Debriefings

Phase I of Operation Homecoming was the POWs' repatriation.  The
exit point for all but nine returned POWs was Hanoi.

Phase II of Operation Homecoming was debriefing at Clark Air Force
Base by the Joint Debriefing and Casualty Reporting Center (JDCRC),
under the direction of CINCPAC.  JDCRC had representatives from
each military service.  Civilian and foreign returnees were
debriefed by the Service with which they were associated or by
members of the U.S. Embassy, Manila.  Each Service handled its own
debriefings, differing in approach, but following common debriefing
instructions.  The Army and Marine Corps used professional
intelligence debriefers whose sole job was debriefing. The Navy and
Air Force used a combination of escort and debriefer. The Navy used
only Air Intelligence Officers.  Air Force escort/debriefers were
not chosen from specific specialties.

The Committee attempted to examine the process of debriefing
returning POWs at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and
again when they returned to the U.S. to determine:

   the objectives of the debrief program;

   its planning -- what assets were devoted to the task and
    how were they organized, deployed and funded?

   its implementation -- how adequately DoD debriefed the POW
    returnees and how well they processed the POW/MIA debrief
    reports. What all-source information was requested and
    collected by DIA as a result of the debriefs?  How were leads
    (such as names, photos, etc.) followed?  How fully were the
    debriefing results reported to the Executive Branch and
    Congress?

DIA made no final report aggregating the results of the individual
debriefings after Operation Homecoming.   While DoD has
provided a substantial amount of material to the Committee, the
collection suffered with the passage of time. Without a final
report, and without complete files and access to information, it is
difficult to fully assess the adequacy of Operation Homecoming
debriefings nearly 20 years after the fact.

The returnees were processed in five cycles. Each group consisted
of 20-150 returnees, arriving at 8-10 day intervals. The debriefs
were transcribed, edited by the senior officer of each service, and
transmitted.  When a returnee's debriefing was completed, the
intelligence packet, including the debriefing tape, transcribed
debrief and/or assessment report, would be assembled and sent by
the escort officer for relay to the appropriate CONUS hospital.

A summary of the debriefings included:

    Returnees Debriefed:
              USAF                324
              USN                 138
              USA                  71
              USMC                 22
              US Civilians         23
              Thai Civilians        2
              German Civilians      2
              Canadian Civilians    1

              Total               583

   Returnees Not Debriefed
         USAF Medical               1
         USMC Higher HQ directed    4
         USA Higher HQ directed     6

         Total                     11

The committee learned a great deal about the debriefing process
from the testimony of Admiral and Mrs. Stockdale -- among them that
POW wives were never debriefed by DIA, and that Admiral Stockdale's
debriefing was limited to his 52-hour initial debriefing.

    Senator Daschle:  . . . ..Do I understand, Mrs. Stockdale,
    that you have never been debriefed officially by the
    Federal Government?

    Mrs Stockdale:  I think you understand correctly, yes never.

    Senator Daschle:  And Admiral Stockdale, to what extent have
    you been debriefed, even in subsequent years, by DIA, by
    anybody, as we try to put together our best information?

    Admiral Stockdale:  Nothing but my initial debrief, which was
    rather extensive.

Phase III debriefings were conducted in the United States.

A symposium was held June 20-23, 1973 to discuss lessons learned.
The panelists thought the debriefings were accomplished without
major problems, although some debriefers complained that emphasis
was placed on familiarization with the POWS background and
insufficient stress was given to basic debriefing techniques.
Rapport between the POW and his debriefer facilitated the flow of
information.  Each service attempted to first establish an
effective working relationship. The Navy allowed the debriefer to
escort the POW from Clark Air Force Base to the U.S., hoping that
this would cement a working relationship.  The Army and Marine
Corps sought to achieve good rapport by matching the debriefer and
POW by rank, background and interest.  Debriefers were primary
collectors of all available data.

While in captivity POWs had designated certain POWs to serve as
"memory banks," this created initial pressure because many early
returnees were hesitant to discuss information which they had not
been directed to gather and commit to memory. This stumbling block
was removed when senior POWS directed them to relate their entire
experience to debriefers.

Suspicions have surrounded the debriefing of returned POWs for
nearly 20 years, primarily because access has been restricted based
on debriefing agreements with the returnees.  Did the
government leave men behind?   Did key officials know it? Were the
returnees told to not report certain information?  Was the prison
system a closed circle of knowledge; could there have been separate
prison systems not known to the returning POWS? Was the American
public told the truth?

Debriefing Results

Life in Captivity

Post-Homecoming debriefings and a DIA Intelligence Appraisal of
them, now unclassified, provide a summary of the prisoners of war's
experience in Southeast Asia.

Captivity ranged from several hours in South Vietnam to more than
eight years in the North.  Most servicemen were captured during the
height of the bombing of the North between 1966 and 1968.  POWs
captured prior to December 1971 were known as the "Old Guys."  The
majority of POWs were Air Force and Navy pilots shot down over
North Vietnam and virtually all were captured within minutes
because they descended directly into populated areas.  Many
suffered ejection injuries and shock which made evasion impossible;
while others evaded successfully for up to 12 days.  Evasion in
Laos was somewhat easier and many more downed airmen were recovered
in the sparsely populated and otherwise more permissive
environment.  POWs captured in Laos and taken to North Vietnam had
spent less than three weeks in Laos itself.

The PRG returned 122 U.S. POWs; 28 were released in South Vietnam.
All but one had been captured by the Viet Cong and detained near
the Cambodian border and the last POW was held in the Delta region.

The remaining 94 POWs were captured north of Da Lat City after 1968
and moved to North Vietnam for detention.

Living conditions in the South were primitive and life was hard.
POWs often were chained or bound for long periods, primarily as a
security precaution.  Movement was frequent and involved walking
several weeks between camp sites, and the daily survival routine
varied little through the years.  There was no overall policy or
systematic torture of POWs in South Vietnam, but treatment varied
by individual camp commanders and guards.  It was more difficult to
survive captivity in the South, but escape was easier, and 26  POWs
(about 12 percent) captured in the South escaped.

Treatment in North Vietnam varied over three eras. Until late 1965,
there was little use of torture.  From late 1965 until late 1969,
torture and mistreatment was common.  Beginning in late 1969,
torture and mistreatment declined.  "Camp rules" were the basis for
punishment, and they specified that all American POWS were
criminals.  This was consistent with North Vietnamese protests that
the Geneva Convention on prisoners did not apply to American POWs
because the war was an undeclared one.

The Prison System

In North Vietnam, 13 camps were used for permanent detention, eight
outside of Hanoi and five within the city.  Three camps outside of
Hanoi were used exclusively to hold POWs captured in South Vietnam
and Laos.  Four camps were used only for POWs captured in the
North.  POWs from all areas were confined in the remaining camps.
The primary camps were Hoa Lo Prison and Cu Loc, dubbed by American
POWs the "Hanoi Hilton" and the "Zoo," respectively.

POWs arriving in Hanoi normally were moved directly to the Hanoi
Hilton, a maximum security prison built in the heart of the city by
the French in the early 1900's. It was divided into three parts:
(1)  "New Guy Village,"  called "Heartbreak" from 1965 to late
1971, served as the interrogation facility throughout the war; (2)
"Little Vegas;" and (3) "Camp Unity," the largest section first
used to detain Americans in 1970.

After interrogation at the Hanoi Hilton, POWs would remain in
Little Vegas or be transferred to either the Plantation or the Zoo.

The Plantation was initially a showplace camp for visits and later
held 108 POWS from Laos and South Vietnam.  The Zoo housed nearly
200 POWs at one time and replaced the Plantation as the North
Vietnamese showplace during the last years of the war and was the
camp visited by Ramsey Clark, Jane Fonda, and Joan Baez.

Prior to 1970, POWs were held in small to medium-sized camps or in
small isolated groups within the camps.  After the Son Tay raid,
the smaller camps were closed, the POWs consolidated, and treatment
of POWs improved.  In late 1972, the North Vietnamese readjusted
the camp system in anticipation of the POW release.  The American
POWS were released from North Vietnam in four increments:  the
first two from the Hanoi Hilton, the third from the Plantation, and
the fourth from the Zoo.  All POWs captured in South Vietnam and
Laos who were held in North Vietnam were released from the Hanoi
Hilton.

Information About Unaccounted-For Servicemen

A preliminary Committee staff analysis of a computer listing
of non-returnees named in the debriefing report showed that
51 servicemen named by returnees had not returned from Southeast
Asia. Upon the Committee's request, DIA prepared a case-by-
case review of these 51 cases and  determined that 51 names
in the USAF listing were inaccurately correlated.  A summary
accompanying the DIA review explained:

    These debriefs were reviewed for intelligence value
    immediately after Operation Homecoming in 1973.  It must be
    emphasized that the returnees were asked for information they
    may possess on unaccounted for Americans, not just for
    information on known prisoners of war.

Of the 51 listed, the following observations remain true:

   Many POWs reported on individuals they personally saw dead.

   Many names reported to debriefers were heard in the prison
    communication system; when investigated after Operation
    Homecoming, most of these reports were cleared:

    .    Many reports came from queries by one individual, about
         what happened to a particular individual; they were
         questions, not answers. (58 percent)

    .    Where the source was identified, it was determined that
         he had never seen the listed man,  (16 percent)

    .    Some individuals were reported as seen in the company of
         a group, but no other member of the group reported having
         seen the individual. (14 percent)

    .    Several reports of possible POWs in a particular camp
         were based upon phonetic spellings seen on camp walls or
         elsewhere, or on radio broadcasts.  (6 percent)

   One report correlates to an individual (Howard Lull) who was
    captured but killed before entering the camp system (Howard
    Lull, XX)

   Five of the individuals on the list of 51 names are Vessey
    cases.  (Hestle, Lane, Eidsmow, Entrican, and Finley)"

Some of the returning POWs also provided debriefers with "memory
lists" of fellow POWs believed to have been in the prison system at
some point in time.  These included the "LuLu Group" (POWs captured
in Laos who entered the prison system in North Vietnam), the "Lost
Sheep List" (POWs who "disappeared" in the prison system) and the
"Lonely Hearts List" (POWs seen dead or dying in the prison
system). The committee requested copies of all such lists.  The DoD
response is included here for the record and discussed
elsewhere in this report chapter dealings with government
knowledgeability and actions.

No information about live Americans was reported from the
debriefings of returned POWs to any member of the U.S. delegation
to the Four Party Joint Military Commission.

The DIA provided the Secretary of Defense weekly summaries of the
Homecoming debriefings.  These reports showed that, after collating
all the debriefings, only three men named by some POWs (whose fate
was not learned from other POWs) were not accounted for.  The
remains of these three men later were returned.

On April 17, 1974, DIA provided the Military Service Intelligence
Chiefs a review of all reports received since Operation Homecoming
of prisoners still held in Southeast Asia:

    Cambodia:   None of the 27 Americans released by the PRG at
    Loc Ninh, South Vietnam in February 1973 were held with, or
    had knowledge of, the fate of any other American or foreign
    POWs in Cambodia.  DIA listed 27 Americans and approximately
    20 foreign journalists missing at the time of this report. No
    information on the fate of either group was obtained during
    Operation Homecoming.

    Laos:  Ten prisoners, nine Americans and one Canadian, were
    released at Gia Lam Airport on March 28, 1973.  Since
    Operation Homecoming, the Pathet Lao claimed to hold no
    Americans prisoner except Mr. Emmet J. Kay.  Live-sighting
    reports at the time of this report in 1974 remained
    unconfirmed, but DIA noted ." . . it is clear that the Pathet
    Lao had captured some personnel who were not released," and
    noted Eugene Debruin and Lt. Col. David Hrdlicka as examples
    of those known to have been captured by the Pathet Lao and not
    released.   The Pathet Lao made various statements over
    the years indicating their knowledge of American POWs in Laos.

    DIA concluded in 1974 that the Pathet Lao had yet to provide
    even a partially satisfactory accounting of the approximate
    300 American POWs unaccounted for in Laos.

    North Vietnam:  In addition to the POWs released during
    Operation Homecoming, the list of 457 U.S. POWs contained the
    names of 23 servicemen reported by the North Vietnamese to
    have died in captivity.  The remains were released in mid-
    March 1974.  DIA noted in April 1974 that there were no
    intelligence reports of U.S. POWs alive in North Vietnam.
    Intelligence reporting was generally limited to sightings of
    U.S. personnel who were subsequently released or died in
    captivity.

    South Vietnam:  122 captured Americans were released during
    Operation Homecoming.  The PRG provided a list of 40 more
    Americans who were reported died in captivity.  DIA noted in
    1974 that approximately 400 Americans remained unaccounted for
    in South Vietnam.  Reports of American POWs in Tay Ninh, Chau
    Doc and Dar Lac provinces were unconfirmed, but two U.S.
    collaborators/deserters were identified, DIA reported.

Other Indications

After Operation Homecoming, U.S. officials and others looked to new
information about POWs' experience for additional leads. For many
years, POWs were not permitted to send or receive letters.  When
mail finally was allowed by the North Vietnamese, the U.S. gained
new information about its POWs.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird recalled that about 5000 letters had
been received and, through them, about 470 POWs in Vietnam and five
in Laos had been identified.

Five individuals verified in captivity by war-time letters but did
not return at Operation Homecoming:

    Dennis W. Hammond (USMC) was captured on February 1968.  He
    wrote a letter that was never mailed by his captors that
    positively identified him as captured.  A 1968 Vietnamese
    radio broadcast indicated that Hammond made a statement.
    Hammond subsequently died in captivity; his death and burial
    were verified by a POW who returned. Hammond's remains have
    not been repatriated.

    PFC Donald L. Sparks (USA) was captured on June 17,1969.  A
    letter written nearly a year after his capture was found on
    the body of a dead North Vietnamese soldier.  PFC Sparks
    remains unaccounted for and is one of the 135 Vessey
    discrepancy cases.

    Capt. Robert Young, (USA) was captured on May 2, 1970. A
    statement dated in 1970 purported to have been made by Young
    was found among captured enemy documents.  A 1971 FBIS report
    reported a statement from Young and other U.S. captives.
    Capt. Young's name appeared on the PRG's died-in- captivity
    list, but his remains have not been repatriated.

    Daniel Niehouse, a U.S. civilian captured on November 25, 1966
    sent a letter to his family in Scotland by prisoners released
    in 1967.  Niehouse appeared on the PRG died-in- captivity
    list, but his remains have not been repatriated.

    W4 John W. Frederick (USMC) was captured in December of 1965.
    He wrote letters to, and received letters from, his family
    while in captivity.  Frederick died in captivity and his
    remains were repatriated to the U.S. in March, 1984.

Were Specialists Kept Behind?

Suspicions continued about whether some POWs with particular
military specialties may have been segregated into a separate
prison system and kept behind.  The committee requested DoD to
advise it about whether any abnormal statistical patterns were
apparent based on military specialties;  DoD's response included a
student research report, "Analysis of Academic and Military
Background of Released U.S. Prisoners of War and Those Unaccounted
For,"  which was completed in March 1981.  In the study, "the
backgrounds of 478 USAF officer POWs/MIAs were statistically
analyzed to determine if there were any significant differences
between the backgrounds of those that returned and those that did
not return." The analysis revealed that men with the following
specialties returned in significantly lower numbers:

   Officers with intelligence-gathering or technically oriented
    specialties (AFSCs);
   Officers with prior assignments at or above Major  Command
    level;

   Officers lost in 1968;

   Officers lost over water near or in the Southern regions of
    North Vietnam;

   Officers on Special Operations or Armed Reconnaissance
    missions; and

   Officers flying F-111As or multi-engine, propeller-type
    aircraft without ejection capabilities.

In conclusion, the findings did indicated that there were some
military background and mission characteristics frequently
associated with non-returning POWs/MIAs, but the question of
whether any POWs/MIAs were held back because of these or other
characteristics remains an open one.

The accompanying memorandum noted that the study was requested by
the DIA and noted:

    . . . .Various studies of the themes suggested in your
    letter have been examined by individual analysts in that
    office, but in general the informal assessments were
    maintained by the analyst only.  Their consistent
    conclusion was, however, as the above analysis concludes,
    that there is no factual basis for the inferences you
    suggest, and it is in fact contradicted anecdotally by
    several of the "specialized " returnees.  This is
    summarized in an overall briefing prepared by the Special
    Officer and provided below.

    A recurring theme in the mythology of the PW-MIA issues
    is that U.S. personnel were exploited for their technical
    knowledge and skills.  This theme is carried to the point
    of allegations that American personnel with certain
    specialized skills or knowledge were taken to third
    countries for exploitation, or were exploited by third-
    county interrogators in Vietnam.  Although the argument
    is seductive, it simply is not correct.  No evidence
    exists to suggest that any American personnel were
    singled out for exploitation because of their technical
    skills, educational background, previous assignments, or
    any other element of their background.  The following
    facts must be considered definitive.
    .    As indicated above, a review of the backgrounds of
         returnees versus missing men as regards previous
         assignments, technical skills, education level,
         mission assignment and many other aspects reveals
         no correlation to returned or non-returned status.
         Simply stated, U.S. personnel with technical
         backgrounds, previous assignments in technical
         areas, or any other specialized skill or background
         are not missing in any greater proportion than are
         individuals without those backgrounds.  In the case
         of air crews, survival of a shootdown, capture, and
         eventual return can only be described as a crap
         shoot.

    .    A review of debriefings of returnees reveals that
         prisoners were not interrogated to any extent on
         their technical knowledge.  While some
         interrogations asked limited technical questions,
         the overwhelming thrust of interrogations and
         torture was to elicit political statements from the
         prisoners.  Technical information was a very low or
         non-existent priority for questioning.

    .    U.S. personnel were not subjected to interrogation
         by anyone other than Vietnamese, except:

         .    In one incident involving several prisoners and a
              few cases where Americans were initially captured
              by Chinese military units operating in North
              Vietnam (these units did or did not conduct simple
              interrogations before turning the Americans over to
              the Vietnamese).

         .    The KGB interrogated at least one American of
              Russian descent, who was on assignment to the Navy
              from the CIA. KGB officer Oleg Nechiporenko also
              prepared a questionnaire which may have been used
              in the interrogation of American POWs.

         .    Some returned POWs report being interrogated by
              Cubans.

    .    The idea that U.S, technical specialists, such
         as an "electronic warfare officer" or a radar
         navigator, could provide valuable engineering,
         design, and operational data to the Vietnamese
         or to some third country is questionable,  In
         the first place, much technical information
         about even sensitive systems is available
         readily through exploitations of open sources.
         A magazine such as "Aviation Week and Space
         Technology" is a better source than an
         injured, frightened, hungry B-52 radar
         navigator.  The Soviets provided to the
         Vietnamese technical data about U.S, systems
         which they had obtained through their normal
         intelligence operations.  Second, the
         information which the Soviets sought on U.S.
         systems simply could not be provided by the
         tactical operators captured by the Vietnamese.
         The Soviets sought design, research and
         engineering data -- information available more
         reliably and readily through penetrations of
         the U.S. defense electronic industry.

Possibility of POWs Outside Returnees' Knowledge

Returning POWs could not fathom a parallel prison system in
Vietnam, the possibility that there was another captive world
outside their own. According to Stockdale, they first considered
the possibility when asked by then Defense Secretary Elliott
Richardson:

    In February or March 1973, I and several senior prisoners
    visited Secretary of Defense Elliott Richardson in his
    office at the Pentagon.  He said, did you leave anybody
    over there?  I answered as spokesman for the group and
    said no, and told him the story I just told you . . .
    .the farthest thing from my mind was anybody being left.
    I thought it was impossible. . . .I told him how we
    counted noses.

    He said, what about a second prison, a secret enclave --
    the first time I'd ever heard that.  . . . I told the
    Secretary I had spent the best part of seven years trying
    to judge just what the North Vietnamese are thinking
    about, what they were capable of, and what they could get
    away with to our detriment. . . and the thought never
    crossed my mind that they could have sort of a stash for
    special prisoners that could be kept secret from the rest
    of us for years.

    Senator McCain:  Admiral, from your very strong statement
    it indicates to me that you do not believe that we
    knowingly left any Americans alive in Southeast Asia. .
    . Is that your view?
    Admiral Stockdale:  . . . I know there are some things I
    don't know about Laos, but I'm positive there's nothing.
    . . ..I have no evident of anybody that was left
    intentionally alive in Laos or anywhere.

Even the threats of their captors did not raise a serious
possibility that there was anywhere else to be sent to:

    Senator Grassley:  . . . returnees independently
    described . . . .instances in which Vietnamese
    interrogators threatened to send POW's to something
    referred to by the Vietnamese as survival camps if they
    did not cooperate. . . .Do you have any knowledge of such
    camps?

    Admiral Stockdale:  . . . .I never heard that expression
    before, but it wasn't uncommon for them to make dire
    threats of death. . . .

    Senator Grassley:  Admiral, as a prisoner and after your
    release, did you ever consider the possibility that the
    Vietnamese might have segregated prisoners soon after
    capture into two separate prison camps?. . . .

    Admiral Stockdale: . . . . . . I've always had the
    feeling that he [Secretary Richardson] thought I was
    right.

Nor has any returned POW has ever suggested to Stockdale that he
believed men were left behind, Stockdale testified.

    Vice Chairman Smith:   To your knowledge, and with all of
    your contacts and communications with other POW's who
    have returned, did any POW ever report to you seeing or
    having seen, or knowing of a POW that they made direct
    contact with, who did not return?

    Admiral Stockdale:  Never did that happen, in eight
    years,. . . .Never did anybody say, "We've got a guy over
    there."  And if you find somebody that says, "I was in
    the Hanoi prison and I saw a guy, and then he didn't come
    home and I don't know what happened to him," he's not
    telling the truth.

    Vice Chairman Smith:  Did any POW that you came back
    with, ever indicate to you that there was any type of
    segregation in the camp system, that you were a part of,
    concerning military specialty, where people or specialty
    in the military?
    Admiral Stockdale:  No, I don't know of any. . . .

At the Committee's request, Admiral Stockdale examined a list of
men last known alive.

Mulligan

Stockdale's first concern was about a POW named Mulligan:

    Senator Reid:  Admiral, it is my understanding that
    yesterday you reviewed a list that Senator Smith gave you
    of 324 names. . . .Did you review that list yesterday?

    Admiral Stockdale:. . . ..I was alarmed about the fact
    that eight of the entries were from the debrief of one
    James Mulligan.  There were names I'd never heard of. .
    . .. So, I called Mulligan [a former POW in North
    Vietnam]. . . .We went through all eight. . . .He said
    not one of those was in my name [memory] bank.

    Vice Chairman Smith:  I just want to say, Admiral, that
    I respect your answer. . . .But, I want to have the
    opportunity to enter into the record. . . the document
    which does mention those names in regard to Mulligan.

The Mulligan extracts  were provided to DoD for rechecking the
names against the debriefs. JSSA's response of December 11, 1992
noted that:

    Col. Brown and his deputy, Mr. Dussault, personally went
    over each page of the lengthy transcript and list of POWs
    memorized by Capt. Mulligan.  They found no reference to
    the MIA Collamore.  However they did locate Homecoming
    debriefing reports that corrected "Collarmore" to "Col.
    Lamar."  Due to the misinterpretation of the taped
    pronunciation the name Cullamore was in fact determined
    to have been Col. Lamar, who has been returned to U.S.
    control.

A second response stated:

    1.   We have reviewed Capt. Mulligan's debriefing file
         and the following names of MIA personnel were
         apparently reported by Capt. Mulligan:
         Beene, James A.
         Collins, Richard F.
         Davies, Joseph E.
         Lawrence, Bruce E.
         Raymond, Paul D.
         Pierson, W. C. III

    2.   Capt. Mulligan also related knowledge of James Q.
         Collins (Capt. USAF) and William P. Lawrence (Cdr,
         USN) who were repatriated during Operation
         Homecoming."

Committee staff telephoned Capt. James A. Mulligan on December 15,
1992.  He stated that copies of the returnee debriefing report had
been faxed to him by Admiral Stockdale and that the information
listing him as the source is in error.

Sponeyberger and Wilson

Admiral Stockdale also discussed the fate of Captain Robert D.
Sponeyberger and Lieutenant William Wilson.

    Admiral Stockdale:. . . We had two people in..well now,
    Sponeyberger was never in our camp system so..I mean he.
    . . he came home but he didn't come home via my prison.
    . . .Sponeyberger. . . .returned ..in March 73 and he's
    shown as a pilot of an F-111 and I don't know where he
    was held. . . . . . And Wilson. . . .He was not in our
    prison system but he was returned. . . .I never had
    anybody in my prison that had flown an F-111, so I don't
    know.

DoD provided a response to the committee's request to determine
where Captain Sponeyberger and Lt Wilson were held captive, if this
was outside the normal prison system, and where the remaining F111
POWS were imprisoned.  This stated:

    . . . . Captain Sponeyberger was captured on 22 December
    1972 and held in Hoa lo prison from 25 December 1972
    through 3 January 1973.  He was then held at Cu Loc
    prison from 3 January 1973 through 29 March 1973.
    Lieutenant Wilson was captured with Captain Sponeyberger
    and held in Hoa Lo from 29 December 1972 through 3
    January 1973 and at Cu Loc from 3 January 1973 through 29
    March 1973.

    VADM Stockdale was in Hoa Lo prison from 25 January 1969
    until his release on 12 February 1973.  The three were
    inmates at Hoa Lo prison at the same time from 29
    December 1972 through 3 January 1973.   Thus, in fact,
    Captain Sponeyberger and Lieutenant Wilson were held in
    facilities in the normal prison system.

    Wilson and Sponeyberger were imprisoned quite late in the
    war, and their incarceration in Hoa Lo overlapped that of
    VADM Stockdale for only a few days.  Because they were in
    the prison system for such a short time, it is possible
    that VADM Stockdale may not have remembered them or may
    never have know about them.

    DIA has found no credible intelligence to suggest that
    any prison system existed other than the "normal" North
    Vietnamese prison system.  None of the other F-111
    aviators lost are known to have survived their loss
    incidents.

Col. Donald "Digger" Odell

More recently, Col. Donald "Digger" Odell , a former POW, was also
reported in the press as stating that two American POWs were taken
away prior to Homecoming and not released.  The Committee requested
a DIA analysis of the news article, and DIA's response stated that
Col. Odell mentioned the names of two individuals he speculated
might have remained behind alive:  Capt. Earl Cobell (USAF) and Lt.
J. J. Connell (USN).  DIA further noted:

    The record seems to indicate that both men died prior to
    Operation Homecoming.  Their names appeared on the DRV died-
    in-captivity list, passed to the U.S. Government on 27 January

    1973.  . . . Both individuals' remains were repatriated in
    March 1974. . . .Other returnees reported that Captain Cobell,
    a particularly recalcitrant prisoner, had been beaten almost
    to the point of insanity, possibly by a Cuban, in August or
    September 1969 and had to be force-fed by his roommate. Lt.
    Connell reportedly tried to deceive the Vietnamese into
    believing that torture had crippled his hands and had caused
    him to be mentally deranged.

The DIA's analysis was read to Col. Odell by phone.  He
acknowledged the press report accurately depicted his statement,
said he had no knowledge of the reported deaths, and offered no
challenge to the DIA statement of death.

Defense Intelligence Agency Assessment

Testimony by the DIA's Bob Sheetz included an undated paper
entitled "Defense Intelligence Agency Commentary on Names Appearing
in Returnee Debriefs," which makes the following points:

    The DoD position is that all Americans known to have been
    in prison system in North Vietnam are accounted for.

    In the prison communications system such as tap codes,
    using various signalling systems, clarity and
    completeness of communications sometimes suffered.
    Partial names, nicknames and names were arrived at
    phonetically.

    The fact that a name was mentioned by a returnee does not
    mean the individual was in the prison system, it could
    merely mean that someone was asking about him,
    introducing his name into the system.

    The objective of the debriefings was to get a listing of
    every name the returnee knew. DoD believed they could
    construct a "fairly tidy" list of names of men who did
    not return. The result, however, was not usable.

    The lists had full names, partial names, nicknames,
    garbled names, names of men seen alive and names with no
    explanation. It was clear detailed analysis was needed.
    This initial listing is the "pink pages." This is the
    list which the committee has now.  That list, is a list
    of raw, unevaluated names from the debriefs at Clark AFB.

    Detailed briefings sorted out the names initially
    provided. Analysis sorted the names. Cross-checking took
    four years, the last published list was September 1977.

    The resulting list called "white pages" was published in
    1977. In the final list of names these are no concrete
    indications that any of the men in the prison system and
    remains of some men on the 1977 list have been
    returned.

On Dec. 23, 1992, DoD provided an additional response from the
Defense Intelligence Agency.  The substance is quoted in full:

    1. In response to the Committee letter of 10 December
    1992 on information found in the returnees' debriefs, the
    Defense Intelligence Agency wishes to clarify the facts
    at issue.  In June 1992, at the request of the Committee,
    we re-analyzed a list of 51 names in debriefs which were
    presented as potential priority discrepancy cases, and
    found that they were, in fact, all references to
    accounted-for servicemen.  We stated at that time
    informally, and again in our September letter, that we
    would be happy to provide specific analytic support on
    specific name questions, but would not provide analysis
    on the total set (that is, a reworking of the whole),
    requested once then, and now again in your 10 December
    letter.  We are unaware of outstanding questions on the
    May 1978 computer listing.  This complete listing was
    thoroughly analyzed in the 1973-77 time frame.  We offer
    the following generic description of that process.

    2.  The Committee should be aware of the details of analysis
    devoted to names provided by returnees during Operation
    Homecoming and subsequent debriefings.  When returning
    American prisoners arrived at Clark Air Base in Spring
    1973, they were debriefed immediately and asked to provide the
    names of other Americans they had seen or heard of in the
    prison system.  At this point, maximum effort was placed on
    collecting names; little attention was paid to accuracy,
    spelling, or circumstances under which the name was heard.  An
    additional problem, here and later, was that many of the names
    were mistakenly identified from the actual tapes of the
    interviews and had not actually been stated by the debriefees.

    The names provided at this time were submitted by message to
    the military service casualty offices and to the Defense
    Intelligence Agency.  On 24 April, 1973, this list of
    initially-reported names was printed on pink paper and became
    known as the "pink pages."  Analysis of these names at the
    time showed a large number of duplications, names of
    returnees, names of men still missing, partial names, and
    phonetic names for which the correct spelling was not
    available.

    3.  The military services and DIA began analyzing these names.

    Their objective was to remove from the list names of men who
    had returned or names which were determined to be invalid.
    Throughout this process, each agency cross-checked its work
    with the other agencies and inter-agency agreement was reached
    on names which should be removed from the listing.  As a
    result, on 9 May and 5 June 1973, a second list of names was
    published.  Names in the "pink pages" which pertained to
    returnees or in other ways did not pertain to missing men were
    not on this May-June 1973 list.

    4.  The list which the Committee notes is dated May 1978 is,
    in fact, a reproduction of the April 1973 "pink pages."  That
    is, the list of the initial, unevaluated listing of names
    provided by the returnees during their debriefings at Clark.
    This list contains names of men in the prison system as well
    as names of men who never appeared in the system but whose
    fates were the subject of discussion through the prison
    communication system.  The appearance of a name on this list
    is no way offers definitive evidence that the man named was in
    the prison system.

    5.  By this time, the returnees had been dispersed from Clark
    to bases and homes in the United States and detailed
    debriefings were begun.  During these debriefings, every
    effort was made to obtain from the returnees details of names
    they had provided during the initial debriefs at Clark.
    Especially important was the necessity to differentiate
    between the name of an individual who was actually in the
    prison system as opposed to the name of an individual who had
    been lost and whose name was being passed through the system
    in an attempt to locate him, though he was never in the prison
    system.

    6.  After this, the names provided by the returnees were
    subjected to exhaustive analysis over a four-year period. from
    April 1973 until September 1977.  They were then checked,
    cross-checked, and analyzed by the services and by DIA.  The
    objective still was to develop a list of men who did not
    return.  When this process was completed, the resulting
    document, known as the "white pages." was published on 2
    September 1977.  This document is the definitive compilation
    of information on missing men provided by the returnees.  In
    virtually every case, the information which the returnees
    furnished dealt with the missing man's loss incident of his
    death in captivity. Four years of analysis of information
    provided by the returnees led DOD to the following
    determination:  all of the men who were known to be in the
    prison system either came home during Operations Homecoming or
    were accounted-for at that time.  DoD stands by that
    conclusion.

    7.  To reiterate, the Department stands ready to assist the
    committee with specific , bounded requests for analytic
    assistance.  We cannot honor the request to do all of this
    work over again especially since the initial work has been
    shown to be valid.

Committee Review of Debriefing Reports

To examine inconsistencies in the record and the hearings, the
Committee requested Operation Homecoming records and information
from DoD.    The responses indicated that no final analysis had
been completed of the debriefings other than the Air Force computer
listing.  The Committee advised DoD that records provided by DoD
showed that the Army had been tasked to provide an historical
record and the committee requested a copy, but none was received by
publication of this report.

The Secretary of Defense declined to allow Committee staff access
to the actual debriefings, citing confidentiality commitments made
to the POWs at the time of their debriefings. "The former POWs were
assured that under no circumstances would these recorded
debriefings be released to anyone.  The Department of Defense has
and will continue to honor that pledge."  The DOD agreed to
make transcripts of the debriefings available to the Chairman and
Vice Chairman, however, although it retained control of the
transcripts.  Both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman reviewed
several summaries and debriefing transcripts, but did not have time
to conduct more than a limited review.

The Committee also sought permission to review returnees'
debriefings.  DoD was unable to provide the addresses of the former
POWs, but Nam-POW, Inc. gave the Committee an updated list and
permission to use its mailing list. A survey was sent to the
483 former POWs with known addresses in October 1992.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman directed that the mailing assure
each former POW that the Select Committee's sole interest was
information on non-returnees to provide casualty resolution.  It
was not a general screen of debriefing reports, but a specific
search for names of those in captivity who did not return.  Senator
McCain, a former POW, approved the questionnaire before it was
sent.

At publication time, the committee had received 368 responses: 19
letters were returned, 285 returnees agreed to the review and 19
declined. Another 27 acknowledged the Committee's request, but had
no information. In all, 18 had additional information or requested
a committee interview; however, this information could not be
followed up without access to the debriefing reports.

Based on these returns, which included a formal release granting
the Committee permission to review that portion of their debriefing
that related to (1) the returnee's knowledge of any individual in
the prison system or (2) to his knowledge of any individual who may
have survived capture, the Committee on November 13, 1992 requested
that the Secretary of Defense make available the debriefings of
those returnees who had granted permission for review.  Cheney
declined the committee request.

At the December 1, 1992 Hearing on DoD Oversight, Carl Ford,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs in an exchange with Senator Kerry and Senator Smith agreed
to work with the committee to seek a compromise on staff access to
the returnee debriefings.  In response to committee
letters, Andrews noted on Dec. 28, 1992:

    We continue to allow the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
    the Select Committee access to the POW debriefings.  We
    are aware that a number of returnees have consented to a
    review by staff of the Committee on POW/MIA Affairs of
    that portion of their debriefings which relates to their
    knowledge of the presence of other POWs in the prison
    system or of their knowledge of any individuals who may
    have survived their incident of capture.

    These former prisoners were asked to grant access to
    Department of Defense records that they do not control.
    If we were to permit staff access to those records where
    the Select Committee has obtained a release it would be
    unfair to the others who might feel pressured concerning
    their decisions to maintain the confidentiality of their
    experiences and would set an unacceptable precedent for
    returnees in future conflicts.

    If the Select Committee determines that the very
    significant cost is warranted, the Department could one
    again review all these debriefs and extract the text
    containing the names of the unaccounted for Americans.
    This effort would take several months to complete.

    We have a high degree of confidence that the effort to
    glean names of unaccounted for Americans from our
    returnees during Operation Homecoming was thorough and
    that those names are accurately reflected in the 1978
    list referenced by Senator Smith on December 3, 1992,
    during the open hearings of the Committee.  In the
    context of Senator Smith's concern that the 1978 list
    might be based on flawed analysis, the Joint Services
    SERE Agency (JSSA) conducted an extensive analysis of the
    Mulligan-Collamore example cited by Senator Smith.  The
    original analysis was reconfirmed by the JSSA review
    which is summarized in enclosure 1.  We believe that the
    accuracy of the remainder of the 1978 list wold be
    substantiated under similar scrutiny.

    JSSA has examined the four debriefs reviewed by Senator Smith
    for any name anomalies and none were found.  The JSSA is
    willing to conduct a similar review of a limited number of
    Committee-selected debriefs of special concern, in order to
    satisfy any specific questions the Committee may have
    regarding the 1978 list.  However, the transcript analysis
    process is lengthy and the analytical resources available to
    the JSSA necessarily limit the cases that can be reviewed
    prior to issuance of the Select Committee's final report.

    Your letter also asks whether returnees may review their own
    debriefs. We have a long standing policy that returnees may
    have visual access to the transcript of their debriefing but
    may not retain copies of the debriefing records.  The debrief
    remains classified SECRET.

    Finally, Mr. Codinha's letter requests the source of
    information for the HOMECOMING computer listings and an
    unclassified copy of the final list of the names of missing
    men about whom the returnees offered information.  The
    original sources for this database were principally the Phase
    I,II and III Egress Recap debriefer report messages.  these
    reports were prepared by the officials who conducted the
    debriefings and were transmitted to Headquarters United States
    Air Force for entry into a database.  As additional
    information was gained concerning the fate of missing
    Americans this database was updated.  For example, names of
    individuals the returnees mentioned but who had returned to
    U.S.control, or whose remains were recovered, were not
    retained in this database.  The Joint Services SERE Agency has
    researched its files for documentation relating to other
    possible sources for entry into this database, but has so far
    found none.  The unclassified copy of the final list is at
    Enclosure 2.

The committee request was in furtherance of a complete record, the
suspicions surrounding the debriefing process, the DIA commentary
on names appearing in returnee debriefs, and because the
committee was denied access for a detailed review of the
debriefings, the Committee again requested that DoD combine the
work previously done on 51 of the approximated 350 names on the
United States Air Force computer listing of the HOMECOMING
debriefings, the work done on Senator Smith's list of 324 with
those not completed to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the
lists of names from the Homecoming debriefs.

Discussion

The Committee repeatedly requested that DoD again conduct a full
review of returnee debriefings. DoD declined to do so. The
Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman were allowed access to the
debriefings, but the volume precluded more than a sampling.

The Committee then requested access by staff to conduct this
review. DoD declined. Therefore, the Committee has placed into the
Archives the computer listings of the debriefing results and
encourages the public to review these comments and draw their own
conclusions.

The Committee urges DoD to conduct a full, independent review to
clarify this issue for the public. The review should be undertaken
by DoD staff and not assigned to the DIA, and the results should be
provided to the appropriate oversight committees of Congress and
made public.