Intention

(Lat. intendere, to stretch toward, to aim at) is an act of the
will by which that faculty efficaciously desires to reach an end
by employing the means. It is apparent from this notion that there
is a sharply defined difference between intention and volition or
even velleity. In the first instance there is a concentration of
the will to the point of resolve which is wholly lacking in the
others. With the purpose of determining the value of an action, it
is customary to distinguish various sorts of intentions which
could have prompted it.

First, there is the actual intention, operating, namely, with the
advertence of the intellect. Secondly, there is the virtual
intention. Its force is borrowed entirely from a prior volition
which is accounted as continuing in some result produced by it. In
other words, the virtual intention is not a present act of the
will. but rather a power (virtus) come about as an effect of a
former act, and now at work for the attainment of the end. The
thing therefore that is wanting in a virtual, as contrasted with
an actual, intention is not of course the element of will, but
rather the attention of the intellect, and that particularly of
the reflex kind. So, for example, a person having made up his mind
to undertake a journey may during its progress be entirely
preoccupied with other thoughts. He will nevertheless be said to
have all the while the virtual intention of reaching his
destination. Thirdly, an habitual intention is one that once
actually existed, but of the present continuance of which there is
no positive trace; the most that can be said of it is that it has
never been retracted. And fourthly an interpretative intention is
one that as a matter of fact has never been really elicited; there
has been and is no actual movement of the will; it is simply the
purpose which it is assumed a man would have had in a given
contingency, had he given thought to the matter.

It is a commonplace among moralists that the intention is the
chief among the determinants of the concrete morality of a human
act. Hence when one's motive is grievously bad, or even only
slightly so, if it be the exclusive reason for doing something,
then an act which is otherwise good is vitiated and reputed to be
evil. An end which is only venially bad, and which at the same
time does not contain the complete cause for acting, leaves the
operation which in other respects was unassailable to be qualified
as partly good and partly bad. A good intention can never hallow
an action the content of which is wrong. Thus it never can be
lawful to steal, even though one's intention be to aid the poor
with the proceeds of the theft. The end does not justify the
means. It may be noted here in passing, as somewhat cognate to the
matter under discussion, that the explicit and frequently renewed
reference of one's actions to Almighty God is not now commonly
thought to be necessary in order that they may be said to be
morally good. The old-time controversy on this point has
practically died out.

Besides affecting the goodness or badness of acts, intention may
have much to do with their validity. Is it required, for instance,
for the fulfilment of the law? The received doctrine is that,
provided the subject is seriously minded to do what is prescribed,
he need not have the intention of satisfying his obligation; and
much less is it required that he should be inspired by the same
motives as urged the legislator to enact the law. Theologians
quote in this connection the saying, "Finis pr�cepti non cadit sub
pr�cepto" (the end of the law does not fall under its binding
force). What has been said applies with even more truth to the
class of obligations called real, enjoining for instance the
payment of debts. For the discharge of these no intention at all
is demanded, not even a conscious act. It is enough that the
creditor gets his own.

The Church teaches very unequivocally that for the valid
conferring of the sacraments, the minister must have the intention
of doing at least what the Church does. This is laid down with
great emphasis by the Council of Trent (sess. VII). The opinion
once defended by such theologians as Catharinus and Salmeron that
there need only be the intention to perform deliberately the
external rite proper to each sacrament, and that, as long as this
was true, the interior dissent of the minister from the mind of
the Church would not invalidate the sacrament, no longer finds
adherents. The common doctrine now is that a real internal
intention to act as a minister of Christ, or to do what Christ
instituted the sacraments to effect, in other words, to truly
baptize, absolve, etc., is required. This intention need not
necessarily be of the sort called actual. That would often be
practically impossible. It is enough that it be virtual. Neither
habitual nor interpretative intention in the minister will suffice
for the validity of the sacrament. The truth is that here and now,
when the sacrament is being conferred, neither of these intentions
exists, and they can therefore exercise no determining influence
upon what is done. To administer the sacraments with a conditional
intention, which makes their effect contingent upon a future
event, is to confer them invalidly. This holds good for all the
sacraments except matrimony, which, being a contract, is
susceptible of such a limitation.

As to the recipients of the sacraments, it is certain that no
intention is required in children who have not yet reached the age
of reason, or in imbeciles, for the validity of those sacraments
which they are capable of receiving. In the case of adults, on the
other hand, some intention is indispensable if the sacrament is
not to be invalid. The reason is that our justification is not
brought about without our co-operation, and that includes the
rational will to profit by the means of sanctification. How much
of an intention is enough is not always quite clear. In general,
more in the way of intention will be demanded in proportion as the
acts of the receiver seem to enter into the making of the
sacrament. So for penance and matrimony under ordinary conditions
a virtual intention would appear to be required; for the other
sacraments an habitual intention is sufficient. For an unconscious
person in danger of death the habitual intention may be implicit
and still suffice for the validity of the sacraments that are then
necessary or highly useful; that is, it may be contained in the
more general purpose which a man has at some time during his life,
and which he has never retracted, of availing himself of these
means of salvation at so supreme a moment. For the gaining of
indulgences the most that can probably be exacted is an habitual
intention.

JOSEPH F. DELANY
Transcribed by Rick McCarty

From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.

Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).

This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the  entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this  worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For  more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.

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