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METHODIUS
CONCERNING FREE-WILL.(1)
[Translated by the Rev. William R. Clark, M.A., Vicar of St. Mary Magdalen,
Taunton.]
ORTHODOXUS. The old man of Ithaca, according to the legend of the
Greeks, when he wished to hear the song of the Sirens, on account of the
charm of their voluptuous voice, sailed to Sicily in bonds, and stopped up
the ears of his companions; not that he grudged them the hearing, or
desired to load himself with bonds, but because the consequence of those
singers' music to those who heard it was death. For such, in the opinion of
the Greeks, are the charms of the Sirens. Now I am not within hearing of
any such song as this; nor have I any desire to hear the Sirens who chant
men's dirges, and whose silence is more profitable to men than their voice;
but I pray to enjoy the pleasure of a divine voice, which, though it be
often beard, I long to hear again; not that I am overcome with the charm of
a voluptuous voice, bat I am being taught divine mysteries, and expect as
the result, not death but eternal salvation. For the singers are not the
deadly Sirens of the Greeks, but a divine choir of prophets, with whom
there is no need to stop the ears of one's companions, nor to load one's-
self with bonds, in fear of the penalty of hearing. For, in the one case,
the hearer, with the entrance of the voice, ceases to live; in the other,
the more he hears, the better life will he enjoy, being led onwards by a
divine Spirit. Let every one come, then, and hear the divine song without
any fear. There are not with us the Sirens from the shore of Sicily, nor
the bonds of Ulysses, nor the wax poured melting into men's ears; but a
loosening of all bonds, and liberty to listen to every one that approaches.
For it is worthy of us to hear such a song as this; and to hear such
singers as these, seems to me to be a thing to be prayed for. But if one
wishes to hear the choir of the apostles as well, he will find the same
harmony of song. For the others sang beforehand the divine plan in a
mystical manner; but these sing an interpretation of what has been
mystically announced by the former. Oh, concordant harmony, composed by the
Divine Spirit! Oh, the comeliness of those who sing of the mysteries of
God? Oh. that I also may join in these songs in my prayer. Let us then also
sing the like song, and raise the hymn to the Holy Father, glorifying in
the Spirit Jesus, who is in His bosom.(2)
Shun not, man, a spiritual hymn, nor be ill-disposed to listen to it.
Death belongs not to it; a story of salvation is our song. Already I seem
to taste better enjoyments, as I discourse on such subjects as these; and
especially when there is before me such a flowering meadow, that is to say,
our assembly of those who unite in singing and hearing the divine
mysteries. Wherefore I dare to ask you to listen to me with ears free from
all envy, without imitating the jealousy of Cain, or persecuting your
brother, like Esau,(4) or approving the brethren of Joseph,(5) because
they, hated their brother on account of his words; but differing far from
all these, insomuch that each of you is used to speak the mind of his
neighbour. And, on this account, there is no evil jealousy among you, as ye
have undertaken to supply your brother's deficiencies. O noble audience,
and venerable company, and spiritual food! That I may ever have a right to
share in such pleasures, be this my prayer!
VALENTINIAN. As I was walking yesterday evening, my friend, along the
shore of the sea, and was gazing on it somewhat intently, I saw an
extraordinary instance of divine power, and a work of art produced by wise
science, if at least such a thing may be called a work of art. For as that
verse of Homer(6) says,--
"As when two adverse winds blowing from Thrace,
Boreas and Zephyrus, the fishy deep
Vex sudden, all around, the sable flood
High curled, flings forth the salt weed on the shore;"--
So it seemed to me to have happened yesterday. For I saw waves very like
mountain-tops, and, so to speak, reaching up to heaven itself. Whence I
expected nothing else but that the whole land would be deluged, and I began
to form in my mind a place of escape, and a Noah's ark. But it was not as I
thought; for, just as the sea rose to a crest, it broke up again into
itself, without overstepping its own limits, having, so to speak, a feeling
of awe for a divine decree.(1) And as oftentimes a servant, compelled by
his master to do something against his will, obeys the command through
fear, while he dares not say a word of what he suffers in his unwillingness
to do it, but, full of rage, mutters to himself,--somewhat so it appeared
to me that the sea, as if enraged and confining its awe within itself, kept
itself under, as not willing to let its Master perceive its anger.
On these occurrences I began to gaze in silence, and wished to measure
in my mind the heaven and its sphere. I began to inquire whence it rises
and where it sets; also what sort of motion it had--whether a progressive
one, that is to say, one from place to place, or a revolving one; and,
besides, how its movement is continued. And, of a truth, it seemed worth
while to inquire also about the sun,--what is the manner of his being set
in the heaven; also what is the orbit he traverses; also whither it is
that, after a short time, he retires; and why it is that even he does not
go out of his proper course: but he, too, as one may say, is observing a
commandment of a higher power, and appears with us just when he is allowed
to do so, and departs as if he were called away.
So, as I was investigating these things, I saw that the sunshine was
departing, and the daylight failing, and that immediately darkness came on;
and the sun was succeeded by the moon, who, at her first rising, was not of
full size, but after advancing in her course presented a larger appearance.
And I did not cease inquiring about her also, but examined the cause of her
waning and waxing, and why it is that she, too, observes the revolution of
days; and it seemed to me from all this that there is a divine government
anti power controlling the whole, which we may justly call God.
And thereupon I began to praise the Creator, as I saw the earth fast
fixed, and living creatures in such variety, and the blossoms of plants
with their many hues. But my mind did not rest upon these things alone; but
thereupon I began to inquire whence they have their origin--whether from
some source eternally co-existent with God, or from Himself alone, none co-
existing with Him; for that He has made nothing out of that which has no
existence appeared to me the right view to take, unless my reason were
altogether untrustworthy. For it is the nature of things which come into
being to derive their origin from what is already existing. And it seemed
to me that it might be said with equal truth, that nothing is eternally co-
existent with God distinct from Himself, but that whatever exists has its
origin from Him, and I was persuaded of this .also by the undeniable
disposition of the elements, and by the orderly arrangement of nature about
them.
So, with some such thoughts of the fair order of things, I returned
home. But on the day following, that is today, as I came I saw two beings
of the same race--I mean men--striking and abusing one another; and
another, again, wishing to strip his neighbour. And now some began to
venture upon a more terrible deed; for one stripped a corpse, and exposed
again to the light of day a body that had been once hidden in the earth,
and treated a form like his own with such insult as to leave the corpse to
be food for dogs; while another bared his sword, and attacked a man like
himself. And he wanted to procure safety by flight; but the other ceased
not from pursuing, nor would control his anger. And why should I say more?
It is enough that be attacked him, and at once smote him with his sword. So
the wounded man became a sup pliant to his fellow, and spread out his hands
in supplication, and was willing to give up his clothing, and only made a
claim for life. But the other did not subdue his anger, nor pity his
fellowman, nor would he see his own image in the being before him; but,
like a wild beast, made preparations with his sword for feeding upon him.
And now he was even putting his mouth to the body so like his own, such was
the extent of his rage. And there was to be seen one man suffering
injurious treatment, and another forthwith stripping him, and not even
covering with earth the body which he denuded of clothing. But, in addition
to these, there was another who, robbing others of their marriage rights,
wanted to insult his neighbour's wife, and urged her to turn to unlawful
embraces, not wishing her husband to be father to a child of his own.
After that I began to believe the tragedies, and thought that the
dinner of Thyestes had really taken place; and believed in the unlawful
lust of Oinomaos, nor doubted of the strife in which brother drew the sword
on brother.
So, after beholding such things as these, I began to inquire whence
they arise, and what is their origin, and who is the author of such devices
against men, whence came their discovery, and who is the teacher of them.
Now to dare to say that God was the author of these things was impossible;
for surely it could not even be said that they have from Him their
substance, or their existence. For how were it possible to entertain these
thoughts of God? For He is good, and the Creator of what is excellent, and
to Him belongs nothing bad. Nay, it is His nature to take no pleasure in
such things; but He forbids their production, and rejects those who delight
in them, but admits into His presence those who avoid them. And how could
it be anything but absurd to call God the maker of these things of which He
disapproves? For He would not wish them not to be, if He had first been
their creator; and He wishes those who approach Him to be imitators of Him.
Wherefore it seemed to me unreasonable to attribute these things to
God, or to speak of them as having sprung from Him; though it must
certainly be granted that it is possible for something to come into
existence out of what has no existence, in case He made what is evil. For
He who brought them into existence out of non-existence would not reduce
them to the loss of it. And again, it must be said that there was once a
time when God took pleasure in evil things, which now is not the case.
Wherefore it seems to me impossible to say this of God. For it is
unsuitable to His nature to attach this to Him. Wherefore it seemed to me
that there is co-existent with Him somewhat which has the name of matter,
from which He formed existing things, distinguishing between them with wise
art, and arranging them in a fair order, from which also evil things seem
to have come into being. For as this matter was without quality or form,
and, besides this, was borne about without order, and was untouched by
divine art, God bore no grudge against it, nor left it to be continually
thus borne about, but began to work upon it, and wished to separate its
best parts from its worst, and thus made all that it was fitting for God to
make out of it; but so much of it as was like lees, so to speak, this being
unfitted for being made into anything, He left as it was, since it was of
no use to Him; and from this it seems to me that what is evil has now
streamed down among men. This seemed to me the right view to take of these
things. But, my friend, if you think that anything I have said is wrong,
mention it, for I exceedingly desire to hear about these things.
ORTHODOXUS. I appreciate your readiness, my friend, and applaud your
zeal about the subject; and as for the opinion which you have expressed
respecting existing things, to the effect that God made them out of some
underlying substance, I do not altogether find fault with it. For, truly,
the origin of evil is a subject that has called out opinions from many
men.(1) Before you and me, no doubt, there have been many able men who
have made the most searching inquiry into the matter. And some of them
expressed the same opinion as you did, but others again represented God as
the creator of these things, fearing to allow the existence of substance as
coeval with Him; while the former, from fear of saying that God was the
author of evil, thought fit to represent matter as coeval with Him.(2) And
it was the fate of both of these to fail to speak rightly on the subject,
in consequence of their fear of God not being in agreement with an accurate
knowledge of the truth.
But others declined to inquire about such a question at all, on the
ground that such an inquiry is endless. As for me, however, my connection
with you in friendship does not allow me to decline the subject of inquiry,
especially when you announce your own purpose, that you are not swayed by
prejudice,--although you had your opinion about the condition of things
derived from your conjectures,--but say that you are confirmed in a desire
of knowing the truth.
Wherefore I will willingly turn to the discussion of the question. But
I wish this companion of mine here to listen to our conversation.(3) For,
indeed, he seems to have much the same opinions about these things as you
have, wherefore I wish that you should both have a share in the discussion.
For whatever I should say to you, situated as you are, I shall say just as
much to him. If, then, you are indulgent enough to think I speak truly on
this great subject, give an answer to each question I ask; for the result
of this will be that you will gain a knowledge of the truth, and I shall
not carry on my discussion with you at random.
VALENTINIAN. I am ready to do as you say; and therefore be quite ready
to ask those questions from which you think I may be able to gain an
accurate knowledge of this important subject. For the object which I have
set before myself is not the base one of gaining a victory, but that of
becoming thoroughly acquainted with the truth. Wherefore apply yourself to
the rest of the discussion.
ORTHODOXUS. Well, then, I do not suppose you are ignorant that it is
impossible for two uncreated things to exist together, although you seem to
have expressed nearly as much as this in an earlier part of the
conversation. Assuredly we must of necessity say one of two things: either
that God is separate from matter, or, on the other hand, that He is
inseparable from it. If, then, one would say that they are united, he will
say that that which is uncreated is one only, for each of the things spoken
of will be a part of the other; and as they are parts of each other, there
will not be two uncreated things, but one composed of different elements.
For we do not, because a man has different members, break him up into many
beings. But, as the demands of reason require, we say that a single being,
man, of many parts, has been created by God. So it is necessary, if God be
not separate from matter, to say that that which is uncreated is one only;
but if one shall say that He is separate, there must necessarily he
something intermediate between the two, which makes their separation
evident. For it is impossible to estimate the distance of one thing from
another, unless there be something else with which the distance between
them may be compared. And this holds good, not only as far as the instance
before us, but also to any number of others. For the argument which we
advanced in the case of two uncreated things would of necessity be of equal
force, were the uncreated things granted to be three in number. For I
should ask also respecting them, whether they are separate from each other,
or, on the other hand, are united each to its neighhour. For if any one
resolve to say that they are united, he will be told the same as before;
if, again, that they are separate, he will not escape the necessary
existence of that which separates them.
If, then, any one were to say that there is a third account which might
fitly be given of uncreated things, namely, that neither is God separate
from matter, nor, again, are they united as part of a whole; but that God
is locally situate in matter, and matter in God, he must be told as the
consequence,(1) that if we say that God is placed in matter, we must of
necessity say that He is contained within limits, and circumscribed by
matter. But then He must, equally with matter, be carried about without
order. And that He rests not, nor remains by Himself, is a necessary result
of that in which He is being carried, now this way, and now that. And
besides this, we must say that God was in worse case still.
For if matter were once without order, and He, determining to change it
for the better, put it into order, there was a time when God was in that
which had no order. And I might fairly ask this question also, whether God
filled matter completely, or existed in some part of it. For if one resolve
to say that God was in some part of matter, how far smaller than matter
does he make Him; that is, if a part of it contained God altogether. But if
he were to say that He is in all of it, and is extended through the whole
of matter, he must tell us how He wrought upon it. For we must say that
there was a sort of contraction of God, which being effected, He wrought
upon that from which He was withdrawn, or else that He wrought in union
with matter, without having a place of withdrawal. But if any one say that
matter is in God, there is equal need of inquiry, namely, whether it is by
His being separated from Himself, and as creatures exist in the air, by His
being divided and parted for the reception of the beings that are in Him;
or whether it is locally situated, that is to say, as water in land; for if
we were to say, as in the air, we must say that God is divisible; but if,
as water in earth,--since matter was without order and arrangement, and
besides, contained what was evil,--we must say, that in God were to be
found the disorderly and the evil. Now this seems to me an unbecoming
conclusion, nay, more a dangerous one. For you wish for the existence of
matter, that you may avoid saying that God is the author of evil; and,
determining to avoid this, you say that He is the receptacle of evil. If,
then, under the supposition that matter is separate from created
substances, you had said that it is uncreated, I should have said much
about it, to prove that it is impossible for it to be uncreated; but since
you say that the question of the origin of evil is the cause of this
supposition, it therefore seems to me right to proceed to inquire into
this. For when it is clearly stated how evil exists, and that it is not
possible to say that God is the cause of evil, because of matter being
subject to Him, it seems to me to destroy such a supposition, to remark,
that if God created the qualities which did not exist, He equally created
the substances.(2) Do you say then, that there co-exists with God matter
without qualities out of which He formed the beginning of this world?
VALENTINIAN. So I think.
ORTHODOXUS. If, then, matter had no qualities, and the world were
produced by God, and qualities exist in the world, then God is the maker
of qualities?
VALENTINIAN. It is so.
ORTHODOXUS. Now, as I heard you say some time ago that it is impossible
for anything to conic into being out of that which has no existence, answer
my question: Do you think that the qualities of the world were not produced
out of any existing qualities?
VALENTINIAN. I do.
ORTHODOXUS. And that they are something distinct from substances?
VALENTINIAN. Yes.
ORTHODOXUS. If, then, qualities were neither made by God out of any
ready at hand, nor derive their existence from substances, because they are
not substances. we must say that they were produced by God out of what had
no existence. Wherefore I thought you spoke extravagantly in saying that it
was impossible to suppose that anything was produced by God out of what did
not exist.
But let our discussion of this matter stand thus. For truly we see
among ourselves men making things out of what does not exist, although they
seem for the most part to be making them with something. As, for instance,
we may have an example in the case of architects; for they truly do not
make cities out of cities, nor in like manner temples out of temples.(1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But if, because substances underlie these things, you think that the
builders make them out of what does exist, you are mistaken in your
calculation. For it is not the substance which makes the city or the
temples, but art applied to substance. And this art is not produced out of
some art which lies in the substances themselves, but from that which is
not in them.
But you seem likely to meet me with this argument: that the artificer
makes the art which is connected with the substance out of the art which he
has. Now I think it is a good reply to this to say, that in man it is not
produced from any art lying beneath; for it is not to be granted that
substance by itself is art. For art is in the class of accidents, and is
one of the things that have an existence only when they are employed about
some substance. For man will exist even without the art of building, but it
will have no existence unless man be previously in being. Whence we must
say that it is in the nature of things for arts to be produced in men out
of what has no existence. If, then, we have shown that this is so in the
case of men, why was it improper to say that God is able to make not only
qualities, but also substances, out of that which has no existence? For as
it appears possible for something to be produced out of what exists not, it
is evident that this is the case with substances. To return to the question
of evil. Do you think evil comes under the head of substances, or of
qualities of substances?
VALENTINIAN. Of qualities.
ORTHODOXUS. But matter was found to be without quality or form?
VALENTINIAN. It was.
ORTHODOXUS. Well, then, the connection of these names with substance is
owing to its accidents. For murder is not a substance, nor is any other
evil; but the substance receives a cognate name from putting it into
practice. For a man is not (spoken of as) murder, but by committing it he
receives the derived name of murderer, without being himself murder; and,
to speak concisely, no other evil is a substance; but by practising any
evil, it can be called evil. Similarly consider, if you imagine anything
else to be the cause of evil to men, that it too is evil by reason of its
acting by them, and suggesting the committal of evil. For a man is evil in
consequence of his actions. For he is said to be evil, because he is the
doer of evil. Now what a man does, is not the man himself, but his
activity, and it is from his actions that he receives the title of evil.
For if we were to say that he is that which he does, and he commits
murders, adulteries, and such-like, he will be all these. Now if he is
these, then when they are produced he has an existence, but when they are
not, he too ceases to be. Now these things are produced by men. Men then
will be the authors of them, and the causes of their existing or not
existing. But if each man is evil in consequence of what he practises, and
what he practises has an origin, he also made a beginning in evil, and evil
too had a beginning. Now if this is the case, no one is without a beginning
in evil, nor are evil things without an origin.
VALENTINIAN. Well, my friend, you seem to me to have argued
sufficiently against the other side. For you appeared to draw right
conclusions from the premises which we granted to the discussion. For truly
if matter is without qualities, then God is the maker of qualities; and if
evils are qualities, God will be the author of evils. But it seems to me
false to say that matter is without qualities; for it cannot be said
respecting any substance that it is without qualities. But indeed, in the
very act of saying that it is without qualities, you declare that it has a
quality, by describing the character of matter, which is a kind of quality.
Therefore, if you please, begin the discussion from the beginning; for it
seems to me that matter never began to have qualities. For such being the
case, I assert, my friend, that evil arises from its emanation.
ORTHODOXUS. If matter were possessed of qualities from eternity, of
what will God be the creator? For if we say substances, we speak of them as
pre-existing; if, again, we say qualities, these too are declared to have
an existence. Since, then, both substances and qualities exist, it seems to
me superfluous to call God a creator. But answer me a question. In what way
do you say that God was a creator? Was it by changing the existence of
those substances into non-existence, or by changing the qualities while He
preserved the substances?
VALENTINIAN. I think that there was no change of the substances, but
only of the qualities; and in respect to these we call God a creator. And
just as if one might chance to say that a house was made of stones, it
cannot be said of them that they do not still continue stones in substance,
because they are called a house; for I affirm that the house is made by the
quality of construction. So I think that God, while substance remained,
produced a change of its qualifies, by reason of which I say that this
world was made by God.
ORTHODOXUS. Do you think, too, that evil is among the qualities of
substances?
VALENTINIAN. I do.
ORTHODOXUS. And were these qualities in matter from the first, or had
they a beginning?
VALENTINIAN. I say that these qualities were eternally co-existent with
matter.
ORTHODOXUS. But do you not say that God has made a change in the
qualities?
VALENTINIAN.I do say this.
ORTHODOXUS.For the better?
VALENTINIAN.I think so.
Orhodoxus.If, then, evil is among the qualities of matter, and its
qualities were changed by God for the better, the inquiry must be made
whence evil arose. For either all of them, being evil, underwent a change
for the better, or some of them being evil, and some not, the evil ones
were not changed for the better; but the rest, as far as they were found
superior, were changed by God for the sake of order.
VALENTINIAN. That is the opinion I held from the beginning.
ORTHODOXUS. How, then, do you say it was that He left the qualities of
evil as they were? Was it that He was able to do away with them, or that,
though He wished to do so, He was unable? For if you say that He was able,
but disinclined to do so, He must be the author of these things; because,
while He had power to bring evil to an end, He allowed it to remain as it
was, especially when He had begun to work upon matter. For if He had had
nothing at all to do with matter, He would not have been the author of what
He allowed to remain. But since He works upon a part of it, and leaves a
part of it to itself, while He has power to change it for the better, I
think He is the author of evil, since He left part of matter in its
vileness. He wrought then for the ruin of a part; and, in this respect, it
seems to me that this part was chiefly injured by His arranging it in
matter, so that it became partaker of evil. For before matter was put in
order, it was without the perception of evil; but now each of its parts has
the capacity of perceiving evil. Now, take an example in the case of man.
Previously to becoming a living creature, he was insensible to evil; but
from the time when he is fashioned by God into the form of man, he gains
the perception of approaching evil. So this act of God, which you say was
done for the benefit of matter, is found to have happened to it rather for
the worse. But if you say that God was not able to stop evil, does the
impossibility result from His being naturally weak, or from His being
overcome by fear, and in subjection to some more powerful being? See which
of these you would like to attribute to the almighty and good God. But,
again, answer me about matter. Is matter simple or compound? For if matter
be simple and uniform, and the universe compound, and composed of different
substances, it is impossible to say that it is made of matter, because
compound things cannot be composed of one pure and simple ingredient. For
composition indicates the mixture of several simple things. But if, on the
other hand, you say that matter is compound, it has been entirely composed
of simple elements, and they were once each separately simple, and by their
composition matter was produced; for compound things derive their
composition from simple things. So there was once a time when matter did
not exist--that is to say, before the combination of the simple elements.
But if there was once a time when matter did not exist, and there was never
a time when what is uncreated did not exist, then matter is not uncreated.
And from this it follows that there are many things which are uncreated.
For if God were uncreated, and the simple elements of which matter was
composed were uncreated, the number of the uncreated would be more than
two. But to omit inquiring what are the simple elements, matter or form--
for this would be followed by many absurdities--let me ask, do you think
that nothing that exists is contrary to itself?
VALENTINIAN. I do.
ORTHODOXUS. Yet water is contrary to fire, and darkness to light, and
heat to cold, and moisture to dryness.
VALENTINIAN. I think it is.
ORTHODOXUS. If, then, nothing that exists is contrary to itself, and
these are contrary to one another, they will not be one and the same mat-
ter--no, nor formed from one and the same matter. But, again, I wish to
ask, do you think that the parts of a thing are not destructive of one
another?
VALENTINIAN. I do.
ORTHODOXUS. And that fire and water, and the rest likewise, are parts
of matter?
VALENTINIAN. I hold them to be so.
ORTHODOXUS. Why, then, do you not think that water is destructive of
fire, and light of darkness, and so on with the rest?
VALENTINIAN. I do.
ORTHODOXUS. Then, if parts of a thing are not destructive of one
another, and these are found to be so, they will not be parts of the same
thing. But if they are not parts of the same thing, they will not be parts
of one and the same matter. And, indeed, they will not be matter either,
because nothing that exists is destructive of itself. And this being the
case with the contraries, it is shown that they are not matter. This is
enough on the subject of matter.
Now we must come to the examination of evils, and must necessarily
inquire into the evils among men. As to these, are they forms of the
principle of evil, or parts of it? If forms, evil will not have a separate
existence distinct from them, because the species are to be sought for in
the forms, and underlie them. But if this is the case, evil has an origin.
For its forms are shown to have an origin--such as murder, and adultery,
and the like. But if you will have them to be parts of some principle of
evil, and they have an origin, it also must have an origin. For those
things whose parts have an origin, are of necessity originated likewise.
For the whole consists of parts. And the whole will not exist if the parts
do not, though there may be some parts, even if the whole be not there.
Now there is nothing existing of which one part is originated, and
another part not. But if I were even to grant this, then there was a time
when evil was not complete, namely, before matter was wrought by God. And
it attains completeness when man is produced by God; for man is the maker
of the parts of evil. And from this it follows that the cause of evil being
complete, is God the Creator, which it is impious to say. But if you say
that evil is neither of the things supposed, but is the doing of something
evil, you declare that it has an origin. For the doing of a thing makes the
beginning of its existence. And besides this, you have nothing further to
pronounce evil. For what other action have you to point out as such, except
what happens among men? Now, it has been already shown that he who acts is
not evil according to his being, but in accordance with his evil doing.
Because there is nothing evil by nature, but it is by use that evil
things become such. So I say, says he, that man was made with a free-will,
not as if there were already evil in existence, which he had the power of
choosing if he wished, but on account of his capacity of obeying or
disobeying God.
For this was the meaning of the gift of Free Will. And man after his
creation receives a commandment from God; and from this at once rises evil,
for he does not obey the divine command; and this alone is evil, namely,
disobedience, which had a beginning.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For man(1) received power, and enslaved himself, not because he was
overpowered by the irresistible tendencies of his nature, nor because the
capacity with which he was gifted deprived him of what was better for him;
for it was for the sake of this that I say he was endowed with it (but he
received the power above mentioned), in order that he may obtain an
addition to what he already possesses, which accrues to him from the
Superior Being in consequence of his obedience, and is demanded as a debt
from his Maker. For I say that man was made not for destruction, but for
better things. For if he were made as any of the elements, or those things
which render a similar service to God, he would cease to receive a reward
befitting deliberate choice, and would be like an instrument of the maker;
and it would be unreasonable for him to suffer blame for his wrong-doings,
for the real author of them is the one by whom he is used. But man did not
understand better things, since he did not know the author (of his
existence), but only the object for which he was made. I say therefore that
God, purposing thus to honour man, and to grant him an understanding of
better things, has given him the power of being able to do what he wishes,
and commends the employment of his power for better things; not that He
depriveshim I again of free-will, but wishes to deprives him again of
free-will, but wishes to pointout the better way. For the power is present
with him, and he receives the commandment; but God exhorts him to turn his
power of choice to better things. For as a father exhorts his son, who has
power to learn his lessons, to give more attention to them inasmuch as,
while he points out this as the better course, he does not deprive his son
of the power which he possessed, even if he be not inclined to learn
willingly; so I do not think that God, while He urges on man to obey His
commands, deprives him of the power of purposing and withholding obedience.
For He points out the cause of His giving this advice, in that He does not
deprive him of the power. But He gives commands, in order that man may be
able to enjoy better things. For this is the consequence of obeying the
commands of God. So that He does not give commands in order to take away
the power which He has given, but in order that a better gift may be
bestowed, as to one worthy of attaining greater things, in return for his
having rendered obedience to God, while he had power to withhold it. I say
that man was made with free-will, not as if there were already existing
same evil, which he had the power of choosing if he wished, . . . but that
the power of obeying and disobeying God is the only cause.(2)
For this was the object to be obtained by free-will. And man after his
creation receives a commandment from God, and from this at once rises evil;
for he does not obey the divine command, and this alone is evil, namely,
disobedience, which had a beginning. For no one has it in his power to say
that it is without an origin, when its author had an origin. But you will
be sure to ask whence arose this disobedience. It is clearly recorded in
Holy Scripture, by which I am enabled to say that man was not made by God
in this condition, but that he has come to it by some teaching. For man did
not receive such a nature as this. For if it were the case that his nature
was such, this would not have come upon him by teaching. Now one says in
Holy Writ, that "man has learnt (evil)."(1) I say, then, that disobedience
to God is taught. For this alone is evil which is produced in opposition to
the purpose of God, for man would not learn evil by itself. He, then, who
teaches evil is the Serpent.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For my part, I said that the beginning of evil was envy, and that it
arose from man's being distinguished by God with higher honour. Now evil is
disobedience to the commandment of God.
Taken from "The Early Church Fathers and Other Works" originally published
by Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. in English in Edinburgh, Scotland beginning in
1867. (ANF 6, Roberts and Donaldson). The digital version is by The
Electronic Bible Society, P.O. Box 701356, Dallas, TX 75370, 214-407-WORD.
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