Pantheism
(From Greek pan, all; theos, god).
The view according to which God and the world are one.
The name pantheist was introduced by John Toland (1670-
1722) in his "Socinianism truly Stated" (1705), while
pantheism was first used by his opponent Fay in
"Defensio Religionis" (1709). Toland published his
"Pantheisticon" in 1732. The doctrine itself goes back
to the early Indian philosophy; it appears during the
course of history in a great variety of forms, and it
enters into or draws support from so many other systems
that, as Professor Flint says ("Antitheistic Theories",
334), "there is probably no pure pantheism". Taken in
the strictest sense, i.e. as identifying God and the
world, Pantheism is simply Atheism. In any of its forms
it involves Monism (q.v.), but the latter is not
necessarily pantheistic. Emanationism (q.v.) may easily
take on a pantheistic meaning and as pointed out in the
Encyclical, "Pascendi dominici gregis" the same is true
of the modern doctrine of immanence (q.v.).
VARIETIES
These agree in the fundamental doctrine that beneath
the apparent diversity and multiplicity of things in
the universe there is one only being absolutely
necessary, eternal, and infinite. Two questions then
arise: What is the nature of this being? How are the
manifold appearances to be explained? The principal
answers are incorporated in such different earlier
systems as Brahminism, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, and
Gnosticism, and in the later systems of Scotus Eriugena
and Giordano Bruno (qq.v.).
Spinoza's pantheism was realistic: the one being of the
world had an objective character. But the systems that
developed during the nineteenth century went to the
extreme of idealism. They are properly grouped under
the designation of "transcendental pantheism", as their
starting-point is found in Kant's critical philosophy.
Kant (q.v.) had distinguished in knowledge the matter
which comes through sensation from the outer world, and
the forms, which are purely subjective and yet are the
more important factors. Furthermore, he had declared
that we know the appearances (phenomena) of things but
not the things-in-themselves (noumena). And he had made
the ideas of the soul, the world, and God merely
immanent, so that any attempt to demonstrate their
objective value must end in contradiction. This
subjectivism paved the way for the pantheistic theories
of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
Fichte set back into the mind all the elements of
knowledge, i.e. matter as well as form; phenomena and
indeed the whole of reality are products of the
thinking Ego-not the individual mind but the absolute
or universal self-consciousness. Through the three-fold
process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the Ego
posits the non-Ego not only theoretically but also for
practical purposes, i.e. for effort and struggle which
are necessary in order to attain the highest good. In
the same way the Ego, free in itself, posits other free
agents by whose existence its own freedom is limited.
Hence the law of right and all morality; but hence also
the Divine being. The living, active moral order of the
world, says Fichte, is itself God, we need no other
God, and can conceive of no other. The idea of God as a
distinct substance is impossible and contradictory.
Such, at any rate, is the earlier form of his doctrine,
though in his later theorizing he emphasizes more and
more the concepts of the Absolute as embracing all
individuals within itself.
According to Schelling, the Absolute is the "identity
of all differences"-object and subject, nature and
mind, the real order and the ideal; and the knowledge
of this identity is obtained by an intellectual
intuition which, abstracting from every individual
thinker and every possible object of thought,
contemplates the absolute reason. Out of this original
unity all things evolve in opposite directions: nature
as the negative pole, mind or spirit as the positive
pole of a vast magnet, the universe. Within this
totality each thing, like the particle of a magnet, has
its nature or form determined according as it manifests
subjectivity or objectivity in greater degree. History
is but the gradual self-revelation of the Absolute;
when its final period will come to pass we know not;
but when it does come, then God will be.
The system of Hegel (q.v.) has been called "logical
pantheism", as it is constructed on the "dialectical"
method; and "panlogismus", since it describes the
entire world-process as the evolution of the Idea.
Starting from the most abstract of notions, i.e. pure
being, the Absolute developes first the various
categories; then it externalizes itself, and Nature is
the result; finally it returns upon itself, regains
unity and self-consciousness, becomes the individual
spirit of man. The Absolute, therefore, is Mind; but it
attains its fulness only by a process of evolution or
"becoming", the stages of which form the history of the
universe.
These idealistic constructions were followed by a
reaction due largely to the development of the natural
sciences. But these in turn offer, apparently, new
support to the central positions of pantheism, or at
any rate they point, it is claimed, to that very unity
and that gradual unfolding which pantheism has all
along asserted. The principle of the conservation of
energy through ceaseless transformations, and the
doctrine of evolution applied to all things and all
phenomena, are readily interpreted by the pantheist in
favour of his own system. Even where the ultimate
reality is said to be unknowable as in Herbert
Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy", it is still one and
the same being that manifests itself alike in evolving
matter and in the consciousness that evolves out of
lower material forms. Nor is it surprising that some
writers should see in pantheism the final outcome of
all speculation and the definitive expression which the
human mind has found for the totality of things.
This statement, in fact, may well serve as a summary of
the pantheistic doctrine:
* Reality is a unitary being; individual things have no
absolute independence- they have existence in the All-
One, the ens realissimum et et perfectissimum of which
they are the more or less independent members;
* The All-One manifests itself to us, so far as it has
any manifestations, in the two sides of reality-nature
and history;
* The universal interaction that goes on in the
physical world is the showing forth of the inner
aesthetic teleological necessity with which the All-One
unfolds his essential being in a multitude of
harmonious modifications, a cosmos of concrete ideas
(monads, entelechies). This internal necessity is at
the same time absolute freedom or self-realization.
CATHOLIC DOCTRINE
The Church has repeatedly condemned the errors of
pantheism. Among the propositions censured in the
Syllabus of Pius IX is that which declares: "There is
no supreme, all-wise and all-provident Divine Being
distinct from the universe; God is one with nature and
therefore subject to change; He becomes God in man and
the world; all things are God and have His substance;
God is identical with the world, spirit with matter,
necessity with freedom, truth with falsity, good with
evil, justice with injustice" (Denzinger-Bannwart,
"Ench.", 1701). And the First Vatican Council
anathematizes those who assert that the substance or
essence of God and of all things is one and the same,
or that all things evolve from God's essence (ibid.,
1803 sqq.).
CRITICISM
To our perception the world presents a multitude of
beings each of which has qualities activities, and
existence of its own, each is an individual thing.
Radical differences mark off living things from those
that are lifeless; the conscious from the unconscious
human thought and volition from the activities of lower
animals. And among human beings each personality
appears as a self, which cannot by any effort become
completely one with other selves. On the other hand,
any adequate account of the world other than downright
materialism includes the concept of some original Being
which, whether it be called First Cause, or Absolute,
or God, is in its nature and existence really distinct
from the world. Only such a Being can satisfy the
demands of human thought, either as the source of the
moral order or as the object of religious worship. If,
then, pantheism not only merges the separate existences
of the world in one existence, but also identifies this
one with the Divine Being, some cogent reason or motive
must be alleged in justification of such a procedure.
Pantheists indeed bring forward various arguments in
support of their several positions, and in reply to
criticism aimed at the details of their system; but
what lies back of their reasoning and what has prompted
the construction of all pantheistic theories, both old
and new, is the craving for unity. The mind, they
insist, cannot accept dualism or pluralism as the final
account of reality. By an irresistible tendency, it
seeks to substitute for the apparent multiplicity and
diversity of things a unitary ground or source, and,
once this is determined, to explain all things as
somehow derived though not really separated from it.
That such is in fact the ideal of many philosophers
cannot be denied; nor is it needful to challenge the
statement that reason does aim at unification on some
basis or other. But this very aim and all endeavours in
view of it must likewise be kept within reasonable
bounds: a theoretical unity obtained at too great a
sacrifice is no unity at all, but merely an abstraction
that quickly falls to pieces. Hence for an estimate of
pantheism two questions must be considered:
* at what cost does it identify God and the world; and
* is the identification really accomplished or only
attempted?
The answer to the first is furnished by a review of the
leading concepts which enter into the pantheistic
system.
God
It has often been claimed that pantheism by teaching us
to see God in everything gives us an exalted idea of
His wisdom, goodness, and power, while it imparts to
the visible world a deeper meaning. In point of fact,
however, it makes void the attributes which belong
essentially to the Divine nature For the pantheist God
is not a personal Being. He is not an intelligent Cause
of the world, designing, creating and governing it in
accordance with the free determination of His wisdom.
If consciousness is ascribed to Him as the one
Substance, extension is also said to be His attribute
(Spinoza), or He attains to self-consciousness only
through a process of evolution (Hegel). But this very
process implies that God is not from eternity perfect:
He is forever changing, advancing from one degree of
perfection to another, and helpless to determine in
what direction the advance shall take place. Indeed,
there is no warrant for saying that He "advances" or
becomes more "perfect"; at most we can say that He, or
rather It, is constantly passing into other forms. Thus
God is not only impersonal, but also changeable and
finite-which is equivalent to saying that He is not
God.
It is true that some pantheists, such as Paulsen, while
frankly denying the personality of God, pretend to
exalt His being by asserting that He is "supra-
personal." If this means that God in Himself is
infinitely beyond any idea that we can form of Him, the
statement is correct; but if it means that our idea of
Him is radically false and not merely inadequate, that
consequently we have no right to speak of infinite
intelligence and will, the statement is simply a
makeshift which pantheism borrows from agnosticism Even
then the term "supra-personal" is not consistently
applied to what Paulsen calls the All-One; for this, if
at all related to personality, should be described as
infra-personal.
Once the Divine personality is removed, it is evidently
a misnomer to speak of God as just or holy, or in any
sense a moral Being. Since God, in the pantheistic
view, acts out of sheer necessity--that is, cannot act
otherwise--His action is no more good than it is evil.
To say, with Fichte, that God is the moral order, is an
open contradiction; no such order exists where nothing
is free, nor could God, a non-moral Being, have
established a moral order either for Himself or for
other beings. If, on the other hand, it be maintained
that the moral order does exist, that it is postulated
by our human judgments, the plight of pantheism is no
better; for in that case all the actions of men, their
crimes as well as their good deeds, must be imputed to
God. Thus the Divine Being not only loses the attribute
of absolute holiness, but even falls below the level of
those men in whom moral goodness triumphs over evil.
Man
No such claim, however, can be made in behalf of the
moral order by a consistent pantheist. For him, human
personality is a mere illusion: what we call the
individual man is only one of the countless fragments
that make up the Divine Being; and since the All is
impersonal no single part of it can validly claim
personality. Futhermore, since each human action is
inevitably determined, the consciousness of freedom is
simply another illusion, due, as Spinoza says, to our
ignorance of the causes that compel us to act. Hence
our ideas of what "ought to be" are purely subjective,
and our concept of a moral order, with its distinctions
of right and wrong, has no foundation in reality. The
so-called "dictates of conscience" are doubtless
interesting phenomena of mind which the psychologist
may investigate and explain, but they have no binding
force whatever; they are just as illusory as the ideas
of virtue and duty, of injustice to the fellow-man and
of sin against God. But again, since these dictates,
like all our ideas, are produced in us by God, it
follows that He is the source of our illusions
regarding morality-a consequence which certainly does
not enhance His holiness or His knowledge.
It is not, however, clear that the term illusion is
justified; for this supposes a distinction between
truth and error-a distinction which has no meaning for
the genuine pantheist; all our judgments being the
utterance of the One that thinks in us, it is
impossible to discriminate the true from the false. He
who rejects pantheism is no further from the truth than
he who defends it; each but expresses a thought of the
Absolute whose large tolerance harbours all
contradictions. Logically, too, it would follow that no
heed should be taken as to veracity of statement, since
all statements are equally warranted. The pantheist who
is careful to speak in accordance with his thought
simply refrains from putting his philosophy into
practice. But it is none the less significant that
Spinoza's chief work was his "Ethics", and that,
according to one modern view, ethics has only to
describe what men do, not to prescribe what they ought
to do.
Religion
In forming its conception of God, pantheism eliminates
every characteristic that religion presupposes. An
impersonal being, whatever attributes it may have,
cannot be an object of worship. An infinite substance
or a self-evolving energy may excite fear but it repels
faith and love. Even the beneficent forms of its
manifestation call forth no gratitude, since these
result from it by a rigorous necessity. For the same
reason, prayer of any sort is useless, atonement is
vain and merit impossible. The supernatural of course
disappears entirely when God and the world are
identified.
Recent advocates of pantheism have sought to obviate
these difficulties and to show that, apart from
particular dogmas, the religious life and spirit are
safeguarded in their theory. But in this attempt they
divest religion of its essentials, reducing it to mere
feeling. Not action, they allege, but humility and
trustfulness constitute religion. This, however is an
arbitrary procedure; by the same method it could be
shown that religion is nothing more than existing or
breathing. The pantheist quite overlooks the fact that
religion means obedience to Divine law; and of this
obedience there can be no question in a system which
denies the freedom of man's will. According to
pantheism there is just as little "rational service" in
the so-called religious life as there is in the
behaviour of any physical agent. And if men still
distinguish between actions that are religious and
those that are not, the distinction is but another
illusion.
Immortality
Belief in a future life is not only an incentive to
effort and a source of encouragement; for the Christian
at least it implies a sanction of Divine law, a
prospect of retribution. But this sanction is of no
meaning or efficacy unless the soul survive as an
individual. If, as pantheism teaches, immortality is
absorption into the being of God, it can matter little
what sort of life one leads here. There is no ground
for discriminating between the lot of the righteous and
that of the wicked, when all ,alike are merged in the
Absolute. And if by some further process of evolution
such a discrimination should come to pass, it can
signify nothing, either as reward or as punishment,
once personal consciousness has ceased. That perfect
union with God which pantheism seems to promise, is no
powerful inspiration to right living when one considers
how far from holy must be a God who continually takes
up into Himself the worst of humanity along with the
best--if indeed one may continue to think in terms that
involve a distinction between evil and good.
It is therefore quite plain that in endeavouring to
unify all things, pantheism sacrifices too much. If
God, freedom, morality and religion must all be reduced
to the One and its inevitable processes, there arises
the question whether the craving for unity may not be
the source of illusions more fatal than any of those
which pantheism claims to dispel. But in fact no such
unification is attained. The pantheist uses his power
of abstraction to set aside all differences, and then
declares that the differences are not really there. Yet
even for him they seem to be there, and so from the
very outset he is dealing with appearance and reality;
and these two he never fuses into one. He simply
hurries on to assert that the reality is Divine and
that all the apparent things are manifestations of the
infinite, but he does not explain why each
manifestation should be finite or why the various
manifestations should be interpreted in so many
different and conflicting ways by human minds, each of
which is a part of one and the same God. He makes the
Absolute pass onward from unconsciousness to
consciousness but does not show why there should be
these two stages in evolution, or why evolution, which
certainly means becoming "other", should take place at
all.
It might be noted, too, that pantheism fails to unify
subject and object, and that in spite of its efforts
the world of existence remains distinct from the world
of thought. But such objections have little weight with
the thorough-going pantheist who follows Hegel, and is
willing for the sake of "unity" to declare that Being
and Nothing are identical.
There is nevertheless a fundamental unity which
Christian philosophy has always recognized, and which
has God for its centre. Not as the universal being, nor
as the formal constituent principle of things, but as
their efficient cause operating in and through each,
and as the final cause for which things exist, God in a
very true sense is the source of all thought and
reality (see St. Thomas, "Contra Gentes", I). His
omnipresence and action, far from eliminating secondary
causes, preserve each in the natural order of its
efficiency-physical agents under the determination of
physical law and human personality in the exercise of
intelligence and freedom. the foundation of the moral
order. The straining after unity in the pantheistic
sense is without warrant, the only intelligible unity
is that which God himself has established, a unity of
purpose which is manifest alike in the processes of the
material universe and in the free volition of man, and
which moves on to its fulfilment in the union of the
created spirit with the infinite Person, the author of
the moral order and the object of religious worship.
EDWARD A. PACE
Transcribed by Tomas Hancil
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright �
1996 by New Advent, Inc., P.O. Box 281096, Denver,
Colorado, USA, 80228. (
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Taken from the New Advent Web Page
(www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia
Project, an effort aimed at placing the entire
Catholic Encyclopedia 1913 edition on the World Wide
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