THE CHURCH IN EAST TIMOR - VOICE OF A SILENCED PEOPLE(Elements for recent history)"We are dying as a people and as a nation... I ask that areferendum be held".  This genuine S.O.S., appealing for areferendum on self-determination, sent to the UN SecretaryGeneral by the Catholic Bishop of East Timor, comprehends thedifferent components which have made up the Timoresepeople's recent history:1. the Indonesian invasion and genocide practiced since 1975,2. the struggle of a people that still resists beyond what wouldseem to be humanly possible,3. the role of a Church, through which this people seeks tosafeguard and maintain its identity,4. and, finally, the silence and abandonment by the internationalcommunity.An approach to the history of East Timor from the mainreactions and attitudes of the Catholic Church will give arestricted, but not confined overview because, given thecircumstances, the Church has had to overstep the bounds of astrictly religious domain to provide a voice for a people that hasbeen silenced.BEFORE THE INDONESIAN INVASIONHistory tells us that the first Europeans to settle on the island ofTimor in 1560 were Catholic priests of the Dominican Order,who had arrived aboard Portuguese sailing ships at the time ofthe Discoveries.  Four centuries later, East Timor was aPortuguese colony, barely "colonised" by a distant metropoliswith insufficient resources.  The Timorese had largely held onto their customs and traditional way of life.  Portugueseinfluence was exerted mainly through the Catholic Church,especially in the realm of education.  However, after 400 yearsof Portuguese presence, and in spite of the privileges enjoyed byCatholicism as the state religion, only 30% of Timorese hadembraced the Catholic faith.When the dictatorship fell in Portugal in 1974, the new regimedecided to give the colonies their independence.  It soon becameapparent that Indonesia did not relish the emergence of anindependent nation within its area of influence.  A missionarytells how, quite some time before Indonesia's invasion, theVatican's representative in Jakarta had assured the PortugueseBishop of East Timor that "the Church has nothing to fear fromintegration with Indonesia", and the Bishop had relayed thismessage to his clergy.  The infighting among the Timorese, andthe abdication of the Portuguese authorities, who werecompletely absorbed by the democratisation process in theirown country, were to give Indonesia a pretext to invade.CHURCH OF SILENCEAlthough some sources report that General Murdani, a Catholicand mastermind behind the invasion, had issued orders to sparethe Church, it was in fact violently hit.  The Dili seminary wasbombed, schools were burned down, numerous churches andreligious buildings were plundered.  From the very beginning,the fate of the Catholic Church in Timor was bound to the fateof the people.  Timor was isolated from the rest of the world;the first letter from a missionary after the invasion only reachedits destination in Portugal two years later, when the PortugueseBishop was substituted as head of the diocese by the oldestTimorese priest, Monsignor da Costa Lopes.GENOCIDE DENOUNCEDIn response to an invitation to take part in a meeting of religioussuperiors from Indonesia, in 1981 the clergy of East Timorwrote in a collective document: "Our relations with theuniversal Church were suddenly curtailed.  We are the clergy ofEast Timor who, together with our people, have been throwninto a vacuum and alienated for 6 years, so we have become thesilent Church of East Timor".  The clergy of Timor realised theimplications of the invitation:  "we are aware that we are being"persuaded" to set up links with the Indonesian Church, becauseit is the Church that is closest to us, and the one the governmentand army have authorised to maintain a closer relationship withus".  However, they accepted the invitation to break the silenceand expose the consequences of the years of Indonesianoccupation: "the tragedy of the people of East Timor, which haslasted for the past six years, has resulted in over 200,000victims".In particular, they expressed their dismay at the silence of theother Churches:  "we are amazed by the silence which appearsto condone the fact that we are dying betrayed", and told theIndonesian religious superiors, who seemed to wholeheartedlyembrace the views of their Government, that "We must allunderstand that the Indonesian national army, that liberatedIndonesia from colonial power in such an extraordinary way,will never liberate the people of East Timor from its colonialstate ... the will of the people of East Timor is to have the rightto choose its own destiny, and not the large-scale massacreswhich have been perpetrated by its neighbours".To anyone who might accuse the Timorese clergy of meddlingin political affairs, they replied: "Only the Church whichpractices the faith of its people and is capable of expressingwhat its people feels, lives and suffers is a living Church.". (1)That same year, before 12,000 Timorese gathered for a religiousceremony, Monsignor da Costa Lopes denounced the crimes ofthe Indonesian army, particularly the massacre of 500 womenand children a few weeks before, at the foot of Mount SantoAntonio.  Reprimanded by the military commander, he replied:"I feel an irrepressible need to tell the whole world about thegenocide being practiced in Timor so that, when we die, at leastthe world will know we died standing". (2)In 1982, a mission from the Ecumenical Council of Churchesvisited Timor:  "The leader of the Catholic Church in Dili didnot hesitate to speak out in the presence of the security officialsand dared criticise the negative aspects of IndonesianGovernment policy, concluding that the problem of East Timoris not a military problem but a political and humanitarian oneand, consequently, cannot be resolved by the use of guns", readtheir subsequent report.Monsignor da Costa Lopes also addressed an appeal to Caritasin Australia to help his people, who were dying of starvation inthe fields in which they had been regrouped by the armedforces.  The Indonesian authorities called him a liar, and tried toget the Vatican to dismiss him, while not ignoring other moreradical methods: "I received reports that the Indonesiansintended to kill me.  As they did not wish to be implicated insuch a murder, they paid some Timorese to do it, but they cameto tell me", recalled Monsignor da Costa Lopes, once he was inexile.MONSIGNOR BELO, A CONTROVERSIAL APPOINTMENTIn May 1983, the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta arrived in Dili toannounce the substitution of Monsignor da Costa Lopes byMonsignor Ximenes Belo.A group of priests in the diocese wrote "to the episcopalconferences and to the free world" to express their"disappointment and deep hurt on learning that members of theIndonesian Catholic Church had joined in the chorus ofcampaigns, within and outside Indonesia, against their prelate ...when his is the only voice raised in defence of a peoplecondemned to silence". (3)The new head of the diocese was a 32-year-old Salesian priest,who had recently returned to Timor after leaving before theinvasion to study in Europe.  He had not, therefore, experiencedlife under the first eight years of occupation, and none of hiscolleagues or teachers remembered ever hearing him mentionthe drama of his people.  The circumstances surrounding hisarrival to the leadership of the diocese contributed to the ideathat he had been chosen to adopt different attitudes to those ofhis predecessor, and his appointment was contested by theclergy as a whole.  Just as in the case of Monsignor da CostaLopes, the Vatican did not appoint Monsignor Belo a "Bishop",but just "Apostolic Administrator", which meant lessinstitutional clout and less security.Soon after his appointment, the Indonesian EpiscopalConference sent a letter of solidarity to the new leader of thediocese.  The Indonesian Bishops deplored the suffering of theTimorese people, but avoided reference to the causes of thesuffering.  The most expressive, or least evasive, sentence read:"we cannot refuse to face up to what is taking place in the midstof the people, especially those events which determine the wellbeing or misery of the masses affected by cruel oppression". (4)Although the only known version of this was in English (it wasdistributed at an international meeting of Catholic organisationswhich give aid to the Church of Indonesia), and there is noknowledge of it ever having been made public in Indonesia, theArchbishop of Jakarta criticised the expression "crueloppression" which, he said, was the result of a mis-translation.Monsignor Belo quickly showed signs of wanting to defend therights of his people.  From the time of the Indonesian invasion,the number of Catholics rapidly increased from 30% of thepopulation in 1975 to 90% at present.  Unintentionally, theIndonesians stimulated this growth in two ways:1.  the Indonesian State forces people to belong to one of thefive big monotheistic religions,2.  the Timorese chose Catholicism, as an affirmation of theirsingularity."It is the generalised determination of a people seeking todefend its identity through us" (5), replied Monsignor Belo,when a journalist questioned him about the large scaleconversions.The Church, and particularly the priests of Timorese origin,have lived up to this show of confidence:  "We do not adoptpolitical positions, but the Church of East Timor is prepared anddetermined to defend fundamental human rights, especially theright of the Timorese people to exist as a people with its ownidentity and culture", stated the new Apostolic Administrator inthe same interview.In late 1984, Ximenes Belo wrote to the French Justice andPeace Commission: "The only solution to the East Timorconflict is a political and diplomatic one, which must include,above all else, respect for a people's right to self-determination".(6)These attitudes brought the head of the diocese closer to hisclergy.  They jointly prepared a document, dated 1 January1985:  "It is with anguish that the Church is witnessing theevents that are slowly leading to the ethnic, cultural andreligious extinction of the identity of the people of East Timor".This text goes on to detail some of the negative aspects ofIndonesian presence: "successive clean-up operations,systematically and periodically carried out by the Indonesianarmy ... reprisal killings by shooting adult and young men ...waves of arrests ... recruitment of the population for militaryoperations ... ineffective health care ... concentration of thepopulation in camps in inhuman conditions ... obligatory nightguard duties and forced labour, without taking into account theneeds of those affected ... the occupation by Indonesians of keypositions and marginalisation of the Timorese ...". (7)  When thedocument was made public by the Washington Post, Indonesiandiplomacy denied its authenticity.  The Apostolic Nuncio inJakarta also declared he had received a telegram in whichMonsignor Belo denied having "written" the document.  Whatmanner of pressure must have been applied to obtain thisapparent denial?REALISMMonsignor Belo went to Rome where, more than likely, morepressure was brought to bear.  When he returned, the Timoresenoticed a change in his attitude:  the head of the diocese wasemphasising "realism", a concept generally accepted outsideTimor, that Indonesia is too big and strong for any resistance toits intentions."I only hope that the Apostolic Administrator and the clergy donot disillusion the people, and know how to be unyielding" (8),wrote a Timorese cleric.  A layman added: "if the priests desertthe fight, we will carry on to the last drop of blood in ourbodies". (9)Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao himself expressed his owndisquiet in a letter to a priest: "our fight would be madeextremely difficult if we did not have the indispensable supportwhich, until now, the Church of East Timor has given andguaranteed the resistance". (10)It seemed that the integration of the diocese of Dili in theIndonesian Episcopal Conference would be a major steptowards facilitating political integration.  The Chairman of thegovernmental Golkar party, Mr. Sudharmono, visited EastTimor and invited himself to the inaugural ceremony of an OurLady grotto.  On that occasion he promised Monsignor Belo thata new cathedral would be built in Dili if the diocese were toagree to integrate with the Indonesian Bishops' Conference.The Director of the Centre for Indonesian Studies in Jakarta,Yusuf Wanandi, promised that new Salesian missionaries wouldbe allowed to enter, on the same condition.  A journalist,covering Sudharmono's visit to Timor, wrote that religiousintegration could be "the last stage in the overall integrationprocess of East Timor, which has lasted for 10 years". (11)As these attempts to achieve their objective were not findingfavour with the Church of Timor, the Indonesians turned theirsights to the Vatican.  In 1987, a Catholic youth organisationasked "the Holy Father to take the steps necessary for unionwith our brothers of East Timor...", without any attempt todisguise the political intention of its request: "for integration inthe Republic of Indonesia". (12)On 25 April 1986, Ximenes Belo met secretly with XananaGusmao, and relayed a proposal from the Vatican to theresistance leader:  the Vatican was prepared to use its influenceto secure the safe- conduct and departure from the country ofthe guerrillas, if they were to give up their fight.  Xanana repliedthat the guerrillas were not fighting for themselves, and asked ifthe chance to leave the country extended to all Timorese.  Apriest said that Monsignor Belo was satisfied with this response.There were other attempts along the same lines: in 1988 Xananaexpressed his regret, in a letter to Monsignor da Costa Lopes,that the Vatican: "was insisting that its Italian and Spanishcollaborators, and the Apostolic Administrator, persuade us tosurrender".  (13)LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERALIn June 1988, Monsignor Belo was consecrated Bishop.Believing the reports from its correspondent in Indonesia, theCatholic information agency of Asia (UCAN) announced: "theprelate of East Timor accepts integration of the territory withIndonesia".  However, it is a mystery how this interpretation ofwhat the Bishop stated was arrived at because, in fact, he hadexpressed quite the opposite view: "if the Vatican and the localCatholics so wished, we would certainly participate as membersof the Episcopal Conference of Indonesia but, until now, thediocese of Dili has not wanted this". (14)Ximenes Belo's appointment to Bishop seemed to give himmore confidence.  In December 1988 he denounced the torturewhich had "become normal practice in East Timor". (15)  InFebruary 1989 he wrote to the UN Secretary General : "Thedecolonisation process of Portuguese Timor has still not beenresolved by the UN, and it should not be forgotten ... I ask thatthe Secretary General initiate in Timor that which is the mostusual and democratic decolonisation process, the holding of aREFERENDUM ... (because) we are dying as a people and as anation". (16)The Indonesians kept pushing for religious integration as a steptowards political integration.  The Secretary of the EpiscopalConference, Monsignor Situmorang, stated:  "We have alwayswanted East Timor to participate in our Episcopal Conference,not only for nationalist reasons, but also because of theecclesiastic ties between us".  These ties, he said, "intensify theTimorese's feeling of belonging to Indonesia". (17)   Theposition of the Nuncio, Monsignor Canalini, did not seem farremoved from this view, although he was more conscious ofdiplomatic procedure: "We are aware of the IndonesianGovernment's wish to see the Timorese Church directlyadministered by the Indonesian Episcopal Conference" but "theHoly See is of the opinion that Indonesia should not interveneuntil the question of East Timor has been resolved ininternational forums.  When the problem has been settled there,the Holy See will proceed without any hesitation". (18)The Indonesian authorities were unhappy when the letter to theUN Secretary General became public.  Once again, theApostolic Nuncio took their side and, according to theIndonesian press, stated that the Bishop's letter represented"neither the aspirations of the Catholic Church nor of the peopleof East Timor". (19)  The Timorese clergy replied to the Nuncioin an open letter that "the clergy of Dili refute the biased viewsand suggestions expressed by certain ecclesiastic personalities(...)  The Bishop is theologically, juridically and ecclesiastically,for all intents and purposes, the representative of the localChurch when, in that capacity, he speaks about the Church andwhat the clergy and people feel". (20)Monsignor Belo also wrote to the Bishop of Setubal (Portugal),asking him to support his appeal for a referendum  The Bishopof Set bal enlisted the support of over 150 Bishops, Archbishopsand Cardinals, but when he wanted to go to New York to delivera petition to the UN Secretary General, the Apostolic Nuncio inLisbon forbade him to do so, and also banned him from publiclyintervening on East Timor (this ban was lifted in 1992).RECOGNISED DIFFERENCESWhen the Pope's visit to Indonesia was announced, theTimorese clergy warned the Vatican of the danger of the visitbeing manipulated to show support for integration.  TheVatican, however, did not heed the warning and, when the Popelanded in Dili, a huge advertising placard greeted him with"Welcome to Timor Timur, 27th Province of Indonesia".During the Pope's visit, Monsignor Belo was asked by ajournalist whether it was true that the Vatican had criticised hisletter to the UN.  The Bishop replied simply: "Yes.  We do notshare the same viewpoint.  They think I am being political.  If Iwere in Rome, perhaps I would also be of that opinion.  But Ilive here.  I see the people's suffering and share in it.  It was myduty to write that letter". (21)  Also, to a Portuguese missionarymagazine, he stated: "I was not ready to take up this post.  I wasonly in the priesthood for two years when I was cast here into adiocese with all kinds of tensions.  After a few years of being intouch with the people, I feel that the task is a difficult one, andthe thought of resigning has crossed my mind.  But if the HolySee is confident in me, and if the people want me to stay, then Iwill stay, and sacrifice myself for the people". (22)   Somejournalists thought then that Monsignor Belo would not be headof the diocese for much longer.An allusion to the case of East Timor may be read in John PaulII's Jakarta speech, when he warns the Indonesian authoritiesthat "a political unity, based solely on military or economicmight, can easily disintegrate".  However, when greeting theChurch of Indonesia he added:  "totally Catholic and totallyIndonesian.  These words are deeply etched into the modernhistory of the nation.  They express the attitude of manyCatholics during the fight for independence, and continue toinspire the life of today's Church of Indonesia". (23)In East Timor, the tone of the homily was totally different.Why?  "They have tried destruction and death ... but we know,through faith, that love transcends the borders between nations,peoples and cultures.  The differences, offences and injuries areof little consequence ... Forgive ... Love your enemies ...". (24)In an important political document containing his "Peace Plan",made public at the time of the Pope's visit, Xanana Gusmaowrote: "Fortunately for the Maubere homeland ... the people ofEast Timor are not fighting alone.  They are not alone becauseits Church is on their side ... Monsignor Belo has announced heis in favour of a referendum ... we unreservedly support ourBishop's proposal". (25)When the mass said by the Pope ended, a pro-independencedemonstration was violently repressed.  In reply to questionsfrom a journalist, Monsignor Belo refused to criticise thedemonstrators:  they "were merely expressing their discontentwith the situation in Timor". (26)Irritated by the demonstration, which lost them propagandapoints gained by the Pope's visit, the Indonesian authoritiesaccused some foreign Salesian missionaries of having incitedthe young demonstrators.  Father Carbonell, the SalesianSuperior who lives in Jakarta, wrote a letter to the authoritiesexpressing his wish to "continue our mission preparing goodChristians and good Indonesian citizens", (27)  and he got themissionaries, accused of the incitement, to sign along with him.The Timorese clergy objected:  "We wanted the foreignmissionaries to be purely defenders of the Gospel ... and notcolonising agents". (28)The report of the Pope's visit, customarily sent to Rome by thediocese, was published in the Osservatore Romano, bearing theBishop of Dili's signature: "all our differences must beeliminated, we must forget our past, and abandon unrealisticambitions ... avoid demonstrations".  This contradictsMonsignor Belo's previous statements.  The OsservatoreRomano also reported that the original had been written inIndonesian.  Investigations have shown that the author was, infact, Father Marcus Wanandi, an Indonesian, and brother of theDirector of the Centre of Strategic Studies in Jakarta.  Sometime before, Father Wanandi had been appointed Director ofCatholic teaching in East Timor.Father Wanandi wrote it, but it bore the signature of MonsignorBelo.  The Timorese priests criticised some of their Bishop'sconcessions, which were to have negative repercussions: theentry of Indonesian priests and religious workers, the occasionaluse of the Indonesian language in the liturgy, the transfer ofmanagement of the Seminary and S. Jose School to Indonesians... without the priests being consulted on such decisions.  Thosespeaking out against injustice were accused of being political,but not those who were friendly towards the Government.Reaffirming their position, the native priests wrote: "we want tobe a Church rooted in the people, committed to their problems".(28)Monsignor Belo acknowledged there were problems: "thepresence of other nationalities creates difficulties:  the Timoresethink more about their rights, their country, their culture". (29)The process which had led to the removal of Monsignor daCosta Lopes seemed to be repeating itself in early 1994.Monsignor Belo revealed to a Polish journalist that he wasaware of two plots to have him assassinated, but that these hadfailed thanks to Timorese who had forewarned him about them.(30)  At the same time, rumours persisted that the Vaticanwanted to divide the diocese of Dili into two.  The samerumours indicated that a new non-Timorese Bishop was to beappointed, and would probably be Father Carbonell, the SpanishSalesian who had told the authorities of his determination totransform the Timorese into "good Indonesian citizens".  Iftransferred to Baucau, the second largest city of East Timor,Monsignor Belo and his appeals in defence of his people's rightswould be relegated to a back seat position.WHERE IS THE "REALISM"?After 18 years of occupation and genocide, but also resistanceand affirmation of its ideals, the people of East Timor haveshown to the world's leaders that they "are different to theIndonesians", and that their "history and cultures are not thesame.  Realism demands that the people of this island beallowed to speak", said Monsignor Belo in an interview with theFrench daily "La Croix".  The Bishop insists on the need for areferendum, but to achieve it international solidarity, includingsolidarity from the "high-ranking Church authorities" which hasbeen lacking all these past years, is vital:  "I am not referring tomoral, spiritual and pastoral support, which is real.  I amspeaking about active support, that is, political". (31)Peace is Possible in East TimorJune 1994NOTES:(1) collective document from clergy in East Timor, 31.7.81(2) written testimony of Monsignor da Costa Lopes(3) collective letter from the clergy, 13.5.83(4) letter to Apostolic Administrator, priests and clergy of EastTimor, 17.11.83(5) Interview in Macau daily, "O Clarim", 19.8.81(6) letter to the French Justice and Peace Commission, 12.84(7) message from the Apostolic Administrator and PresbyterialCouncil of the diocese of Dili, 1.1.85(8) undated written views of a Timorese cleric(9) views of a Timorese Christian, 2.5.85(10) letter from a priest, 17.6.86(11) Sinar Harapan, 16.10.85(12) Hidup, n. 4 - 1987(13) letter to Mnsgr. da Costa Lopes, 10.3.88(14) UCAN, Asia Focus, 20.8.88(15) pastoral note, 5.12.88(16) letter to the UN Secretary General, 6.2.89(17) Asia News, 15.2.89(18) Jakarta Post, 12.4.89(19) Jakarta Post, 14.6.89(20) collective letter from priests of diocese of Dili, 7.89(21) Ouest France, 12.89(22) Ale m Mar, 12.89(23) homily given in Jakarta(24) homily given in Dili(25) document from X. Gusmao, 5.10.89(26) LUSA agency(27) letter to the Head of Armed Forces in East Timor(28) reflections of the native priests, 8.90(29) Publico, 26.9.90(30) Rzecjpospolita, 25.3.94(31) La Croix, 5.94** End of text from cdp:reg.easttimor *****************************************************************************This material came from PeaceNet, a non-profit progressive networkingservice.  For more information, send a message to [email protected]***************************************************************************.