Traditionalism
A philosophical system which makes tradition the supreme criterion
and rule of certitude.
Exposition
According to traditionalism, human reason is of itself radically
unable to know with certainty any truth or, at least, the
fundamental truths of the metaphysical, moral, and religious
order. Hence our first act of knowledge must be an act of faith,
based on the authority of revelation. This revelation is
transmitted to us through society, and its truth is guaranteed by
tradition or the general consent of mankind. Such is the
philosophical system maintained chiefly, in its absolute form, by
the Vicomte de Bonald and F. de Lamennais in their respective
works and, with some mitigation, by Bautain, Bonetty, Ventura,
Ubaghs, and the school of Louvain.
According to de Bonald, man is essentially a social being. His
development comes through society; and the continuity and progress
of society have their principle in tradition. Now language is the
instrument of sociability, and speech is as natural to man as is
his social nature itself. Language could not have been discovered
by man, for "man needs signs or words in order to think as well as
in order to speak"; that is "man thinks his verbal expression
before he verbally expresses his thought"; but originally
language, in its fundamental elements together with the thoughts
which it expresses, was given him by God His Creator (cf.
L�gislation primitive, I, ii). These fundamental truths,
absolutely necessary to the intellectual, moral, and religious
life of man, must be first accepted by faith. They are
communicated through society and education, and warranted by
tradition or universal reason of mankind. There is no other basis
for certitude and there remains nothing, besides tradition, but
human opinions, contradiction, and uncertainty (cf. Recherches
philosophiques, i, ix).
The system presented by Lamennais is almost identical with that of
de Bonald. Our instruments of knowledge, namely sense, feeling,
and reason, he says, are fallible. The rule of certitude therefore
can only be external to man and it can consist only in the control
of the individual senses, feelings, and reasoning by the testimony
of the senses, feelings, and reason of all other men; their
universal agreement is the rule of certitude. Hence, to avoid
scepticism, we must begin with an act of faith preceding all
reflection, since reflection pre-supposes the knowledge of some
truth. This act of faith must have its criterion and rule in the
common consent or agreement of all, in the general reason (la
raison g�n�rale). "Such is", Lamennais concludes, "the law of
human nature", outside of which "there is no certitude, no
language no society, no life" (cf. D�fense de l'Essai sur
l'Indiff�rence, xi).
The Mitigated Traditionalists make a distinction between the order
of acquisition (ordo acquisitionis) and the order of demonstration
(ordo demonstrationis). The knowledge of metaphysical truths, they
say, is absolutely necessary to man in order to act reasonably. It
must then be acquired by the child through teaching or tradition
before he can use his reason. And this tradition can have its
source only in a primitive revelation. Hence, in the order of
acquisition, faith precedes science. With these truths, however,
received by faith, human reason is able, through reflection, to
demonstrate the reasonableness of this act of faith, and thus, in
the order of demonstration, science precedes faith. When replaced
in its historical surroundings, Traditionalism clearly appears as
a reaction and a protest against the rationalism of the
philosophers of the eighteenth century and the anarchic
individualism of the French Revolution. Against these errors it
pointed out and emphasized the weakness and insufficiency of human
reason, the influence of society, education, and tradition on the
development of human life and institutions. The reaction was
extreme, and landed in the opposite error.
Criticism
Since Traditionalism, in its fundamental principles, is a kind of
Fideism, it falls under the condemnation pronounced by the Church
and under the refutation furnished by reason and philosophy
against Fideism. We may, however, advance certain criticisms
touching the characteristic elements of Traditionalism. It is
evident, first of all, that authority, whatever be the way or
agency in which it is presented to us, cannot of itself be the
supreme criterion or rule of certitude. For, in order to be a rule
of certitude, it must first be known as valid, competent, and
legitimate, and reason must have ascertained this before it is
entitled to our assent (cf. St. Thomas, I-II:2:1). Without
entering upon the psychological problem of the relations between
thought and expression, and even admitting with de Bonald that the
primitive elements of thought and language were originally given
directly by God to man, we are not forced to conclude logically
with him that our first act is an act of faith. Our first act
should rather be an act of reason, acknowledging, by natural
reflection, the credibility of the truths revealed by God.
Lamennais's criterion of universal reason or consent is open to
the same objections. First, how could universal consent or general
reason, which is nothing more than the collection of individual
judgments or of individual reasons, give certitude, when each of
these individual judgments is only matter of opinion or each of
these individual reasons is declared to be fallible? Again, how
could we in practice apply such a criterion, that is, how could we
ascertain the universality of such a judgment in the whole human
race, even if only moral universality were required? Moreover,
what would be, in this system, the criterion of truth, concerning
matters in which the human mind is not generally interested, or in
the scientific problems of which it is generally incompetent? But
above all, in order to give a firm and unhesitating assent to the
teaching of universal consent, we must first have ascertained the
reasonableness and legitimacy of its claims to our assent; that
is, reason must ultimately precede faith, otherwise our assent
would not be reasonable.
Mitigated or Semi-Traditionalism, in spite of its apparent
differences, is substantially identical with pure Traditionalism,
and falls under the same criticism, since religious and moral
truths are declared to be given to man directly by Revelation and
accepted by him antecedently to any act of his reason. Moreover,
there is no real foundation for the essential distinction between
the orders of invention and demonstration, which is supposed to
distinguish Semi-Traditionalism from pure Traditionalism. The
difference between these two orders is only accidental. It
consists in the fact that it is easier to demonstrate a truth
already known than to discover it for the first time; but the
faculties and process used in both operations are essentially the
same, since to demonstrate a truth already known is simply to
reproduce, under the guidance of this knowledge, the operation
performed and to take again the path followed in its first
discovery (cf. St. Thomas, "De Veritate", Q. xi, a. 1). Semi-
Traditionalism and absolute Traditionalism, then, rest upon the
same fundamental error, namely, that ultimately faith precedes
reason. Let us point out, however, the partial truth contained in
Traditionalism. Against Individualism and Rationalism, it rightly
insisted upon the social character of man, and rightly maintained
that authority and education play a large part in the
intellectual, moral, and religious development of man. Rightly
also it recalled to the human mind the necessity of respect for
tradition, for the experience and teaching it contains, to secure
a true and solid progress Universal consent may indeed be, in
certain conditions; a criterion of truth. In many circumstances,
it may furnish suggestion for the discovery of truth or afford
confirmation of the truth already discovered, but it can never be
the supreme criterion and rule of truth. Unless we admit that our
reason is of itself capable of knowing with certainty some
fundamental truths, we logically end in scepticism-the ruin of
both human knowledge and faith. The true doctrine, as taught by
the Catholic Church and confirmed by psychology and history, is
that man is physically and practically able to know with certainty
some fundamental truths of the natural, moral, and religious
order, but that, although he has the physical power, he remains in
the conditions of the present life, morally and practically
incapable of knowing sufficiently all the truths of the moral and
religious order, without the help of Divine Revelation (cf. First
Vatican Council, Sess. III, cap. ii).
GEORGE M. SAUVAGE
Transcribed by Tomas Hancil and Joseph P. Thomas
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc., P.O. Box 281096, Denver, Colorado, USA, 80228.
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