Faculties of the Soul
I. MEANING
Whatever doctrine one may hold concerning the nature of the human
soul and its relations to the organism, the four following points
are beyond the possibility of doubt.
1.Consciousness is the scene of incessant change; its processes
appear, now in one sequence now in another; and, normally, the
duration of each is brief.
2.All do not present the same general features, nor affect
consciousness in the same manner. They differ on account both of
their characters as manifested in consciousness, and of the organ,
either external or internal, on which their appearance depends.
Yet the features they have in common under this twofold aspect,
together with their differences, make it possible and necessary to
group mental states in certain more or less comprehensive classes.
3.There is more in the mind than is actually manifested in
consciousness; there are latent images, ideas, and feelings, which
under given conditions emerge and are recognized even after a
considerable interval of time. By reason of their innate or
acquired aptitudes, minds differ in capacity or power. Hence, even
if it were possible for two minds to experience processes
perfectly similar, they would nevertheless differ greatly because
one is capable of experiences impossible to the other.
4.Notwithstanding their variety and their intermittent character,
these processes belong to one and the same conscious subject; they
are all referred naturally and spontaneously to the self or me.
These facts are the psychological basis for admitting faculties
(from facere, to do), capacities (capax, from capere, to hold), or
powers (from posse, to be able; the Scholastics generally use the
corresponding Latin term potenti�).
Any attempt, however, to define with greater precision the meaning
of faculties, is sure to call forth vigorous protest. In fact, few
psychological questions of similar importance have been the object
of so many animated discussions, and, it may be added, of so many
misunderstandings. One extreme view looks upon faculties as real,
though secondary agents, exercising an active influence on one
another, and as being scientific explanations of psychological
facts. Why does man see and reason? Because he has the faculties
of vision and reasoning. The will acts, is free; there is an
interaction of the intellect, the will, the senses, the feelings,
etc. Sometimes, however, such expressions are used with the
understanding that they are metaphors, and with the explicit or
implicit warning that they must not be taken literally.
At the other extreme are found psychologists--and they are
numerous to-day--who refuse to concede any kind of reality
whatsoever to faculties. Processes alone are real; faculties are
simply general terms used to label certain groups of processes.
Like all abstractions they should never be looked upon as having
any reality outside of the mind, which uses them as logical
substitutes to facilitate the classification of mental facts.
That the faculty theory has no essential connection with Catholic
dogma is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that it has found, and
still finds, opponents as well as advocates among Catholic
theologians and philosophers.
Judging, therefore, the question on its own merits, it may be said
that the doctrine of St. Thomas avoids both extremes mentioned
above, and is at least free from the absurdities with which modern
psychologists so frequently charge the faculty theory. His
expressions, taken apart from their context, and translated
without a sufficient acquaintance with Scholastic terminology,
might easily be given a wrong interpretation. For as the knowledge
of the nature of the soul and its faculties, according to St.
Thomas, is partly negative, and, in its positive aspect,
analogical, it is necessary to use expressions taken from things
which are known more directly. But we are given some principles
which must always be kept in mind; for instance, "the faculties
act only by the energy of the soul"; they have no energy of their
own, for "they are not the agents". Coming to more special
applications, "it is not the intellect that understands, but the
soul through the intellect" (Qu�st. Disp., De Veritate, x, 9, ad
3). Again, the question is not asked whether the will is free, but
whether man is free (Summa, I:83; I-II:13; De Veritate, xxiv; De
Malo, vi). This shows that when a real distinction is admitted
between the soul and its faculties, or between the faculties
themselves, the meaning is not that of a distinction between
substances or agents. In Scholastic terminology, distinction does
not always mean separation nor even the possibility of separation.
And the distinction between a substance and its qualities,
attributes or modes, was called a real distinction.
If the soul can originate or experience states which, as everybody
admits, may be widely different, it is because there are in the
mind various modes of energy or faculties. Since minds differ not
only by the actual contents of consciousness, but also, and
chiefly, by the power which they have of experiencing different
processes, it is clear that if this constitutes a real difference,
it must itself be something real. So unavoidable is this
conclusion, that some of the strongest opponents of faculties are
at the same time the strongest defenders of the theory of
psychical dispositions, which they postulate in order to explain
the facts of memory, mental habit, and in general, the
utilization, conscious or unconscious, of past experience. And
yet, what is a psychical disposition but an acquired power or
faculty? Stuart Mill's "background of possibilities" or Taine's
"permanent possibility" are certainly less clear and more
objectionable than faculties, for the faculty is not a mere
possibility, but a real power of an agent, a potentia (see ACTUS
ET POTENTIA).
Psychical dispositions are no more explanations of facts than are
faculties, if by explanation is meant the assigning of an
antecedent better known than, or known independently of, the facts
to be explained. In both cases, the whole knowledge of the
faculty, or the disposition, is derived from the processes
themselves, for neither can fall under direct observation. The
possibility of an experience or action, if known, is always known
by direct inference or by analogy from past experiences or
actions. Yet without being a scientific explanation, and without
substituting itself for scientific explanations, the faculty, like
the disposition, trace, subconscious activity, etc., is a
legitimate postulate.
II. CLASSIFICATION
Plato admits three parts, forms, or powers of the soul, perhaps
even three distinct souls: the intellect (no�s), the nobler
affections (thum�s), and the appetites or passions
(epithumetik�n). For Aristotle, the soul is one, but endowed with
five groups of faculties (dun�meis): the "vegetative" faculty
(threptik�n), concerned with the maintenance and development of
organic life; the appetite (oretik�n), or the tendency to any
good; the faculty of sense perception (aisthetik�n); the
"locomotive" faculty (kinetik�n), which presides over the various
bodily movements; and reason (dianoetik�n). The Scholastics
generally follow Aristotle's classification. For them body and
soul are united in one complete substance. The soul is the forma
substantialis, the vital principle, the source of all activities.
Hence their science of the soul deals with functions which
nowadays belong to the provinces of biology and physiology. In
more recent times, however, especially under the influence of
Descartes, the mind has been separated, and even estranged, from
the organism. Psychology deals only with the inner world, that is,
the world of consciousness and its conditions. The nature of the
mind and its relations to the organism are questions that belong
to philosophy or metaphysics. As a consequence, also, modern
psychology fails to distinguish between the spiritual faculties of
the soul, i.e. those which the soul exercises itself without the
intrinsic co-operation of the organism, and the faculties of the
compositum, i.e. the soul and organism united in one complete
principle of action, or of one special animated organ. This
distinction was also an essential point in the Aristotelean and
Scholastic psychology.
Finally, the Scholastics reduced affective life to the general
faculty of appetites, whereas to-day, especially since Kant, a
tripartite division is more commonly accepted, namely into
cognitive, affective, and conative faculties. Some, however, still
hold a bipartite division. Others, finally, reject both as
unsatisfactory, and follow the order of development, or base their
classification both on objective conditions and subjective
characteristics. Without entering into the discussion, it may be
said that, however useful and justifiable the tripartite
classification may prove in psychology, the Scholastic reduction
of feelings to "appetite" seems to be deeper and more
philosophical. For feelings and emotions, pleasurable or painful,
result from an agreement or conflict between certain experiences
and the mind's tendency.
C.A. DUBRAY
Transcribed by Rick McCarty
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.
-------------------------------------------------------
Provided courtesy of:
Eternal Word Television Network
PO Box 3610
Manassas, VA 22110
Voice: 703-791-2576
Fax: 703-791-4250
Web:
http://www.ewtn.com
Email address:
[email protected]
-------------------------------------------------------
