The Nature and Attributes of God
I. As Known Through Natural Reason
A. Infinity of God
B. Unity or Unicity of God
C. Simplicity of God
D. Divine Personality
II. As Known Through Faith
A. Eternity
B. Immensity and Ubiquity, or Omnipresence
C. Immutability
D. The Divine Attributes
1. Divine Knowledge
2. The Divine Will
3. Intellect and Will (Providence, Predestination, and
Reprobation)
I. AS KNOWN THROUGH NATURAL REASON
("THE GOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS")
Having established by inductive inference the self-existence of a
personal First Cause distinct from matter and from the human mind
(see EXISTENCE OF GOD), we now proceed by deductive analysis to
examine the nature and attributes of this Being to the extent
required by our limited philosophical scope. We will treat
accordingly of
� the infinity,
� unity or unicity, and
� simplicity of God, adding
� some remarks on Divine personality.
A. INFINITY OF GOD
When we say that God is infinite, we mean that He is unlimited in
every kind of perfection or that every conceivable perfection
belongs to Him in the highest conceivable way. In a different
sense we sometimes speak, for instance, of infinite time or space,
meaning thereby time of such indefinite duration or space of such
indefinite extension that we cannot assign any fixed limit to one
or the other. Care should be taken not to confound these two
essentially different meanings of the term. Time and space, being
made up of parts in duration or extension, are essentially finite
by comparison with God's infinity. Now we assert that God is
infinitely perfect in the sense explained, and that His infinity
is deducible from His self-existence. For a self-existent being,
if limited at all, could be limited only by itself; to be limited
by another would imply causal dependence on that other, which the
very notion of self-existence excludes. But the self-existing
cannot be conceived as limiting itself, in the sense of curtailing
its perfection of being, without ceasing to be self-existing.
Whatever it is, it is necessarily; its own essence is the sole
reason or explanation of its existence, so that its manner of
existence must be as unchangeable as its essence, and to suggest
the possibility of an increase or diminution of perfection would
be to suggest the absurdity of a changeable essence. It only
remains, then, to say that whatever perfection is compatible with
its essence is actually realized in a self-existing being; but as
there is no conceivable perfection as such -- that is, no
expression of positive being as such -- that is not compatible
with the essence of the self-existent, it follows that the self-
existent must be infinite in all perfection. For self-existence
itself is absolute positive being and positive being cannot
contradict, and cannot therefore limit, positive being.
This general, and admittedly very abstract, conclusion, as well as
the reasoning which supports it, will be rendered more
intelligible by a brief specific illustration of what it involves.
(i) When, in speaking of the Infinite, we attribute all
conceivable perfections to Him, we must not forget that the
predicates we employ to describe perfections derive their meaning
and connotation in the first instance from their application to
finite beings; and on reflection it is seen that we must
distinguish between different kinds of perfections, and that we
cannot without palpable contradiction attribute all the
perfections of creatures in the same way to God. Some perfections
are such that even in the abstract, they necessarily imply or
connote finiteness of being or imperfection; while some others do
not of themselves necessarily connote imperfection. To the first
class belong all material perfections -- extension, sensibility
and the like -- and certain spiritual perfections such as
rationality (as distinct from simple intelligence); to the second
class belong such perfections as being truth, goodness,
intelligence, wisdom, justice, holiness, etc. Now while it cannot
be said that God is infinitely extended, or that He feels or
reasons in an infinite way, it can be said that He is infinitely
good, intelligent, wise, just, holy, etc. -- in other words, while
perfections of the second class are attributed to God formally
(i.e., without any change in the proper meaning of the predicates
which express them), those of the first class can only be
attributed to Him eminently and equivalently, (i.e. whatever
positive being they express belongs to God as their cause in a
much higher and more excellent way than to the creatures in which
they formally exist). By means of this important distinction,
which Agnostics reject or neglect, we are able to think and to
speak of the Infinite without being guilty of contradiction, and
the fact that men generally -- even Agnostics themselves when off
their guard -- recognize and use the distinction, is the best
proof that it is pertinent and well founded. Ultimately it is only
another way of saying that, given an infinite cause and finite
effects, whatever pure perfection is discovered in the effects
must first exist in the cause (via affirmationis) and at the same
time that whatever imperfection is discovered in the effects must
be excluded from the cause (via negationis vel exclusionis). These
two principles do not contradict, but only balance and correct one
another.
(ii) Yet sometimes men are led by a natural tendency to think and
speak of God as if He were a magnified creature -- more especially
a magnified man -- and this is known as anthropomorphism. Thus God
is said to see or hear, as if He had physical organs, or to be
angry or sorry, as if subject to human passions: and this
perfectly legitimate and more or less unavoidable use of metaphor
is often quite unfairly alleged to prove that the strictly
Infinite is unthinkable and unknowable, and that it is really a
finite anthrpomorhic God that men worship. But whatever truth
there may be in this charge as applied to Polytheistic religions,
or even to the Theistic beliefs of rude and uncultured minds, it
is untrue and unjust when directed against philosophical Theism.
The same reasons that justify and recommend the use of
metaphorical language in other connections justify and recommended
it here, but no Theist of average intelligence ever thinks of
understanding literally the metaphors he applies, or hears applied
by others, to God, any more than he means to speak literally when
he calls a brave man a lion, or a cunning one a fox.
(iii) Finally it should be observed that, while predicating pure
perfections literally both of God and of creatures, it is always
understood that these predicates are true in an infinitely higher
sense of God than of creatures, and that there is no thought of
coordinating or classifying God with creatures. This is
technically expressed by saying that all our knowledge of God is
analogical, and that all predicates applied to God and to
creatures are used analogically, not univocally (see ANALOGY). I
may look at a portrait or at its living original, and say of
either, with literal truth, that is a beautiful face. And this is
an example of analogical predication. Beauty is literally and
truly realized both in the portrait and its living original, and
retains its proper meaning as applied to either; there is
sufficient likeness or analogy to justify literal predication but
there is not that perfect likeness or identity between painted and
living beauty which univocal predication would imply. And
similarly in the case of God and creatures. What we contemplate
directly is the portrait of Him painted, so to speak, by Himself
on the canvas of the universe and exhibiting in a finite degree
various perfections, which, without losing their proper meaning
for us, are seen to be capable of being realized in an infinite
degree; and our reason compels us to infer that they must be and
are so realized in Him who is their ultimate cause.
Hence we admit, in conclusion, that our knowledge of the Infinite
is inadequate, and necessarily so since our minds are only finite.
But this is very different from the Agnostic contention that the
Infinite is altogether unknowable, and that the statements of
Theists regarding the nature and attributes of God are so many
plain contradictions. It is only by ignoring the well-recognized
rules of predication that have just been explained, and
consequently by misunderstanding and misrepresenting the Theistic
position, that Agnostics succeed in giving an air of superficial
plausibility to their own philosophy of blank negation. Anyone who
understands those rules, and has learned to think clearly, and
trusts his own reason and common sense, will find it easy to meet
and refute Agnostic arguments, most of which, in principle, have
been anticipated in what precedes. Only one general observation
need be made here -- that the principles to which the Agnostic
philosopher must appeal in his attempt to invalidate religious
knowledge would, if consistently applied, invalidate all human
knowledge and lead to universal scepticism -- and it is safe to
say that, unless absolute scepticism becomes the philosophy of
mankind, Agnosticism will never supplant religion.
B. UNITY OR UNICITY OF GOD
Obviously there can be only one infinite being, only one God. If
several were to exist, none of them would really be infinite, for,
to have plurality of natures at all, each should have some
perfection not possessed by the others. This will be readily
granted by every one who admits the infinity of God, and there is
no need to delay in developing what is perfectly clear. It should
be noted, however, that some Theistic philosophers prefer to
deduce unicity from self-existence and infinity from both
combined, and in a matter so very abstract it is not surprising
that slight differences of opinion should arise. But we have
followed what seems to us to be the simpler and clearer line of
argument. The metaphysical argument by which unicity, as distinct
from infinity, is deduced from self-existence seems to be very
obscure, while on the other hand infinity, as distinct from
unicity, seems to be clearly implied in self-existence as such. If
the question, for example, be asked: Why may there not be several
self-existing beings? The only satisfactory answer, as it seems to
us, is this: Because a self-existent being as such is necessarily
infinite, and there cannot be several infinities. The unity of God
as the First Cause might also be inductively inferred from the
unity of the universe as we know it; but as the suggestion might
be made, and could not be disproved, that there may be another or
even several universes of which we have no knowledge, this
argument would not be absolutely conclusive.
C. SIMPLICITY OF GOD
God is a simple being or substance excluding every kind of
composition, physical or metaphysical. Physical or real
composition is either substantial or accidental -- substantial, if
the being in question consists of two or more substantial
principles, forming parts of a composite whole, as man for
example, consists of body and soul; accidental, if the being in
question, although simple in its substance (as is the human soul),
is capable of possessing accidental perfections (like the actual
thoughts and volition of man's soul) not necessarily identical
with its substance. Now it is clear that an infinite being cannot
be substantially composite, for this would mean that infinity is
made up of the union or addition of finite parts -- a plain
contradiction in terms. Nor can accidental composition be
attributed to the infinite since even this would imply a capacity
for increased perfection, which the very notion of the infinite
excludes. There is not, therefore, and cannot be any physical or
real composition in God.
Neither can there be that kind of composition which is known as
metaphysical, and which results from "the union of diverse
concepts referring to the same real thing in such a way that none
of them by itself signifies either explicitly or even implicitly
the whole reality signified by their combination." Thus every
actual contingent being is a metaphysical compound of essence and
existence, and man in particular, according to the definition, is
a compound of animal and rational. Essence as such in relation to
a contingent being merely implies its conceivableness or
possibility, and abstracts from actual existence; existence as
such must be added before we can speak of the being as actual. But
this distinction, with the composition it implies, cannot be
applied to the self-existent or infinite being in whom essence and
existence are completely identified. We say of a contingent being
that it has a certain nature or essence, but of the self-existent
we say that it is its own nature or essence. There is no
composition therefore of essence and existence -- or of
potentiality and actuality -- in God, nor can the composition of
genus and specific difference, implied for example in the
definition of man as a rational animal, be attributed to Him. God
cannot be classified or defined, as contingent beings are
classified and defined; for there is no aspect of being in which
He is perfectly similar to the finite, and consequently no genus
in which He can be included. From this it follows that we cannot
know God adequately in the way in which He knows Himself, but not,
as the Agnostic contends, that our inadequate knowledge is not
true as far as it goes. In speaking of a being who transcends the
limitations of formal logical definition our propositions are an
expression of real truth, provided that what we state is in itself
intelligible and not self-contradictory; and there is nothing
unintelligible or contradictory in what Theists predicate of God.
It is true that no single predicate is adequate or exhaustive as a
description of His infinite perfection, and that we need to employ
a multitude of predicates, as if at first sight infinity could be
reached by multiplication. But at the same time we recognize that
this is not so -- being repugnant to the Divine simplicity; and
that while truth, goodness, wisdom, holiness and other attributes,
as we conceive and define them express perfections that are
formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately
identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality -- the
one infinitely perfect and simple being.
D. DIVINE PERSONALITY
When we say that God is a personal being we mean that He is
intelligent and free and distinct from the created universe.
Personality as such expresses perfection, and if human personality
as such connotes imperfection, it must be remembered that, as in
the case of similar predicates, this connotation is excluded when
we attribute personality to God. It is principally by way of
opposition to Pantheism that Divine personality is emphasized by
the Theistic philosopher. Human personality, as we know it, is one
of the primary data of consciousness, and it is one of those
created perfections which must be realized formally (although only
analogically) in the First Cause. But Pantheism would require us
to deny the reality of any such perfection, whether in creatures
or in the Creator, and this is one of the fundamental objections
to any form of Pantheistic teaching. Regarding the mystery of the
Trinity or three Divine Persons in God, which can be known only by
revelation, it is enough to say here that properly understood the
mystery contains no contradiction, but on the contrary adds much
that is helpful to our inadequate knowledge of the infinite.
II. AS KNOWN THROUGH FAITH
("THE GOD OF REVELATION")
Reason, as we have seen, teaches that God is one simple and
infinitely perfect spiritual substance or nature. Sacred Scripture
and the Church teach the same. The creeds, for example, usually
begin with a profession of faith in the one true God, Who is the
Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, and is also, in the words of
the First Vatican Council, "omnipotent, eternal, immense,
incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and in every
perfection" (Sess. III, cap. i, De Deo). The best way in which we
can describe the Divine nature is to say that it is infinitely
perfect, or that God is the infinitely perfect Being but we must
always remember that even being itself, the most abstract and
universal term we possess, is predicated of God and of creatures
not univocally or identically, but only analogically. But other
predicates, which, as applied to creatures, express certain
specific determinations of being, are also used of God --
analogically, if in themselves they express pure or unmixed
perfection, but only metaphorically if they necessarily connote
imperfection. Now of such predicates as applied to creatures we
distinguish between those that are used in the concrete to denote
being as such more or less determined (v.g., substance, spirit,
etc.), and those that are used in the abstract or adjectively to
denote determinations, or qualities, or attributes of being (v.g.,
good, goodness; intelligent, intelligence, etc.); and we find it
useful to transfer this distinction to God, and to speak of the
Divine nature or essence and Divine attributes being careful at
the same time, by insisting on Divine simplicity, to avoid error
or contradiction in its application. For, as applied to God, the
distinction between nature and attributes, and between the
attributes themselves, is merely logical and not real. The finite
mind is not capable of comprehending the Infinite so as adequately
to describe its essence by any single concept or term; but while
using a multitude of terms, all of which are analogically true, we
do not mean to imply that there is any kind of composition in God.
Thus, as applied to creatures, goodness and justice, for example,
are distinct from each other and from the nature or substance of
the beings in whom they are found, and if finite limitations
compel us to speak of such perfections in God as if they were
similarly distinct, we know, nevertheless, and are ready, when
needful, to explain, that this is not really so, but that all
Divine attributes are really identical with one another and with
the Divine essence.
The Divine attributes or perfections which may thus logically be
distinguished are very numerous, and it would be a needless task
to attempt to enumerate them fully. But among them some are
recognized as being of fundamental importance, and to these in
particular is the term attributes applied and special notice
devoted by theologians -- though there is no rigid agreement as to
the number or classification of such attributes. As good a
classification as any other is that based on the analogy of
entitative and operative perfections in creatures -- the former
qualifying nature or essence as such and abstracting from
activity, the latter referring especially to the activity of the
nature in question. Another distinction is often made between
physical, and moral or ethical, attributes -- the former of
themselves abstracting from, while the latter directly express,
moral perfection. But without labouring with the question of
classification, it will suffice to notice separately those
attributes of leading importance that have not been already
explained. Nothing need be added to what has been said above
concerning self-existence, infinity, unity, and simplicity (which
belong to the entitative class); but eternity, immensity, and
immutability (also of the entitative class), together with the
active attributes, whether physical or moral, connected with the
Divine intellect and will, call for some explanation here.
A. ETERNITY
By saying that God is eternal we mean that in essence, life, and
action He is altogether beyond temporal limits and relations. He
has neither beginning, nor end, nor duration by way of sequence or
succession of moments. There is no past or future for God -- but
only an eternal present. If we say that He was or that He acted,
or that He will be or will act, we mean in strictness that He is
or that He acts; and this truth is well expressed by Christ when
He says (John, viii, 58-A.V.): "Before Abraham was, I am."
Eternity, therefore, as predicated of God, does not mean
indefinite duration in time -- a meaning in which the term is
sometimes used in other connections -- but it means the total
exclusion of the finiteness which time implies. We are obliged to
use negative language in describing it, but in itself eternity is
a positive perfection, and as such may be best defined in the
words of Boethius as being "interminabilis vitae tota simul et
perfecta possessio," i.e. possession in full entirety and
perfection of life without beginning, end, or succession.
The eternity of God is a corollary from His self-existence and
infinity. Time being a measure of finite existence, the infinite
must transcend it. God, it is true, coexists with time, as He
coexists with creatures, but He does not exist in time, so as to
be subject to temporal relations: His self-existence is timeless.
Yet the positive perfection expressed by duration as such, i.e.
persistence and permanence of being, belongs to God and is truly
predicated of Him, as when He is spoken of, for example, as "Him
that is, and that was and that is to come" (Apoc., i, 4); but the
strictly temporal connotation of such predicates must always be
corrected by recalling the true notion of eternity.
B. IMMENSITY AND UBIQUITY, OR OMNIPRESENCE
Space, like time, is one of the measures of the finite, and as by
the attribute of eternity, we describe God's transcendence of all
temporal limitations, so by the attribute of immensity we express
His transcendent relation to space. There is this difference,
however, to be noted between eternity and immensity, that the
positive aspect of the latter is more easily realized by us, and
is sometimes spoken of, under the name of omnipresenee, or
ubiquity, as if it were a distinct attribute. Divine immensity
means on the one hand that God is necessarily present everywhere
in space as the immanent cause and sustainer of creatures, and on
the other hand that He transcends the limitations of actual and
possible space, and cannot be circumscribed or measured or divided
by any spatial relations. To say that God is immense is only
another way of saying that He is both immanent and transcendent in
the sense already explained. As some one has metaphorically and
paradoxically expressed it, "God's centre is everywhere, His
circumference nowhere."
That God is not subject to spatial limitations follows from His
infinite simplicity; and that He is truly present in every place
or thing -- that He is omnipresent or ubiquitous -- follows from
the fact that He is the cause and ground of all reality. According
to our finite manner of thinking we conceive this presence of God
in things spatial as being primarily a presence of power and
operation -- immediate Divine efficiency being required to sustain
created beings in existence and to enable them to act; but, as
every kind of Divine action ad extra is really identical with the
Divine nature or essence, it follows that God is really present
everywhere in creation not merely per virtuten et operationem, but
per essentiam. In other words God Himself, or the Divine nature,
is in immediate contact with, or immanent in, every creature --
conserving it in being and enabling it to act. But while insisting
on this truth we must, if we would avoid contradiction, reject
every form of the pantheistic hypothesis. While emphasizing Divine
immanence we must not overlook Divine transcendence.
There is no lack of Scriptural or ecclesiastical testimonies
asserting God's immensity and ubiquity. It is enough to refer for
example to:
� Heb. i, 3 iv, 12, 13
� Acts, xvii, 24, 27, 28;
� Eph., i, 23;
� Col., i, ;6, 17,
� Ps. cxxxviii, 7-12;
� Job, xii, 10, etc.
C. IMMUTABILITY
In God "there is no change, nor shadow of alteration" (James, i
17); "They [i.e. "the works of thy hands"] shall perish, but thou
shalt continue: and they shall all grow old as a garment. And as a
vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but
thou art the selfsame and thy years shall not fail" (Heb., i, 10-
12, Ps. ci, 26-28. Cf. Mal., iii, 6; Heb., xiii, 8). These are
some of the Scriptural texts which clearly teach Divine
immutability or unchangeableness, and this attribute is likewise
emphasized in church teaching, as by the Council of Nicaea against
the Arians, who attributed mutability to the Logos (Denzinger, 54-
old No. 18), and by the First Vatican Council in its famous
definition.
That the Divine nature is essentially immutable, or incapable of
any internal change, is an obvious corollary from Divine infinity.
Changeableness implies the capacity for increase or diminution of
perfection, that is, it implies finiteness and imperfection. But
God is infinitely perfect and is necessarily what He is. It is
true that some attributes by which certain aspects of Divine
perfection are described are hypothetlcal or relative, in the
sense that they presuppose the contingent fact of creation:
omnipresence, for example, presupposes the actual existence of
spatial beings. But it is obvious that the mutability implied in
this belongs to creatures, and not to the Creator; and it is a
strange confusion of thought that has led some modern Theists --
even professing Christians -- to maintain that such attributes can
be laid aside by God, and that the Logos in becoming incarnate
actually did lay them aside, or at least ceased from their active
exercise. But as creation itself did not affect the immutability
of God, so neither did the incarnation of a Divine Person;
whatever change was involved in either case took place solely in
the created nature.
D. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
The so-called active Divine attributes are best treated in
connection with the Divine Intellect and Will -- principles of
Divine operation ad extra -- to which they are all ultimately
reducible.
1. Divine Knowledge
Description of the Divine Knowledge
That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of
all things, follows from His infinite perfection. In the first
place He knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately, and
in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends
their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows them
individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows
everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad as well
as what is good. Everything, in a word, which to our finite minds
signifies perfection and completeness of knowledge may be
predicated of Divine omniscience, and it is further to be observed
that it is on Himself alone that God depends for His knowledge. To
make Him in any way dependent on creatures for knowledge of
created objects would destroy His infinite perfection and
supremacy. Hence it is in His eternal, unchangeable, comprehensive
knowledge of Himself or of His own infinite being that God knows
creatures and their acts, whether there is question of what is
actual or merely possible. Indeed, Divine knowledge itself is
really identical with Divine essence, as are all the attributes
and acts of God; but according to our finite modes of thought we
feel the need of conceiving them distinctly and of representing
the Divine essence as the medium or mirror in which the Divine
intellect sees all truth. Moreover, although the act of Divine
knowledge is infinitely simple in itself, we feel the need of
further distinctions -- not as regards the knowledge in itself,
but as regards the multiplicity of finite objects which it
embraces. Hence the universally recognized distinction between the
knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) and that of simple
intelligence (simplicis intelligentiae), and the famous
controversy regarding the scientia media. We shall briefly explain
this distinction and the chief difficulties involved in this
controversy.
Distinctions in the Divine Knowledge
In classifying the objects of Divine omniscience the most obvious
and fundamental distinction is between things that actually exist
at any time, and those that are merely possible. And it is in
reference to these two classes of objects that the distinction is
made between knowledge "of vision" and "of simple intelligence";
the former referring to things actual, and the latter to the
merely possible. This distinction might appear at first sight to
be absolutely comprehensive and adequate to the purpose for which
we introduce distinctions at all, but some difficulty is felt once
the question is raised of God's knowledge of the acts of creatures
endowed with free will. That God knows infallibly and from
eternity what, for example, a certain man, in the exercise of free
will, will do or actually does in any given circumstances, and
what he might or would actually have done in different
circumstances is beyond doubt -- being a corollary from the
eternal actuality of Divine knowledge. So to speak, God has not to
wait on the contingent and temporal event of the man's free choice
to know what the latter's action will be; He knows it from
eternity. But the difficulty is: how, from our finite point of
view, to interpret and explain the mysterious manner of God's
knowledge of such events without at the same time sacrificing the
free will of the creature.
The Dominican school has defended the view that the distinction
between knowledge of "vision" and of "simple intelligence" is the
only one we need or ought to employ in our effort to conceive and
describe Divine omniscience, even in relation to the free acts of
intelligent creatures. These acts, if they ever take place, are
known or foreknown by God as if they were eternally actual -- and
this is admitted by all; otherwise they remain in the category of
the merely possible -- and this is what the Jesuit school denies,
pointing for example to statements such as that of Christ
regarding the people of Tyre and Sidon, who would have done
penance had they received the same graces as the Jews (Matt., xi,
21). This school therefore maintains that to the actual as such
and the purely possible we must add another category of objects:
hypothetical facts that may never become actual, but would become
actual were certain conditions realized. The hypothetical truth of
such facts, it is rightly contended, is more than mere
possibility, yet less than actuality; and since God knows such
facts in their hypothetical character there is good reason for
introducing a distinction to cover them -- and this is the
scientia media. And it is clear that even acts that take place and
as such fall finally under the knowledge of vision may be
conceived as falling first under the knowledge of simple
intelligence and then under the scientia media, the progressive
formula would be:
� first, it is possible Peter would do so and so;
� second, Peter would do so and so, given certain conditions;
� third, Peter will do or does so and so.
Now, were it not for the differences that lie behind there would
probably be no objection raised to scientia media, but the
distinction itself is only the prelude to the real problem.
Admitting that God knows from eternity the future free acts of
creatures the question is how or in what way He knows them or
rather how we are to conceive and explain by analogy the manner of
the divine foreknowledge, which in itself is beyond our powers of
comprehension? It is admitted that God knows them first as objects
of the knowledge of simple intelligence; but does he know them
also as objects of the scientia media, i.e. hypothetically and
independently of any decree of His will, determining their
actuality, or does He know them only in and through such decrees?
The Dominican contention is that God's knowledge of future free
acts depends on the decrees of His free will which predetermine
their actuality by means of the praemotio physica. God knows, for
example, that Peter will do so and so, because He has decreed from
eternity so to move Peter's free will that the latter will
infallibly, although freely, cooperate with, or consent to, the
Divine premotion. In the case of good acts there is a physical and
intrinsic connection between the motion given by God and the
consent of Peter's will, while as regards morally bad acts, the
immorality as such -- which is a privation and not a positive
entity -- comes entirely from the created will.
The principal difficulties against this view are that in the first
place it seems to do away with human free will, and in the next
place to make God responsible for sin. Both consequences of course
are denied by those who uphold it, but, making all due allowance
for the mystery which shrouds the subject, it is difficult to see
how the denial of free will is not logically involved in the
theory of the praemotio physica, how the will can be said to
consent freely to a motion which is conceived as predetermining
consent; such explanations as are offered merely amount to the
assertion that, after all, the human will is free. The other
difficulty consists in the twofold fact that God is represented as
giving the praemotio physica in the natural order for the act of
will by which the sinner embraces evil, and that He withholds the
supernatural praemotio or efficacious grace which is essentially
required for the performance of a salutary act. The Jesuit school,
on the other hand -- with whom probably a majority of independent
theologians agree -- using the scientia media maintains that we
ought to conceive God's knowledge of future free acts not as being
dependent and consequent upon decrees of His will, but in its
character as hypothetical knowledge or being antecedent to them.
God knows in the scientia media what Peter would do if in given
circumstances he were to receive a certain aid, and this before
any absolute decree to give that aid is supposed. Thus there is no
predetermination by the Divine of what the human will freely
chooses; it is not because God foreknows (having foredecreed) a
certain free act that that act takes place, but God foreknows it
in the first instance because as a matter of fact it is going to
take place; He knows it as a hypothetical objective fact before it
becomes an object of the scientia visionis -- or rather this is
how, in order to safeguard human liberty, we must conceive Him as
knowing it. It was thus, for example, that Christ knew what would
have been the results of His ministry among the people of Tyre and
Sidon. But one must be careful to avoid implying that God's
knowledge is in any way dependent on creatures, as if He had, so
to speak, to await the actual event in time before knowing
infallibly what a free creature may choose to do. From eternity He
knows, but does not predetermine the creature's choice. And if it
be asked how we can conceive this knowledge to exist antecedently
to and independently of some act of the Divine will, on which all
things contingent depend, we can only say that the objective truth
expressed by the hypothetical facts in question is somehow
reflected in the Divine Essence, which is the mirror of all truth,
and that in knowing Himself God knows these things also. Whichever
way we turn we are bound ultimate]y to encounter a mystery, and,
when there is a question of choosing between a theory which refers
the mystery to God Himself and one which only saves the truth of
human freedom by making free-will itself a mystery, most
theologians naturally prefer the former alternative.
2. The Divine Will
Description of the Divine Will
(a) The highest perfections of creatures are reducible to
functions of intellect and will, and, as these perfections are
realized analogically in God, we naturally pass from considering
Divine knowledge or intelligence to the study of Divine volition.
The object of intellect as such is the true; the object of will as
such, the good. In the case of God it is evident that His own
infinite goodness is the primary and necessary object of His will,
created goodness being but a secondary and contingent object. This
is what the inspired writer means when he says: "The Lord hath
made all things for himself" (Prov., xvi, 4). The Divine will of
course, like the Divine intellect, is really identical with the
Divine Essence but according to our finite modes of thought we are
obliged to speak of them as if they were distinct and, just as the
Divine intellect cannot be dependent on created objects for its
knowledge of them, neither can the Divine will be so dependent for
its volition. Had no creature ever been created, God would have
been the same self-sufficient being that He is, the Divine will as
an appetitive faculty being satisfied with the infinite goodness
of the Divine Essence itself. This is what the First Vatican
Council means by speaking of God as "most happy in and by Himself"
-- not that He does not truly wish and love the goodness of
creatures, which is a participation of His own, but that He has no
need of creatures and is in no way dependent on them for His
bliss.
(b) Hence it follows that God possesses the perfection of free
will in an infinitely eminent degree. That is to say, without any
change in Himself or in His eternal act of volition, He freely
chooses whether or not creatures shall exist and what manner of
existence shall be theirs, and this choice or determination is an
exercise of that dominion which free will (liberty of
indifference) essentially expresses. In itself free will is an
absolute and positive perfection, and as such is most fully
realized in God. Yet we are obliged to describe Divine liberty as
we have done relatively to its effects in creation, and, by way of
negation, we must exclude the imperfections associated with free
will in creatures. These imperfections may be reduced to two:
� potentiality and mutability as opposed to immutable pure act,
and
� the power of choosing what is evil.
Only the second need be noticed here.
(c) When a free creature chooses what is evil, he does not choose
it formally as such, but only sub specie boni, i.e., what his will
really embraces is some aspect of goodness which he truly or
falsely believes to be discoverable in the evil act. Moral evil
ultimately consists in choosing some such fancied good which is
known more or less clearly to be opposed to the Supreme Good, and
it is obvious that only a finite being can be capable of such a
choice. God necessarily loves Himself, who is the Supreme Good,
and cannot wish anything that would be opposed to Himself. Yet He
permits the sins of creatures, and it has always been considered
one of the gravest problems of theism to explain why this is so.
We cannot enter on the Problem here, but must content ourselves
with a few brief observations.
� First, however difficult or even mysterious, may be the problem
of moral evil for the theist, it is many times more difficult for
every kind of anti-theist.
� Secondly, so far as we can judge the possibility of moral
defection seems to be a natural limitation of created free will,
and can only be excluded supernaturally, and, even viewing the
question from a purely rational standpoint, we are conscious on
the whole that, whatever the final solution may be, it is better
that God should have created free beings capable of sinning than
that He should not have created free beings at all. Few men would
resign the faculty of free will just to escape the danger of
abusing it.
� Thirdly, some final solution, not at present apparent to our
limited intelligence, may be expected on merely rational grounds
from the infinite wisdom and justice of God, and supernatural
revelation, which gives us glimpses of the Divine plan, goes a
long way towards supplying a complete answer to the questions that
most intimately concern us. The clearly perceived truth to be
emphasized here is that sin is hateful to God and essentially
opposed to His infinite holiness, and that the wilful discord
which sin introduces into the harmony of the universe will somehow
be set right in the end.
There is no need to delay in discussing mere physical as distinct
from moral evil, and it is enough to remark that such evil is not
merely permitted, but willed by God, not indeed in its character
as evil, but as being, in such a universe as the present, a means
towards good and in itself relatively good.
Distinctions in the Divine Will
As distinctions are made in the Divine knowledge, so also in the
Divine will, and one of these latter is of sufficient importance
to deserve a passing notice here. This is the distinction between
the antecedent and consequent will, and its principal application
is to the question of man's salvation. God, according to St. Paul
(I Tim., ii, 4),"wills that all men be saved", and this is
explained to be an antecedent will; that is to say, abstracting
from circumstances and conditions which may interfere with the
fulfilment of God's will (e.g., sin on man's part, natural order
in the universe, etc.), He has a sincere wish that all men should
attain supernatural salvation, and this will is so far efficacious
that He provides and intends the necessary means of salvation for
all -- sufficient actual graces for those who are capable of
cooperating with them and the Sacrament of Baptism for infants. On
the other hand, the consequent will takes account of those
circumstances and conditions and has reference to what God wills
and executes in consequence of them. It is thus, for example, that
He condemns the wicked to punishment after death and excludes
unbaptized infants from the beatific vision.
3. Intellect and Will (Providence, Predestination, and
Reprobation)
Several attributes and several aspects of Divine activity partake
both of an intellectual and a volitional character and must be
treated from the combined point of view. Such are omnipotence,
holiness, justice, blessedness, and so forth, but it is
unnecessary to delay on such attributes which are self-
explanatory. Some notice, on the other hand, must be devoted to
providence and to the particular aspects of providence which we
call predestination and reprobation; and with a brief treatment of
these which are elsewhere fully treated this article will be
concluded.
Providence
Providence may be defined as the scheme in the Divine mind by
which all things treated are ordered and guided efficiently to a
common end or purpose (ratio perductionis rerum in finem in mente
divina existens). It includes an act of intellect and an act of
will, in other words knowledge and power. And that there is such a
thing as Divine Providence by which the entire universe is ruled
clearly follows from the fact that God is the author of all things
and that order and purpose must characterize the action of an
intelligent creator. Nor is any truth more insistently proclaimed
in revelation. What the author of Wisdom (xiv, 3) says of a
particular thing is applicable to the universe as a whole: "But
your providence, O Father, governs it", and no more beautiful
illustration of the same truth has ever been given than that given
by Christ Himself when He instances God's care for the birds of
the air and the lilies of the field (Matt., vi, 25 sq.). But to
rational creatures God's providential care is extended in a very
special way, yet not so as to do away with the utility and
efficacy of prayer, whether for temporal or spiritual favours
(Matt., vii, 8), nor to disturb or override the efficiency of
secondary causes. It is in and through secondary causes that
providence ordinarily works, and no miracle, as a rule, is to be
expected in answer to prayer
Predestination and reprobation
Predestination and reprobation are those special parts of Divine
Providence which deal specially with man's salvation or damnation
in the present supernatural order. Predestination is the
foreknowledge on the part of God of those who will de facto be
saved and the preparation and bestowal of the means by which
salvation is obtained, while reprobation is the foreknowledge of
those who will de facto be damned and the permission of this
eventuality by God. In both cases an act of the intellect
(infallible foreknowledge), and an act of the will are supposed;
but whereas in predestination the antecedent and consequent will
is the same, in reprobation God wills consequently what He does
not antecedently will at all but only permits, namely, the eternal
punishment of the sinner.
Many controversies have arisen on the subject of predestination
and reprobation, into which we cannot enter here. But we shall
briefly summarize the leading points on which Catholic theologians
have agreed and the points on which they differ.
First, that predestination exists, i.e. that God knows from
eternity with infallible certainty who will be saved and that He
wills from eternity to give them the graces by which salvation
will be secured, is obvious from reason and is taught by Christ
Himself (John, x, 27), and by St. Paul (Rom., viii, 29, 30).
Second, while God has this infallible foreknowledge, we on our
part cannot have an absolutely certain assurance that we are among
the number of the predestined -- unless indeed by means of a
special Divine revelation such as we know from experience is
rarely, if ever, given. This follows from the Tridentine
condemnation of the teaching of the Reformers that we could and
ought to believe with the certainty of faith in our own
justification and election (Sess. VI, cap. ix, can. xiii-xv).
Third, the principal controverted point regarding predestination
between Catholic theologians is concerned with its gratuity, and
in order to understand the controversy it is necessary to
distinguish between predestination in intention, i.e. as it is a
mere act of knowledge and of purpose in the Divine mind, and in
execution, i.e. as it means the actual bestowal of grace and of
glory; and also between predestination in the edequate sense, as
referring both to grace and to glory, and in the inadequate sense,
as referring particularly to one's destination to glory, and in
the inadequate sense, as referring particularly to one's
destination to glory, and abstracting from the grace by which
glory is obtained. Now,
� speaking of predestination in execution, all Catholic
theologians maintain in opposition to Calvinists that it is not
entirely gratuitous, but in the case of adults depends partly on
the free mercy of God and partly on human cooperation; the actual
bestowal of glory is at least partly a reward of true merit.
� Speaking of predestination in intention and in the adequate
sense, Catholic theologians agree that it is gratuitous; so
understood it includes the first grace which cannot be merited by
man.
� But if we speak of predestination in intention and in the
inadequate sense, i.e. to glory in abstraction from grace, there
is no longer unanimity of opinion. Most Thomists and several other
theologians maintain that predestination in this sense is
gratuitous, i.e. God first destines a man to glory antecedently to
any foreseen merits, and consequently upon this decrees to give
the efficacious grace by which it is obtained. Predestination to
grace is the result of an entirely gratuitous predestination to
glory, and with this is combined for those not included in the
decree of election what is known as a negative reprobation. Other
theologians maintain on the contrary that there is no such thing
as negative reprobation, and that predestination to glory is not
gratuitous but dependent on foreseen merits. The order of
dependence, according to these theologians, is the same in
predestination in intention as it is in predestination in
execution, and as already stated, the bestowal of glory only
follows upon actual merit in the case of adults. These have been
the two prevailing opinions followed for the most part in the
schools, but a third opinion, which is a somewhat subtle via
media, has been put forward by certain other theologians and
defended with great skill by such an authority as Billot. The gist
of this view is that while negative reprobation must be rejected,
gratuitous election to glory ante praevisa merita must be
retained, and an effort is made to prove that these two may be
logically separated, a possibility overlooked by the advocates of
the first two opinions. Without entering into details here, it is
enough to observe that the success of this subtle expedient is
very questionable.
Fourth, as regards reprobation,
� all Catholic theologians are agreed that God foresees from
eternity and permits the final defection of some, but that the
decree of His will destining them to eternal damnation is not
antecedent to but consequent upon foreknowledge of their sin and
their death in the state of sin. The first part of this
proposition is a simple corollary from Divine omniscience and
supremacy, and the second part is directed against Calvinistic and
Jansenistic teaching, according to which God expressly created
some for the purpose of punishing them, or at least that
subsequently to the fall of Adam, He leaves them in the state of
damnation for the sake of exhibiting His wrath. Catholic teaching
on this point reechoes II Peter, iii, 9, according to which God
does not wish that any should perish but that all should return to
penance, and it is the teaching implied in Christ's own
description of the sentence that is to be pronounced on the
damned, condemnation being grounded not on the antecedent will of
God, but on the actual demerits of men themselves (e. g. Matt.,
xxv, 41).
� So-called negative reprobation, which is commonly defended by
those who maintain election to glory antecedently to foreseen
merits, means that simultaneously with the predestination of the
elect God either positively excludes the damned from the the
decree of election to glory or at least fails to include them in
it, without, however, destining them to positive punishment except
consequently on their foreseen demerits. It is this last
qualification that distinguishes the doctrine of negative
reprobation from Calvinistic and Jansenistic teaching, leaving
room, for instance, for a condition of perfect natural happiness
for those dying with only original sin on their souls. But,
notwithstanding this difference, the doctrine ought to be
rejected, for it is opposed very plainly to the teaching of St.
Paul regarding the universality of God's will to save all (I Tim.,
ii, 4), and from a rational point of view it is difficult to
reconcile with a worthy concept of Divine justice.
P.J. TONER
Transcribed by Tomas Hancil
From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright � 1913 by the
Encyclopedia Press, Inc. Electronic version copyright � 1996 by
New Advent, Inc.
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an
effort aimed at placing the entire Catholic Encyclopedia 1913
edition on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to
contribute to this worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-
mail at (knight.org/advent). For more information please download
the file cathen.txt/.zip.
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