(NOTE: The electronic text obtained from The Electronic Bible Society was
not completely corrected. EWTN has corrected all discovered errors.)

Transliteration of Greek words: All phonetical except: w = omega; h serves
three puposes: 1. = Eta; 2. = rough breathing, when appearing intially
before a vowel; 3. = in the aspirated letters theta = th, phi = ph, chi =
ch. Accents are given immediately after their corresponding vowels: acute =
' , grave = `, circumflex = ^. The character ' doubles as an apostrophe,
when necessary.


ATHENAGORAS OF ATHENS

ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

[Translated by the Rev. B. P. Pratten.]

CHAP. I.--DEFENCE OF THE TRUTH SHOULD PRECEDE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING IT.[1]

   BY the side of every opinion and doctrine which agrees with the truth
of things, there springs up some falsehood; and it does so, not because it
takes its rise naturally from some fundamental principle, or from some
cause peculiar to the matter in hand, but because it is invented on purpose
by men who set a value on the spurious seed, for its tendency to corrupt
the truth. This is apparent, in the first place, from those who in former
times addicted themselves to such inquiries, and their want of agreement
with their predecessors and contemporaries, and then, not least, from the
very confusion which marks the discussions that are now going on. For such
men have left no truth free from their calumnious attacks--not the being of
God, not His knowledge, not His operations, not those books which follow by
a regular and strict sequence from these, and delineate for us the
doctrines of piety. On the contrary, some of them utterly, and once for
all, give up in despair the truth concerning these things, and some distort
it to suit their own views, and some of set purpose doubt even of things
which are palpably evident. Hence I think that those who bestow attention
on such subjects should adopt two lines of argument, one in defence of the
truth, another concerning the truth: that in defence of the truth, for
disbelievers and doubters; that concerning the truth, for such as are
candid and receive the truth with readiness. Accordingly it behoves those
who wish to investigate these matters, to keep in view that which the
necessity of the case in each instance requires, and to regulate their
discussion by this; to accommodate the order of their treatment of these
subjects to what is suitable to the occasion, and not for the sake of
appearing always to preserve the same method, to disregard fitness and the
place which properly belongs to each topic. For, so far as proof and the
natural order are concerned, dissertations concerning the truth always take
precedence of those in defence of it; but, for the purpose of greater
utility, the order must be reversed, and arguments in defence of it precede
those concerning it. For the farmer could not properly cast the seed into
the ground, unless he first extirpated the wild wood, and whatever would be
hurtful to the good seed; nor the physician introduce any wholesome
medicines into the body that needed his care, if he did not previously
remove the disease within, or stay that which was approaching. Neither
surely can he who wishes to teach the truth persuade any one by speaking
about it, so long as there is a false opinion lurking in the mind of his
hearers, and barring the entrance of his arguments. And, therefore, from
regard to greater utility, I myself sometimes place arguments in defence of
the truth before those concerning the truth; and on the present occasion it
appears to me, looking at the requirements of the case, not without
advantage to follow the same method in treating of the resurrection. For in
regard to this subject also we find some utterly disbelieving, and some
others doubting, and even among those who have accepted the first
principles some who are as much at a loss what to believe as those who
doubt; the most unaccountable thing of all being, that they are in this
state of mind without having any ground whatsoever in the matters
themselves for their disbelief, or finding it possible to assign any
reasonable cause why they disbelieve or experience any perplexity.

CHAP. II.--A RESURRECTION IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

   Let us, then, consider the subject in the way I have indicated. If all
disbelief does not arise from levity and inconsideration, but if it springs
up in some minds on strong grounds and accompanied by the certainty which
belongs to truth [well and good]; for it then maintains the appearance of
being just, when the thing itself to which their disbelief relates appears
to them unworthy of belief; but to disbelieve things which are not
deserving of disbelief, is the act of men who do not employ a sound
judgment about the truth. It behoves, therefore, those who disbelieve or
doubt concerning the resurrection, to form their opinion on the subject,
not from any view they have hastily adopted, and from what is acceptable to
profligate men, but either to assign the origin of men to no cause (a
notion which is very easily refuted), or, ascribing the cause of all things
to God, to keep steadily in view the principle involved in this article of
belief, and from this to demonstrate that the resurrection is utterly
unworthy of credit. This they will succeed in, if they are able to show
that it is either impossible for God, or contrary to His will, to unite and
gather together again bodies that are dead, or even entirely dissolved into
their elements, so as to constitute the same persons. If they cannot do
this, let them cease from this godless disbelief, and from this blasphemy
against sacred things: for, that they do not speak the truth when they say
that it is impossible, or not in accordance with the divine will, will
clearly appear from what I am about to say. A thing is in strictness of
language considered impossible to a person, when it is of such a kind that
he either does not know what is to be done, or has not sufficient power for
the proper doing of the thing known, For he who is ignorant of anything
that requires to be done, is utterly unable either to attempt or to do what
he is ignorant of; and he, too, who knows ever so well what has to be done,
and by what means, and how, but either has no power at all to do the thing
known, or not power sufficient, will not even make the attempt, if he be
wise and consider his powers; and if he did attempt it without due
consideration, he would not accomplish his purpose. But it is not possible
for God to be ignorant, either of the nature of the bodies that are to be
raised, as regards both the members entire and the particles of which they
consist, or whither each of the dissolved particles passes, and what part
of the elements has received that which is dissolved and has passed into
that with which it has affinity, although to men it may appear quite
impossible that what has again combined according to its nature with the
universe should be separable from it again. For He from whom, antecedently
to the peculiar formation of each, was not concealed either the nature of
the elements of which the bodies of men were to consist, or the parts of
these from which He was about to take what seemed to Him suitable for the
formation of the human body, will manifestly, after the dissolution of the
whole, not be ignorant whither each of the particles has passed which He
took for the construction of each. For, viewed relatively to the order of
things now obtaining among us, and the judgment we form concerning other
matters, it is a greater thing to know beforehand that which has not yet
come to pass; but, viewed relatively to the majesty and wisdom of God, both
are according to nature, and it is equally easy to know beforehand things
that have not yet come into existence, and to know things which have been
dissolved.

CHAP. III.--HE WHO COULD CREATE, CAN ALSO RAISE UP THE DEAD.

   Moreover also, that His power is sufficient for the raising of dead
bodies, is shown by the creation of these same bodies. For if, when they
did not exist, He made at their first formation the bodies of men, and
their original elements, He will, when they are dissolved, in whatever
manner that may take place, raise them again with equal ease: for this,
too, is equally possible to Him. And it is no damage to the argument, if
some suppose the first beginnings to be from matter, or the bodies of men
at least to be derived from the elements as the first materials, or from
seed. For that power which could give shape to what is regarded by them as
shapeless matter, and adorn it, when destitute of form and order, with many
and diverse forms, and gather into one the several portions of the
elements, and divide the seed which was one and simple into many, and
organize that which was unorganized, and give life to that which had no
life,that same power can reunite what is dissolved, and raise up what is
prostrate, and restore the dead to life again, and put the corruptible into
a state of incorruption. And to the same Being it will belong, and to the
same power and skill, to separate that which has been broken up and
distributed among a multitude of animals of all kinds which are wont to
have recourse to such bodies, and glut their appetite upon them,--to
separate this, I say, and unite it again with the proper members and parts
of members, whether it has passed into some one of those animals, or into
many, or thence into others, or, after being dissolved along with these,
has been carried back again to the original elements, resolved into these
according to a natural law--a matter this which seems to have exceedingly
confounded some, even of those admired for wisdom, who, I cannot tell why,
think those doubts worthy of serious attention which are brought forward by
the many.

CHAP. IV.--OBJECTION FROM THE FACT THAT SOME HUMAN BODIES HAVE BECOME PART
OF OTHERS.

   These persons, to wit, say that many bodies of those who have come to
an unhappy death in shipwrecks and rivers have become food for fishes, and
many of those who perish in war, or who from some other sad cause or state
of things are deprived of burial, lie exposed to become the food of any
animals which may chance to light upon them. Since, then, bodies are thus
consumed, and the members and parts composing them are broken up and
distributed among a great multitude of animals, and by means of nutrition
become incorporated with the bodies of those that are nourished by them,--
in the first place, they say, their separation from these is impossible;
and besides this, in the second place, they adduce another circumstance
more difficult still. When animals of the kind suitable for human food,
which have fed on the bodies of men, pass through their stomach, and become
incorporated with the bodies of those who have partaken of them, it is an
absolute necessity, they say, that the parts of the bodies of men which
have served as nourishment to the animals which have partaken of them
should pass into other bodies of men, since the animals which meanwhile
have been nourished by them convey the nutriment derived from those by whom
they were nourished into those men of whom they become the nutriment. Then
to this they tragically add the devouring of offspring perpetrated by
people in famine and madness, and the children eaten by their own parents
through the contrivance of enemies, and the celebrated Median feast, and
the tragic banquet of Thyestes; and they add, moreover, other such like
unheard-of occurrences which have taken place among Greeks and barbarians:
and from these things they establish, as they suppose, the impossibility of
the resurrection, on the ground that the same parts cannot rise again with
one set of bodies, and with another as well; for that either the bodies of
the former possessors cannot be reconstituted, the parts which composed
them having passed into others, or that, these having been restored to the
former, the bodies of the last possessors will come short.

CHAP. V.--REFERENCE TO THE PROCESSES OF DIGESTION AND NUTRITION.

   But it appears to me that such persons, in the first place, are
ignorant of the power and skill of Him that fashioned and regulates this
universe, who has adapted to the nature and kind of each animal the
nourishment suitable and correspondent to it, and has neither ordained that
everything in nature shall enter into union and combination with every kind
of body, nor is at any loss to separate what has been so united, but grants
to the nature of each several created being or thing to do or to suffer
what is naturally suited to it, and sometimes also hinders and allows or
forbids whatever He wishes, and for the purpose He wishes; and, moreover,
that they have not considered the power and nature of each of the creatures
that nourish or are nourished. Otherwise they would have known that not
everything which is taken for food under the pressure of outward necessity
turns out to be suitable nourishment for the animal, but that some things
no sooner come into contact with the plicatures of the stomach than they
are wont to be corrupter, and are vomited or voided, or disposed of in some
other way, so that not even for a little time do they undergo the first and
natural digestion, much less become incorporated with that which is to be
nourished; as also, that not even everything which has been digested in the
stomach and received the first change actually arrives at the parts to be
nourished, since some of it loses, its nutritive power even in the stomach,
and some during the second change, and the digestion that takes place in
the liver is separated and passes into something else which is destitute of
the power to nourish; nay, that the change which takes place in the liver
does not all issue in nourishment to men, but the matter changed is
separated as refuse according to its natural purpose; and that the
nourishment which is left in the members and parts themselves that have to
be nourished sometimes changes to something else, according as that
predominates which is present in greater or less, abundance, and is apt to
corrupt or to turn into itself that which comes near it.

CHAP. VI.--EVERYTHING THAT IS USELESS OR HURTFUL IS REJECTED.

   Since, therefore, great difference of nature obtains in all animals,
and the very nourishment which is accordant with nature is varied to suit
each kind of animal, and the body which is nourished; and as in the
nourishment of every animal there is a threefold cleansing and separation,
it follows that whatever is alien from the nourishment of the animal must
be wholly destroyed and carried off to its natural place, or change into
something else, since it cannot coalesce with it; that the power of the
nourishing body must be suitable to the nature of the animal to be
nourished, and accordant with its powers; and that this, when it has passed
through the strainers appointed for the purpose, and been thoroughly
purified by the natural means of purification, must become a most genuine
addition to the substance,--the only thing, in fact, which any one calling
things by their right names would call nourishment at all; because it
rejects everything that is foreign and hurtful to the constitution of the
animal nourished and that mass of superfluous food introduced merely for
filling the stomach and gratifying the appetite. This nourishment, no one
can doubt, becomes incorporated with the body that is nourished, interwoven
and blended with all the members and parts of members; but that which is
different and contrary to nature is speedily corrupted if brought into
contact with a stronger power, but easily destroys that which is overcome
by it, and is converted into hurtful humours and poisonous qualities,
because producing nothing akin or friendly to the body which is to be
nourished. And it is a very clear proof of this, that in many of the
animals nourished, pain, or disease, or death follows from these things,
if, owing to a too keen appetite, they take in mingled with their food
something poisonous and contrary to nature; which, of course, would tend to
the utter destruction of the body to be nourished, since that which is
nourished is nourished by substances akin to it and which accord with its
nature, but is destroyed by those of a contrary kind. If, therefore,
according to the different nature of animals, different kinds of food have
been provided suitable to their nature, and none of that which the animal
may have taken, not even an accidental part of it, admits of being blended
with the body which is nourished, but only that part which has been
purified by an entire digestion, and undergone a complete change for union
with a particular body, and adapted to the parts which are to receive
nourishment,--it is very plain that none of the things contrary to nature
can be united with those bodies for which it is not a suitable and
correspondent nourishment, but either passes off by the bowels before it
produces some other humour, crude and corrupter; or, if it continue for a
longer time, produces suffering or disease hard to cure, destroying at the
same time the natural nourishment, or even the flesh itself which needs
nourishment. But even though it be expelled at length, overcome by certain
medicines, or by better food, or by the natural forces, it is not got rid
of without doing much harm, since it bears no peaceful aspect towards what
is natural, because it cannot coalesce with nature.

CHAP. VII. --THE RESURRECTION-BODY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESENT.

   Nay, suppose we were to grant that the nourishment coming from these
things (let it be so called, as more accordant with the common way of
speaking), although against nature, is yet separated and changed into some
one of the moist or dry, or warm or cold, matters which the body contains,
our opponents would gain nothing by the concession: for the bodies that
rise again are reconstituted from the parts which properly belong to them,
whereas no one of the things mentioned is such a part, nor has it the form
or place of a part; nay, it does not remain always with the parts of the
body which are nourished, or rise again with the parts that rise, since no
longer does blood, or phlegm, or bile, or breath, contribute anything to
the life. Neither, again, will the bodies nourished then require the things
they once required, seeing that, along with the want and corruption of the
bodies nourished, the need also of those things by which they were
nourished is taken away. To this must be added, that if we were to suppose
the change arising from such nourishment to reach as far as flesh, in that
case too there would be no necessity that the flesh recently changed by
food of that kind, if it became united to the body of some other man,
should again as a part contribute to the formation of that body, since
neither the flesh which takes it up always retains what it takes, nor does
the flesh so incorporated abide and remain with that to which it was added,
but is subject to a great variety of changes,--at one time being dispersed
by toil or care, at another time being wasted by grief or trouble or
disease, and by the distempers arising from being heated or chilled, the
humours which are changed with the flesh and fat not receiving the
nourishment so as to remain what they are. But while such are the changes
to which the flesh is subject, we should find that flesh, nourished by food
unsuited to it, suffers them in a much greater degree; now swelling out and
growing fat by what it has received, and then again rejecting it in some
way or other, and decreasing in bulk, from one or more of the causes
already mentioned; and that that alone remains in the parts which is
adapted to bind together, or cover, or warm the flesh that has been chosen
by nature, and adheres to those parts by which it sustains the life which
is according to nature, and fulfils the labours of that life. So that
whether the investigation in which we have just been engaged be fairly
judged of, or the objections urged against our position be conceded, in
neither case can it be shown that what is said by our opponents is true,
nor can the bodies of men ever combine with those of the same nature,
whether at any time, through ignorance and being cheated of their
perception by some one else, men have partaken of such a body, or of their
own accord, impelled by want or madness, they have defiled themselves with
the body of one of like form; for we are very well aware that some brutes
have human forms, or have a nature compounded of men and brutes, such as
the more daring of the poets are accustomed to represent.

CHAP. VIII.--HUMAN FLESH NOT THE PROPER OR NATURAL FOOD OF MEN.

   But what need is there to speak of bodies not allotted to be the food
of any animal, and destined only for a burial in the earth in honour of
nature, since the Maker of the world has not alloted any animal whatsoever
as food to those of the same kind, although some others of a different kind
serve for food according to nature? If, indeed, they are able to show that
the flesh of men was alloted to men for food, there will be nothing to
hinder its being according to nature that they should eat one another, just
like anything else that is allowed by nature, and nothing to prohibit those
who dare to say such things from regaling themselves with the bodies of
their dearest friends as delicacies, as being especially suited to them,
and to entertain their living friends with the same fare. But if it be
unlawful even to speak of this, and if for men to partake of the flesh of
men is a thing most hateful and abominable, and more detestable than any
other unlawful and unnatural food or act; and if what is against nature can
never pass into nourishment for the limbs and parts requiring it, and what
does not pass into nourishment can never become united with that which it
is not adapted to nourish,--then can the bodies of men never combine with
bodies like themselves, to which this nourishment would be against nature,
even though it were to pass many times through their stomach, owing to some
most bitter mischance; but, removed from the influence of the nourishing
power, and scattered to those parts of the universe again from which they
obtained their first origin, they are united with these for as long a
period of time as may be the lot of each; and, separated thence again by
the skill and power of Him who has fixed the nature of every animal, and
furnished it with its peculiar powers, they are united suitably, each to
each, whether they have been burnt up by fire, or rotted by water, or
consumed by wild beasts, or by any other animals, or separated from the
entire body and dissolved before the other parts; and, being again united
with one another, they occupy the same place for the exact construction and
formation of the same body, and for the resurrection and life of that which
was dead, or even entirely dissolved. To expatiate further, however, on
these topics, is not suitable; for all men are agreed in their decision
respecting them,--those at least who are not half brutes.

CHAP. IX.--ABSURDITY OF ARGUING FROM MAN'S IMPOTENCY.

   As there are many things of more importance to the inquiry before us, I
beg to be excused from replying for the present to those who take refuge in
the works of men, and even the constructors of them, who are unable to make
anew such of their works as are broken in pieces, or worn out by time, or
otherwise destroyed, and then from the analogy of potters and carpenters
attempt to show that God neither can will, nor if He willed would be able,
to raise again a body that is dead, or has been dissolved,--not considering
that by such reasoning they offer the grossest insult to God, putting, as
they do, on the same level the capabilities of things which are altogether
different, or rather the natures of those who use them, and comparing the
works of art with those of nature. To bestow any serious attention on such
arguments would be not undeserving of censure, for it is really foolish to
reply to superficial and trifling objections. It is surely far more
probable, yea, most absolutely true, to say that what is impossible with
men is possible with God. And if by this statement of itself as probable,
and by the whole investigation in which we have just been engaged reason
shows it to be possible, it is quite clear that it is not impossible. No,
nor is it such a thing as God could not will.

CHAP. X.--IT CANNOT BE SHOWN THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL A RESURRECTION.

   For that which is not accordant with His will is so either as being
unjust or as unworthy of Him. And again, the injustice regards either him
who is to rise again, or some other than he. But it is evident that no one
of the beings exterior to him, and that are reckoned among the things that
have existence, is injured. Spiritual natures (nohtai` phu'seis) cannot be
injured by the resurrection of men, for the resurrection of men is no
hindrance to their existing, nor is any loss or violence inflicted on them
by it; nor, again, would the nature of irrational or inanimate beings
sustain wrong, for they will have no existence after the resurrection, and
no wrong can be done to that which is not. But even if any one should
suppose them to exist for ever, they would not suffer wrong by the renewal
of human bodies: for if now, in being subservient to the nature of men and
their necessities while they require them, and subjected to the yoke and
every kind of drudgery, they suffer no wrong, much more, when men have
become immortal and free from want, and no longer need their service, and
when they are themselves liberated from bondage, will they suffer no wrong.
For if they had the gift of speech, they would not bring against the
Creator the charge of making them, contrary to justice, inferior to men
because they did not share in the same resurrection. For to creatures whose
nature is not alike the Just Being does not assign a like end. And,
besides, with creatures that have no notion of justice there can be no
complaint of injustice. Nor can it be said either that there is any
injustice done as regards the man to be raised, for he consists of soul and
body, and he suffers no wrong as to either soul or body. No person in his
senses will affirm that his soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking so, he
would at the same time be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for
if now, while dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it
has had no wrong done to it much less will it suffer wrong when living in
conjunction with a body which is free from corruption and suffering. The
body, again, suffers no wrong; for if no wrong is done to it now while
united a corruptible thing with an incorruptible, manifestly will it not be
wronged when united an incorruptible with an incorruptible. No; nor can any
one say that it is a work unworthy of God to raise up and bring together
again a body which has been dissolved: for if the worse was not unworthy of
Him, namely, to make the body which is subject to corruption and suffering,
much more is the better not unworthy, to make one not liable to corruption
or suffering.

CHAP. XI.--RECAPITULATION.

   If, then, by means of that which is by nature first and that which
follows from it, each of the points investigated has been proved, it is
very evident that the resurrection of dissolved bodies is a work which the
Creator can perform, and can will, and such as is worthy of Him: for by
these considerations the falsehood of the contrary opinion has been shown,
and the absurdity of the position taken by disbelievers. For why should I
speak of their correspondence each with each, and of their connection with
one another? If indeed we ought to use the word connection, as though they
were separated by some difference of nature; and not rather say, that what
God can do He can also will, and that what God can will it is perfectly
possible for Him to do, and that it is accordant with the dignity of Him
who wills it. That to discourse concerning the truth is one thing, and to
discourse in defence of it is another, has been sufficiently explained in
the remarks already made, as also in what respects they differ from each
other, and when and in dealing with whom. they are severally useful; but
perhaps there is no reason why, with a view to the general certainty, and
because of the connection of what has been said with what remains, we
should not make a fresh beginning from these same points and those which
are allied to them. To the one kind of argument it naturally pertains to
hold the foremost place, to the other to attend upon the first, and clear
the way, and to remove whatever is obstructive or hostile. The discourse
concerning the truth, as being necessary to all men for certainty and
safety, holds the first place, whether in nature, or order, or usefulness:
in nature, as furnishing the knowledge of the subject; in order, as being
in those things and along with those things which it informs us of; in
usefulness, as being a guarantee of certainty and safety to those who
become acquainted with it. The discourse in defence of the truth is
inferior in nature and force, for the refutation of falsehood is less
important than the establishment of truth; and second in order, for it
employs its strength against those who hold false opinions, and false
opinions are an aftergrowth from another sowing and from degeneration. But,
notwithstanding all this, it is often placed first, and sometimes is found
more useful, because it removes and clears away beforehand the disbelief
which disquiets some minds, and the doubt or false opinion of such as have
but recently come over. And yet each of them is referrible to the same end,
for the refutation of falsehood and the establishment of truth both have
piety for their object: not, indeed, that they are absolutely one and the
same, but the one is necessary, as I have said, to all who believe, and to
those who are concerned about the truth and their own salvation; but the
other proves to be more useful on some occasions, and to some persons, and
in dealing with some. Thus much by way of recapitulation, to recall what
has been already said. We must now pass on to what we proposed, and Show
the truth of the doctrine concerning the resurrection, both from the cause
itself, according to which, and on account of which, the first man and his
posterity were created, although they were not brought into existence in
the same manner, and from the common nature of all men as men; and further,
from the judgment of their Maker upon them according to the time each has
lived, and according to the rules by which each has regulated his
behaviour,--a judgment which no one can doubt will be just.

CHAP. XII.--ARGUMENT FOR THE RESURRECTION. FROM THE PURPOSE CONTEMPLATED IN
MAN'S CREATION.

   The argument from the cause will appear, if we consider whether man was
made at random and in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose,
whether simply that he might live and continue in the natural condition in
which he was created, or for the use of another; and if with a view to use,
whether for that of the Creator Himself, or of some one of the beings who
belong to Him, and are by Him deemed worthy Of greater care. Now, if we
consider this in the most general way, we find that a person of sound mind,
and who is moved by a rational judgment to do anything, does nothing in
vain which he does intentionally, but either for his own use, or for the
use of some other person for whom he cares, or for the sake of the work
itself, being moved by some natural inclination and affection towards its
production. For instance (to make use of an illustration, that our meaning
may be clear), a man makes a house for his own use, but for cattle and
camels and other animals of which he has need he makes the shelter suitable
for each of them; not for his own use, if we regard the appearance only,
though for that, if we look at the end he has in view, but as regards the
immediate object, from concern for those for whom he cares. He has
children, too, not for his own use, nor for the sake of anything else
belonging to him, but that those who spring from him may exist and continue
as long as possible, thus by the succession of children and grandchildren
comforting himself respecting the close of his own life, and hoping in this
way to immortalize the mortal. Such is the procedure of men. But God can
neither have made man in vain, for He is wise, and no work of wisdom is in
vain; nor for His own use, for He is in want of nothing. But to a Being
absolutely in need of nothing, no one of His works can contribute anything
to His own use. Neither, again, did He make man for the sake of any of the
other works which He has made. For nothing that is endowed with reason and
judgment has been created, or is created, for the use of another, whether
greater or less than itself, but for the sake of the life and continuance
of the being itself so created. For reason cannot discover any use which
might be deemed a cause for the creation of men, since immortals are free
from want, and in need of no help from men in order to their existence; and
irrational beings are by nature in a state of subjection, and perform those
services for men for which each of them was intended, but are not intended
in their turn to make use of men: for it neither was nor is right to lower
that which rules and takes the lead to the use of the inferior, or to
subject the rational to the irrational, which is not suited to rule.
Therefore, if man has been created neither without cause and in vain (for
none of God's works is in vain, so far at least as the purpose of their
Maker is concerned), nor for the use of the Maker Himself, or of any of the
works which have proceeded from Him, it is quite clear that although,
according to the first and more general view of the subject, God made man
for Himself, and in pursuance of the goodness and wisdom which are
conspicuous throughout the creation, yet, according to the view which more
nearly touches the beings created, He made him for the sake of the life of
those created, which is not kindled for a little while and then
extinguished. For to creeping things, I suppose, and birds, and fishes, or,
to speak more generally, all irrational creatures, God has assigned such a
life as that; but to those who bear upon them the image of the Creator
Himself, and are endowed with understanding, and blessed with a rational
judgment, the Creator has assigned perpetual duration, in order that,
recognising their own Maker, and His power and skill, and obeying law and
justice, they may pass their whole existence free from suffering, in the
possession of those qualifies with which they have bravely borne their
preceding life, although they lived in corruptible and earthly bodies. For
whatever has been created for the sake of something else, when that has
ceased to be for the sake of which it was created, will itself also fitly
cease to be, and will not continue to exist in vain, since, among the works
of God, that which is useless can have no place; but that which was created
for the very purpose of existing and living a life naturally suited to it,
since the cause itself is bound up with its nature, and is recognised only
in connection with existence itself, can never admit of any cause which
shall utterly annihilate its existence. But since this cause is seen to lie
in perpetual existence, the being so created must be preserved for ever,
doing and experiencing what is suitable to its nature, each of the two
parts of which it consists contributing what belongs to it, so that the
soul may exist and remain without change in the nature in which it was
made, and discharge its appropriate functions (such as presiding over the
impulses of the body, and judging of and measuring that which occurs from
time to time by the proper standards and measures), and the body be moved
according to its nature towards its appropriate objects, and undergo the
changes allotted to it, and, among the rest (relating to age, or
appearance, or size), the resurrection. For the resurrection is a species
of change, and the last of all, and a change for the better of what still
remains in existence at that time.

CHAP. XIII.--CONTINUATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

   [1]Confident of these things, no less than of those which have already
come to pass, and reflecting on our own nature, we are content with a life
associated with neediness and corruption, as suited to our present state of
existence, and we stedfastly hope for a continuance of being in
immortality; and this we do not take without foundation from the inventions
of men, feeding ourselves on false hopes, but our belief rests on a most
infallible guarantee--the purpose of Him who fashioned us, according to
which He made man of an immortal soul[1] and a body, and furnished him with
understanding and an innate law for the preservation and safeguard of the
things given by Him as suitable to an intelligent existence and a rational
life: for we know well that He would not have fashioned such a being, and
furnished him with everything belonging to perpetuity, had He not intended
that what was so created should continue in perpetuity. If, therefore, the
Maker of this universe made man with a view to his partaking of an
intelligent life, and that, having become a spectator of His grandeur, and
of the wisdom which is manifest in all things, he might continue always in
the contemplation of these; then, according to the purpose of his Author,
and the nature which he has received, the cause of his creation is a pledge
of his continuance for ever, and this continuance is a pledge of the
resurrection, without which man could not continue. So that, from what has
been said, it is quite clear that the resurrection is plainly proved by the
cause of man's creation, and the purpose of Him who made him. Such being
the nature of the cause for which man has been brought into this world, the
next thing will be to consider that which immediately follows, naturally or
in the order proposed; and in our investigation the cause of their creation
is followed by the nature of the men so created, and the nature of those
created by the just judgment of their Maker upon them, and all these by the
end of their existence. Having investigated therefore the point placed
first in order, we must now go on to consider the nature of men.

CHAP. XIV.--THE RESURRECTION DOES NOT REST SOLELY ON THE FACT OF A FUTURE
JUDGMENT.

   The proof[2] of the several doctrines of which the truth consists, or
of any marten whatsoever proposed for examination, if it is to produce an
unwavering confidence in what is said, must begin, not from anything
without, nor from what certain persons think or have thought,[3] but from
the common and natural notion[4] of the matter, or from the connection of
secondary troths with primary ones. For the question relates either to
primary beliefs, and then all that is necessary is reminiscence, so as to
stir up the natural notion; or to things which naturally follow from the
first and to their natural sequence. And in these things we must observe
order, showing what strictly follows from the first truths, or from those
which are placed first, so as neither to be unmindful of the truth, or of
our certainty respecting it, nor to confound the things arranged by nature
and distinguished from each other, or break up the natural order. Hence I
think it behoves those who desire to handle the subject with fairness, and
who wish to form an intelligent judgment whether there is a resurrection or
not, first to consider attentively the force of the arguments contributing
to the proof of this, and what place each of them holds--which is first,
which second, which third, and which last. And in the arrangement of these
they should place tint the cause of the creation of men,--namely, the
purpose of the Creator in making man; and then connect with this, as is
suitable, the nature of the men so created; not as being second in order,
but because we are unable to pass our judgment on both at the same time,
although they have the closest natural connection with each other, and are
of equal force in reference to the subject before us. But while from these
proofs as the primary ones, and as being derived from the work of creation,
the resurrection is clearly demonstrated, none the less can we gain
conviction respecting it from the arguments taken from providence,--I mean
from the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with just
judgment, and from the end of human existence. For many, in discussing the
subject of the resurrection, have rested the whole cause on the third
argument alone, deeming that the cause of the resurrection is the judgment.
But the fallacy of this is very clearly shown, from the fact that, although
all human beings who die rise again, yet not all who rise again are to be
judged: for if only a just judgment were the cause of the resurrection, it
would of course follow that those who had done neither evil nor good--
namely, very young children[5]--would not rise again; but seeing that all
are to rise again, those who have died in infancy as well as others, they
too justify our conclusion that the resurrection takes place not for the
sake of the judgment as the primary reason, but in consequence of the
purpose of God in forming men, and the nature of the beings so formed.

CHAP. XV.--ARGUMENT FOR THE RESURRECTION FROM THE NATURE OF MAN.

   But while the cause discoverable in the creation of men is of itself
sufficient to prove that the resurrection follows by natural sequence on
the dissolution of bodies, yet it is perhaps right not to shrink from
adducing either of the proposed arguments, but, agreeably to what has been
said, to point out to those who are not able of themselves to discern them,
the arguments from each of the truths evolved from the primary; and first
and foremost, the nature of the men created, which conducts us to the same
notion, and has the same force as evidence of the resurrection. For if the
whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body
which was fitted to it in the creation, and if neither to the nature of the
soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned
such a creation or such a life and entire course of existence as this, but
to men compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have passed
through their present existence, arrive at one common end, with the same
elements of which they are composed at their birth and during life, it
unavoidably follows, since one living-being is formed from the two,
experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever the body
experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment of the
senses or of the reason, that the whole series of these things must be
referred to some one end, in order that they all, and by means of
all,namely, man's creation, man's nature, man's life, man's doings and
sufferings, his course of existence, and the end suitable to his nature,--
may concur in one harmony and the same common experience. But if there is
some one harmony and community of experience belonging to the whole being,
whether of the things which spring from the soul or of those which are
accomplished by means of the body, the end for all these must also be one.
And the end will be in strictness one, if the being whose end that end is
remains the same in its constitution; and the being-will be exactly the
same, if all those things of which the being consists as parts are the
same. And they will be the same in respect of their peculiar union, if the
parts dissolved are again united for the constitution of the being. And the
constitution of the same men of necessity proves that a resurrection will
follow of the dead and dissolved bodies; for without this, neither could
the same parts be united according to nature with one another, nor could
the nature of the same men be reconstituted. And if both understanding and
reason have been given to men for the discernment of things which are
perceived by the understanding, and not of existences only, but also of the
goodness and wisdom and rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows
that, since those things continue for the sake of which the rational
judgment is given, the judgment given for these things should also
continue. But it is impossible for this to continue, unless the nature
which has received it, and in which it adheres, continues. But that which
has received both understanding and reason is man, not the soul by itself.
Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But
it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no
resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not
continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain has the soul
been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the
body been lettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient to
the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is the
understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the observance of rectitude, or even
the practice of every virtue, and the enactment and enforcement of laws,--
to say all in a word, whatever is noble in men or for men's sake, or rather
the very creation and nature of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded from
all the works of God, and from all the gifts bestowed by Him, the
conclusion is unavoidable, that, along with the interminable duration of
the soul, there will be a perpetual continuance of the body according to
its proper nature.

CHAP. XVI--ANALOGY OF DEATH AND SLEEP, AND CONSEQUENT ARGUMENT FOR THE
RESURRECTION.

   And let no one think it strange that we call by the name of life a
continuance of being which is interrupted by death and corruption; but let
him consider rather that this word has not one meaning only, nor is there
only one measure of continuance, because the nature also of the things that
continue is not one. For if each of the things that continue has its
continuance according to its peculiar nature, neither in the case of those
who are wholly incorruptible and immortal shall we find the continuance
like ours, because the natures of superior beings do not take the level of
such as are inferior; nor in men is it proper to look for a continuance
invariable and unchangeable; inasmuch as the former are from the first
created immortal, and continue to exist without end by the simple will of
their Maker, and men, in respect of the soul, have from their first origin
an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality
by means of change. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the
resurrection; and, looking to this, we both await the dissolution of the
body, as the sequel to a life of want and corruption, and after this we
hope for a continuance with immortality,[1] not putting either our death on
a level with the death of the irrational animals, or the continuance of man
with the continuance of immortals, lest we should unawares in this way put
human nature and life on a level with things with which it is not proper to
compare them. It ought not, therefore, to excite dissatisfaction, if some
inequality appears to exist in regard to the duration of men; nor, because
the separation of the soul from the members of the body and the dissolution
of its parts interrupts the continuity of life, must we therefore despair
of the resurrection. For although the relaxation of the senses and of the
physical powers, which naturally takes place in sleep, seems to interrupt
the sensational life when men sleep at equal intervals of time, and, as it
were, come back to life again, yet we do not refuse to call it life; and
for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the brother of death,[1] not as
deriving their origin from the same ancestors and fathers, but because
those who are dead and those who sleep are subject to similar states, as
regards at least the stillness and the absence of all sense of the present
or the past, or rather of existence itself and their own life. If,
therefore, we do not refuse to call by the name of life the life of men
full of such inequality from birth to dissolution, and interrupted by all
those things which we have before mentioned, neither ought we to despair of
the life succeeding to dissolution, such as involves the resurrection,
although for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from
the body.

CHAP. XVII.--THE SERIES OF CHANGES WE CAN NOW TRACE IN MAN RENDERS A
RESURRECTION PROBABLE.

   For this nature of men, which has inequality allotted to it from the
first, and according to the purpose of its Maker, has an unequal life and
continuance, interrupted sometimes by sleep, at another time by death, and
by the changes incident to each period of life, whilst those which follow
the first are not clearly seen beforehand. Would any one have believed,
unless taught by experience, that in the soft seed alike in all its parts
there was deposited such a variety and number of great powers, or of
masses, which in this way arise and become consolidated--I mean of bones,
and nerves, and cartilages, of muscles too, and flesh, and intestines, and
the other parts of the body? For neither in the yet moist seed is anything
of this kind to be seen, nor even in infants do any of those things make
their appearance which pertain to adults, or in the adult period what
belongs to those who are past their prime, or in these what belongs to such
as have grown old. But although some of the things I have said exhibit not
at all, and others but faintly, the natural sequence and the changes that
come upon the nature of men, yet all who are not blinded in their judgment
of these matters by vice or sloth, know that there must be first the
depositing of the seed, and that when this is completely organized in
respect of every member and part and the progeny comes forth to the light,
there comes the growth belonging to the first period of life, and the
maturity which attends growth, and after the maturity the slackening of the
physical powers till old age, and then, when the body is worn out, its
dissolution. As, therefore, in this matter, though neither the seed has
inscribed upon it the life or form of men, nor the life the dissolution
into the primary elements; the succession of natural occurrences makes
things credible which have no credibility from the phenomena themselves,
much more does reason, tracing out the truth from the natural sequence,
afford ground for believing in the resurrection, since it is safer and
stronger than experience for establishing the truth.

CHAP. XVIII.--JUDGMENT MUST HAVE REFERENCE BOTH TO SOUL AND BODY: THERE
WILL THEREFORE BE A RESURRECTION.

   The arguments I just now proposed for examination, as establishing the
truth of the resurrection, are all of the same kind, since they all start
from the same point; for their starting: point is the origin of the first
men by creation. But while some of them derive their strength from the
starting-point itself from which they take their rise, others, consequent
upon the nature and the life of men, acquire their credibility from the
superintendence of God over us; for the cause according to which, and on
account of which, men have come into being, being closely connected with
the nature of men, derives its force from creation; but the argument from
rectitude, which represents God as judging men according as they have lived
well or ill, derives its force from the end of their existence: they come
into being on the former ground, but their state depends more on God's
superintendence. And now that the matters which come first have been
demonstrated by me to the best of my ability, it will be well to prove our
proposition by those also which come after--I mean by the reward or
punishment due to each man in accordance with righteous judgment, and by
the final cause of human existence; and of these I put foremost that which
takes the lead by nature, and inquire first into the argument relating to
the judgment: premising only one thing, from concern for the principle
which appertains to the matters before us, and for order--namely, that it
is incumbent on those who admit God to be the Maker of this universe, to
ascribe to His wisdom and rectitude the preservation and care of all that
has been created if they wish to keep to their own principles; and with
such views to hold that nothing either in earth or in heaven is without
guardianship or providence, but that; on the contrary, to everything,
invisible and visible alike, small and great, the attention of the Creator
reaches; for all created things require the attention of the Creator,[1]
and each one in particular, according to its nature and the end for which
it was made: though I think it would be a useless expenditure of trouble to
go through the list now, or distinguish between the several cases, or
mention in detail what is suitable to each nature. Man, at all events, of
whom it is now our business to speak, as being in want, requires food; as
being mortal, posterity; as being rational, a process of judgment. But if
each of these things belongs to man by nature, and he requires food for his
life, and requires posterity for the continuance of the race, and requires
a judgment in order that food and posterity may be according to law, it of
course follows, since food and posterity refer to both together, that the
judgment must be referred to them too (by both together I mean man,
consisting of soul and body), and that such man becomes accountable for all
his actions, and receives for them either reward or punishment. Now, if the
righteous judgment awards to both together its retribution for the deeds
wrought; and if it is not proper that either the soul alone should receive
the wages of the deeds wrought in union with the body (for this of itself
has no inclination to the faults which are committed in connection with the
pleasure or food and culture of the body), or that the body alone should
(for this of itself is incapable of distinguishing law and justice), but
man, composed of these, is subjected to trial for each of the deeds wrought
by him; and if reason does not find this happening either in this life (for
the award according to merit finds no place in the present existence, since
many atheists and persons who practise every iniquity and wickedness live
on to the last, unvisited by calamity, whilst, on the contrary, those who
have manifestly lived an exemplary life in respect of every Virtue, live in
pain, in insult, in calumny and outrage, and suffering of all kinds) or
after death (for both together no longer exist, the soul being separated
from the body, and the body itself being resolved again into the materials
out of which it was composed, and no longer retaining anything of its
former structure or form, much less the remembrance of its actions): the
result of all this is very plain to every one,--namely, that, in the
language of the apostle, "this corruptible (and dissoluble) must put on
incorruption,"[2] in order that those who were dead, having been made alive
by the resurrection, and the parts that were separated and entirely
dissolved having been again united, each one may, in accordance with
justice, receive what he has done by the body, whether it be good or bad.

CHAP. XIX.--MAN WOULD BE MORE UNFAVOURABLY SITUATED THAN THE BEASTS IF
THERE WERE NO RESURRECTION.

   In replying, then, to those who acknowledge a divine superintendence,
and admit the same principles as we do, yet somehow depart from their own
admissions, one may use such arguments as those which have been adduced,
and many more than these, should he be disposed to amplify what has been
said only concisely and in a cursory manner. But in dealing with those who
differ from us concerning primary truths, it will perhaps be well to lay
down another principle antecedent to these, joining with them in doubting
of the things to which their opinions relate, and examining the matter
along with them in this manner--whether the life of men, and their entire
course of existence, is overlooked, and a sort of dense darkness is poured
down upon the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both the men
themselves and their actions; or whether it is much safer to be of opinion
that the Maker presides over the things which He Himself has made,
inspecting all things whatsoever which exist, or come into existence, Judge
of both deeds and purposes. For if no judgment whatever were to be passed
on the actions of men, men would have no advantage over the irrational
creatures, but rather would fare worse than these do, inasmuch as they keep
in subjection their passions, and concern themselves about piety, and
righteousness, and the other virtues; and a life after the manner of brutes
would be the best, virtue would be absurd, the threat of judgment a matter
for broad laughter, indulgence in every kind of pleasure the highest good,
and the common resolve of all these and their one law would be that maxim,
so dear to the intemperate and lewd, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow
we die." For the termination of such a life is not even pleasure, as some
suppose, but utter insensibility. But if the Maker of men takes any concern
about His own works, and the distinction is anywhere to be found between
those who have lived well and ill, it must be either in the present life,
while men are still living who have conducted themselves virtuously or
viciously, or after death, when men are in a state of separation and
dissolution. But according to neither of these suppositions can we find a
just judgment taking place; for neither do the good in the present life
obtain the rewards of virtue, nor yet do the bad receive the wages of vice.
I pass over the fact, that so long as the nature we at present possess is
preserved, the moral nature is not able to bear a punishment commensurate
with the more numerous or more serious faults. For the robber, or ruler, or
tyrant, who has unjustly put to death myriads on myriads, could not by one
death make restitution for these deeds; and the man who holds no true
opinion concerning God, but lives in all outrage and blasphemy, despises
divine things, breaks the laws, commits outrage against boys and women
alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses with their inhabitants, and
devastates a country, and at the same time destroys inhabitants of cities
and peoples, and even an entire nation--how in a mortal body could he
endure a penalty adequate to these crimes, since death prevents the
deserved punishment, and the mortal nature does not suffice for any single
one of his deeds? It is proved, therefore, that neither in the present life
is there a judgment according to men's deserts, nor after death.

CHAP. XX.--MAN MUST BE POSSESSED BOTH OF A BODY AND SOUL HEREAFTER, THAT
THE JUDGMENT PASSED UPON HIM MAY BE JUST.

   For either death is the entire extinction of life, the soul being
dissolved and corrupted along with the body, or the soul remains by itself,
incapable of dissolution, of dispersion, of corruption, whilst the body is
corrupted and dissolved, retaining no longer any remembrance of past
actions, nor sense of what it experienced in connection with the soul. If
the life of men is to be utterly extinguished, it is manifest there will be
no care for men who are not living, no judgment respecting those who have
lived in virtue or in vice; but there will rush in again upon us whatever
belongs to a lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities which follow from
it, and that which is the summit of this lawlessness--atheism. But if the
body were to be corrupted, and each of the dissolved particles to pass to
its kindred element, yet the soul to remain by itself as immortal, neither
on this supposition would any judgment on the soul take place, since there
would be an absence of equity: for it is unlawful to suspect that any
judgment can proceed out of God and from God which is wanting in equity.
Yet equity is wanting to the judgment, if the being is not preserved in
existence who practised righteousness or lawlessness: for that which
practised each of the things in life on which the judgment is passed was
man, not soul by itself. To sum up all in a word, this view will in no case
consist with equity.

CHAP. XXI.--CONTINUATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

   For if good deeds are rewarded, the body will clearly be wronged,
inasmuch as it has shared with the soul in the toils connected with well-
doing, but does not share in the reward of the good deeds, and because,
though the soul is often excused for certain faults on the ground of the
body's neediness and want, the body itself is deprived of all share in the
good deeds done, the toils on behalf of which it helped to bear during
life. Nor, again, if faults are judged, is the soul dealt fairly with,
supposing it alone to pay the penalty for the faults it committed through
being solicited by the body and drawn away by it to its own appetites and
motions, at one time being seized upon and carried off, at another
attracted in some very violent manner, and sometimes concurring with it by
way of kindness and attention to its preservation. How can it possibly be
other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things
towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no
impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the
unjust acts arising out of these? For if the majority of such evils come
from men's not having the mastery of the passions which solicit them, and
they are solicited by the neediness and want of the body, and the care and
attention required by it (for these are the motives for every acquisition
of property, and especially for the using of it, and moreover for marriage
and all the actions of life, in which things, and in connection with which,
is seen what is faulty and what is not so), how can it be just for the soul
alone to be judged in respect of those things which the body is the first
to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to sympathy and
participation in actions with a view to things Which it wants; and that the
appetites and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which
whatever exceeds the proper bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set
in motion by the body, and yet that the sins arising from these, and the
punishments for the sins committed, should fall upon the soul alone, which
neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers of
itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer? But even if we hold that
these affections do not pertain to the body alone, but to man, in saying
which we should speak correctly, because the life of man is one, though
composed of the two, yet surely we shall not assert that these things
belong to the soul, if we only look simply at its peculiar nature. For if
it is absolutely without need of food, it can never desire those things
which it does not in the least require for its subsistence; nor can it feel
any impulse towards any of those things which it is not at all fitted to
use; nor, again, can it be grieved at the want of money or other property,
since these are not suited to it. And if, too, it is superior to
corruption, it fears nothing whatever as destructive of itself: it has no
dread of famine, or disease, or mutilation, or blemish, or fire, or sword,
since it cannot suffer from any of these any hurt or pain, because neither
bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. But if it is absurd to attach the
passions to the soul as belonging specially to it, it is in the highest
degree unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God to lay upon the soul
alone the sins which spring from them, and the consequent punishments.

CHAP. XXII.--CONTINUATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

   In addition to what has been said, is it not absurd that, while we
cannot even have the notion of virtue and vice as existing separately in
the soul (for we recognise the virtues as man's virtues, even as in like
manner vice, their opposite, as not belonging to the soul in separation
from the body, and existing by itself), yet that the reward or punishment
for these should be assigned to the soul alone? How can any one have even
the notion of courage or fortitude as existing in the soul alone, when it
has no fear of death, or wounds, or maiming, or loss, or maltreatment, or
of the pain connected with these, or the suffering resulting from them? And
what shall we say of self-control and temperance, when there is no desire
drawing it to food or sexual intercourse, or other pleasures and
enjoyments, nor any other thing soliciting it from within or exciting it
from without? And what of practical wisdom, when things are not proposed to
it which may or may not be done, nor things to be chosen or avoided, or
rather when there is in it no motion at all or natural impulse towards the
doing of anything? And how in any sense can equity be an attribute of
souls, either in reference to one another or to anything else, whether of
the same or of a different kind, when they are not able from any source, or
by any means, or in any way, to bestow that which is equal according to
merit or according to analogy, with the exception of the honour rendered to
God, and, moreover, have no impulse or motion towards the use of their own
things, or abstinence from those of others, since the use of those things
which are according to nature, or the abstinence from them, is considered
in reference to those who are so constituted as to use them, whereas the
soul neither wants anything, nor is so constituted as to use any things or
any single thing, and therefore what is called the independent action of
the parts cannot be found in the soul so constituted?

CHAP. XXIII.--CONTINUATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

   But the most irrational thing of all is this: to impose properly
sanctioned laws on men, and then to assign to their souls alone the
recompense of their lawful or unlawful deeds. For if he who receives the
laws would also justly receive the recompense of the transgression of the
laws, and if it was man that received the laws, and not the soul by itself,
man must also bear the recompense for the sins committed, and not the soul
by itself, since God has not enjoined on souls to abstain from things which
have no relation to them, such as adultery, murder, theft, rapine,
dishonour to parents, and every desire in general that tends to the injury
and loss of our neighbours. For neither the command, "Honour thy father and
thy mother," is adapted to souls alone, since such names are not applicable
to them, for souls do not produce souls, so as to appropriate the
appellation of father or mother, but men produce men; nor could the
command, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," ever be properly addressed to
souls, or even thought of in such a connection, since the difference of
male and female does not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual
intercourse, nor appetite for it; and where there is no appetite, there can
be no intercourse; and where there is no intercourse at all, there can be
no legitimate intercourse, namely marriage; and where there is no lawful
intercourse, neither can there be unlawful desire of, or intercourse with,
another man's wife, namely adultery. Nor, again, is the prohibition of
theft, or of the desire of having more, applicable to souls, for they do
not need those things, through the need of which, by reason of natural
indigence or want, men are accustomed to steal or to rob, such as gold, or
silver, or an animal, or something else adapted for food, or shelter, or
use; for to an immortal nature everything which is desired by the needy as
useful is useless. But let the fuller discussion of these matters be left
to those who wish to investigate each point more exactly, or to contend
more earnestly with opponents. But, since what has just been said, and that
which concurs with this to guarantee the resurrection, suffices for us, it
would not be seasonable to dwell any longer upon them; for we have not made
it our aim to omit nothing that might be said, but to point out in a
summary manner to those who have assembled what ought to be thought
concerning the resurrection, and to adapt to the capacity of those present
the arguments bearing on this question.

CHAP. XXIV.--ARGUMENT FOR THE RESURRECTION FROM THE CHIEF END OF MAN.

   The points proposed for consideration having been to some extent
investigated, it remains to examine the argument from the end or final
cause, which indeed has already emerged m what has been said, and only
requires just so much attention and further discussion as may enable us to
avoid the appearance of leaving unmentioned any of the matters briefly
referred to by us, and thus indirectly damaging the subject or the division
of topics made at the outset. For the sake of those present, therefore, and
of others who may pay attention to this subject, it may be well just to
signify that each of those things which are constituted by nature, and of
those which are made by art, must have an end peculiar to itself, as indeed
is taught us by the common sense of all men, and testified by the things
that pass before our eyes. For do we not see that husbandmen have one end,
and physicians another; and again, the things which spring out of the earth
another, and the animals nourished upon it, and produced according to a
certain natural series, another? If this is evident, and natural and
artificial powers, and the actions arising from these, must by all means be
accompanied by an end in accordance with nature, it is absolutely necessary
that the end of men, since it is that of a peculiar nature, should be
separated from community with the rest; for it is not lawful to suppose the
same end for beings destitute of rational judgment, and of those whose
actions are regulated by the innate law and reason, and who live an
intelligent life and observe justice. Freedom from pain, therefore, cannot
be the proper end for the latter, for this they would have in common with
beings utterly devoid of sensibility: nor can it consist in the enjoyment
of things which nourish or delight the body, or in an abundance of
pleasures; else a life like that of the brutes must hold the first place,
while that regulated by virtue is without a final cause. For such an end as
this, I suppose, belongs to beasts and cattle, not to men possessed of an
immortal soul and rational judgment.

CHAP. XXV.--ARGUMENT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED.

   Nor again is it the happiness of soul separated from body: for we are
not inquiring about the life or final cause of either of the parts of which
man consists, but of the being who is composed of both; for such is every
man who has a share in this present existence, and there must be some
appropriate end proposed for this life. But if it is the end of both parts
together, and this can be discovered neither while they are still living in
the present state of existence through the numerous causes already
mentioned, nor yet when the soul is in a state of separation, because the
man cannot be said to exist when the body is dissolved, and indeed entirely
scattered abroad, even though the soul continue by itself--it is absolutely
necessary that the end of a man's being should appear in some
reconstitution of the two together, and of the same living being. And as
this follows of necessity, there must by all means be a resurrection of the
bodies which are dead, or even entirely dissolved, and the same men must be
formed anew, since the law of nature ordains the end not absolutely, nor as
the end of any men whatsoever, but of the same men who passed through the
previous life; but it is impossible for the same men to be reconstituted
unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls. But that the same
soul should obtain the same body is impossible in any other way, and
possible only by the resurrection; for if this takes place, an end
befitting the nature of men follows also. And we shall make no mistake in
saying, that the final cause of an intelligent life and rational judgment,
is to be occupied uninterruptedly with those objects to which the natural
reason is chiefly and primaily adapted, and to delight unceasingly in the
contemplation of Him who is, and of His decrees, notwithstanding that the
majority of men, because they are affected too passionately and too
violently by things below, pass through life without attaining this object.
For the large number of those who fail of the end that belongs to them does
not make void the common lot, since the examination relates to individuals,
and the reward or punishment of lives ill or well spent is proportioned to
the merit of each.


Taken from "The Early Church Fathers and Other Works" originally published
by Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. in English in Edinburgh, Scotland beginning in
1867. (ANF 2, Roberts and Donaldson.) The digital version is by The
Electronic Bible Society, P.O. Box 701356, Dallas, TX 75370, 214-407-WORD.

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