US Senate Report on Ratification of International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights

U.S. Senate Executive Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.).

The Covenant was adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976;


INTRODUCTION:


  MARCH 24, 1992. -- Ordered to be printed

  Mr. PELL, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following

  REPORT

  The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16,
1966, and signed on behalf of the United States on October 5, 1977,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with 5
reservations, 5 understandings, 4 declarations, and 1 proviso,and
recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification
thereof.


  I.  PURPOSE

  The Covenant guarantees a broad spectrum of civil and political
rights, rooted in basic democratic values and freedoms, to all
individuals within the territory or under the jurisdiction of the
States Party without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender,
ethnicity, et cetera.  The Covenant obligates each State Party to
respect and ensure these rights, to adopt legislative or other
necessary measures to give effect to these rights, and to provide an
effective remedy to those whose rights are violated.

  The Covenant also establishes a Human Rights Committee to oversee
compliance and investigate reports of noncompliance made by one Party
against another.

  II.  BACKGROUND

  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted
unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16,
1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976.  To date, 103 States
have become Party to the Covenant and another 5 have signed.

  The United States signed the Covenant on October 5, 1977.  President
Carter transmitted the Covenant to the Senate on February 23, 1978,
with several proposed U.S. conditions.  The Foreign Relations Committee
held hearings on this, and three other human rights treaties submitted
by the Carter Administration, on November 14, 15, 16, and 19, 1979.
Domestic and international events at the end of 1979, including the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran,
prevented the Committee from moving to a vote on the Covenant.  The
Reagan Administration did not indicate any interest in ratifying the
Covenant.

  On August 8, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Senator Claiborne
Pell, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, urging the
Senate to renew its consideration of the Covenant "with a view to
providing advice and Consent to ratification." On November 21, 1991,
the Bush Administration submitted a package of proposed U.S. conditions
which are, in many respects, similar to those proposed by the Carter
Administration.

  The Covenant is part of the international community's early efforts
to give the full force of international law to the principles of human
rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
United Nations Charter. The Civil and Political Rights Covenant is
rooted in western legal and ethical values.  The rights guaranteed by
the Covenant are similar to those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.

  III.  COMMITTEE ACTION

  On November 21, 1991, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a
public hearing on the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.  Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, testified on behalf of the
Administration.  The following public witnesses also testified:
Professor Louis B. Sohn, Chair Elect, Section of International Law and
Practice, American Bar Association; Professor Ronald Rotunda, College
of Law, University of Illinois; Dr. Carole Nagengast, Chair, Board of
Directors, Amnesty International; Harold W. Andersen, Chairman, World
Press Freedom Committee; William T. Lake, Member, Board of Directors,
International Human Rights Law Group; Michael H. Posner, Executive
Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights; and Bruce Fein, attorney
and columnist.

  The Committee met to consider the Covenant on March 4, 1992.  The
Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by Senator Helms
to the proposed resolution of ratification.  The Helms amendment added
a proviso, to be included in the resolution of ratification but not in
the instrument of ratification, clarifying the relationship of the
Covenant to the U.S. Constitution.  The Committee then voted 19 to 0 to
report favorably the Covenant with a resolution of ratification to the
Senate for its advice and consent.  Ayes: Senators Pell, Biden,
Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, Robb,
Wofford, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, McConnell,
Brown, and Jeffords.

  The resolution of ratification reported by the Committee contains
the reservations, understandings, and declarations submitted by the
Bush Administration and the Helms proviso.

  IV.  COMMITTEE COMMENTS

  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of
the fundamental instruments created by the international community for
the global promotion and protection of human rights.  Over 100 States,
including the member states of the European Community, Canada, and
other traditional U.S. allies, have ratified the Covenant.  In view of
the leading role that the United States plays in the international
struggle for human rights, the absence of U.S. ratification of the
Covenant is conspicuous and, in the view of many, hypocritical.  The
Committee believes that ratification will remove doubts about the
seriousness of the U.S. commitment to human rights and strengthen the
impact of U.S. efforts in the human rights field.

  The rights enumerated in the Covenant, such as freedom of thought,
conscience, religion, and expression, the right to vote, and the right
to a fair trial, are the cornerstones of a democratic society.  The
historical changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have created
an opportunity for democracy to grow and take hold.  By ratifying the
Covenant at this time, the United States can enhance its ability to
promote democratic values and the rule of law, not only in Eastern
Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union but also in those
countries in Africa and Asia which are beginning to move toward
democratization.

  Ratification will enable the United States to participate in the
work of the Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant to
monitor compliance.  Since its creation in 1977, the Human Rights
Committee has established an impressive record and has become an
important element in the U.N. human rights system.  The Committee
agrees with the Administration that the United States should accept the
competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear complaints from one
State Party about another State Party's failure to comply.  This
competence is critical to the Human Rights Committee's ability to
monitor and enforce compliance.  By accepting this competence, the
United States will not only further enhance the effectiveness of the
Human Rights Committee but also have an opportunity to play a more
aggressive role in the process of enforcing compliance with the
Covenant.

  Strong support for ratification was expressed by the majority of
witnesses that testified at the Committee's hearing in November.  The
principal argument against ratification was rooted in concern about
certain limitations that the Covenant allows on freedom of speech and
freedom of expression.  Article 19 of the Covenant guarantees the right
to freedom of expression in all its forms. However, this right can be
restricted under Article 19 in certain circumstances, for example to
protect national security or public order.  Article 20 of the Covenant
prohibits propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that would result in discrimination, hostility, or
violence.

  The Committee recognizes that these restrictions are inconsistent
with the guarantees of free speech in the U.S. Constitution and the
Bill of Rights and, therefore, strongly supports the Administration's
proposed reservation to Article 20 and declaration on the limitation of
rights.  The Committee believes that these adequately address any
potential problem which might arise with respect to this area.  The
Administration's proposed conditions, which are incorporated in the
Committee's resolution of ratification, make it absolutely clear that
no restrictions will be imposed on the rights of free speech and
expression in the United States.  Ratification of the Covenant will
allow the United States to seek revisions in Articles 19 and 20 and to
help ensure that the limitations permitted under these articles are
interpreted narrowly.

  The overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are
compatible with existing U.S. domestic law.  In those few areas where
the two diverge, the Administration has proposed a reservation or other
form of condition to clarify the nature of the obligation being
undertaken by the United States.  This approach has caused concern
among some private groups and individuals in the human rights field who
argue that U.S. law should be brought into conformance with
international human rights standards in those areas where the
international standards are superior.

  The Committee recognizes the importance of adhering to
internationally recognized standards of human rights.  Although the
U.S. record of adherence has been good, there are some areas in which
U.S. law differs from the international standard.  For example, the
Covenant prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons below the age of eighteen but U.S. law allows it
for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18.  In areas such as these,
it may be appropriate and necessary to question whether changes in U.S.
law should be made to bring the United States in to full compliance at
the international level.  However, the Committee anticipates that
changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur through the normal
legislative process.

  The approach taken by the Administration and the Committee in its
resolution of ratification will enable the United States to ratify the
Covenant promptly and to participate with greater effectiveness in the
process of shaping international norms and behavior in the area of
human rights.  It does not preclude the United States from modifying
its obligations under the Covenant in the future if changes in U.S. law
allow the United States to come into full compliance.  In view of this
situation, ratification with the Administration's proposed
reservations, understandings, and declarations is supported by a broad
coalition of human rights and legal groups and scholars in the United
States, notwithstanding concerns any of them may have with respect to
particular conditions.

  Subsequent to the Committee's hearing, questions were raised as to
whether ratification would require any changes in United States labor
law.  The Administration has taken the position that ratification would
have no effect on the domestic labor law of the United States.  The
Administration has concluded that the rights of association embodied in
Article 22 of the Covenant are general rights of association similar to
those contained in the First Amendment and that nothing in the Covenant
would require the United States to alter or amend any labor
legislation.  The Committee accepts this conclusion and agrees with the
Administration's views, as stated in Appendix B.

  During consideration of the Covenant on March 4, the Committee
accepted a proviso, offered by Senator Helms, to be included in the
resolution of ratification but not in the instrument of ratification.
The proviso states that the Covenant does not require any legislation
or other action prohibited by the Constitution.  It is similar to
language adopted by the Senate in October 1990 during consideration of
the resolution of ratification of the Covenant Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  The
substantive language of the proviso reflects the Administration's
position on the relationship between treaties and the Constitution
Since this relationship is a matter of domestic U.S. law, the proviso
is not included in the instrument of ratification.  This approach
eliminates the potential for confusion at the international level about
the nature of the U.S. ratification.

  V.  MAJOR PROVISIONS 1.  Rights guaranteed

  Each Party to the Covenant undertakes "to respect and to ensure" to
all individuals within its territory and under its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant "without distinction of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status";
to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to
these rights; and to provide an effective remedy to those whose rights
are violated.

  The rights enumerated in the Covenant include: self-determination;
right to life; right to liberty and security of person; right to
compensation for unlawful arrest or detention; liberty of movement;
right to a fair trial; right of  privacy;  freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion; freedom of expression; right of peaceful
assembly; freedom of association; rights of the family; right to vote
and participate in public affairs; and equal protection of the law. 2.
Prohibitions

  The Covenant prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; slavery, servitude, and other forms of forced
or compulsory labor; propaganda for war, and advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred. 3.  Public emergencies

  Parties to the Covenant may, in time of declared public emergency,
take measures derogating from their obligations as required by the
situation as long as such measures are not inconsistent with
international law and do not involve racial, ethnic, religious, social,
or sex discrimination. 4.  Human Rights Committee

  The Covenant establishes a Human Rights Committee, composed of
eighteen members with recognized competence in the human rights field,
to oversee compliance with the provisions of the Covenant by the
Parties.  Members are nationals of and nominated by the Parties and
serve for four-year terms.  The Committee receives reports from the
Parties on the measures they have adopted to give effect to he rights
enumerated in the Covenant and "on the progress made in the enjoyment
of those rights."

  At any time a Party may declare that it recognizes the Committee's
competence to "receive and consider communications" (i.e. complaints)
from one Party that another Party has failed to fulfill its obligations
under the Covenant.  The Committee can exercise this authority only if
both Parties -- the complaining State and the State which is the object
of the complaint -- recognize the Committee's competence.  The
Committee has one year to investigate and report on the complaint.  It
also has the authority to set up an ad hoc Conciliation Commission,
with the prior consent of the Parties involved, to assist in resolving
the matter if the Committee itself fails to do so to the Parties'
satisfaction. 5.  Obligations of Federal States

  The Covenant states expressly that obligations undertaken by the
Parties extend to all parts of federal states "without any limitations
or exceptions."

  VI.  BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONDITIONS

  The Carter Administration transmitted the Covenant to the Senate in
February 1978 with 8 conditions (4 reservations, 1 understanding, 2
declarations, and 1 statement).  In many respects, the conditions
proposed by the Bush Administration are similar to those proposed by
the Carter Administration. Following is a summary of the reservations,
understandings, and declarations proposed by the Bush Administration
and incorporated in the Committee's resolution of ratification.

  RESERVATIONS 1.  Free speech

  Article 20 of the Covenant prohibits propaganda for war and advocacy
of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.  Because the prohibitions of
Article 20 would contravene the First Amendment to the Constitution,
the Administration proposed a reservation to the effect that Article 20
does not authorize or require the restriction of free speech or freedom
of association.  The Carter Administration proposed a similar
reservation. 2.  Capital punishment

  Article 6 limits the circumstances in which capital punishment may
be imposed.  Article 6 specifically prohibits the imposition of the
death sentence for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age
and on pregnant women. The Administration accepted the obligation with
respect to pregnant women. However, it proposed a reservation
clarifying that the United States does not accept the prohibition on
executing people for crimes committed while they were 16 or 17 years of
age.  The execution of people for crimes committed while they were
under the age of 16 has been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. The reservation proposed by the Bush Administration is
significantly narrower than that proposed by the Carter Administration.
3.  Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

  Article 7 prohibits the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.  The Administration proposed a reservation limiting its
obligation to cruel, inhuman, unusual or inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.  This reservation is consonant with the
reservation proposed by the Administration and adopted by the Senate in
the resolution of ratification of the Covenant against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 4.
Criminal penalties

  Article 15, paragraph 1, stipulates that a person who has committed
an offense shall benefit from any changes in law, made subsequent to
the commission of the offense, that provide for a lighter penalty.
Under U.S. law the offender generally gets the punishment in effect at
the time of the offense.  The Administration proposed a reservation to
conform the United States' obligation under this paragraph to U.S.
domestic law.  The Carter Administration proposed a similar
reservation. 5.  Juveniles

  Paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10 stipulate respectively that
accused juveniles be separated from adults and that juvenile offenders
be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to
their age and legal status. Paragraph 4 of Article 14 requires that in
the case of juveniles, the trial procedure of the criminal justice
system shall take into account their age and the desirability of
promoting their rehabilitation.

  Although current domestic practice is generally in compliance with
these provisions, there are instances in which juveniles are not
separated from adults, for example because of the juvenile's criminal
history or the nature of the offense.  In addition, the military
justice system in the United States does not guarantee special
treatment for those under age 18.  For these reasons, the
Administration proposed a reservation stating that the United States
reserves the right, in "exceptional circumstances", to treat juveniles
as adults notwithstanding these provisions of the Covenant.  The
Administration's proposal also reserves with respect to individuals who
volunteer for military service prior to age 18.

  UNDERSTANDING 1.  Non-discrimination and equal protection

  Article 2, paragraph 1 and Article 4, paragraph 1, guarantee the
rights in the Covenant on a nondiscriminatory basis.  Article 26
provides equal protection before the law and equal protection of the
law without any discrimination.  U.S. law makes some legal
distinctions, for example on the basis of age.  The Administration
proposed an understanding to the effect that the United States does not
regard these distinctions as inconsistent with its obligations under
the Covenant. 2.  Right to compensation for illegal arrest and
miscarriage of justice

  Article 9, paragraph 5, and Article 14, paragraph 6, establish an
enforceable right to compensation for a person subjected to unlawful
arrest or detention or to a miscarriage of justice.  The Administration
argues that U.S. law provides the right to seek compensation but does
not provide a right to obtain compensation.  Therefore, the
Administration proposed an understanding conforming U.S. obligations
under these paragraphs to domestic law.  The Carter Administration
proposed similar language in the form of a reservation. 3.  Separate
treatment of the accused

  Article 10, paragraph 2, requires that accused persons be segregated
"save in exceptional circumstances" from convicts and that juveniles
who are accused of a crime be separated from adults.  The
Administration argues that federal law and prison policy conform to
this approach for the most part.  However, some exceptions exist.  For
example, prison authorities are allowed to take factors such as a
prisoner's overall dangerousness into account when determining
treatment.  In addition, prisoners are allowed to waive segregation to
participate in special programs.  The Administration proposed an
understanding clarifying the meaning of the term "exceptional
circumstances" to include these cases.

  Paragraph 3 of Article 10 states that the essential aim of the penal
system is reformation and social rehabilitation.  The Administration
proposed an understanding clarifying the relationship between these
goals and other traditional goals of the penal system such as
punishment.

  The Carter Administration proposed a statement declaring that the
requirements of paragraphs 2 and 3 are goals to be achieved
progressively. 4.  Right to counsel, compelled witnesses, double
jeopardy

  Paragraphs 3(b) and 3(d) of Article 14 provide a defendant with the
right to choose his own counsel.  U.S. law recognizes circumstances,
such as indigence, in which a defendant may not choose his own counsel.
Therefore, the Administration proposed an understanding conforming the
U.S. obligation under the treaty to domestic law.

  Paragraph 3(e) of Article 14 entitles a defendant to obtain
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him have been obtained. The Administration argues that U.S. law permits
a defendant to obtain witnesses on his own behalf only to the extent
necessary for his defense.  Therefore, the Administration proposed an
understanding conforming the U.S. obligation under this subparagraph to
domestic law.

  Paragraph 7 of Article 14 prohibits an individual from being tried
or punished again for an offense for which he or she has already been
finally convicted or acquitted.  The Administration argues that the
multiple jurisdictions in the United States allow an individual to be
acquitted at one level and prosecuted again at the federal level or to
be prosecuted in two different state jurisdictions.  In recognition of
this situation, the Administration proposed an understanding that would
limit the application of the prohibition in paragraph 7 against double
jeopardy.

  These understandings are very similar to those proposed by the
Carter Administration. 5.  Federalism

  Article 50 extends the provisions of the Covenant to all parts of
federal states.  Because of the federal nature of the U.S. system, the
Administration proposed an understanding clarifying the degree to which
the federal government is obliged to ensure compliance with the
Covenant by state and local entities. The Administration proposed and
the Senate approved a similar understanding in its resolution of
ratification of the Convention against Torture.  The Carter
Administration proposed a federal-state reservation.

  DECLARATIONS 1.  Non-self-executing

  The Administration proposed a declaration stating that Articles 1
through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.  These articles deal
with the rights guaranteed and the activities prohibited by the
Covenant. 2.  Limitations on rights

  Articles 19 and 20 allow certain limitations to be placed on the
right of free speech.  The Administration proposed a declaration
stating that the United States will not limit this right and urging
Parties to the Covenant to refrain from exercising the limitations on
free speech permitted by the Covenant. 3.  Competence of the Human
Rights Committee

  The Administration proposed a declaration stating that the United
States accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee under
Article 41. 4.  Natural wealth and resources

  Article 47 states that nothing in the Covenant affects the right of
all peoples to enjoy and utilize their natural wealth and resources.
The Administration proposed a declaration clarifying the relationship
between this Article and international law.

  VII.  EXPLANATION OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONDITIONS

  The Bush Administration submitted its proposed reservations,
understandings and declarations to the Committee on November 21, 1991.
At the same time, the Administration submitted the following
explanation of its proposals.

  INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

  Explanation of Proposed Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations

  GENERAL COMMENTS

  In general, the substantive provisions of the Covenant are
consistent with the letter and spirit of the United States Constitution
and laws, both state and federal.  Consequently, the United States can
accept the majority of the Covenant's obligations and undertakings
without qualification.

  In a few instances, however, it is necessary to subject U.S.
ratification to reservations, understandings or declarations in order
to ensure that the United States can fulfill its obligations under the
Covenant in a manner consistent

with the United States Constitution, including instances where the
Constitution affords greater rights and liberties to individuals than
does the Covenant. Additionally, a few provisions of the Covenant
articulate legal rules which differ from U.S. law and which, upon
careful consideration, the Administration declines to accept in
preference to existing law.  Specific proposals dealing with both
situations are included below.

  To promote clarity of application and interpretation, it may be
appropriate to address a few additional issues through comments to be
included in the record of consideration by the Senate and its Foreign
Relation Committee but which needs not be included in either the
resolution of advice and consent or the instrument of ratification
itself.

  FORMAL RESERVATIONS 1.  Free speech (article 20)

  Although Article 19 of the Covenant specifically protects freedom of
expression and opinion.  Article 20 directly conflicts with the First
Amendment by requiring the prohibition of certain forms of speech and
expression which are protected under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (i.e., propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence).  The United States cannot accept such an
obligation.

  Accordingly, the following reservation is recommended:

  Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action
by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. This is a slight revision of the reservation proposed in 1978.
It responds to criticisms of the earlier version by focusing
specifically on Article 20 and omitting the reference to U.S.
"practice." It seems appropriate to retain the reference to "laws,"
however, to make clear that we accept no obligation to limit statutory
protections of free speech and association even where they are more
protective than the Constitution requires.  We do not believe a
reference to Article 5(1) is required in this context. 2.  Article 6
(capital punishment)

  Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant prohibits imposition of the
death sentence for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age
and on pregnant women.  In 1978, a broad reservation to this article
was proposed in order to retain the right to impose capital punishment
on any person duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting
the imposition of capital punishment.  The Administration is now
prepared to accept the prohibition against execution of pregnant women.
However, in light of the recent reaffirmation of U.S. policy towards
capital punishment generally, and in particular the Supreme Court's
decisions upholding state laws permitting the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles aged 16 and 17, the prohibition against
imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed by minors is not
acceptable.  Given the sharply differing view taken by many of our
future treaty partners on the issue of the death penalty (including
what constitutes "serious crimes" under Article 6(2)), it is advisable
to state our position clearly.

  Accordingly, we recommend the following reservation to Article 6:

  The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a
pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting
the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.

  This reservation would, of course, leave open the possibility that
Congress might adopt legislation, in connection with ratification of
the Covenant or subsequently, prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by those below 18.  Legislation giving
effect to the Covenant's prohibition against executions of pregnant
women will not be required, since neither the Federal nor the state
governments in fact carry out executions until after the birth of the
condemned woman's child. 3.  Article 7 (torture/punishment)

  Article 7 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or be subjected
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
Since the United States is already proceeding toward ratification of
the more detailed Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the basis of several carefully
crafted reservations, declarations and understandings, it will be made
clear in the record that we interpret our obligations under Article 7
of the Covenant consistently with those we have undertaken in the
Torture Convention.

  We believe it is advisable to take, with respect to the Covenant, an
identical reservation with regard to the meaning of "cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment." Because the Bill of Rights already
contains substantively equivalent protections, and because the Human
Rights Committee like the European Court of Human Rights) has adopted
the view that prolonged judicial proceedings in cases involving capital
punishment could in certain circumstances constitute such treatment,
U.S. ratification of the Covenant should be conditioned upon a
reservation limiting our undertakings in this respect to the
prohibitions of the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments. This
would also have the effect of excluding such other practices as
corporal punishment and solitary confinement, both of which the
Committee has indicated might, depending on the circumstances, be
considered contrary to Article 7. (Most of the Committee's interpretive
statements under Article 7 have focused on such practices as torture,
disappearances, extrajudicial killings and incommunicado detention.)

  To ensure uniformity of interpretation between the Covenant and the
Torture Convention on this point, we recommend the following
reservation:

  The United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent
that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. No comparable reservation was proposed in 1978. 4.  Article
15(1) (post-offense reductions in penalty)

  Article 15, paragraph 1, precludes the imposition of a heavier
penalty for a criminal offense than was applicable at the time the
offense was committed, and requires States Party to comply with any
post-offense reductions in penalties: "[i]f, subsequent to the
commission of the offense, provision is made by law for the imposition
of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby." Current
federal law, as well as the law of most states, does not require such
relief and in fact contains a contrary presumption that the penalty in
force at the time the offense is committed will be imposed, although
post-sentence reductions are permitted (see 18 U.S.C. | 3582(c)(2) and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) and are often granted in practice
when there have been subsequent statutory changes.  Upon consideration,
there is no disposition to require a change in U.S. law to conform to
the Covenant.

  Accordingly, we recommend a reservation similar to the one proposed
in 1978:

  Because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in
force at the time the offense was committed, the United States does not
adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of Article 15. 5.  Articles
10 (2)(b) and (3) (treatment of juveniles)

  Several provisions of the Covenant contemplate the separate
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system.  Article 10,
paragraph 2(b) provides that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be
separated from adults.  * * *" Similarly, Article 10, paragraph 3
provides that "[j]uvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status."
Finally, Article 14, paragraph 4, concerning trial procedure in the
criminal justice system, states that "[i]n the case of juveniles, the
procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the
desirability of promoting their rehabilitation."

  Although current domestic practice generally is in compliance with
these provisions, it is important that flexibility remain to address
exceptional circumstances in which trial or incarceration of juveniles
as adults is appropriate: for example, trial of certain juveniles as
adults based on their criminal histories or the nature of their
offenses, and incarceration of particularly dangerous juveniles as
adults in order to protect other juveniles in custody.  Moreover,
special treatments cannot be guaranteed by the military justice system
to those who volunteer for the services while under age 18.

  Accordingly, we recommend the following reservation:

  The policy and practice of the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant's provisions regarding
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system.  Nevertheless,
the United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to
treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of
Article 10 and paragraph 4 of Article 14.  The United States further
reserves to these provisions with respect to individuals who volunteer
for military service prior to age 18. No comparable reservation was
proposed in 1978.  The reference to "exceptional circumstances" is
drawn from Article 10, paragraph 2(a), which permits the incarceration
of accused adults with convicted adults under such conditions.

  UNDERSTANDINGS 1.  Article 2(1), 4(1) and 26 (non-discrimination)

  The very broad anti-discrimination provisions contained in the above
articles do not precisely comport with long-standing Supreme Court
doctrine in the equal protection field.  In particular, Articles 2(1)
and 26 prohibit discrimination not only on the basis of "race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth" but also on any "other status." Current U.S.
civil rights law is not so open-ended; discrimination is only
prohibited for specific statuses, and there are exceptions which allow
for discrimination.  For example, under the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, age may be taken into account in certain circumstances.  In
addition, U.S. laws permits additional distinctions, for example
between citizens and non-citizens and between different categories of
non-citizens, especially in the context of the immigration laws.

  In interpreting the relevant Covenant provisions, the Human Rights
Committee has observed that not all differentiation of treatment
constitutes discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation
are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose
which is legitimate under the Covenant.  In its General Comment on
non-discrimination, for example, the Committee noted that the enjoyment
of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical
treatment in every instance.

  Notwithstanding the very extensive protections already provided
under U.S. law and the Committee's interpretive approach to the issue,
we recommend the following understanding:

  The Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all persons
equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections against
discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or any other status -- as
those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph 1 and Article 26 -- to be
permitted which such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective.  The United States further
understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of Article 4 upon
discrimination, in time of public emergency, based "solely" on the
status of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin not to
bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons
of a particular status. 2.  Articles 9(5) and 14(6) (compensation for
unlawful arrest and miscarriage of justice)

  Article 9(5) provides that "anyone who has been victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
Article 14(6) requires "compensation according to law" for a person
whose conviction has been reversed or who has been pardoned "on the
ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that
there has been a miscarriage of justice * * * unless it is proved that
the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly
attributable to him").  Some concern has been expressed that U.S. law
does not, at either the federal or state level, in fact recognize an
across-the-board, enforceable right of compensation in all
circumstances involving unlawful arrest or detention or miscarriage of
justice.

  Clearly, federal law does provide an enforceable right to seek
compensation against the individuals concerned (see, e.g., Rivers v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 386 (1971)) and, in certain
instances, against the government itself (for example, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act).  However, federal law does not generally
accord a right to compensation for an arrest or detention made in good
faith but ultimately determined to have been unlawful.  See Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bivens, supra; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).  Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity generally
restricts opportunities for recovery of compensation against the
government.  For instance, military personnel may not sue the Federal
Government for injuries incident to their military service, including
alleged torts of this kind.  Given the multiplicity of state and local
jurisdictions in the United States, it is possible that in some other
situations a victim of unlawful arrest or detention might not in fact
be able to recover compensation, notwithstanding the variety of
compensatory schemes which have been adopted.

  Although we do not believe that Article 9(5) in fact reflects an
international legal standard requiring payment of compensation in all
circumstances, the negotiating history of the Covenant is at best
ambiguous. With respect to Article 9(5), a U.S. proposal to replace the
words "an enforceable right to compensation" with "a right of action
for compensation" was twice rejected, as was a U.S. attempt to amend
Article 14(6) to read "a miscarriage of justice through no misconduct
or neglect of [the individual concerned]." Moreover, we are unaware of
any authoritative interpretations limiting Article 9(5), for example,
to arbitrary arrests and detentions or defining the content of
"miscarriage of justice" in Article 14(6).

  Accordingly, we recommend an understanding clarifying that we view
these provisions as imposing an obligation to provide appropriate
avenues to seek (rather than in every instance to obtain) compensation,
subject to reasonable requirements of domestic law.

  The United States understands the right to compensation referred to
in Articles 9(5) and 14(6) to require the provision of effective and
enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or
detention or a miscarriage of justice may seek and, where justified,
obtain compensation from either the responsible individual or the
appropriate governmental entity.  Entitlement to compensation may be
subject to the reasonable requirements of domestic law. 3.  Article 10
(2) and (3) (separate treatment of the accused)

  Article 10 (2)(a) provides that, "save in exceptional
circumstances," accused persons shall be "segregated" from the
convicted and given "separate treatment appropriate to their status as
unconvicted persons." Article 10(3) provides that the essential aim of
treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary system shall be their
reformation and social rehabilitation.

  Federal law and prison policy generally accords with these
requirements but permits prison authorities to take into account
additional factors, such as the prisoner's overall dangerousness, in
determining his treatment; prisoners may also waive segregation in
order to participate in special programs. Additionally, punishment,
deterrence and incapacitation are recognized as legitimate penal
objectives.  Moreover, segregation of the accused from the convicted,
while consistent with DOD policy, cannot always be guaranteed in light
of military exigencies.

  A number of other States Parties have conditioned their acceptance
of Article 10 on statements that these provisions must be interpreted
flexibly and taken as objectives to be achieved progressively.  A
"statement" to that effect was proposed in 1978.  There is a basis in
the negotiating history for so interpreting paragraph 2(a) concerning
segregation of the accused from the convicted; there is no reference to
differential treatment of the accused by the military; and there is
virtually no interpretive guidance of these provisions by the Human
Rights Committee.

  Accordingly, we believe it prudent to include the following
understanding:

  The United States understands the reference to "exceptional
circumstances" in paragraph 2(a) of Article 10 to permit the
imprisonment of an accused person with convicted persons where
appropriate in light of an individual's overall dangerousness, and to
permit accused persons to waive their right to segregation from
convicted persons.  The United States further understands that
paragraph 3 of Article 10 does not diminish the goals of punishment,
deterrence, and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes for a
penitentiary system. 4.  Article 14 (right to counsel, compelled
witness, and double jeopardy)

  In a few particular aspects, this Article could be read as going
beyond existing U.S. domestic law.  In particular, current Federal law
does not entitle a defendant to counsel of his own choice when he is
either indigent or financially able to retain counsel in some form; nor
does federal law recognize a right to counsel with respect to offenses
for which imprisonment is not imposed.  With respect to the compelled
attendance and examination of witnesses, a criminal defendant must show
that the requested witness is necessary to his defense.  Under the
Constitution, double jeopardy attaches only to multiple prosecutions by
the same sovereign and does not prohibit trial of the same defendant
for the same crime in, for example, state and federal courts or in the
courts of two states.  See Burton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

  To clarify our reading of the Covenant with respect to these issues,
we recommend the following understanding, similar to the one proposed
in 1978:

  The United States understands that subparagraphs 3(b) and (d) of
Article 14 do not require the provision of a criminal defendant's
counsel of choice when the defendant is provided with court-appointed
counsel on grounds of indigence, when the defendant is financially able
to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is not imposed.
The United States further understands that paragraph 3(e) does not
prohibit a requirement that the defendant make a showing that any
witness whose attendance he seeks to compel is necessary for his
defense.  The United States understands the prohibition upon double
jeopardy in paragraph 7 to apply only when the judgment of acquittal
has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the
Federal Government or a constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for
the same cause. 5.  Article 50 (federalism)

  In light of Article 50 ("The provisions of the present Covenant
shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions"), it is appropriate to clarify that, even though the
Covenant will apply to state and local authorities, it will be
implemented consistent with U.S. concepts of federalism.

  The following recommended understanding is a modification of the
understanding adopted on the same point in connection with the Torture
Convention:

  The United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein,
and otherwise by the State and local governments; to the extent that
State and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters,
the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the State or local
governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Convention.

  The proposed understanding serves to emphasize domestically that
there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority
between the State and Federal governments or to use the provisions of
the Covenant to "federalize" matters now within the competence of the
States.  (During the negotiation of the Covenant, the "federal-state"
issue assumed some importance because there were legally justified
practices, at the State and local level, which were both manifestly
inconsistent with the Covenant and beyond the reach of Federal
authority under the law in force at that time; that is no longer the
case.)

  A reservation is not necessary with respect to Article 50 since the
intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant
but rather to put our future treaty partners on notice with regard to
the implications of our federal system concerning implementation.
Moreover, an attempt to reserve to this article would likely prove
contentious.  For example, in the face of objections from other States
Parties, Australia recently withdrew its initial reservation to Article
50 (to the effect that implementation of the Covenant would be a matter
for the authorities of its constituent States where the subject-matter
was within the States' legislative, executive and judicial
jurisdiction), replacing it with a declaration that, since it has a
federal system, the Covenant will be implemented by Commonwealth, State
and Territorial authorities having regard to their respective
constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise.  The
proposed understanding is similarly intended to signal to our treaty
partners that the U.S. will implement its obligations under the
Covenant by appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means,
federal or state as appropriate, and that the Federal Government will
remove any federal inhibition to the States' abilities to meet their
obligations.

  DECLARATIONS 1.  Non-self-executing treaty

  For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that
the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing.  The
intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause
of action in U.S. courts.  As was the case with the Torture Convention,
existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; hence,
implementing legislation is not contemplated.

  We recommend the following declaration, virtually identical to the
one proposed in 1978 as well as the one adopted by the Senate with
respect to the Torture Convention:

  The United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through
27 of the Covenant are not self-executing. 2.  Restrictions on rights

  In a number of respects the Covenant recognizes the possibility that
States Party may in exceptional circumstances limit or circumscribe
certain rights otherwise protected.  For example, Article 12(3) permits
States Party by law to impose restrictions on the rights to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose residence when "necessary to protect
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others," when consistent with the other
rights recognized in the Covenant.  Similar restrictions are
permissible with regard to the right of peaceful assembly (Article 21)
and freedom of association (Article 22(2)); somewhat narrower
restrictions are authorized with respect to the right to a fair and
public hearing (Article 14(1)), freedom of religion (Article 18(3)),
and the right to freedom of expression (Article 19(3)).  Certain
limited derogations from recognized rights are also permitted during
times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation under
Article 4.

  Since such limitations are permissible rather than required, it is
not necessary to condition U.S. ratification on a reservation.
However, because of concerns raised in particular by representatives of
the U.S. media over restrictions placed by foreign governments on the
free flow of information and ideas, we believe it would be beneficial
to include in our instrument of ratification a declaration along the
following lines:

  It is the view of the United States that States Party to the
Covenant should wherever possible refrain from imposing any
restrictions or limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized
and protected by the Covenant, even when such restrictions and
limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant. For the
United States, Article 5, paragraph 2, which provides that fundamental
human rights existing in any State Party may not be diminished on the
pretext that the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent, has
particular relevance to Article 19, paragraph 3, which would permit
certain restrictions on the freedom of expression.  The United States
declares that it will continue to adhere to the requirements and
constraints of its Constitution in respect of all such restrictions and
limitations. 3.  Article 41 (State-to-State complaints)

  Under Article 41, States Party to the Covenant may accept the
competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider state-to-state
complaints by means of a formal declaration to that effect.  It is in
the interest of the United States to participate in and influence the
state-to-state complaint procedure established by the Covenant, not
least because it is hoped that the work of the Committee will
contribute to the development of a generally accepted international law
of human rights.  (It should be noted that declarations made pursuant
to Article 41 may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the
Secretary-General.) It is our usual practice to inform the Senate of
our intention to make such a declaration at the time of ratification;
most recently, we followed this procedure with respect to the Torture
Convention, concerning acceptance of the analogous competence of the
Committee Against Torture to consider state-to-state complaints.

  Accordingly, we recommend informing the Senate of our intent,
subject to its approval, to make an appropriate declaration under
Article 41 at the time of ratification, as follows:

  The United States declares that it accepts the competence of the
Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications under
Article 41 in which a State Party claims another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. 4.  Article 47 (savings
clause on natural wealth and resources)

  Article 47 provides that "[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and
utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources." In 1978,
the Administration proposed a caveat to this provision to emphasize the
important, countervailing principle of international law requiring
prompt, adequate and effective compensation in cases of expropriation
or nationalization.  Even though nothing in the Covenant permits states
to avoid their obligations under international law or justifies
arbitrary deprivation of property, we recommend the following
declaration, identical to the one originally proposed:

  The United States declares that the right referred to in Article 47
may be exercised only in accordance with international law.

  VIII.  COST ESTIMATE

  The Congressional Budget Office has supplied the Committee with the
following information on the possible budgetary impact of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

  U.S. CONGRESS,

  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, March 20, 1992. Hon.
CLAIBORNE PELL, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

  DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Executive E,
95-2) and the accompanying Resolution of Ratification, as ordered
reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 4, 1992.
Ratification of the Covenant would not affect the budgets of federal,
state, or local governments.

  The Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended that the Senate
advise and consent to ratification of the Covenant with the conditions
set forth in the Resolution of Ratification.

  The Covenant is designed to guarantee civil and political rights to
persons within each country that ratifies it.  In many instances, the
rights parallel those provided to U.S. citizens in the Bill of Rights.
Ratification would permit the United States to participate in the work
of the Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance of nations
that have ratified the Covenant. Funding for the Human Rights Committee
is currently provided by the United Nations, and ratification would not
obligate the United States to provide any additional funding.

  Ratification of the Covenant would not affect direct spending or
receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to
ratification.

  Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide
further details on this estimate.  The CBO staff contact is Kent
Christensen, who can be reached at 226-2840.

  Sincerely,

  JAMES L. BLUM

  (For Robert D. Reischauer).

  IX.  TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

  Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and signed on
behalf of the United States on October 5, 1977, (Executive E, 95-2),
subject to the following reservations, understandings, declarations and
proviso:

  I.  The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
reservations:

  (1) That Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or
other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free
speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.

  (2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person
(other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future
laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.

  (3) That the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to
the extent that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment" means the cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

  (4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the
penalty in force at the time the offense was committed, the United
States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of Article
15.

  (5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally
in compliance with and supportive of the Covenant's provisions
regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right, in exceptional
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs
2(b) and 3 of Article 10 and paragraph 4 of Article 14.  The United
States further reserves to these provisions with respect to individuals
who volunteer for military service prior to age 18.

  II.  The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
understandings, which shall apply to the obligations of the United
States under this Covenant:

  (1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee
all persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive
protections against discrimination.  The United States understands
distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or any other status -- as those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph
1 and Article 26 -- to be permitted when such distinctions are, at
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.
The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of
Article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public emergency, based
"solely" on the status of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin not to bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate
effect upon persons of a particular status.

  (2) That the United States understands the right to compensation
referred to in Articles 9(5) and 14(6) to require the provision of
effective and enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful
arrest or detention or a miscarriage of justice may seek and, where
justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible individual
or the appropriate governmental entity.  Entitlement to compensation
may be subject to the reasonable requirements of domestic law.

  (3) That the United States understand the reference to "exceptional
circumstances" in paragraph 2(a) of Article 10 to permit the
imprisonment of an accused person with convicted persons where
appropriate in light of an individual's overall dangerousness, and to
permit accused persons to waive their right to segregation from
convicted persons.  The United States further understands that
paragraph 3 of Article 10 does not diminish the goals of punishment,
deterrence, and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes for a
penitentiary system.

  (4) That the United States understands that subparagraphs 3(b) and
(d) of Article 14 do not require the provision of a criminal
defendant's counsel of choice when the defendant is provided with
court-appointed counsel on grounds of indigence, when the defendant is
financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is
not imposed.  The United States further understands that paragraph 3(e)
does not prohibit a requirement that the defendant make a showing that
any witness whose attendance he seeks to compel is necessary for his
defense.  The United States understands the prohibition upon double
jeopardy in paragraph 7 to apply only when the judgment of acquittal
has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the
Federal Government or a constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for
the same cause.

  (5) That the United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein,
and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that
state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters,
the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local
governments may take appropriated measures for the fulfillment of the
Convention.

  III.  The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
declarations:

  (1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles
1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.

  (2) That it is the view of the United States that States Party to
the Covenant should wherever possible refrain from imposing any
restrictions or limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized
and protected by the Covenant, even when such restrictions and
limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant.  For the
United States, Article 5, paragraph 2, which provides that fundamental
human rights existing in any State Party may not be diminished on the
pretext that the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent, has
particular relevance to Article 19, paragraph 3, which would permit
certain restrictions on the freedom of expression.  The United States
declares that it will continue to adhere to the requirements and
constraints of its Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and
limitations.

  (3) That the United States declares that it accepts the competence
of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications
under Article 41 in which a State Party claims that another State Party
is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.

  (4) That the United States declares that the right referred to in
Article 47 may be exercised only in accordance with international law.

  IV.  The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of ratification
to be deposited by the President:

  Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.

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