Catholic Encyclopedia: Hope
Hope, in its widest acceptation, is described as the desire of something together with
the expectation of obtaining it. The Scholastics say that it is a movement of the appetite
towards a future good, which though hard to attain is possible of attainment.
Consideration of this state of soul is limited in this article to its aspect as a factor in the
supernatural order. Looked at in this way it is defined to be a Divine virtue by which
we confidently expect, with God's help, to reach eternal felicity as well as to have at our
disposal the means of securing it. It is said to be Divine not merely because its
immediate object is God, but also because of the special manner of its origin. Hope,
such as we are here contemplating, is an infused virtue; ie., it is not, like good habits in
general, the outcome of repeated acts or the product of our own industry. Like
supernatural faith and charity it is directly implanted in the soul by Almighty God.
Both in itself and in the scope of its operation it outstrips the limits of the created
order, and is to be had if at all only through the direct largess of the Creator. The
capacity which it confers is not only the strengthening of an existing power, but rather
the elevation, the transforming of a faculty for the performance of functions essentially
outside its natural sphere of activity. All of this is intelligible only on the basis, which
we take for granted, that there is such a thing as the supernatural order, and that the
only realizable ultimate destiny of man in the present providence of God lies in that
order.
Hope is termed a theological virtue because its immediate object is God, as is true of
the other two essentially infused virtues, faith and charity. St. Thomas acutely says that
the theological virtues are so called "because they have God for their object, both in so
far as by them we are properly directed to Him, and because they are infused into our
souls by God alone, as also, finally, because we come to know of them only by Divine
revelation in the Sacred Scriptures". Theologians enlarge upon this idea by saying that
Almighty God is both the material and the formal object of hope. He is the material
object because He is that which is chiefly, though not solely, aimed at when we elicit
acts of this virtue- ie., whatever else is looked for is only desired in so far as it bears a
relation to Him. Hence according to the generally followed teaching, not only
supernatural helps, particularly such as are necessary for our salvation, but also things
in the temporal order, inasmuch as they can be means to reach the supreme end of
human life, may be the material objects of supernatural hope. It is worthwhile noting
here that in a strict construction of the term we cannot properly hope for eternal life for
someone other than ourselves. The reason is that it is of the nature of hope to desire and
expect something apprehended precisely as the good or happiness of the one who
hopes (<bonum proprium>). In a qualified sense, however, that is so far as love may
have united us with others, we may hope for others as well as for ourselves. By the
formal object of hope we understand the motive or motives which lead us to entertain a
confident expectation of a happy issue to our efforts in the matter of eternal salvation
notwithstanding the difficulties which beset our path. Theologians are not of one mind
in determining what is to be assigned as the sufficient reason of supernatural hope.
Mazzella (De Virtutibus Infusis, disp. v, art. 2), whose judgment has the merit of
simplicity as well as that of adequate analysis, finds the foundation of our hope in two
things. It is based, according to him, on our apprehension of God as our supreme
supernatural good Whose communication in the beatific vision is to make us happy for
all eternity, and also on those Divine attributes such as omnipotence, mercy and
fidelity, which unite to exhibit God as our unfailing helper. These considerations, he
thinks, motive our wills or furnish the answer to the question why we hope. Of course
it is taken for granted that the yearning for God, not simply because of His own infinite
perfections but explicitly because He is to be our reward, is a righteous temper of soul,
otherwise the spiritual attitude of hope in which such a longing is included would not
be a virtue at all. Luther and Calvin were at one in insisting that only the product of
the perfect love of God, ie. the love of God for His own sake, was to be regarded as
morally good. Consequently they rejected as sinful whatever was done only through
consideration of eternal reward or, in other words, through that love of God which the
Scholastics call "amor concupiscentiae". The Council of Trent (Sess. vi, can. 31)
stigmatized these errors as heresy: "If anyone says that a justified person sins when
such a one does what is right through hope of eternal reward, let him be anathema". In
spite of this unequivocal pronouncement of the council, Baius, the celebrated Louvain
theologian, substantially reiterated the false doctrine of the Reformers on this point. His
teaching on the matter was formulated in the thirty-eighth proposition extracted from
his works, and was condemned by St. Pius V. According to him there is no true act of
virtue except what is elicited by charity, and as all love is either of God or His
creatures, all love which is not the love of God for His own sake, ie. for His own infinite
perfections, is depraved cupidity and a sin. Of course in such a theory there could not
properly speaking be any place for the virtue of hope as we understand it. It is easy
also to see how it fits in with the initial Protestant position of identifying faith and
confidence and thus making hope rather an act of the intellect than of the will. For if
we may not hope, in the Catholic sense, for blessedness, the only substitute available
seems to be belief in the Divine mercy and promises.
It is a truth constantly acted upon in Catholic life and no less explicitly taught, that
hope is necessary to salvation. It is necessary first of all as an indispenssible means
(<necessitate medii>) of attaining salvation, so that no one can enter upon eternal bliss
without it. Hence even infants, though they cannot have elicited the act, must have had
the habit of hope infused in Baptism. Faith is said to be "the substance of things hoped
for" (Hebrews, ii, 1), and without it "it is impossible to please God " (ibid ., xi, 6).
Obviously, therefore, hope is required for salvation with the same absolute necessity as
faith. Moreover, hope is necessary because it is prescribed by law, the natural law
which, in the hypothesis that we are destined for a supernatural end, obliges us to use
the means suited to that end. Further, it is prescribed by the positive Divine law, as, for
instance, in the first Epistle of St. Peter, i, 13: "Trust perfectly in the grace which is
offered you in the revelation of Jesus Christ".
There is both a negative and a positive precept of hope. The <negative precept<i/> is
in force ever and always. Hence there can never be a contingency in which one may
lawfully despair or presume. The <positive precept> enjoining the exercise of the virtue
of hope demands fulfilment sometimes, because one has to discharge certain Christian
duties which involve an act of this supernatural confidence, such as prayer, penance,
and the like. Its obligation is then said, in the language of the schools, to be <per
accidens>. On the other hand, there are times when it is binding without any such
spur, because of its own intrinsic importance, or <per se>. How often this is so in the
lifetime of a Christian, is not susceptible of exact determination, but that it is so is quite
clear from the tenor of a proposition condemned by Alexander VII: "Man is at no time
during his life bound to elicit an act of faith, hope and charity as a consequence of
Divine precepts cepts appertaining to these virtues". It is, however, perhaps not
superfluous us to note that the explicit act of hope is not exacted. The average good
Christian, who is solicitous about living up to his beliefs, implicitly satisfies the duty
imposed by the precept of hope.
The doctrine herein set forth as to the necessity of Christian hope was impugned in the
seventeenth century by the curious mixture of fanatical mysticism and false spirituality
called Quietism. This singular array of errors was given to the world by a Spanish
priest named Miguel Molinos. He taught that to arrive at the state of perfection it was
essential to lay aside all self-love to such an extent that one became indifferent as to
one's own progress, salvation, or damnation. The condition of soul to be aimed at was
one of absolute quiet brought about by the absence of every sort of desire or anything
that could be construed as such. Hence, to quote the words of the seventh of the
condemned propositions taken from Molinos's <Spiritual Guide>, "the soul must not
occupy itself with any thought whether of reward or punishment, heaven or hell, death
or eternity". As a result one ought not to entertain any hope as to one's salvation; for
that, as a manifestation of selfwill, implies imperfection. For the same reason petitions
to Almighty God about anything whatever are quite out of place. No resistance, except
of a purely negative sort, should be offered to temptations, and an entirely passive
attitude should be fostered in every respect. In the year 1687 Innocent XII condemned
sixty-eight propositions embodying this extraordinary doctrine as heretical,
blasphemous scandalous, etc. He likewise consigned the author to perpetual
confinement in a monastery, where, having previously abjured his errors, he died in
the year 1696. About the same time a species of pseudomysticism, largely identical
with that of Molinos, but omitting the objectionable conclusions, was defended by
Madame Guyon. It even found an advocate in Fenelon who engaged in a
controversy with Bossuet on the subject. Ultimately twenty-three propositions drawn
from Fenelon's <Explanation of the maxims of the Saints on the interior life>
were proscribed by Innocent XII. The gist of the teaching, so far as we are concerned,
was that there is in this life a state of perfection with which it is impossible to reconcile
any love of God except that which is absolutely disinterested, which therefore does not
contemplate possession of God as our reward.
It would follow that the act of hope is incompatible with such a state, since it postulates
precisely a desire for God, not only because He is good in Himself, but also and
formally because He is our adequate and final good. Hope is less perfect than charity,
but that admission does not involve a moral deformity of any kind, still less is it true
that we can or ought to pass our lives in a quasi uninterrupted act of pure love of God.
As a matter of fact, there is no such state anywhere identifiable, and if there were it
would not be inconsistent with Christian hope.
The question as to the necessity of hope is followed with some natural sequence by the
inquiry as to its certitude. Manifestly, if hope be absolutely required as a means to
salvation, there is an antecedent presumption that its use must in some sense be
accompanied by certainty. It is clear that, as certitude is properly speaking a predicate
of the intellect, it is only in a derived sense, or as St. Thomas says <participative>, that
we can speak of hope, which is largely a matter of the will, as being certain. In other
words, hope, whose office is to elevate and strengthen our wills, is s said to share the
certitude of faith, whose abiding place is our intellects. For our purpose it is of
importance to recall what it is that, being apprehended by our intellect, is said to do
service as the foundation of Christian hope. This has already been determined to be the
concept of God as our helper gathered from reflecting on His goodness, mercy,
omnipotence, and fidelity to His promises. In a subordinate sense our hope is built
upon our own merits, as the eternal reward is not forthcoming except to those who
shall have employed their free will to co-operate with the aids afforded by God's
bounty.
Now there is a threefold certitude discernible.
A thing is said to be certain conditionally when, another thing being given, the first
infallibly follows. Supernatural hope is evidently certain ain in this way, because,
granted that a man does all that is required to save his soul, he is sure to attain to
eternal life. This is guaranteed by the infinite power and goodness and fidelity of God
There is a certainty proper to virtues in general in so far as they are principles of action.
Thus for instance a really temperate man may be counted on to be uniformly sober.
Hope being a virtue may claim this moral certainty inasmuch as it constantly and after
an established method encourages us to look for eternal blessedness to be had by the
Divine munificence and as the crown of our own merits accumulated through grace.
Finally, a thing is certain absolutely, ie., not conditionally upon the verification of some
other thing, but quite independently of any such event. In this case no room for doubt
is left. Is hope certain in this meaning of the word? So far as the secondary material
object of hope is concerned, ie. those graces which are at least remotely adequate for
salvation, we can be entirely confident that these are most certainly provided. As to the
primary material object of hope namely, the face-to-face vision of God, the Catholic
doctrine, as set forth in the sixth session of the Council of Trent, is that our hope is
unqualifiedly certain if we consider only the Divine attributes, which are its support,
and which cannot fail. If, however, we limit our attention to the sum total of salutary
operation which we contribute and upon which we also lean as upon the reason of our
expectation, then, prescinding from the case of an individual revelation, hope is to be
pronounced uncertain. This is plainly for the reason that we cannot in advance insure
ourselves against the weakness or the malice of our free wills.
This doctrine is in direct antagonism to the initial Protestant contention that we can and
must be altogether certain of our salvation. The only thing required for this end,
according to the teaching of the Reformers, was the special faith or confidence in the
promises which alone, without good works, justified a man. Hence, even though there
were no good works distinguishable in a person's earthly career, such a one might and
ought, notwithstanding, cherish a firm hope, provided only that he did not cease to
believe.
Assuming that the seat of hope is our will, we may ask whether, having been once
infused, it can ever be lost. The answer is that it can be destroyed, both by the
perpetration of the sin of despair, which is its formal opposite, and by the subtraction
of the habit of faith, which assigns the motives for it. It is not so clear that the sin of
presumption expels the supernatural virtue of hope, although of course it cannot
coexist with the act. We need not be detained with the inquiry whether a man could
continue to hope if his eternal damnation had been revealed to him. Theologians are
agreed in regarding such a revelation as practically, if not absolutely, impossible. ble.
If, by an all but clearly absurd hypothesis, we suppose Almighty God to have revealed
to anyone in advance that he was surely to be lost, such a person obviously could no
longer hope. Do the souls in Purgatory hope? It is the commonly held opinion that, as
they have not yet been admitted to the intuitive vision of God, and as there is nothing
otherwise in their condition which is at variance with the concept of this virtue, they
have the habit and elicit the act of hope. As to the damned, the concordant judgment is
that, as they have been deprived of every other supernatural gift, so also knowing well
the perpetuity of their reprobation, they can no longer hope. With reference to the
blessed in heaven, St. Thomas holds that, possessing what they have striven for, they
can no longer be said to have the theological virtue of hope. The words of St. Paul
(Rom., viii, 24) are to the point: "For we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen, is not
hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" They can still desire the glory
which is to be proper to their risen bodies and also by reason of the bonds of charity,
they can wish for the salvation of others, but this is not, properly speaking, hope. The
human Soul of Christ furnishes an example. Because of the hypostatic union It was
already enjoying the beatific vision. At the same time, because of the passible nature
with which He had clothed Himself, He was in the state of pilgrimage (<in statu
viatoris>), and hence He could look forward with longing to His assumption of the
qualities of the glorified body. This however was not hope, because hope has as its
main object union with God in heaven.
WILHELM AND SCANNEL <Manual of Dogmatic Theology> (London, 1909);
MAZZELLA, <De Virtutibus Infusis> (Rome, 1884), SLATER, <Manual of Moral
Theology> (New York, 1908); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS <Summa Theologica> (Turin,
1885); BALLERINI, <Opus Theologicum Morale> (Prato, 1901).
JOSEPH F. DELANY
Transcribed by Gerard Haffner
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
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