Ethics
1. Definition
Many writers regard ethics (Gr. ethike) as any scientific
treatment of the moral order and divide it into theological, or
Christian, ethics (moral theology) and philosophical ethics (moral
philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics, however, is
philosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the
present article will treat the subject. Moral philosophy is a
division of practical philosophy. Theoretical, or speculative,
philosophy has to do with being, or with the order of things not
dependent on reason, and its object is to obtain by the natural
light of reason a knowledge of this order in its ultimate causes.
Practical philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself with what
ought to be, or with the order of acts which are human and which
therefore depend upon our reason. It is also divided into logic
and ethics. The former rightly orders the intellectual activities
and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of truth, while
the latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the
former is the true; that of the latter is the good. Hence ethics
may be defined as the science of the moral rectitude of human acts
in accordance with the first principles of natural reason. Logic
and ethics are normative and practical sciences, because they
prescribe norms or rules for human activities and show how,
according to these norms, a man ought to direct his actions.
Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive; for it orders the
activity of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the
other faculties of man in motion. Hence, to order the will is the
same as to order the whole man. Moreover, ethics not only directs
a man how to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets before
him the absolute obligation he is under of doing good and avoiding
evil.
A distinction must be made between ethics and morals, or morality.
Every people, even the most uncivilized and uncultured, has its
own morality or sum of prescriptions which govern its moral
conduct. Nature had so provided that each man establishes for
himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are
applicable to the details of practical life, without the necessity
of awaiting the conclusions of science. Ethics is the scientific
or philosophical treatment of morality. The subject-matter proper
of ethics is the deliberate, free actions of man; for these alone
are in our power, and concerning these alone can rules be
prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed
without deliberation, or through ignorance or coercion. Besides
this, the scope of ethics includes whatever has reference to free
human acts, whether as principle or cause of action (law,
conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action
(merit, punishment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object)
under which ethics considers free acts is that of their moral
goodness or the rectitude of order involved in them as human acts.
A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a
morally bad man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor
artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which
relates to man as man, and which makes of him a good man.
Like ethics, moral theology also deals with the moral actions of
man; but unlike ethics it has its origin in supernaturally
revealed truth. It presupposes man's elevation to the supernatural
order, and, though it avails itself of the scientific conclusions
of ethics, it draws its knowledge for the most part from Christian
Revelation. Ethics is distinguished from the other natural
sciences which deal with moral conduct of man, as jurisprudence
and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first
principles, but borrow their fundamental notions from ethics, and
are therefore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitutes
good or bad, just or unjust, what is virtue, law, conscience,
duty, etc., what obligations are common to all men, does not lie
within the scope of jurisprudence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and
yet these principles must be presupposed by the former, must serve
them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are subordinated to
ethics. The same is true of political economy. The latter is
indeed immediately concerned with man's social activity inasmuch
as it treats of the production, distribution and consumption of
material commodities, but this activity is not independent of
ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral
law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political
economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the
requirements of ethics. Sociology is at the present day considered
by many as a science distinct from ethics. If, however, by
sociology is meant a philosophical treatment of society, it is a
division of ethics; for the enquiry into the nature of society in
general, into the origin, nature, object and purpose of natural
societies (the family, the state) and their relations to one
another forms an essential part of Ethics. If, on the other hand,
sociology be regarded as the aggregate of the sciences which have
reference to the social life of man, it is not a single science
but a complexus of sciences; and among these, so far as the
natural order is concerned, ethics has the first claim.
II. Sources and Methods of Ethics
The sources of ethics are partly man's own experience and partly
the principles and truths proposed by other philosophical
disciplines (logic and metaphysics). Ethics takes its origin from
the empirical fact that certain general principles and concepts of
the moral order are common to all people at all times. This fact
has indeed been frequently disputed, but recent ethnological
research has placed it beyond the possibility of doubt. All
nations distinguish between what is good and what is bad, between
good men and bad men, between virtue and vice; they are all agreed
in this: that the good is worth striving for , and that evil must
be shunned, that the one deserves praise, the other, blame. Though
in individual cases they may not be one in denominating the same
thing good or evil, they are nevertheless agreed as to the general
principle, that good is to be done and evil avoided. Vice
everywhere seeks to hide itself or to put on the mask of virtue;
it is a universally recognized principle, that we should not do to
others what we would not wish them to do to us. With the aid of
the truths laid down in logic and metaphysics, ethics proceeds to
give a thorough explanation of the this undeniable fact, to trace
it back to its ultimate causes, then to gather from fundamental
moral principles certain conclusions which will direct man, in the
various circumstances and relations of life, how to shape his own
conduct towards the attainment of the end for which he was
created. Thus the proper method of ethics is at once speculative
and empirical; it draws upon experience and metaphysics.
Supernatural Christian Revelation is not a proper source of
ethics. Only those conclusions properly belong to ethics which can
be reached with the help of experience and philosophical
principles. The Christian philosopher, however, may not ignore
supernatural revelation, but must at least recognise it as a
negative norm, inasmuch as he is not to advance any assertion in
evident contradiction to the revealed truth of Christianity. God
is the fountain-head of all truth - whether natural as made known
by Creation, or supernatural as revealed through Christ and the
Prophets. As our intellect is an image of the Divine Intellect, so
is all certain scientific knowledge the reflex and interpretation
of the Creator's thoughts embodied in His creatures, a
participation in His eternal wisdom. God cannot reveal
supernaturally and command us to believe on His authority anything
that contradicts the thoughts expressed by Him in his creatures,
and which, with the aid of the faculty of reason which he has
given us, we can discern in His works. To assert the contrary
would be to deny God's omniscience and veracity, or to suppose
that God was not the source of all truth. A conflict, therefore,
between faith and science is impossible, and hence the Christian
philosopher has to refrain from advancing any assertion which
would be evidently antagonistic to certain revealed truth. Should
his researches lead to conclusions out of harmony with faith, he
is to take it for granted that some error has crept into his
deductions, just as the mathematician whose calculations openly
contradict the facts of experience must be satisfied that his
demonstration is at fault.
After what has been said the following methods of ethics must be
rejected as unsound.
1.Pure Rationalism. - This system makes reason the sole source of
truth, and therefore at the very outset excludes every reference
to Christian Revelation, branding any such reference as degrading
and hampering free scientific investigation. The supreme law of
science is not freedom, but truth. It is not derogatory to the
true dignity and freedom of science to abstain from asserting
what, according to Christian Revelation, is manifestly erroneous.
2.Pure Empiricism, which would erect the entire structure of
ethics exclusively on the foundation of experience, must also be
rejected. Experience can tell us merely of present or past
phenomena; but as to what, of necessity, and universal, must, or
ought to, happen in the future, experience can give us no clue
without bringing in the aid of necessary and universal principles.
Closely allied to Empiricism is Historicism, which considers
history as the exclusive source of ethics. What has been said of
Empiricism may also be applied to Historicism. History is
concerned with what has happened in the past and only too often
has to rehearse the moral aberrations of mankind. 3.Positivism is
a variety of Empiricism; it seeks to emancipate ethics from
metaphysics and base it on facts alone. No science can be
constructed on the mere foundation of facts, and independently of
metaphysics. Every science must set out from evident principles,
which form the basis of all certain cognition. Ethics especially
is impossible without metaphysics, since it is according to the
metaphysical view we take of the world that ethics shapes itself.
Whoever considers man as nothing else than a more highly developed
brute will hold different ethical views from one who discerns in
man a creature fashioned to the image and likeness of God,
possessing a spiritual, immortal soul and destined to eternal
life; whoever refuses to recognize the freedom of the will
destroys the very foundation of ethics. Whether man was created by
God or possesses a spiritual, immortal soul which is endowed with
free will, or is essentially different from brute creation, all
these are questions pertaining to metaphysics. Anthropology,
moreover, is necessarily presupposed by ethics. No rules can be
prescribed for man's actions, unless his nature is clearly
understood. 4.Another untenable system is Traditionalism, which in
France, during the last half of the nineteenth century, counted
many adherents (among others, de Bonald, Bautain), and which
advanced the doctrine that complete certainty in religious and
moral questions was not to be attained by the aid of reason alone,
but only by the light of revelation as made known to us through
tradition. They failed to see that for all reasonable belief
certain knowledge of the existence of God and of the fact of
revelation is necessarily presupposed, and this knowledge cannot
be gathered from revelation. Fideism, or, as Paulsen designated
it, the Irrationalism of many Protestants, also denies the ability
of reason to furnish certainty in matters relating to God and
religion. With Kant, it teaches that reason does not rise above
the phenomena of the visible world; faith alone can lead us into
the realm of the supersensible and instruct us in matters moral
and religious. This faith, however, is not the acceptance of truth
on the strength of external authority, but rather consists in
certain appreciative judgments, i.e. assumptions or convictions
which are the result of each one's own inner experiences, and
which have, therefore, for him a precise worth, and correspond to
his own peculiar temperament. Since these persuasions are not
supposed to come within the range of reason, exception to them
cannot be taken on scientific grounds. According to this opinion,
religion and morals are relegated to pure subjectivism and lose
all their objectivity and universality of value.
III. Historical View of Ethics
As ethics is the philosophical treatment of the moral order, its
history does not consist in narrating the views of morality
entertained by different nations at different times; this is
properly the scope of the history of civilization, and of
ethnology. The history of ethics is concerned solely with the
various philosophical systems which in the course of time have
been elaborated with reference to the moral order. Hence the
opinions advanced by the wise men of antiquity, such as Pythagoras
(582-500 B.C.), Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.), Confucius (558-479
B.C.), scarcely belong to the history of ethics; for, though they
proposed various moral truths and principles, they did so in a
dogmatic and didactic, and not in a philosophically systematic
manner. Ethics properly so-called is first met with among the
Greeks, i.e. in the teaching of Socrates (470- 399 B.C.).
According to him the ultimate object of human activity is
happiness, and the necessary means to reach it, virtue. Since
everybody necessarily seeks happiness, no one is deliberately
corrupt. All evil arises from ignorance, and the virtues are one
and all but so many kinds of prudence. Virtue can, therefore, be
imparted by instruction. The disciple of Socrates, Plato (427-347
B.C.) declares that the summum bonum consists in the perfect
imitation of God, the Absolute Good, an imitation which cannot be
fully realised in this life. Virtue enables man to order his
conduct, as he properly should, according to the dictates of
reason, and acting thus he becomes like unto God. But Plato
differed from Socrates in that he did not consider virtue to
consist in wisdom alone, but in justice, temperance, and fortitude
as well, these constituting the proper harmony of man's
activities. In a sense, the State is man writ large, and its
function its function is to train its citizens in virtue. For his
ideal State he proposed the community of goods and of wives and
the public education of children. Though Socrates and Plato had
been to the fore in this mighty work and had contributed much
valuable material to the upbuilding of ethics; nevertheless,
Plato's illustrious disciple, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), must be
considered the real founder of systematic ethics. With
characteristic keenness he solved, in his ethical and political
writings, most of the problems with which ethics concerns itself.
Unlike Plato, who began with ideas as the basis of his
observation, Aristotle chose rather to take the facts of
experience as his starting-point; these he analyzed accurately,
and sought to trace to their highest and ultimate causes. He set
out from the point that all men tend to happiness as the ultimate
object of all their endeavours, as the highest good, which is
sought for its own sake, and to which all other goods merely serve
as means. This happiness cannot consist in external goods, but
only in the activity proper to human nature - not indeed in such a
lower activity of the vegetative and sensitive life as man
possesses in common with plants and brutes, but in the highest and
most perfect activity of his reason, which springs in turn from
virtue. This activity, however, has to be exercised in a perfect
and enduring life. The highest pleasure is naturally bound up with
this activity, yet, to constitute perfect happiness, external
goods must also supply their share. True happiness, though
prepared for him by the gods as the object and reward of virtue,
can be attained only through a man's own individual exertion. With
keen penetration Aristotle thereupon proceeds to investigate in
turn each of the intellectual and moral virtues, and his treatment
of them must, even at the present time, be regarded as in great
part correct. The nature of the State and of the family were, in
the main, rightly explained by him. The only pity is that his
vision did not penetrate beyond this earthly life, and that he
never saw clearly the relations of man to God.
A more hedonistic (edone, "pleasure") turn in ethics begins with
Democritus (about 460-370 B.C.), who considers a perpetually
joyous and cheerful disposition as the highest good and happiness
of man. The means thereto is virtue, which makes us independent of
external goods - so far as that is possible - and which wisely
discriminates between the pleasures to be sought after and those
that are to be shunned. Pure Sensualism or Hedonism was first
taught by Aristippus of Cyrene ( 435-354 B.C.), according to whom
the greatest possible pleasure, is the end and supreme good of
human endeavour. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) differs from Aristippus
in holding that the largest sum total possible of spiritual and
sensual enjoyments, with the greatest possible freedom from
displeasure and pain, is man's highest good. Virtue is the proper
directive norm in the attainment of this end.
The Cynics, Antisthenes (444-369 B.C.) and Diogenes of Sinope
(414-324 B.C.), taught the direct contrary of Hedonism, namely
that virtue alone suffices for happiness, that pleasure is an
evil, and that the truly wise man is above human laws. This
teaching soon degenerated into haughty arrogance and open contempt
for law and for the remainder of men (Cynicism). The Stoics, Zeno
(336-264 B.C.) and his disciples, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and
others, strove to refine and perfect the views of Antisthenes.
Virtue, in their opinion, consist in man's living according to the
dictates of his rational, and, as each one's individual nature is
but a part of the entire natural order, virtue is, therefore, the
harmonious agreement with the Divine Reason, which shapes the
whole course of nature. Whether they conceived this relation of
God to the world in a pantheistic or a theistic sense, is not
altogether clear. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and it
suffices for man's happiness. All other things are indifferent and
are, as circumstances require, to be striven after or shunned. The
passions and affections are bad, and the wise man is independent
of them. Among the Roman Stoics were Seneca (4 B.C. - A.D. 65),
Epictetus (born about A.D. 50), and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius
(A.D. 121-180), upon whom however, at least upon the latter two,
Christian influences had already begun to make themselves felt.
Cicero (106-43 B.C.) elaborated no new philosophical system of his
own, but chose those particular views from the various systems of
Grecian philosophy which appeared best to him. He maintained that
moral goodness, which is the general object of all virtues,
consists in what is becoming to man as a rational being as
distinct from the brute. Actions are often good or bad, just or
unjust, not because of human institutions or customs, but of their
own intrinsic nature. Above and beyond human laws, there is a
natural law embracing all nations and all times, the expression of
the rational will of the Most High God, from obedience to which no
human authority can exempt us. Cicero gives an exhaustive
exposition of the cardinal virtues and the obligations connected
with them; he insists especially on devotion to the gods, without
which human society could not exist.
Parallel with the above-mentioned Greek and Roman ethical systems
runs a skeptical tendency, which rejects every natural moral law,
bases the whole moral order on custom or human arbitrariness, and
frees the wise man from subjection to the ordinary precepts of the
moral order. This tendency was furthered by the Sophists, against
whom Socrates and Plato arrayed themselves, and later on by
Carnea, Theodore of Cyrene, and others.
A new epoch in ethics begins with the dawn of Christianity.
Ancient paganism never had a clear and definite concept of the
relation between God and the world, of the unity of the human
race, of the destiny of man, of the nature and meaning of the
moral law. Christianity first shed full light on these and similar
questions. As St. Paul teaches (Rom., ii, 24 sq.), God has written
his moral law in the hearts of all men, even of those outside the
influence of Christian Revelation; this law manifests itself in
the conscience of every man and is the norm according to which the
whole human race will be judged on the day of reckoning. In
consequence of their perverse inclinations, this law had to a
great extent become obscured and distorted among the pagans;
Christianity, however, restored it to its pristine integrity.
Thus, too, ethics received its richest and most fruitful stimulus.
Proper ethical methods were now unfolded, and philosophy was in a
position to follow up and develop these methods by means supplied
from its own store-house. This course was soon adopted in the
early ages of the Church by the Fathers and ecclesiastical
writers, as Justin Martyr, Iranaeus, Tertullian, Clement of
Alexandria, Origen, but especially the illustrious Doctors of the
Church, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, who, in the exposition and
defence of Christian truth, made use of the principles laid down
by the pagan philosophers. True, the Fathers had no occasion to
treat moral questions from a purely philosophical standpoint, and
independently of Christian Revelation; but in the explanation of
Catholic doctrine their discussions naturally led to philosophical
investigations. This is particularly true of St. Augustine, who
proceeded to thoroughly develop along philosophical lines and to
establish firmly most of the truths of Christian morality. The
eternal law (lex aterna), the original type and source of all
temporal laws, the natural law, conscience, the ultimate end of
man, the cardinal virtues, sin, marriage, etc. were treated by him
in the clearest and most penetrating manner. Hardly a single
portion of ethics does he present to us but is enriched with his
keen philosophical commentaries. Late ecclesiastical writers
followed in his footsteps.
A sharper line of separation between philosophy and theology, and
in particular between ethics and moral theology, is first met with
in the works of the great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, especially
of Albert the Great (1193-1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274),
Bonaventure (1221-1274), and Duns Scotus (1274-1308). Philosophy
and, by means of it, theology reaped abundant fruit from the works
of Aristotle, which had until then been a sealed treasure to
Western civilization, and had first been elucidated by the
detailed and profound commentaries of St. Albert the Great and St.
Thomas Aquinas and pressed into the service of Christian
philosophy. The same is particularly true as regards ethics. St.
Thomas, in his commentaries on the political and ethical writings
of the Stagirite, in his "Summa contra Gentiles" and his
"Quaestiones disputatae, treated with his wonted clearness and
penetration nearly the whole range of ethics in a purely
philosophical manner, so that even to the present day his words
are an inexhaustible source whence ethics draws its supply. On the
foundations laid by him the Catholic philosophers and theologians
of succeeding ages have continued to build. It is true that in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks especially to the
influence of the so-called Nominalists, a period of stagnation and
decline set in, but the sixteenth century is marked by a revival.
Ethical questions, also, though largely treated in connection with
theology, are again made the subject of careful investigation. We
mention as examples the great theologians Victoria, Dominicus
Soto, L. Molina, Suarez, Lessius, and De Lugo. Since the sixteenth
century special chairs of ethics (moral philosophy) have been
erected in many Catholic universities. The larger, purely
philosophical works on ethics, however do not appear until the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an example of which we
may instance the production of Ign. Schwarz, "Instituitiones juris
universalis naturae et gentium" (1743).
Far different from Catholic ethical methods were those adopted for
the most part by Protestants. With the rejection of the Church's
teaching authority, each individual became on principle his own
supreme teacher and arbiter in matters appertaining to faith and
morals. True it is that the Reformers held fast to Holy Writ as
the infallible source of revelation, but as to what belongs or
does not belong to it, whether, and how far, it is inspired, and
what is its meaning - all this was left to the final decision of
the individual. The inevitable result was that philosophy
arrogantly threw to the winds all regard for revealed truth, and
in many cases became involved in the most pernicious errors.
Melanchthon, in his "Elementa philosophiae moralis", still clung
to the Aristotelean philosophy; so, too, did Hugo Grotius, in his
work, "De jure belli et pacis". But Cumberland and his follower,
Samuel Pufendorf, moreover, assumed, with Descartes, that the
ultimate ground for every distinction between good and evil lay in
the free determination of God's will, a view which renders the
philosophical treatment of ethics fundamentally impossible. Quite
an influential factor in the development of ethics was Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679). He supposes that the human race originally
existed in existed in a rude condition (status naturae) in which
every man was free to act as he pleased, and possessed a right to
all things, whence arose a war of all against all. Lest
destruction should be the result, it was decided to abandon this
condition of nature and to found a state in which, by agreement,
all were to be subject to one common will (one ruler). This
authority ordains, by the law of the State, what is to be
considered by all as good and as evil, and only then does there
arise a distinction between good and evil of universal binding
force on all. The Pantheist Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) considers
the instinct to self-preservation as the foundation of virtue.
Every being is endowed with the necessary impulse to assert
itself, and, as reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it
requires each one to follow this impulse and to strive after
whatever is useful to him. And each individual possesses power and
virtue just in so far as he obeys this impulse. Freedom of the
will consists merely in the ability to follow unrestrainedly this
natural impulse. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) bases ethics on the
affections or inclinations of man. There are sympathetic,
idiopathic, and unnatural inclinations. The first of these regard
the common good, the second the private good of the agent, the
third are opposed to the other two. To lead a morally good life,
war must be waged upon the unnatural impulses, while the
idiopathetic and sympathetic inclinations must be made to
harmonize. This harmony constitutes virtue. In the attainment of
virtue the subjective guiding principle of knowledge is the "moral
sense", a sort of moral instinct. This "moral sense" theory was
further developed by Hutcheson (1694-1747); meanwhile "common
sense" was suggested by Thomas Reid (1710-1796) as the highest
norm of moral conduct. In France the materialistic philosophers of
the eighteenth century - as Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Holbach,
Condillac, and others - disseminated the teachings of Sensualism
and Hedonism as understood by Epicurus.
A complete revolution in ethics was introduced by Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804). From the wreck of pure theoretical reason he turned
for rescue to practical reason, in which he found an absolute,
universal, and categorical moral law. This law is not to be
conceived as an enactment of external authority, for this would be
heteromony, which is foreign to true morality; it is rather the
law of our own reason, which is, therefore, autonomous, that is,
it must be observed for its own sake, without regard to any
pleasure or utility arising therefrom. Only that will is morally
good which obeys the moral law under the influence of such a
subjective principle or motive as can be willed by the individual
to become the universal law for all men. The followers of Kant
have selected now one now another doctrine from his ethics and
combined therewith various pantheistical systems. Fichte places
man's supreme good and destiny in absolute spontaneity and
liberty; Schleiermacher, in co-operating with the progressive
civilization of mankind. A similar view recurs substantially in
the writings of Wilhelm Wundt and, to a certain extent, in those
of the pessimist, Edward von Hartmann, though the latter regards
culture and progress merely as means to the ultimate end, which,
according to him, consists in delivering the Absolute from the
torment of existence.
The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good of
mankind to be the end and criterion of moral conduct, was renewed
on a positive basis in the nineteenth century by Auguste Comte and
has counted many adherents, e.g., in England, John Stuart Mill,
Henry Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; in Germany, G.T. Fechner, F.E.
Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) sought
to effect a compromise between social Utilitarianism (Altruism)
and private Utilitarianism (Egoism) in accordance with the theory
of evolution. In his opinion, that conduct is good which serves to
augment life and pleasure without any admixture of displeasure. In
consequence, however, of man's lack of adaptation to the
conditions of life, such absolute goodness of conduct is not as
yet possible, and hence various compromises must be made between
Altruism and Egoism. With the progress of evolution, however, this
adaptability to existing conditions will become more and more
perfect, and consequently the benefits accruing to the individual
from his own conduct will be most useful to society at large. In
particular, sympathy (in joy) will enable us to take pleasure in
altruistic actions.
The great majority of non-Christian moral philosophers have
followed the path trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption
that man, by a series of transformations, was gradually evolved
from the brute, and therefore differs from it in degree only, they
seek the first traces and beginnings of moral ideas in the brute
itself. Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these
lines, and Spencer did not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on
the pre-human justice, conscience, and self-control of brutes.
Present-day Evolutionists follow his view and attempt to show how
animal morality has in man continually become more perfect. With
the aid of analogies taken from ethnology, they relate how mankind
originally wandered over the face of the earth in semi-savage
hordes, knew nothing of marriage or the family, and only by
degrees reached a higher level of morality. These are the merest
creations of fancy. If man is nothing more than a highly developed
brute, he cannot possess a spiritual and immortal soul, and there
can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the
future retribution of good and evil, nor can man in consequence be
hindered from ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the
well-being of others only in so far as it redounds to his own
profit.
As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of
evolution from their ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base
their observations on scientific principles, but on social and
economic considerations. According to K. Marx, F. Engels, and
other exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of
history", all moral, religious, juridical and philosophical
concepts are but the reflex of the economical conditions of
society in the minds of men. Now these social relations are
subject to constant change; hence the ideas of morality, religion,
etc. are also continually changing. Every age, every people, and
even each class in a given people forms its moral and religious
ideas in accordance with its own peculiar economical situation.
Hence, no universal code of morality exists binding on all men at
all times; the morality of the present day is not of Divine
origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make
room for another system of morality. Allied to this materialistic
historical interpretation, though derived from other sources, is
the system of Relativism, which recognizes no absolute and
unchangeable truths in regard to ethics or anything else. Those
who follow this opinion aver that nothing objectively true can be
known by us. Men differ from one another and are subject to
change, and with them the manner and means of viewing the world
about them also change. Moreover the judgments passed on matters
religious and moral depend essentially on the inclinations,
interests, and character of the person judging, while these latter
are constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from Relativism
inasmuch as that not only is to be considered true which is proven
by experience to be useful; and, since the same thing is not
always useful, unchangeable truth is impossible.
In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it
need not surprise us that, as regards ethical problems, skepticism
is extending its sway to the utmost limits, in fact many exhibit a
formal contempt for the traditional morality. According to Max
Nordau, moral precepts are nothing but "conventional lies";
according to Max Stirner, that alone is good which serves my
interests, whereas the common good, the love for all men, etc. are
but empty phantoms. Men of genius and superiority in particular
are coming more and more to be regarded as exempt from the moral
law. Nietzsche is the originator of a school whose doctrines are
founded on these principles. According to him, goodness was
originally identified with nobility and gentility of rank.
Whatever the man of rank and power did, whatever inclinations he
possessed were good. The down-trodden proletariat, on the other
hand were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without any other
derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a
gradual process that the oppressed multitude through hatred and
envy evolved the distinction between good and bad, in the moral
sense, by denominating the characteristics and conduct of those in
power and rank as bad, and their own behaviour as good. And thus
arose the opposition between the morality of the master and that
of the slave. Those in power still continued to look upon their
own egoistic inclinations as noble and good, while the oppressed
populace lauded the "instincts of the common herd", i.e. all those
qualities necessary and useful to its existence - as patience,
meekness, obedience and love of one's neighbour. Weakness became
goodness, cringing obsequiousness became humility, subjection to
hated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant patience. "All
morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value
attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely
re- arranged. Intellectual superiority is above and beyond good
and evil as understood in the traditional sense. There is no
higher moral order to which men of such caliber are amenable. The
end of society is not the common good of its members; the
intellectual aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its
behalf the common herd, the "too many", must be reduced to slavery
and decimated. As it rests with each individual to decide who
belongs to this intellectual aristocracy, so each man is at
liberty to emancipate himself from the existing moral order.
In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which
has manifested itself far and wide; namely, the effort to make all
morality independent of all religion. It is clear that many of the
above-mentioned ethical systems essentially exclude all regard for
God and religion, and this is true especially of materialistic,
agnostic, and in the last analysis, of all pantheistic systems.
Apart, also, from these systems, "independent morality", called
also "lay morality", has gained many followers and defenders.
Kant's ideas formed the basis of this tendency, for he himself
founded a code of morality on the categorical imperative and
expressly declared that morality is sufficient for itself, and
therefore has no need of religion. Many modern philosophers -
Herbart, Eduard von Hartmann, Zeller, Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and
a number of others - have followed Kant in this respect. For
several decades practical attempts have been made to emancipate
morality from religion. In France religious instruction was
banished from the schools in 1882 and moral instruction
substituted. This tendency manifests a lively activity in what is
known as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly speaking, is
in the United States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell
University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York
City. Similar societies were formed in other cities. These were
consolidated in 1887 into the "Union of the Societies for Ethical
Culture." Besides Adler, the chief propagators of the movement by
word of mouth and writing were W.M. Salter and Stanton Coit. The
purpose of these societies is declared to be "the improvement of
the moral life of the members of the societies and of the
community to which they belong, without any regard to theological
or philosophical opinions". In most of the European countries
ethical societies were founded on the model of the American
organization. All these were combined in 1894 into the
"International Ethical Association". Their purpose, i.e. the
amelioration of man's moral condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but
it is erroneous to suppose that any such moral improvement can be
brought about without taking religion into consideration. In fact
many members of the ethical societies are openly antagonistic to
all religions, and would therefore do away with denominational
schools and supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction.
Even upon purely ethical considerations such attempts must be
unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that even in the case of
adults moral instruction without religion, without any higher
obligation or sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how
much more so is it in the case of the young? It is evident that,
judged from the standpoint of Christianity, these efforts must
meet with a still more decided condemnation. Christians are bound
to observe not only the prescriptions of the natural law, but also
all the precepts given by Christ concerning faith, hope, love,
Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. The Christian,
moreover, knows that without Divine grace and, hence, without
prayer and the frequent reception of the sacraments, a morally
good life for any considerable length of time is impossible. >From
their earliest years, therefore, the young must not only receive
thorough instruction in all the Commandments, but must be
exercised and trained in the practical use of the means of grace.
Religion must be the soil and atmosphere in which education
develops and flourishes.
While, among non-Catholics ever since the Reformation, and
especially since Kant, there has been an increasing tendency to
divorce ethics from religion, and to dissolve it into countless
venturesome and frequently contradictory systems, Catholics for
the most part have remained free from these errors, because, in
the Church's infallible teaching authority, the Guardian of
Christian Revelation, they have always found secure orientation.
It is true that towards the end of the eighteenth, and at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, Illuminism and Rationalism
penetrated here and there into Catholic circles and attempted to
replace moral theology by purely philosophical ethics, and in turn
to transform the latter according to the Kantian autonomy. This
movement, however, was but a passing phase. With a reawakening of
the Church's activity, fresh impetus was given to Catholic
science, which was of benefit to ethics also and produced in its
domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again had to the
illustrious past of Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern
ethical systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and
verification of principles of the moral order. Taparelli d'Azeglio
led the way with his great work "Saggio teoretico di diritto
naturale appogiato sul fatto" (1840-43). Then followed, in Italy,
Audisio, Rosmini, Liberatore, Sanseverino, Rosselli, Zigliara,
Signoriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo, and others. In Spain
this revival of ethics was due to, among others, J. Balmes, Donoso
Cortes, Zefirio Gonzalez, Mendive, R. de Cepeda; in France and
Belgium, to de Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie,
Onclair, Ath, Vallet, Charles Perin, Piat, de Pascal, Moulart,
Castelein; in England and America, to Joseph Rickaby, Jouin,
Russo, Hollaind, J.J. Ming. In German-speaking countries the
reawakening of Scolasticism in general begins with Kleutgen
(Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853); Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and
of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsatze der
Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis
seu philosophiae moralis universae, 1885-1900). After them came A.
St�ckl, Ferd, Walter, Moy de Sons, C. Gutberlet, Fr. J. Stein,
Brandis, Costa-Rossetti, A.M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen, Willems,
V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerous
Catholic writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and
political economy.
IV. Outlines of Ethics
It is clear that the following statement cannot pretend to treat
thoroughly all ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford
the reader an insight into the most important problems dealt with
by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment.
Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical
ethics, and special, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds
and verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral
order; special ethics applies these general principles to the
various relations of man, and determines his duties in particular.
Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation
to the certain knowledge of the existence of God, the origin and
end of all things. On this fundamental truth the structure of
ethics must be based. God created man, as he created all things
else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper
motive of the will's activity. If God were not the ultimate object
and end of His own activity, he would depend upon His creatures,
and would not be infinitely perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end
of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that he
can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to an
infinitely perfect being, but for His glory. They are to manifest
His goodness and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of
themselves directly glorify God, for they are incapable of knowing
Him. The are intended as means to the end for which rational man
was created. The end of man, however, is to know God, to love Him
and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unending
happiness. Every man has within him an irresistible,
indestructible desire for perfect happiness; he seeks to be free
from every evil and to possess every attainable good. This impulse
to happiness is founded on man's nature; it is implanted there by
his Maker; and hence will be duly realised, if nothing is wanting
on the part of man's own individual endeavour. But perfect
happiness is unattainable in the present life, if for no other
reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an early end
to all earthly happiness. There is reserved for man a better life,
if he freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the
crown of victory to be conferred upon him hereafter, if at present
he remains subject to God and keeps His Commandments. Only from
the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and the moral order
acquire their proper significance and value. But how does man,
considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence of
supernatural revelations, come to know what God requires of him
here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in order to
arrive at eternal happiness? - By means of the natural law.
From eternity there existed in the mind of God the idea of the
world, which he determined to create, as well as the plan of
government according to which He wished to rule the world and
direct it to its end. This ordination existing in the mind of God
from all eternity, and depending on the nature and essential
relations of rational beings, is the eternal law of God (lex
aeterna Dei), the source from which all temporal laws take their
rise. God does not move and govern His creatures by a mere
external directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but by
means of internal impulses and inclinations, which He has bound up
with their natures. Irrational creatures are urged, by means of
physical forces or natural impulses and instincts to exercise the
activity peculiar to them and keep the order designed for them.
Man, on the other hand, is a being endowed with reason and free
will; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses and instincts in
a manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend on
practical principles and judgments, which point out to him how he
is to order his conduct. These principles must somehow or other be
manifested to him by nature. All created things have implanted in
their natures certain guiding principles, necessary to their
corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule.
He must be led by a natural inborn light, manifesting to him what
he is to do, or not to do. This natural light is the natural law.
When we speak of man as possessing a natural, inborn light, it is
not to be understood in the sense that man has innate ideas.
Innate ideas do not exist. It is true, nevertheless, that the
Creator has endowed man with the ability and the inclination to
form many concepts and develop principles. As soon as he comes to
the use of reason, he forms, by a natural necessity, on the basis
of experience, certain general concepts of theoretical reason -
e.g. those of being and not being, of cause and effect, of space
and time - and so he arrives at universal principles, e.g. that
"nothing can exist and not exist at the same time", that "every
effect has its cause", etc. As it is in the theoretical, so also
in the practical order. As soon as reason has been sufficiently
developed, and the individual can somehow or other practically
judge that he is something more than a mere animal, by an
intrinsic necessity of his nature he forms the concept of good and
evil, i.e. of something that is proper to the rational nature
which distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore
worth striving for, and something which is unbecoming and
therefore to be avoided. And, as by nature he feels himself
attracted by what is good, and repelled by what is evil, he
naturally forms the judgments, that "good is to be done and evil
avoided", that "man ought to live according to the dictates of
reason", etc. From hid own reflections, especially when assisted
by instruction from others, he easily comes to the conclusion that
in these judgments the will of a superior being, of the Creator
and Designer of nature, has its expression. Around about him he
perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is very
easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and
all-wise power. He himself has been appointed to occupy in the
domain of nature the position of lord and master; he, too, must
lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational being, not merely
because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedience to his
Creator. Man did not give himself his nature with all its
faculties and inclinations; he received it from a superior being,
whose wisdom and power are everywhere manifest to him in Creation.
The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoid
evil", "Lead a life regulated according to reason", etc., from
which all the Commandments of the Decalogue are derived, are the
basis of the natural law, of which St. Paul (Rom., ii, 14) says,
that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an
emanation of the Divine law, made known to all men by nature
herself; it is the expression of the will of nature's Author, a
participation of the created rational being in the eternal law of
God. Hence the obligation it imposes does not arise from man's own
autonomy, as Kant held, nor from any other human authority, but
from the will of the Creator; and man cannot violate it without
rebelling against God, his master, offending Him, and becoming
amenable to his justice. How deeply rooted among all nations this
conviction of the higher origin of the natural law was, is shown
by the fact that for various violations of it (as murder,
adultery, perjury, etc.) they did their utmost to propitiate the
angered deity by means of prayers and sacrifices. Hence they
looked upon the deity as the guardian and protector of the moral
order, who would not let the contempt of it to go unpunished. The
same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have
attached to the moral order, a value far surpassing that all other
earthly goods. The noblest among the nations maintained that it
was better to undergo any hardship, even death itself, rather than
prove recreant to one's duty. They understood, therefore, that,
over and above earthly treasures, there were higher and more
lasting goods whose attainment was dependent upon the observance
of the moral order, and this not by reason of any ordinance of
man, but because of the law of God. This being premised, it is
clearly impossible to divorce morality from religion without
robbing it of its true obligation and sanction, of its sanctity
and inviolability and of its importance as transcending every
other earthly consideration.
The natural law consists of general practical principles (commands
and prohibitions) and the conclusion necessarily flowing
therefrom. It is the peculiar function of man to formulate these
conclusions himself, though instruction and training are to assist
him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take these
principles as a guide of his conduct and apply them to his
particular actions. This, to a certain extent, everybody does
spontaneously, by virtue of an innate tendency. As in the case of
all practical things, so in regard to what concerns the moral
order, reason uses syllogistic processes. When a person, e.g., is
on the point of telling a lie, or saying what is contrary to his
convictions, there rises before his mental vision the general
precept of the natural law: "Lying is wrong and forbidden." Hence
he avails himself, at least virtually, of the following syllogism:
"Lying is forbidden; what you are about to say is a lie;
therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." The conclusion
thus arrived at is our conscience, the proximate norm of our
conduct. Conscience, therefore, is not an obscure feeling or a
sort of moral instinct, but a practical judgment of our reason on
the moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice of
conscience, our reward is peace and calm of soul, if we resist
this voice, we experience disquiet and remorse.
The natural law is the foundation of all human laws and precepts.
It is only because we recognize the necessity of authority for
human society, and because the natural law enjoins obedience to
regularly constituted authority, that it is possible for a human
superior to impose laws and commands binding in conscience. Indeed
all human laws and precepts are fundamentally the conclusions, or
more minute determinations, of the general principles of the
natural law, and for this very reason every deliberate infraction
of a law or precept binding in conscience is a sin, i.e. the
violation of a Divine commandment, a rebellion against God, an
offence against Him, which will not escape punishment in this life
or in the next, unless duly repented of before death.
The problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical,
ethics, and their investigation in nearly all cases bear upon the
natural law, whose origin, nature, subject- matter, obligation,
and properties it is the scope of ethics to explain thoroughly and
verify. The general philosophical doctrine of right is usually
treated in general ethics. Under no circumstances may the example
of Kant and others be imitated in severing the doctrine of right
from ethics, or moral philosophy, and developing it as a separate
and independent science. The juridical order is but a part of the
moral order, even as justice is but one of the moral virtues. The
first principle of right: "Give every man his due"; "Commit no
injustice"; and the necessary conclusions from these: "Thou shalt
not kill"; "Thou shalt not commit adultery", and the like, belong
to the natural law, and cannot be deviated from without violating
one's duty and one's neighbour's rights, and staining one's
conscience with guilt in the sight of God.
Special ethics applies the principles of general, or theoretical,
ethics to the various relations of man, and thus deduces his
duties in particular. General ethics teaches that man must do good
and avoid evil, and must inflict injury upon no one. Special
ethics descends to particulars and demonstrates what is good or
bad, right or wrong, and therefore to be done or avoided in the
various relations of human life. First of all, it treats of man as
an individual in his relations to God, to himself, and to his
fellow-men. God is the Creator, Master, and ultimate end of man;
from these relations arise man's duties toward God. Presupposing
his own individual efforts, he is, with God's assistance, to hope
for eternal happiness from Him; he must love God above all things
as the highest, infinite good, in such a manner that no creature
shall be preferred to Him; he must acknowledge Him as his absolute
lord and master, adore and reverence Him, and resign himself
entirely to His holy Will. The first, highest, and most essential
business of man is to serve God. In case it is God's good pleasure
to reveal a supernatural religion and to determine in detail the
manner and means of our worship of Him, man is bound by the
natural law to accept this revelation in a spirit of faith. and to
order his life accordingly. Here, too, it is plain that to divorce
morality from religion is impossible. Religious duties, those,
namely, which have direct reference to God, are man's principal
and most essential moral duties. Linked to these duties to God are
man's duties regarding himself. Man loves himself by an intrinsic
necessity of his nature. From this fact Schopenhauer drew the
conclusion that the commandment concerning self-love was
superfluous. This would be true, if it were a matter of
indifference how man loved himself. But such is not the case; he
must love himself with a well-ordered love. He is to be solicitous
for the welfare of his soul and to do what is necessary to attain
to eternal happiness. He is not his own master, but was created
for the service of God; hence the deliberate arbitrary destruction
of one's own life (suicide), as well as the freely intended
mutilation of self, is a criminal attack on the proprietary right
God has to man's person. Furthermore, every man is supposed to
take a reasonable care to preserve his health. He has certain
duties also as regards temperance; for the body must not be his
master, but an instrument in the service of the soul, and hence
must be cared for in so far only as is conducive to this purpose.
A further duty concerns the acquisition of external material
goods, as far as they are necessary for man's support and the
fulfillment of his other obligations. This again involves the
obligation to work; furthermore, God has endowed man with the
capacity for work in order that he might prove himself a
beneficial member of society; for idleness is the root of all
evil. Besides these self-regarding duties, there are similar ones
regarding our fellow-men: duties of love, justice, fidelity,
truthfulness, gratitude, etc. The commandment of the love of our
neighbour first received its true appreciation in the Christian
Dispensation. Though doubtlessly contained to a certain extent in
the natural law, the pagans had so lost sight of the unity of the
human race, and of the fact that all men are members of one vast
family dependent upon God, that they looked on every stranger as
an enemy. Christianity restored to mankind the consciousness of
its unity and solidarity, and supernaturally transfigured the
natural precept to love our neighbour, by demonstrating that all
men are children of the same Father in heaven, were redeemed by
the same blood of the same Saviour, and are destined to the same
supernatural salvation. And, better still, Christianity provided
man with the grace necessary to the fulfillment of this precept
and thus renewed the face of the earth. In man's intercourse with
his fellow-men the precepts of justice and of the other allied
virtues go hand in hand with the precept of love. There exists in
man the natural tendency to assert himself when there is question
of his goods or property. He expects his fellow-men to respect
what belongs to him, and instinctively resists any unjust attempt
to violate this proprietorship. He will brook an injury from no
one in all that regards his life or health, his wife or child, his
honour or good name; he resents faithlessness and ingratitude on
the part of others, and the lie by which they would lead him into
error. Yet he clearly understands that only then can he reasonably
expect others to respect his rights when he in turn respects
theirs. Hence the general maxim: "Do not do to others, what you
would not wish them to do to you"; from which are naturally
deduced the general commandments known to all men: "Thou shalt not
kill, nor commit adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness
against thy neighbour", etc. In this part of ethics it is
customary to investigate the principles of right as regards
private ownership. Has every man the right to acquire property?
Or, at least, may not society (the State) abolish private
ownership and assume possession and control of all material goods
either wholly or in part, in order to thus distribute among the
members of the community the products of their joint industry?
This latter question is answered in the affirmative by the
Socialists; and yet, it is the experience of all ages that the
community of goods and of ownership is altogether impracticable in
larger commonwealths, and would, if realized in any case, involve
widespread slavery.
The second part of special, or applied, ethics, called by many
sociology, considers man as a member of society, as far as this
can be made the subject of philosophical investigation. Man is by
nature a social being; out of his innate needs, inclinations, and
tendencies the family and State necessarily arise. And first of
all the Creator had to provide for the preservation and
propagation of the human race. Man's life is brief, were no
provision made for the perpetuation of the human species, the
world would soon become an uninhabited solitude, a well-appointed
abode without occupants. Hence God has given man the power and
propensity to propagate his kind. The generative function was not
primarily intended for man's individual well-being, but for the
general good of his species, and in its exercise, therefore, he
must be guided accordingly. This general good cannot be perfectly
realized except in a lasting indissoluble monogamy. The unity and
indissolubility of the marriage bond are requirements of the
natural law, at least in the sense that man may not on his own
authority set them aside. Marriage is a Divine institution, for
which God Himself has provided by means of definite laws, and in
regard to which, therefore, man has not the power to make any
change. The Creator might, of course, dispense for a time from the
unity and indissolubility of the marriage tie; for, though the
perfection of the married state demands these qualities, they are
not of absolute necessity; the principal end of marriage may be
attained to a certain degree without them. God could, therefore,
for wise reasons grant a dispensation in regard to them for a
certain length of time. Christ, however, restored marriage to the
original perfection consonant with its nature. Moreover He raised
marriage to the dignity of a sacrament and made it symbolic of His
own union with the Church; and had he done nothing more in this
respect than restore the natural law to its pristine integrity,
mankind would be bound to Him by an eternal debt of gratitude. For
it was chiefly be means of the unity and indissolubility of the
married life that the sanctuary of the Christian family was
established, from which mankind has reaped the choicest blessings,
and compared with which paganism has no equivalent to offer. This
exposition of the nature of marriage from a theistic standpoint is
diametrically opposed to the views of modern Darwinists. According
to them, men did not primitively recognize any such institution as
the married state, but lived together in complete promiscuity.
Marriage was the result of gradual development, woman was
originally the centre about which the family crystallized, and
from this latter circumstance there arises an explanation of the
fact that many savage tribes reckon heredity and kinship between
families according to the lineal descent of the female. We cannot
dwell long upon these fantastic speculations, because they do not
consider man as essentially different from the brute, but as
gradually developed from a purely animal origin. Although marriage
is of Divine institution, not every individual is obliged, as a
human being, to embrace the married state. God intends marriage
for the propagation of the human race. To achieve this purpose it
is by no means necessary for each and every member of the human
family to enter upon marriage, and this particularly at the
present time, when the question of over-population presents so
many grave difficulties to social economists. In this connection
certain other considerations from a Christian point of view arise,
which do not, however, belong to philosophical ethics. Since the
principal end of marriage is the procreation and education of
children, it is incumbent upon both parents to co-operate
according to the requirements of sex in the attainment of this
end. From this it may readily be gathered what duties exist
between husband and wife, and between parents and their children.
The second natural society, the State, is a logical and necessary
outcome of the family. A completely isolated family could scarcely
support itself, at all events it could never rise above the lowest
grade of civilization. Hence we see that at all times and in all
places, owing to natural needs and tendencies, larger groups of
families are formed. A division of labour takes place. Each family
devotes itself to some industry in which it may improve and
develop its resources, and then exchanges its products for those
of other families. And now the way is opened to civilization and
progress. This grouping of families, in order to be permanent, has
need of authority, which makes for security, order, and peace, and
in general provides for what is necessary to the common good.
Since God intends men to live together in harmony and order, He
likewise desires such authority in the community as will have the
right to procure what is needful for the common good. This
authority, considered in itself and apart from the human vehicle
in which it is placed, comes immediately from God, and hence,
within its proper sphere, it imposes upon the consciences of the
subjects the duty of obedience. In the light of this
interpretation, the exercise of public power is vested with its
proper dignity and inviolability, and at the same time is
circumscribed by necessary limitations. A group of families under
a common authoritive head, and not subject to any similar
aggregation, forms the primitive State, however small this may be.
By further development, or by coalition with other States, larger
States gradually come into existence. It is not the purpose of the
State to supplant the families, but to safeguard their rights, to
protect them, and to supplement their efforts. It is not to
forfeit their rights or to abandon their proper functions that
individuals and families combine to form the State, but to be
secured in these rights, and to find support and encouragement in
the discharge of the various duties assigned them. Hence the State
may not deprive the family of its right to educate and instruct
the children, but must simply lend its assistance by supplying,
whenever needful, opportunities for the better accomplishment of
this duty. Only so far as the order and prosperity of the body
politic requires it, may the State circumscribe individual effort
and activity. In other words, the State is to posit the conditions
under which, provided private endeavour be not lacking, each
individual and each family may attain to true earthly happiness.
By true earthly happiness is meant such as not only does not
interfere with the free performance of the individual's moral
duties, but even upholds and encourages him therein.
Having defined the end and aim of the State, we are now in a
position to examine in detail its various functions and extent.
Private morality is not subject to State interference; but it is
the proper function of the State to concern itself with the
interests of public morality. It must not only prevent vice from
parading in public and becoming a snare to many (e.g. through
immoral literature, theatres, plays, or other means of seduction),
but also see to it that the public ordinances and laws facilitate
and advance morally good behaviour. The State may not affect
indifference as regards religion; the obligation to honour God
publicly is binding upon the Sate as such. It is true that the
direct supervision of religious matters in the present
supernatural order was entrusted by Christ to His Church;
nevertheless, it is the duty of the Christian State to protect and
uphold the Church, the one true Church founded by Christ. Of
course, owing to the unfortunate division of Christians into
numerous religious systems, such an intimate relation between
Church and State is at the present day but rarely maintained. The
separation of Church and State, with complete liberty of
conscience and worship, is often the only practical modus vivendi.
In circumstances such as these the State must be satisfied to
leave the affairs of religion to various bodies, and to protect
the latter in those rights which have reference to the general
public order. The education and instruction of children belongs
per se to the family, and should not be monopolized by the State.
The later has, however, the right and the duty to suppress schools
which disseminate immoral doctrine or foster the practice of vice;
beyond such control it may not set limits to free individual
endeavour. It may, however, assist the individual in his efforts
to secure an education, and, in case these do not suffice, it may
establish schools and institutions for his benefit. Finally, the
State has to exercise important economical functions. It must
protect private property and see to it that in man's industrial
life the laws affecting justice be carried out in all their force
and vigour. But its duties do not stop here. It should pass such
laws as will enable its subjects to procure what is needed for
their respectable sustenance and even to attain a moderate
competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme poverty involve many
dangers to the individual and to society. Hence the State should
pass such laws as will favour the sturdy middle class of citizens
and add to their numbers. Much can be done to bring about this
desirable condition by the enactment of proper tax and inheritance
laws, of laws which protect the labouring, manufacturing, and
agricultural interests, and which supervise and control trusts,
syndicates, etc.
Although the authority of the State comes immediately from God,
the person who exercises it is not immediately designated by Him.
This determination is left to the circumstances of men's progress
and development or of their modes of social aggregation. According
as the supreme power resides in one individual, or in a privileged
class, or in the people collectively, governments are divided into
three forms: the monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The
monarchy is hereditary or elective, according as succession to
supreme power follows the right of primogeniture of a family
(dynasty) or is subject to suffrage. At the present day the only
existing kind of monarchy is the hereditary, the elective
monarchies, such as Poland and the old German Sovereignty, having
long since disappeared. Those States in which the sovereign power
resides in the body of the people are called polycracies, or more
commonly, republics, and are divided into aristocracies and
democracies. In republics sovereignty is vested in the people. The
latter elect from their number representatives who frame their
laws and administer the affairs of government in their name. The
almost universally prevailing form of government in Europe,
fashioned upon the model created in England, is the constitutional
monarchy, a mixture of the monarchical, aristocratic, and
democratic forms. The law- making power is vested in the king and
two chambers. The members of one chamber represent the
aristocratic and conservative element, while the other chamber,
elected from the body of citizens, represents the democratic
element. The monarch himself is responsible to no one, yet his
governmental acts require the counter-signature of the ministers,
who in turn are responsible to the chamber.
With regard to its appointed functions the government of the State
is divided into the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers.
It is of primary importance that the State enact general and
stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as
this is required for the good order and well-being of the whole
body. For this purpose it must possess the right to legislate; it
must, moreover, carry out these laws and provide, by means of the
administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to
the general good of the community; finally, it has to punish
infractions of the laws and authoritively settle legal disputes,
and for this purpose it has need of the judiciary power (in civil
and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties
is founded on the necessity to preserve good order and of
providing for the security of the whole body politic. In a
community there are always found those who can in no other way be
effectually forced to observe the laws and respect the rights of
others than by the infliction of punishment. Hence the State must
have the right to enact penal statutes, calculated to deter its
subjects from violating the laws, and the right, moreover, to
actually inflict punishment after the violation has occurred.
Among the legitimate modes of punishment is capital punishment. It
is considered, and rightly so, a step forward in civilization,
that nowadays a milder practice has been adopted in this regard,
and that capital punishment is more rarely inflicted, and then
only for such heinous crimes as murder and high treason.
Nevertheless humanitarian sentimentalism has no doubt been carried
to an exaggerated degree, so much so that many would on principle
do away with capital punishment altogether. And yet, this is the
only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from
committing the gravest crimes.
When it is asserted, with Aristotle, that the State is a society
sufficient for itself, this is to be considered true in the sense
that the State needs no further development to complete its
organization, but not in the sense that it is independent in every
respect. The greater the advance of mankind in progress and
civilization, the more necessary and frequent the communication
between nations becomes. Hence the question arises as to what
rights and duties mutually exist between nation and nation. That
portion of ethics which treats this question from a philosophical
standpoint is called the theory of international law, or of the
law of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day deny
the propriety of a philosophical treatment of international law.
According to them the only international rights and duties are
those which have been established by some positive measure either
implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, indeed, is the
position that must be taken by all who reject the natural law. On
the other hand, this position precludes the possibility of any
positive international law whatever, for lasting and binding
compacts between various States are possible only when the primary
principle of right is recognized - that it is just and obligatory
to stand by lawful agreements. Now this is a principle of natural
law; hence, those who deny the existence of natural law (e.g. E.
von Hartmann) must consequently reject any international law
properly so called. In their opinion any international agreements
are mere conventions, which each one observes as long as he finds
it necessary or advantageous. And so we are eventually led back to
the principle of ancient paganism, which, in the intercourse
between nations, too often identified right with might. But
Christianity brought the nations into a closer union and broke
down the barriers of narrow-minded policy. It proclaimed,
moreover, the duties of love and justice as binding on all
nations, thus restoring and perfecting the natural law. The
fundamental principles: "Give each one his due", "Do injury to no
man", "Do not to others what you would not have them do to you",
etc., have an absolute and universal value, and hence must obtain
also in the intercourse between nations. Purely natural duties and
rights are common to all nations; the acquired or positive ones
may vary considerably. Various, too, are the rights and duties of
nations in peace and in war. Since, however, there are, under this
head, many details of a doubtful and changeable character, the
codification of international law is a most urgent desideratum.
Besides this an international court should be established to
attend to the execution of the various measures promulgated by the
law and to arbitrate in case of dispute. The foundations of such
an international court of arbitration have been laid at The Hague;
unfortunately, its competence has been hitherto very much
restricted, and besides, it exercises its functions only when the
Powers at variance appeal to it of their own accord. In the
codification of international law no one would be more competent
to lend effective cooperation and to maintain the principles of
justice and love which should exist between nations in their
intercourse with one another, than the pope. No one can offer
sounder guarantees for the righteousness of the principles to be
laid down, and no one can exert greater moral influence towards
carrying them into effect. This is even recognized by unprejudiced
Protestants. At the Vatican Council not only the many Catholic
bishops present, but the Protestant David Urquhart appealed to the
pope to draw up a schedule of the more important principles of
international law, which were to be binding on all Christian
nations. Religious prejudice, however, places many difficulties in
the way of realizing this plan.
V. CATHREIN
Transcribed by Brendan Byrne
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.
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