The Committee investigated whether the United States Government may
have undertaken or supported covert operations in order to confirm
the presence of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia after Operation
Homecoming and, if so, to review the intelligence information upon
which those operations were based.
The Committee has identified only one operation of this type
mounted after 1973. Although operational details remain classified,
the fact that the operation took place has been reported publicly.
The operation was prompted by a combination of human, photographic
and signals intelligence concerning the possible presence of as
many as 30 American POWs at a detention camp near the village of
Nhom Marrot in Laos from 1979 until early 1981. The intelligence
resulted in extensive and highest-level efforts by the U.S.
Government to confirm the information. Unfortunately, the results
of the covert operation were inconclusive and subsequent efforts
were rendered impossible by press leaks.
Intelligence Support in Laos During the Vietnam War
During the Vietnam war, intelligence support for the U.S. effort in
Laos was handicapped because Administration policy, at the
insistence of the State Department, excluded the significant use of
military intelligence assets. This was true despite the fact that
accounting for missing military personnel in Laos was the
responsibility of the respective military services, and despite
strenuous efforts made by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to gain
support for an improved POW/MIA related military intelligence
effort. The Committee believes that an expanded wartime military
intelligence effort in Laos might have increased significantly our
ability to account for the Americans lost in that country.
Cooperation from Governments in Southeast Asia
It is not possible to account for the Americans who are missing
from the war in Southeast Asia without cooperation from the
governments of the region, especially Vietnam. The U.S. has
requested this cooperation in four forms. First, we have requested
information concerning live American prisoners, former prisoners or
deserters. Second, we have asked for the return of any recovered or
recoverable remains of missing American servicemen. Third, we have
sought accesss to files, records, documents and other materials
that are relevant to the fate of missing Americans. Finally, we
have asked for permission to visit certain locations within these
countries for the purpose of investigating live-sighting reports
and searching actual or suspected airplane crash sites.
The Committee has done everything it could to complement the
diplomatic and political initiatives of the Executive branch in
seeking to encourage a greater degree of cooperation on POW/MIA
issues from the governments of Southeast Asia.
Vietnam
The U.S. has long suspected that the North Vietnamese have been
withholding a considerable amount of information bearing on the
fate of missing Americans. The North Vietnamese maintained detailed
records of U.S. servicemen who came within their prison system
during the war, including many lost in North Vietnamese-controlled
areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. U.S. intelligence
agencies are convinced, moreover, that the Government of Vietnam
recovered and stored an unknown quantity of remains of American
servicemen for release at politically strategic points in time.
The level of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation in accounting for missing
Americans has varied over the years depending on bilateral and
global political conditions and on the degree of emphasis placed on
the issue by officials of the United States. At the time the Select
Committee was created, there was considerable progress being made
in the investigation of discrepancy cases. In addition, an
agreement had been reached with Vietnam to allow an official
Defense Department investigating presence to be established in
Hanoi. These steps were directly attributable to the work of Gen.
John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam on POW/MIA
issues.
The impetus for Vietnam's cooperation has come from several
directions. Gen. Vessey has provided the Vietnamese with a
respected and influential source of contact within our government.
Bush Administration policies have established a clear linkage
between different levels of Vietnamese cooperation and American
response. The disintegration of the Soviet empire has deprived
Vietnam of many external sources of economic assistance and
political comfort. The rapid economic growth of other Southeast
Asian nations has given younger Vietnamese leaders a strong
incentive to establish their own contacts with the west. And the
creation of the Select Committee has demonstrated anew the high
priority attached to the POW/MIA issue by the American people and
government. Obviously, the Committee does not know precisely how
all of these matters have been factored into the calculations of
the Vietnamese Government, but clearly the overall trends are
hopeful.
Over the past year, Committee Members have visited Vietnam on four
occasions to press for further information. Committee delegations
met with a wide range of high-level Vietnamese officials, including
those in charge of administering the wartime prisoner of war
system. The Committee visits, coupled with ongoing efforts from the
Executive branch, have yielded substantial results.
These results include:
permission for U.S. investigators to carry out short-notice
investigations of many live-sighting reports;
permission for U.S. investigators to use U.S.-owned,
maintained and operated helicopters in the course of
investigations within Vietnam;
grants of access to certain highly-secure prison and defense
ministry buildings for the purpose of investigating live-
sighting reports;
guarantees of full access for JTF-FA investigators to
political and military archives containing POW/MIA related
information;
access to certain key archival documents and personnel that
had been long-requested, and long-denied by Vietnam;
the provision of thousands of photographs of American wartime
casualties;
access to Vietnam's military museum, including hundreds of
material objects once owned by American servicemen that might
contain clues about the fate of missing Americans;
declaration of an amnesty for any Vietnamese citizens
illegally holding American remains to come forward with them
without fear of punishment;
a commitment to cooperate in the conduct of an "oral history"
program that would seek to record information from Vietnamese
military officials, soldiers and civilians who might have
information about the fate of missing Americans;
promises of full cooperation from Vietnam in working with Laos
and Cambodia to investigate discrepancy cases involving
servicemen lost in parts of those countries controlled by
North Vietnamese forces during the war; and
permission for POW/MIA families, if they so desire, to come to
Vietnam and evaluate the investigation process.
The Committee welcomes the very substantial strides towards full
cooperation on the POW/MIA issue that the Government of Vietnam has
made in recent months. The Committee looks forward to the
implementation of those steps in the hope that they will yield
significant additional information concerning missing Americans and
encourages the Executive branch to do all it can to see that the
promises and commitments made by Vietnam are fulfilled.
In noting recent progress, the Committee does not wish to under-
state the fact that the progress is coming very late--almost 20
years after the signing of the peace agreement, and after two
decades of noncooperation, stalling and deception on the part of
Vietnam's leaders. The Committee also recognizes that the recent
changes in policy appear to be the result primarily of Vietnam's
desire for economic contacts with the west. The closed and
nondemocratic nature of the government in Vietnam argues for
caution in accepting Vietnamese promises, for pledges given by a
government unwilling to be open with its own people can hardly be
taken at face value. Nonetheless, the Committee remains hopeful
that recent improvements in POW/MIA cooperation are symptomatic of
a trend in Vietnam that will lead ultimately to dramatic
improvements in human rights, and political, economic and religious
freedoms.
United States policy towards Vietnam should reflect the importance
of freedoms that are central to American society and which have
been central to our investigation. Without a free press or
representative government, the American people would not have
learned the full extent of our own government's knowledge about our
POW/MIAs. Our policy towards Vietnam, as towards the other nations
of Southeast Asia, should be predicated on a vision of the same
freedoms for the people of that region that we enjoy here at home.
Laos
More than 500 Americans are still listed as unaccounted for in
Laos, including 335 who were originally considered either POW or
MIA. Accordingly, the Committee has attached a high priority to
gaining greater cooperation from the Lao Government. The current
leaders of Laos, who are successors to the Pathet Lao forces that
contended for power during the war, almost certainly have some
information concerning missing Americans that they have not yet
shared. At a minimum, they should be able to provide specific
information about the fates of a small number of U.S. POWs known to
have been held by the Pathet Lao during the early stages of the
war. Unfortunately, Lao leaders have been significantly less
cooperative than those in Vietnam. The Lao have denied any
knowledge of U.S. POWs; they have refused access to some requested
sources of information; and they have been even more reluctant than
the Vietnamese to grant U.S. access to their territory for
conducting live-sighting investigations and inspecting crash
sights. The atmosphere has improved to some extent in recent
months, however. As a result, some discrepancy case investigations
are underway and negotiations are ongoing for the establishment of
a permanent POW/MIA investigation office in Vientiane.
Cambodia
The present government of war-ravaged Cambodia cannot be expected
to possess documentary information relevant to the fate of missing
American servicemen. Nonetheless, the Committee met with Cambodian
President Hun Sen, who expressed his government's full cooperation
with the U.S. in efforts to resolve discrepancy cases.
Unfortunately, the Cambodian Government is unable to guarantee
security in areas controlled by the brutal and lawless Khmer Rouge.
The Committee is grateful to President Hun Sen for his help on this
issue, given the scope and urgency of the other perils faced by his
government and his country.
Government Policies and Actions
Declassification
The Committee believes that much of the controversy surrounding the
U.S. Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue could have been
avoided if relevant documents had been declassified and made
available to the public long ago. Unnecessary secrecy breeds the
suspicion that important information is being withheld, while
fueling speculation about what that information may be.
From its inception, the Committee has urged the Executive branch to
identify and declassify all documents and other materials within
its possession that are related to POW/MIA issues, with the single
exception of information bearing directly on intelligence sources
and methods.
A Task Force of the Select Committee, led by Senators Charles Robb
and Chuck Grassley, formulated specific requests and
recommendations upon which the Committee acted. For example, the
President was asked, and agreed, to order the expeditious
declassification of POW/MIA records from the Vietnam War, and the
U.S. Senate unanimously approved a resolution calling for the
declassification of POW/MIA materials. A series of letters sent,
requests made and meetings held resulted in a high degree of
cooperation and understanding between the Committee and the
Executive branch on this issue.
The result of the Committee's efforts has been the most rapid and
comprehensive declassification of materials on a single subject in
American history. More than one million pages have already been
declassified and the Committee is confident that remaining
documents will be made available. The Committee believes that
President Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft should
be congratulated for their cooperation on this issue.
Although the Committee was generally very satisfied with the degree
of understanding and help it received from the Executive branch,
its request for the release of relevant CIA operational files has,
to date, been denied.
The Committee recommends that the process of declassification of
current POW/MIA related materials go forward rapidly until
completion and that the relevant CIA operations files be included.
The Committee also recommends that policies be put in place to
assure the rapid declassification of POW/MIA related information
from possible future conflicts. It should be enshrined in both
attitude and law that the right of a POW/MIA family to know what
the government knows about its loved one is as inalienable a right
as any spelled out in the Constitution.
Finally, the Committee's records will be sent to the National
Archives, with specific instructions that they be made available
for public review. We caution, however, that these records include
staff materials, memoranda of conversation, notes and other
documents that may reflect raw opinion, incorrect data, discredited
theories, or bits of fact that may mislead unless placed within a
proper context. The Committee emphasizes that judgments reached by
the Committee, after consideration of all available evidence, are
reflected in this report. Other information and judgments should
not be accorded credibility simply because of their presence in the
Committee's working files.
Inter-Agency Group
Since January, 1980, Executive branch policy-making has been
coordinated by the Interagency Group on POW/MIA Affairs (IAG).
Agencies and organizations represented on the IAG include the
Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
National Security Council and the National League of POW/MIA
Families (the League). In recent years, IAG meetings have occurred
every two to three weeks on the average. Meetings are characterized
by informal discussions of policy options; decisions are reached by
consensus; and no formal minutes of the meetings are maintained.
The scope of IAG discussion covers a broad spectrum of POW/MIA
related matters including intelligence collection, communications
with families, diplomatic initiatives and public awareness
activities. A major focus of attention over the past two years has
been U.S. policy towards Vietnam.
The presence of League President Ann Mills Griffiths on the IAG is
controversial. During Committee hearings, Members of the IAG said
Griffiths was a highly constructive and energetic member of the
group who has contributed significantly to improvements in U.S.
policy. It is, however, extremely unusual for a private citizen to
serve on a high-level panel such as the IAG, and to have access to
sensitive intelligence information without the kind of
accountability and official responsibility demanded of government
representatives on that group.
During the summer of 1991, for example, Griffiths actively
discouraged the Defense Department from granting access to
classified POW/MIA materials to Senate staff investigators with
appropriate clearances. The Committee finds it anomalous that a
private citizen representing POW/MIA families would be in a
position to try to deny Senate investigators the same right to
review sensitive materials that she herself has been granted.
The Committee believes that an interagency coordinating body for
POW/MIA policies is needed and that the IAG ably fulfills this
role. However, the Committee is disturbed by the lack of formality
in IAG record-keeping and believes that, at a minimum, that the
minutes of discussions at such meetings should be maintained.
Second, although the IAG should consult regularly with the League
and other POW/MIA family organizations, the Committee believes that
the role of the IAG and issues of membership on it should be
reviewed by the new Administration.
Government-to-Government Offers
The Committee investigated the possibility that Vietnam or Laos had
approached U.S. officials at any time since the end of the war in
Southeast Asia with a proposal that live U.S. POWs be returned in
exchange for money or some other consideration. The Committee found
no convincing evidence of any such offer being made. There were,
however, two incidents which require further explanation.
The Committee received information that the Reagan Administration
may have received an offer from Vietnam in 1981, transmitted
through a third country, to exchange live POWs for $4.5 billion.
The source of the information was a Secret Service agent who
reported that he had overheard a discussion in the White House
concerning this subject. The Committee deposed one of the
individuals, former National Security Adviser Richard Allen, said
to have been involved in the discussion, and several individuals
who were said to have been in the area of the discussion. The
Secret Service agent was not willing to provide testimony to the
Committee voluntarily, and the Committee voted 7-4 not to subpoena
that testimony. A complete description of the investigation and the
subpoena issue is contained in Chapter 6 of this report.
The Committee also received a report concerning a possible approach
by Vietnam in 1984, through officials in an ASEAN nation,
concerning the exchange of American remains and possibly live POWs.
According to the report, the Vietnamese had indicated that they
would welcome an offer from the U.S. on the subject. U.S. officials
traveled to Vietnam late in 1984, but were reportedly told by
Vietnamese officials that there were no live POWs and that the only
issue that could be discussed involved remains. Select Committee
investigators traveled to the ASEAN nation to interview officials
in an effort to determine whether an approach from Vietnam
concerning live U.S. POWs had, in fact, been made. The results were
inconclusive. Two secondary sources disagreed about whether an
exchange involving live POWs had been discussed. The individual who
had initially discussed the subject with Vietnamese officials later
told the State Department that the issue of live American POWs had
not been raised. This investigation is also described in greater
detail in chapter 6.
Review of Private Activities
A major part of the Committee's investigation entailed the review
of private activities related to the POW/MIA issue. This review
focused on efforts by such organizations to educate the public
about the issue, to influence government policy, to raise funds and
to recover information concerning possible American POWs.
In its review, the Committee asked more than 50 POW/MIA-related
organizations to provide information, on a voluntary basis,
concerning their activities. Committee staff also interviewed or
took formal testimony from organization officials and from the
family members of some POW/MIAs.
The Committee found that the vast majority of POW/MIA related
organizations are modest, local groups of volunteers operating on
small budgets and dedicated to public education, grassroots
lobbying, mutual assistance and remembrance activities. These
organizations, and those who support them, have performed an
important service for the nation in maintaining a strong national
spotlight on the need for the fullest possible accounting of our
POW/MIAs.
The Committee investigated several privately-organized operations
aimed at physically rescuing or recovering information concerning
possible American POWs. These included: 1) the Team Falcon
operation in 1991-1992; 2) a 1988 effort to locate prisoners in
Laos; 3) Operation Skyhook II, an early 1980's initiative also
aimed at finding prisoners in Laos; and 4) the efforts of retired
Army Lt. Col. Bo Gritz. None of these operations have been
successful in rescuing prisoners or in uncovering evidence that
prisoners are being held.
The Committee also investigated a number of photographs of
individuals purported to be of U.S. POWs. In the cases
investigated, we found that such photographs are sometimes used by
private organizations as a means of attracting financial support
for "rescue" or "reconnaissance" operations. The Committee
concluded, based on investigative work done by the DIA, that
photographs circulated in 1991 allegedly depicting missing
Americans Donald Carr, Daniel V. Borah, John L. Robertson, Larry J.
Stevens and Albro Lundy are fraudulent. (The Committee respects the
fact that the Robertson, Stevens and Lundy families have not
accepted the DIA analysis).
In contrast to the large number of small, voluntary POW/MIA
organizations, there are a few private POW organizations that are
relatively large, have paid staff and use professional fundraisers
to prepare and distribute solicitation materials to millions of
actual or potential contributors. These solicitations have yielded
tens of millions of dollars in contributions since the end of the
war. The Committee was concerned about a number of issues,
including the extent to which some groups have diverted funds for
purposes other than those advertised, the possibility that
misleading or false information has been included in solicitations,
the failure of fundraisers' to disclose information to potential
donors and the impact that these solicitations may have had on the
emotions and expectations of POW/MIA families.
The Committee's principal findings are:
The vast majority of private organizations engaged in POW/MIA
related activities reflect the highest standards of voluntary,
public service and deserve the nation's gratitude and praise.
Private initiatives aimed at the "rescue" of U.S. prisoners
have failed in the past and are problematic for several
reasons. In general, such operations are dependent on sources
of information in Southeast Asia that have a very poor record
of reliability and, in some cases, a consistent track record
of fraud. Second, it is unrealistic to believe that such
efforts will have a better chance of success than official
efforts. Third, the possibility exists that such operations
might jeopardize ongoing U.S. diplomatic and intelligence
activities. Fourth, such activities sometimes involve the
violation of U.S. and/or foreign law.
The manufacture of fraudulent POW/MIA related materials,
including photographs, dog tags and other purported evidence
of live Americans has become a cottage industry in certain
parts of Southeast Asia, and particularly Thailand. Sadly,
these activities have been spurred by well-intentioned private
offers of large rewards for information leading to the return
of live U.S. POWs. The Committee is angered and repulsed by
activities that exploit the anguish of POW/MIA families for
private gain.
The Committee's examination of POW/MIA-related fundraising
activities has created serious reason for concern. In some
instances, an excessive percentage of funds raised has been
retained by the fundraising organization. In others, the
fundraising solicitations have over-stated to the point of
distortion the weight of evidence indicating that live U.S.
POWs continue to be held in Southeast Asia.
Information from Russia and Eastern Europe
Although the Committee's investigation focused primarily on efforts
to account for Americans missing from the war in Southeast Asia,
the principle of accounting for lost American servicemen is the
same, whether the war occurred 20 years ago or 50 years ago.
Accordingly, the Committee undertook a review of information and
allegations concerning Americans missing from earlier conflicts and
hired a full time investigator to work in Moscow on this and
related issues.
The Committee's effort was facilitated greatly by the lifting of
the Iron Curtain and by the policies of openness and cooperation
advocated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In February, 1992,
the Committee's Chairman, Sen. John Kerry, and Vice-chairman, Sen.
Bob Smith, met with Russian officials and veterans in Moscow to
discuss cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. This visit laid the
groundwork for the creation of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission
(Commission) on POW/MIA Affairs under the leadership of Col. Gen.
Dimitri Volkogonov and Malcolm Toon, former U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union. The objectives of the Commission are 1) to gain
access to people and documents in Russia that could shed light on
the fate of missing Americans; 2) to pursue reports that current or
former U.S. POWs may be alive within the borders of the former
Soviet Union; and 3) to establish a means by which remains
identified as American may be repatriated. Investigative work by
the U.S. side to the Joint Commission is carried out by the Defense
Department's Task Force Russia (TFR), under the leadership of Gen.
Bernard Loeffke.
The Committee's investigation was conducted, in large part, through
the staff investigator assigned to work with the Commission in
Moscow. In Washington, the Committee reviewed documents obtained
from the National Archives and from private researchers. We also
conducted interviews with former officials of the Eisenhower
Administration and others possessing information on the subject.
In June, 1992, the Committee hosted a meeting of the Commission
with Gen. Volkogonov following Russian President Yeltsin's public
statements on the POW/MIA issue. In November, 1992, two days of
public hearings were held during which both U.S. investigators and
Gen. Volkogonov testified. Finally, in December, 1992, Committee
investigators participated in fact-finding trips to Czechoslavakia
and Ukraine, and attended a formal meeting of the Commission in
Moscow.
The Committee emphasizes that firm or precise judgments about the
number and circumstances under which American military and civilian
personnel may have found themselves detained within the former
Soviet Union in the past cannot yet be made. Large quantities of
records, both in Moscow and elsewhere, remain to be reviewed. There
are also many well-informed former military and intelligence
officers and diplomatic personnel who have not yet been
interviewed. It is possible that evidence will be uncovered
indicating greater involvement of former Soviet officials in the
interrogation, transportation or detention of U.S. POWs from the
Vietnam War and prior conflicts. Thus, the findings below, which
are based on work to date, must be considered as preliminary in
nature:
Gen. Volkogonov's Assessment
Gen. Volkogonov contends that, to his knowledge, no Americans are
currently being held against their will within the borders of the
former Soviet Union. Although the Committee has found evidence
that some U.S. POWs were held in the former Soviet Union after WW
II, the Korean War and Cold War incidents, we have found no proof
that would contradict Gen. Volkogonov's contention with respect to
the present. However, the Committee cannot, based on its
investigation to date, rule out the possibility that one or more
U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held
somewhere within the borders of the former Soviet Union.
World War II
The Committee found that the Russians have been particularly
successful in producing World War II archival documents, and is
pleased to report that the fate of some American military and
civilian personnel from the World War II era has been determined
through recent investigations in Russia. Moreover, archival
documents provided by Russia indicate that several hundred U.S.
POWs were held against their will on Soviet territory at the end of
World War II. In almost all cases, these were individuals who had
been born in, or who had previously lived in, the Soviet Union, and
who could, therefore, be considered Soviet citizens by the Soviet
Government. Many of these individuals served in the Armed Forces of
Germany, fought against the Soviet Army and were captured in
combat. Some U.S. civilians from this era survived terms in
concentration camps and are still alive today, living freely either
in one of the former Soviet Republics or in the United States.
Cold War
There is evidence, some of which has been confirmed to the
Committee by President Yeltsin, that some U.S. personnel, still
unaccounted for from the Cold War, were taken captive and held
within the former Soviet Union. This information involves several
incidents stretching across the former Soviet Union from the Baltic
Sea to the Sea of Japan.
The Committee is pleased to report that Task Force Russia has been
actively investigating these cases and is keeping surviving family
members fully apprised of its progress to date. The Committee
notes, however, that progress is, in large part, dependent on
cooperation from Russian authorities. In the Committee's November,
1992 hearings, our investigator in Moscow testified that the U.S.
was "intentionally being stonewalled" by the Russians on the
subject of Cold War incidents, despite pledges of cooperation from
President Yeltsin and Gen. Volkogonov. The Committee, therefore,
urges the Joint Commission to place special attention and focus on
obtaining further information on the fate of those U.S. personnel
who are believed to have been taken captive during the Cold War.
Korean Conflict
There is strong evidence, both from archived U.S. intelligence
reports and from recent interviews in Russia, that Soviet military
and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of
American POWs during the Korean Conflict, notwithstanding recent
official statements from the Russian side that this did not happen.
Additionally, the Committee has reviewed information and heard
testimony which we believe constitutes strong evidence that some
unaccounted for American POWs from the Korean Conflict were
transferred to the former Soviet Union in the early 1950's. While
the identity of these POWs has not yet been determined, the
Committee notes that Task Force Russia concurs in our assessment
concerning the transfers. We are pleased that this subject was
raised by the U.S. side in December, 1992 at the plenary session of
the Joint Commission in Moscow.
The Committee further believes it is possible that one or more POWs
from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of
the former Soviet Union. The most notable case in this regard
concerns a USAF pilot named David "Markham" or "Markin", who was
reportedly shot down during the Korean Conflict. According to
several sources, this pilot was reportedly alive in detention
facilities in Russia as late as 1991. Although Task Force Russia
has thus far been unable to confirm these reports, we note that the
investigation is continuing.
Vietnam War
The Committee is aware of several reports that U.S. POWs may have
been transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War.
Information about this possibility that was provided by a former
employee of the National Security Agency (NSA), Mr. Jerry Mooney,
was thoroughly investigated and could not be substantiated. The
Committee notes that Mr. Mooney testified that he personally
believed prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union but that he
had "no direct information" that this took place. Other reports
concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from
Vietnam to the former Soviet Union deserve further investigation
and followup.
With respect to interrogations, the Committee has confirmed that
one KGB officer participated directly in the questioning of an
American POW during the Vietnam Conflict. More generally, Soviet
military officers have told the Committee that they received
intelligence from North Vietnamese interrogations of American POWs
and that the Soviets "participated" in interrogations through the
preparation of questions and through their presence during some of
the interrogations. It is possible that American POWs would not
have been aware of the presence of Soviet officers during these
interrogations. The Committee has also received information that
Soviet personnel operated certain SAM sites in Vietnam which shot
down American aircraft during the war.
The Committee notes that the cooperation received to date from
Russia on POW/MIA matters has been due largely to the leadership of
President Boris Yeltsin. During a visit to Washington last summer,
President Yeltsin declared that "each and every document in each
and every archive will be examined to investigate the fate of every
American unaccounted for." Although there is still much work to be
done, Russian officials deserve credit for providing access to
archival material, for cooperating in efforts to solicit testimony
from Russian veterans and other citizens and for their willingness
to disclose certain previously undisclosed aspects of the
historical record. The ultimate success of the Joint Commission
will be judged, however, on whether the U.S. side is able to obtain
full support for its interview program and archival research from
all levels of power and authority throughout the former Soviet
Union.
President Yeltsin has made a heroic effort to demonstrate his own
commitment to full cooperation and Gen. Volkogonov has done a great
deal, with limited resources, to meet this standard. Unfortunately,
the level of cooperation from within the Russian military and
intelligence bureaucracy has been less extensive and has, at times,
seemed intentionally obstructive. This may well be due to the
uncertainty of the current political situation in Russia. It is
vital, therefore, that U.S. officials, both in Congress and the
Executive branch, continue to demonstrate to Russian authorities
that America attaches a high priority to cooperation on this issue
and to ensure that any problems that might develop are raised with
the Russians promptly and at a senior level.
The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russia Joint
Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain the full
cooperation, as needed and appropriate, of the other Republics of
the former Soviet Union.
Information from North Korea and China
As part of the Committee's investigation into the fate of those
Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict, the Committee
Vice-Chairman traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea from December 19-
21, 1992. This trip was especially significant in that it was the
first time a United States Senator had traveled to the North Korean
capital. Also, for the first time, a State Department official
traveled with Senator Smith to Pyongyang, in addition to two staff
members working with the Committee. The trip itself was a follow-
on to an earlier trip made by Senator Smith to Korea in June, 1991.
The timing of the trip was important in that just a few weeks
earlier, the Committee had held the first in-depth Congressional
hearings on American POW/MIAs from the Korean Conflict in more than
35 years. In view of the fact that the North Korean Government has
provided virtually no information on 8,177 unaccounted for
Americans in the last 40 years, the goal of the trip was to
establish a dialogue which would encourage North Korea to move the
accounting process forward on a humanitarian basis. A second goal
of the fact-finding trip was to gain information from North Korea
on reports which had surfaced during the Committee's November
hearings on the fate of some American POWs.
The Committee is pleased to report that Senator Smith was
successful in achieving both of these goals during the trip.
Meetings were held with Supreme Assembly Speaker Yang Hyong Sop,
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, and a staff of ministry
officials who appeared knowledgeable on POW/MIA issues. The
atmosphere was cooperative and it was the sense of Senator Smith
and his delegation that North Korea is prepared and willing to move
forward on this humanitarian issue without any preconditions. As
a sign of good faith, the North Koreans allowed Senator Smith and
his delegation to visit their war museum in Pyongyang, although the
request had been made only hours earlier. This was the first time
any American official had visited the museum. At the museum,
Senator Smith was able to view photographs of POWs, documents,
letters, personal effects and captured weaponry from U.S.
servicemen. Senator Smith's delegation was also permitted to
photograph and take notes concerning many of the items in the
museum. Important new information was also learned from North
Korean officials concerning China's involvement with American POWs.
The principal Committee findings and recommendations concerning
this trip are:
Although the North Korean officials with whom Senator Smith
met denied that any American POWs had survived to the present
day in North Korea, the Committee cannot exclude the
possibility in view of intelligence information which has been
received by the United States in recent years. Specifically,
the Committee shares Senator Smith's frustration during his
trip at not being able to investigate unconfirmed reports that
a small number of American POWs may be teaching English at a
military language school on the outskirts of Pyongyang. The
Committee, therefore, urges the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to cooperate fully in the
investigation of these recent reports, in addition to other
live-sighting reports which have been received by the United
States during the last few decades.
It is likely that a large number of possible MIA remains can
be repatriated and several records and documents on
unaccounted for POWs and MIAs can be provided from North Korea
once a joint working level commission is set up under the
leadership of the United States. Accordingly, the Committee
strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to take
immediate steps to form this commission through the United
Nations Command at Panmunjom, Korea. The Committee also
encourages President-elect Clinton, upon taking office, to
appoint a high level representative to sit on the commission.
The Committee further believes that the proposed joint
commission should have a strictly humanitarian mission and
should not be tied to political developments on the Korean
pennisula.
Comments made by North Korean officials during the trip
substantiated indications that many American POWs had been
held in China during the Korean Conflict and that foreign POW
camps in both China and North Korea were run by Chinese
officials. In addition, North Korean officials confirmed that
propaganda photos showing POW camps with large numbers of U.S.
personnel had, in fact, been taken in China, not in North
Korea as purported by the propaganda publications. The
Committee notes that other information from both high level
Russian intelligence sources and from several U.S.
intelligence reports corroborates the comments made by the
North Koreans.
Given the fact that only 26 Army and 15 Air Force personnel
returned from China following the war, the Committee can now firmly
conclude that the People's Republic of China surely has information
on the fate of other unaccounted for American POWs. The Committee,
therefore, strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to
form a POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia.
The Committee also strongly urges the Department of State to raise
this matter at the highest levels in Beijing. In this regard, we
are pleased that the first round of talks was held in January,
1993. We believe that a proposed POW Task Force on China will need
to have several additional rounds of talks with the Chinese in
order to search for and receive POW information in China over the
coming months.
For the surviving families of those Americans still missing from
the Korean Conflict, the perception has been that determining the
fate of their loved ones is a task that has not been vigorously
pursued by their government. We note that this perception has been
fueled by past intransigence and lack of information from North
Korea and China. In addition, accounting for POWs and MIAs from
the Vietnam Conflict has received far greater media attention in
America. The Committee can therefore understand why the Korean
Conflict has often been labeled the "Forgotten War" by veterans and
POW/MIA family members.
However, in view of the Vice-Chairman's recent trip to North Korea,
the Committee believes that a dramatic breakthough has been
achieved in terms of establishing a dialogue and gaining access to
new information on POWs and MIAs. Consequently, there is now a
window of opportunity which the Committee believes should be fully
exploited by the United States on behalf of the families of those
Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict.
Families
By its nature, war claims victims and produces suffering. Some are
killed, and their loved ones mourn. Some become missing, and their
loved ones both mourn and hope. When a loved one is in danger, the
state of "not knowing" is emotionally the most difficult; and for
many POW/MIA families, that state has now stretched on for two
decades or more.
The Committee understands that it is difficult to generalize
accurately about POW/MIA families, whether from the Vietnam era or
from prior wars. The families are diverse in their views, in the
particular circumstances surrounding the loss of their loved one,
and in the experiences they have had in dealing with their
government. Some believe the government has generally done all it
could; others believe it has bungled inexcusably. Some believe we
should put this part of our history behind us; others are convinced
live Americans remain in captivity. None among us can attack the
validity of any one of these points of view; for on this question,
every POW/MIA family member has fair claim to be considered an
expert in the truest sense of that word.
The Committee owes its creation to the activism of family members
and, from the beginning, sought to work closely with the families
and with their representatives. Fitting, family members were
represented at the Committee's first set of hearings and the last.
The Committee asked not only for public testimony about individual
cases, but directly contacted each of the POW/MIA families from the
Vietnam era seeking their advice and participation.
Largely in response to Committee and family requests, the President
appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA
Affairs in January, 1992 to serve as a central coordinator and
point of contact for families and for the bureaucracy. Even more
importantly, the Committee's drive for the declassification and
public release of POW/MIA related documents was a direct result of
past family frustration in seeking answers to legitimate questions
about their loved ones and about the government's overall knowledge
of the issue.
The Committee's review of past family experiences reflect an array
of problems in dealing with our government that never should have
happened and that can--with proper organization and planning--be
avoided in the future.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends:
Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field in
Southeast Asia should be made available, when schedules
permit, to meet with families in the United States.
Military service casualty offices should be headed by
civilians who are not subject to the kind of routine duty
rotations experienced by military personnel. Individuals in
these sensitive positions must have experience and a base of
institutional memory if they are to deal effectively and
knowledgeably with family members.
The resumed publication of a regular newsletter containing
POW/MIA related information would be a useful means of sharing
new developments with the families.
Guidelines should be established immediately for the creation
of a central computerized data base within the Executive
branch with information on all unaccounted for U.S. personnel
from past military conflicts, to include World War II, Korea,
the Cold War and Vietnam. All relevant casualty and
intelligence data, in addition to any recently obtained
information potentially correlating to a specific case should
be made readily available to family members and researchers
through the central data base. On-line access to the central
data base should be made available through an easily
accessible modem system.
Procedures also should be developed to ensure that requests
for information contained in the data base can be processed
easily so that family members receive prompt, printed
responses when necessary. Additionally, procedures should be
established by the Department of Defense and the Department of
State to ensure that the data base is updated regularly. The
Committee further recommends that the Secretary of Defense
authorize the DOD family liaison officer to work with the
service casualty officers to develop a data base program which
meets the needs of families and researchers who need to use
the system.
Family members of Vietnam era POW/MIAs who would like to
travel to Southeast Asia for direct discussions with
appropriate U.S. and foreign government officials should be
encouraged and helped to do so.
Conclusion
This executive summary began with three well-deserved tributes--to
our POWs, to POW/MIA families, and to veterans and other
responsible activist groups. The efforts and contributions of
others deserve recognition, as well. The investigatory
responsibilities of this Committee caused it to place enormous
demands on the Executive branch for information, for the processing
and declassification of documents, and for access to archived
files.
Committee Members questioned current and former Executive branch
officials rigorously, repeatedly and, at times, very bluntly about
important issues of judgment and fact. These requests and questions
were an essential part of the Committee's job, but the demands
placed on the time and energies, especially of current officials,
was very real.
Accordingly, the Committee wishes to acknowledge the truly
extraordinary level of cooperation it received from President
George Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretaries of State
James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger, National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft, and many others in the Executive branch.
Further, the Committee must respond to the frequently-heard
criticism that our government is "not doing enough" in behalf of
our missing Americans. There is no question that such criticisms
have been valid at points in the past. Although the answers we seek
are in Vietnam and Laos and other foreign lands, this Committee was
created not so much because other governments have failed to
cooperate, but because our people did not believe our own
government was doing enough.
We believe that, over the past 15 months, our Committee has played
a major role in remedying past problems. Building on the efforts of
family and veterans groups, we urged creation of the JTF-FA. We
have complemented the heroic efforts made by Gen. John Vessey to
gain greater access to Vietnam so that our investigations of live-
sighting reports and discrepancy cases in that country will yield
credible results. We helped spark creation of the U.S.-Russia Joint
Commission and took steps to open the doors of cooperation with
North Korea.
Today, the improvements are visible on the ground throughout
Southeast Asia and in Moscow. The level of commitment at the
highest levels of our government has never been greater, and our
Committee has witnessed first-hand the dedication that exists
within the rank and file of the JCRC and the DIA. These are people
who have worked in extremely difficult conditions in Southeast
Asia, often for weeks at a time in remote and hostile locations,
searching for remains, following up live-sighting reports or
pursuing other evidence about what happened to missing Americans.
These individuals have earned our admiration and are symptomatic of
a revived national effort to gain the fullest possible accounting
for our POW/MIAs.
This Committee was created to remedy the atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust that has so long pervaded this issue. It is our hope
that this report, and the record of our work, will in fact help to
repair the bonds of trust between our government and the public,
and heal the wounds caused by past allegations and anger.
The bitterness surrounding the U.S. Government's effort to account
for Americans missing from past wars has gone on long enough. It is
time to move beyond past differences to a unified and informed
commitment to seek further answers within the bounds of what time
and the circumstances of war realistically permit.
Our people, and especially our POW/MIA families, have a right to
know all that it is possible to know about the fate of their fellow
countrymen and loved ones. This Committee, with strong public
support, has pressed both our government and foreign governments to
add to that knowledge--through the declassification of documents,
response to hard questions, access to archives and eyewitness
accounts. A process has been established that will permit timely,
in-country investigations of evidence that live Americans remain in
captivity. The search for remains and other evidence that could
bring certainty to families is ongoing. More people are now
employed and working full time on the POW/MIA issue than at any
time since the end of the war, almost 20 years ago. America is
finally being allowed to do what it should have been able to do
long ago.
Unfortunately, the existence of a strong "accountability process"
cannot stop the pain in a family member's heart, nor can it
substitute for the gut belief held by some that one or more U.S.
POWs survive. The qualities of love and faith reflect what is best
about us, and are not answerable to laws of probability or
perspective. That is why some of us will always bring to the
evidence a different level of passion and a different standard for
judging evidence than others. But this Committee's investigation
demonstrates that these kinds of differences need not lead to
differences of goal. It does not matter with what emotions we
proceed at this point to seek further answers; it is important only
that we continue looking as long as there is good reason to believe
that additional answers may be found.
The Committee's investigation has answered a host of questions
about the past, while opening the door to future progress. With
this final report, the Committee will cease to exist. But that does
not mean that our own work on this issue will also end. To the
extent that there remain questions outstanding that are not
adequately dealt with by the Executive branch, we will ensure that
these questions are pursued through the normal Committee structure
of the Congress. We will also work with officials in the Clinton
Administration to see that the major recommendations of the Select
Committee are implemented and that needed, additional diplomatic
steps are taken.
We undertook our assignments as Members of this Committee not only
out of official duty, but as a personal commitment; a commitment
founded variously on prior military service or a concern for
families in our respective states or out of a simple desire to
pursue the truth. For each of us, that commitment has grown over
the past year as we have worked with the families and agonized with
them in trying to sort out the facts. Now, having completed our
work as Members of the Select Committee, we move to a different
stage of our effort but with no change of goal. We remain
committed, and will ensure that our nation remains dedicated, to
obtaining the fullest possible accounting of missing Americans. We
owe no less to our POW/MIA families; nor can we accept less and be
at peace with ourselves.
