Cosmology

�  ORIGIN OF COSMOLOGY
�  METHOD
�  DIVISION OF COSMOLOGY
     �  The first cause of the material universe
     �  The constituent causes of the world
     �  The final cause of the material universe

From its Greek etymology (k�smos world; l�gos, knowledge or
science) the word cosmology means the science of the world. It
ought, therefore, to include in its scope the study of the whole
material universe: that is to say, of inorganic substances, of
plants, of animals, and of man himself. But, as a matter of fact,
the wide range indicated by the etymology of the word has been
narrowed in the actual meaning. In our day cosmology is a branch
of philosophical study, and therefore excludes from its
investigation whatever forms the object of the natural sciences.
While the sciences of physics and biology seek the proximate
causes of corporal phenomena, the laws that govern them, and the
wonderful harmony resulting therefrom, cosmology aims to discover
the deeper and remoter causes which neither observation nor
experiment immediately reveals. This special purpose restricts in
many ways the field of cosmology. There is another limitation not
less important. Man's unique position in the universe makes him
the object of a special philosophical study, viz. psychology, or
anthropology; and, in consequence, that portion of the corporeal
world with which these sciences deal has been cut off from the
domain of cosmology properly so called.

There is a tendency at present to restrict the field still
further; and limit it to what is known as inorganic creation.
Psychology being by its very definition the study of human fife
considered in its first principle and in the totality of its
phenomena, its investigations ought to comprise, it would seem,
the threefold life of man, vegetative, animal, and rational. And,
indeed, the inter-dependence of these three lives in the one
living human being appears to justify the enlargement demanded
nowadays by many authors of note for the psychological field.
Hence for those who accept this view, cosmology has nothing to do
with organic life but is reduced to "a philosophical study of the
inorganic world". Such, in our opinion, is the best definition
that can be given. At the same time it should be remarked that
many philosophers still favour a broader definition, which would
include not only the mineral kingdom but also living things
considered in a general way. In German-speaking countries
cosmology, as a rule, is known as Naturphilosophie, i.e.
philosophy of nature.

Under this name, philosophers usually understand a study of the
universe along the lines of one of the foregoing definitions.
Scientists, on the other hand, give a more scientific turn to this
philosophy of nature, transforming it into a sort of general
physics with an occasional excursion into the realm of sensitive
and intellectual life. A notable instance is the work of Prof.
Ostwald, "Vorlesungen �ber Naturphilosophie" (Leipzig, 1902).

ORIGIN OF COSMOLOGY

The word itself is of recent origin. It was first used by Wolff
when, in 1730, he entitled one of his works "Cosmologia Generalis"
(Frankfort and Leipzig). In this treatise the author studies
especially the laws of motion, the relations that exist among
things in nature, the contingency of the universe, the harmony of
nature, the necessity of postulating a God to explain the origin
of the cosmos and its manifestation of purpose. Because of the
advance the natural sciences were then making, Wolff omitted from
his philosophic study of nature the purely scientific portion
which till then had been closely allied with it. The cosmology of
the ancients and especially of Aristotle was simply a branch of
physics. The "Physics" of Aristotle treats of corporeal beings in
as far as they are subject to motion. The work is divided into two
parts:

�  General physics, which embraces the general principles
governing corporeal being. It treats of local motion and its
various kinds; the origin of substantial compounds; changes in
quality; changes in quantity by increase and decrease; and changes
arising from motion in place, on which Aristotle hinges our
notions of the infinite, of time, and of space.

�  Special physics which deals with the various classes of beings:
terrestrial bodies, celestial bodies, and man.

It is the first part of this work that comes nearest to what we
mean by cosmology. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, as a rule,
follow the path marked out for them by Aristotle. Cosmological
subjects, properly so called, have no reserved place in
philosophical study, and are generally treated as a part of
physics. In our own time, philosophers employ the words
"cosmology" and "philosophy of nature" to designate the
philosophic study of the corporeal world.

METHOD

Cosmology is the natural complement of the special sciences. It
begins where they leave off, and its domain is quite distinct from
theirs. The scientist determines the immediate cause of the
phenomena observed in the mineral or the organic world: he
formulates their laws, and builds these into a synthesis with the
help of certain general theories, such as those of light, of heat,
and of electricity. The cosmologist, on the other hand, seeks the
ultimate causes, not off this or that class of beings or of
phenomena, but of the whole material universe. He inquires into
the constituent nature of corporeal beings, their destiny, and
their first cause. It is clear that these larger problems are
quite beyond the range and purpose of the various sciences, each
of which is by its method confined to its own particular subject.
Nevertheless, cosmology must borrow, and borrow largely, from the
data of science, since the causes which it studies are not
directly perceptible; they can be known only through phenomena
which are their more or less faithful manifestations. It is on
these that cosmology must rest in order to pass upward from cause
to cause till the ultimate cause is reached. Since, then, it is
the role of the natural sciences to analyze and classify the
properties and phenomena of nature, cosmology is obliged to draw
very freely upon those sciences and to neglect none of their
definitive results. In a word, the cosmological method is
essentially a posteriori. Descartes and his school followed a
different, even an opposite, course. Being a mathematician above
all else, he applies to cosmology the principles of mathematics,
and as mathematics sets out from the simplest propositions and
travels along the road of deduction to the most complex truths, so
Descartes, starting from extension as the primordial and universal
property of matter, in fact its very essence, ends by ascribing to
all bodies in nature whatever extension implies and by eliminating
from them whatever it excludes. This a priori method, being
essentially deductive is anti-scientific; and is based, moreover,
on a false supposition, since extension is only one of the many
properties of matter, not its essence. As Leibniz pointed out,
extension presupposes something extended, just as a repetition
presupposes something to be repeated. Philosophers, therefore,
have almost entirely abandoned this method; with the exception
perhaps of the Idealistic Pantheists of whom we shall speak
presently.

DIVISION OF COSMOLOGY

Cosmology, as most philosophers understand it, has a threefold
problem to solve: Whence this corporeal world? What is it? Why is
it? Hence its three parts, concerned respectively with

�  the primordial efficient cause of the cosmos;

�  its actual constituent causes;

�  its final cause.

The first cause of the material universe

Geology, go back as it may and as far as it may in the scientific
history of the earth, must ever remain face to face with a fact
that calls for explanation, viz. the existence of matter itself.
Even if it could decisively prove Laplace's hypothesis, according
to which all portions of this universe, earth, sun, and the whole
stellar system, originally made up a single nebular class, there
would still remain the very reasonable question, whence came this
mass and what was its origin? Now this is precisely the question
cosmology asks; and in seeking the answer it has riven rise to
many systems which can always be brought under one of the
following headings:

(a) Monism;

(b) the theory of Transitive Emanation;

(c) Creationism.

(a) Monism

The Monist theory is that all beings in the world are but one and
the same necessary and eternal substance having within itself the
sufficient reason of its existence; while the seeming diversity of
things and their attributes, are but the various manifestations
and evolutions of this single substance. Pantheism identifies the
world with the Divine Being. This Being is ceaselessly in process
of evolution; which, however, in no wise disturbs the universal
identity of things. The Pantheist is either an Idealist or a
Realist according to the view he takes of the nature and character
of the original substance. If that substance is real he is styled
a Realist, and such were Erigena, Amalric, David of Dinant,
Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza. But if the original substance is
something ideal, e.g. the Ego, the Absolute, the Concept, he is
styled an idealist, and such were Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte.
Kraus and Tiberghien support the Pantheistic view: God is in the
world and the world is in God, although they are not identical.
Schopenhauer devised a form of Pantheism which is known as
Panthelism. According to his view the motive force of the whole
universe is a single blind will. Hartmann goes a step farther and
says the world is but the constant evolution of the unconscious:
hence the name Panhylism. Modern Materialists, such as B�chner,
Hackel, Baruch, as well as the old Greek Atomists, Leucippus,
Democritus, and Epicurus, consider all the activities of the
universe as so many purely material phenomena arising from one
necessary and eternal substance. Lastly, according to the
supporters of the Immanent Emanation theory, the Divine Being
develops within itself so that it is continually identifying
itself with the beings it evolves, or that come forth from it,
just as the grub maintains its substantial identity throughout its
transformation into chrysalis and butterfly. It is clear that such
a theory hardly differs from Pantheism

(b) Transitive Emanation

In the Transitive Emanation theory all beings issue from the
Divine Substance much in the same way as new fruits appear on the
parent tree without changing its substance and without diminishing
its productive power.

(c) Creationism

Creationism is the view held by the generality of spiritualistic
philosophers. The universe through its endless transformations
reveals its contingency: that is to say, its existence is not a
necessity: therefore it must have received its existence from some
other being. This first cause must be a necessary and independent
one, unless we admit an infinite series of dependent causes and so
leave unsolved the problem of the world's existence. God has,
therefore, drawn all things from nothingness by the free act of
His Almighty Will; in a word, He has made them out of nothing,
since any other explanation, e.g. Emanationism, which implies a
real intrinsic change in God, is incompatible with the
immutability, necessity, and absolute perfection of the Divine
Being.

The constituent causes of the world

The composition of corporeal beings is also the subject of much
discussion. There are actually four systems of note, each
promising to solve this delicate problem: Mechanism; Hylomorphism
(the Scholastic system); Dynamic Atomism; and Dynamism proper.

(a) Mechanism

The characteristic tendency of Mechanism, i.e. of the mechanical
theory, is to disregard all qualitative difference in natural
phenomena and to emphasize their quantitative differences. That is
to say, in this system the constituent matter of all corporeal
beings is everywhere the same and is essentially homogeneous; all
the forces animating it are of the same nature; they are simply
modes of local motion. Furthermore, there is no internal principle
of finality; in the world everything is determined by mechanical
laws. To explain all cosmic phenomena, nothing is needed but mass
and motion; so that all the differences observable between
corporeal beings are merely differences in the amount of matter
and motion. Mechanism appeals especially to the law of the
correlation of forces in nature and of the mechanical equivalent
of heat. Heat, we know, does work; but it consumes itself in
proportion to its own activity. In like manner mechanical causes
produce heat and grow weaker in proportion to the intensity of
their effect. So it is with all corporeal energy; one form may be
substituted for another, but the quantity of the new force will be
always equivalent to the quantity of the force that has
disappeared. Having in this way identified mechanical force with
motion, the holders of this theory felt authorized to unify all
forces and reduce them to local motion; and it was then an easy
step to consider substance as homogeneous since its only use is to
serve as a background for phenomena. Other arguments are drawn
from chemistry, especially from the facts of isomerism,
polymerism, and allotropism.

The mechanical theory is of ancient origin. Amongst its earliest
partisans were Thales, Anaximander, and Heraclitus, whose chief
concern was to prove the derivation of the world from one simple
primitive substance. Empedocles, however, held out for four
elements--air, earth, water, fire. But Democritus, and later
Epicurus, suppressed this distinction between the elements,
proclaimed the essential homogeneity of matter, and referred the
variety of natural phenomena to differences of motion. After the
time of Epicurus (270 B.C.), this system disappeared from
philosophical thought for eighteen centuries. Restored by
Descartes it soon won the favour of most scientists, and it is
still dominant in scientific research. The Cartesian philosophy
was a restatement of the two basic principles of the old theory,
the homogeneity of nature and the reduction of all forces to terms
of motion; but it got new vigour by contact with the natural
sciences, especially physics and chemistry; hence the name Atomism
(q.v.) by which it is usually known. It should, however, be noted
that there are two Atomisms, the one purely chemical, the other
philosophical. According to the former all simple bodies are made
up of atoms, i.e. of particles so small that no chemical force
known to us can divide them, but which have all the properties of
visible bodies. Atoms form groups of two or four or sometimes
more; these small tenacious groups, known as chemical molecules
coalesce in physical molecules, and from these in turn are built
up the material bodies we see around us. The material body thus
results from a progressive aggregation of molecules, and the very
smallest portion of it that is endowed with the properties of the
compound contains many atoms of various species, since by
definition the compound results from the union of numerous
elements. On this atomic theory, independent as such of all
philosophical systems, was grafted during the last century that
philosophical Atomism which, while ascribing to all atoms the same
nature, differentiates them only by varying amounts of mass and
motion.

(b) Dynamism

Another explanation of the material world is offered by Dynamism.
If Mechanism attributes extension to matter and complete passivity
to corporeal substances, Dynamism sees in the world only simple
forces, unextended, yet essentially active. There is nothing
strange in the antithesis of these two systems. The Dynamism of
Leibniz--it was he who propounded it--was but a reaction against
the Mechanism of Descartes. To these two matrix-ideas of
unextended, active forces the majority of Dynamists add the
principle of actio in distans. They soon found out that points
without extension can touch only by completely merging the one
with the other, and on their own hypothesis the points in contact
would amount to nothing more than a mathematical point which could
never give us even the illusion of apparent extension. To avoid
this pitfall, the Dynamists bethought them of considering all
bodies as aggregates of force unextended indeed but separated by
intervals from one another. Conceived by Leibniz, who held the
monads to be dowered with all immanent activity, this system has
been amended and modernized by Father Boscovich, Kant, Father
Palmieri, Father Carbonelle, Hirn, and Father Leroy. On the whole
it has found few supporters; scientists as a rule prefer the
mechanical view. It would seem, however, that a reaction towards
it has set in since the discovery of the radioactivity of matter.
The property manifested by a considerable number of bodies of
emitting at ordinary temperatures a seemingly inexhaustible
quantity of electric rays suggests the idea that matter is a focus
of energy which tends to diffuse itself in space. But in point of
fact there are only two arguments in favour of Dynamism. One is
drawn from the difficulties of grasping the concept of extension;
the other from the fact that all we know of matter comes to us
through its action on our organs of sense; hence the inference
that force is the only thing existing apart from ourselves.

(c) Hylomorphism

Between these two extremes stands the Scholastic theory, known as
Hylomorphism, or theory of matter and form (h�le, matter; morphe,
form), also as the Aristotelean theory, and later as the Thomistic
theory from the name of its principal defender in the Middle Ages.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who was its author, gave it a large
place in his treatises on physics and on metaphysics. It was
discussed during centuries in the Peripatetic and neo-Platonic
schools and in the schools of Constantinople and Athens; but from
the sixth century to the twelfth, though its essential principles
survived, it was an insignificant factor in philosophic thought.
An exception, however, must be made in favour of Avicenna in the
East (980-1037) and of Averroes in Spain (1126-1198), both famous
commentators on the Aristotelean encyclopedia. In the thirteenth
century, the Golden Age of Scholasticism, the system was restored,
thanks to a number of Latin translations, and its long-forgotten
treasures were brought to light by daring prospectors, such as
Alexander of Hales, St. Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, St.
Bonaventure, and Henry of Ghent. During the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries the cosmological theory, and indeed the whole
Scholastic system, suffered a decline which lasted till the
nineteenth century, though during the interval it found ardent
supporters in some of the religious orders. The restoration
movement began about the middle of the nineteenth century with the
works of Kleutgen (1811-1883); Sanseverino (1811-1865), and
Liberatore (1810-1892); but it was especially owing to the impulse
given it by the famous Encyclical of Leo XIII, "�terni Patris"
(1879), that Scholasticism regained its place of honour beside the
great modern systems.

The Scholastic theory can be summed up in the following
propositions:

�  Bodies both elementary and compound have an essential unity;
they differ specifically, and are by their very nature extended;

�  they possess powers or energies both passive and active which
spring from their substantial nature and are inseparable from it;

�  they have an immanent tendency toward certain special ends to
be realized by the exercise of their native energies.

The basic principle of this cosmology is that of immanent
finality. The corporeal world is a masterpiece of order and
harmony. In spite of ceaseless transformations, every species of
body, simple and composite alike, reappears again and again with
its characteristic properties to further the well-being of the
individual and of the universe as a whole. Now this constant and
harmonious co-operation of innumerable causes acting under
conditions the most diverse can only be explained, say the
Scholastics, by admitting in the material agents themselves fixed
and permanent principles of order. The universe must therefore be
composed of specific natures, i.e. of beings which by their
constitution and properties are really adapted to the ends they
have to attain. Substance and its distinctive energies form a
whole which is completely subordinated to its appointed destiny;
so that if serious alterations, such as chemical combinations,
succeed in affecting these properties and in marring the harmony
that ought to exist between them and their substantial base, the
being so affected must put on a new nature in harmony with its new
state. There takes place, in other words, what the Scholastics
call a substantial transformation. But this implies that an
essential portion of the original being must persist throughout
the change, and be carried over into the final result, otherwise
transformation would involve the annihilation of the first being
and the production of the second out of nothing. On the other
hand, if we hold that during the process the being in question
does not lose its own specific difference in exchange for another,
it would be illogical to speak of a transformation, since a change
which preserves the substantial integrity of the being can never
have as its result the production of a new being. All bodies,
then, that are subject to such a change must contain, in spite of
their unity, two constituent principles. The one is a specifying
or determining principle whence spring the actuality and
distinguishing marks of the body itself; and it is this principle
which is born and dies at every step in the deeper transformations
of matter. It is called substantial form. The other, the
indeterminate complement of this, is the substratum which receives
the various essential forms; and it is called first matter. These
are the fundamental ideas in the Scholastic theory.

As a system it is not at every point the direct antithesis of the
two other systems outlined above. It is true that, while Mechanism
claims that the properties of bodies are nothing but local motion,
the Scholastics admit the existence of qualities properly so
called in all bodies, i.e. accidental determinations, fixed and
destined for action. These properties are generated with the new
substance; they cling to it indissolubly during its existence and
they are its natural manifestation. But, on the other hand, the
Scholastics concede to the mechanical theory that local motion
plays a large part in the world, that it is the accompaniment and
the measure of every exertion of material force. Hence they give
Mechanism credit for assigning a quantitative value to the
phenomena of nature by measuring the movement proportionate to
each; while, on their side, they explain the activity at work in
each case by taking into account the qualitative elements as well
as the kinetic. Again, with the mechanical theory the Scholastic
recognizes in every corporeal being an essential principle of
passivity, of inertia, divisibility, and extension--in a word, of
all the properties so highly prized by Mechanism; this principle
is first matter. But the Scholastic theory adds a substantial
form, i.e. a determining principle and a root-cause of the
activities and peculiar tendencies displayed by each individual
body.

A similar partial agreement exists between Scholasticism and
Dynamism. In the hylomorphic constitution of bodies the dynamic
element has a preponderating role, represented by the substantial
form; but since the corporeal being does not appear to be a source
of energy pure and simple, the dynamic element is joined with
first matter, of which passivity and extension are the natural
outcome.

(d) Dynamic Atomism

A fourth and last system is called Dynamic Atomism. The only real
difference between it and Mechanism lies in the fact that it
attributes to bodies forces distinct from local motion; but at the
same time it maintains that they are purely mechanical forces.
Matter, it asserts, is homogeneous and the atom incapable of
transformation. This theory, proposed by Martin and Tongiorgi, and
upheld nowadays by certain scientists, is a transition between the
mechanical and the Scholastic system. Its partisans, in fact, are
persuaded that a theory which denies the reality of qualitative
energies inherent in matter and reduces them to local motion
thereby makes the true explanation of natural phenomena impossible
and hands over the universe to the whims of chance. Some
Dynamists, therefore, to meet the obvious requirements of order in
the world, seek in substance itself the reasons of its secondary
principles of activity. But in this hypothesis it seems rather
hard not to admit, as the Scholastics maintain, that diversity of
substance is the only explanation of the constancy observed in the
accidental differences of things.

The final cause of the material universe

The last problem that cosmology attempts to solve is that of the
final cause. It is intimately bound up with that of the first
cause. Materialists like Hackel and B�chner, who refuse to see in
the universe a plan or a purpose, can assign no goal to cosmic
evolution. In their opinion, just as the world, during its eternal
past, has undergone countless variations in form, so during its
eternal future it is destined to ceaseless change. The laws of
mechanics, the chance encounter of atoms and molecules, the
capricious play of natural forces following no preconceived aim,
will determine the number, nature, and form of the states through
which matter is to pass. Pantheists and all who identify God with
matter share as a rule the same view. For them the condition of
the world is but the fatal result of purposeless evolution; so
that the world is its own end or rather is itself the term of its
existence and activity.

Those who believe in the existence of a personal God can never
admit that an all-wise being created without a purpose. And since
a perfect and independent being can have no other than himself as
the final aim of his action, it follows that the ultimate end of
creation is to manifest the glory of the Creator, man being the
intermediary, and, as it were, the high-priest of the material
world. The welfare of man himself is the secondary purpose of
creation. According to St. Thomas the world is a vast hierarchy of
which inorganic matter is the base and man the summit. The mineral
order ministers to the vegetable and this in turn to the animal,
while man finds in all these the satisfaction of his needs and the
adornment of his earthly life. Above all he finds in the material
universe and in the service it renders him a means of rising to
perfect happiness in the possession of God.

D. NYS
Transcribed by Rick McCarty


http://www.knight.org/advent

From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.

Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).

This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the  entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this  worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For  more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.

-------------------------------------------------------

  Provided courtesy of:

       Eternal Word Television Network
       PO Box 3610
       Manassas, VA 22110
       Voice: 703-791-2576
       Fax: 703-791-4250
       Data: 703-791-4336
       Web: http://www.ewtn.com
       FTP: ewtn.com
       Telnet: ewtn.com
       Email address: sysop@ ewtn.com

  EWTN provides a Catholic online
  information and service system.

-------------------------------------------------------

You are viewing proxied material from gopher.ratthing.com. The copyright of proxied material belongs to its original authors. Any comments or complaints in relation to proxied material should be directed to the original authors of the content concerned. Please see the disclaimer for more details.