Christ and Reconciliation
Romanus Cessario, O.P.
Fr. Cessario, in his first essay in Faith & Reason, offers a profound
reflection upon the role of Christ in fulfilling the Father's
salvific plan.
Introduction
The theological act remains an act of historical understanding in two
respects.1 First of all, it bears upon a content that the Christian
tradition has historically transmitted, beginning with the scriptural
witness and proceeding thence through its transmission in tradition.
Its objective, therefore, concerns a set of claims about history that
have themselves been historically mediated. At the same time, we can
consider the theological exercise historical in another sense. For
it investigates the testimonial materials received from the past
tradition in light of the present historical situation. Of course,
its retrieval of the past is not an historically neutral one,
consisting in an immediate attainment of past meanings and older
explanations. Rather, the encounter embraces the perspective of
concerns that remain contemporary with the theological act itself.2
We call such encounter critical and even scientific to the extent
that the perspectives of the past and that of present theological
inquiry mutually illumine one another. Appropriately enough, then,
German thinkers especially remind us that theology forms a kind of
retrieval and, consequently, call it a <Wiederholung.>
During the course of the Christian millennia, Christian claims about
salvation and about the role of Jesus of Nazareth in God's final and
definitive deed of saving humanity have included a variety of
understandings, explanations, and analogies. Moreover, those claims
and their various renderings have a doctrinal and theological
history, within which St. Thomas Aquinas occupies a canonical
position.3 We characterize the received tradition as fundamentally
objectivist in kind, evident, for example, in his discussion of the
incarnation. There Aquinas employs the notion of "common nature
assumed" as a central concept. Even in his treatment of the
sacraments, he introduces the Aristotelian categories of efficient
and instrumental cause to account for what a sacrament accomplishes,
in particular, the abiding sacrament. Other examples occur in his
works which confirm the realist temper of his thought. On the other
hand, from a slightly different outlook, we might wonder whether
Aquinas, in fact, does not enjoy an unique historical position.
Writing as he does during the middle of the thirteenth-century,
Aquinas both follows the period of monastic theology, with its
reliance on literary forms and allegorical imagery, and at the same
time antedates the modern period, with its much vaunted turn towards
the subject and human consciousness.4
Because it also precedes the balkanization of the <sacra doctrina>,
Aquinas' realist outlook necessarily includes exactly the sort of
perspectives that do not immediately fit in with the contemporary
understanding of the theological act. Whatever critical reservations
one might posit concerning its attempt to penetrate and appropriate
the received historical tradition, the simple fact remains that the
post-modern situation locates the theological act within entirely
different perspectives from those of Aquinas. And although a return
to theological realism both in systematics and in morals already has
commenced among certain theologians, in the meantime we are still
caught in an ambiguity characteristic of a <Zwischenzeit.>5 Thus,
many theologians still grapple with a contemporary theological
perspective, dominant since Descartes, which assumes the dynamism of
the subject as in some measure creative of the meaning and value of
human interactions with the world. Besides, closely allied to this
subjectivist interest and the exaggerated personalist concerns which
it generates, there also remains the emergence of historical
understanding. In short, its proponents recognize that one cannot
simply equate human being <tout court> with historical being.6
Rather we can best recognize what constitutes the distinctively human
only in those dimensions in which human being stands out from common
nature and purely temporal succession. All in all, the proponent of
Thomist realism in christology and sacraments faces stiff odds when
he tries to compete in the theological marketplace. Such a one must
show that both Aquinas and the tradition which developed his thought
through the sixteenth century did in fact advance a particular view
of Christian personalism.7
Yet the difference in perspective necessarily establishes the
starting point of any theological exercise directed toward recovering
the Christian soteriological tradition and its extension in the
sacraments of the Christian faith. For the practitioner of
theological inquiry, even the one disposed to value the tradition,
will enter upon the theological enterprise undoubtedly shaped to some
extent by the contemporary perspective. Consequently, owing to this
initial difference in perspectives, a certain experience of the
"foreignness" of the received tradition will undoubtedly mark the
initial encounter with the Thomist synthesis. But this heterogeneity
need not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. Why? Because the
genius of any theological exercise always seeks to discover certain
latent intelligibilities in the tradition without too facilely
eliding the difference of perspectives. Thus, in his introduction to
the 1984 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, <Reconciliatio et
paenitentia>, Pope John Paul II adapts this principle to the
requirements of ecclesiology: "the Church _ without identifying
herself with the world or being of the world _ is in the world and is
engaged in dialogue with the world."8 By the same token, theology
enters into history without being fully identified with it.
In this essay, Aquinas' soteriological model of satisfaction allows
us to question whether a received theological tradition can measure
up to the canons of contemporary theological inquiry. To be sure,
its basic perspective appears alien at first, and any number of
authors have taken up the challenge to explain why. Besides,
Aquinas' theology of satisfaction also suffers from the baggage of
the metaphorical residue which St. Anselm's satisfaction theory in
<Cur Deus Homo?> brings as well as from its later conflation with
substitutional theories of Christ's saving work.9 Even in the
nineteenth century, for example, the American preacher Phillip Brooks
(1835-1893) summarized the ambiguity: "You say that the death of
Christ appeased God's wrath. I am not sure there may not be some
meaning of those words which does not include the truth which they
try to express, but in their natural sense which men gather from them
out of their ordinary human uses, I do not believe that they are
true."10 As a theological exercise, then, this essay seeks to
accomplish two goals. First of all, it intends to set forth the
distinctive perspective which St. Thomas gives to his account of the
satisfactory character of Christ's work and at the same time to
establish the theological warrant of Aquinas' insight for a
contemporary theology of Christian penance and satisfaction. The
retrieval of Aquinas' insights on these important truths will surely
invite the men and women of our time "to rediscover, translated into
their own way of speaking, the very words with which our Saviour and
Teacher Jesus Christ began his preaching: 'Repent, and believe in
the gospel.' "11
<I. The Satisfaction of Christ>
First of all, I would like to present a theology of Christian
satisfaction. Since it takes full account of the continuity between
creation and redemption, the doctrine portrays salvation as a work of
image-perfection and image-restoration. These analogues, which
actually derive from common Augustinian theology, represent the dyad
of Christian merit and satisfaction which essentially constitute the
work of salvation.12 In the first instance, image-perfection refers
to that reward of a distinctively supernatural life which Christ
makes available to the members of his Body. "Through grace, Christ's
soul was moved by God," writes Aquinas, "in such a way that not only
he himself should arrive at the glory of eternal life but should
bring others to it as well."13 Again, Aquinas consciously places his
treatment of the grace of Christ in a context which illumines two
important features of his christology. First, he affirms that
Christ's merit derives from the ontologically prior <gratia unionis>,
the hypostatic union, and, secondly, that it remains foremost
associated with his passion and death. Thus, as the letter to the
Hebrews, with all its implications for later doctrines on priesthood
and sacrifice, makes clear, Christ in his role as head of the Church
and author of human salvation alone makes it possible for us to reach
God.14 Image-perfection, then, points directly to the intellectual
creature's call to a supernatural perfection.
On the other hand, image-restoration points to the fact that this
eschatological achievement occurs principally and determinatively
during the course of our ordinary human existence, which even after
baptism retains the scars and creases of original sin. As a result,
the believer moves towards image-restoration by accomplishing certain
penitential actions which have as their chief purpose the
rehabilitation of our human capacities, however disordered as a
result of both personal and original sin. For the Christian, every
freely-accepted or self-imposed suffering, especially consecrated by
the power of Christ in the sacrament of penance, conforms him or her
more closely to the person of Christ. Moreover, at the same time, it
restores a complete life of virtue to the individual. Christian
satisfaction, then, marks an important step in the realization of the
economy of salvation. This explains why the early Fathers of the
Church coined the axiom, "what was not assumed was not saved."15
Indeed, Christ had to assume every part of human nature because no
part of that nature escaped the effects of sin. As a result, image-
restoration, which constitutes our personal share in the sufferings
of Christ, embraces every feature and aspect of our created nature.
It comes as no surprise, then, that during the great period of
christological debate (before the Council of Chalcedon, 451) the
axiom mentioned above served as a principal criterion for orthodoxy.
Central to the image-perfection and image-restoration of every human
person remain the mysteries of Christ's life and death. For example,
in the final section of his <Summa theologiae>, where Aquinas treats
the incarnation and the whole economy of salvation, he stresses both
these aspects of our salvation. In fact, he uses the perfection and
restoration of the human person as basic principles of organization
for the <tertia pars.>16 First of all, then, under the heading of
image-perfection (<promotio in bono>), he begins the whole treatise
with an enumeration of benefits which, as a result of the
incarnation, promote the believing member of Christ's Body towards
the goods that a life marked by both the infused moral and
theological virtues embodies. Secondly, under the heading of image-
restoration (<remotio mali>), St. Thomas lists those detrimental
realities from which the passion of Christ delivers the human race.
This distinction between promotion towards the good and removal of
evil surmounts the traditional controversy between Thomists and
Scotists about the true purpose of the Incarnation. In fact, both
schools agree that the incarnation seeks but one goal or end, namely
the perfection of the <imago Dei> in every man and woman.
Nonetheless, Aquinas will always insist that this goal cannot be
reached unless the work of image-restoration, accomplished through
satisfaction and penance, first takes place in the life of the
believer. Animated by this conviction, he finds support in the
scriptures, since the forgiveness of sins remains the only motive
which the inspired texts point to as a sufficient reason or motive
for the incarnation.17
The history of the theory demonstrates that Aquinas' use of
satisfaction as a central category for Christian soteriology marks a
decided advance in the development of western theology. Admittedly,
the notion that Christ died in order to satisfy the heavenly Father
for the sins of the human race intrigued the thirteenth century
medieval theologians. Although the image behind satisfaction, if not
the actual term itself, can make a reputable claim to represent some
of the earliest Christian soteriology, it is St. Anselm of Canterbury
and his eleventh century work <Cur Deus Homo?> who actually give the
notion a recognizable form and currency in subsequent theological
debate. Moreover, much like the Ontological Argument of his
<Proslogion>, St. Anselm's formulation of the satisfaction argument
continues to attract the interest of contemporary theologians.
Still, certain difficulties haunt Anselm's explanation of
satisfaction, especially anent his well-informed attempt to enlarge
on the trinitarian aspects of the mystery. Thus, even during the
early scholastic period, for example, theologians sought to work out
the trinitarian implications of this theory despite the fact that it
risked misleading the theologically unsophisticated reader. It
suggests that our salvation actually results from some form of
commercial exchange which takes place only after the Father
successfully strikes a bargain with his Son. To put it differently,
Anselm's theology amounts to a <theologie de comptoir.>18 In short,
the categories of early medieval theology simply did not serve well
the requirements of later periods. Even today <Cur Deus Homo?>
requires an elaborate hermeneutic in order to distinguish it from the
literary genre known as pious.
On the positive side, however, the impulse to identify the atonement
as an integral and connected part of the trinitarian movement in the
world did contribute towards the solution of one problem intrinsic to
the theology of satisfaction. How can a past historical event, such
as the death of Christ, remain effective for salvation in every
subsequent historical moment? Theologians still wrestle with
accounts given to support the universal character of Christian
redemption.19 Even so, it is interesting to note the theological
intuition of the medieval theologians. Because they generally held
to the authentic transcendence of God, these theologians, by
representing the sacrifice of Christ as really involved with the
Trinity, provided a way out of a problem which later theologians,
either less convinced of the divine transcendence or, more likely,
more intent on remaining strictly within the limits of historical and
textual analysis, still find difficult to resolve. Indeed,
fundamental to an adequate sacramental theology remains an account
that explains how the actions of the divine and human agents converge
in the achievement of the sacramental effects. In Christ, of course,
the hypostatic union provides both the explanatory concept for the
incarnation and the model for all other mediations in the Church.
But the sacraments, since they involve individual human agency in
both the minister and the recipient _ "separated instruments," in the
phrase of Aquinas _ require further explanation. One of the chief
purposes of this essay, then, remains to advance a proposal about how
one can coherently affirm this "double agency" in sacramental theory.
First of all, we should look at the satisfaction of Christ. Scholars
agree that St. Thomas Aquinas, especially during the latter part of
his career, gave St. Anselm's formulation of christological
satisfaction an entirely new focus.20 Of course, cultural changes
which occurred during the thirteenth century, especially the gradual
disappearance of feudalism and the transferal of monastery schools to
the newly-founded universities, helped Aquinas recognize that
Anselm's feudal metaphor of an insulted lord assuaged by the
superabundant good deed of his son, although perfectly intelligible
within the perspectives of monastic theology, would simply no longer
satisfy the theological sophistication of the university masters.
So, he looked for a different approach to the question, one which
reflected, moreover, his more mature grasp of the reality of grace
and divinization. At the same time, Aquinas also developed a deeper
intuition about the whole nature of theological language. For he
recognized that neither the juridical categories of crime and
punishment, nor the mercantile categories of exchange and purchase
(and still less the mythological category which spoke about a ransom
to the devil) could adequately serve as ways of talking about
Christian redemption. Since all images limp, so these images only
partially reflected the full teaching of the <sacra doctrina> about
Christ's sacrifice. As a result, Aquinas, mainly inspired by his
reading of the Greek fathers, set about to develop an interpretation
of satisfaction which would accentuate the personal character of God-
man relations as pre-eminently realized in the person of the
incarnate Word.21
Drawing upon the richness of the various Fathers available to him,
St. Thomas fashioned a satisfaction model which derives both its
structure and meaning from an animated vision of the saving work of
Jesus Christ. We see a good example of this borrowing in his
treatment of the sacraments. Within this context, Aquinas preferred
to speak about salvation as actualized in the individual believer in
order to move him or her forward on the journey towards beatific
fellowship. For Aquinas, then, the human person always remains set
between God and God. As I have already said, central to this
explanation, which coheres with the <exitus-reditus> pattern, remains
the notion of the reformation and perfection of the image of God in
each human person. The <imago Dei>, with all of its dynamic
resonances in St. Thomas' account, accomplishes its purpose through
the free exercise of satisfactory acts in the personal sin-marked
histories of believers. But this happens only when such acts remain
suffused with and justified by the pre-eminent satisfaction of
Christ, who always remains by reason of the grace of union (<gratia
unionis>) personally united to God. This scheme, of course, serves
to highlight the unconditional priority of the divine action at the
heart of the discussion, for it always remains God who is acting in
Jesus to complete the divine plan for salvation. Thus, Aquinas
continues the teaching, for example, of St. Ambrose: "For it is not
of human power to confer divine things, but it is your function,
Lord, and that of the Father."22
Indeed, any discussion of a given part of the theological synthesis
which Aquinas and those who follow him adopt requires that we grasp
how these theologians understand the nature of the divine essence and
how that shapes their conception of the divine activity <ad extra>.
First, God does not act in order to acquire some new perfection as an
end or goal. Rather, as <ipsum esse subsistens>, his ontological
transcendence remains the root of the sheer liberality and
graciousness of all his activities with respect to the non-divine.
Thus the sole reason why God operates <ad extra> remains the divine
reality itself, that is, the sheer communicative good that
constitutes his being.23 Such operation remains above all ordered to
the bestowal of triune communication in that good upon all rational
creatures. Since they aptitudinally bear the image of this communion
in their constitution and their destiny, everyone remains a potential
participant in the beatific fellowship. Moreover, St. Thomas
develops his satisfaction-model to explain the achievement of such
personal communion as a surpassing gift in the face of human
historical sin. It also embodies the meaning he fathoms in the words
of St. Paul, "in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself" (II
Cor 5:19).24
In order to gain an accurate understanding of how this reconciling
love actually works, we need to inquire about a personalist
perspective on Christian satisfaction and sacramental practice, one
which transcends the somewhat inert and highly impersonal categories
of saving subject and saved objects. Even so, after nearly a
millennium of formalized "satisfaction-theory," neither Roman
Catholics nor Protestants have entirely succeeded in escaping from
such conceptual frameworks. To tell the truth, theologians still
strive to stretch out the saving efficacy of Christ towards its
potential beneficiaries in much the same way that modern philosophy
endeavors to match an object up with its appropriate knowing subject.
Furthermore, this occurs across the spectrum of theological opinions.
We can see it both in Marxist inspired theologies of liberation,
where the stretching reaches straightaway and, it seems exclusively,
to the economically disadvantaged and politically dispossessed. We
find it also in so-called conservative soteriologies, where the
stretching takes the form of additions and subtractions in an
account-ledger, as if Christ asked us to earn so many quarters of
social security in order to insure safely a comfortable (heavenly)
retirement. Unfortunately both positions ultimately establish a
theoretical distance between God's work and the creature, when, in
fact, by reason of the incarnation, none exists; such subject-object
perspectives can only interfere with the divine initiative for
salvation. Aquinas, for example, makes a point of insisting upon the
immediacy of the union between the creature and God which the
incarnation itself makes possible. So not even the sacred humanity
of Christ stands between the individual believer and his relationship
with God.
St. Thomas' developed theological view of Christian salvation, one of
the great achievements of his <Summa theologiae>, avoids the
falsifying subject-object dualism. For example, although the notion
of "common nature assumed" with all of its connotations alien to
contemporary philosophical <Denkformen> does function in St. Thomas'
account of Christ's satisfactory work, nevertheless this notion
remains in some respects only a preliminary element of explanation.
The human nature assumed by the Word is that whereby Christ remains,
in the phrase of Chalcedon, "homoousious h min," that is, "one in
being with us."25 Consequently, it serves to explain ontic
accessibility and communion between Christ and other human beings
insofar as all possess this same nature. At the same time, the
divine person of the Word, who is one in being with the Father,
indicates the point to which this communion ineluctably leads. For
Aquinas, then, "common nature assumed" serves, in the case of Christ,
as the unique instrument which manifests the mystery of Christ's
divinity and establishes the ground for all authentic personalism
within the created order. Christ, the eternal Word of creation,
completes the hidden plan of God through the Spirit-filled work which
he, the incarnate Son, offers once and for all to the Father. Even
if St. Thomas refuses to grant the premise that human being remains
exclusively historical being, henceforth only divine providence can
trace for the Christian the design of human history. Of course, the
remote origin for this form of Christian personalism lies in the
testimonials of faith. In this case, the Chalcedonian definition
itself, according to a later formulation, calls the union between the
human nature of Christ and God <in una persona>, thereby confirming
the ground of created personhood as the most exquisite of human
realities.26
From another and more proximate point of view, however, the
explanation for St. Thomas' understanding of personalism lies in a
theological awareness, developed during the latter part of his
career, of the unqualified uniqueness of the divine presence to human
creatures. Largely as a result of reading the Greek Fathers
(probably during his Italian sojourn, 1259-1268), St. Thomas came to
realize that the notion of divinization, a complex theory whereby the
Eastern Church sought to describe the effects of God's special
presence to the world in Christ, grace, and the Eucharist, radically
changed the way one should describe the theology of Christian life
and practice. Accordingly, this changed perspective fundamentally
affects the way that subsequent theologians, in principle, explain
sacramental efficacy. Penitential satisfaction, for example, is not
something that God requires of man, nor even, for that matter, of
Jesus, as a condition for accomplishing the divine plan of salvation.
Rather it remains the means whereby God accomplishes his eternal
design, "the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he
set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all
things in him, things in heaven and things on earth" (Eph 1:9-10).27
To sum up: It is man and not God whom satisfaction changes. For, on
the one hand, the increment and restoration of perfection designated
by the term "satisfaction" pertains entirely to the human creature.
By contrast, the communication of that increment pertains with
absolute priority to the divine goodness and mercy penetrating the
human creature with God's own love. It remains the individual, then,
in the historical and social dimensions of his or her personhood, who
in the progressive reformation of the God-like image (in the present
order of things marred by the sin of Adam as well as by personal sin)
is gradually changed into being what God intends his creature to be.
Thus, St. Paul reminds the Colossians: "For in him all the fullness
of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself
all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood
of his cross" (Col 1:19-20). As a sure mark of theological
integrity, well-founded soteriology always centers on the revealed
truth about Jesus Christ.28
II. Sin and Human Disorder: Imago Dei
A personalist perspective on salvation, however, requires that the
theologian likewise understand the reverse side of the picture,
namely sin and its own dyadic structure, which the scholastics called
<macula> and <poena.>29 Following the standard theological tradition
which derives principally from St. Augustine, the medieval schoolmen
asserted that a disordered action affects the beauty of the soul
(hence, the stain or <macula>) even as it necessarily produces within
the powers of the soul a sort of penalty (hence, the guilt of
punishment or <reatus poenae>). Until some form of purification
occurs, either directly, through satisfactory works, or indirectly,
for example through an indulgence, this liability for punishment
permanently marks the psychological condition of the sinner.
Historically speaking, it is interesting to note that neither the
juridical categories of casuistry nor the contemporary forms of
revisionist moral theology emphasize sufficiently the intrinsic
character of a sinful action. But a complete theology of salvation
must include reference to the several aspects of self-destructiveness
which sin by its defective nature inevitably discloses.
To tell the truth, the <felix culpa>, traditional in both the
Church's liturgy and spirituality, has yet fully to influence the way
theologians talk about sin. As a result, much contemporary theology
ignores the significant implications of sin's providential character,
a point associated especially with Thomists when they emphasize the
divine permission to sin. At first, such a position may appear
strange for Christian faith and practice which, as the II Vatican
Council reminds us, chiefly stress the universal call to holiness.
Indeed some theologians, influenced by recent enthusiasm for
optimistic anthropologies, may even think that such a starting-point
betrays the fundamental goodness which they, confusedly, imagine
present both in creation and the new order of grace.30 On the
contrary, such a vantage-point actually takes full account of the
Christian teaching on the true meaning of sin. When it comes to
describing the malice of sin, the real theological <parvenu> remains
the one who supposes that sin principally consists in either an
infraction of certain rules and regulations or a transgression of
personal conscience's dictates. As I have said, the classical
tradition interprets sin as a harmful disordering of the person's
human powers or capacities and insists that the results of sin in
fact remain identified with the very disorder itself.
The authentic tradition, of course, also refuses to accept a vision
of human nature which insists on post-lapsarian humanity as an
essentially corrupt instance of what had been something very good.
Such a view, however, does approximate, among other positions, the
reformed misconception on original sin. At the same time, the
Christian tradition also refuses to endorse the thesis which grants
fallen human nature the capacity for permanent integral operation
without divine grace. That contention amounts to the Pelagian
extreme. Rather, the orthodox benchmark for the doctrine of grace
points to a view of original sin and its effect on human nature.
This avoids having to choose between two heterodox alternatives which
continue to polarize the lengthy discussions generated by these
questions.
Aquinas, for example, who inherits the language, if not the concepts,
of the era of metaphorical theology, serves as a representative
exponent of the realist tradition. Although he continues the
metaphor of stain, the <macula peccati>, Aquinas makes it plain that
the privative effects of sinful actions stem from a disordered action
judged with reference to the authentic goals of human fulfillment.
In this context, stain remains a metaphor which chiefly suggests the
graceful beauty and integrity of life missing from the sinner who
sets his or her energies on goals short of those which comprise
divine beatitude. In brief, what is missing in sin remains the
totality exacted by the meaning of charity. As an action which lacks
its appropriate finality _ <actus debito ordine privatus>, Aquinas
calls it _ sin remains inconsistent with God's plan for our
happiness.31 At all costs, Christian theology should avoid the
fundamentally juridical view of sin, advanced today by certain
proponents of revisionist moral theology. They apparently remain
comfortable with nominalist categories and, therefore, liable to an
uncontrolled re-defining of disordered actions. But Aristotle's
warning still holds good: <Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis
videtur ei.>32 Furthermore, the doctrine of creation simply will not
allow for this kind of hermeneutic, because the <imago Dei> will not
permit frustrating the soul's desire for authentic holiness.
Sin, as I have said, also entails a liability to punishment, a
<reatus poenae.> But this indebtedness in which sin puts the
creature does not necessarily argue for the Anselmian notion of
vicarious satisfaction. This conclusion has also haunted Christian
reflection on the atonement for nearly a millennium. Rather, the
punishment of sin, insofar as it falls within the providential
designs of God's saving plan, principally occurs in the process of
righting the imbalance within the creature. So the personalist
perspective of Aquinas himself does not allow God to turn farther
away from the sinner than the sinner has turned away from him.
Conversion, then, always entails a deeper appreciation of the
gratuity of God's love. In his earlier works, Aquinas still spoke as
if evangelical justification observed much the same norms as the
Aristotelian moral virtue of justice. This stance, however, lent
credence to the false notion that salvation chiefly consists in
retributive justice. He later learned that in the new dispensation
the spirit really does give life and that the letter kills. In this,
Aquinas penetrates the deeply religious intuition which St. Augustine
bequeathed to the western theological tradition: "What are the laws
of God written by God himself in our hearts, if not the very presence
of the Holy Spirit?"33
Sin, then, includes the notion of a human order deprived of its
ultimate and proper end. Admittedly, philosophers argue about the
suitability of enumerating basic purposes and goals for human
existence, but the Christian faith maintains no such uncertainty.
For it makes beatific fellowship with the triune God the main measure
of an authentic Christian life. Even if sin distances us from God,
the justified life compensates for that imbalance. This explains why
in the final analysis the fundamental measure of the estrangement
also remains the measure of our own discontent. We can speculate
further as to whether only the theologian really is able to grasp the
full implications of sin. Even if philosophers can adequately
articulate the dimensions of the human malaise and its predicament,
the full meaning of sin still requires a context of faith in order
for one to comprehend fully what it means to lose God. Although it
may sound strange, philosophers can only stumble onto sin's meaning;
thus they rightly speak about the <mysterium iniquitatis.>
This principle especially holds true when it comes to speaking about
original sin. St. Thomas' notion of original sin and original
justice represents a high point of theological achievement in his
career.34 Contending with multiple viewpoints concerning the
authentic meaning of the biblical doctrine of the Fall and the
original state of our first parents, Aquinas developed a
comprehensive theory. It has two advantages: one recognizes the
parameters of God's creative goodness and the other takes account as
well of what role original sin plays in describing the human
condition. Despite the questionably earnest efforts of creation-
centered spiritualities, authentic Catholic teaching simply will not
allow for a facile reinterpretation of original sin. In particular,
an attempt to reformulate the doctrine in continuity with magisterial
teaching must maintain the following elements: (a) original sin
comprises a privation located at the level of nature and (b) it forms
a part of human history.35 These elements make it an originating sin
which affects subsequent development in the race. As Cardinal
Ratzinger recently remarked, the notion is quite widespread these
days that a whole series of dogmas of the Catholic faith, especially
creation, original sin, Christology, and sacramental doctrine, are no
longer defensible. But such biases cannot stand the test of serious
theological reflection.36
On the other hand, a more controversial debate centers around the
personal status of the first parents before sin. In addressing this
question, controverted even in the Middle Ages, Aquinas enunciates a
set of principles which help us to interpret the difference between
creation freely willed and grace gratuitously bestowed _ what we call
justification. He recognizes, of course, that original justice does
constitute a grace precisely because both the praeternatural gifts
and the actual enjoyment of divine fellowship itself remain freely-
bestowed; and in the latter case, supernatural endowments for the
human creature. On the other hand, original justice does not
comprise a grace in the sense that it forms an integral part of human
nature in its original constitution. Rather the human person remains
<capax Dei> precisely as created in the divine image. This does not
impede, however, original justice from perfecting man on a natural
level. Theologians traditionally refer to these perfections as the
praeternatural gifts and include among them: impassability,
immortality, rectification of the sense appetites, and a direction of
the will to God as the author of the natural law.37 As qualities of
nature, then, these gifts steadied both human physical powers and
moral energies. To be sure, such perfections, while they truly
formed part of our first parent's nature, nevertheless remained
linked to grace without, thereby making grace a constitutive part of
our common nature.
The above distinction between grace and creation would help settle
some of the confusion which surrounds the now common assertion that
we were created in grace. Of course, we can hold this position but
not the conclusions drawn by some theologians. They miss the
distinction between a grace freely given in creation and what would
amount to the essentially oxymoronic reality of a "natural grace."
Moreover, to speak about the state of integral nature, as original
justice is sometimes called, does not imply what certain periods in
theology described as a state of "pure nature." Like a photographic
negative, a so-called "pure nature" could only provide a frozen image
of mankind, but it could never put on the stage an acting person.
Likewise, sexual congress alone can never account for the propagation
of original justice. On the contrary, Aquinas held the view that
grace remained the root cause of the praeternatural gifts. If Adam
had not sinned, for example, each new member of his progeny would
have had to receive original justice much after the fashion of the
immediate infusion of the spiritual soul.38 Altogether original sin
constitutes a lack of original justice, "a corrupt habit of sorts,"
but still not a positive inclination to evil; it includes only the
loss of these supernatural endowments that would have restrained the
development of moral and even physical defect.
If it be adequate to interpret the authentic tradition, theological
anthropology must embrace a fully Christian view of man. This,
moreover, requires a broad view of creation, providence and sin.
Creation remains a coming forth from God's sustaining power and
providence. And whatever the full meaning of fallen nature entails,
it surely includes certain privative effects in the powers of the
soul, the intellect, the will and the sense appetites; these amount,
in effect, to a disordering of the powers of the soul among
themselves. As something concrete and consonant with the biblical
teaching, the alienation accomplished by original sin exists on three
distinct levels: the individual, societal and the divine. Thus, in
our post-lapsarian state, deprived of the special endowments which
our first parents enjoyed, the work of Christian grace on fallen
nature must always remain elevating and restorative, or as the
scholastics put it, <gratia sanans et elevans.> And this brings us
back to the original dyads of redemption: satisfaction and merit,
image-restoration and image-perfection. In fact, we could summarize
the discussion in this way. A good Christian anthropology achieves a
balance between the Scylla embodied in rationalist accounts of
original sin with their correlative reductionist view of Christ's
work and the Charybdis instantiated in pessimistic descriptions of
human nature with their implied deficient trust in Christ's efficacy.
As the Fathers remind us, Christ has become our integrity.
III. The Sacrament of Reconciliation
Finally, I would like to remark briefly on the sacrament of penance.
The Holy Father points to this sacrament as a principal locus where
through the working of the Holy Spirit the human person encounters
the reconciliation effected by Christ's salvific death. As happens
in every sacrament, penance also manifests God's saving providence
for the baptized member of Christ's Body or, as St. Leo the Great
remarks, "Our Redeemer's presence has passed into the sacraments."39
In the case of penance, however, this providential care exists in
order to provide for a certain contingency in human affairs. In
short, we require penance as a remedy for sins committed after
baptism. This explains why the Council of Trent accepted the
metaphorical reference, a second plank after shipwreck, as an apt
image for this sacrament.40 Expressing one of his fundamental
convictions about this sacrament, the Holy Father writes: "[F]or a
Christian, the sacrament of penance is the ordinary way of obtaining
forgiveness and the remission of serious sins committed after
baptism."41 The sacrament of penance, then, provides the sinner with
an opportunity to encounter personally the cause of divine
reconciliation.
Following a principle basic to and constitutive of every sacramental
reality, theologians advance the view that the efficacy of penance
derives from the passion of Christ itself. Only the satisfaction of
Christ can merit our spiritual well-being. But penance holds a
secondary place relative to the integrity which the other sacraments,
especially baptism and the eucharist, confer and preserve on the
member of Christ's Body. Hence the Church correctly, if only
metaphorically, refers to the sacrament as "the second plank after
shipwreck." Indeed, the first protection for those crossing a sea
remains the safety provided by an intact ship; but after shipwreck,
one can only cling to a plank as a second remedy. Thus Aquinas
concludes: "So also, the first protection in the sea of this life
remains that a person preserve spiritual integrity; but if one, by
committing sin, should lose it, the second remedy is that regained
through penance."42 However obliquely, this emphasis on the
conditional character of penance points to the mystery of human
freedom and divine providence. The sacrament of penance, then,
establishes the condition necessary to transform sin into a <felix
culpa.>
The history of this sacrament within the Church evidences several
misconceptions concerning its nature and efficacy. To begin with one
example of misguided instruction on how the Christian should react to
sin and temptation, historical Quietism subverted the Church's
teaching in order to accommodate a spirituality negligent with
respect to moral discipline. And although current interest in the
works of Madame Guyon suggests a limited renaissance of this view,
the ecclesiastical condemnation and subsequent punishment of Miguel
Molinos still remains an effective witness to the truth that the
simplicity of God's love never provides an excuse for vicious
behavior.43 Likewise, the sacrament of Christ's reconciliation can
never become an excuse for moral indifference or spiritual laxity.
Mortal sin remains the greatest evil which can befall the human
person. Indeed, spiritual authors continually warn against the
especially vicious sin of ingratitude for the forgiveness of past
sins. To be sure, mortal sin always embodies the prime analogue for
any sinful activity because only this kind of aversion from God
destroys the bond of charity and friendship with God which baptismal
grace establishes in the soul. So theories about penance err both by
excess and by defect.
We need to understand, then, how penance works. When the medieval
theologians sought to explain the constitutive reality of a given
sacrament, they identified three principal elements present in each
of the <sacra septenaria>: (1) the liturgical rite itself; (2) the
interior effect or personal grace which the sacrament accomplishes;
and (3) the permanent feature or abiding aspect of the sacrament. In
the technical language of the schools, we refer to these respectively
as: the <sacramentum tantum>, the <res tantum>, and the <res et
sacramentum.>44 Since the grace of penance remains especially allied
with the satisfaction of Christ, we can freely assign the work of
image-restoration and image-perfection as the principal interior
effect of penance. Again, leaving the matter of the liturgical rite
aside for the moment, we can inquire about the permanent feature
which penance sacramentally establishes within the Church. In other
terms, how does this sacrament mediate the passion of Christ to those
whom the Holy Spirit draws towards the tribunal of God's mercy?
This question, in fact, exacerbated certain medieval theologians who
found it difficult to pin down in a theological formulation something
so contingent as personal sorrow. Even Aquinas' position on the
sacramentality of penance remains a difficult feature of his entire
sacramental theology. After considering the relative merits of other
views, he mentions the <res et sacramentum>, the abiding sacrament of
penance, as the penitent's sorrow for sin based on faith in the
saving power of Christ's mysteries. Already inspired by the gift of
the Spirit, the repentant sinner's renewed love for God combines with
the action of the priest's absolution to bring the penitent towards a
renewed sense of belonging to God. Thus, the phrase of St. Augustine
serves to remind us of the cooperative character of this sacrament:
"He who has created you without yourself will not justify you without
yourself."45 Some modern theologians, on the other hand, prefer to
speak simply of solemn admission to the Eucharist, thereby setting
aside the difficult questions involved in stabilizing personal
contrition within the ambit of sacramental efficacy and ecclesial
communion.
The tradition enumerates three principal elements which compose the
sacrament of penance: contrition of the heart, confession of the
lips, and the satisfaction of works. The Holy Father includes
reference to these "realities or parts" in <Reconciliatio et
paenitentia.> "Satisfaction," he writes, "is the final act which
crowns the sacramental sign of Penance."46 He goes on to explain
that acts of satisfaction, in addition to joining the sinner's own
physical and spiritual mortification to the passion of Jesus Christ,
remain valuable signs of the personal commitment which the Christian
has made to God in the sacrament to begin a new life. The imposition
of an individual satisfaction, then, remains integral to the
celebration of reconciliation as a sacrament. It acts in the same
way that true sorrow and (under normal circumstances) particular
confession of sins also do. The penance, as custom refers to it,
both completes the necessary elements of sacramental reconciliation
and segues the forgiven sinner towards a renewed life of virtue and
charity within the Church. Furthermore, everything that Christ
accomplished by his satisfaction now stands at the disposal of the
newly reconciled member of his Body.
This explains Aquinas' contention that in penance not only is the
restoration of the balance of justice sought, as in retributive
justice, but above all the reconciliation of friendship.47 The very
notion of commutative justice prevails even here, resembling that
which can exist even between members of a family. When, for example,
a father distributes benefits to his children, he does so according
to a wisdom and love which he alone possesses. This allusion remains
the controlling image in Aquinas' explanation of reconciliation. In
fact, the actual living out of image-restorative works, now ratified
by the sacrament of Christ's love, itself constitutes the achievement
of divine grace. The liturgy still reflects this theology of
satisfaction when it counsels priests to join the following prayer
after the sacramental absolution: "May the Passion of Our Lord Jesus
Christ, the merits of the blessed Virgin Mary and of all the saints,
and also whatever good you do and evil you endure, be cause for the
remission of your sins, the increase of grace, and the reward of life
everlasting."48 Through it, the Church, making explicit reference to
the <thesaurus ecclesiae>, as the merits of Christ and of the saints
over which she holds definitive authority are called, sacramentalizes
the whole life of the believer. It also signifies the reviviscence
of grace.
To be sure, the institute of frequent confession does not occupy a
central place in contemporary pastoral theology and we find very
little written today which urges the celebration of the sacrament
precisely as a means towards spiritual growth. But the Holy Father
still maintains that "[T]he frequent use of the sacrament [of
penance] . . . strengthens the awareness that even minor sins offend
God and harm the Church, the Body of Christ."49 Christian
satisfaction and the sacrament of penance which establishes it as an
effective means for image-perfection both accomplishes this goal and
at the same time brings Christ's mission to completion. St. John
tells us that "[I]n this is love perfected with us, that we may have
confidence for the day of judgment, because as he is so are we in
this world" (I Jn 4:12). Indeed, Christ wants to fulfill this
mission which he has received from the Father: "The glory which thou
hast given me I have given to them, that they may be one even as we
are one, I in them and thou in me, that they may become perfectly
one, so that the world may know that thou hast sent me and hast loved
me" (Jn 17:24). The reconciliation of a fallen race remains Christ's
glory, the very task given him by the Father to accomplish. We read
in St. Luke's Gospel, "Father I have sinned against heaven and before
you."50 The power of Christ's passion mediated in the sacrament
turns the penitent person back to God, with a purpose of amendment,
as a son and daughter turn towards their father. It is precisely in
this aspect of divine forgiveness, that the Church especially
discerns the healing or medicinal character of reconciliation. "And
this is linked to the fact," writes the Holy Father, "that the Gospel
frequently presents Christ as healer, while his redemptive work is
often called <medicina salutis.">51 Further, if we look at this from
the perspective of the divine action operative in the sacrament, we
can recognize unequivocally the divine intention which Christ
manifests, what St. John refers to as his glory. For he comes to
fulfill a task, to reveal God's true purposes concerning our
salvation, unfolding the heart of the Father's desire for unity.
Above all and like a human father, God desires more to draw his
prodigal children back to loving union with himself than to punish
them according to the canons of vindicative justice. And our
awareness of this desire should consequently move us towards seeking
the sacrament with greater and greater frequency and fervor.
Foremost in any theological discussion remain two mysteries, the
incarnation and the Trinity, a fact which all Catholic theologians
accept. When practiced in accord with their original purposes,
Christian soteriology and sacramental theory lead us to a personal
communion with the three-personed God. That remains the only goal
indicating where the work of Christ leads. Theologians speak about
the missions of the divine persons as a way of indicating the active
role which God takes in our personal histories. The missions, in
turn, reflect the trinitarian processions which, with all of their
inner necessity in knowledge and love, constitute the very Godhead
itself. These trinitarian missions, moreover, form special
relationships in those to whom God freely extends justification in
the Church of faith and sacraments. Indeed, the visible sending of
the Son and invisible coming of the Holy Spirit comprise the
principal trinitarian missions which characterize the economy of
salvation.52
The patristic doctrine of <perichoresis>, <circuminsessio> in Latin,
reminds us of the fundamental unity and consubstantiality of the
divine persons. But what the Latin theologians further distinguish
as <circumincessio> points to another aspect of God's inner life,
namely, the attraction which the divine persons exercise upon one
another, drawing together all those parts of the divine plan known
only to God. Accordingly, on a personal level, the blessed Trinity
remains present to the souls of the justified believer as "object
known and loved." Although this formulation reflects the realist
preference for the primacy of knowledge in the human person, the
formulation nonetheless makes a clear reference to the unity of human
subjectivity. Indeed, the spiritual tradition prefers to call this
knowledge quasi-experiential in order to emphasize the importance of
the non-cognitive elements which mark it as unique. Like the Gifts
of the Holy Spirit, which constitute the special and privileged
endowments of the Christian believer, the three-personed God remains
the principal and unique source of spiritual benefit and growth for
the members of Christ's Body. So the sacraments point to God. And
in the sacrament of penance, especially, we discover how the Trinity
effects a sacrament of salvation for those who remain united with the
incarnate Son.
IV. Conclusion
By divine condescension, human reality has been created in order to
enter into communion with the fellowship of the divine persons. This
destiny, moreover, remains strictly supernatural. The openendedness
of the human intellect and of human love remains as it were the
negative condition for the achievement of this supernatural destiny.
This basically human structure aptitudinally images the personal
communion of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in knowledge
and love. The gracious conferral of resources proportionate to a
supernatural destiny of communion complement and fulfill what remains
only a trajectory impressed upon human nature. First of all,
habitual grace transforms the human person so as to share in the
divine nature and, then, the theological virtues confer a share in
the very divine loving and knowing. Thus, the merely aptitudinal
imaging of the three divine persons coincident with human nature
itself is achieved as an actual imaging of the three divine persons
as regards both their communion in the divine nature and their
personal communion in knowledge and love. It should be noted, then,
that the image of the three divine persons, the created analogue of
<perichoresis>, remains actualized in precisely those dimensions of
consciousness as free self-determination through love that also
constitutes the <ratio> of human historicity. In this saving action,
the immanent and visible mysteries of the incarnate Son both reveal
and point to the invisible transcendence of the Trinity, fulfilling
Christ's intention to turn everything over to the Father. "For he
must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet" (I Cor
15:25).
In St. Thomas' view, a particular expression of divine love and
justice is showing mercy. Indeed, it is this condescension that
accounts for the incarnation and actively shapes all that transpires
in the human intellect and will of Christ. To the human will of
Christ, God communicates the fullness of supernatural love as a
capital endowment, such that his love for the Father should be both
abounding love for us and the love of the Father on behalf of the
members of his Body. Thus rectified by charity, the human will of
Christ fulfills the divine justice _ that is, performs the substance
of Adam's original establishment in justice: a complete submission
and subjection of all human energies and interest to the Father. It
is this "evangelical" justice, suffused by excelling charity, that
forms the inner core of Christ's salvific work under its satisfactory
aspects. For, in this attitude of subjection and obedience, Christ
ratifies the Father's salvific plan within the ambit of his human
history and destiny. What remains salvifically determinative and
therefore satisfactory about Christ's human destiny therefore is not
simply the physical event of his passion, the exaction of a penalty
of death, but the interior attitudes of love, obedience, and self-
disposal in the Father's favor that animate Christ's sufferings. The
perfect interplay of the Father's loving initiative to save mankind
and of Christ's human response remains a crucial feature of Christ's
satisfactory work according to St. Thomas, for that communion of
loves restores our own imaging communion with the Trinity.
Of course, Saint Thomas' account of Christ's salvific work in its
satisfactory character addresses not merely the achievement of this
sort of personal communion between head and members and of the whole
Body through its Head with triune fellowship. It equally confronts
the historical situation of such communion and that which has
rendered such communion historically impossible: the reality of
human sin, historical sin as a concrete determinant of universal
human history. The "economy" of sin is by no means an ultimate nor
even equiparent with the economy of salvation in the Christian view.
Indeed, inasmuch as human moral failure instantiates whatever lacks
due order, characterized by deficient causality and
unintelligibility, its historical shape remains parasitic upon God's
governance of his creation.
Likewise, medicinal punishment as an effect of human moral fault
shows that God's loving intentions retain the upper hand in guiding
human history to its true destiny. It is radically the incarnation
of the Word and Christ's consequent disposal of his historical
freedom in loving response to the Father which show that what remains
uppermost and triumphant remains the Father's love. In that perfect
response to the Father's saving will, Christ has freely and lovingly
chosen solidarity with human history and a history of suffering
(imposed as a punishment). In virtue of Christ's solidarity with
suffering humanity, penal suffering becomes "once and for all" truly
restorative and rectifies human willing. For, in truth, Christ
"learned obedience through suffering," inasmuch as the full range of
Christ's subjection of himself to the Father's saving will includes
the acceptance of suffering experienced as the historical locus for
obedient and loving acceptance of that will. The supernatural gifts
which the Body derive from their Head accordingly effect a personal
solidarity with him in other situations of human suffering. The
grace and charity which Christ's members receive from him and in him
always remain the grace and love of his passion. These conform
Christ's Body to Christ's own obedience and love. This conformity
urges the members of the Church to "make up what is lacking in the
sufferings of Christ" _ that is, to supply their own free
ratification of the experience of the cross as the definitive
historical shape of communion with the Father and the Holy Spirit in
and through their Head. Union in and with the mind of Christ enables
Christians to transform and shape human history by extending Christ's
salvific work through culture and society. This openness, in short,
helps us "to redeem the time."
ENDNOTES
1 We find the doctrinal grounds for this assertion in the dogmatic
constitution <Dei Filius> (1870). In this document, the Fathers of
Vatican I elaborated the following vision of speculative theology:
"When reason illuminated by faith searches with diligence, piety, and
prudence, it attains _ through the gift of God _ a certain
understanding of the mysteries [of faith], and an abundantly fruitful
understanding at that: both from analogy with what it knows
naturally as well as from the interconnection of these very mysteries
with each other and with the final purpose of man" (DS 3016). For a
commentary on this passage, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., C. 1,
"De intelligentia Theologiae" in his <Divinarum personarum
conceptionem analogicam>, 2nd edition (Romae: Universitatis
Gregorianae Aedes, 1959), 7-48.
2 Thus, Bernard J. F. Longergan, S.J. explains the heuristic
structure of a universal viewpoint, which, he tells us, remains
"concerned with the principal acts of meaning that lie in insights
and judgments, and it reaches these principal acts by directing
attention to the experience, the understanding and the critical
reflection of the interpreter." See his <Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding>, Third edition (New York: Philosophical Library,
1970), 565ff.
3 The present <Codex Iuris Canonici> (1983) continues to recognize
the special place which Aquinas holds in the teaching of theology,
for example c. 252.3: "s. Thoma praesertim magistro." Earlier, the
Apostolic Constitution <Sapientia christiana>, which establishes
norms for ecclesiastical faculties, also stresses the importance of
Aquinas' doctrine both in theology (art. 71) and in philosophy (art.
80), cf. AAS, 1979, pp. 469-521.
4 Addressing the medieval context, M. - D. Chenu, O.P. contrasts the
twelfth century theologians with those later thinkers, including
Aquinas, whom he refers to as the masters of theological science:
"The statues of Rheims would have been out of place in the tympanum
at Vezelay, no less than the masters would have been in monastic
cloisters. But the two Christendoms of feudal Vezelay and of urban
Rheims, each with its own understanding of faith and mode of
expression, formed part of a single church." See his <Nature, Man
and Society in the Twelfth Century>, translated by Jerome Taylor and
Lester K. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 309.
On the other hand, Etienne Gilson, <The Unity of Philosophical
Experience> (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1982), 152-97,
concludes that more than any other figure in the seventeenth century
Descartes marks the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern
world. Afterwards, Gilson argues, Cartesian spiritualism and
idealism characterize large portions of modern philosophy.
5 Edward Farley documents the balkanization of theology in his
<Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education>
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), especially, 49-124. And J. A.
DiNoia, O.P., "Religious Theology in the Perspective of Religious
Diversity," <Theological Studies> 49 (1988), 401-416 suggests some
advantages of realist theology, especially in the context of
theological pluralism.
6 More than any other Roman Catholic theologian in recent times, Karl
Rahner, S.J. has insisted on the significance of human transcendence
in theological investigation. As a result, many theologians
(sometimes, as ill luck would have it, without the proper nuance)
regard the human person as simply an unfinished and dynamic being,
thrusting toward a fulfillment, both individual and social, that lies
indefinitely ahead. For example, see the account given by John
Macquarrie, "The Anthropological Approach to Theology," <The Heythrop
Journal> 25 (1984), 272-287.
7 The late Dominican theologian Colman E. O'Neill steadily developed
and defended this thesis, especially in his last work, <Sacramental
Realism: A General Theory of the Sacraments> (Wilmington, DE:
Michael Glazier, Inc., 1983), especially 31-49.
8 John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation <On Reconciliation
and Penance in the Mission of the Church Today>, Dec. 2, 1984
(hereafter RP), 2. Cf. <Origins> 14:433-58.
9 For a general study of this especially vexed question, see P.
Galtier, "Satisfaction," <Dictionnaire de theologie catholique> XIV:
1129-1210 and Louis Richard, <The Mystery of the Redemption>
(Baltimore-Dublin: Helicon Press, 1965).
10 See Philips Brooks, <Sermons> in 10 Volumes (New York: B. F.
Dutton, 1881-1911), Seventh series.
11 RP, 1. For a detailed study of Aquinas' personalist understanding
developed in the context of Christ's satisfaction, see Romanus
Cessario, O.P., <Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas> (Washington, DC:
University Press of America, 1982).
12 For an analysis of Augustine's original doctrine concerning the
<imago Dei,> see Walter H. Principe, C.S.B., "The Dynamism of
Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the
Human Person," <Studia Patristica> 18, edited by Elizabeth A.
Livingstone (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), Vol. 3, 1291-99. The
author also includes an extensive bibliography.
13 <Summa theologiae> Ia-IIae q. 114, a. 6. Aquinas develops this
inchoative ecclesiology in the <tertia pars> when he speaks about the
capital grace of Christ.
14In a key text for the biblical doctrine of satisfaction, Hebrews
2:9-10 actually mentions Christ's suffering which forms an integral
part of his mission to establish the Church of glory. "But we see
Jesus, who for a little while was made lower than the angels, crowned
with glory and honor because of the suffering of death, so that by
the grace of God he might taste death for every one. For it was
fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist, in bringing
many sons to glory, should make the pioneer of their salvation
perfect through suffering." For further information on this point,
see Ceslas Spicq, O.P., <L'Epitre aux Hebreux> (Paris: J. Gabalda et
Cie., 1952), especially 3, n. 1. Moreover, scholars agree that
Aquinas produced the first medieval commentary, as distinguished from
a gloss, on this New Testament writing. In fact, not only does
Aquinas' biographer, Bernard Gui, mention the commentary on Hebrews
separately but it also circulated independently from any other
<Expositio et lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli,> as 7 extant
manuscripts give witness.
15 The axiom represents the principal line of argument given by St.
Athanasius in his famous treatise, <On the Incarnation of the Logos
of God.> Again, in the <Letter to Epictetus>, 7 (PG XXVI:1061)
Athanasius writes: "[B]ut the Savior having in very truth become
man, the salvation of the whole man was brought about. For if the
Word were in the body putatively, as they say, and by putative is
meant imaginary, it follows that both the salvation and the
resurrection of man is apparent only, as the most impious Manichaeus
held."
16 See <Summa theologiae> IIIa q. 1, a. 2 where Aquinas, having
distinguished between strict necessity and a necessity "per quod
melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem," lists five ways in
which the incarnation, according to the second kind of necessity,
serves "ad promotionem hominis in bono" and five ways in which it
remains useful "ad remotionem mali."
17 See J. - H. Nicolas, O.P., <Synthese Dogmatique: De la Trinite a
la Trinite> (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1985), especially,
454-60. The author provides clarity about an issue which previously
suffered from distorting rhetoric generated by long-standing
historical controversies.
18 See Rene Roques, ed., <Pourquoi Dieu s'est fait homme>, French
translation of <Cur Deus Homo?> with notes and introduction (Paris:
Les Editions du Cerf, 1963), especially 161-72.
19 For a standard contemporary solution which draws, moreover, upon
the German idealist notion of solidarity, see Walter Kasper, <Jesus
the Christ>, translated by V. Green (New York: Paulist Press, 1976),
215-225.
20 In short, the discovery of the personalist dimensions evident in
the patristic doctrine of divinization moved Aquinas to recognize the
fundamental inadequacy latent in a juridical or mercantile construal
of salvation. See James A. Weisheipl, O.P., <Friar Thomas D'Aquino>
(New York: Doubleday & Company, 1974), especially the "Influence of
Greek Theology," 163-76.
21 For a good treatment which explains Aquinas' use of and reliance
upon the Fathers of the Church, see G. Geenen, "Thomas d'Aquin. VII.
Saint Thomas et les Peres," <Dictionnaire de theologie catholique>
XV:738-61 and the classical study by I. Baches, <Die Christologie des
hl. Thomas v. Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenvater> (Paderborn,
1931).
22 <On the Holy Spirit>, Prologue, 18 (PL XVI:708).
23 With almost poetic elegance, Aquinas elaborates this fundamental
truth of the Christian faith in a disputed question: "The ultimate
end is not the communication of goodness, but rather divine goodness
itself. It is from his love of this goodness that God wills it to be
communicated. In fact, when he acts because of his goodness, it is
not as if he were pursuing something that he does not have, but, as
it were, willing to communicate what he does have. For he does not
act from desire for the end, but from love of the end." See <De
potentia>, q. 3, a. 15, ad 14.
24 St. Paul makes this remark in the context of the creature's
transformation in Christ: "Therefore, if any one is in Christ, he is
a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come.
All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and
gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was
reconciling the world to himself. . . ." See II Corinthians 5:17-19.
25 The Council of Chalcedon (451) in fact complements the work of
Nicaea (325) which used the same expression, "consubstantial," to
identify the divine in Christ with the Trinity. For a theological
discussion of the Chalcedonian definition, see Aloys Grillmeier,
S.J., <Christ in Christian Tradition>, Vol. 1, translated by John
Bowden (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), especially 543-50.
26 Aquinas puts it simply: "Person signifies what is noblest in the
whole of creation" in <Summa theologiae> Ia q. 24, a. 2. Etienne
Gilson discusses both the historical background and philosophical
implications of this Christian view of created personhood. See his
chapter on "Christian Personalism," <The Spirit of Medieval
Philosophy>, translated by A.H.C. Downes (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1940), 189-208.
27 For Aquinas, the Eternal Law, which he principally identifies with
the trinitarian Logos, remains the source of divine providence for
the rational creature. See <Summa theologiae> Ia-IIae q. 93,
especially aa. 5-6. See Oscar J. Brown, <Natural Rectitude and
Divine Law in Aquinas> (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1981), especially 1-12.
28 Colin Gunton points out the interest this topic holds for
contemporary theologians in "When the Gates of Hell Fall Down:
towards a modern theology of the justice of God," <New Blackfriars>
69 (1988): 488-96.
29 For a detailed analysis of Aquinas' notion of sin, see T. C.
O'Brien, <Effects of Sin, Stain and Guilt,> Vol. 27 (Ia 2ae 86-89) of
the Blackfriars <Summa theologiae> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1974), especially 99-109.
30 Unfortunately, we often find this view expressed by those who
propose to interpret the thought of Karl Rahner. His well-known
rejection of "supernaturalism" still leads some thinkers to make
ambiguous statements about the relationship of nature and grace,
thereby making it difficult to discern what in fact pertains only to
God's gratuity. For example, Lucien Richard writes: "Creation is
the establishment, by God, of what is other precisely as other. . . .
Because of the unity of nature and grace from the very beginning of
creation, the history of the world and salvation history are
materially identical and coextensive. . . ." <Is There a Christian
Ethics?> (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 15.
31 See <Summa theologiae> Ia-IIae q. 72, a. 1, ad 2: "Sin is not a
pure privation, but an action lacking its due order."
32 Aristotle wrote: "the [moral] end appears to each man in a form
answering to his character," Ethics III, 5. 1114a32-1114b2. But see
Aquinas' use of this axiom in <Summa theologiae> Ia-IIae q. 58, a. 5,
where he develops it as a principle for the exercise of prudence.
33 <De spiritu et littera>, 26 (PL XLIV:229).
34 See <Summa theologiae> Ia-IIae q. 81-85 for his discussion of
original sin. T. C. O'Brien provides one of the best commentaries on
this subject in Original Sin, Vol. 26 (Ia2ae 81-85) of the
Blackfriars <Summa theologiae> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1965), especially 105-143.
35 These propositions include the principal elements of the Council
of Trent's declaration that original sin remains "origine unum et
propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus inest unicuique
proprium" (DS 1513). For a commentary on the Council's statement,
see Henri Rondet, <Original Sin>, translated by C. Finegan, O.P.
(Staten Island: Alba House, 1972), especially 169-75.
36 Remarks made upon the announcement of the publication in English
translation of <The New German Catechism: The Church's Confession of
Faith: A Catholic Catechism for Adults> (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1987).
37 See <Summa theologiae> Ia qq. 93-98, especially q. 95, a. 1 where
Aquinas discusses a problem much debated among the scholastics,
"Whether or not man was created in grace." For further information,
see I. H. Dalmais, O.P., "Original Sin" in <God and His Creation>,
Vol. 2, <Theological Library>, edited by A. M. Henry, O.P.,
translated by C. Miltner, CSC (Cork: Mercier Press, nd), 355-71.
38 "[I]t has to be said that if children had been born in original
justice they would also have been born with grace. . . . Yet this
would not have made grace natural, because it would not have been
transmitted by any virtue in the seed, but would have been conferred
on man the moment he had a rational soul. Just as the moment a body
is ready for it God infuses a rational soul, which is not, for all
that, propagated." See <Summa theologiae> Ia q. 100, a. 2, ad 2.
39 Sermon 2, On the Ascension, c. 11 (PL LIV:398).
40 "Si quis . . . paenitentiam non recte 'secundum post naufragium
tabulam' apellari: an s." (DS 1702).
41RP 31.I. See the recent study on the history of penance by Joseph
A. Favazza, <The Order of Penitents: Historical Roots and Pastoral
Future> (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1988).
42 <Summa theologiae> IIIa q. 84, a. 6.
43 See Ronald Knox, <Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of
Religion> (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1983), 319-339; 295-
318 for an introduction to Madame Guyon and Molinos respectively.
Between 1975-1985 Christian Books, Gardiner, Maine published several
revised English translations of Madame Guyon's treatises as works of
popular piety.
44 See O'Neill, <Sacramental Realism>, especially 98, 106, 171ff,
181ff. Contemporary sacramental theology, with its emphasis on the
symbolic and anthropological aspects of the sacraments, does not
emphasize these distinctions.
45 Ibid., 175-77 for a brief discussion of Aquinas' position on the
sacramentality of penance.
46 RP 31.III.
47 Aquinas actually makes this point in the context of the virtue of
penitence: "And it is thus that the penitent turns to God, with the
purpose of amendment as a servant to his master, . . . and as the son
to his father, . . . and as a wife to her husband. . . ." <Summa
theologiae> IIIa q. 85. a. 3.
48 <Ordo Paenitentiae>, n. 93.
49 <RP> 32. In our day, Adrienne von Speyr stresses this important
practice in the spiritual life. See her <Confession>, translated by
Douglas W. Stott (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985).
50 Cf. Luke 15:11-32. Biblical commentators remark on this passage:
". . . through his sin, or better, through his fatherly pardon,
patterned on the sin, the prodigal, discovering paternal love,
retrieves _ or even perhaps experiences for the first time _ the
sentiments of a son." See Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J. and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., <Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and
Patristic Study> (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 36, 37.
51 <RP> 31.II.
52 For an expert discussion of the trinitarian implications latent in
sacramental reconciliation, see William J. Hill, O.P., <The Three-
Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation> (Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), especially 273-314.
This article was taken from the Spring 1991 issue of "Faith & Reason". Subscriptions available from Christendom Press, 2101 Shenandoah Shores Road, Ft. Royal, VA 22630, 703-636-2900, Fax 703-636-1655. Published quarterly at $20.00 per year.
Romanus Cessario, O.P. received his doctorate in sacred theology from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. He is currently Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC and exchange Professor at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family. Father Cessario's writings include "The Godly Image: Studies in Historical Theology VI" (Petersham: St. Bede's Publications, 1990).
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