(Renatus Cartesius), philosopher and scientist, born at La Haye France, 31
March, 1596; died at Stockholm, Sweden, 11 February 1650. He studied at the
Jesuit college of La Fl�che, one of the most famous schools of the time. In
1613 he went to Paris, where he formed a lasting friendship with Father
Mersenne, O. F. M., and made the acquaintance of the mathematician Mydorge.
He afterwards enlisted in the armies of Maurice of Nassau, and of the Duke
of Bavaria. On 10 November, 1619, he felt a strong impulse to set aside the
prejudices of his childhood and of his environment, and to devote his life
to the restoration of human knowledge, which was then in a state of
decadence; and for him this mission took on quite a mystical character. He
had a dream which he interpreted as a revelation, and he became convinced
that "it was the Spirit of Truth that willed to open for him all the
treasures of knowledge". After much journeying in Brittany, Poitou,
Switzerland, and Italy, he returned to Paris in 1625. There he remained for
two years during which it was his fortune to meet Cardinal B�rulle who
encouraged him in his scientific vocation. But as Paris offered neither the
peace nor the independence his work demanded, he set out in 1629 for
Holland, and there in the midst of a commercial people he enjoyed the
advantage of living as quietly as in a desert. From this retreat he gave to
the world his "Discours de la m�thode" (1637), "M�ditations" (1641),
"Principes" (1644), and "Passions"(l649). "Le Monde" had been completed in
1633, but the condemnation of Galileo frightened Descartes who preferred to
avoid all collision with ecclesiastical authority. He deferred the
publication of this clever work without, however, losing hope of eventually
bringing it out. In 1649, yielding to the entreaties of Queen Christina, he
went to Sweden, and died at Stockholm of inflammation of the lungs.
Descartes' work is important rather because of its quality than of its
quantity. Let us see first of all wherein his method is new. He observed,
as Bacon had already done before him, that there is no question on which
men agree. "There is nothing", he says "so evident or so certain that it
may not be controverted. Whence then this widespread and deep-rooted
anarchy? From the fact that our inquiries are haphazard" (R�gles pour la
direction de l'esprit, 4e R�gle). The first problem, then, is to discover a
scientific method. How is success in this difficult task to be assured? To
begin with, we must cease to rely on authority; and for two principal
reasons. "In whom can we trust" when "there is hardly a statement made by
one man, of which the opposite is not loudly supported by some other?" And
even "if all were agreed, the knowledge of their teaching would not suffice
us." "Had we by rote all the arguments of Plato and Aristotle, we should
not be any the more philosophers unless we were able to bring to bear on
any given question a solid judgment of our own. We should have indeed
learned history but not mastered a science" (3e R�gle) Philosophy
presupposes the understanding of problems--and consequently its method
cannot be external, it must be essentially immanent. The true method is to
seek for reasonable evidence and the norm of such evidence is to be found
in the science of mathematics (Discours de la m�thode, 2e partie). "It is
not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences to be learned, but
that he who would progress on the road to truth must not delay over any
object about which he cannot have a certainty equal to that given by
arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations" (2e R�gle).
Is everything, then, capable of being known in this way, and consequently
can human knowledge become the complete counterpart of reality? Descartes
says so over and over again; it is his controlling idea; and he endeavours
to prove it both from the nature of our thought and from the universal
connexion of things. The mind is equally intelligent however diverse the
objects it considers; and those objects because of their perfect
enchainment are always equally intelligible. There is, therefore, no
question "so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach or so deeply
hidden that we cannot discover it", provided only that we persevere and
follow the right method (Disc. de la m�th. 2e partie; 4e R�gle). Such is
the rationalism of Descartes, surpassing even that of Plato, in which under
the name of "the Infinite" three-fourths of reality remains for ever
unknowable. How then is this mathematical evidence to be obtained. Two
methods, dangerous at once and sterile, must be avoided. We cannot build on
the experience of our senses; "for they are often deceptive", and
consequently need a control which they have not in themselves. Bacon was
misled on this point (2e R�gle). Neither can we adopt the syllogistic
method; for this is not, as was formerly thought, a means of discovery. It
is simply a process in which, two terms being given, we find by means of a
third that the former two are linked together, i. e. that they have some
common characteristic. Now if they have this common characteristic it is
useless to search for it with any light other than their own. Let them pass
under direct scrutiny; let their natures be studied, and in time the common
trait will reveal itself. This is the mind's straight road to discovery,
passing on from one idea to another without the aid of a third. The
syllogism is of no use until the discovery has been made; it simply serves
the purpose of exposition (14e R�gle). There are but two ways leading to
mathematical evidence: intuition and deduction (3e R�gle). Intuition "is
the conception formed by an attentive mind so clear and distinct that it
admits of no doubt: or what amounts to the same thing, it is the clear
conception of a sound and attentive mind, the product of unaided reason"
(3e R�gle). Intuition is not, therefore, perception by the senses--it is an
act of the understanding brought to bear on an idea. The senses do not
supply the object but merely the occasion. A movement, for instance,
awakens in us the idea of motion, and it is that idea we must regard as the
object of intuition. In very simple matters intuition acts quickly; thus
"everyone can know intuitively that he exists; that a triangle is
terminated by three angles, neither more nor less, and that a globe has but
one surface" (3e R�gle; 12e R�gle; R�p. aux deux objections). In the case
of objects more or less complex, intuition proceeds by way of analysis.
Since it deals with ideas, and ideas are but one aspect of thought,
everything must be reduced to clear and distinct elements, to ultimate or
"indecomposable" parts. These ultimate parts must be inspected one after
another, until the object is exhausted, "by passing from those that are
easily known to those that are less easily known" (6e R�gle). In the long
run everything will be spread out in full light.
Deduction is the process in which by a continuous movement of thought we
draw from a thing that we certainly know the conclusions that of necessity
flow from it. This procedure may be carried on in two ways. "If, for
instance, after various calculations I discover the relation between the
quantities A and B, between B and C, between C and D, and lastly between D
and E, I do not yet know the relation between A and E"; but I can infer it
by retracting the several steps of the series. This is the first form of
deduction (7e R�gle). There is a second form in which, the connecting links
of the series being too numerous to enter the mental field of vision all at
once, we are content to draw conclusions from the general impression we
have of the series (7e R�gle). Deduction is an intellectual process, but it
differs from intuition by bringing in memory as a factor. And this is
noteworthy in view of the important role that memory plays in the Cartesian
explanation of certitude, and the desperate effort he makes to defend this
procedure. From the conspicuous place that reason holds in the Cartesian
method, one might infer that there was no room for experience. Nothing
could be less true. For Descartes, as for Bacon, the one purpose of science
is utility. He also expects from it a continual betterment of the
conditions of human life, and his hopes in that direction go very far, as,
for instance, when he says of medicine that in the end it would procure us
the boon of immortality (Disc. de la m�th. 6e partie). And as he who wills
the end wills the means also, Descartes accepts in its entirety the
experimental part of the Baconian method (letter to Mersenne, 1631), and
acts accordingly. He put himself in touch with all the experimental work of
his day (letter, April, 1632), urged others to take up research (letter to
Mersenne, 1632), and carried on experiments of his own that covered a wide
range of subjects: the weight of air (letter, 2 June, 1631), the laws of
sound and light (letter, 1633); the essential differences between oils,
spirits, eaux-de-vie, common waters, aquafortis, and salts. He dissected
the heads of various animals to show the workings of memory and imagination
(cf. letters to Mersenne, 1633 April, 1637; 13 November, 1639; 4 January,
1643, ed. Cousin, Paris, 1826). There was hardly a fact that escaped this
apologist of Reason nor anything into whose hidden nature he did not
inquire; even the "Chasse de Pan" he followed with his accustomed ardour.
But if the mind, moving as it does in the realm of intelligible objects,
have a power of intuition sufficient to master them all, why these
researches? Are they not a hindrance rather than a help? Let deduction but
go on to the end, and it must assuredly attain that exhaustive knowledge
which is the goal of investigation, but such is not the case. Experiment
helps reasoning in more ways than one. It supplies the fact that calls
forth in our intelligence the idea of the problem to be solved. That idea
once aroused, the intelligence takes hold of it, and may produce many
others, according to the nature of which experience and reason play
reciprocal, yet different, roles. The idea of a problem may be so simple as
to allow a mathematical deduction of the properties of the object in
question and nothing more. In this case experiment is called in only by way
of illustration, as happens, for instance, in the study of the laws of
motion. (Cf. Principes, 2e partie.) But again the idea of a problem may be
so complex as to suggest various hypotheses, since principles as a rule are
so fruitful that we can draw from them more than we see in the world around
us. We must then choose from among the hypotheses presented by the
intellect that which corresponds most nearly to the facts: and experiment
is our only resource. It acts as a sort of guide to rational deduction. It
sets up, so to say, a number of sign-posts which point out, at the
cross-roads of logic the right direction to the world of facts. Finally, we
may be confronted with two or more hypotheses equally applicable to the
known facts, observations must then be multiplied until we discover some
peculiarity which determines our choice: and thus experiment becomes a real
means of verification (Principes, 4e partie.) In every case experiment is,
as it were, the matter, while calculation becomes the form. In the physical
world there is nothing but motion and extension, nothing but quantity.
Everything can be reduced to numerical proportions, and this reduction is
the final object of science. To understand means to know in terms of
mathematics. When this final stage is reached, intelligence and experience
unite in closest bonds: the intellect setting its seal on experience and
endowing it with intelligibility.
Such is the method of Descartes. There remains to be seen what use he makes
of it. Recourse must be had to provisional doubt as the only means of
distinguishing the true from the false in the labyrinth of contradictory
opinions which are held in the schools and in the world at large. We must
needs imitate those builders who, in order to erect a lofty structure,
begin by digging deep, so that the foundations may be laid on the rock and
solid ground (Remarques sur les 7es objections, ed. Charpentier, Paris; cf.
Disc. de la m´thode, 3e partie.) And this provisional doubt goes very
deep indeed. We may reject the evidence of the senses for they are
deceptive, "and it is but the part of prudence never to trust absolutely
what has once deceived us" (1re M�ditation). We may even question whether
there be "any earth or sky or other extended body"; for, supposing that
nothing of the sort exist, I can still have the impression of their
existence as I had before; this is plain from the phenomena of madness and
dreams. What is more, the very simplest and clearest truths are not free
from suspicion." How do I know that God has not so arranged it that I am
deceived each time I add two and three together, or number the sides of a
square, or form some judgment still more simple, if indeed anything more
simple can be imagined" (3e M�ditation). What then remains intact? One
thing only, the fact of my thought itself. But if I think it is because I
exist, for from the one to the other of these terms we pass by simple
inspection-- Cogito, ergo sum: Behold the long-sought rock on which the
edifice of knowledge must be built (Disc. de la m�th., 4e partie, 2e M�d.).
But how is this to be done? how are we to make our way out of the abyss
into which we have descended? By analysing the basic fact, i. e. the
content of our thought. I observe that, since my thought gropes amid doubt,
I must be imperfect: and this idea calls forth this other, viz. of a being
that is not imperfect, and therefore is perfect and infinite (Disc. de la
m�th., 4e partie.) Let us consider this other idea. It must necessarily
include existence otherwise something would be wanting to it; it would not
be perfect or infinite. Therefore, God exists, and "I know no less clearly
and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to His nature
than I know that whatever I can demonstrate of any figure or number belongs
truly to the nature of that figure or number " (Disc. de la m�th., 4e
partie; 5e M�dit.; R�p. aux premi�res obj.).
God, therefore, is known to us at the outset, the moment we take the
trouble to look into the nature of our own minds; and this is enough to
eliminate the hypothesis of an evil genius that would take pleasure in
deceiving us; it is enough also to secure the validity of all our
deductions, whatever be their length, for "I recognize that it is
impossible that He should ever deceive me, since in all fraud and deceit
there is a certain imperfection" (4e M�d.). Otherwise how would this idea
of God be anything more than an idle fancy? It has immensity; it has
infinity, and therefore it must of itself be capable of existing. Spinoza,
and after him Hegel, will teach that the possible infolds, as it were, an
essential tendency to existence, and that this tendency is greater in
proportion as the possible is perfect. It is on this principle that they
will build their vast synthetic systems. Descartes anticipates them and
when closely pressed he replies just as do these later philosophers. (R�p.
aux premi�res objections.) It is a fact worth noting with reference to the
genesis of modern systems.
The presence in us of this idea of God must also be explained; and here we
find a new ray of light. The objective reality of our ideas must have some
cause, and this is readily found when there is question of secondary
qualities; these may be illusory or they may result from the imperfection
of our nature. The question also can be solved without too much difficulty
when it concerns primary qualities. May not these arise perchance from some
depth of my own mental being that is beyond the control of my will? But
such explanations are of no avail when we try to account for the idea of a
being infinite and perfect. I myself am limited, finite; and from the
finite, turn it about as we may, we can never derive the infinite the
lesser never gives us the greater (3e M�d. cf. Princ., 7e partie).
Considered from any and every point of view, the idea of God enlightens us
as to His existence. Whatever the manner of our questioning it gives us
always from the depth of its fulness the one reply, Ego sum qui sum. Since
then the veracity of God Himself guarantees our faculties in their natural
exercise, we may go forward in our inquiry; and the first question that
meets us concerns the subject in which the process of thought takes place,
i.e. the soul. Understanding, conceiving, doubting, affirming, denying,
willing, refusing, imagining, feeling, desiring--these are the activities
of what I call my soul. Now all these activities have one common quality:
they cannot take place without thought or perception, without consciousness
or knowledge. Thought then is the essential attribute of the soul. The soul
is "a thing that thinks" (2e M�d., Princ., 1re partie) and it is nothing
else. There is no substratum underlying and supporting its various states;
its whole being issues in each of its activities; thought and soul are
equivalent (12e R�gle).
Is thought, then, always in some mode of activity? Descartes leans to the
belief that it is. "I exist", he says, "but for how long? Just as long as I
am thinking; for perhaps if I should wholly cease to think, I should at the
same time altogether cease to be" (2e M�d.). It is only with reluctance and
under the pressure of objections that he concedes to the soul a simple
potentia or power of thinking (5es Obj.); and, as may be easily seen, the
concession is quite illogical. Thought, though in itself a unitary process,
takes on different forms; it begins with confused ideas or perceptions
which require the co-operation of the body; such are the feelings of
pleasure and pain, sensations imagination, and local memory. Then the soul
has clear and distinct ideas, which it begets and develops within itself as
immanent activities. Under this head come the ideas of substance, duration,
number, order extension, figure, motion, thought, intelligence, and will
(6e M�d.; Princ., I).
These clear and distinct notions constitute of themselves the object of the
understanding, and one may say that they are all involved in the idea of
perfect being. Whether I understand, or pass judgment or reason, it is
always that idea which I perceive and my understanding could have no other
object, seeing that its sphere of action is always the infinite, the
eternal and the necessary. To advance in knowledge is to progress in the
knowledge of God Himself. (Rep. aux 2es obj.) But thought has another
dominant form, viz. freedom. For Descartes this function of the mind is a
fact "of which reason can never convince us", but one which "we experience
in ourselves", and this fact is so evident" that it may be considered one
of the most generally known ideas" (Rep. aux 3es obj.; Rep. aux 5es obj.-
Princ., 1re partie). Not only is this freedom a primordial and undeniable
datum of consciousness: it is, in a way, infinite like God, "since there is
no object to which it cannot turn". (4e M�d.; Princ., 1re partie.) It does
not creep round in a sort of semi-ignorance, as St. Thomas Aquinas holds,
but it grows as the influencing motives become clearer; indifference is but
its lowest stage (letter to Mersenne, 20 May, 1630). The part it plays in
our lives is considerable: it enters into each of our judgments, and it is
the formal cause of all our errors. It makes itself felt in every part of
our organism, and through this it influences the external world.
Nevertheless, the sum total of motion in the world is always constant; for
while our wills may change the direction of movement they do not affect its
quantity. (Letter to Regius.) Confronting the soul is the external world:
but the soul does not see it as it really is. Heat, odour taste, light,
sound, resistance, weight are qualities which we attribute to bodies but
which are really in ourselves, since we only conceive them in relation to
ourselves. In reality there is nothing in the physical world but motion and
extension. Motion imitates as far as possible the immutability of God who
is its first cause; hence its principal laws, viz. that the sum of motion
in the world is always constant; that a body will continue in its actual
state unless disturbed by some other body outside itself; that "once a body
is in motion we have no reason for thinking its present velocity will ever
cease provided it impinges on no other body which would slacken or destroy
its motion". All movement is primarily rectilinear (on this point Aristotle
was mistaken). When two bodies moving in different directions collide, a
change takes place in their directions, but "such change is always the
least possible". When two moving bodies impinge on each other, one cannot
transmit any motion to the other without losing what it transmits (Princ.,
2e partie). Extension is not infinite in duration but it is infinite in
space. "It seems to me that one cannot prove or even conceive that there
are limits to the matter of which the world is composed, for I find it is
composed of nothing but extension in length, breadth, and depth. So that
whatever possesses these three dimensions is a portion of such matter": and
however far back in imagination we push the limits of space we still find
these three dimensions; they are bounded by no limits (letter to Chanut;
letter to Marus). Extension is therefore one block, continuous from end to
end; and this proves at the same time that there is no such thing as a
vacuum, either in bodies or between them. Moreover extension is divisible
ad infinitum since the divided particles, however small, are still
extended. It is everywhere homogeneous, since it is made up of spatial
dimensions only, and these of themselves give rise to no qualitative
differences. And this brilliant idea suggested to Descartes many hypotheses
that were to prove fruitful. In his view the matter of the earth and of the
stars was the same; and spectrum analysis subsequently proved that he was
correct. He held that the primordial state of the sun and planets was
nebulous, that under the influence of a cooling process the heavenly bodies
formed their crusts, and to changes in these crusts is due the variation in
brilliance of the stars and the emergence of the continents on our earth.
(Cf. Trait� du Monde; Princ., 3e and 4e p.) It does not follow that the
world is self-sufficient; but the finality, of which so much is said, leads
to nothing. God gave matter a first impulse and the rest followed in the
course of nature's laws. "Even if the chaos of the poets be granted, one
could always show that, thanks to the laws of nature, this confusion would
eventually work itself out to our present order"; the laws of nature being
such that "matter is constrained to pass through all the forms of which it
is capable".
The older Descartes grew, the more he busied himself with morals, and his
aim was to end up with a treatise on ethics. As a matter of fact, we have
his treatise on the passions, and a few brief disquisitions scattered among
his letters to Chanut and to the Princess Elizabeth. The passions are
perceptions generated and nurtured in the soul "through the medium of the
nerves" (Passions, 1re partie, art. 3-22). The nerves are bundles of fine
threads: these threads contain the animal spirits which are the subtlest
parts of the blood: and they all meet at the pineal gland which is the seat
of the soul. By means of this mechanism the thinking subject receives
impressions from the world without, perceives them, and transforms them
into passions (Pass., 1re p, art. 31). And though our organism thus
contains the cause of our passions, it is not their subject either entirely
or partially; on this point also Aristotle was mistaken. There are
perceptions arising from the body and localizing themselves in one or other
portion of it--such as hunger, thirst, pain--but the passions are
different. They originate in the body, but belong to the soul alone; they
are purely psychological facts (Passions, 1re p., art.25). There are as
many passions as there are ways in which objects capable of affecting our
senses may be hurtful or profitable to us. The primary passions to which
all others may be reduced are the six following:
* admiration or surprise, produced by an object as to which we are as
yet ignorant whether it is useful or hurtful;
* love and hate, caused by the impression produced on our organs of
sense by objects which are already known to us as beneficial or
harmful;
* desire, which is but the love or the hate we bear an object considered
as future;
* joy and sadness, which result from the presence of an object that is
loved or hated (Passions, 2e partie, art. 52).
Perhaps on the whole St. Thomas and Bossuet will be found to have surpassed
Descartes, by reducing all the passions to love. In the Cartesian teaching
the passions are good in themselves, but they must be kept in subjection to
the law of moral order. What this law is he does not clearly indicate; he
gives only some scattered precepts in which one may discern a noble effort
to build up a Stoico-Christian system of ethics.
The foregoing account may perhaps give the impression that Descartes was a
great savant rather than a great philosopher; but the significance of his
scientific work should be properly understood. What remains of value is not
so much his theories, but the impetus given by his genius, his method, his
discoveries. His quantitative conception of the world is being gradually
abandoned, and today men's minds are turning to a philosophy of nature
wherein quality plays a controlling part.
CLODIUS PIAT
Transcribed by Rick McCarty
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an effort aimed at placing the entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913 edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight, editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to contribute to this worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-mail at (knight.org/advent). For more information please download the file cathen.txt/.zip.
