Imagination
ITS NATURE
Imagination is the faculty of representing to oneself sensible
objects independently of an actual impression of those objects on
our senses. It is, according to scholastic psychology, one of the
four infernal senses, distinct, on the one hand, from the sensus
intimus, the sensus aestimativus, and the memory, and, on the
other hand, distinct from the spiritual intellect. The last
distinction is to be specially noted on account of the similarity
between the operations of the imagination and certain acts of the
intellect. We acquire knowledge of our different faculties only
from a study of their operations, and the nature of image is the
object of endless controversy. Is it psychologically identical
with perception, being differentiated only by lesser intensity?
Or, on the contrary, has it a specific nature of its own? It would
be hard to say. The problem is very complex and perhaps insoluble.
The analogy and the points of contact between the image and the
perceptive representation are evident, but they hardly seem to
justify an identification of the image with the complete
perception, and the opinion which regards them as distinct still
seems to us the more probable. The imagination is a psycho-
physical faculty. To think it can be reduced to the physiological
functioning of the brain is an unwarranted and misleading
assumption, though it is quite clear that its operations postulate
a material basis. Cerebral fatigue, mental disease, and the
necessarily quantitative character of its objects leave no room
for doubt on this point.
OBJECT
Although the imagination is independent of actual impression by
sensible objects, yet it can represent only what has in some way
passed through the senses. There is in this regard however, a very
marked difference between the different external senses. In the
case of normal subjects visual images are the most numerous and
the most perfect. Those derived from the sense of hearing are also
very common; but the images arising from the senses of taste,
smell, and touch are much rarer, and many persons, normally
constituted, declare that they never have them unless perhaps in
almost imperceptible degree. There has been much discussion of
late in regard to "affective" images. Ribot believes we can
unhesitatingly assert their existence; they are constituted he
claims, by the revival of an affective state, independent of the
mental representation of the object which first occasioned it. But
the question is not settled, many persons emphatically deny the
existence of such images, and the question may be raised whether
the so-called "affective image" is not the mere imaginative
representation of a past affection, or the actual affective re-
echo of an unusually impressive image.
DIVISIONS
Imagination is twofold, retentive (reproductive) and creative
(productive). The object of the first is a sensible reality, which
we have previously perceived as such. The creative forms its
object by combining elements which were separately perceived. The
analysis of the creative imagination es of considerable importance
for the psychology of invention, and of artistic and intellectual
initiative. It brings us in contact with that as yet mysterious
region, which is designated by the very indefinite and certainly
collective name of "subconsciousness". Judged by their relative
perfection, images are complete or incomplete, generic or
schematic. The complete image approaches, in richness and
precision, objective perception. It occurs most frequently among
the passive images which will be discussed farther on. The
incomplete image, as its name indicates, is less rich, less
precise. Certain details of the object escape consciousness, but
what is represented is still sufficient to characterize an
individual object. Of course, its complete or incomplete character
is relative and, consequently, susceptible of innumerable
gradations. The generic image results from the fusion of several
more or less analogous images, with the incompatible differences
eliminated. It corresponds to the ensemble of all the individual
objects of one kind that the subject has ever perceived. This is
why materialists and even persons incapable of psychological
observation confound it with an abstract idea, from which,
however, it is absolutely distinct. The generic image is evidently
very incomplete. The schematic image is still more summary It is
hardly ever sought for its own sake; it gives only the schema of
the object that is to say certain characteristic outlines
sufficient to support the intellect in its proper functions. As a
rule the schematic image alone would be insufficient for this
purpose; it is, for instance, impossible to imagine a multitude of
40,000 objects, in a manner sufficiently precise to supply the
intellect with the sensible factors, indispensable for the
mathematical operations to which this number lends itself. Hence
the irresistible tendency to complete the schematic image by the
verbal image, and the part which the word thus comes to play in
the process of thought has given rise to serious errors. Not a few
psychologists have mistaken the verbal image, which adds precision
to the schematic image, for the idea itself, and it is evident
that such a psychological error leads directly to nominalism.
As regards genesis, images are either voluntary or spontaneous.
Voluntary images are produced freely. We will to imagine our home,
our parents, or some familiar place we have left. These images are
usually incomplete, vague, and dull, we render them somewhat more
definite by fixing the attention on each part in turn, the
grouping of all the parts into a unit being the work of memory.
Spontaneous, or passive images are entirely different. Without the
slightest impulse or direction of our will, they spring up
suddenly in consciousness, representing at times an object which
has no apparent connexion with the trend of our thoughts. Images
occurring in a dream are a good example, but sleep is by no means
necessary for their production; anyone who is accustomed to
introspection will readily acknowledge that there are constantly
arising from the depths of the soul passive images which often
become the starting point of new associations. However, they are
best observed in the state of reverie. When this is brought on by
fatigue, the most surprising images appear, and they are so well
defined and so perfect that they might well pass for pseudo-
hallucinations.
THE EXTERNALIZING OF IMAGES
The relation existing between the image and the "consciousness of
presence" is highly complex. The main point is to determine
whether the image tends naturally to externalize itself, i. e.
whether the image if left to itself would picture its object as
existing outside the mind. This has been denied at times, on
account of the probable distinction between the perception and the
image, and also because a complete image is a rare occurrence. Are
we to admit that a generic or schematic image could externalize
itself? To admit this would not settle the question, it is,
rather, probable that every image would project itself were it not
inhibited by some other influence. It is, indeed, difficult to
recognize in a dream anything else than the play of images. For
the animal as well as for man, a dream manifestly runs its course
in exterior space, and provokes acts, which, if the externalizing
of images be denied, are quite incomprehensible. This theory is
supported by the characteristics of hallucination which also throw
some light on the mechanism of inhibition. In the case of
hallucination the image, even though corrected by reason,
represents its object as existing in exterior space. We must
remark, further, that hallucination takes place in cases of
extreme fatigue or when certain cerebral centres appear to be
paralyzed by poison. It is possible, of course, to refer the
phenomenon not to paralysis but to toxic stimulation. But such a
solution seems to be excluded by the manner in which we seize on
the subconscious elements and by the circumstances in which these
elements come to the surface. Pseudo-hallucination offers a form
intermediate between the totally inhibited image and
hallucination. At times the objects appear with wonderful
clearness making us almost feel their presence; but the space they
occupy does not correspond with external space, nor have they any
spatial relation with the objects which we perceive by our senses.
They occur most naturally when one is dreaming or in a half-
awakened state, and it is well-known that they are due to fatigue
or to the suspension of critical reason and voluntary intellectual
activity. It is consequently when the image is most intense and
when another function, especially critical reason, is in abeyance,
that images display a tendency to externalize themselves, and,
sometimes, are actually externalized. It seems therefore that,
normally, the image would be projected, if no other factor
intervened. An analysis of normal perception leads to the same
conclusion. This, we know, is the outcome both of sensory
impressions and of the images that we externalize. What the latter
contribute is, it seems to us, just as objective as what is
contributed by the sensory impressions. There may be another way
of interpreting the phenomenon; but when we consider it in
conjunction with the facts just mentioned, it seems necessary to
admit that, normally, the image externalizes itself.
Psychologists often raise the question why certain states of
consciousness, such as perception, give us the impression of the
external presence of an object. Probably this impression is a
primordial characteristic and, from a psychological point of view,
it would be more natural to enquire why images, in certain cases
are devoid of that characteristic. Of course, that is no solution
of the philosophical problem concerning the objective value of our
faculties; but the fact is of considerable importance in the
domain of experimental psychology. The only possible answer to the
question seems to be as follows: the image is inhibited and
appears as subjective whenever its externalization would produce
incoherence in the things perceived. It is quite certain that
children, possessing less of the critical sense and fewer acquired
associations, readily believe "whatever comes into their heads"
and again great fatigue, drunkenness, and other states of the sort
which are evidently obstacles to the action of reason are
precisely the conditions in which images have the greatest
tendency to externalize themselves.
In normal circumstances there is always some special note in the
image or in the thing perceived which prevents them from
corresponding exactly. Disagreements therefore appear which force
us to place images in a category distinct from that of
perceptions, and our acquired associations convince us that they
belong to the unreal, or at least less real, world of the
conscious subject. This view is corroborated by the phenomenon of
normal perception. The data of sense stir up through association
images that complete them; the latter, then, must be in perfect
accord with the former, and, as a matter of fact, we know that we
externalize them spontaneously. In dreams we project into outer
space incoherent images, but frequent observation shows that we
coordinate and complete them, arranging them in a logical whole.
It would seem then most likely that along with this coherence we
produce their illusory externalization. It is well known how
suddenly fantastic images disappear as soon as we recognize their
absurdity. There seems to be no doubt then that images of their
own nature tend to externalize themselves, and they do so as long
as no conflict results therefrom. It will be urged, perhaps that
we are not conscious of this rational criticism demonstrating the
logical impossibility of externalizing the images; to this we
rejoin that analytic reason intervenes in exceptional cases only,
and that it is nearly always a question of simple acquired
associations. Dogs and cats, without an inkling of the principle
of causality, seek the cause of sensible phenomena. In like
spontaneous fashion we inhibit or suppress our subjective images
when they differ too widely from reality.
THE MOTIVE FORCE OF IMAGES
It is well known that an image inclines to action, and Ribot has
formulated the general law that "every image tends to its own
realization". If external action does not always reveal all the
images that arise in consciousness the reason is that many of them
are neutralized by antagonistic images, which, owing to the
character of their object, tend to issue in actions of an opposite
sort. This motive force of images makes itself felt at every
moment of our lives; but it should be observed that ordinarily it
acts only through an emotional state and perhaps, as scholastic
philosophers maintain, by means of a special "locomotive" faculty.
Be that as it may, it seems to be proved that, in order to
influence action and movements, images need not necessarily be in
consciousness, much less at its focus. "Marginal" images, or even
totally subconscious images, can act on our members and produce at
times very complex movements. It would be an error to think that
this occurs only exceptionally and in abnormal conditions;
nevertheless it is through the practices of spiritism, table
turning, automatic writing, etc., that special attention has been
drawn to it and the most striking examples of it offered to the
psychologist. The "motive force" of images is only a particular
instance of a law so general that it dominates the whole psychic
life. Each psychic state,whereveritmayoccur in the human person,
tends to spread over adjacent areas and thereby produce
equilibrium, i. e. the harmonious condition of the whole
personality. An image causing a muscular contraction illustrates
this diffusion in a very striking way, and that is why it has been
observed sooner and formulated in a more precise manner than any
other.
ELABORATION OF IMAGES BY THE INTELLECT
The image is the starting point and in some measure the immediate
matter of all our intellectual operations. It is certain that any
cessation of imaginative activity puts an end at once to
intellectual function; and since these two faculties, imagination
and intelligence, are subjectively distinct, this dependence must
be of an objective sort, i. e. the intellect borrows from the
imagination. An analysis of our higher knowledge even the most
abstract, gives this explanation all the corroboration that
immediate experience can furnish. The ideas of the most spiritual
things, such as God or virtue, yield through analysis just those
elements which are taken from the purely sensible order, and are
presented by the imagination. Consequently there can be no doubt
as to the objective cooperation of the imaginative faculty in the
phenomenon of ideation. But certain dangerous errors in this
matter must be guarded against. Hitherto we have insisted on the
distinction to be observed between the schematic image and the
idea. It would be a serious mistake to admit that any combination
of images, however summary and refined, can furnish the object of
the idea. Abstraction is often explained as though its initial
process, the leaving aside of the individualizing notes, applied
to the image itself, and as though the residue of that operation
were the intellectual determinant, the species impressa, which
starts the intellect itself into action. This is clearly an
illusion. The image in its own essence is, and remains,
individual; no separation of parts can bring to view the
universal, the non-quantitive, in it. We must consider the role of
the image in ideation as something quite different. It determines,
not the intellectus agens, which would be inconceivable, but the
conscious subject, to produce the intellectual object. There is no
proportion, so far as the nature of the processes goes, between
the image and the object of the intellect. Only a spiritual
faculty (the intellectus agens) is proportioned to such an object;
but the image is, as it were, a bait, which, in accordance with
the nature of its own object, draws out the superior powers of the
conscious subject. Hence, although everything in our intellectual
knowledge is derived from the images, everything in it transcends
them. These two aspects of the question the essential dependence
of the intellect on the images, and its transcendency in respect
to them, must always be considered if we are to understand
accurately the part played by the image in the process of
ideation. There result therefrom important consequences the
study,of which pertains to the psychology of intelligence.
To conclude: we conceive the higher realities only by analogy with
sensible things, but it in no way follows that we concieve nothing
but what is material. Images play a very important part in all the
activities of the intellectual order; but they do not constitute
that order itself. The very spirituality of the human soul depends
on this latter truth.
M.P. DE MUNNYNCK
Transcribed by Tomas Hancil
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.
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