The Pope

(Ecclesial Latin papa from Gr. papas, a variant of
pappas father, in classical Latin pappas -- Juvenal,
"Satires" 6:633).

The title pope, once used with far greater latitude
(see below, section V), is at present employed solely
to denote the Bishop of Rome, who, in virtue of his
position as successor of St. Peter, is the chief pastor
of the whole Church, the Vicar of Christ upon earth.
Besides the bishopric of the Roman Diocese, certain
other dignities are held by the pope as well as the
supreme and universal pastorate: he is Archbishop of
the Roman Province, Primate of Italy and the adjacent
islands, and sole Patriarch of the Western Church. The
Church's doctrine as to the pope was authoritatively
declared in the First Vatican Council in the
Constitution "Pastor Aeternus". The four chapters of
that Constitution deal respectively with the office of
Supreme Head conferred on St. Peter, the perpetuity of
this office in the person of the Roman pontiff, the
pope's jurisdiction over the faithful, and his supreme
authority to define in all questions of faith and
morals. This last point has been sufficiently discussed
in the article INFALLIBILITY, and will be only
incidentally touched on here.

The present article is divided as follows:

I. Institution of a Supreme Head by Christ
II. Primacy of the Roman See
III. Nature and Extent of the Papal Power
IV. Jurisdictional Rights and Prerogatives of the Pope
V. Primacy of Honour: Titles and Insignia

I. INSTITUTION OF A SUPREME HEAD BY CHRIST

The proof that Christ constituted St. Peter head of His
Church is found in the two famous Petrine texts,
Matthew 16:17-19, and John 21:15-17. In Matthew 16:17-
19, the office is solemnly promised to the Apostle. In
response to his profession of faith in the Divine
Nature of his Master, Christ thus addresses him:.
"Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and
blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who
is in heaven. And I say to thee: That thou art Peter;
and upon this rock I will build my church, and the
gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will
give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And
whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth it shall be bound
also in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on
earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." The
prerogatives here promised are manifestly personal to
Peter. His profession of faith was not made as has been
sometimes asserted, in the name of the other Apostles.
This is evident from the words of Christ. He pronounces
on the Apostle, distinguishing him by his name Simon
son of John, a peculiar and personal blessing,
declaring that his knowledge regarding the Divine
Sonship sprang from a special revelation granted to him
by the Father (cf. Matthew 11:27). He further proceeds
to recompense this confession of His Divinity by
bestowing upon him a reward proper to himself: "Thou
art Peter [Cepha, transliterated also Kipha] and upon
this rock [Cepha] I will build my Church." The word for
Peter and for rock in the original Aramaic is one and
the same; this renders it evident that the various
attempts to explain the term "rock" as having reference
not to Peter himself but to something else are
misinterpretations. It is Peter who is the rock of the
Church. The term ecclesia (ekklesia) here employed is
the Greek rendering of the Hebrew qahal, the name which
denoted the Hebrew nation viewed as God's Church (see
CHURCH, THE, I).

Here then Christ teaches plainly that in the future the
Church will be the society of those who acknowledge
Him, and that this Church will be built on Peter. The
expression presents no difficulty. In both the Old and
New Testaments the Church is often spoken of under the
metaphor of God's house (Numbers 12:7; Jeremiah 12:7;
Osee 8:1; 9:15; 1 Cor. 3:9-17, Eph. 2:20-2; 1 Tim. 3:5;
Hebrews 3:5; I Peter 2:5). Peter is to be to the Church
what the foundation is in regard to a house. He is to
be the principle of unity, of stability, and of
increase. He is the principle of unity, since what is
not joined to that foundation is no part of the Church;
of stability, since it is the firmness of this
foundation in virtue of which the Church remains
unshaken by the storms which buffet her; of increase,
since, if she grows, it is because new stones are laid
on this foundation. It is through her union with Peter,
Christ continues, that the Church will prove the victor
in her long contest with the Evil One: "The gates of
hell shall not prevail against it." There can be but
one explanation of this striking metaphor. The only
manner in which a man can stand in such a relation to
any corporate body is by possessing authority over it.
The supreme head of a body, in dependence on whom all
subordinate authorities hold their power, and he alone,
can be said to be the principle of stability, unity,
and increase. The promise acquires additional solemnity
when we remember that both Old Testament prophecy
(Isiah 28:16) and Christ's own words (Matthew 7:24) had
attributed this office of foundation of the Church to
Himself. He is therefore assigning to Peter, of course
in a secondary degree, a prerogative which is His own,
and thereby associating the Apostle with Himself in an
altogether singular manner.

In the following verse (Matthew 16:19) He promises to
bestow on Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The
words refer evidently to Isaiah 22:22, where God
declares that Eliacim, the son of Helcias, shall be
invested with office in place of the worthless Sobna:
"And I will lay the key of the house of David upon his
shoulder: and he shall open, and none shall shut: and
he shall shut and none shall open." In all countries
the key is the symbol of authority. Thus, Christ's
words are a promise that He will confer on Peter
supreme power to govern the Church. Peter is to be His
vicegerent, to rule in His place. Further the character
and extent of the power thus bestowed are indicated. It
is a power to "bind" and to "loose" -- words which, as
is shown below, denote the grant of legislative and
judicial authority. And this power is granted in its
fullest measure. Whatever Peter binds or looses on
earth, his act will receive the Divine ratification.
The meaning of this passage does not seem to have been
challenged by any writer until the rise of the
sixteenth-century heresies. Since then a great variety
of interpretations have been put forward by Protestant
controversialists. These agree in little save in the
rejection of the plain sense of Christ's words. Some
Anglican controversy tends to the view that the reward
promised to St. Peter consisted in the prominent part
taken by him in the initial activities of the Church,
but that he was never more than primus inter pares
among the Apostles. It is manifest that this is quite
insufficient as an explanation of the terms of Christ's
promise.

The promise made by Christ in Matthew 16:16-19,
received its fulfilment after the Resurrection in the
scene described in John 21. Here the Lord, when about
to leave the earth, places the whole flock -- the sheep
and the lambs alike -- in the charge of the Apostle.
The term employed in 21:16, "Be the shepherd [poimaine]
of my sheep" indicates that his task is not merely to
feed but to rule. It is the same word as is used in
Psalm 2:9 (Sept.): "Thou shalt rule [poimaneis] them
with a rod of iron". The scene stands in striking
parallelism with that of Matthew 16. As there the
reward was given to Peter after a profession of faith
which singled him out from the other eleven, so here
Christ demands a similar protestation, but this time of
a yet higher virtue: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou
Me more than these"? Here, too, as there, He bestows on
the Apostle an office which in its highest sense is
proper to Himself alone. There Christ had promised to
make Peter the foundation-stone of the house of God:
here He makes him the shepherd of God's flock to take
the place of Himself, the Good Shepherd. The passage
receives an admirable comment from St. Chrysostom: "He
saith to him, 'Feed my sheep'. Why does He pass over
the others and speak of the sheep to Peter? He was the
chosen one of the Apostles, the mouth of the disciples,
the head of the choir. For this reason Paul went up to
see him rather than the others. And also to show him
that he must have confidence now that his denial had
been purged away. He entrusts him with the rule
[prostasia] over the brethren.... If anyone should say
'Why then was it James who received the See of
Jerusalem?', I should reply that He made Peter the
teacher not of that see but of the whole world" ["Hom.
88 (87) in Joan.", 1. Cf. Origen, "In Ep. ad Rom.",
5:10; Ephraem Syrus "Hymn. in B. Petr." in "Bibl.
Orient. Assemani", 1:95; Leo I, "Serm. iv de natal.",
2]. Even certain Protestant commentators frankly own
that Christ undoubtedly intended here to confer the
supreme pastorate on Peter. But other scholars, relying
on a passage of St. Cyril of Alexandria ("In Joan."
12:1), maintain that the purpose of the threefold
charge was simply to reinstate St. Peter in the
Apostolic commission which his threefold denial might
be supposed to have lost to him. This interpretation is
devoid of all probability. There is not a word in
Scripture or in patristic tradition to suggest that St.
Peter had forfeited his Apostolic commission; and the
supposition is absolutely excluded by the fact that on
the evening of the Resurrection he received the same
Apostolic powers as the others of the eleven. The
solitary phrase of St. Cyril is of no weight against
the overwhelming patristic authority for the other
view. That such an interpretation should be seriously
advocated proves how great is the difficulty
experienced by Protestants regarding this text.

The position of St. Peter after the Ascension, as shown
in the Acts of the Apostles, realizes to the full the
great commission bestowed upon him. He is from the
first the chief of the Apostolic band -- not primus
inter pares, but the undisputed head of the Church (see
CHURCH, THE, III). If then Christ, as we have seen,
established His Church as a society subordinated to a
single supreme head, it follows from the very nature of
the case that this office is perpetual, and cannot have
been a mere transitory feature of ecclesiastical life.
For the Church must endure to the end the very same
organization which Christ established. But in an
organized society it is precisely the constitution
which is the essential feature. A change in
constitution transforms it into a society of a
different kind. If then the Church should adopt a
constitution other than Christ gave it, it would no
longer be His handiwork. It would no longer be the
Divine kingdom established by Him. As a society it
would have passed through essential modifications, and
thereby would have become a human, not a Divine
institution. None who believe that Christ came on earth
to found a Church, an organized society destined to
endure for ever, can admit the possibility of a change
in the organization given to it by its Founder. The
same conclusion also follows from a consideration of
the end which, by Christ's declaration, the supremacy
of Peter was intended to effect. He was to give the
Church strength to resist her foes, so that the gates
of hell should not prevail against her. The contest
with the powers of evil does not belong to the
Apostolic age alone. It is a permanent feature of the
Church's life. Hence, throughout the centuries the
office of Peter must be realized in the Church, in
order that she may prevail in her age-long struggle.
Thus an analysis of Christ's words shows us that the
perpetuity of the office of supreme head is to be
reckoned among the truths revealed in Scripture. His
promise to Peter conveyed not merely a personal
prerogative, but established a permanent office in the
Church. And in this sense, as will appear in the next
section, His words were understood by Latin and Greek
Fathers alike.

II. PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN SEE

We have shown in the last section that Christ conferred
upon St. Peter the office of chief pastor, and that the
permanence of that office is essential to the very
being of the Church. It must now be established that it
belongs of right to the Roman See. The proof will fall
into two parts:

(a) that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and (b) that
those who succeed him in that see succeed him also in
the supreme headship.

(a) that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome

It is no longer denied by any writer of weight that St.
Peter visited Rome and suffered martyrdom there
(Harnack, "Chronol.", I, 244, n. 2). Some, however, of
those who admit that he taught and suffered in Rome,
deny that he was ever bishop of the city e. g.
Lightfoot, "Clement of Rome", II, 501; Harnack, op.
cit., I, 703. It is not, however, difficult to show
that the fact of his bishopric is so well attested as
to be historically certain. In considering this point,
it will be well to begin with the third century, when
references to it become frequent, and work backwards
from this point. In the middle of the third century St.
Cyprian expressly terms the Roman See the Chair of St.
Peter, saying that Cornelius has succeeded to "the
place of Fabian which is the place of Peter" (Ep 55:8;
cf. 59:14). Firmilian of Caesarea notices that Stephen
claimed to decide the controversy regarding rebaptism
on the ground that he held the succession from Peter
(Cyprian, Ep. 75:17). He does not deny the claim: yet
certainly, had he been able, he would have done so.
Thus in 250 the Roman episcopate of Peter was admitted
by those best able to know the truth, not merely at
Rome but in the churches of Africa and of Asia Minor.
In the first quarter of the century (about 220)
Tertullian (De Pud. 21) mentions Callistus's claim that
Peter's power to forgive sins had descended in a
special manner to him. Had the Roman Church been merely
founded by Peter and not reckoned him as its first
bishop, there could have been no ground for such a
contention. Tertullian, like Firmilian, had every
motive to deny the claim. Moreover, he had himself
resided at Rome, and would have been well aware if the
idea of a Roman episcopate of Peter had been, as is
contended by its opponents, a novelty dating from the
first years of the third century, supplanting the older
tradition according to which Peter and Paul were co-
founders, and Linus first bishop. About the same
period, Hippolytus (for Lightfoot is surely right in
holding him to be the author of the first part of the
"Liberian Catalogue" -- "Clement of Rome", 1:259)
reckons Peter in the list of Roman bishops.

We have moreover a poem, "Adversus Marcionem", written
apparently at the same period, in which Peter is said
to have passed on to Linus "the chair on which he
himself had sat" (P.L., II 1077). These witnesses bring
us to the beginning of the third century. In the second
century we cannot look for much evidence. With the
exception of Ignatius, Polycarp, and Clement of
Alexandria, all the writers whose works we possess are
apologists against either Jews or pagans. In works of
such a character there was no reason to refer to such a
matter as Peter's Roman episcopate. Irenaeus, however,
supplies us with a cogent argument. In two passages
(Adv. haer. 1:27:1, and 3:4:3) he speaks of Hyginus as
ninth Bishop of Rome, thus employing an enumeration
which involves the inclusion of Peter as first bishop
(Lightfoot was undoubtedly wrong in supposing that
there was any doubt as to the correctness of the
reading in the first of these passages. In 3:4:3, the
Latin version, it is true, gives "octavus"; but the
Greek text as cited by Eusebius reads enatos. Irenaeus
we know visited Rome in 177. At this date, scarcely
more than a century after the death of St. Peter, he
may well have come in contact with men whose fathers
had themselves spoken to the Apostle. The tradition
thus supported must be regarded as beyond all
legitimate doubt. Lightfoot's suggestion (Clement
1:64), that it had its origin in the Clementine
romance, has proved singularly unfortunate. For it is
now recognized that this work belongs not to the
second, but to the fourth century. Nor is there the
slightest ground for the assertion that the language of
Irenaeus, 3:3:3, implies that Peter and Paul enjoyed a
divided episcopate at Rome -- an arrangement utterly
unknown to the Church at any period. He does, it is
true, speak of the two Apostles as together handing on
the episcopate to Linus. But this expression is
explained by the purpose of his argument, which is to
vindicate against the Gnostics the validity of the
doctrine taught in the Roman Church. Hence he is
naturally led to lay stress on the fact that that
Church inherited the teaching of both the great
Apostles. Epiphanius ("Haer." 27:6) would indeed seem
to suggest the divided episcopate; but he has
apparently merely misunderstood the words of Irenaeus.

(b) that those who succeed him in that see succeed him
also in the supreme headship

History bears complete testimony that from the very
earliest times the Roman See has ever claimed the
supreme headship, and that that headship has been
freely acknowledged by the universal Church. We shall
here confine ourselves to the consideration of the
evidence afforded by the first three centuries. The
first witness is St. Clement, a disciple of the
Apostles, who, after Linus and Anacletus, succeeded St.
Peter as the fourth in the list of popes. In his
"Epistle to the Corinthians", written in 95 or 96, he
bids them receive back the bishops whom a turbulent
faction among them had expelled. "If any man", he says,
"should be disobedient unto the words spoken by God
through us, let them understand that they will entangle
themselves in no slight transgression and danger" (Ep.
59). Moreover, he bids them "render obedience unto the
things written by us through the Holy Spirit". The tone
of authority which inspires the latter appears so
clearly that Lightfoot did not hesitate to speak of it
as" the first step towards papal domination (Clement
1:70). Thus, at the very commencement of church
history, before the last survivor of the Apostles had
passed away, we find a Bishop of Rome, himself a
disciple of St. Peter, intervening in the affairs of
another Church and claiming to settle the matter by a
decision spoken under the influence of the Holy Spirit.
Such a fact admits of one explanation alone. It is that
in the days when the Apostolic teaching was yet fresh
in men's minds the universal Church recognized in the
Bishop of Rome the office of supreme head.

A few years later (about 107) St. Ignatius of Antioch,
in the opening of his letter to the Roman Church,
refers to its presiding over all other Churches. He
addresses it as "presiding over the brotherhood of love
[prokathemene tes agapes] The expression, as Funk
rightly notes, is grammatically incompatible with the
translation advocated by some non-Catholic writers,
"pre-eminent in works of love". The same century gives
us the witness of St. Irenaeus -- a man who stands in
the closest connexion with the age of the Apostles,
since he was a disciple of St. Polycarp, who had been
appointed. Bishop of Smyrna by St. John. In his work
"Adversus Haereses" (3:3:2) he brings against the
Gnostic sects of his day the argument that their
doctrines have no support in the Apostolic tradition
faithfully preserved by the Churches, which could trace
the succession of their bishops back to the Twelve. He
writes: " Because it would be too long in such a volume
as this to enumerate the successions of all the
churches, we point to the tradition of that very great
and very ancient and universally known Church, which
was founded and established at Rome, by the two most
glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul: we point I say, to
the tradition which this Church has from the Apostles,
and to her faith proclaimed to men which comes down to
our time through the succession of her bishops, and so
we put to shame . . . all who assemble in unauthorized
meetings. For with this Church, because of its superior
authority, every Church must agree -- that is the
faithful everywhere -- in communion with which Church
the tradition of the Apostles has been always preserved
by those who are everywhere [Ad hanc enim eoclesiam
propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem
convenire ecclesiam, hoc est eos qui sunt undique
fideles, in qua semper ab his qui sunt undique,
conservata est ea qu� est ab apostolis traditio]". He
then proceeds to enumerate the Roman succession from
Linus to Eleutherius, the twelfth after the Apostles,
who then occupied the see. Non-Catholic writers have
sought to rob the passage of its importance by
translating the word convenire "to resort to", and thus
understanding it to mean no more than that the faithful
from every side (undique) resorted to Rome, so that
thus the stream of doctrine in that Church was kept
immune from error. Such a rendering, however, is
excluded by the construction of the argument, which is
based entirely on the contention that the Roman
doctrine is pure by reason of its derivation from the
two great Apostolic founders of the Church, Sts. Peter
and Paul. The frequent visits made to Rome by members
of other Christian Churches could contribute nothing to
this. On the other hand the traditional rendering is
postulated by the context, and, though the object of
innumerable attacks, none other possessing any real
degree of probability has been suggested in its place
(see Dom. J. Chapman in "Revue Benedictine", 1895, p.
48).

During the pontificate of St. Victor (189-98) we have
the most explicit assertion of the supremacy of the
Roman See in regard to other Churches. A difference of
practice between the Churches of Asia Minor and the
rest of the Christian world in regard to the day of the
Paschal festival led the pope to take action. There is
some ground for supposing that the Montanist heretics
maintained the Asiatic (or Quartodeciman) practice to
be the true one: in this case it would be undesirable
that any body of Catholic Christians should appear to
support them. But, under any circumstances, such a
diversity in the ecclesiastical life of different
countries may well have constituted a regrettable
feature in the Church, whose very purpose it was to
bear witness by her unity to the oneness of God (John
17:21). Victor bade the Asiatic Churches conform to the
custom of the remainder of the Church, but was met with
determined resistance by Polycrates of Ephesus, who
claimed that their custom derived from St. John
himself. Victor replied by an excommunication. St.
Irenaeus, however, intervened, exhorting Victor not to
cut off whole Churches on account of a point which was
not a matter of faith. He assumes that the nope can
exercise the power, but urges him not to do so.
Similarly the resistance of the Asiatic bishops
involved no denial of the supremacy of Rome. It
indicates solely that the bishops believed St. Victor
to be abusing his power in bidding them renounce a
custom for which they had Apostolic authority. It was
indeed inevitable that, as the Church spread and
developed, new problems should present themselves, and
that questions should arise as to whether the supreme
authority could be legitimately exercised in this or
that case. St. Victor, seeing that more harm than good
would come from insistence, withdrew the imposed
penalty.

Not many years since a new and important piece of
evidence was brought to light in Asia Minor dating from
this period. The sepulchral inscription of Abercius,
Bishop of Hieropolis (d. about 200), contains an
account of his travels couched in allegorical language
(see ABERCIUS, INSCRIPTION OF). He speaks thus of the
Roman Church: "To Rome He [Christ] sent me to
contemplate majesty: and to see a queen golden-robed
and golden-sandalled." It is difficult not to recognize
in this description a testimony to the supreme position
of the Roman See. Tertullian's bitter polemic, "De
Pudicitia" (about 220), was called forth by an exercise
of papal prerogative. Pope Callistus had decided that
the rigid discipline which had hitherto prevailed in
many Churches must be in u large measure relaxed.
Tertullian, now lapsed into heresy, fiercely attacks
"the peremptory edict", which "the supreme pontiff, the
bishop of bishops", has sent forth. The words are
intended as sarcasm: but none the less they indicate
clearly the position of authority claimed by Rome. And
the opposition comes, not from a Catholic bishop, but
from a Montanist heretic.

The views of St. Cyprian (d. 258) in regard to papal
authority have given rise to much discussion (see
CYPRIAN OF CARTHAGE, SAINT). He undoubtedly entertained
exaggerated views as to the independence of individual
bishops, which eventually led him into serious conflict
with Rome. Yet on the fundamental principle his
position is clear. He attributed an effective primacy
to the pope as the successor of Peter. He makes
communion with the See of Rome essential to Catholic
communion, speaking of it as "the principal Church
whence episcopal unity had its rise" (ad Petri
cathedram et ad ecclesiam principalem unde unitas
sacerdotalis exorta est). The force of this expression
becomes clear when viewed in the light of his doctrine
as to the unity of the Church. This was he teaches,
established by Christ when He founded His Church upon
Peter. By this act the unity of the Apostolic college
was ensured through the unity of the foundation. The
bishops through all time form a similar college, and
are bound in a like indivisible unity. Of this unity
the Chair of Peter is the source. It fulfils the very
office as principle of union which Peter fulfilled in
his lifetime. Hence to communicate with an antipope
such as Novatian would be schism (Ep. 68:1). He holds,
also, that the pope has authority to depose an
heretical bishop. When Marcian of Arles fell into
heresy, Cyprian, at the request of the bishops of the
province, wrote to urge Pope Stephen "to send letters
by which, Marcian having been excommunicated, another
may be substituted in his place" (Ep. 68:3). It is
manifest that one who regarded the Roman See in this
light believed that the pope possessed a real and
effective Primacy. At the same time it is not to be
denied that his views as to the right of the pope to
interfere in the government of a diocese already
subject to a legitimate and orthodox bishop were
inadequate. In the rebaptism controversy his language
in regard to St. Stephen was bitter and intemperate.
His error on this point does not, however, detract from
the fact that he admitted a primacy, not merely of
honour but of jurisdiction. Nor should his mistake
occasion too much surprise. It is as true in the Church
as in merely human institutions that the full
implications of a general principle are only realized
gradually. The claim to apply it in a particular case
is often contested at first, though later ages may
wonder that such opposition was possible.

Contemporary with St. Cyprian was St. Dionysius of
Alexandria. Two incidents bearing on the present
question are related of him. Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 7:9)
gives us a letter addressed by him to St. Xystus II
regarding the case of a man who, as it appeared, had
been invalidly baptized by heretics, but who for many
years had been frequenting the sacraments of the
Church. In it he says that he needs St. Xystus's advice
and begs for his decision (gnomen), that he may not
fall into error (dedios me hara sphallomai). Again,
some years later, the same patriarch occasioned anxiety
to some of the brethren by making use of some
expressions which appeared hardly compatible with a
full belief in the Divinity of Christ. They promptly
had recourse to the Holy See and accused him to his
namesake, St. Dionysius of Rome, of heretical leanings.
The pope replied by laying down authoritatively the
true doctrine on the subject. Both events are
instructive as showing us how Rome was recognized by
the second see in Christendom as empowered to speak
with authority on matters of doctrine. (St. Athanasius,
"De sententia Dionysii" in P. G., XXV, 500). Equally
noteworthy is the action of Emperor Aurelian in 270. A
synod of bishops had condemned Paul of Samosata,
Patriarch of Alexandria, on a charge of heresy, and had
elected Domnus bishop in his place. Paul refused to
withdraw, and appeal was made to the civil power. The
emperor decreed that he who was acknowledged by the
bishops of Italy and the Bishop of Rome, must be
recognized as rightful occupant of the see. The
incident proves that even the pagans themselves knew
well that communion with the Roman See was the
essential mark of all Christian Churches. That the
imperial Government was well aware of the position of
the pope among Christians derives additional
confirmation from the saying of St. Cyprian that Decius
would have sooner heard of the proclamation of a rival
emperor than of the election of a new pope to fill the
place of the martyred Fabian (Ep. 55:9).

The limits of the present article prevent us from
carrying the historical argument further than the year
300. Nor is it in fact necessary to do so. From the
beginning of the fourth century the supremacy of Rome
is writ large upon the page of history. It is only in
regard to the first age of the Church that any question
can arise. But the facts we have recounted are entirely
sufficient to prove to any unprejudiced mind that the
supremacy was exercised and acknowledged from the days
of the Apostles. It was not of course exercised in the
same way as in later times. The Church was as yet in
her infancy: and it would be irrational to look for a
fully developed procedure governing the relations of
the supreme pontiff to the bishops of other sees. To
establish such a system was the work of time, and it
was only gradually embodied in the canons. There would,
moreover, be little call for frequent intervention when
the Apostolic tradition was still fresh and vigorous in
every part of Christendom. Hence the papal prerogatives
came into play but rarely. But when the Faith was
threatened, or the vital welfare of souls demanded
action, then Rome intervened. Such were the causes
which led to the intervention of St. Dionysius, St.
Stephen, St. Callistus, St. Victor, and St. Clement,
and their claim to supremacy as the occupants of the
Chair of Peter was not disputed. In view of the
purposes with which, and with which alone, these early
popes employed their supreme power, the contention, so
stoutly maintained by Protestant controversialists,
that the Roman primacy had its origin in papal
ambition, disappears. The motive which inspired these
men was not earthly ambition, but zeal for the Faith
and the consciousness that to them had been committed
the responsibility of its guardianship. The
controversialists in question even claim that they are
justified in refusing to admit as evidence for the
papal primacy any pronouncement emanating from a Roman
source, on the ground that, where the personal
interests of anyone are concerned, his statements
should not be admitted as evidence. Such an objection
is utterly fallacious. We are dealing here, not with
the statements of an individual, but with the tradition
of a Church -- of that Church which, even from the
earliest times, was known for the purity of its
doctrine, and which had had for its founders and
instructors the two chief Apostles, St. Peter and St.
Paul. That tradition, moreover, is absolutely unbroken,
as the pronouncements of the long series of popes bear
witness. Nor does it stand alone. The utterances, in
which the popes assert their claims to the obedience of
all Christian Churches, form part and parcel of a great
body of testimony to the Petrine privileges, issuing
not merely from the Western Fathers but from those of
Greece, Syria, and Egypt. The claim to reject the
evidence which comes to us from Rome may be skilful as
a piece of special pleading, but it can claim no other
value. The first to employ this argument were some of
the Gallicans. But it is deservedly repudiated as
fallacious and unworthy by Bossuet in his "Defensio
cleri gallicani" (II, 1. XI, c. vi).

The primacy of St. Peter and the perpetuity of that
primacy in the Roman See are dogmatically defined in
the canons attached to the first two chapters of the
Constitution "Pastor Aeternus":

* "If anyone shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle
was not constituted by Christ our Lord as chief of all
the Apostles and the visible head of the whole Church
militant: or that he did not receive directly and
immediately from the same Lord Jesus Christ a primacy
of true and proper jurisdiction, but one of honour
only: let him be anathema."

* "If any one shall say that it is not by the
institution of Christ our Lord Himself or by divinely
established right that Blessed Peter has perpetual
successors in his primacy over the universal Church: OF
that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of Blessed
Peter in this same primacy. -- let him be anathema"
(Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1823, 1825).

A question may be raised as to the precise dogmatic
value of the clause of the second canon in which it is
asserted that the Roman pontiff is Peter's successor.
The truth is infallibly defined. But the Church has
authority to define not merely those truths which form
part of the original deposit of revelation, but also
such as are necessarily connected with this deposit.
The former are held fide divina, the latter fide
infallibili. Although Christ established the perpetual
office of supreme head, Scripture does not tell us that
He fixed the law according to which the headship should
descend. Granting that He left this to Peter to
determine, it is plain that the Apostle need not have
attached the primacy to his own see: he might have
attached it to another. Some have thought that the law
establishing the succession in the Roman episcopate
became known to the Apostolic Church as an historic
fact. In this case the dogma that the Roman pontiff is
at all times the Church's chief pastor would be the
conclusion from two premises -- the revealed truth that
the Church must ever have a supreme head, and the
historic fact that St. Peter attached that office to
the Roman See. This conclusion, while necessarily
connected with revelation, is not part of revelation,
and is accepted fide infallibili. According to other
theologians the proposition in question is part of the
deposit of faith itself. In this case the Apostles must
have known the law determining the succession to the
Bishop of Rome, not merely on human testimony, but also
by Divine revelation, and they must have taught it as a
revealed truth to their disciples. It is this view
which is commonly adopted. The definition of the First
Vatican to the effect that the successor of St. Peter
is ever to be found in the Roman pontiff is almost
universally held to be a truth revealed by the Holy
Spirit to the Apostles, and by them transmitted to the
Church.

III. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PAPAL POWER

This section is divided as follows :

1. the pope's universal coercive jurisdiction 2. the
pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction in regard of
all the faithful, whether singly or collectively 3. the
right of entertaining appeals in all ecclesiastical
causes.

The relation of the pope's authority to that of
ecumenical councils, and to the civil power, are
discussed in separate articles (see COUNCILS, GENERAL;
CIVIL ALLEGIANCE).

(1) The Pope's Universal Coercive Jurisdiction Not only
did Christ constitute St. Peter head of the Church, but
in the words, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, it
shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou
shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed in heaven," He
indicated the scope of this headship. The expressions
binding and loosing here employed are derived from the
current terminology of the Rabbinic schools. A doctor
who declared a thing to be prohibited by the law was
said to bind, for thereby he imposed an obligation on
the conscience. He who declared it to be lawful was
said to loose). In this way the terms had come
respectively to signify official commands and
permissions in general. The words of Christ, therefore,
as understood by His hearers, conveyed the promise to
St. Peter of legislative authority within the kingdom
over which He had just set him, and legislative
authority carries with it as its necessary
accompaniment judicial authority. Moreover, the powers
conferred in these regards are plenary. This is plainly
indicated by the generality of the terms employed:
"Whatsoever thou shalt bind . . . Whatsoever thou shalt
loose"; nothing is withheld. Further, Peter's authority
is subordinated to no earthly superior. The sentences
which he gives are to be forthwith ratified in heaven.
They do not need the antecedent approval of any other
tribunal. He is independent of all save the Master who
appointed him. The words as to the power of binding and
loosing are, therefore, elucidatory of the promise of
the keys which immediately precedes. They explain in
what sense Peter is governor and head of Christ's
kingdom, the Church, by promising him legislative and
judicial authority in the fullest sense. In other
words, Peter and his successors have power to impose
laws both preceptive and prohibitive, power likewise to
grant dispensation from these laws, and, when needful,
to annul them. It is theirs to judge offences against
the laws, to impose and to remit penalties. This
judicial authority will even include the power to
pardon sin. For sin is a breach of the laws of the
supernatural kingdom, and falls under the cognizance of
its constituted judges. The gift of this particular
power, however, is not expressed with full clearness in
this passage. It needed Christ's words (John 20:23) to
remove all ambiguity. Further, since the Church is the
kingdom of the truth, so that an essential note in all
her members is the act of submission by which they
accept the doctrine of Christ in its entirety, supreme
power in this kingdom carries with it a supreme
magisterium -- authority to declare that doctrine and
to prescribe a rule of faith obligatory on all. Here,
too, Peter is subordinated to none save his Master
alone; he is the supreme teacher as he is the supreme
ruler. However, the tremendous powers thus conferred
are limited in their scope by their reference to the
ends of the kingdom and to them only. The authority of
Peter and his successors does not extend beyond this
sphere. With matters that are altogether extrinsic to
the Church they are not concerned.

Protestant controversialists contend strenuously that
the words, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind etc.", confer no
special prerogative on Peter, since precisely the same
gift, they allege, is conferred on all the Apostles
(Matthew 18:18). It is, of course, the case that in
that passage the same words are used in regard of all
the Twelve. Yet there is a manifest difference between
the gift to Peter and that bestowed on the others. In
his case the gift is connected with the power of the
keys, and this power, as we have seen, signified the
supreme authority over the whole kingdom. That gift was
not bestowed on the other eleven: and the gift Christ
bestowed on them in Matthew 18:18, was received by them
as members of the kingdom, and as subject to the
authority of him who should be Christ's vicegerent on
earth. There is in fact a striking parallelism between
Matthew 16:19, and the words employed in reference to
Christ Himself in Apocalypse 3:7: "He that hath the key
of David; he that openeth, and no man shutteth;
shutteth, and no man openeth." In both cases the second
clause declares the meaning of the first, and the power
signified in the first clause by the metaphor of the
keys is supreme. It is worthy of note that to no one
else save to Christ and His chosen vicegerent does Holy
Scripture attribute the power of the keys.

Certain patristic passages are further adduced by non-
Catholics as adverse to the meaning given by the Church
to Matthew 16:19. St. Augustine in several places tells
us that Peter received the keys as representing the
Church -- e. g. "In Joan.", tr. 1:12: "Si hoc Petro
tantum dictum est, non facit hoc Ecclesia . . .; si hoc
ergo in Ecclesia fit, Petrus quando claves accepit,
Ecclesiam sanctam significavit' (If this was said to
Peter alone, the Church cannot exercise this power . .
; if this power is exercised in the Church, then when
Peter received the keys, he signified the Holy Church);
cf. tr. 124:5; Serm. 295. It is argued that, according
to Augustine, the power denoted by the keys resides
primarily not in Peter, but in the whole Church.
Christ's gift to His people was merely bestowed on
Peter as representing the whole body of the faithful.
The right to forgive sins, to exclude from communion,
to exercise any other acts of authority, is really the
prerogative of the whole Christian congregation. If the
minister performs these acts he does so as delegate of
the people. The argument, which was formerly employed
by Gallican controversialists (cf. Febronius, "De statu
eccl.", 1:76), however, rests on a misunderstanding of
the passages. Augustine is controverting the Novatian
heretics, who affirmed that the power to remit sins was
a purely Personal gift to Peter alone, and had
disappeared with him. He therefore asserts that Peter
received it that it might remain for ever in the Church
and be used for its benefit. It is in that sense alone
that he says that Peter represented the Church. There
is no foundation whatever for saying that he desired to
affirm that the Church was the true recipient of the
power conferred. Such a view would be contrary to the
whole patristic tradition, and is expressly reprobated
in the First Vatican Decree, cap. 1.

It appears from what has been said that, when the popes
legislate for the faithful, when they try offenders by
juridical process, and enforce their sentences by
censures and excommunications, they are employing
powers conceded to them by Christ. Their authority to
exercise jurisdiction in this way is not founded on the
grant of any civil ruler. Indeed the Church has claimed
and exercised these powers from the very first. When
the Apostles, after the Council of Jerusalem, sent out
their decree as vested with Divine authority (Acts
15:28), they were imposing a law on the faithful. When
St. Paul bids Timothy not receive an accusation against
a presbyter unless it be supported by two or three
witnesses, he clearly supposes him to be empowered to
judge him in foro externo. This claim to exercise
coercive jurisdiction has, as might be expected been
denied by various heterodox writers. Thus Marsilius
Patavinus (Defensor Pacis 2:4), Antonius de Dominis (De
rep. eccl. 4:6-7, 9), Richer (De eccl. et pol.
potestate, 11-12), and later the Synod of Pistoia, all
alike maintained that coercive jurisdiction of every
kind belongs to the civil power alone, and sought to
restrict the Church to the use of moral means. This
error has always been condemned by the Holy See. Thus,
in the Bull "Auctorem Fidei", Pius VI makes the
following pronouncement regarding one of the Pistoian
propositions: "[The aforesaid proposition] in respect
of its insinuation that the Church does not possess
authority to exact subjection to her decrees otherwise
than by means dependent on persuasion: so far as this
signifies that the Church 'has not received from God
power, not merely to direct by counsel and persuasion
but further to command by laws, and to coerce and
compel the delinquent and contumacious by external and
salutary penalties' [from the brief 'Ad assiduas'
(1755) of Benedict XIV], leads to a system already
condemned as heretical. " Nor may it be held that the
pope's laws must exclusively concern spiritual objects,
and their penalties be exclusively of a spiritual
character. The Church is a perfect society (see CHURCH
XIII). She is not dependent on the permission of the
State for her existence, but holds her charter from
God. As a perfect society she has a right to all those
means which are necessary for the attaining of her end.
These, however, will include far more than spiritual
objects and spiritual penalties alone: for the Church
requires certain material possessions, such, for
example, as churches, schools, seminaries, together
with the endowments necessary for their sustentation.
The administration and the due protection of these
goods will require legislation other than what is
limited to the spiritual sphere. A large body of canon
law must inevitably be formed to determine the
conditions of their management. Indeed, there is a
fallacy in the assertion that the Church is a spiritual
society; it is spiritual as regards the ultimate end to
which all its activities are directed, but not as
regards its present constitution nor as regards the
means at its disposal. The question has been raised
whether it be lawful for the Church, not merely to
sentence a delinquent to physical penalties, but itself
to inflict these penalties. As to this, it is
sufficient to note that the right of the Church to
invoke the aid of the civil power to execute her
sentences is expressly asserted by Boniface VIII in the
Bull "Unam Sanctam" This declaration, even if it be not
one of those portions of the Bull in which the pope is
defining a point of faith, is so clearly connected with
the parts expressly stated to possess such character
that it is held by theologians to be theologically
certain (Palmieri, "De Romano Pontifice", thes. 21).
The question is of theoretical, rather than of
practical importance, since civil Governments have long
ceased to own the obligation of enforcing the decisions
of any ecclesiastical authority. This indeed became
inevitable when large sections of the population ceased
to be Catholic. The state of things supposed could only
exist when a whole nation was thoroughly Catholic in
spirit, and the force of papal decisions was recognized
by all as binding in conscience.

(2) The Pope's Immediate and Ordinary Jurisdiction

In the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus", cap. 3, the pope
is declared to possess ordinary, immediate, and
episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful: "We
teach, moreover, and declare that, by the disposition
of God, the Roman Church possesses supreme ordinary
authority over all Churches, and that the jurisdiction
of the Roman Pontiff, which is true episcopal
jurisdiction is immediate in its character" (Enchir.,
n. 1827). It is further added that this authority
extends to all alike, both pastors and faithful,
whether singly or collectively. An ordinary
jurisdiction is one which is exercised by the holder,
not by reason of any delegation, but in virtue of the
office which he himself holds. All who acknowledge in
the pope any primacy of jurisdiction acknowledge that
jurisdiction to be ordinary. This point, therefore,
does not call for discussion. That the papal authority
is likewise immediate has, however, been called in
question. Jurisdiction is immediate when its possessor
stands in direct relation to those with whose oversight
he is charged. If, on the other hand, the supreme
authority can only deal directly with the proximate
superiors, and not with the subjects save through their
intervention, his power is not Immediate but mediate.
That the pope's jurisdiction is not thus restricted
appears from the analysis already given of Christ's
words to St. Peter. It has been shown that He conferred
on him a primacy over the Church, which is universal in
its scope, extending to all the Church's members, and
which needs the support of no other power. A primacy
such as this manifestly gives to him and to his
successors a direct authority over all the faithful.
This is also implied in the words of the pastoral
commission, " Feed my sheep ". The shepherd exercises
immediate authority over all the sheep of his flock.
Every member of the Church has been thus committed to
Peter and those who follow him. This immediate
authority has been always claimed by the Holy See. It
was, however, denied by Febronius (op. cit., 7:7). That
writer contended that the duty of the pope was to
exercise a general oversight over the Church and to
direct the bishops by his counsel; in case of
necessity, where the legitimate pastor was guilty of
grave wrong, he could pronounce sentence of
excommunication against him and proceed against him
according to the canons, but he could not on his own
authority depose him (op. cit., 2:4:9). The Febronian
doctrines, though devoid of any historical foundation,
yet, through their appeal to the spirit of nationalism,
exerted a powerful influence for harm on Catholic life
in Germany during the eighteenth and part of the
nineteenth century. Thus it was imperative that the
error should be definitively condemned. That the pope's
power is truly episcopal needs no proof. It follows
from the fact that he enjoys an ordinary pastoral
authority, both legislative and judicial, and immediate
in relation to its subjects. Moreover, since this power
regards the pastors as well as the faithful, the pope
is rightly termed Pastor pastorum, and Episcopus
episcoporum.

It is frequently objected by writers of the Anglican
school that, by declaring the pope to possess an
immediate episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful,
the First Vatican Council destroyed the authority of
the diocesan episcopate. It is further pointed out that
St. Gregory the Great expressly repudiated this title
(Ep. 7:27; 8:30). To this it is replied that no
difficulty is involved in the exercise of immediate
jurisdiction over the same subjects by two rulers,
provided only that these rulers stand in subordination,
the one to the other. We constantly see the system at
work. In an army the regimental officer and the general
both possess immediate authority over the soldiers; yet
no one maintains that the inferior authority is thereby
annulled. The objection lacks all weight. The First
Vatican Council says most justly (cap. iii): "This
power of the supreme pontiff in no way derogates from
the ordinary immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction,
in virtue of which the bishops, who, appointed by the
Holy Spirit [Acts 20:28], have succeeded to the place
of the Apostles as true pastors, feed and rule their
several flocks, each the one which has been assigned to
him: that power is rather maintained, confirmed and
defended by the supreme pastor" (Enchir., n. 1828). It
is without doubt true that St. Gregory repudiated in
strong terms the title of universal bishop, and relates
that St. Leo rejected it when it was offered him by the
fathers of Chalcedon. But, as he used it, it has a
different signification from that with which it was
employed in the First Vatican Council. St. Gregory
understood it as involving the denial of the authority
of the local diocesan (Ep. 5:21). No one, he maintains,
has a right so to term himself universal bishop as to
usurp that apostolically constituted power. But he was
himself a strenuous asserter of that immediate
jurisdiction over all the faithful which is signified
by this title as used in the First Vatican Decree. Thus
he reverses (Ep. 6:15) a sentence passed on a priest by
Patriarch John of Constantinople, an act which itself
involves a claim to universal authority, and explicitly
states that the Church of Constantinople is subject to
the Apostolic See (Ep. 9:12). The title of universal
bishop occurs as early as the eighth century; and in
1413 the faculty of Paris rejected the proposition of
John Hus that the pope was not universal bishop
(Natalis Alexander, 'Hist. eccl.", saec. XV and XVI, c.
ii, art. 3, n. 6)

(3) The Right of Entertaining Appeals in All
Ecclesiastical Causes

The Council goes on to affirm that the pope is the
supreme judge of the faithful, and that to him appeal
may be made in all ecclesiastical causes. The right of
appeal follows as a necessary corollary from the
doctrine of the primacy. If the pope really possesses a
supreme jurisdiction over the Church, every other
authority, whether episcopal or synodal, being subject
to him, there must of necessity be an appeal to him
from all inferior tribunals. This question, however,
has been the subject of much controversy. The Gallican
divines de Marca and Quesnel, and in Germany Febronius,
sought to show that the right of appeal to the pope was
a mere concession derived from ecclesiastical canons,
and that the influence of the pseudo-Isidorean
decretals had led to many unjustifiable exaggerations
in the papal claims. The arguments of these writers are
at the present day employed by frankly anti-Catholic
controversialists with a view to showing that the whole
primacy is a merely human institution. It is contended
that the right of appeal was first granted at Sardica
(343), and that each step of its subsequent development
can be traced. History, however, renders it abundantly
clear that the right of appeal had been known from
primitive times, and that the purpose of the Sardican
canons was merely to give conciliar ratification to an
already existing usage. It will be convenient to speak
first of the Sardican question, and then to examine the
evidence as regards previous practice.

In the years immediately preceding Sardica, St.
Athanasius had appealed to Rome against the decision of
the Council of Tyre (335). Pope Julius had annulled the
action of that council, and had restored Athanasius and
Marcellus of Ancyra to their sees. The Eusebians,
however, had contested his right to call a conciliar
decision in question. The fathers who met at Sardica,
and who included the most eminent of the orthodox party
from East and West alike, desired by their decrees to
affirm this right, and to establish a canonical mode of
procedure for such appeals. The principal provisions of
the canons which deal with this matter are:

* that a bishop condemned by the bishops of his
province may appeal to the pope either on his own
initiative or through his judges;

* that if the pope entertains the appeal he shall
appoint a court of second instance drawn from the
bishops of the neighbouring provinces; he may, if he
thinks fit, send judges to sit with the bishops.

There is nothing whatever to suggest that new
privileges are being conferred. St. Julius had
recently, not merely exercised the right of hearing
appeals in the most formal manner, but had severely
censured the Eusebians for neglecting to respect the
supreme judicial rights of the Roman See: "for", he
writes, "if they [Athanasius and Marcellus] really did
some wrong, as you say, the judgment ought to have been
given according to the ecclesiastical canon and not
thus.... Do you not know that this has been the custom
first to write to us, and then for that which is just
to be defined from hence?" (Athanasius, "Apol." 35) .
Nor is there the smallest ground for the assertion that
the pope's action is hedged in within narrow limits, on
the ground that no more is permitted than that he
should order a re-hearing to take place on the spot.
The fathers in no way disputed the pope's right to hear
the case at Rome. But their object was to deprive the
Eusebians of the facile excuse that it was idle for
appeals to be carried to Rome, since there the
requisite evidence could not be forthcoming. They
therefore provided a canonical procedure which should
not be open to that objection.

Having thus shown that there is no ground for the
assertion that the right of appeal was first granted at
Sardica, we may now consider the evidence for its
existence in earlier times. The records of the second
century are so scanty as to throw but little light on
the subject. Yet it would seem that Montanus, Prisca,
and Maximilla appealed to Rome against the decision of
the Phrygian bishops. Tertullian (Con. Prax. 1), tells
us that the pope at first acknowledged the genuineness
of their prophecies, and that thus "he was giving peace
to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia", when further
information led him to recall the letters of peace
which he had issued. The fact that the pope's decision
had weight to decide the whole question of their
orthodoxy is sufficiently significant. But in St
Cyprian's correspondence we find clear and unmistakable
evidence of a system of appeals. Basilides and Martial,
the bishops of Leon and Merida in Spain, had in the
persecution accepted certificates of idolatry. They
confessed their guilt, and were in consequence deposed,
other bishops being appointed to the sees. In the hope
of having themselves reinstated they appealed to Rome,
and succeeded, by misrepresenting the facts, in
imposing on St. Stephen, who ordered their restoration.
It has been objected to the evidence drawn from this
incident, that St. Cyprian did not acknowledge the
validity of the papal decision, but exhorted the people
of Leon and Merida to hold fast to the sentence of
deposition (Ep. 67:6). But the objection misses the
point of St. Cyprian's letter. In the case in question
there was no room for a legitimate appeal, since the
two bishops had confessed. An acquittal obtained after
spontaneous confession could not be valid. It has
further been urged that, in the case of Fortunatus (Ep.
59:10), Cyprian denies his right of appeal to Rome, and
asserts the sufficiency of the African tribunal. But
here too the objection rests upon a misunderstanding.
Fortunatus had procured consecration as Bishop of
Carthage from a heretical bishop, and St. Cyprian
asserts the competency of the local synod in his case
on the ground that he is no true bishop -- a mere
pseudo-episcopus. Juridically considered he is merely
an insubordinate presbyter, and he must submit himself
to his own bishop. At that period the established
custom denied the right of appeal to the inferior
clergy. On the other hand, the action of Fortunatus
indicates that he based his claim to bring the question
of his status before the pope on the ground that he was
a legitimate bishop. Privatus of Lambese, the heretical
consecrator of Fortunatus who had previously been
himself condemned by a synod of ninety bishops (Ep.
59:10), had appealed to Rome without success (Ep.
36:4).

The difficulties at Carthage which led to the Donatist
schism provide us with another instance. When the
seventy Numidian bishops, who had condemned Caecilian,
invoked the aid of the emperor, the latter referred
them to Rome, that the case might be decided by Pope
Miltiades (313). St. Augustine makes frequent mention
of the circumstances, and indicates plainly that he
holds it to have been Caecilian's undoubted right to
claim a trial before the pope. He says that Secundus
should never have dared to condemn Caecilian when he
declined to submit his case to the African bishops,
since he had the right "to reserve his whole case to
the judgment of other colleagues, especially to that of
Apostolical Churches" (Ep. 43:7). A little later (367)
a council, held at Tyana in Asia Minor, restored to his
see Eustathius, bishop of that city, on no other ground
than that of a successful appeal to Rome. St. Basil
(Ep. 263:3) tells us that they did not know what test
of orthodoxy Liberius had required. He brought a letter
from the pope demanding his restoration, and this was
accepted as decisive by the council It should be
observed that there can be no question here of the pope
employing prerogatives conferred on him at Sardica, for
he did not follow the procedure there indicated. Indeed
there is no good reason to believe that the Sardican
procedure ever came into use in either East or West. In
378 the appellate jurisdiction of the pope received
civil sanction from Emperor Gratian. Any charge against
a metropolitan was to come before the pope himself or a
court of bishops nominated by him, while all (Western)
bishops had the right of appeal from - their provincial
synod to the pope (Mansi, III, 624). Similarly
Valentinian III in 445 assigned to the pope the right
of evoking to Rome any cause he should think fit (Cod.
Theod. Novell., tit. 24, De episcoporum ordin.). These
ordinances were not, however, in any sense the source
of the pope's jurisdiction, which rested on Divine
institution; they were civil sanctions enabling the
pope to avail himself of the civil machinery of the
empire in discharging the duties of his office. What
Pope Nicholas I said of the synodal declarations
regarding the privileges of the Holy See holds good
here also: "Ista privilegia huic sanctae Ecclesiae a
Christo donata, a synodis non donata, sed jam solummodo
venerata et celebrata" (These privileges bestowed by
Christ on this Holy Church have not been granted her by
synods, but merely proclaimed and honoured by them)
("Ep. ad Michaelem Imp." in P. L., CXIX, 948).

Much has been made by anti-Catholic writers of the
famous letter "Optaremus", addressed in 426 by the
African bishops to Pope St. Celestine at the close of
the incident relating to the priest Apiarius. As the
point is discussed in a special article (APIARIUS OF
SICCA), a brief reference will suffice here. Protestant
controversialists maintain that in this letter the
African bishops positively repudiate the claim of Rome
to an appellate jurisdiction, the repudiation being
consequent on the fact that they had in 419 satisfied
themselves that Pope Zosimus was mistaken in claiming
the authority of Nicaea for the Sardican canons. This
is an error. The letter, it is true, urges with some
display of irritation that it would be both more
reasonable and more in harmony with the fifth Nicene
canon regarding the inferior clergy and the laity, if
even episcopal cases were left to the decision of the
African synod. The pope's authority is nowhere denied,
but the sufficiency of the local tribunals is asserted.
Indeed the right of the pope to deal with episcopal
cases was freely acknowledged by the African Church
even after it had been shown that the Sardican canons
did not emanate from Nicaea. Antony, Bishop of Fussala,
prosecuted an appeal to Rome against St. Augustine in
423, the appeal being supported by the Primate of
Numidia (Ep. ccix). Moreover, St. Augustine in his
letter to Pope Celestine on this subject urges that
previous popes have dealt with similar cases in the
same manner, sometimes by independent decisions and
sometimes by confirmation of the decisions locally
given (ipsa sede apostolica judicante vel aliorum
judicata firmante), and that he could cite examples
either from ancient or from more recent times (Ep.
209:8). These facts appear to be absolutely conclusive
as to the traditional African practice. That the letter
"Optaremus" did not result in any change is evinced by
a letter of St. Leo's in 446, directing what is to be
done in the case of a certain Lupicinus who had
appealed to him (Ep. 12:13). It is occasionally argued
that if the pope really possessed jure divino a supreme
jurisdiction, the African bishops would neither have
raised any question in 419 as to whether the alleged
canons were authentic, nor again have in 426 requested
the pope to take the Nicene canon as the norm of his
action. Those who reason in this way fail to see that,
where canons have been established prescribing the mode
of procedure to be followed in the Church, right reason
demands that the supreme authority should not alter
them except for some grave cause, and, as long as they
remain the recognized law of the Church should observe
them. The pope as God's vicar must govern according to
reason, not arbitrarily nor capriciously. This,
however, is a very different thing from saying, as did
the Gallican divines, that the pope is subject to the
canons. He is not subject to them, because he is
competent to modify or to annul them when he holds this
to be best for the Church.

IV. JURISDICTIONAL RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF THE POPE

In virtue of his office as supreme teacher and ruler of
the faithful, the chief control of every department of
the Church's life belongs to the pope. In this section
the rights and duties which thus fall to his lot will
be briefly enumerated. It will appear that, in regard
to a considerable number of points, not merely the
supreme control, but the whole exercise of power is
reserved to the Holy See, and is only granted to others
by express delegation. This system of reservation is
possible, since the pope is the universal source. of
all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Hence it rests with
him to determine in what measure he will confer
jurisdiction on bishops and other prelates.

(1) As the supreme teacher of the Church, whose it is
to prescribe what is to be believed by all the
faithful, and to take measures for the preservation and
the propagation of the faith, the following are the
rights which pertain to the pope:

* it is his to set forth creeds, and to determine when
and by whom an explicit profession of faith shall be
made (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. 24, cc. 1 and 12);

* it is his to prescribe and to command books for the
religious instruction of the faithful; thus, for
example, Clement XIII has recommended the Roman
Catechism to all the bishops.

* The pope alone can establish a university, possessing
the status and privileges of a canonically erected
Catholic university;

* to him also belongs the direction of Catholic
missions throughout the world; this charge is fulfilled
through the Congregation of the Propaganda.

* It is his to prohibit the reading of such books as
are injurious to faith or morals, and to determine the
conditions on which certain classes of books may be
issued by Catholics;

* his is the condemnation of given propositions as
being either heretical or deserving of some minor
degree of censure, and lastly

* he has the right to interpret authentically the
natural law. Thus, it is his to say what is lawful or
unlawful in regard to social and family life, in regard
to the practice of usury, etc.

(2) With the pope's office of supreme teacher are
closely connected his rights in regard to the worship
of God: for it is the law of prayer that fixes the law
of belief. In this sphere very much has been reserved
to the sole regulation of the Holy See. Thus

* the pope alone can prescribe the liturgical services
employed in the Church. If a doubt should occur in
regard to the ceremonial of the liturgy, a bishop may
not settle the point on his own authority, but must
have recourse to Rome. The Holy See likewise prescribes
rules in regard to the devotions used by the faithful,
and in this way checks the growth of what is novel and
unauthorized.

* At the present day the institution and abrogation of
festivals which was till a comparatively recent time
free to all bishops as regards their own dioceses, is
reserved to Rome.

* The solemn canonization of a saint is proper to the
pope. Indeed it is commonly held that this is an
exercise of the papal infallibility. Beatification and
every permission for the public veneration of any of
the servants of God is likewise reserved to his
decision.

* He alone gives to anyone the privilege of a private
chapel where Mass may be said.

* He dispenses the treasury of the Church, and the
grant of plenary indulgences is reserved to him. While
he has no authority in regard to the substantial rites
of the sacraments, and is bound to preserve them as
they were given to the Church by Christ and His
Apostles, certain powers in their regard belong to him;

* he can give to simple priests the Power to confirm,
and to bless the oil of the sick and the oil of
catechumens, and

* he can establish diriment and impedient impediments
to matrimony.

(3) The legislative power of the pope carries with it
the following rights:

* he can legislate for the whole Church, with or
without the assistance of a general council;

* if he legislates with the aid of a council it is his
to convoke it, to preside, to direct its deliberations,
to confirm its acts.

* He has full authority to interpret, alter, and
abrogate both his own laws and those established by his
predecessors. He has the same plenitude of power as
they enjoyed, and stands in the same relation to their
laws as to those which he himself has decreed;

* he can dispense individuals from the obligation of
all purely ecclesiastical laws, and can grant
privileges and exemptions in their regard. In this
connexion may be mentioned

* his power to dispense from vows where the greater
glory of God renders it desirable. Considerable powers
of dispensation are granted to bishops, and, in a
restricted measure, also to priests; but there are some
vows reserved altogether to the Holy See.

(4) In virtue of his supreme judicial authority

* causae majores are reserved to him. By this term are
signified cases dealing with matters of great moment,
or those in which personages of eminent dignity are
concerned.

* His appellate jurisdiction has been discussed in the
previous section. It should, however, be noted

* that the pope has full right, should he see fit, to
deal even with causae minores in the first instance,
and not merely by reason of an appeal (Trent, Sess.
XXIV; cap. 20). In what concerns punishment,

* he can inflict censures either by judicial sentence
or by general laws which operate without need of such
sentence.

* He further reserves certain cases to his own
tribunal. All cases of heresy come before the
Congregation of the Inquisition. A similar reservation
covers the cases in which a bishop or a reigning prince
is the accused party.

(5) As the supreme governor of the Church the pope has
authority over all appointments to its public offices.
Thus

* it is his to nominate to bishoprics, or, where the
nomination has been conceded to others, to give
confirmation. Further, he alone can translate bishops
from one see to another, can accept their resignation,
and can, where grave cause exists, sentence to
deprivation.

* He can establish dioceses, and can annul a previously
existing arrangement in favour of a new one. Similarly,
he alone can erect cathedral and collegiate chapters.

* He can approve new religious orders, and

* can, if he sees fit, exempt them from the authority
of local ordinaries.

* Since his office of supreme ruler imposes on him the
duty of enforcing the canons, it is requisite that he
should be kept informed as to the state of the various
dioceses. He may obtain this information by legates or
by summoning the bishops to Rome. At the present day
this jus relationum is exercised through the triennial
visit ad limina required of all bishops. This system
was introduced by Sixtus V in 1585 (Constitution, "Rom.
Pontifex"), and confirmed by Benedict XIV in 1740
(Constitution, "Quod Sancta") .

* It is to be further observed that the pope's office
of chief ruler of the Church carries with it jure
divino the right to free intercourse with the pastors
and the faithful. The placitum regium, by which this
intercourse was limited and impeded, was therefore an
infringement of a sacred right, and as such was
solemnly condemned by the First Vatican Council
(Constitution, "Pastor Aeternus", cap. iii). To the
pope likewise belongs the supreme administration of the
goods of the Church. He alone

* can, where there is just cause, alienate any
considerable quantity of such property. Thus, e. g.,
Julius III, at the time of the restoration of religion
in England under Queen Mary validated the title of
those laymen who had acquired Church lands during the
spoliations of the previous reigns.

* The pope has further the right to impose taxes on the
clergy and the faithful for ecclesiastical purposes
(cf. Trent, Sess. XXI, cap. iv de Ref.).

Though the power of the pope, as we have described it,
is very great, it does not follow that it is arbitrary
and unrestricted. "The pope", as Cardinal Hergenroether
well says, "is circumscribed by the consciousness of
the necessity of making a righteous and beneficent use
of the duties attached to his privileges....He is also
circumscribed by the spirit and practice of the Church,
by the respect due to General Councils and to ancient
statutes and customs, by the rights of bishops, by his
relation with civil powers, by the traditional mild
tone of government indicated by the aim of the
institution of the papacy -- to 'feed' -- and finally
by the respect indispensable in a spiritual power
towards the spirit and mind of nations" ("Cath. Church
and Christian State", tr., I, 197).

V. PRIMACY OF HONOUR: TITLES AND INSIGNIA

Certain titles and distinctive marks of honour are
assigned to the pope alone; these constitute what is
termed his primacy of honour. These prerogatives are
not, as are his jurisdictional rights, attached jure
divino to his office. They have grown up in the course
of history, and are consecrated by the usage of
centuries; yet they are not incapable of modification.

(1) Titles

The most noteworthy of the titles are Papa, Summus
Pontifex, Pontifex Maximus, Servus servorum Dei. The
title pope (papa) was, as has been stated, at one time
employed with far more latitude. In the East it has
always been used to designate simple priests. In the
Western Church, however, it seems from the beginning to
have been restricted to bishops (Tertullian, "De Pud."
13). It was apparently in the fourth century that it
began to become a distinctive title of the Roman
Pontiff. Pope Siricius (d. 398) seems so to use it (Ep.
vi in P. L., XIII, 1164), and Ennodius of Pavia (d.
473) employs it still more clearly in this sense in a
letter to Pope Symmachus (P. L., LXIII, 69). Yet as
late as the seventh century St. Gall (d. 640) addresses
Desiderius of Cahors as papa (P. L., LXXXVII, 265).
Gregory VII finally prescribed that it should be
confined to the successors of Peter. The terms Pontifex
Maximus, Summus Pontifex, were doubtless originally
employed with reference to the Jewish high-priest,
whose place the Christian bishops were regarded as
holding each in his own diocese (I Clement 40). As
regards the title Pontifex Maximus, especially in its
application to the pope, there was further a
reminiscence of the dignity attached to that title in
pagan Rome. Tertullian, as has already been said, uses
the phrase of Pope Callistus. Though his words are
ironical, they probably indicate that Catholics already
applied it to the pope. But here too the terms were
once less narrowly restricted in their use. Pontifex
summus was used of the bishop of some notable see in
relation to those of less importance. Hilary of Arles
(d. 449) is so styled by Eucherius of Lyons (P. L., L,
773), and Lanfranc is termed "primas et pontifex
summus" by his biographer, Milo Crispin (P. L., CL,
10). Pope Nicholas I is termed "summus pontifex et
universalis papa" by his legate Arsenius (Hardouin,
"Conc.", V, 280), and subsequent examples are common.
After the eleventh century it appears to be only used
of the popes. The phrase Servus servorum Dei is now so
entirely a papal title that a Bull in which it should
be wanting would be reckoned unauthentic. Yet this
designation also was once applied to others. Augustine
(Ep. 217 a. d. Vitalem) entitles himself "servus
Christi et per Ipsum servus servorum Ipsius".
Desiderius of Cahors made use of it (Thomassin,
"Ecclesiae nov. et vet. disc.", pt. I, I. I, c. iv, n.
4): so also did St. Boniface (740), the apostle of
Germany (P. L., LXXIX, 700). The first of the popes to
adopt it was seemingly Gregory I; he appears to have
done co in contrast to the claim put forward by the
Patriarch of Constantinople to the title of universal
bishop (P. L., LXXV, 87). The restriction of the term
to the pope alone began in the ninth century.

(2) Insignia and Marks of Honour

The pope is distinguished by the use of the tiara or
triple crown (see TIARA). At what date the custom of
crowning the pope was introduced is unknown. It was
certainly previous to the forged donation of
Constantine, which dates from the commencement of the
ninth century, for mention is there made of the pope's
coronation. The triple crown is of much later origin.
The pope moreover does not, like ordinary bishops, use
the bent pastoral staff, but only the erect cross. This
custom was introduced before the reign of Innocent III
(1198-1216) (cap. un. X de sacra unctione, I, 15). He
further uses the pallium (q. v.) at all ecclesiastical
functions, and not under the same restrictions as do
the archbishops on whom he has conferred it. The
kissing of the pope's foot -- the characteristic act of
reverence by which all the faithful do honour to him as
the vicar of Christ -- is found as early as the eighth
century. We read that Emperor Justinian II paid this
respect to Pope Constantine (708-16) (Anastasius Bibl.
in P. L., CXXVIII 949). Even at an earlier date Emperor
Justin had prostrated himself before Pope John I (523-
6; op. cit., 515), and Justinian I before Agapetus
(535-6; op. cit., 551). The pope, it may be added,
ranks as the first of Christian princes, and in
Catholic countries his ambassadors have precedence over
other members of the diplomatic body.

(For the full list of men who have held this office,
see LIST OF POPES.)

G. H. JOYCE
Transcribed by Gerard Haffner

From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright �
1996 by New Advent, Inc., P.O. Box 281096, Denver,
Colorado, USA, 80228. ([email protected])

Taken from the New Advent Web Page
(www.knight.org/advent).

This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia
Project, an effort aimed at placing the  entire
Catholic Encyclopedia 1913 edition on the World Wide
Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,  editor of the
New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this  worthwhile project, you can contact
him by e-mail at (knight.org/advent). For  more
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