The Logos

The word Logos is the term by which Christian theology in the
Greek language designates the Word of God, or Second Person of the
Blessed Trinity. Before St. John had consecrated this term by
adopting it, the Greeks and the Jews had used it to express
religious conceptions which, under various titles, have exercised
a certain influence on Christian theology, and of which it is
necessary to say something.

I. THE LOGOS IN HELLENISM

It is in Heraclitus that the theory of the Logos appears for the
first time, and it is doubtless for this reason that, first among
the Greek philosophers, Heraclitus was regarded by St. Justin
(Apol. I, 46) as a Christian before Christ. For him the Logos,
which he seems to identify with fire, is that universal principle
which animates and rules the world. This conception could only
find place in a materialistic monism. The philosophers of the
fifth and fourth centuries before Christ were dualists, and
conceived of God as transcendent, so that neither in Plato
(whatever may have been said on the subject) nor in Aristotle do
we find the theory of the Logos.

It reappears in the writings of the Stoics, and it is especially
by them that this theory is developed. God, according to them,
"did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by
wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the
universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von
Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the
honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so
intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch
as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called
Logos; and inasmuch as He IS the germ from which all else
develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This
Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force
which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common
end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw
itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly
(Cleanthus, "Hymn to Zeus" in "Fr. Stoic." I, 527-cf. 537).
Conformably to their exegetical habits, the Stoics made of the
different gods personifications of the Logos, e. g. of Zeus and
above all of Hermes.

At Alexandria, Hermes was identified with Thoth, the god of
Hermopolis, known later as the great Hermes, "Hermes
Trismegistus", and represented as the revealer of all letters and
all religion. Simultaneously, the Logos theory conformed to the
current Neoplatonistic dualism in Alexandria: the Logos is not
conceived of as nature or immanent necessity, but as an
intermediary agent by which the transcendent God governs the
world. This conception appears in Plutarch, especially in his
"Isis and Osiris"; from an early date in the first century of the
Christian era, it influenced profoundly the Jewish philosopher
Philo.

II. THE WORD IN JUDAISM

Quite frequently the Old Testament represents the creative act as
the word of God (Gen.,i,3; Ps. xxxii, 9; Ecclus., xlii, 15);
sometimes it seems to attribute to the word action of itself,
although not independent of Jahveh (Is. Iv, 11, Zach., v, 1-4; Ps.
cvi, 20; cxlvii, 15). In all this we can see only bold figures of
speech: the word of creation, of salvation, or, in Zacharias, the
word of malediction, is personified, but is not conceived of as a
distinct Divine hypostasis. In the Book of Wisdom this
personification is more directly implied (xviii, 15 sq.), and a
parallel is established (ix, 1, 2) between wisdom and the Word.

In Palestinian Rabbinism the Word (Memra) is very often mentioned,
at least in the Targums: it is the Memra of Jahveh which lives,
speaks, and acts, but, if one endeavour to determine precisely the
meaning of the expression, it appears very often to be only a
paraphrase substituted by the Targumist for the name of Jahveh.
The Memra resembles the Logos of Philo as little as the workings
of the rabbinical mind in Palestine resembled the speculations of
Alexandria: the rabbis are chiefiy concerned about ritual and
observances; from religious scruples they dare not attribute to
Jahveh actions such as the Sacred Books attribute to Him; it is
enough for them to veil the Divine Majesty under an abstract
paraphrase, the Word, the Glory, the Abode, and others. Philo's
problem was of the philosophic order; God and man are infinitely
distant from each other, and it is necessary to establish between
them relations of action and of prayer; the Logos is here the
intermediary.

Leaving aside the author of the Book of Wisdom, other Alexandrian
Jews before Philo had speculated as to the Logos; but their works
are known only through the rare fragments which Christian authors
and Philo himself have preserved. Philo alone is fully known to
us, his writings are as extensive as those of Plato or Cicero, and
throw light on every aspect of his doctrine; from him we can best
learn the theory of the Logos, as developed by Alexandrian
Judaism. The character of his teaching is as manifold as its
sources:

�  sometimes, influenced by Jewish tradition, Philo represents the
Logos as the creative Word of God ("De Sacrific. Ab. et Cain"; cf.
"De Somniis", I 182; "De Opif. Mundi", 13);

�  at other times he describes it as the revealer of God,
symbolized in Scripture by the angel of Jahveh ("De Somniis", I,
228-39, "De Cherub.", 3; "De Fuga", 5; "Quis rer. divin. haeres
sit", 201-205).

�  Oftener again he accepts the language of Hellenic speculation;
the Logos is then, after a Platonistic concept, the sum total of
ideas and the intelligible world ("De Opif. Mundi", 24, 25; "Leg.
Alleg.", I, 19; III, 96),

�  or, agreeably to the Stoic theory, the power that upholds the
world, the bond that assures its cohesion, the law that determines
its development ("De Fuga", 110; "De Plantat. Noe," 8-10; "Quis
rer. divin. haeres sit", 188, 217; "Quod Deus sit immut.", 176;
"De Opif. Mundi", 143).

Throughout so many diverse concepts may be recognized a
fundamental doctrine: the Logos is an intermediary between God and
the world; through it God created the world and governs it;
through it also men know God and pray to Him ("De Cherub.", 125;
"Quis rerum divin. haeres sit", 205-06.) In three passages the
Logos is called God ("Leg. Alleg.", III, 207; "De Somniis", I,
229; "In Gen.", II, 62, cited by Eusebius, "Praep. Ev.", VII, 13);
but, as Philo himself explains in one of these texts (De Somniis),
it is an improper appellation and wrongly employed, and he uses it
only because he is led into it by the Sacred Text which he
comments upon. Moreover, Philo does not regard the Logos as a
person; it is an idea, a power, and, though occasionally
identified with the angels of the Bible, this is by symbolic
personification.

III. THE LOGOS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

The term Logos is found only in the Johannine writings: in the
Apocalypse (19:13), in the Gospel of St. John (1:1-14), and in his
First Epistle (1:1; cf. 1:7 - Vulgate). But already in the
Epistles of St. Paul the theology of the Logos had made its
influence felt. This is seen in the Epistles to the Corinthians,
where Christ is called "the power of God, and the wisdom of God"
(I Cor., 1:24) and "the image of God" (II Cor., 4:4); it is more
evident in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:15 sqq.); above all in
the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the theology of the Logos lacks
only the term itself, that finally appears in St. John. In this
epistle we also notice the pronounced influence of the Book of
Wisdom, especially in the description which is given of the
relations between the Son and the Father: "the brightness of his
glory, and the figure of his substance" (cf. Wis., vii, 26). This
resemblance suggests the way by which the doctrine of the Logos
entered into Christian theology; another clue is furnished by the
Apocalypse, where the term Logos appears for the first time
(19:13), and not apropos of any theological teaching, but in an
apocalyptic vision, the content of which has no suggestion of
Philo but rather recalls Wisdom 18:15.

In the Gospel of St. John the Logos appears in the very first
verse without explanation, as a term familiar to the readers, St.
John uses it at the end of the prologue (i, 14), and does not
mention it again in the Gospel. From this Harnack concludes that
the mention of the Word was only a starting-point for the
Evangelist, and that he passed directly from this Hellenic
conception of the Logos to the Christian doctrine of the only Son
("Ueber das Verhaltniss des Prologs des vierten Evangeliums zum
ganzen Werk" in "Zeitschrift fur Theol. und Kirche", II, 1892,
189-231). This hypothesis is proved false by the insistence with
which the Evangelist comes back on this idea of the Word, it is,
moreover, natural enough that this technical term, employed in the
prologue where the Evangelist is interpreting the Divine mystery,
should not reappear in the sequel of the narrative, the character
of which might thus suffer change.

What is the precise value of this concept in the writings of St.
John? The Logos has not for him the Stoic meaning that it so often
had for Philo: it is not the impersonal power that sustains the
world, nor the law that regulates it; neither do we find in St.
John the Platonistic concept of the Logos as the ideal model of
the world; the Word is for him the Word of God, and thereby he
holds with Jewish tradition, the theology of the Book of Wisdom,
of the Psalms, of the Prophetical Books, and of Genesis; he
perfects the idea and transforms it by showing that this creative
Word which from all eternity was in God and was God, took flesh
and dwelt among men.

This difference is not the only one which distinguishes the
Johannine theology of the Logos from the concept of Philo, to
which not a few have sought to liken it. The Logos of Philo is
impersonal, it is an idea, a power, a law; at most it may be
likened to those half abstract, half-concrete entities, to which
the Stoic mythology had lent a certain personal form. For Philo
the incarnation of the Logos must have been absolutely without
meaning, quite as much as its identification with the Messias. For
St. John, on the contrary, the Logos appears in the full light of
a concrete and living personality; it is the Son of God, the
Messias, Jesus. Equally great is the difference when we consider
the role of the Logos. The Logos of Philo is an intermediary: "The
Father who engendered all has given to the Logos the signal
privilege of being an intermediary (methorios) between the
creature and the creator . . . it is neither without beginning
(agenetos) as is God, nor begotten (genetos) as you are [mankind],
but intermediate (mesos) between these two extremes "(Quis rer.
divin. haeres sit, 205-06). The Word of St. John is not an
intermediary, but a Mediator; He is not intermediate between the
two natures, Divine and human, but He unites them in His Person;
it could not be said of Him, as of the Logos of Philo, that He is
neither agenetos nor genetos, for He is at the same time one and
the other, not inasmuch as He is the Word, but as the Incarnate
Word (St. Ignatius, "Ad Ephes.", vii, 2).

In the subsequent history of Christian theology many conflicts
would naturally arise between these rival concepts, and Hellenic
speculations constitute a dangerous temptation for Christian
writers. They were hardly tempted, of course, to make the Divine
Logos an impersonal power (the Incarnation too definitely forbade
this), but they were at times moved, more or less consciously, to
consider the Word as an intermediary being between God and the
world. Hence arose the subordinationist tendencies found in
certain Ante-Nicene writers; hence, also, the Arian heresy (see
NICAEA, COUNCIL OF).

IV. THE LOGOS IN ANCIENT CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

The Apostolic Fathers do not touch on the theology of the Logos; a
short notice occurs in St. Ignatius only (Ad Magn. viii, 2). The
Apologists, on the contrary, develop it, partly owing to their
philosophic training, but more particularly to their desire to
state their faith in a way familiar to their readers (St. Justin,
for example, insists strongly on the theology of the Logos in his
"Apology" meant for heathens, much less so in his "Dialogue with
the Jew Tryphon"). This anxiety to adapt apologetic discussion to
the circumstances of their hearers had its dangers, since it was
possible that in this way the apologists might land well inside
the lines of their adversaries.

As to the capital question of the generation of the Word, the
orthodoxy of the Apologists is irreproachable: the Word was not
created, as the Arians held later, but was born of the very
Substance of the Father according to the later definition of
Nicaea (Justin, "Dial.",128, Tatian, "Or.", v, Athenagoras,
"Legat." x-xviii, Theophilus, "Ad Autolyc.", II, x; Tertullian
"Adv. Prax.", vii). Their theology is less satisfactory as regards
the eternity of this generation and its necessity; in fact, they
represent the Word as uttered by the Father when the Father wished
to create and in view of this creation (Justin, "II Apol.", 6; cf.
"Dial.",6162; Tatian, "Or.", v, a corrupt and doubtful text;
Athenagoras, "Legat.", x; Theophilus, "Ad Autolyc.", II, xxii
Tertullian, "Adv. Prax.", v-vii). When we seek to understand what
they meant by this "utterance", it is difficult to give the same
answer for all Athenagoras seems to mean the role of the Son in
the work of creation, the syncatabasis of the Nicene Fathers
(Newman, "Causes of the Rise and Successes of Arianism" in "Tracts
Theological and Ecclesiastical", London, 1902, 238), others,
especially Theophilus and Tertullian (cf. Novatian, "De Trinit.",
xxxi), seem quite certainly to understand this "utterance" as
properly so called. Mental survivals of Stoic psychology seem to
be responsible for this attitude: the philosophers of the Portico
distinguished between the innate word (endiathetos) and the
uttered word (prophorikos) bearing in mind this distinction the
aforesaid apologists conceived a development in the Word of God
after the same fashion. After this period, St. Irenaeus condemned
very severely these attempts at psychological explanation (Adv.
Haeres., II, xiii, 3-10, cf. II, xxviii, 4-6), and later Fathers
rejected this unfortunate distinction between the Word endiathetos
and prophorikos [Athanasius (?), "Expos. Fidei", i, in P. G., XXV,
201-cf. "Orat.", II, 35, in P. G., XXVI, 221; Cyril of Jerusalem
"Cat.", IV, 8, in P. G., XXXIII, 465-cf. "Cat.", XI, 10, in P. G.,
XXXIII, 701-cf. Council of Sirmium, can. viii, in Athan., "De
Synod.", 27-P. G., XXVI,

As to the Divine Nature of the Word, all apologists are agreed but
to some of them, at least to St. Justin and Tertuilian, there
seemed to be in this Divinity a certain subordination (Justin, "I
Apol.", 13-cf. "II Apol.", 13; Tertullian, "Adv. Prax.", 9, 14,
26).

The Alexandrian theologians, themselves profound students of the
Logos doctrine, avoided thc above mentioned errors concerning the
dual conception of the Word (see, however, a fragment of the
"Hypotyposes", of Clement of Alexandria, cited by Photius, in P.
G., CIII, 384, and Zahn, "Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutest.
Kanons", Erlangen, 1884, xiii 144) and the generation in time; for
Clement and for Origen the Word is eternal like the Father
(Clement "Strom.", VII, 1, 2, in P. G., IX, 404, 409, and
"Adumbrat. in Joan.", i, 1, in P. G., IX, 734; Origen, "De
Princip.", I, xxii, 2 sqq., in P. G., XI, 130 sqq.; "In Jer.
Hom.", IX, 4, in P. G., XIII, 357, "In Jo. ', ii, 32, in P. G.,
XIV, 77; cf. Athanasius, "De decret. Nic. syn.", 27, in P. G.,
XXV, 465). As to the nature of the Word their teaching is less
sure: in Clement, it is true, we find only a few traces of
subordinationism ("Strom.", IV, 25, in P. G., VIII, 1365;
"Strom.", VII, 3, in P. G., IX, 421; cf. "Strom.", VII, 2, in P.
G., IX, 408); elsewhere he very explicitly affirms the equality of
the Father and the Son and the unity (" Protrept.", 10, in P. G.,
VIII 228, "Paedag.", I, vi, in P. G., VIII, 280; I, viii, in P.
G., VIII, 325 337 cf. I, ix, in P. G., VIII, 353; III, xii, in P.
d., V*I, 680). Origen, on the contrary, frequently and formally
defended subordinationist ideas (" De Princip.", I, iii, 5, in P.
G., XI, 150; IV, xxxv, in P. G., XI, 409, 410; "In Jo." ii, 2, in
P. G., XIV, 108, 109; ii, 18, in P. G., XIV, 153, 156; vi, 23, in
P. G., XIV, 268; xiii, 25, in P. G., XIV, 44144; xxxii, 18, in P.
G., XIV, 817-20; "In Matt.", xv, 10, in P. G., XIII, 1280, 1281;
"De Orat.", 15, in P. G., XI,464, "Contra Cels.", V, xi, in P. G.,
XI,1197); his teaching concerning the Word evidently suffered from
Hellenic speculation: in the order of religious knowledge and of
prayer, the Word is for him an intermediary between God and the
creature.

Amid these speculations of apologists and Alexandrian theologians,
elaborated not without danger or without error, the Church
maintained her strict dogmatic teaching concerning the Word of
God. This is particularly recognizable in the works of those
Fathers more devoted to tradition than to philosophy, and
especially in St. Irenaeus, who condemns every form of the
Hellenic and Gnostic theory of intermediary beings (Adv. Haer.,
II, xxx, 9; II, ii, 4; III, viii, 3; IV, vii, 4, IV, xx, 1), and
who affirms in the strongest terms the full comprehension of the
Father by the Son and their identity of nature (Adv. Haer., II,
xvii, 8; IV, iv, 2, IV, vi, 3, 6). We find it again with still
greater authority in the letter of Pope St. Dionysius to his
namesake, the Bishop of Alexandria (see Athan., "De decret. Nic.
syn.", 26, in P. G., XXV,461-65): "They lie as to the generation
of the Lord who dare to say that His Divine and ineffable
generation is a creation. We must not divide the admirable and
Divine unity into three divinities, we must not lower the dignity
and sovereign grandeur of the Lord by the word creation, but we
must believe in God the Father omnipotent, in Christ Jesus His
Son, and in the Holy Ghost, we must unite the Word to the God of
the universe, for He has said: 'I and the Father are one', and
again: 'I am in the Father, and the Father in me'. Thus we protect
the Divine Trinity, and the holy avowal of the monarchy [unity of
God]." The Council of Nicaea (325) had but to lend official
consecration to this dogmatic teaching.

V. ANALOGY BETWEEN THE DIVINE WORD AND HUMAN SPEECH

After the Council of Nicaea, all danger of Subordinationism being
removed, it was possible to seek in the analogy of human speech
some light on the mystery of the Divine generation; the Greek
Fathers especially refer to this analogy, in order to explain how
this generation is purely spiritual and entails neither diminution
nor change: Dionysius of Alexandria (Athan., "De Sent. Dion.", 23,
in P. G., XXV, 513); Athanasius ("De decret. Nic. syn.", 11, in P.
G., XXV, 444); Basil ("In illud: In principio erat Verbum", 3, in
P. G., XXXI, 476-77); Gregory of Nazianzus ("Or.", xxx,20,inP.G.,
XXXVI, 128-29) Cyril of Alexandria (" Thes." iv, in P. G., LXXV,
56; cf. 76, 80; xvi, ibid., 300; xvi, ibid., 313; "De Trinit.",
dial. ii, in P. G., LXXV, 768 69), John Damasc. ("De Fide
Orthod.", I, vi, in P. G., XCIV, 804).

St. Augustine studied more closely this analogy between the Divine
Word and human speech (see especially "De Trinit.", IX, vii, 12
sq., in P. L., XLII, 967, XV, x, 17 sq., ibid., 1069), and drew
from it teachings long accepted in Catholic theology. He compares
the Word of God, not to the word spoken by the lips, but to the
interior speech of the soul, whereby we may in some measure grasp
the Divine mystery; engendered by the mind it remains therein, is
equal thereto, is the source of its operations. This doctrine was
later developed and enriched by St. Thomas, especially in "Contra
Gent.", IV, xi-xiv, opusc. "De natura verbi intellectus"; "Quaest.
disput. de verit." iv, "De potent.", ii-viii, 1, "Summa Theol.",
I-I, xxvii, 2; xxxiv. St. Thomas sets forth in a very clear way
the identity of meaning, already noted by St. Augustine (De
Trinit., VII, ii, 3), between the terms Son and Word: "eo Filius
quo Verbum, et eo Verbum quo Filius" ("Summa Theol.", I-I, xxvii,
2, "Contra Gent.", IV, xi). The teaching of St. Thomas has been
highly approved by the Church especially in the condemnation of
the Synod of Pistoia by Pius VI (Denzinger, "Enchiridion", 1460).
(See JESUS CHRIST; TRINITY.)

J. LEBRETON
Transcribed by Joseph P. Thomas


From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.

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