participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991
1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of
Stateand Government agreed on the need to transform the
Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in
Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the
Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that
the developments taking place in Europe would have a
far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met
in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental
strategic review.The resulting new Strategic Concept is set
out below.
PART I - THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The New Strategic Environment
2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in
Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the
security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance
seeks to achieve its objectives.
The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their
sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing
radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their
independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from
Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were
formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact
and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in
varyingdegrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed
at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect
for human rights and a market economy. The political division
of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of
the Cold War period has thus been overcome.
3. In the West, there have also been significant changes.
Germany has been united and remains a full member of the
Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the
countries of the European Community are working towards the
goal of political union, including the development of a
European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of
the WEU, are important factors for European security. The
strengthening of the security dimension in the process of
European integration, and the enhancement of the role and
responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are
positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a
European security identity and defence role, reflected in the
strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will
not only serve the interests of the European states but also
reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as
a whole.
4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced
stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing
military transparency and mutual confidence (including through
the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987
and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building
measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty
will lead to increased stability through substantial and
balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms.
Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear
forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be
pursued following President Bush's September 1991 initiative.
Also of great importance is the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990
Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's
numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and
provide for effective verification procedures. All these
developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of
military transparency in Europe, thus increasing
predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would
be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies
regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in
arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the
achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as
restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the proliferation
of certain weapons technologies.
5. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has
already contributed significantly to overcoming the division
of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes
new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual
framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a
constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the
process of European integration, in preserving peace.
6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which
have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out
in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall
security of the Allies.
The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which
was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty
years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of
uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the
Alliance remain.
7. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security
environment in which the positive changes referred to above
have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the
completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces
from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by
all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the
Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light
of the evolving security environment and in particular
progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation
will be made to the extent necessary.
Security Challenges and Risks
8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are
different in nature from what they were in the past. The
threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's
European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no
longer provides the focus for Allied strategy.
Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack
has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning
time has increased accordingly.
9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in
nature and multi- directional, which makes them hard to
predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such
risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance
members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various
ways.
10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from
calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but
rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may
arise from the serious economic, social and political
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial
disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they
remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and
territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could,
however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and
even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or
spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect
on the security of the Alliance.
11. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and
uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be
seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces
are significantly larger than those of any other European
State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that
of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into
account if stability and security in Europe are to be
preserved.
12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and
non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern
Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the
countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important
for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991
Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the
build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons
technologies in the area, including weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the
territory of some member states of the Alliance.
13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from
whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of
the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also
take account of the global context. Alliance security
interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,
including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of
terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance
for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of
their efforts including their responses to such risks.
14. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these
different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a
non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military
capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear
dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of
which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the
strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West
confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major
conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk
of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and
would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of
a lesser magnitude.
15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the
strategic context. The first is that the new environment does
not change the purpose or the security functions of the
Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The
second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment
offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame
its strategy within a broad approach to security.
PART II - ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY
FUNCTIONS
The Purpose of the Alliance
16. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty
and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the
freedom and security of all its members by political and
military means in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its
inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful
order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.
The Nature of the Alliance
17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security
of North America is permanently tied to the security of
Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective
effort among its members in support of their common interests.
18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is
that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among
sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security
for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given
substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the
political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is
forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing
with basic security challenges. Without depriving member
states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign
responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables
them through collective effort to enhance their ability to
realise their essential national security objectives.
19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members
of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their
circumstances or in their national military capabilities
relative to each other, contributes to overall stability
within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive
to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with
others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance,
together with other nations, are able to pursue the
development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe
whole and free.
The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance
20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security
policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the
maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war
and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to
manage successfully crises affecting the security of its
members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring
dialogue with other nations and the active search for a
cooperative approach to European security, including in the
field of arms control and disarmament.
21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs
the following fundamental security tasks:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a
stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to
intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony
through the threat or use of force.
II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied
consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests,
including possible developments posing risks for members'
security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in
fields of common concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against the territory of any NATO member state.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
22. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE
also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation
of a European identity in security and defence will underline
the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of
responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce
transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership
and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in
that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is
the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and
defence commitments of its members under the Washington
Treaty.
23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the
terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of
the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as
provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.
PART III - A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY
Protecting Peace in a New Europe
24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives
of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its
members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in
Europe, through both political and military means. This
comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's
security policy.
25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the
security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance
objectives through political means are greater than ever
before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from
the fact that security and stability have political, economic,
social, and environmental elements as well as the
indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of
challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to
security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing
elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and
the maintenance of a collective defence capability.
26. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation,
underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective
defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict
arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased
mutual understanding and confidence among all European states;
to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies;
and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership
among all European countries in dealing with common security
problems.
27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and
disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to
cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play
a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security
objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and
disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest
possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of
defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that
defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in
harmony.
28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security
functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the
legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful
resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and
friendly international relations and support democratic
institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable
contribution being made by other organizations such as the
European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these
institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.
Dialogue
29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the
opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with
the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular
diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London
Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue
through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified
exchange of views and information on security policy issues.
Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively,
will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities
afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout
Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of
respective security concerns, to increase transparency and
predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce
stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of
the past, not least through intensified military contacts and
greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of
dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation
throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and
conflicts by peaceful means.
Cooperation
30. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with
all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to
develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European
security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or,
should they arise, ensuring their effective management.
Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other
nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential
factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe
whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression
of the inseparability of security among European states. It is
built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that
the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions
across the continent could lead to future instability, and
such divisions must thus be diminished.
Collective Defence
31. The political approach to security will thus become
increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension
remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military
capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the
common defence remain central to the Alliance's security
objectives. Such a capability, together with political
solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at
coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military
aggression directed against the Alliance can never be
perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is
equally indispensable so that dialogue and cooperation can be
undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.
Management of Crisis and Conflict Prevention
32. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe,
the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and
preventing war depends even more than in the past on the
effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful
management of crises affecting the security of its members.
Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would
be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much
smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks
facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.
33. In these new circumstances there are increased
opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an
early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a
coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political
authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis
management measures as required from a range of political and
other measures, including those in the military field. Close
control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be
applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate
consultation and decision making procedures are essential to
this end.
34. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of
Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse
crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is
inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To
this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process
and its institutions. Other bodies including the European
Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also
have an important role to play.
PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE
Principles of Alliance Strategy
35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus
requires a broad approach to security. The transformed
political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to
change a number of important features of its military strategy
and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven
fundamental principles.
At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new
military strategy and a revised force posture responding to
the changed circumstances.
36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of
fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in
purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in
self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's
adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate
to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force
against the territory of one of the Allies would meet
collective and effective action by all of them and that the
risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any
foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be
able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's
advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the
territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war
rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease
his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military
forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political
independence of its member states, and thus contribute to
peace and stability in Europe.
37. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on
one is an attack onall. Alliance solidarity and strategic
unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective
security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends
critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and
responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence.
The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear
forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe,
which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the
process of developing a European security identity and defence
role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the
European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of
the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the
responsibility for the defence of Europe.
38. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in
practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the
crucial political, military and resource advantages of
collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of
defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sover-
eignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military
structure as well as on cooperation and coordination
agreements. Key features include collective force planning;
common operational planning; multinational formations; the
stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate
on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement
arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards
and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint
and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and
logistics cooperation.
39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of
coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable
future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces
based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although
at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential
to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other.
Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring
that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy
victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking
into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance
could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to
provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the
Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the
prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution
in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and
unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.
The Alliance's New Force Posture
40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move
away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence
towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the
principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance
on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new
strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the
Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the
missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture.
The Missions of Alliance Military Forces
41. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee
the security and territorial integrity of member states,
remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new
strategic environment, in which a single massive and global
threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks.
Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace,
crisis and war.
42. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard
against risks to the security of Alliance members; to
contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in
Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can
contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by
their participation in confidence-building activities,
including those which enhance transparency and improve
communication; as well as in verification of arms control
agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to
contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces
for United Nations missions.
43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military
threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's
military forces can complement and reinforce political actions
within a broad approach to security,and thereby contribute to
the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution.
This requires that these forces have a capability for measured
and timely responses in such circumstances;
the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the
event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it
as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member
states.
44. While in the new security environment a general war in
Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled
out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their
fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the
essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum
level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should
aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the
capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already
described.
Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture
45. To implement its security objectives and strategic
principles in the new environment, the organization of the
Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that
can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that
affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war,
while retaining at all times the means to defend, if
necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The
posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines
developed in the following paragraphs.
46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the
Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its
strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to
the new strategic environment including arms control
agreements. This means in particular:
(a) that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many
cases their readiness, will be reduced;
(b) that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear
defensive posture in the central region will no longer be
required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces
will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the
territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward
deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and,
in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance
will have to be taken into account, including the shorter
warning times to which the northern and southern regions will
be subject compared with the central region and, in the
southern region, the potential for instability and the
military capabilities in the adjacent areas.
47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces
can play an effective role both in managing crises and in
countering aggression against any Ally, they will require
enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability
for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:
(a) Available forces will include, in a limited but
militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea
immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a
wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable.
They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to
deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the
territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those
launched without long warning time.
(b) The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to
permit their military capability to be built up when
necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by
mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in
proportion to potential threats to Alliance security,
including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that
prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major
conflict.
Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and
resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of
critical importance.
(c) Appropriate force structures and procedures, including
those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and
draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed
to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to
reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be
exercised regularly in peacetime.
(d) In the event of use of forces, including the deployment
of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an
instrument of crisismanagement, the Alliance's political
authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their
employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed
in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance
forces.
Characteristics of Conventional Forces
48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a
credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis
and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment.
This will be reflected in force and equipment levels;
readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment
and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all
of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces
of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid
reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the
bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial
integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of
communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a
means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region.
Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active
and mobilisable elements.
49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate
closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed
at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of
the following:
(a) Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain
territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of
readiness and, overall,there will be a greater reliance on
mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces
will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with
an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.
(b) Maritime forces, which because of their inherent
mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important
contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their
essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to
safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication,to support
land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment
of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
(c) Air forces, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental
roles in both independent air and combined operations -
counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support - as
well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and
electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall
effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in
supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require
appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling
capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command
and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air
defence environment.
50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of
this problem will require complementary approaches including,
for example, export control and missile defences.
51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare
capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest
possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and
effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even
after implementation of a global ban, precautionsof a purely
defensive nature will need to be maintained.
52. In the new security environment and given the reduced
overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely
together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of
Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the
achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The
Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those
concerned, the integrated military structure, including
multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in
this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures,
as they are further developed in the context of an emerging
European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a
similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies'
ability to work together in the common defence. Allies'
efforts to achieve maximum cooperation will be based on the
common guidelines for defence defined above.
Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the
necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the
European security and defence identity and the Alliance.
53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of
possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require
effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and
control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate
logistics capabilities, including transport capacities.
Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of
forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is
available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build up
larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely
manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance
security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis
management and defence. This capability will include the
ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of
the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and
where this is needed.Elements of all three force categories
will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both
intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement.
Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the
necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate
support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of
increasing relevance in this context.
54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements
will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing
national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate
the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective
defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the
transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar.
Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces,
reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying
more capable formations than might be available purely
nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce
defence resources. This may include a highly integrated,
multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.
Characteristics of Nuclear Forces
55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the
Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion
and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential
role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor
about the nature of the Allies' response to military
aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is
not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security
of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of
the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the
independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France,
which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the
overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration
of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention
continue to require widespread participation by European
Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their
territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to
NATO provide an essential political and military link between
the European and the North American members of the Alliance.
The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces
in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary
characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability,
to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the
Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at
the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical
changes in the security situation, including conventional
force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and
increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis
through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary,
to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly
improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons
might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more
remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their
sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate
sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an
essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the
trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable
aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by
offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however,
not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and
attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear
artillery or groundlaunched short-range nuclear missiles and
they will be eliminated.
PART V - CONCLUSION
58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of
the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their
security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; cooperation;
and effective collective defence asmutually reinforcing
instruments for preserving the peace.
Making full use of the new opportunities available, the
Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level
of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this
way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to
promoting a lasting peaceful order.
59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further
progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with
the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will
also play an active part in promoting dialogue and cooperation
between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in
the Paris Charter.
60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect
further developments in the politico-military environment,
including progress in the moves towards a European security
identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance
security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will
form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's
defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and
nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning
arrangements.
