Europe's security has substantially improved. The threat
of massive military confrontation no longer hangs over
it. Nevertheless potential risks to security from instability
or tension still exist. Against this background, NATO's
Strategic Concept reaffirms the core functions of the
Alliance including the maintenance of the transatlantic
link and of an overall strategic balance in Europe. The
Strategic Concept reflects the broad approach to stability
and security outlined above. It recognises that security is
based on political, economic, social and environmental
considerations as well as defence. It reflects the unpreced-
ented opportunity which now exists to achieve the Alli-
ance's long-standing objectives by political means, in
keeping with the undertakings made in Articles 2 and 4
of the North Atlantic Treaty. Accordingly, the future
security policy of the Alliance can be based on three
mutually reinforcing elements, namely: dialogue; cooper-
ation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capabil-
ity. Each of these elements is designed to ensure that
crises affecting European security can be prevented or
resolved peacefully.
The military dimension of the Alliance remains an
essential factor if these goals are to be achieved. It will
continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles:
- The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose.
- Security is indivisible. An attack on one member of
the Alliance is an attack upon all. The presence of
North American forces in and committed to Europe
remains vital to the security of Europe, which is
inseparably linked to that of North America.
- NATO's security policy is based on collective defence,
including an integrated military structure as well as
relevant cooperation and coordination agreements.
- The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear
and conventional forces based in Europe will be re-
quired for the foreseeable future.
/ The full text of the Alliance's Strategic Concept is reproduced
in Appendix II.
In the changed circumstances affecting Europe's secu-
rity, NATO forces are being adapted to the new strategic
environment and are becoming smaller and more flexible.
Conventional forces are being substantially reduced and
in many cases so is their level of readiness. They are also
being made more mobile, to enable them to react to a
wider range of contingencies; and they are being reorgan-
ised to ensure that they have the flexibility to contribute
to crisis management and to enable them to be built up if
necessary for the purposes of defence. Multinational
forces will in future play a greater role within NATO's
integrated military structure.
Nuclear forces are also being greatly reduced. The
withdrawal of short-range land-based nuclear weapons
from Europe, announced in September 1991, was com-
pleted in July 1992. The overall NATO stockpile of sub-
strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is being reduced to
about one fifth of the level of the 1990 stockpile. As far as
strategic nuclear forces are concerned, far-reaching recip-
rocal cuts were proposed by the President of the United
States in his State of the Union address at the end of
January 1992 and additional proposals were made by
President Yeltsin. The fundamental purpose of the
Alliance's remaining nuclear forces of either category will
continue to be political: to preserve peace and prevent
war or any kind of coercion.
The Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security
must take account of the global context. It points out
risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital re-
sources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can
affect Alliance security interests. The Concept therefore re-
affirms the importance of arrangements existing in the
Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article
4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate,
coordination of its efforts including its responses to
such risks. The Alliance will continue to address broader
challenges in its consultations and in the appropriate
multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation
with other states.
28. DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION
The development of dialogue and partnership with its
new cooperation partners forms an integral part of
NATO's Strategic Concept. The establishment of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the end of 1991
thus marked a further advance in the evolution of a new,
positive relationship based on constructive dialogue and
cooperation.
The creation of the NACC was the culmination of a
number of earlier steps taken by the members of the
Alliance in the light of the fundamental changes which
were taking place in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. At the July 1990 London Summit Meeting the
Alliance extended its hand of friendship and established
regular diplomatic liaison with them. In Paris, in Novem-
ber 1990, the Alliance members and their new partners
signed a Joint Declaration stating that they no longer
regarded each other as adversaries.
In June 1991, when Alliance Foreign Ministers met in
Copenhagen, further steps were taken to develop this
partnership. As a result of high level visits, exchanges of
views on security and other issues, intensified military
contacts and exchanges of expertise in many fields, a new
relationship has been built up.
When NATO Heads of State and Government met in
Rome in November 1991, they decided to broaden and
intensify this dynamic process. In reaching this decision
they took account of the growth of democratic institu-
tions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the encour-
aging experience of cooperation acquired thus far and
the desire shown by their cooperation partners for closer
ties.
As a next step they therefore decided to develop the
institutional basis for consultation and cooperation on
political and security issues. Foreign Ministers of Central
and Eastern European governments were invited to
attend a meeting with their NATO counterparts to issue a
joint political declaration in order to enhance the concept
of partnership, and to work out how the process should
be further developed. Concrete proposals for periodic
meetings and contacts with the North Atlantic Council,
the NATO Military Committee and other NATO commit-
tees were put forward, in addition to the creation of the
NACC.
These steps were designed to enable the member coun-
tries of the Alliance to respond effectively to the changed
situation in Europe and to contribute positively to the
efforts undertaken by their cooperation partners to fulfil
their commitments under the CSCE process and to make
democratic change irrevocable.
Consisting of Foreign Ministers or Representatives of
the 16 NATO countries as well as the Central and Eastern
European and Baltic States with which NATO established
diplomatic liaison during 1990 and 1991, the NACC held
its inaugural meeting on 20 December 1991 with the par-
ticipation of 25 countries. Following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union which took place on the same day, and the
subsequent creation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), participation in the NACC was expanded to
include all the member states of the CIS. Georgia and
Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 respec-
tively. At the meeting of the NACC held in Oslo in June
1992, Finland also attended as an observer.
Consultations and cooperation in the framework of
the NACC focus on security and related issues where
Alliance member countries can offer experience and exper-
tise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of
civilian-military relations, scientific and environmental
affairs, civil/military coordination of air traffic manage-
ment and the conversion of defence production to civilian
purposes. Participation by all these countries in NATO's
scientific and environmental programmes is also be-
ing enhanced, as well as the dissemination of inform-
ation about NATO in the countries concerned, through
diplomatic liaison channels and embassies and by other
means. NATO governments undertook to provide appro-
priate resources to support these activities.
The Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooper-
ation issued by the countries represented in the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council in March 1992, identified a
number of topics in the defence-planning field where
cooperation and consultation could be of particular rel-
evance. These include principles and key aspects of
strategy; force and command structures; military exer-
cises, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations;
national defence programmes and budgets; and training
and education methods and concepts in the defence field.
A number of activities are taking place in these areas,
including joint meetings, military contacts and visits, and
participation in courses at the NATO Defense College in
Rome and the NATO (SHAPE) School at Oberammergau.
Defence Ministers held their first joint meeting with
cooperation partners on 1 April 1992 to discuss current
issues and to consider ways of deepening their dialogue
and promoting cooperation on issues falling within their
competence. It was decided to hold a high level seminar
on defence policy and management, covering the role and
constitutional position of armed forces in democratic
societies as well as strategic concepts and their implement-
ation; and a workshop on practical aspects of defence
management and the reform and restructuring of armed
forces. A further workshop on practices and work meth-
ods relating to the environmental clean-up of defence
installations was also scheduled.
Other possible areas for cooperation on defence-related
issues identified by Defence Ministers include discussion
of concepts such as defence sufficiency, stability, flexibil-
ity and crisis management; how defence programmes
can be planned and managed in democratic societies
(eg, accountability, financial planning, programme
budgeting and management, research and development,
equipment procurement procedures and personnel man-
agement); consideration of the legal and constitutional
framework regarding the position of military forces in a
democracy; democratic control of armed forces; civil-
military relations and parliamentary accountability; har-
monisation of defence planning and arms control issues;
matters relating to training and exercises; defence edu-
cation; and other topics including reserve forces, environ-
mental concerns, air traffic management, search and
rescue activities, humanitarian aid and military medicine.
NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Gleneagles in
October 1992 also indicated that peace keeping issues
would be a further subject of discussion with cooperation
partners.
The first meeting of the Military Committee in Co-
operation Session took place on 10 April 1992 at Chiefs of
Staff level, in accordance with the NACC Work Plan. It
represented an important milestone in the partnership
process and resulted in a military work plan designed to
develop cooperation and to assist cooperation partners
with the process of restructuring their armed forces. Fur-
ther meetings and other activities, including bilateral visits
of military officials to and from cooperation countries,
are taking place in this framework.
29. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
A key component of the new security architecture is the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or
CSCE (see Part IV).
The Alliance remains deeply committed to strengthen-
ing the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in
promoting stability and democracy in Europe. Consulta-
tions within the Alliance thus continue to be a source of
initiatives for strengthening the CSCE, which has the
outstanding advantage of being the only forum that
brings together all the countries of Europe as well as
Canada and the United States under a common frame-
work with respect to human rights, fundamental
freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic
liberty. New CSCE institutions and structures, proposed
at the NATO Summit in London in July 1990, were
created at the Paris CSCE Summit in November 1990.
Efforts are now being made to enable them to be consoli-
dated and further developed so as to provide the CSCE
with the means to ensure full implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE
documents.
The CSCE's capacity as a forum for consultation and
cooperation among all participating States is thus being
enhanced to ensure that it is capable of effective action in
line with its new and increased responsibilities. This
applies in particular to the role of the CSCE with regard
to questions of human rights and security, including arms
control and disarmament, and to its contribution to
effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of
disputes in ways which are consistent with international
law and CSCE principles.
A number of specific proposals were made at the NATO
Summit Meeting in Rome to translate these objectives
into practical realities. These ideas were taken several
steps further in December 1991 when NATO Foreign
Ministers set out broad policy objectives for the prepara-
tion of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. They in-
cluded the establishment of a European security forum,
preserving the autonomy and distinct character of the
various elements involved in the process but also ensuring
coherence between them; and the institution of a perma-
nent security dialogue in which legitimate security concerns
can be addressed.
30. EUROPE'S SECURITY IDENTITY AND DEFENCE
ROLE
Further important elements in the progress towards the
new security architecture, subject to decisions concerning
their ratification, are the Treaties on Monetary and
Political Union signed by the leaders of the European
Community in Maastricht in December 1991. The Treaty
on Political Union included agreement on the develop-
ment of a common foreign and security policy, including
the eventual framing of a common defence policy which
might in time lead to a common defence. It included
reference to the Western European Union (WEU) (see
Part IV) as an integral part of the development of the
European Union which would be created by the two
Treaties and requested the WEU to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the European Union which
have defence implications.
At the meeting of the WEU Member States which took
place in Maastricht at the same time as the meeting of
the European Council, a declaration was issued inviting
members of the European Union to accede to the WEU or
to become observers, and inviting other European mem-
bers of NATO to become associate members of the WEU.
The Treaty on Political Union also made provision for
a report evaluating the progress made and experience
gained in the field of foreign and security policy to be
presented to the European Council in 1996.
The Alliance welcomed these steps, recognising that
the development of a European security identity and
defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the
European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the
integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance as a
whole. Moreover these two positive processes are mutu-
ally reinforcing. In parallel with them, member countries
of the Alliance have agreed to enhance the essential
transatlantic link which the Alliance guarantees and to
maintain fully the strategic unity and the indivisibility of
their security.
The Alliance's Strategic Concept, which is the agreed
conceptual basis for the military forces of all the members
of the Alliance, facilitates complementarity between the
Alliance and the emerging defence component of the
European political unification process. The Alliance mem-
ber countries intend to preserve their existing operational
coherence since, ultimately, their security depends on it.
However, they welcomed the prospect of a gradual rein-
forcement of the role of the Western European Union, both
as the defence component of the process of European
unification and as a means of strengthening the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance. WEU member states have
affirmed that the Alliance will remain the essential forum
for consultation among its members and the venue for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence
commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.
31. ARMS CONTROL
Efforts to bring about more stable international relations
at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through
effective and verifiable arms control agreements and
confidence-building measures, have long been an integral
part of NATO's security policy. Meaningful and verifiable
arms control agreements, which respect the security con-
cerns of all the countries involved in the process, help to
improve stability, increase mutual confidence and dimin-
ish the risks of conflict. Defence and arms control policies
must therefore remain in harmony and their respective
roles in safeguarding security must be consistent and
mutually reinforcing. The principal criterion for the
Alliance in the context of all arms control negotiations is
not whether agreements are desirable objectives in their
own right, but rather whether or not they maintain stab-
ility and enhance the long-term security interests of all
participants. To do this successfully agreements have to be
clear and precise, verifiable and not open to circumvention.
Arms control deals essentially with two broad catego-
ries of proposal: those seeking agreement on measures to
build confidence and those which result in reductions and
limitations of military manpower and equipment. The
Alliance is actively involved in both these areas. Extensive
consultation takes place within NATO over the whole
range of disarmament and arms control issues so that
commonly agreed positions can be reached and national
policies coordinated. In addition to the consultation
which takes place in the North Atlantic Council and the
Political Committees, a number of special bodies have
been created to deal with specific arms control issues.
In May 1989, in order to take account of all the
complex and interrelated issues arising in the arms control
context, the Alliance developed a Comprehensive Con-
cept of Arms Control and Disarmament. The Concept
provided a framework for the policies of the Alliance in
the whole field of arms control. It covered the conclusion
and implementation of the INF Treaty between the United
States and the Soviet Union in December 1987, which
eliminated all United States and Soviet land-based
intermediate-range missiles on a global basis.
Other objectives of the Comprehensive Concept included:
- a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear
weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of con-
ventional forces by eliminating disparities in the whole
of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conven-
tional balance, tangible and verifiable reductions of
land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range,
leading to equal ceilings.
The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) among the member countries of NATO
and of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which began in
Vienna in March 1989, resulted in the conclusion of the
CFE Treaty on 19 November 1990. The Treaty was
signed by the 22 states, in the framework of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, during a
Summit Meeting in Paris of all 34 countries then particip-
ating in the CSCE process. Also signed at the Paris
Summit by all CSCE participants was the Vienna Docu-
ment 90, containing a large number of substantial
confidence- and security-building measures applicable
throughout Europe. In March 1992 this document was
subsumed by the Vienna Document 92, in which further
measures on openness and transparency were introduced.
As a result of the dramatic political and military de-
developments which have taken place since 1989, some of
the initial premises for the CFE Treaty changed during
the course of the negotiations. Key factors in this respect
were the unification of Germany; substantial Soviet troop
withdrawals from Eastern Europe; the advent of demo-
cratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe; the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact; and comprehensive
unilateral reductions in the size of Soviet armed forces as
well as those of other countries in the region.
Notwithstanding these changes which inevitably had
major implications, particularly in terms of the attribution
of national responsibility for implementing the Treaty,
the successful outcome of the negotiations and the entry
into force of the Treaty are fundamental enhancements
of European security. The Treaty is the culmination of
efforts initiated by the Alliance in 1986 to reduce the
level of armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean
to the Ural Mountains. It imposes legally-binding limits
on key categories of forces and equipment held individu-
ally and collectively. The limits are designed not only to
bring about dramatic reductions but also to ensure that
no single country is able to maintain military forces at
levels which would enable it to hold a dominating military
position on the European continent. The main categories
of equipment covered by these provisions are those which
constitute offensive military capability, namely tanks,
artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and
helicopters.
In addition, there are provisions contained in declara-
tions forming an integral part of the Treaty on land-
based naval aircraft and a no-increase commitment with
regard to personnel strengths. The implementation of the
Treaty provisions is subject to a precise calendar and a
rigid regime of information exchanges and inspections
under detailed ``verification'' clauses.
Two further essential elements of the CFE Treaty should
be mentioned, namely:
(a) the establishment of a Joint Consultative Group, on
which all the parties to the Treaty are represented,
where any issues relating to implementation can be
raised and discussed; and
(b) the opening of follow-on (CFE IA) talks on further
measures including limitations on personnel strengths.
These talks began on 29 November 1990.
The members of the Alliance attach paramount import-
ance to the Treaty as the cornerstone of Europe's future
military security and stability and, together with their
cooperation partners, have called upon all the countries
concerned to move forward promptly with its ratification
and full implementation. In December 1991 they jointly
established a High Level Working Group in which all
Central and Eastern European countries are actively par-
ticipating, as well as the independent states in the former
Soviet Union with territory in the CFE area of application,
with a view to facilitating the early entry into force of the
Treaty. In February 1992 agreement was reached on a
phased approach for bringing the CFE Treaty into force.
In May agreement was reached in the High Level Working
Group with the eight former Soviet states concerned on the
apportionment of rights and obligations assumed by the
Soviet Union under the terms of the CFE Treaty. This
agreement, which was confirmed at the June 1992 Extra-
ordinary Conference in Oslo, provided the basis for the
provisional entry into force of the CFE Treaty through-
out the area of application on 17 July 1992, allowing its
verification procedures to be implemented immediately.
Following ratification by all eight states of the former
Soviet Union with territory in the area of application of
the Treaty, and completion of the ratification process by
all 29 signatories, the CFE Treaty formally entered into
force on 9 November 1992.
The Alliance also attaches considerable importance to
the parallel implementation of the Concluding Act on the
Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe which establishes the commitments
entered into by the parties to the CFE IA follow-on
negotiations in accordance with agreements reached on 6
July 1992.
In 1990 the North Atlantic Council established a Verifica-
tion Coordinating Committee to coordinate verification
efforts among members of the Alliance with regard to arms
control and disarmament agreements in general, and particu-
larly with regard to the CFE Treaty. The Committee ensures
information exchange among Alliance nations on their
inspection plans and on any verification-related issues. It
also oversees the development and operation of a central
verification data base maintained at NATO Headquarters,
in which all data relative to inspections are permanently
stored. In addition the Committee supervises the inspection
support activities of the NATO Military Authorities, such
as the development of common field procedures or the
conduct of NATO verification courses, providing guidance
as necessary. Last but not least, the Committee serves as
a forum for consultations among Allies on compliance
concerns and related issues.
The Verification Coordinating Committee has also
become the forum for consultation, coordination and
exchange of experience among Allies on activities related
to the implementation of the Stockholm and Vienna 1990
CSCE Documents on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures, (subsequently subsumed by the Vienna Docu-
ment 1992) such as evaluation visits, inspections or exer-
cise observations.
Other important new elements introducing greater open-
ness and confidence-building in the military field include
agreements achieved in March 1992 on an ``Open Skies''
regime, permitting overflights of national territory on a
reciprocal basis.
The CSCE process has a pivotal role in the field of arms
control and disarmament. The 1992 CSCE Follow-Up
Meeting in Helsinki was therefore seen as a turning point
in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe
which now involves all CSCE participants. It offered a
unique opportunity to move the process forward and, by
shaping a new cooperative order, to make it unnecessary
for any participating country to fear for its security. The
decisions taken at the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-
up Meeting are summarised in Part IV.
In the field of nuclear arms control, the Alliance's
objective is to achieve security at the minimum level of
nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
The early ratification of the START Agreement signed on
31 July 1991, is an important aspect of this. President
Bush's initiative of 27 September 1991, which was strongly
supported by the Alliance, opened new prospects for
nuclear arms reductions. In particular, the decision to
eliminate nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-
range weapon systems fulfilled the SNF arms control ob-
jectives expressed in the London Declaration of July 1990.
In January 1992 the United States President again took
the initiative in the field of nuclear arms control in his
State of the Union address, proposing further reciprocal
cuts in strategic nuclear forces. The initial reactions of the
Russian leadership were extremely positive and included
additional proposals. Allies also welcomed the announce-
ment made in May 1992 that withdrawal of former Soviet
tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of Russia for
ultimate dismantlement had been completed. They fully
supported the Lisbon Agreement of May 1992 between
the United States and the four successor states of the
former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their terri-
tory (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), commit-
ting them to joint implementation of the START Treaty.
The June 1992 agreement between the United States and
Russia to reduce their strategic forces well below the
ceilings established in the START Treaty, and to elimi-
nate land-based multiple warhead intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, was a further major step.
Despite these many positive developments in the field of
arms control, the global proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and of their means of delivery is a matter of
serious concern to Alliance governments since it under-
mines international security. NATO Foreign Ministers
have made clear their preoccupations on this subject
repeatedly, emphasizing that non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons is an essential element of cooperative security
and international stability. They have offered to provide
assistance in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons
in the former Soviet Union and have stressed the need for
measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear
or other destabilizing equipment and technology. Similar
concerns about proliferation were voiced by all the mem-
bers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in their
statements of December 1991 and June 1992, underlining
the importance attached to efforts undertaken in this field.
The Alliance welcomed the commitments by Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine to adhere to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and
urged these states to implement all their commitments as
soon as time allowed.
Transfers of conventional armaments which exceed
legitimate defensive needs, to other regions where tensions
exist, also make the peaceful settlement of disputes less
likely. The Alliance therefore has supported the establish-
ment by the United Nations of a universal non-
discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers as
well as steps undertaken to address other aspects of
proliferation and further initiatives designed to build
confidence and underpin international security. Within
the CSCE, NATO Allies have led the way in tabling
proposals dealing with non-proliferation in general and
transfers of conventional weapons in particular.
An additional essential aim remains the completion of
a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on
chemical weapons. In June 1992 negotiators in Geneva
agreed on the final draft of an agreement, paving the way
for approval of the document by the UN General
Assembly in October 1992 and the signing of a Treaty in
Paris early in 1993. In a related field, the results achieved
by the Third Review Conference of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, and the decision taken to
explore the feasibility of verification in this area, have
been further positive developments.
