CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: HABIT

Habit

Habit is an effect of repeated acts and an aptitude to reproduce them, and may be
defined as "a quality difficult to change, whereby an agent whose nature it is to work
one way or another indeterminately, is disposed easily and readily at will to follow this
or that particular line of action" (Rickaby, Moral Philosophy). Daily experience shows
that the repetition of actions or reactions produces, if not always an inclination, at least
an aptitude to act or react in the same manner. To say that a man is accustomed to a
certain diet, climate, or exercise, that he is an habitual smoker or early-riser, that he can
dance, fence, or play the piano, that he is used to certain points of view, modes of
thinking, feeling, and willing, etc., signifies that owing to past experience he can do
now that which formerly was impossible, do easily that which was difficult, or
dispense with the effort and attention which were at first necessary.  Like any faculty or
power, habit cannot be known directly in itself, but only indirectly--retrospectively
from the actual processes which have given rise to it, and prospectively from those
which proceed from it. Habit will be considered:

I. Habit in general

II. Physiological aspects

III. Psychological aspects

IV. Ethical aspects

V. Pedagogical aspects

VI. Philosophical aspects

VII. Theological aspects

I. HABIT IN GENERAL

If an attitude, action, or series of actions resulting from a well-formed and deep-rooted
habit is compared with the corresponding attitude, action, or series before the habit was
contracted, the following differences are generally observed:

Uniformity and regularity have succeeded diversity and variety; under the same
circumstances and conditions the same action recurs invariably and in the same
manner, unless a special effort is made to inhibit it;

Selection has taken the place of diffusion; after a number of attempts in which the
energy was scattered in several directions, the proper movements and adaptations have
been singled out; the energy now follows a straight line and goes forth directly toward
the expected result;

Less stimulus is required to start the process, and, where perhaps resistance had to be
overcome, the slightest cue now suffices to give rise to a complex action;

Difficulty and effort have disappeared; the elements of the action, every one of which
used to require distinct attention, succeed one another automatically;

Where there was merely desire, often difficult to satisfy, or indifference, perhaps even
repugnance, there is now tendency, inclination, or need, and the unwonted
interruption of an habitual action or mode of thinking generally results in a painful
feeling of uneasiness;

Instead of the clear and distinct perception of the action in its details, there is only a
vague consciousness of the process in its totality, together with a feeling of familiarity
and naturalness. In a word, habit is selective, produces quickness of response, causes
the processes to be more regular, more perfect, more rapid and tends to automatism.

From these effects of habit, together with the wideness of the field which it covers, its
importance is easily inferred.  Progress requires flexibility, power to change and to
conquer, fixity of useful modifications and the power to retain conquests.  Adaptability
to new surroundings, and facility of processes presuppose the power of acquiring
habits. Without them, not only mental functions like reflecting, reasoning, counting, but
even the most ordinary actions like dressing, eating, walking, would necessitate a
distinct effort for every detail, consume a great deal of time, and withal remain very
imperfect. Hence habit has been called a second nature, and man termed a bundle of
habits; and, although such expressions, like all aphorisms, may be open to criticism if
taken too literally, yet they contain much truth.  Nature is the common groundwork of
all activities and essentially the same in all men, but its special direction and
manifestations, the special emphasis of certain forms of activity together with their
manifold individual features, are, for the most part, the results of habits. Speech,
writing, skill in its varied applications, in fact every complex action of organism and
mind, which are matters of course for the adult or the adept, appear simple only
because they are habitual; the child or the beginner knows how complex they are in
reality. Even in merely physiological functions the influence of habit is felt: the stomach
becomes accustomed to certain foods; the blood to certain stimulants and poisons; the
whole organism to certain hours for resting and awaking, to the climate and
surroundings. All mental functions in the adult are the results of habits, or are modified
by them. Habits of thought, speculative and practical, habits of feelings and will,
religious and moral attitudes, etc., are constantly shaping man's views of things,
persons, and events, and determine his behaviour toward those who agree with or
differ from him. Observation and reflection show that the empire of habit is wellnigh
unlimited, and that there is no form of human activity to which it does not extend. It is
hardly possible to exaggerate its importance; the danger is rather that one may under-
estimate, or at least fail to fully appreciate it.

Habit is acquired by exercise; in this it differs from the instincts and other natural
predispositions and aptitudes which are innate. In a series of actions, it begins with the
first act, for, if this left no trace whatsoever, there would be no more reason why it
should begin with the second or any subsequent act. Yet at this early stage the trace or
disposition is too weak to be called a habit; it must grow and be strengthened by
repetition. The growth of habit is twofold, intensive and extensive, and may be
compared to that of a tree which extends its branches and roots farther and farther, and
at the same time acquires a stronger vitality, can resist more effectively obstacles to life,
and becomes more difficult to uproot. A habit also ramifies; its influence, restricted at
first to one line of action, gradually extends, making itself felt in a number of other
processes. Meanwhile it takes deeper root, and its intensity increases so that to remove
or change it becomes a more and more arduous task.

The main factors in the growth of habit are:

The number of repetitions, as every repetition strengthens the disposition left by
previous exercise;

their frequency: too long an interval of time allows the disposition to weaken, whereas
too short an interval fails to give sufficient rest, and results in organic and mental
fatigue;

their uniformity: at least change must be slow and gradual, new elements being added
little by little;

the interest taken in the actions, the desire to succeed, and the attention given;

the resulting pleasure or feeling of success which becomes associated with the idea of
the action.

No general rules, however, can be given for a strict determination of these factors. For
instance, how frequently the actions should be repeated, or how rapidly the complexity
may be increased, will depend not only on actual psychological factors of interest,
attention, and application, but also on the nature of the actions to be performed and on
natural aptitudes and tendencies. Habits decrease or disappear negatively by
abstaining from exercising them, and positively by acting in an opposite direction,
antagonistic to the existing habits.

II. PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS

All organic functions are due to, facilitated or modified by, habit. Some habits, like
those referring to climate, temperature, certain foods, etc., are purely physiological, the
mind contributing little or nothing. For instance, the same dose of alcohol or stimulants
might be fatal for some organisms, while it is necessary for those which have been used
to it. Or again, a bird, confined in an enclosed place in which the air gradually becomes
foul, grows so far accustomed to the fetid condition of the atmosphere that it may
continue to live for several hours after the air has been so poisoned with carbonic acid
as to kill almost immediately another bird suddenly placed therein. In the acquisition
of other physiological habits, especially those of skill and dexterity, psychological
factors have a great importance, above all the antecedent idea of the end, which directs
the selection of the appropriate movements, and the subsequent idea of success
associated with them. Moreover a number of such habits are made use of under the
guidance of the mind. Thus the acquired facility for writing is adapted to the ideas to
be expressed; fencing consists in the adaptation of certain movements facilitated by
habit to the perceived or foreseen movements of the adversary. They are therefore
mixed habits of organism and mind.

Physiological habit supposes that an action, after being performed, leaves some trace in
the organism, especially in the nervous system. In the present stage of physiological
science, the nature of these traces cannot be determined with certainty.  By some they
are described as persisting movements and vibrations; by others, as fixed impressions
and structural modifications; by others finally, as tendencies and dispositions to certain
functions. These views are not exclusive, but may be combined, for the disposition,
which has a more direct reference to future processes, may result from permanent
impressions and movements, which have special reference to past processes.
Somewhat metaphorically, physiological habit has also been explained as a
canalization, or the creation of paths of least resistance which the nervous energy tends
to follow.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Psychologically habit signifies the acquired facility of conscious processes. The
education of the senses, association of ideas, memory, mental attitudes derived from
experience and from studies general or special, the powers of attention, reflection,
reasoning, insight, etc., and all these complex factors which form man's frame of mind
and character, such as strength of will, weakness or obstinacy, irascibility or calmness,
likes and dislikes, prejudices, and so on, are due largely to habits intentionally or
unintentionally contracted. Owing to the great variety of conscious processes and the
complexity of their determinants, it is difficult to reduce the psychological effects of
habit to universal laws. The statement frequently made that habit lessens consciousness
cannot be accepted without qualification; for sometimes the being accustomed to a
stimulus means ceasing to have a clear consciousness of it, as in the case of the ticking
of a clock which little by little ceases to be perceived distinctly, while sometimes on the
contrary it means an increase of consciousness, as in the case of the developed keenness
of the musician's ear in discriminating sounds of slightly different pitch. Here a few
distinctions must be kept in mind. First, between prolonged sensation, producing
fatigue and consequently dullness of the sense-organ, and repeated sensation allowing
sufficient rest. A second, between mental processes in which the mind is chiefly
passive, and those in which it is chiefly active, as habit lessens passive and augments
active sensitiveness. Finally one must see whether conscious processes are ends or
simply means. Compared to the quality of the sounds to be produced, the special
activity of the pianist's fingers or the singer's vocal organs is but a means to an end.
Hence the musician becomes less conscious of this activity but more conscious of its
result. In any case, since the energy flows naturally in the wonted direction, effort and
attention are in inverse ratio to habit.

To pleasures as a rule applies the proverb "Assueta vilescunt" (Familiarity breeds
contempt). By being repeated the same experience loses its novelty, which is one of the
elements of pleasure and interest. But the rapidity of the decrease depends, not only on
the frequency of the repetitions, but also on the wealth and variety contained in the
experiences; hence it is that some musical compositions become tiresome much sooner
than others in which the mind continues to discover some new pleasurable element.
Pleasures resulting from the satisfaction of periodical wants, like resting or eating,
undergo no change from the mere fact of repetition. Inclinations (i. e. desire and
aversion) decrease; desires frequently change into needs of, or unconscious cravings
after, experiences which formerly were pleasurable, but have now become tasteless or
are even known to be injurious.  Persons or things habitually met with, even if they are
the source of no pleasure, are missed if they happen to disappear. Painful impressions
become less keen unless they are increased in reality or exaggerated by the
imagination. By exercise mental activity is strengthened in proportion to natural
dispositions and to the quantity and quality of the energy employed. Hence habit is a
force which impels to act, diminishes the strength of the will, and may become so
strong as to be almost irresistible.

IV. ETHICAL ASPECTS

From the point of view of ethics, the main division of habits is into good and bad, i. e.
into virtues and vices, according as they lead to actions in conformity with or against
the rules of morality. It is needless to insist on the importance of habit in moral
conduct; the majority of actions are performed under its influence, frequently without
reflection, and in accordance with principles or prejudices to which the mind has
become accustomed. The actual dictates of an upright conscience are dependent on
intellectual habits, especially those of rectitude and honesty without which it happens
too often that reason is used, not to find out what is right or wrong, but to justify a
course of action one has taken or wishes to take. Custom also is an important factor, as
that which is of frequent occurrence, even if known at first to be wrong, little by little
becomes familiar, and its commission no longer produces in us feelings of shame or
remorse. The voice of conscience is stifled; it ceases to give its warning, or at least no
attention is paid to it.

By lessening freedom, habit also lessens the actual responsibility of the agent, for
actions are less perfectly attended to, and in varying degrees escape the control of the
will. But it is important to note the distinction between habits acquired and retained
knowingly, voluntarily, and with some foresight of the consequences likely to result,
and habits acquired unconsciously, without our noticing them, and therefore without
our thinking of the possible consequences. In the former case, actions good or bad,
though actually not quite free, are nevertheless imputable to the agent, since they are
voluntary in their cause, that is, in the implied consent given them at the beginning of
the habit. If on the contrary the will had no part at all in acquiring or retaining the
habit, actions proceeding from it are not voluntary, but, as soon as the existence and
dangers of a bad habit are noticed, efforts to uproot it become obligatory.

V. PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS

Between the child and the adult there is not merely a difference in the quantity of
energy, bodily and mental, which they command, but especially a difference of
adaptability, co-ordination or habit, thanks to which such energy is made more
available for a definite purpose. Growth or increase and development or organization
must proceed together. The main end of education is to direct the harmonious
development of all the child's faculties according to their relative importance, and thus
to do for the child that which it is not yet able to do for itself, namely to fit its various
energies for future use, and to select from among the tendencies deposited in its nature
those which are to be cultivated and those which are to be destroyed. While the work
must proceed gradually according to the increasing capacities of the child, the fact must
always be kept in view that in early years both organism and mind are plastic and
more easily influenced. Later their power of adaptability is much less, and frequently
the learning of a new habit implies the difficult task of breaking off an old one.

As the complexity of functions increases, it becomes imperative, as far as possible, that
the new elements find at once their proper place and associations, and take root there,
since otherwise it would be necessary later on to eradicate them and perhaps transplant
them somewhere else. Hence all habits necessary to human perfection must be
cultivated so as to be grooved into one another. Hence also the principle of negative
education advocated by Rousseau is inadmissible. In early years, according to him, "the
only habit which the child should be allowed to form is that of contracting no habit
whatsoever", not even that of using one hand rather than the other, or that of eating,
sleeping, acting at the same regular hours. Up to twelve, the child should not be able to
distinguish its right from its left hand. With regard to intelligence and will, "the first
education must be purely negative. It consists not in teaching virtue or truth, but in
guarding the heart against vice and the mind against error". To judge this principle, it
must be remembered that there are three periods in the development of activity: one of
diffusion during which actions take place largely at random, and the energy is
dispersed in many channels; the second of effort at co-ordination during which the
proper modes of functioning are selected and practised; the third of habit which
removes everything superfluous, and greatly facilitates correct modes of functioning.
To prolong the first of these periods, since the last is the most perfect, would be an
injustice against the child, who has a right not only to the necessaries of life, but also to
the help required for its development. Moreover, it may be asked, how can the heart be
guarded against vice, and the mind against error, without showing what vice and error
are, and without teaching virtue and truth? How in general can a bad habit be avoided
or combated more effectively than by the acquisition of the contrary habit?  Experience
shows that many good habits, if not cultivated in childhood, are never acquired at all,
or not so perfectly, and defects in the adult may often be traced back to early education.

To obtain the best results, it is important for the teacher to know the natural aptitudes
of every pupil, for the effort which is possible for one might be, if required of another, a
source of discouragement, or exercise even a still more deleterious influence on the
mind of the child. The use of rewards and punishments must always be made in a
manner suited to the child's dispositions and directed by the general effects of habit
upon pleasurable and painful impressions and emotions. At the same time that habits
grow, attention has to be paid to their dangers, and the child must not be allowed to
become a mere automaton. Habits of reflection and attention, together with
determination and strength of will, will enable the child to control, direct, and govern
other habits.

VI. PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS

In Aristotelean and Scholastic metaphysics habit comes under the category called
quality. To be the subject of habits a being must be <in potentia> (see ACTUS ET
POTENTIA), i. e. capable of determination and perfection; and this <potentia> must
not be restricted to only one mode of activity or receptivity, for, where there is absolute
fixity, where one and the same line is invariably followed, there is no room for habit,
which implies adaptation and specification. On the strength of this condition, Saint
Thomas holds that habit properly so-called cannot be found in the material world, but
only in the spiritual faculties of intellect and will. In man, however, we may speak of
organic habits for such functions as are under the dependence of these spiritual
faculties. Matter, even in plants and animals, is the subject merely of dispositions, and
the difference between habit and disposition is that the former is more stable, the latter
more easily changed. Against this position several objections have been urged. In the
first place, the proposed distinction of habit and disposition is not based on anything
essential, but on a difference of degree, which seems insufficient to draw a strict line
between beings that are the subjects of habits and those that are the subjects of
dispositions only. If it is clear that moral habits of will differ from merely organic
habits, it is impossible to say why, e. g. the habit of a horse of stopping at certain places,
or the habits of trained animals differ radically from human habits of skill and
dexterity and why to the latter alone the name of habits can be given. Furthermore it is
true, as Aristotle remarks, that, by being thrown in the air, a stone will never acquire
any facility for taking the same direction, but will always tend to fall toward the centre
of attraction according to a vertical line; and that after any number of revolutions in the
same direction a mill-stone acquires no facility for that special movement, unless it be
an extrinsic one due to the adaptation of the mechanism. Nevertheless, in proportion as
the elements of a material system are more varied, there is room for different
arrangements, and consequently for new permanent aptitudes. In the sheet of paper
which, after being folded, is more easily folded again; in the clothes or shoes which fit
better after being worn for some time; in the mechanism which gives the best results
after some functioning; in the violin which good use improves and bad use
deteriorates, in domestic or trained animals, etc., there is something at least analogical
to habit, and which cannot be distinguished from it on the mere ground of greater
changeableness.

Hence if habit is considered exclusively from the point of view of retentiveness, there
is no reason to deny its existence in the material world. It has been even said that, being
simply an application of the law of inertia, it finds its maximum of application in
inorganic matter, which, unless acted on by some contrary force, keeps indefinitely its
modifications and conditions of rest or movement. Hence James writes that "the
philosophy of habit is thus, in the first instance, a chapter in physics rather than in
physiology or psychology" (Principles of Psychology I, 105). However, since habit
means essentially specificizing of that which was indetermined, and the fixating of that
which was indifferent, from this point of view of plasticity, adaptability,
indetermination, selectiveness, it applies more strictly to organic than to inorganic
matter, and more strictly still to the will which is capable even of such contrary
determinations as temperance and intemperance, speaking the truth and lying, and, in
general, of acting in one or another way and of abstaining entirely from action.

VII. THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

In theology, the question of habits has several important applications. In fundamental
morals, its discussion is necessary for the determination of the degree of responsibility
in human actions, and the treatise <de paenitentia> deals with the attitude to be taken
by the confessor toward penitents who habitually fall into the same sins, with the rules
for granting or denying absolution, and with the advice to be given such persons in
order to help them out of their habits. The scholastics, using a terminology. which is
little in accordance with the modern meaning of habit and somewhat confusing to the
lay reader, make a distinction between natural and supernatural, and between acquired
and infused habits. Of the natural habits some are acquired by practice, others are
innate like the <habitus primorum principiorum>, that is, the innate aptitude of the
human mind to grasp at once the truth of self-evident principles as soon as their
meaning is understood.  Supernatural habits cannot be acquired, since they direct man
to his supernatural end, and, therefore, are above the exigencies and the forces of
nature. They suppose a higher principle, given by God, which is sanctifying or
"habitual" grace. With habitual grace the three theological virtues, which are also
<habitus supernaturales>, and, according to the more common opinion, the four
cardinal virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, are infused in the soul. Of themselves,
such "habitus" give no facility to act, but only the power, the mere <potentia>.  The
facility--habit proper, or virtue in the strict sense--is acquired by the co-operation of
man with Divine grace and the repetition of acts. By sin, on the contrary, these
<habitus> are lessened or lost.

C. A. DUBRAY

Transcribed by Mary Ann Grelinger

<Dedicated to her grandchildren: Christian, Elizabeth, Kathleen, John, Jamie, Mary
Catherine, William, and two yet unborn.>

Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).

This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an effort aimed at placing the
entire Catholic Encyclopedia on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to contribute to this
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