Voluntarism
Voluntarism (Lat. voluntas, will) in the modern metaphysical sense
is a theory which explains the universe as emanating ultimately
from some form of will. In a broader psychological sense, the term
is applied to any theory which gives prominence to will (in
opposition to intellect). In this latter sense, but not in the
former, the philosophy of Augustine, Anselm, William of Occam, and
Scotus may be styled Voluntarism. Philosophy is defined by
Augustine as "Amor sapienti�" ("De ordine", I, 11, n. 32; PL
32:993; "De civitate Dei", VIII, ii; PL 51:225). It is wisdom, but
it must be sought pie, caste, et diligenter ("De quant. an.", PL
32:1049); with the whole soul, not with the intellect only. Yet
nowhere does Augustine subordinate intellect to will. The neo-
Platonism which underlies the whole of his philosophic speculation
makes such an attitude impossible. Augustine's doctrine of grace
and of providence supposes a definite and characteristic
psychology of will. But in the metaphysical order God is ever
conceived as essentially intelligence. He is the "Father of
Truth". On this is based a proof of God's existence, which occurs
several times in his works and is peculiarly Augustinian in tone
("De div.", Q. 83, 14; PL 40:38; "De lib. arb.", II, nn. 7-33; PL
32:1243-63; "Confess.". VII, c. 10, n. 16; PL 32:742; "Soliloq.",
I, i, n. 2; PL 32:870; cf. "De civ. Dei", VIII, iv; PL 41:228,
229). In God Augustine places "the intelligible world" of the
Platonists, and the Divine concursus is a special way required by
human thought. God is "the sun of the soul" ("Gen. ad lit." XII,
xxxi, n. 59; PL 34:479; "De pecc. mer.", I, 25, n. 38; PL 44:130;
cf. "Soliloq.", I, 8,; PL 32:877), Himself performing the
functions which Scholastics ascribe to the intellectus agens.
Faith, too, with Augustine as with Anselm, involves intelligence.
For the principle intelligo ut credam is no less true than the
principle credo ut intelligam. ("In Ps. cxviii", serm. xviii, n.
3; PL 37:1552; serm xliii, c. vii, n. 9; PL 38:258.)
The philosophy of Scotus is more distinctly voluntaristic. On the
freedom of the will he is particularly clear and emphatic. He
insists that the will itself, and nothing but the will, is the
total cause of its volitions. It is not determined by another, but
determines itself contingenter, not inevitabiliter, to one of the
alternatives that are before it (II Sent., dist. xxv; see also
"ult comm." ibid). This is freedom, an attribute which is
essential to all higher forms of will, and consequently is not
suspended or annulled in the beatific vision (IV Send., dist.
xlix, Q. 4). Because the will holds sway over all other faculties
and again because to it pertains the charity which is the greatest
of the virtues, will is a more noble attribute of man than is
intelligence. Will supposes intelligence, is posterior
generatione, and therefore more perfect (IV Sent., dist. xlix, 4
"qu�stio lateralis").
Kant's "practical reason", in that it passes beyond the phenomenal
world to which "pure reason" is confined, is superior to the
latter. Practical reason, however, is not will: rather it is an
intelligence which is moved by will; and in any case it is a human
faculty, not a faculty of the absolute. Fichte is the first to
conceive will or deed-action (Thathandlung) as the ultimate and
incomprehensible source of all being. He is followed by Schelling,
who says that will is Ursein: there is no other being than it, and
of it alone are predicable the attributes usually predicated of
God. Schopenhauer holds will to be prior to intelligence both in
the metaphysical and the physical order. It appears in nature
first as a vague self-consciousness mingled with sympathy. Ideas
come later, as differences are emphasized and organization
developed. But throughout the will holds sway, and in its repose
Schopenhauer places his ideal. Nietzsche transforms "the will to
live" into "the will to power". His philosophy breathes at once
tyranny and revolt: tyranny against the weak in body and in mind;
revolt against the supremacy of the State, of the Church, and of
convention.
Pragmatism (q. v.) is an extreme form of psychological
Voluntarism; and with it is closely connected Humanism--a wider
theory, in which the function of the will in the "making of truth"
is extended to the making of reality. The Voluntarism of
Absolutists, such as Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer, confuses
the abstract concept of being, as activity in general, with the
more determinate, psychological concept of will, as rational self-
determination. The pragmatist identifies intelligence and will
with action.
LESLIE J. WALKER
Transcribed by Rick McCarty
http://www.knight.org/advent
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
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