.
And these things are exhibited by a succession of changes throughout the
year, that nothing may at any time be wanting by which the life of men is
sustained. But (9) (it is said) the same earth nourishes the other living
creatures, and by the produce of the same even the dumb animals are fed.
Has not God laboured also for the sake of the dumb animals? By no means;
because they are void of reason. On the contrary, we understand that even
these themselves in the same manner were made by God for the use of man,
partly for food, partly for clothing, partly to assist him in his work; so
that it is manifest that the divine providence wished to furnish and adorn
the life of men with an abundance of objects and resources, and on this
account He both filled the air with birds, and the sea with fishes, and the
earth with quadrupeds. But the Academics, arguing against the Stoics, are
accustomed to ask why, if God made all things for the sake of men, many
things are found even opposed, and hostile, and injurious to us, as well in
the sea as on the land. And the Stoics, without any regard to the truth,
most foolishly repelled this. For they say that there are many things among
natural productions, (10) and reckoned among animals, the utility of which
hitherto (11) escapes notice, but that this is discovered in process of the
times, as necessity and use have already discovered many things which were
unknown in former ages. What utility, then, can be discovered in mice, in
beetles, in serpents, which are troublesome and pernicious to man? Is it
that some medicine lies concealed in them? If there is any, it will at some
time be found out, namely, as a remedy against evils, whereas they complain
that it is altogether evil. They say that the viper, when burnt and reduced
to ashes, is a remedy for the bite of the same beast. How much better had
it been that it should not exist at all, than that a remedy should be
required against it drawn from itself?

   They might then have answered with more conciseness and truth after
this manner. When God had formed man as it were His own image, that which
was the completion of His workmanship, He breathed wisdom into him alone,
so that he might bring all things into subjection to his own authority and
government, and make use of all the advantages of the world. And yet He set
before him both good and evil things, inasmuch as He gave to him wisdom,
the whole nature of which is employed in discerning things evil and good:
for no one can choose better things, and know what is good, unless he at
the same time knows to reject and avoid the things which are evil. (12)
They are both mutually connected with each other, so that, the one being
taken away, the other must also be taken away. Therefore, good and evil
things being set before it, then at length wisdom discharges its office,
and desires the good for usefulness, but rejects the evil for safety.
Therefore, as innumerable good things have been given which it might enjoy,
so also have evils, against which it might guard. For if there is no evil,
no danger--nothing, in short, which can injure man--all the material of
wisdom is taken away, and will be unnecessary for man. For if only good
things are placed in sight, what need is there of reflection, of
understanding, of knowledge, of reason? since, wherever he shall extend his
hand, that is befitting and adapted to nature; so that if any one should
wish to place a most exquisite dinner before infants, who as yet have no
taste, it is plain that each will desire that to which either impulse, or
hunger, or even accident, shall attract them; and whatever they shall take,
it will be useful and salutary to them. What injury will it therefore be
for them always to remain as they are, and always to be infants and
unacquainted with affairs? But if you add a mixture either of bitter
things, or things useless, or even poisonous, they are plainly deceived
through their ignorance of good and evil, unless wisdom is added to them,
by which they may have the rejection of evil things and the choice of good
things.

   You see, therefore, that we have greater need of wisdom on account of
evils; and unless these things had been proposed to us, we should not be a
rational animal. But if this account is true, which the Stoics were in no
manner able to see, that argument also of Epicurus is done away. God, he
says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and
is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and
able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in
accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is
envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing
nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is
both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source
then are evils? or why does He not remove them? I know that many of the
philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this
argument, and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes
no interest in anything, which Epicurus especially aims at; but having
examined the matter, we easily do away with this formidable argument. For
God is able to do whatever He wishes, and there is no weakness or envy in
God. He is able, therefore, to take away evils; but He does not wish to do
so, and yet He is not on that account envious. For on this account He does
not take them away, because He at the same time gives wisdom, as I have
shown; and there is more of goodness and pleasure in wisdom than of
annoyance in evils. For wisdom causes us even to know God, and by that
knowledge to attain to immortality, which is the chief good. Therefore,
unless we first know evil, we shall be unable to know good. But Epicurus
did not see this, nor did any other, that if evils are taken away, wisdom
is in like manner taken away; and that no traces of virtue remain in man,
the nature of which consists in enduring and overcoming the bitterness of
evils. And thus, for the sake of a slight gain (1) in the taking away of
evils, we should be deprived of a good, which is very great, and true, and
peculiar to us. It is plain, therefore, that all things are proposed for
the sake of man, as well evils as also goods.

CHAP. XIV. --WHY GOD MADE MAN.

   It follows that I show for what purpose God made man himself. As He
contrived the world for the sake of man, so He formed man himself t on His
own account, as it were a priest of a divine temple, a spectator of His
works and of heavenly objects. For he is the only being who, since he is
intelligent and capable of reason, is able to understand God, to admire His
works, and perceive His energy and power; for on this account he is
furnished with judgment, intelligence, and prudence. On this account he
alone, beyond the other living creatures, has been made with an upright
body and attitude, so that he seems to have been raised up for the
contemplation of his Parent. (2) On this account he alone has received
language, and a tongue the interpreter of his thought, that he may be able
to declare the majesty of his Lord. Lastly, for this cause all things were
placed under his control, that he himself might be under the control of
God, their Maker and Creator. If God, therefore, designed man to be a
worship per of Himself, and on this account gave him so much honour, that
he might rule over all things; it is plainly most just that he should
worship Him (3) who bestowed upon him such great gifts, and love man, who
is united with us in the participation of the divine justice. For it is not
right that a worshipper of God should he injured by a worshipper of God.
From which it is understood that man was made for the sake of religion and
justice. And of this matter Marcus Tullius is a witness in his books
respecting the Laws, since he thus speaks: (4) "But of all things
concerning which learned men dispute, nothing is of greater consequence
than that it should be altogether understood that we are born to justice."
And if this is most true, it follows that God will have all men to be just,
that is, to have God and man as objects of their affection; to honour God
in truth as a Father, and to love man as a brother: for m these two things
the whole of justice is comprised. But he who either fails to acknowledge
God or acts injuriously to man, lives unjustly and contrary to his nature,
and in this manner disturbs the divine institution and law.

CHAP. XV.--WHENCE SINS EXTENDED TO MAN.

   Here perhaps some one may ask, Whence sins extended to man, or what
perversion distorted the rule of the divine institution to worse things, so
that, though he was born to justice, he nevertheless performs unjust works.
I have already in a former place explained, that God at the same time set
before him good and evil, and that He loves the good, and hates the evil
which is contrary to this; but that He permitted the evil on this account,
that the good also might shine forth, since, as I have often taught, we
understand that the one cannot exist without the other; in short, that the
world itself is made up of two elements opposing and connected with one
another, of fire and moisture, and that light could not have been made
unless there has also been darkness, since there cannot be a higher place
without a lower, nor a rising without a setting, nor warmth without cold,
nor softness without hardness. Thus also we are composed of two substances
equally opposed to one another -- soul and body: the one of which is
assigned to the heaven, because it is slight and not to be handled; the
other to the earth, because it is capable of being laid hold of: the one is
firm (1) and eternal, the other frail and mortal. Therefore good clings to
the one, and evil to the other: light, life, and justice to the one;
darkness, death, anti injustice to the other. Hence there arose among men
the corruption of their nature, so that it was necessary that a law should
be established, by which vices might be prohibited, and the duties of
virtue be en-joined. Since, therefore, there are good and evil things in
the affairs of men, the nature of which I have set forth, it must be that
God is moved to both sides, both to favour when He sees that just things
are done, and to anger when He perceives unjust things.

   But Epicurus opposes us, and says: "If there is in God the affection of
joy leading Him to favour, and of hatred influencing Him to anger, He must
of necessity have both fear, and inclination, and desire, and the other
affections which belong to human weakness." It does not follow that he who
is angry must fear, or that he who feels joy must grieve; in short, they
who are liable to anger are less timid, and they who are of a joyful
temperament are less affected with grief. What need is there to speak of
the affections of humanity, to which our nature yields? Let us weigh the
divine necessity; for I am unwilling to speak of nature, since it is
believed that our God was never born. The affection of fear has a subject-
matter in man, but it has none in God. Man, inasmuch as he is liable to
many accidents and dangers, fears lest any greater violence should arise
which may strike, despoil, lacerate, dash down, and destroy him. But God,
who is liable neither to want, nor injury, nor pain, nor death, can by no
means fear, because there is nothing which can offer violence to Him. Also
the reason and cause of desire is manifest in man. For, inasmuch as he was
made frail and mortal, it was necessary that another and different sex
should be made, by union with which offspring might be produced to continue
the perpetuity of his race. But this desire has no place in God, because
frailty and death are far removed from Him; nor is there with Him any
female in whose union He is able to rejoice; nor does He stand in need of
succession, since He will live for ever. The same things may be said
respecting envy and passion, to which, from sure and manifest causes, man
is liable, but to which God is by no means liable. But, in truth, favour
and anger and pity have their substance (2) in God, and that greatest and
matchless power employs them for the preservation of the world.

CHAP. XVI. --OF GOD, AND HIS ANGER AND AFFECTIONS.

   Some one will ask what this substance is. First of all, when evils
befall them, men in their dejected state for the most part have recourse to
God: they appease and entreat Him, believing that He is able to repel
injuries from them. He has therefore an occasion of exercising pity; for He
is not so unmerciful and a despiser of men as to refuse aid to those who
are in distress. Very many, also, who are persuaded that justice is
pleasing to God, both worship Him who is Lord and Parent of all, and with
continual prayers and repeated vows offer gifts and sacrifices, follow up
His name with praises, striving  to gain His favour by just and good works.
There is therefore a reason, on account of which God may and ought to
favour them. For if there is nothing so befitting God as beneficence, and
nothing so unsuited to His character as to be ungrateful, it is necessary
that He should make some return for the services of those who are
excellent, and who lead a holy life, that He may not be liable to the
charge of ingratitude which is worthy of blame (3) even in the case of a
man. But, on the contrary, others are daring (1) and wicked, who pollute
all things with their lusts, harass with slaughters, practise fraud,
plunder, commit perjury, neither spare relatives nor parents, neglect the
laws, and even God Himself. Anger, therefore, has a befitting occasion (2)
in God.

   For it is not right that, when He sees such things, He should not be
moved, and arise to  take vengeance upon the wicked, and destroy the
pestilent and guilty, so as to promote the interests of all good men. Thus
even in anger itself there is also contained a showing of kindness. (3)
Therefore the arguments are found to be empty and false, either of those
who, when they will not admit that God is angry, will have it that He shows
kindness, because this, indeed, cannot take place without anger; or of
those who think that there is no emotion of the mind in God. And because
there are some affections to which God is not liable, as desire, fear,
avarice, grief, and envy, they have said that He is entirely free from all
affection. For He is not liable to these, because they are vicious
affections; but as to those which belong to virtue,--that is, anger towards
the wicked, regard towards the good, pity towards the afflicted, --
inasmuch as they are worthy of the divine power, He has affections of His
own, (4) both just and true. And if He is not possessed of them, the life
of man will be thrown into confusion, and the condition of things will come
to such disturbance that the laws will be despised and overpowered, and
audacity alone reign, so that no one can at length be in safety unless he
who excels (5) in strength. Thus all the earth will be laid waste, as it
were, by a common robbery. But now, since the wicked expect punishment, and
the good hope for favour, and the afflicted look for aid, there is place
for virtues, and crimes are more rare. But (6) it is said, ofttimes the
wicked are more prosperous, and the good more wretched, and the just are
harassed with impunity by the unjust. We will hereafter consider why these
things happen. In the meantime let us explain respecting anger, whether
there be any in God; whether He takes no notice at all, and is unmoved at
those things which are done with impiety.

CHAP. XVII.--OF GOD, HIS CARE AND ANGER.

   God, says Epicurus, regards nothing; therefore He has no power. For he
who has power must of necessity regard affairs. For if He has power, and
does not use it, what so great cause is there that, I will not say our
race, but even the universe itself, should be contemptible in His sight? On
this account he says He is pure (7) and happy, because He is always at
rest. (8) To whom, then, has the administration of so great affairs been
entrusted, (9) if these things which we see to be governed by the highest
judgment are neglected by God? or how can he who lives and perceives be at
rest? For rest belongs either to sleep or to death. But sleep has not rest.
For when we are asleep, the body indeed is at rest, but the soul is
restless and agitated: it forms for itself images which it may behold, so
that it exercises its natural power of motion by a variety of visions, and
calls itself away from false things, until the limbs are satiated, and
receive vigour from rest. Therefore eternal rest belongs to death alone.
Now if death does not affect God, it follows that God is never at rest. But
in what can the action of God consist, but in the administration of the
world? But if God carries on the care of the world, it follows that He
cares for the life of men, and takes notice of the acts of individuals, and
He earnestly desires that they should be wise and good. This is the will of
God, this the divine law; and he who follows and observes this is beloved
by God. It is necessary that He should be moved with anger against the man
who has broken or despised this eternal and divine law. If, he says, God
does harm to any one, therefore He is not good. They are deceived by no
slight error who defame all censure, whether human or divine, with the name
of bitterness and malice, thinking that He ought to be called injurious
(10) who visits the injurious with punishment. But if this is so, it
follows that we have injurious laws, which enact punishment for offenders,
and injurious judges who inflict capital punishments on those convicted of
crime. But if the law is just which awards to the transgressor his due, and
if the judge is called upright and good when he punishes crimes, -- for he
guards the safety of good men who punishes the evil,--it follows that God,
when He opposes the evil, is not injurious; but he himself is injurious who
either injures an innocent man, or spares an injurious person that he may
injure many.

   I would gladly ask from those who represent God as immoveable, (11) if
any one had property, a house, a household" of slaves, and his slaves,
despising the forbearance of their master, should attack all things, and
themselves take the enjoyment of his goods, if his household should honour
them, while the master was despised by all, insulted, and deserted: could
he be a wise man who should not avenge the insults, but permit those over
whom he had power to have the enjoyment of his property? Can such
forbearance be found in any one? If, indeed, it is to be called
forbearance, and not rather a kind of insensible stupor. But it is easy to
endure contempt. What if those things were done which are spoken of by
Cicero? (1) "For I ask, if any head of a family, (2) when his children had
been put to death by a slave, his wife slain and his house set on fire,
should not exact most severe punishment from that slave, whether he would
appear to be kind and merciful, or inhuman and most cruel?" But if to
pardon deeds of this kind is the part of cruelty rather than of kindness,
(3) it is not therefore the part of goodness in God not to be moved at
those things which are done unjustly. For the world is, as it were, the
house of God, and men, as it were, His slaves; and if His name is a mockery
to them, what kind or amount of forbearance is it to give (4) up His own
honours, to see wicked and unjust things done, and not to be indignant,
which is peculiar and natural to Him who is displeased with sins! To be
angry, therefore, is the part of reason: for thus faults are removed, and
licentiousness is curbed; and this is plainly in accordance with justice
and wisdom.

   But the Stoics did not see that there is a distinction between right
and wrong, that there is a just and also an unjust anger; and because they
did not find a remedy for the matter, they wished altogether to remove it.
But the Peripatetics said that it was not to be cut out, but moderated; to
whom we have made a sufficient reply in the sixth book of the Institutions.
(5) Now, that the philosophers were ignorant of the nature of anger, is
plain from their definitions, which Seneca enumerated in the books which he
composed on the subject of anger. "Anger is," he says, "the desire of
avenging an injury." Others, as Posidonius says, describe it as the desire
of punishing him by whom you think that you have been unfairly injured.
Some have thus defined it: "Anger is an incitement of the mind to injure
him who either has committed an injury, or who has wished to do so." The
definition of Aristotle does not differ greatly from ours; (6) for he says
that "anger is the desire of requiting pain." This is the unjust anger,
con-  coming which we spoke before, which is contained even in the dumb
animals; but it is to be restrained in man, lest he should rush to some
very great evil through rage. This cannot exist in God, because He cannot
be injured; (7) but it is found in man, inasmuch as he is frail. For the
inflicting (8) of injury inflames (9) anguish, and anguish produces a
desire of revenge. Where, then, is that just anger against offenders? For
this is evidently not the desire of revenge, inasmuch as no injury
precedes. I do not speak of those who sin against the laws; for although a
judge may be angry with these without incurring blame, let us, however,
suppose that he ought to be of a sedate mind when he sentences the guilty
to punishment, because he is the executor (10) of the laws, not of his own
spirit or power; for so they wish it who endeavour to extirpate anger. But
I speak of those in particular who are in our own power, as slaves,
children, wives, and pupils; for when we see these offend, we are incited
to restrain them.

   For it cannot fail to be, that he who is just and good is displeased
with things which are bad, and that he who is displeased with evil is moved
when he sees it practised. Therefore we arise to take vengeance, not
because we have been injured, but that discipline may be preserved, morals
may be corrected, and licentiousness be suppressed. This is just anger; and
as it is necessary in man for the correction of wickedness, so manifestly
is it necessary in God, from whom an example comes to man. For as we ought
to restrain those who are subject to our power, so also ought God to
restrain the of-fences of all. And in order that He may do this, He must be
angry; because it is natural for one who is good to be moved and incited at
the fault of another. Therefore they ought to have given this definition:
Anger is an emotion of the mind arousing itself for the restraining of
faults. (11) For the definition given by Cicero, "Anger is the desire of
taking vengeance," does not differ much from those already mentioned. (12)
But that anger which we may call either fury or rage ought not to exist
even in man, because it is altogether vicious; but the anger which relates
to the correction of vices ought not to be taken away from man; nor can it
be taken away from God, because it is both serviceable for the affairs of
men, and necessary.

CHAP. XVIII.--OF THE PUNISHMENT OF FAULTS, THAT IT CANNOT TAKE PLACE
WITHOUT ANGER.

   What need is there, they say, of anger, since faults can be corrected
without this affection? But there is no one who can calmly see any one
committing an offence. This may perhaps be possible in him who presides
over the laws, because the deed is not committed before his eyes, but it is
brought before him as a doubtful matter from another quarter. Nor can any
wickedness be so manifest, that there is no place for a de-fence; and
therefore it is possible that a judge may not be moved against him who may
possibly be found to be innocent; and when the detected crime shall have
come to light, he now no longer uses his own opinion, but that of the laws.
It may be granted that he does that which he does without anger; for he has
that which he may follow. We, undoubtedly, when an offence is committed by
our household at home, whether we see or perceive it, must be indignant;
for the very sight of a sin is unbecoming. For he who is altogether unmoved
either approves of faults, which is more disgraceful and unjust, or avoids
the trouble of reproving them, which a tranquil spirit and a quiet mind
despises and refuses, unless anger shall have aroused and incited it. But
when any one is moved, and yet through unseasonable leniency grants pardon
more frequently than is necessary, or at all times, he evidently both
destroys the life of those whose audacity he is fostering for greater
crimes, and furnishes himself with a perpetual source of annoyances.
Therefore the restraining of one's anger in the case of sins is faulty.

   Archytas of Tarentum is praised, who, when he had found everything
ruined (1) on his estate, rebuking the fault of his bailiff, said, "Wretch,
I would have beaten you to death if I had not been angry." They consider
this to be a singular example of forbearance; but influenced by authority,
they do not see how foolishly he spoke and acted. For if (as Plato says) no
prudent man punishes because there is an offence, but to prevent the
occurrence of an offence, it is evident how evil an example this wise man
put forth. For if slaves shall perceive that their master uses violence
when he is not angry, and abstains from violence (2) when he is angry, it
is evident that they will not commit slight offences, lest they  should be
beaten; but will commit the greatest  offences, that they may arouse the
anger of the perverse man, and escape with impunity. But I should praise
him if, when he was enraged, he? had given space to his anger, that the
excitement of his mind might calm down through the interval of time, and
his chastisement might be confined within moderate limits. Therefore, on
account of the magnitude of the anger, punishment ought not to have been
inflicted, but to  have been delayed, lest it should inflict (3) upon  the
offender pain greater than is just, or occasion an outburst of fury in the
punisher. But now, how is it equitable or wise, that any one should be
punished on account of a slight offence, and should be unpunished on
account of a very great one? But if he had learned the nature and causes of
things, he never would have professed so unsuitable a forbearance, that a
wicked slave should rejoice that his master has been angry with him. For as
God has furnished the human body with many and various senses which are
necessary for the use of life, so also He has assigned to the soul various
affections by which the course of life might be regulated; and as He has
given desire for the sake of producing offspring, so has He given anger for
the sake of restraining faults.

   But they who are ignorant of the ends of good and evil things, as they
employ sensual desire for the purposes of corruption and pleasure, in the
same manner make use of anger and passion for the inflicting of injury,
while they are angry with those whom they regard with hatred. Therefore
they are angry even with those who commit no offence, even with their
equals, or even with their superiors. Hence they daily rush to monstrous
(4) deeds; hence tragedies often arise. Therefore Archytas would be
deserving of praise, if, when he had been enraged against any citizen or
equal who injured him, he had curbed himself, and by forbearance mitigated
the impetuosity of his fury. This self-restraint is glorious, by which any
great evil which impends is restrained; but it is a fault not to check the
faults of slaves and children; for through their escaping without
punishment they will proceed to greater evil. In this case anger is not to
be restrained; but even if it is in a state of inactivity, (5) it must be
aroused. But that which we say respecting man, we also say respecting God,
who made man like to Himself. I omit making mention of the figure of God,
because the Stoics say that God has no form, and another great subject will
arise if we should wish to refute them. I only speak respecting the soul.
If it belongs (6) to God to reflect, to be wise, to understand, to foresee.
to excel, and of all animals man alone has these qualities, it follows that
he was made after the likeness of God; but on this account he goes on to
vice, because, being mingled with frailty derived from earth, he is unable
to preserve pure and uncontaminated that which he has received from God,
unless he is imbued with the precepts of justice by the same God.

CHAP. XIX.--OF THE SOUL AND BODY, AND OF PROVIDENCE.

   But since he is made up, as we have said, of two parts, soul and body,
the virtues are contained in the one, and vices in the other, and they
mutually oppose each other. For the good properties of the soul, which
consist in restraining lusts, are contrary to the body; and the good
properties of the body, which consist in every kind of pleasure, are
hostile to the soul. But if the virtue of the soul shall have resisted the
desires, and suppressed them, he will be truly like to God. From which it
is evident that the soul of man, which is capable of divine virtue, is not
mortal. But there is this distinction, that since virtue is attended with
bitterness, and the attraction of pleasure is sweet, great numbers are
overcome and are drawn aside to the pleasantness; but they who have given
themselves up to the body and earthly things are pressed to the earth, and
are unable to attain to the favour of the divine bounty, because they have
polluted  themselves with the defilements of vices. But they who, following
God, and in obedience to Him, have despised the desires of the body, and,
preferring virtue to pleasures, have preserved innocence and righteousness,
these God recognises as like to Himself.

   Since, therefore, He has laid down a most holy law, and wishes all men
to be innocent and beneficent, is it possible that He should not be angry
when He sees that His law is despised, that virtue is rejected, and
pleasure made the object of pursuit? But if He is the governor of the
world, as He might to be, He surely does not despise that which is even of
the greatest importance in the whole world. If He has fore-  sight, as it
is befitting that God should have, it is plain that He consults the
interests of the human race, in order that our life may be more abundantly
supplied, and better, and safer. If He is the Father and God of all, He is
undoubtedly delighted with the virtues of men, and provoked by their vices.
Therefore He loves the just, and hates the wicked. There is no need (one
says) of hatred; for He once for all has fixed a reward for the good, and
punishment for the wicked. But if any one lives justly and innocently, and
at the same time neither worships God nor has any regard for Him, as
Aristides, and Timon, (1) and others of the philosophers, will he escape
(2) with impunity, because, though he has obeyed the law of God, he has
nevertheless despised God Himself? There is therefore something on account
of which God may be angry with one rebelling against Him, as it were, in
reliance upon His integrity. If He can be angry with this man on account of
his pride, why not more so with the sinner, who has despised the law
together with the Lawgiver? The judge cannot pardon offences, because he is
subject to the will of another. But God can pardon, because He is Himself
the arbitrator (3) and judge of His own law; and when He laid down this, He
did not surely deprive Himself of all power, but He has the liberty of
bestowing pardon.

CHAP. XX.--OF OFFENCES, AND THE MERCY OF GOD.

   If He is able to pardon, He is therefore able also to be angry. Why,
then, some one will say, does it often occur, that they who sin are
prosperous, and they who live piously are wretched? Because fugitives and
disinherited (4) persons live without restraint, and they who are under the
discipline of a father or master live in a more strict and frugal manner.
For virtue is proved and fixed s by means of ills; vices by means of
pleasure. Nor, however, ought he who sins  to hope for lasting impunity,
because there is no lasting happiness.

"But, in truth, the last day is always to be looked for by man and no one
ought to be called happy before his death and last funeral rites," (6)

as the not inelegant poet says. It is the end which proves happiness, and
no one is able to escape the judgment of God, either when alive or after
death. For He has the power both to cast down the living from on high, and
to punish the dead with eternal torments. Nay, he says, if God is angry, He
ought to have inflicted vengeance at once, and to have punished every one
according to his desert. But (it is replied) if He had done this, no one
would survive. For there is no one who offends in no respect, and there are
many things which excite to the commission of sin--age, intemperance, want,
opportunity, reward. To such an extent is the frailty of the flesh with
which we are clothed liable to sin, that unless God were indulgent to this
necessity, perhaps too few would live. On this account He is most patient,
and restrains His anger. For because there is in Him perfect virtue, it
follows of necessity that His patience also is perfect, which is itself
also a virtue. How many men, from having been sinners, have afterwards
become righteous; from being injurious, have become good; from being
wicked, have become temperate! How many who were in early life base, and
condemned by the judgment of all, afterwards have turned out praiseworthy?
But it is plain that this could not happen if punishment followed every
offence.

   The public laws condemn those who are manifestly guilty; but there are
great numbers whose offences are concealed, great numbers who restrain the
accuser either by entreaties or by reward, great numbers who elude justice
by favour or influence. But if the divine censure should condemn all those
who escape the punishment of men, there would be few or even no men on the
earth. In short, even that one reason for destroying the human race might
have been a just one, that men, despising the living God, pay divine honour
to earthly and frail images, as though they were of heaven, adoring works
made by human hands. And though God their Creator made them of elevated
countenance and upright figure, and raised them to the contemplation of the
heaven and the knowledge of God, they have preferred, like cattle, to bend
themselves to the earth. (1) For he is low, and curved, and bent downward,
who, turning away from the sight of heaven and God his Father, worships
things of the earth, which he ought to have trodden upon, that is, things
made and fashioned from earth. Therefore, amidst such great impiety and
such great sins of men, the forbearance of God attains this object, that
men, condemning the errors of their past life, correct themselves. In
short, there are many who are just and good; and these, having laid aside
the worship of earthly things, acknowledge the majesty of the one and only
God. But though the forbearance of God is very great and most useful; yet,
although late, He punishes the guilty, and does not suffer them to proceed
further, when He sees that they are incorrigible.

CHAP. XXI.--OF THE ANGER OF GOD AND MAN.

   There remains one question, and that the last. For some one will
perhaps say, that God is so far from being angry, that in His precepts He
even forbids man to be angry. I might say that the anger of man ought to be
curbed, because he is often angry unjustly; and he has immediate emotion,
because he is only for a time. (2) Therefore, lest those things should be
done which the low, and those of moderate station, and great kings do in
their anger, his rage ought to have been moderated and suppressed, lest,
being out of his mind, (3) he should commit some inexpiable crime. But God
is not angry for a short time, (4)  because He is eternal and of perfect
virtue, and He is never angry unless deservedly. But, however, the matter
is not so; for if He should altogether prohibit anger, He Himself would
have been in some measure the censurer of His own workmanship, since He
from the beginning had inserted anger in the liver s of man, since it is
believed that the cause of this emotion is contained in the moisture of the
gall. Therefore He does not altogether prohibit anger, because that
affection is necessarily given, but He forbids us to persevere in anger.
For the anger of mortals ought to be mortal; for if it is lasting, enmity
is strengthened to lasting destruction. Then, again, when He enjoined us to
be angry, and yet not to sin, (6) it is plain that He did not tear up anger
by the roots, but restrained it, that in every correction we might preserve
moderation and justice. Therefore He who commands us to be angry is
manifestly Himself angry; He who enjoins us to be quickly appeased is
manifestly Himself easy to be appeased: for He has enjoined those things
which are just and useful for the interests of society. (7)

   But because I had said that the anger of God is not for a time (8)
only, as is the case with man, who becomes inflamed with an immediate (9)
excitement, and on account of his frailty is unable easily to govern
himself, we ought to understand that because God is eternal, His anger also
remains to eternity; but, on the other hand, that because He is endued with
the greatest excellence, He controls His anger, and is not ruled by it, but
that He regulates it according to His will. And it is plain that this is
not opposed to that which has just been said. For if His anger had been
altogether immortal, there would be no place after a fault for satisfaction
or kind feeling, though He Himself commands men to be reconciled before the
setting of the sun.(10) But the divine anger remains for ever against those
who ever sin. Therefore God is appeased not by incense or a victim, not by
costly offerings, which things are all corruptible, but by a reformation of
the morals: and he who ceases to sin renders the anger of God mortal. For
this reason He does not immediately (11) punish every one who is guilty,
that man may have the opportunity of coming to a right mind, (12) and
correcting himself.

CHAP. XXII.--OF SINS, AND THE VERSES OF THE SIBYLS RESPECTING THEM RECITED.

   This is what I had to say, most beloved Donatus, respecting the anger
of God, that you might know how to refute those who represent God as being
without emotions. (13) It only remains that, after the practice of Cicero,
I should use an epilogue by way of peroration. As he did in the Tusculan
Disputations, (1) when discoursing on the subject of death, so we in this
work ought to bring forward divine testimonies, which may be believed, to
refute the persuasion of those who, believing that God is without anger,
destroy all religion, without which, as we have shown, we are either equal
to the brutes in savageness, or to the cattle in foolishness; for it is in
religion only--that is, in the knowledge of the Supreme God--that wisdom
consists. All the prophets, being filled with the Divine Spirit, speak
nothing else than of the favour of God towards the righteous, and His anger
against the ungodly. And their testimony is indeed sufficient for us; but
because it is not believed by those who make a display of wisdom by their
hair and dress, (2) it was necessary to refute them by reason and
arguments. For they act so pre-posterously, (3) that human things give
authority to divine things, whereas divine things ought rather  to give
authority to human. But let us now leave these things, lest we should
produce no  effect upon them, and the subject should be indefinitely drawn
out. Let us therefore seek those testimonies which they can either believe,
or at any rate not oppose.

   Authors of great number and weight have made mention of the Sibyls; of
the Greeks,  Aristo the Chian, and Apollodorus the Erythraean; of our
writers, Varro and Fenestella.  All these relate that the Erythraean Sibyl
was distinguished and noble beyond the rest. Apollodorus, indeed, boasts of
her as his own citizen and countrywoman. But Fenestella also relates that
ambassadors were sent by the senate to Erythrae, that the verses of this
Sibyl might be conveyed to Rome, and that the consuls Curio and Octavius
might take care that they should be placed in the Capitol, which had then
been restored under the care of Quintus Catulus. In her writings, verses of
this kind are found respecting the Supreme God and Maker of the world: --

"The incorruptible and eternal Maker who dwells in the heaven, holding
forth good to the good, a much greater reward, but stirring up anger and
rage against the evil and unjust."

Again, in another place, enumerating the deeds by which God is especially
moved to anger, she introduced these things: --

"Avoid unlawful services, and serve the living God. Abstain from adultery
and impurity; bring up a pure generation of children; do not kill: for the
Immortal will be angry with every one who may sin."

Therefore He is angry with sinners.

CHAP. XXIII. --OF THE ANGER OF GOD AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SINS, AND A
RECITAL OF THE VERSES OF THE SIBYLS RESPECTING IT; AND, MOREOVER, A REPROOF
AND EXHORTATION.

   But because it is related by most learned men that there have been many
Sibyls, the testimony of one may not be sufficient to confirm the truth, as
we purpose to do. The volumes, indeed, of the Cumaean Sibyl, in which are
written the fates of the Romans are kept secret; but the writings of all
the others are, for the most part, not prohibited from being in common use.
And of these another, denouncing the anger of God against all nations on
account of the impiety of men, thus began:--

"Since great anger is coming upon a disobedient world, I disclose the
commands of God to the last age, prophesying to all men from city to city."

   Another Sibyl also said, that the deluge was caused by the indignation
of God against the unrighteous in a former age, that the wickedness  of the
human race might be extinguished:--

"From the time when, the God of heaven being enraged against the cities
themselves and all men, a deluge having burst forth, the sea covered the
earth."

In like manner she foretold a conflagration about  to take place hereafter,
in which the impiety of men should again be destroyed:--

" And at some time, God no longer soothing His anger, but increasing it,
and destroying the race of men, and laying waste the whole of it by fire."

From which mention is thus made concerning Jupiter by Ovid: (4) --

"He remembers also that it is fated that the time shall come in which the
sea, the earth, and the palace of heaven, being caught by fire, shall be
burnt, and the curiously wrought framework of the world (5) be in danger."

And this must come to pass at the time when the honour and worship of the
Supreme shall have perished among men. The same Sibyl, however, testifying
that He was appeased by reformation (6) of conduct and self-improvement,
added these things :--

"But, ye mortals, in pity (7) turn yourselves now, and do not lead the
great God to every kind of auger."

And also a little later: --

"He will not destroy, but will again restrain His anger, if you all
practise valuable piety in your minds."

Then another Sibyl declares that the Father of heavenly and earthly things
ought to be loved, lest His indignation should arise, to the destruction of
men: --

"Lest by chance the immortal God should be angry, and destroy the whole
race of men, their life and shameless race, it is befitting that we love
the wise, ever-living God the Father."

   From these things it is evident that the arguments of the philosophers
are vain, who imagine that God is without anger, and among His other
praises reckon that which is most useless, detracting from Him that which
is most salutary for human affairs, by which majesty itself exists. For
this earthly, kingdom and government, unless guarded by fear, is broken
down. Take away anger from a king, and he will not only cease to be obeyed,
but he will even be cast down headlong from his height. Yea, rather take
away this affection from any person of low degree, and who will not plunder
him? Who will not deride him? Who will not treat him with injury? Thus he
will be able to have neither clothing, nor an abode, nor food, since others
will deprive him of whatever he has; much less can we suppose that the
majesty of the heavenly government can exist without anger and fear. The
Milesian Apollo being consulted concerning the religion of the Jews,
inserted these things in his answer:--

"God, the King and Father of all, before whom the earth trembles, and the
heaven and sea, and whom the recesses of Tartarus and the demons dread."

   If He is so mild, as the philosophers will have it, how is it that not
only the demons and ministers of such great power, but even the heaven and
earth, and the whole system of the universe, tremble at His presence? For
if no one submits to the service of another except by compulsion, it
follows that all government exists by fear, and fear by anger. For if any
one is not aroused against one who is unwilling to obey, it will not be
possible for him to be compelled to obedience. Let any one consult his own
feelings; he will at once understand that no one can be subdued to the
command of another without anger and chastisement. Therefore, where there
shall be no anger, there will be no authority. But God has authority;
therefore also He must have anger, in which authority consists. Therefore
let no one, induced by the empty prating(1) of the philosophers, train
himself to the contempt of God, which is the greatest impiety. We all are
bound both to love Him, because He is our Father; and to reverence Him,
because He is our Lord: both to pay Him honour, because He is bounteous;
and to fear Him, because He is severe: each character in Him is worthy of
reverence.(2) Who can preserve his piety, and yet fail to love the parent
of his life? or who can with impunity despise Him who, as ruler of all
things, has true and everlasting power over all? If you consider Him in the
character of Father, He supplies to us our entrance to the light which we
enjoy: through Him we live, through Him we have entered into the abode(3)
of this world. If you contemplate Him as God, it is. He who nourishes us
with innumerable re sources: it is He who sustains us, we dwell in  His
house, we are His household;(4) and if we  are less obedient than was
befitting, and less attentive to our duty(5) than the endless merits of our
Master and Parent demanded: nevertheless it is of great avail to our
obtaining pardon, if we retain the worship and knowledge of Him; if, laying
aside low and earthly affairs and goods, we meditate upon heavenly and
divine things which are everlasting. And that we may be able to do this,
God must be followed by us, God must be adored and loved; since there is in
Him the substance(6) of things, the principle(7)  of the virtues, and the
source of all that is good.  For what is greater in power than God, or more
perfect in reason, or brighter in clearness? And since He begat us to
wisdom, and produced us to righteousness, it is not allowable for man to
forsake God, who is the giver of intelligence and life and to serve earthly
and frail things, or, intent upon seeking temporal goods, to turn aside
from innocence and piety. Vicious and deadly pleasures do not render a man
happy; nor does opulence, which is the inciter of lusts; nor empty
ambition; nor frail honours, by which the human soul, being ensnared and
enslaved to the body, is condemned(8) to eternal death: but innocence and
righteousness alone, the lawful and due reward of which is immortality,
which God from the beginning appointed for holy and uncorrupted minds,
which keep themselves pure and uncontaminated from vices, and from every
earthly impurity. Of this heavenly and eternal reward they cannot be
partakers, who have polluted their conscience by deeds of  violence,
frauds, rapine, and deceits; and who, by injuries inflicted upon men, by
impious actions, have branded themselves(9) with indelible stains.
Accordingly it is befitting that all who wish deservedly to be called wise,
who wish to be called men, should despise frail things, should trample upon
earthly things, and should look down upon base(10) things, that they may be
able to be united in a most blissful relationship with God.

   Let impiety and discords be removed; let turbulent and deadly
dissensions be allayed,(11) by which human societies and the divine union
of the public league are broken in upon, divided, and dispersed; as far as
we can, let "us aim at being good and bounteous: if we have a supply of
wealth and resources, let it not be devoted to the pleasure of a single
person, but bestowed on the welfare of many. For pleasure is as shortlived
as the body to which it does service. But justice and kindness are as
immortal as the mind and soul, which by good works attain to the likeness
of God. Let God be consecrated by us, not in temples, but in our heart. All
things which are made by the hand are destructible.(1) Let us cleanse this
temple, which is defiled not by smoke or dust, but by evil thoughts  which
is lighted not by blazing tapers? but by the brightness and light of
wisdom. And if we believe that God is always present in this temple, to
whose divinity the secrets of the heart are open, we shall so live as
always to have Him propitious, and never to fear His anger.


Taken from "The Early Church Fathers and Other Works" originally published
by Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. in English in Edinburgh, Scotland beginning in
1867. (ANF 7, Roberts and Donaldson). The digital version is by The
Electronic Bible Society, P.O. Box 701356, Dallas, TX 75370, 214-407-WORD.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
  The electronic form of this document is copyrighted.
  Copyright (c) Eternal Word Television Network 1996.
  Provided courtesy of:

       EWTN On-Line Services
       PO Box 3610
       Manassas, VA 22110
       Voice: 703-791-2576
       Fax: 703-791-4250
       Data: 703-791-4336
       FTP: ftp.ewtn.com
       Telnet: ewtn.com
       WWW: http://www.ewtn.com.
       Email address: [email protected]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

You are viewing proxied material from gopher.ratthing.com. The copyright of proxied material belongs to its original authors. Any comments or complaints in relation to proxied material should be directed to the original authors of the content concerned. Please see the disclaimer for more details.