Vows

I. GENERAL VIEW

A vow is defined as a promise made to God. The promise is binding,
and so differs from a simple resolution which is a present purpose
to do or omit certain things in the future. As between man and
man, a promise pledges the faith of the man who makes it; he
promises, wishing some other person to trust him, and depend upon
him. By his fidelity he shows himself worthy of trust; if he
breaks his word, he loses credit, by causing the other a
disappointment which is destructive of mutual confidence -- and,
like faith, mutual confidence is important to society, for the
natural law condemns all conduct which shakes this confidence.
These statements do not apply to a promise made to God; it is
impossible for me to deceive God as to my present intention, and
He knows whether I shall be constant in the future: God, then, is
protected against that disappointment on account of which the
failure to fulfil a promise to a fellow-man is considered
disgraceful. But, just as one can offer to God an existing thing,
or a present action, so also one can offer Him a future action,
and perseverance in the purpose of fulfilling it. That offering of
perseverance is characteristic of avow. A subsequent change in
one's purpose is a want of respect to God: it is like taking away
something that has been dedicated to Him, and committing sacrilege
in the widest sense of the word. Unlike the simple breach of a
promise made to a man, a failure to give to God what has been
promised Him is a matter of importance, a very serious offence.

This explanation shows us also how a vow is an act of religion,
just as any offering made to God. It is a profession that to God
is due the dedication of our actions, and an acknowledgment of the
order which makes Him our last end. By adding to our obligations,
we declare that God deserves more than He demands. Lastly we see
why a vow is always made to God -- for, as all our actions ought
to be ultimately directed to Him, we cannot make a final promise
of those actions to anyone but God. Promises made to the saints
cannot be lightly neglected without detracting from the honour we
owe them; but a failure in this respect, though grave in itself,
is vastly less serious than breaking a vow, to which it bears some
resemblance. These promises occasionally imply a vow. God is well
pleased with the honour paid to His saints, and they rejoice at
the glory given to God. We may then confirm by a vow the promise
made to a saint, and likewise we may honour a saint by a vow made
to God, as for instance, to erect in memory of some saint a temple
for Divine worship.

The vow, moreover, is approved by God, because it is useful to
man; it strengthens his will to do what is right. The Protestants
of the sixteenth century, following Wyclif, declared themselves
opposed to vows; but Luther and Calvin condemned only vows
relating to acts which were not of obligation, the latter because
he considered all good actions as obligatory, the former because
the vow of a free action was contradictory to the spirit of the
new law. Both denied that the vow was an act of religion and
justified it by the simple human reason of strengthening the will.
Certain recent tendencies have minimized the importance at least
of vows made by members of religious communities. Errors of this
kind are due to overemphasis of the fact that vows, and especially
the perpetual vow of chastity, of religious life, or of missionary
labour, do not imply any special instability in the person who
makes them, but only the fickleness natural to the human will; and
that instead of denoting the grudging service of a slave, they
imply rather the enthusiasm of a generous will, eager to give and
sacrifice beyond what is necessary, and at the same time so
sincere in self-knowledge as to imitate warriors who burned their
ships to cut off the possibility and even the temptation to
flight. In the case of a will incapable of change, a vow would
have no meaning; it were useless to offer a perseverance that
could never be found wanting; for this reason it is not suitable
to Christ, or the angels, or to the blessed in heaven.

II. MORAL AND THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A vow, even in an unimportant matter, presupposes the full consent
of the will; it is an act of generosity towards God. One does not
give unless one knows fully what one is doing. Every substantial
error, or indeed every error which is really the cause of making a
vow, renders the vow null and void. This condition must be
properly understood; to judge of the effect of the error, it is
necessary to know the will of the person making the vow at the
moment of making it. One who can say sincerely, "if I had known
this or that, I would not have made the vow", is not bound by the
vow. If, however, one who is aware of some ignorance on the matter
of a vow, but, in spite of that, generously decides to make it,
knowing its general import and that it is in itself proper and
commendable, such as the vow of chastity, for instance, is bound
by it, as it is entirely valid. Lastly, the vows which accompany
the entrance into a state, such as the vows of religion, can only
be rendered void by some really substantial error. The good of the
community requires this stability. For every vow whatsoever such
knowledge and liberty are required as render a person capable of
committing serious sin; though it does not follow that at the age
when one is capable of committing mortal sin, one is capable of
understanding the importance of a perpetual engagement. The object
of a vow, according to the classical formula, must be not merely
something good, but something better; whence it follows that no
vow must be made to God of any unlawful or indifferent matter. The
reason is simple: God is all holy and cannot accept the offering
of anything which is bad or less good in its nature. Again, the
object of the vow must be something that is humanly possible, for
no one can be bound to do what is impossible. No man can make a
vow to avoid all manner of sin, even the slightest, because this
is morally impossible. The vow to avoid deliberate sin is valid,
at least in persons who have made some progress in virtue. A vow
may apply to a duty already existing or to acts which are not
commanded by any law. A vow, being a personal act, binds only the
person who makes it; but a superior, who makes a vow in the name
of his community, may, within the limits of his authority, command
the fulfilment of the vow. (As to the obligation of heirs, see
section III of this article.) A vow binds according to the
intention of the person who makes it; and this intention must be
reasonable: in an unimportant matter, one cannot bind oneself
under pain of grievous sin. In order to estimate the gravity of
the matter, we distinguish between vows which affect isolated
acts, and vows which relate to a series of acts. To an isolated
act the well-known rule applies: The matter is grave if, in the
hypothesis of an ecclesiastical command, it would oblige under
mortal sin; but if the vow relates to a series of acts, then we
must see what is truly important in regard to the end pursued.
Thus every grave offence against the virtue of chastity, as it
should be observed outside the married state, is a serious matter
for the vow of chastity. The omission of one or two Masses or one
or two Rosaries is not a grave matter in the case of a vow to be
present at Mass or to say the Rosary every day. Every mortal sin
is a grave offence against a vow to do what is most perfect; it is
not the same with venial sin, even when deliberate; there must be
a habit of committing acts which are certainly imperfect, in order
to constitute a grave sin against this vow.

A vow is fulfilled by doing what has been promised, even without a
positive intention of fulfilling the vow. One should personally
fulfil the vow of some act or omission, promised as such as, for
instance, the vow of a pilgrimage, but may fulfil through another
such a vow as that of almsgiving, or donation or restitution of
property. All obligation ceases when the fulfilment of the vow
becomes impossible or harmful, or if the reason for the vow ceases
to exist. (As to dispensation from vows, see section III.) A vow
is a good action, but should be made with prudence and discretion;
in the Christian life, love is better than bonds. We should avoid
vows which are embarrassing, either because they are too numerous
or because we may be unable to fulfil them (for failure to fulfil
a vow is sure to be followed by sorrow which may endure for a long
time); besides such vows as are not helpful to sanctification or
charity. The more important the obligation the more careful
reflection and preparation it requires. No objection can be made
to reasonable vows made in order to increase the efficacy of
prayer; but the vows to be commended above all are those which
give us strength against some weakness, help us to cure some
fault, or, best of all, contain the germ of some great spiritual
fruit. Such are the vows of religion or missionary work.

III. CANONICAL ASPECT

A. Division of Vows

The vow properly so called is made to God alone, but promises made
to the saints have a certain resemblance to vows and are often
accompanied by a vow, as we have already seen. A vow may be the
act of a private person, or the act of a superior representing a
community. In the latter case the community is only indirectly
bound by the vow. The sentiment which leads a person to take a vow
marks the distinction between absolute and conditional vows. The
condition may be suspensive, that is to say, it may make the
commencement of the obligation depend on the happening or the not
happening of some future uncertain event; for instance, the words,
"If I recover my health", make the obligation commence upon the
recovery; or it may be resolutory, that is, it may have the effect
of rescinding the vow, as if the person adds to the vow the words,
"Unless I lose my fortune", in which case the vow ceases to bind
if the fortune is lost. The same sentiment distinguishes between
simple, or pure, vows, by which a person promises simply to do an
act which is pleasing to God, and vows having some special end in
view, such as another's conversion. According to their object,
vows may be personal, as a promise to do a certain act; or real,
as a promise of a certain thing; or mixed, as a promise to nurse a
sick person with one's own hands. They may also have reference to
a single definite object, or leave the choice among two or three
objects (disjunctive vows). According to the manner of their
utterances, there are vows interior and exterior; vows express,
and vows tacit or implied (as for instance, that of the subdeacon
at his ordination); vows secret, and vows made in public.
According to their juridical form, they may be private or made
with the Church's recognition; and these last are divided into
simple and solemn vows. Lastly, from the point of view of the
dispensation required, vows are either reserved to the Holy See or
not reserved. In itself the vow is a promise, and does not imply
any surrender or transfer of rights; certain vows, however,
according to ecclesiastical law, modify the rights of persons;
such are the vows taken in religious orders.

B. Simple and Solemn Vows

Under RELIGIOUS LIFE we have seen how the distinction arose
historically between simple and solemn vows, the names of which
appear in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Various opinions
have been expressed as to the matter of this distinction, and the
question has not yet been decided. Some persons make the essential
solemnity consist in the surrender of oneself which accompanies
certain vows; this is the opinion of Gregory of Valentia (Comment.
theol., III, D. 6, Q. vi, punct. 5) and many recent Thomists. But
the surrender is found in vows which are not solemn, such as the
vows of scholastics of the Society of Jesus, who would not be
religious properly so-called, if their surrender differed
essentially from that of the professed fathers. Moreover, the
surrender really accompanies only a vow of obedience accepted in a
religious order, while other vows are solemn, even without any
question of obedience, such as the vow of chastity made by
subdeacons in the opinion of Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor., I, nn. 64750)
the solemnity of the vow consists in a spiritual consecration, the
effect of which is that, after such a vow, a person is irrevocably
set apart and appointed by the Church to serve God by the offering
of that vow. This opinion has its attractive side, but does it
agree with history? The vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land was
temporary and solemn. Or does it agree with the definition of law?
Boniface VIII declares those vows to be solemn which are
accompanied either by a consecration or by a religious profession.
And lastly, does not the consecration logically follow the
solemnity, rather than precede or cause it? In spite of its
complication and the forced explanations to which recourse is had,
in order to escape from the difficulty, the opinion of Suarez (De
religione tr. VII, c.ii, c.x, n.l; c.xii, nn.7-9; c.xiii, nn.3, 8-
13; c.xiv, n. 10) still finds distinguished defenders, especially
Wernz (Jus Decretalium, III, n. 572). This opinion places the
essence of the solemnity in the absolute surrender of himself by
the religious, and the acceptance of that surrender by the
religious order, which is accomplished by solemn profession, and
also in the incapacity of a person who is bound by solemn vows to
perform validly acts that are contrary to those vows; such as the
incapacity to possess property, or to contract marriage. But
historically this incapacity was not and is not always attached to
solemn vows; the solemn vow of obedience does not as such involve
any particular incapacity; and often solemn vows do not produce
this effect. Will they be called solemn as being attached to the
vow of obedience, and solemnized by the surrender of oneself?

But, apart from the arbitrary nature of these explanations, the
vow of the Crusader was solemn without being attached to any more
general vow of obedience; and we have seen that the surrender does
not constitute the solemnity. For this reason we prefer a simple
opinion, which, in accord with Vasquez (In I-II, Q. xcvi, d. clxv,
especially n. 83) and Sanchez (In decalogum, 1, 5, c. 1, n. 11-
13), places the material solemnity of vows of religion in the
surrender followed by irrevocable acceptance; and with Laymann (De
statu religioso, c. i, n. 4), Pellizarius (Manuale regularium, tr.
IV, c. i. nn. 10-18). Medina (De sacrorum hominum continentia, l.
4, controv. 7, c. xxxviii), V. De Buck (De solemnitate votorum
epistola), Nilles (De juridica votorum solemnitate), and Palmieri
(Opus theol., II, pp. 445, 446) respects the ordinary juridical
signification of the solemn act. The juridical solemnities are
formalities to be observed in order to give to the act either its
legal value or at least the more or less valuable guarantee of
perfect authenticity. This very simple explanation accounts for
the historical changes, both those which have reference to the
number and conditions of vows, and those which concern their
effects. It is natural that there should be greater difficulty in
obtaining a dispensation from a solemn vow, and also that the
Church should attach certain disabilities to such a vow. But these
effects of solemn vows cannot constitute the essence of such vows.
However this may be, canon law at the present day does not
recognize any vow as solemn except the vow of chastity, solemnized
by religious profession in an order strictly so called. The vows
taken in religious congregations, like the simple vows which in
religious orders precede the solemn profession, and also the
complementary simple vows which follow the profession in some
institutes, and lastly the final simple vows taken in certain
religious orders in place of solemn profession, are, strictly
speaking, private; but they derive a certain authenticity from the
approval of the Church and the circumstances in which they are
taken.

C. Obligation of the Heir

In itself the vow creates a personal obligation, which does not
arise from the virtue of justice and which would seem to cease at
the death of the person taking the vow. It is admitted,
nevertheless, that heirs are bound to fulfil the vows called real,
because they imply a promise to make over certain property or
money; the origin of this obligation is the Roman law "De
pollicitionibus", accepted as canon law. As to its nature, it is
an obligation of religion, if the person making the vow has not
made a bequest of the property by will. In this supposition the
obligation would be of justice; but in the other cases, seeing
that the law mentions no specific title, but simply declares that
the obligation of the vow devolves on the heirs, we infer it
devolves talis qualis, that is as a religious obligation.

The obligation of the vow is cancelled not only by the performance
of the work promised, but also by the effective substitution of a
better work, and by any circumstance which would have prevented
the obligation from arising; as, for instance, if the work became
useless, or unnecessary, or impossible. The obligation of the vow
may also be annulled by lawful authority. We shall first sum up
the generally accepted doctrine, and then endeavour to explain it
briefly.

We must distinguish between the power to annul a vow and the power
to dispense from the obligation to fulfil it. A vow may be
annulled directly or indirectly. No vow can be made to the
prejudice of an obligation already existing. If a person entitled
to benefit under a previous obligation asserts a claim which is
incompatible with the fulfilment of a vow, the fulfilment is
prevented, and the obligation is ipso facto at least temporarily
removed. Thus, a master may require the performance of services
promised by the contract of hiring, without reference to any vow
subsequently made; a husband may also require his wife to fulfil a
conjugal duty. This is indirect annulment, which presents no
difficulty. But besides this, certain persons, in virtue of a
general power over the acts of others, may directly and finally
annul all vows made by their subjects, or may prevent them
generally from taking vows in the future. This power belongs to
the father or guardian in the case of a minor, to the regular
prelate, and even to the superior of religious congregations, in
the case of professed religious; and, according to many
authorities, to the husband, in the case of the married woman; and
the person exercising this power of annulment is not required to
prove the existence of just cause.

The power of dispensing, on the contrary, requires a just cause,
less, however, than that which would suffice by itself to exempt
from a vow. A still less reason is enough to commute the vow into
another good work, especially if the latter is almost equivalent
to the work promised. According to canon law, all vows made before
solemn profession cease to bind by the fact of that profession,
due regard being shown to the rights of third persons; and it is
always permissible for a person to commute vows previously made
into those of his or her religious profession, even when this is
not solemn. When a vow is commuted by ecclesiastical authority,
although the person who has taken the vow may always fulfil his
obligation by doing the work originally promised, he is not in any
case bound to do so, even if the substituted work becomes
impossible. The power of dispensing and commuting belongs to those
who have ordinary jurisdiction (besides the pope, the bishop and
the regular prelate) over all vows not reserved to the pope and
vows the dispensation from which does not prejudice the rights of
third persons. Without the consent of the latter these rights
cannot be prejudiced by a dispensation from the vow, except by the
exercise of a supreme power over those rights, such as is
possessed by the pope over the rights of religious congregations.
Moreover, the power of dispensation may be delegated either in
special cases or even generally: thus the confessors of the
regular orders may grant dispensation from vows to their
penitents-that is to persons whose confessions they are authorized
to receive.

Dispensation from a vow is ordinarily justified by great
difficulty in its fulfilment or by the fact that it was taken
without due deliberation, or by the probability of some greater
good either to the person taking it or to others, as, for
instance, to a family, the State, or the Church. In dispensing
from vows, the ecclesiastical superior does not dispense from any
Divine law, but he exercises the power of the keys, the power of
binding and loosing, in order to remit the debt contracted to God:
and this power appears so useful to society, that, even if it had
not been formally conferred by Christ, we might contend that it
would always have belonged to the authority responsible for the
public interests of religion. (See Suarez, "De religione", VI, Q.
xviii.) The direct annulment of vows is more difficult of
explanation; for no one can have a power extending so far as to
interfere with the interior acts of another person. A son not yet
arrived at the age of puberty may, even without the consent of his
parents, make a promise of marriage; why does he appear to be
unable, by reason of his tender age, to bind himself by any vow to
God? We may observe that the distinction between direct and
indirect annulment is not found in St. Thomas, or in Cajetan, but
dates from a later period. With Lehmkuhl, we cannot explain this
power without the intervention of ecclesiastical authority: in our
opinion, the Church, in consideration of the weakness of minors
and the condition of religious and married women, gives them a
general conditional dispensation that is to say a dispensation at
the discretion of the father, the superior, or the husband. The
power to commute vows does not give the power to dispense from
them; but the power over vows may, according to a probable
opinion, extend also to oaths, and even to vows confirmed by
oaths.

D. Reserved Vows

No person may, in virtue of ordinary powers, dispense from vows
which the sovereign pontiff has reserved to himself. These vows
are, first, all such as form part of a religious profession, at
least in an institute approved by Rome, and this reservation
applies also to vows taken by women belonging to orders, entitled
to make solemn VOWS, but who in some countries take only simple
VOWS. Besides these, five vows are reserved to the Holy See: the
vow of perpetual chastity, the vow to enter the religious state
(that is in an institution with solemn vows), a vow of a
pilgrimage to the tombs of the Apostles, to St. James of
Compostela, or to the Holy Land. However, these vows are only
reserved if they are made under grave obligation, with full
liberty and unconditionally, and if they include the whole object
of the vow. The reservation does not extend to accidental
circumstances, for instance, to enter one order in preference to
another, or to make a pilgrimage in this or that manner. In urgent
cases, when there would be great peril in delay, the ordinaries
may, if necessary, dispense even from reserved vows.

IV. THE VOW OF CHASTITY

The vow of chastity forbids all voluntary sexual pleasure, whether
interior or exterior: thus its object is identical with the
obligations which the virtue of chastity imposes outside the
marriage state. Strictly speaking, it differs (though in ordinary
language the expressions may be synonymous) from the vow of
celibacy (or abstinence from marriage), the vow of virginity
(which becomes impossible of fulfilment after complete
transgression), or the vow not to use the rights of marriage. The
violation of the vow of chastity is always a sin against religion;
it constitutes also a sacrilege in a person who has received Holy
orders, or in a religious, because each of these persons has been
consecrated to God by his vow: his vow forms part of the public
worship of the Church. Some authors consider that this sacrilege
is committed by the violation of even a private vow of chastity.
Although a sin against the virtue of chastity is committed, there
is no violation of the vow when a person without experiencing any
sexual pleasure personally becomes an accomplice (as for instance
by counsel) in the sin of another person not bound by a vow.
Unless the person concerned is able honestly to abstain from all
use of the rights of marriage, every simple vow of chastity
constitutes a prohibitive impediment to marriage; sometimes, as is
the case in the Society of Jesus, it becomes by privilege a
diriment impediment; when joined to religious solemn profession,
it has the effect even of annulling a previous marriage not
consummated. Some theologians have expressed the opinion that the
religious profession produced this effect by Divine law; but it is
more usual at the present day, and it seems to us more correct, to
see in this a point of ecclesiastical discipline. A person who, in
defiance of his solemn vow, attempts to contract marriage, incurs
the excommunication reserved to the bishop by the Constitution
"Apostolicae Sedis". Marriage following after the simple vow of
perpetual chastity has the effect of making the perfect fulfilment
of the vow impossible, as long as the married state continues --
therefore the observance of the vow is suspended, and the bishop
or the regular confessor may give permission for the use of
marriage. If the marriage is dissolved, the vow recovers its full
force. We have already seen that the vow of the wife, taken at
marriage, can be directly annulled by the husband, and that of the
husband indirectly by the wife.

The Sovereign Pontiff may dispense from the vow, even the solemn
vow, of chastity. History contains well-known examples of such
dispensations; thus, Julius III permitted Cardinal Pole to
dispense even priests who, at the time of the Anglican schism, had
contracted marriage; Pius VII dispensed priests who were civilly
married under the French Revolution. But such dispensations are
only granted for exceptionally grave reasons; and even when a case
is one of a simple vow of perpetual chastity freely and
deliberately taken, the Holy See ordinarily grants a dispensation
only in view of marriage, and imposes a perpetual commutation,
such as the condition of approaching the sacraments once a month.

V. HISTORICAL VIEWS

Historically there are frequent instances of special vows in the
Old Testament, generally under the form of offerings conditionally
made to God-offerings of things, of animals, even of persons,
which might, however, be redeemed; offerings of worship, of
abstinence, of personal sacrifices. See for example the vow of
Jacob (Gen., xxviu, 2022), of Jephte (Judges, xi, 30, 31), of Anna
the mother of Samuel (I Kings, i, 11), in which we find an example
of Nazaritism, and the imprecatory vow of Saul (I Kings, xiv, 24).
In Deuteronomy, xxiii, 21-23, it is laid down that there is no sin
in not making a promise to God, but that there is sin in delaying
to pay the vow. The New Testament contains no express commendation
of vows; but two instances of special vows are specially recorded
in the Acts of the Apostles (xviii, 18, and xxi, 23). In both
these passages, the vows are of the same nature as those of the
Nazarenes. These particular vows were not unknown to the Fathers
of the Church, especially to St. Ambrose, "De officiis
ministrorum", III, xii (P. L., XVI, 168); St. Jerome, Epistle 130
(PL 22:1118 and St. Augustine, Sermon 148 (P. L., XXXVIII, 799).
But the Church especially recognized the promise to devote one's
life to the service of God; baptism itself is accompanied by
promises which were formerly considered as genuine vows, and which
contain in reality a consecration of oneself to Jesus Christ by
the renunciation of the devil and paganism. At a very early period
continence was professed by virgins and widows -- and though this
profession appears rather under the form of the choice of a state
of life than a formal promise, in the fifth century it was
considered strictly irrevocable.

A. VERMEEBSCH
Transcribed by Tomas Hancil and Joseph P. Thomas

http://www.knight.org/advent

From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.

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