United States General Accounting Office
__________________________________________________________________
GAO Report to the Chairman, Legislation
and National Security Subcommittee,
Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives
Stable Design and Adequate Testing
Must Precede Decision to Deploy
Some of the information in this report--e.g., pictures, charts,
and tables--could not be shown in ASCII text format. If you wish
to obtain a complete report, call GAO report distribution at
202/275-6241 (7:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m. EST) or write to GAO, P.O. Box
6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20877.
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman, Legislation and
National Security Subcommittee
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This report discusses why the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization will not be able to support currently scheduled
full-scale development or deployment decisions on any part
of Phase I of the Strategic Defense System. The
organization will not be able to support these decisions
until it has solidified the system architecture, conducted
integrated system-level testing in real time involving
actual pieces of hardware and software, and until the
Department of Defense adheres to technical and programmatic
oversight, commensurate with such a system.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce
the contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of
this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We
will then send copies to other appropriate congressional
committees; the Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties.
This report was prepared under the direction of Samuel W.
Bowlin, Director for Defense and Security Information
Systems, who may be reached at (202) 275-4649. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix IV.
The Department of Defense plans to spend between $69
and $87 billion to develop and deploy the first of a
multiple phase Strategic Defense System designed to
shield the United States from a massive Soviet
nuclear ballistic missile attack. At the request of
the Chairman, Legislation and National Security
Subcommittee, House Committee on Government
Operations, GAO reviewed the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization's (SDIO's) test and
evaluation plans. These plans are to support a 1993
executive decision by the President on deploying
Phase I and a 1994-1995 acquisition decision by the
Department of Defense to enter full-scale
development. Specifically, GAO was asked to
determine
-- what test and evaluation
requirements were established for
making development and deployment
decisions for the first phase, and
-- whether SDIO's approach will meet
those requirements and support a
decision on deployment.
____________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND
The Strategic Defense System is being designed to
destroy thousands of incoming ballistic missiles and
warheads. This will require detecting the missiles
and warheads, discriminating them from hundreds of
thousands of decoys, precisely tracking the
missiles and warheads, and then destroying them--all
within about 35 minutes or less, and despite the
enemy's concerted effort to defeat the system. The
Strategic Defense System is, by far, the most
complex, technologically challenging system ever
attempted. As currently envisioned, a
sophisticated communications system will link
together hundreds, or possibly thousands, of
computer-operated components in space and on the
ground. The system will consist of several
subsystems (elements), which include surveillance
satellites, space- and ground-based weapons, and
ground-based subsystems to command and control the
satellites and weapons.
2
The Strategic Defense System is being developed in
several phases. Phase I will be built using
existing technologies; later phases would use more
exotic technologies, such as lasers and particle
beams. On September 17, 1987, the Secretary of
Defense directed that Phase I enter the concept
demonstration and validation stage. This stage is
important because enough information must be
developed to show that the system is feasible before
a decision is made to enter full-scale development.
Because Phase I cannot be demonstrated outside of an
actual ballistic missile attack, much of this
information can be generated only through computer
simulation and modeling.
In 1988, SDIO formally adopted a design
(architecture) for Phase I. However, in January
1990 SDIO changed the design dramatically by
incorporating a new space-based weapon, called
Brilliant Pebbles. The idea behind Brilliant
Pebbles is that thousands of small, relatively
autonomous weapons would be deployed to intercept
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.
____________________________________________________________________
RESULTS IN BRIEF
The President is scheduled to make a decision in
1993 on deploying Phase I. His options include
deploying, delaying, or cancelling Phase I. Public
Law 99-145 states that a Strategic Defense System
may not be deployed in whole or in part unless the
President certifies to the Congress that the system
can fulfill its mission. SDIO may be able to
justify a decision to delay or cancel Phase I;
however, SDIO will not be able to support an
informed decision to deploy it. To do so requires a
stable design, sufficient testing and evaluation,
and according to SDIO, minimum funding levels.
However, it is highly unlikely any of these
conditions will be met.
The addition of Brilliant Pebbles in January 1990
has reduced, changed, or eliminated the need for
some of the space-based elements in the 1988 design.
At this point, it is uncertain exactly what Phase I
will consist of in terms of elements or what
functions they will perform. Additionally, while
SDIO initially required real-time integrated system-
level testing prior to a presidential deployment
decision and a full-scale development decision, SDIO
officials now state that such detailed tests will
not be conducted prior to either decision.
Furthermore, according to SDIO, because of fiscal
year 1990 funding cuts, the full-scale development
3
decision has been delayed until 1994-1995, and
research efforts have been scaled back, further
reducing the amount of information that will be
available for a presidential deployment decision.
SDIO officials believe they will be able to support
a presidential deployment decision with less
information than was originally desired, but state
that this will be done at increased risk.
Phase I has not received the scrutiny and oversight
that Defense initially envisioned. The Defense
Acquisition Board did not conduct its scheduled 1989
review, nor has it assessed how Brilliant Pebbles
affects the design and test and evaluation
requirements. The lack of effective agency
oversight has contributed to the failure of other
automated weapons systems, none of which matches the
scale and technological complexity of Phase I.
Consequently, any executive decision in 1993 to
deploy Phase I would be premature and fraught with
high risk.
____________________________________________________________________
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
SDI Design and
Test Plans in
State of Flux
Several problems are hampering SDIO's design and
test plans. First, Brilliant Pebbles radically
changed the design and sent the program into a state
of flux. SDIO has not yet solidified the role of
Brilliant Pebbles or what elements will be in the
final design. This causes problems because without
a stable design detailed Strategic Defense System
requirements cannot be determined. Setting
requirements is especially important for Phase I
where weapon, sensor, and communication systems are
interdependent. Changing a requirement for a
weapon system could significantly affect sensor and
communications systems as well. Further, an
unstable design increases the probability that
system requirements will not be adequately
determined and sufficient testing will not be
performed to ensure that the system works.
Nevertheless, Defense has requested $265 million for
full-scale development of one of the sensor
elements, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System, for fiscal year 1991 even though Brilliant
Pebbles may eliminate or reduce the requirements for
this system.
Second, SDIO does not plan to conduct integrated
system-level testing by the scheduled 1993
presidential decision. SDIO-funded studies and test
plans have cited the importance of running real-time
4
integrated system-level tests, which combine
computer simulation and actual hardware and
software prototypes with human intervention.
Furthermore, most of the system tests and
evaluations so far have been based on the pre-
Brilliant Pebbles design. Consequently, much of the
testing and analyses may no longer be relevant and
will have to be repeated.
Also, according to SDIO, its ability to support an
informed deployment decision depended on a minimum
funding level of $4.6 billion for fiscal year 1990.
However, funding was cut by 20 percent. According
to SDIO, such a cut will reduce the amount of
research performed, delay SDIO's full-scale
development decision by 2 years, and reduce the
amount of information available to the President.
Nevertheless, SDIO officials have stated that they
will be able to support a presidential decision on
the program even though less information will be
available.
Original Program
Oversight Reduced
Because of the complexity, uniqueness, and cost of
Phase I, the Defense Acquisition Board initially was
to follow a highly structured oversight system of
annual reviews looking at cost growth, changing
requirements, and test and evaluation results.
However, the October 1989 program review scheduled
by the Defense Acquisition Board did not occur.
According to Defense officials, the review was
cancelled because the fiscal year 1990 budget had
not yet been finalized and because Defense was
reassessing the amount of oversight needed for the
Strategic Defense System. Even though a Defense
Acquisition Board review is scheduled for June 15,
1990, major changes to the Phase I design and
significant reductions to test and evaluation
requirements have already occurred without the
Board's review and evaluation.
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense advise
the President to defer a decision to deploy any
element of the Phase I system until SDIO has
stabilized the design and has demonstrated the
effectiveness of the system through integrated
system-level tests in real time, using system
hardware and software prototypes with human
5
intervention. Further, the Secretary should ensure
that required oversight by the Defense Acquisition
Board be followed. The Board should more closely
monitor system design, development, testing, and
evaluation. GAO is making other recommendations in
chapter 4.
RECOMMENDATION TO
THE CONGRESS
GAO recommends that the Congress not fund full-scale
development for any element of Phase I, including
$265 million for the Boost Surveillance and
Tracking System in fiscal year 1991, until SDIO has
stabilized the design and has demonstrated the
effectiveness of the system through integrated
system-level tests in real time, using system
hardware and software prototypes with human
intervention.
____________________________________________________________________
AGENCY COMMENTS
As requested by the Chairman's office, GAO did not
obtain official agency comments on a draft of this
report. However, GAO discussed the information
contained in this report with SDIO officials and has
incorporated their comments where appropriate.
6
C o n t e n t s
---------------
Page
----
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION 9
Genesis/Evolution of the SDI Program 9
Objective of a Strategic Defense System 10
Description of Phase I 11
Importance of Concept Demonstration and 12
Validation and Defense Acquisition Oversight
Constraints Affecting SDIO's Approach to 13
Concept Demonstration and Validation
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14
2 UNSTABLE ARCHITECTURE AND TEST PLANS WILL NOT 17
SUPPORT A PRESIDENTIAL DEPLOYMENT DECISION IN 1993
Brilliant Pebbles Sends Phase I and Strategic 17
Defense System into State of Flux
SDIO Will Not Perform Integrated System-Level 20
Testing Prior to 1993
SDIO Asserts Funding Cuts Will Reduce Information 22
Needed For an Informed Decision in 1993
3 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 24
HAS BEEN REDUCED
Oversight For Phase I More Stringent Than 24
Typical Acquisition
1989 Annual DAB Review Did Not Occur; Decisions 25
Have Been Made Without DAB Review and Approval
Congress Cuts Funding for Operational Testing 26
and Evaluation Until Architecture is Solidified
7
4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 28
Recommendations to the Secretary of 30
Defense
Recommendations to the Congress 30
APPENDIXES
Appendix I: Department of Defense Major 31
Systems Acquisition Stages
Appendix II: Strategic Defense System Elements 33
of Phase I
Appendix III: Test Beds Supporting Demonstration 34
and Validation of the Strategic Defense System
Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 35
FIGURES (These figures are not included because they could not be
shown as ASCII text.)
Figure 1.1: Phases of a Ballistic Missile Attack 11
Figure 1.2: Phase I Architecture Incorporating 12
Brilliant Pebbles
ABBREVIATIONS
-------------
DAB Defense Acquisition Board
GAO General Accounting Office
IMTEC Information Management And Technology Division
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
8
CHAPTER 1
---------
INTRODUCTION
------------
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a program to develop and
deploy a Strategic Defense System to shield the United States
against a Soviet nuclear ballistic missile attack. Research and
development for the SDI program began in 1984, and in 1987 a
Strategic Defense System was approved for acquisition. This
system is to be developed in multiple phases. Phase I, the
subject of this report, is in the concept demonstration and
validation stage of the Department of Defense's acquisition
process.#1
The Strategic Defense System will be an expensive undertaking.
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) cost
estimates range from $69.6 to $87 billion for completion of Phase
I development and deployment--with an additional $10.1 billion for
Phase I operation and support until deployment is completed.
While the cost of follow-on phases is unknown, SDIO estimates
that, in addition to the Phase I costs, approximately $26.4
billion will be needed for fiscal years 1990 through 1994 to
pursue non-Phase I research and development. GAO has recently
reported to the Congress that the above figures are, at best,
optimistic.#2
GENESIS/EVOLUTION OF THE SDI PROGRAM
------------------------------------
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan called for a comprehensive
scientific research effort to develop a system that would render
nuclear ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete. In January
1984, SDI was established as a research and technology development
program, and in April 1984, Defense formally chartered the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization as the agency responsible
for managing Defense's efforts.
After several years of research, SDIO decided in 1987 to develop
and deploy the system in phases. SDIO felt that working in phases
would allow SDIO to be prepared for an early deployment, if such a
decision were made, and to respond to changing threats. Phase I of
the system is to be based on currently available technologies,
while later phases are to incorporate technologies that are
expected to be available in the future, such as neutral particle
beams and lasers. Phase I is not intended to be a "total defense",
but is being designed to destroy a certain percentage of some
intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles (the exact
percentages are classified). Creating a full strategic defense
1The Department of Defense's major system acquisition process is
supposed to provide a single approach to designing, developing,
implementing, and maintaining major weapons systems. (The five
stages of the acquisition process are discussed in appendix I.)
2Strategic Defense Initiative: Funding Needs Through Completion of
Phase I System (GAO/NSIAD-90-79FS, Jan. 29, 1990).
9
capability will require the deployment of the follow-on phases.
Therefore, a critical aspect of the first phase is the capability
to evolve and support future phases. Further, the system is not
being designed to destroy sea-and air-launched cruise missiles.#3
Other costly systems independent of the SDI program will be needed
to defend against these weapons.
From the beginning, SDIO has had one overall goal--to conduct a
vigorous research and technology program that would provide the
basis for an informed decision regarding the deployment of a
Strategic Defense System. The current Phase I program is intended
to support an executive decision on deployment by the President in
1993 and an acquisition decision on full-scale development by
Defense in 1994 or 1995. According to SDIO test and evaluation
officials, the President will have a range of options including
deploying, delaying, or cancelling Phase I. However, if the
President decides to deploy the system, Phase I development will
not be consistent with Defense's prudent acquisition policies
specifying that deployment decisions be made after full-scale
development.
OBJECTIVE OF A STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM
---------------------------------------
The Strategic Defense System is based on a layered defense
concept; the system is supposed to intercept a missile or a
deployed warhead, as it travels toward its target. The basic
concept is that separate sensor, weapon, and command and control
systems (SDIO refers to these separate systems as elements) would
be in space and on the ground. The system would be tied together
by a complex communications network and a sophisticated computer-
based command and control element. During an attack, the system
would have to function in an extremely hostile environment,
including nuclear explosions and a concerted effort by the enemy
to destroy the Strategic Defense System.
The threat the system would be facing, along with the environment
in which it would be operating, creates a unique and demanding
challenge. First, the space-based elements of the Strategic
Defense System would have to be able to detect and begin tracking
thousands of missiles almost immediately after launch, and then
intercept and destroy some of them. Those missiles that are not
destroyed would release warheads, along with decoys intended to
confuse the system, forcing the system to track hundreds of
thousands of objects. Also at this point, space-based elements of
the system would have to distinguish the warheads from the decoys,
and intercept and destroy some of the warheads. The system would
need to continue discriminating and tracking the surviving warheads
so that the ground-based elements could intercept more warheads
before they hit the United States. These functions would have to
be tightly coordinated and performed in less than 35 minutes--all
this with nuclear warheads exploding, anti-satellite weapons
attacking the system, and the enemy trying to disrupt
3Cruise missiles are guided missiles that have terrain-seeking
radar and fly at moderate speed in low altitude.
10
communications and computer operations. Figure 1.1 describes the
phases of a ballistic missile attack.
Figure 1.1: Phases of a Ballistic Missile Attack
(This figure is not included because it could not be shown as
ASCII text.)
Source: Adapted from SDI Technology Survivability and Software,
Office of Technology Assessment, May 1988.
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE I
----------------------
In 1988, a Phase I design, made up of seven elements, was approved
by the Defense Acquisition Board. The design consisted of two
space-based sensors (Boost Surveillance and Tracking System and
Space Surveillance and Tracking System); a space-based weapon
(Space-Based Interceptor); two ground-based sensors (Ground
Surveillance and Tracking System and Ground-Based Radar); and a
ground-based weapon (Ground-Based Interceptor), all managed by a
command and control system (Command Center Element). (Appendix II
describes each element.) The six surveillance and weapon elements
would be highly interdependent and rely heavily on the command and
control element, along with a complex communications system. The
individual elements would work together as an integrated system to
detect, track, discriminate, and destroy ballistic missiles and
their warheads. At the heart of the system is a large,
distributed, real-time computer software system which, by some
estimates, could have 40-100 million lines of code. The complexity
and risk of this undertaking cannot be overstated. We have
reported repeatedly on Defense systems that were far less complex,
contained far fewer lines of code, but have yet to perform as
intended.#4
In January 1990, SDIO decided to include a new weapon concept,
called Brilliant Pebbles, in Phase I. Brilliant Pebbles involves
several thousand individual interceptors orbiting the earth in
order to detect and destroy a target by smashing into it at high
speed. Brilliant Pebbles is supposed to improve system
survivability and reduce costs by dispersing thousands of space-
based interceptors that are smaller and more autonomous than the
Space-Based Interceptor. The Space-Based Interceptor would house
a number of interceptors, but unlike Brilliant Pebbles, it would
rely on other satellites for tracking, targeting, and
4Military Space Operations: Operational Problems Continue With
the Satellite Control Computer System (GAO/IMTEC-89-56, Aug. 8,
1989); Space Defense: Management and Technical Problems Delay
Operations Center Acquisition (GAO/IMTEC-89-18, Apr. 20, 1989);
Attack Warning: NORAD's Communications System Segment Replacement
Program Should Be Reassessed (GAO/IMTEC-89-1, Nov. 30, 1988);
Military Space Operations: Shuttle and Satellite Computer Systems
Do Not Meet Performance Objectives (GAO/IMTEC-88-7, Aug. 5, 1988).
11
communications. By making interceptors autonomous, they would no
longer need to rely on other satellites to perform these
functions. Further, because each interceptor would work
independently, the system's survivability would be increased, in
principle, because the loss of any one interceptor would not
greatly affect the system's overall effectiveness. Figure 1.2
shows Phase I with the six elements and Brilliant Pebbles.
Figure 1.2: Phase I Architecture Incorporating Brilliant Pebbles
(This figure is not included because it could not be shown as
ASCII text.)
SDIO funded three Brilliant Pebbles research and development
studies during 1989 and 1990. Studies completed by the Defense
Science Board and the JASONs--a group of scientists who
periodically provide technical support to the Department of
Defense--determined that the Brilliant Pebbles concept was
technically feasible. Along with these two studies, Defense
issued a Space-Based Architecture Study which reviewed the four
space-based elements of Phase I--Space Surveillance and Tracking
System, Boost Surveillance and Tracking System, the Space-Based
Interceptor, and Brilliant Pebbles--and defined and justified a
recommended space-based architecture. The Space-Based
Architecture Study recommended that research continue on both
Brilliant Pebbles and the Space-Based Interceptor and that
modified versions of the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System
and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System sensors be
included.
SDIO has decided to eliminate the Space-Based Interceptor from
Phase I, claiming that Brilliant Pebbles will cut costs by 20
percent, that is, from $87 to $69.6 billion. However, it is
unclear whether the costs for all Phase I requirements have been
incorporated into the $69.6 billion. Further, neither figure
includes the costs for operating and maintaining the system.
IMPORTANCE OF CONCEPT DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION
--------------------------------------------------
AND DEFENSE ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT
---------------------------------
On September 17, 1987, the Secretary of Defense directed that
Phase I of the Strategic Defense System enter the concept
demonstration and validation stage of Defense's major systems
acquisition process. SDIO's basic acquisition strategy is to
complete Phase I while researching later phases of a Strategic
Defense System. After successfully completing concept
demonstration and validation, Phase I could enter full-scale
development.
According to the Defense Systems Management College, concept
demonstration and validation may be the most critical of all
acquisition stages. The primary purpose of this stage is to
validate the feasibility of Strategic Defense System concepts and
technologies, and show that the risk is low enough to enter full-
scale development. According to the College, the Secretary of
Defense's decision to place a major system in full-scale
12
development is extremely important. During full-scale
development, the system is built, tested, and ready for full-rate
production. Not only will development consume enormous resources,
but major systems, at this point, take on a life of their own and
are seldom cancelled.
To help Defense gain sufficient design and development
information, major system acquisitions are reviewed by the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB). The purpose of the DAB, which is chaired
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, is to oversee
major Defense acquisitions. The DAB reviews each acquisition stage
to ensure that every program is ready to proceed into more advanced
stages of development or production. Each stage of the acquisition
process, as well as each milestone decision, is to be supported by
test and evaluation. The purpose of test and evaluation is to help
ensure the timely development, production, and fielding of systems
that meet users' requirements and perform as intended. The DAB
relies on information from test and evaluation to determine whether
a system is ready to enter full-scale development. The DAB reviews
also ensure that plans for later stages follow sound acquisition
management practices.
The complexity, cost, and uniqueness of the Strategic Defense
System has prompted the need for a more detailed program review
process. For example, the DAB developed a guidance document
called the Implementor, which provides a framework for additional
oversight. Although formal DAB reviews are usually only required
at major milestones, the Implementor recommends yearly DAB
reviews. Further, SDIO must submit additional documentation to
the DAB to ensure program goals are being met.
CONSTRAINTS AFFECTING SDIO's APPROACH
-------------------------------------
TO CONCEPT DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION
---------------------------------------
Constraints exist which affect how the Strategic Defense System
can be demonstrated. Although the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty permits research, it limits the development, testing, and
deployment of different types of strategic defense systems and
components. According to SDIO's 1989 report to the Congress on
SDI compliance with the treaty, research includes conceptual
design and laboratory testing. Development occurs after research
but precedes full-scale testing of systems and components designed
for actual deployment. The development, testing, and deployment of
launchers, interceptors, and radars are restricted. Also, the
extent to which the system can demonstrate its ability to interact
in a nuclear environment is constrained by limits on nuclear
testing.
Because the Strategic Defense System cannot be tested in its
operational environment, many system capabilities must be
demonstrated through computer modeling and simulation. For
example, in simulations, software models would mimic the behavior
of sensors and weapons and be used in place of the actual elements
to evaluate system performance. A ballistic missile attack from
launch to impact must also be simulated in software to prompt the
element models to respond. Eventually, some of these tests would
13
involve actual prototypes#5 of weapons and sensor hardware and
software interacting in the simulation. This type of integrated
system-level testing would be used to evaluate the performance of
elements within the context of the entire Strategic Defense System.
Thus, the ability to simulate the interaction of the systems'
hundreds of computers with their many millions of lines of software
code becomes of paramount importance in demonstrating whether the
system can perform its mission.
Early in the SDI program, SDIO recognized the need for integrated
system-level testing prior to a full-scale development decision.
Defense policies state that models or simulations can support a
full-scale development decision and that prototyping is one of the
most powerful tools available for determining system feasibility
and capability. Consequently, SDIO initially planned to build a
simulation framework to conduct tests using software and hardware
prototypes. SDIO studies and contractor documents have supported
the need for such test capabilities before a full-scale development
decision. However, because SDIO believed building such a
simulation framework would be very complex, it explored other
approaches for demonstrating and validating the Phase I system.
SDIO decided instead to use multiple test beds.#6 Under this
approach, each test bed would address critical strategic defense
issues such as system performance, command and control,
communications, and sensing and tracking. The system performance
test bed, known as the System Simulator, would be at the core of
this test environment. The System Simulator, using computer
models of individual elements, would perform end-to-end, system-
level tests in which all aspects of Phase I's performance would be
evaluated while under a simulated ballistic missile attack.
Although the System Simulator, or some other simulation framework,
might evolve to include real-time integrated hardware-, software-,
and human-in-the-loop capabilities, SDIO has no plans to accomplish
this prior to either the presidential decision on deployment or the
full-scale development decision.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------
On June 5, 1989, the Chairman, Legislation and National Security
Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations, requested
that we assess the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization's
program activities, test and evaluation requirements, and
decisions on the development and deployment of Phase I of the
Strategic Defense System. Specifically, the objectives of our
review were to determine (1) what test and evaluation requirements
5A prototype is an original or model on which a later item is
formed or based. A prototype is usually built during the concept
demonstration and validation stage and tested prior to the full-
scale development decision.
6Test beds are sites, facilities, or activities used for testing
models or prototypes. SDIO refers to its network of geographically
dispersed test facilities as the National Test Bed.
14
were established for making development and deployment decisions
for the first phase of the Strategic Defense System and (2) whether
the current program approach will meet those requirements and
support a decision on whether to deploy.
To address our objectives, we interviewed a wide range of
officials involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDIO
representatives included: (1) the Phase I System Engineer, as well
as other Engineering Office officials, (2) test and evaluation
officials, (3) Brilliant Pebbles Program Office officials, and (4)
National Test Bed Program Office officials. We discussed technical
issues with members of the Phase One Engineering Team, which acts
as a consultant to SDIO. Team members are experts in ballistic
missile defense and include physicists, software and electrical
engineers, and simulation analysts. We also met with officials
from Martin Marietta, the prime contractor for the National Test
Bed, and officials from General Electric Company, the system
engineer and integration contractor for the Strategic Defense
System. General Electric has the responsibility for defining Phase
I demonstration and validation requirements, including those for
test and evaluation. We met with Army and Air Force officials
involved in major SDI research and development as well as Defense
Acquisition Board officials. Additionally, we consulted with
ballistic missile defense experts at Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories.
Our approach was to obtain a thorough understanding of the
underlying engineering concepts for the Strategic Defense System
by (1) obtaining and analyzing key system design and requirements
documents, (2) interviewing and consulting with experts from the
ballistic missile defense community, and (3) visiting and
assessing research and development sites. We reviewed pertinent
management, technical, and contract documents provided by SDIO,
SDIO contractors, the Air Force, the Army, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and the Defense Science Board. We analyzed and
compared system documents such as the 1988 System Description
Document, the 1990 System Description Document, the Brilliant
Pebbles System Description Document, and the Space-Based
Architecture Study. Furthermore, we analyzed and compared test
and evaluation documents including the 1987 and 1989 Test and
Evaluation Master Plan, the Phase I Integrated Test Plan, the
System Simulator requirements document, the technical
specifications and software for the current System Simulator, the
Brilliant Pebbles Integrated Test Plan, and the Brilliant Pebbles
Test and Evaluation Master Plan. Through our analyses we were
able to identify the chronology of events that led to SDIO's
current test and evaluation approach in support of decisions on
deployment and full-scale development. We did not, however,
validate test and evaluation results.
Our work was conducted at SDIO Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the
National Test Bed Joint Program Office, Falcon Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado; Electronic Systems Division, Boston,
Massachusetts; the Army Strategic Defense Command, Huntsville,
Alabama; Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico; the Phase One
15
Engineering Office, Crystal City, Virginia; the Defense
Acquisition Board, Washington, D.C.; General Electric Corporation,
Blue Bell, Pennsylvania; and Martin Marietta Corporation, Colorado
Springs, Colorado.
We discussed the facts in this report with SDIO officials and have
incorporated their comments where appropriate. However, in
accordance with the requester's wishes, we did not obtain official
agency comments on a draft of the report. We conducted our work
from June 1989 through May 1990, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
16
CHAPTER 2
---------
UNSTABLE ARCHITECTURE AND TEST PLANS WILL NOT
---------------------------------------------
SUPPORT A PRESIDENTIAL DEPLOYMENT DECISION IN 1993
--------------------------------------------------
The President is scheduled to make a decision in 1993 on deploying
Phase I of the Strategic Defense System.#7 Public Law 99-145
states that a Strategic Defense System may not be deployed in whole
or in part unless the President certifies to the Congress that the
system can survive, meaning that it can maintain enough
effectiveness during a war to fulfill its mission. However, by
1993 SDIO will not have conducted integrated system-level tests
designed to demonstrate that the entire Phase I system will work as
planned, so it will not be able to support an informed deployment
decision by the President.
The recent inclusion of Brilliant Pebbles has fundamentally
changed the 1988 Phase I architecture by potentially reducing or
eliminating the need for two sensors and one weapon component of
the system. This change has significantly destabilized the
architecture, resulting in a dramatic restructuring of Phase I.
According to SDIO test and evaluation officials, the new Phase I
architecture will not be solidified until 1991 thus decreasing the
level of system testing that can be performed by 1993.
Furthermore, according to SDIO's Director, because of fiscal year
1990 funding cuts, research will be scaled back, reducing the
information available on which to make a deployment decision in
1993.
BRILLIANT PEBBLES SENDS PHASE I AND
-----------------------------------
STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM INTO STATE OF FLUX
-------------------------------------------
In January 1990, Brilliant Pebbles was formally incorporated into
the Phase I design. However, exactly what role Brilliant Pebbles
will play in the Phase I architecture and even what pieces of
Phase I will be deployed is uncertain and consequently, has put
the design of the Strategic Defense System into a state of flux.
The result is a destabilized architecture and a major
restructuring of SDIO's program.
Stable Integrated Architecture
------------------------------
Needed for System Development
-----------------------------
The SDIO Phase I System Engineer has stated that his first goal in
support of the presidential deployment decision is to create "a
complete and coherent system design with definition of all elements
and inter-element interfaces."#8 It is important in systems
7SDIO is conducting the SDI program to support a decision by the
President prior to the completion of his current term. Much of the
specific program guidance and direction, as well as the timing of
the presidential decision is classified.
8Interfaces are the internal and external communication paths
within and outside of the system.
17
development to have a stable, integrated architecture before
detailed system requirements can be determined. A stable
architecture provides the blueprint for design and development of
each element. An unstable architecture causes confusion and
increases the probability that system requirements and integrated
test objectives will not be met, and that the system will not
perform as intended.
The Strategic Defense System is a "system-of-systems" and
accordingly, the elements are all interdependent. A requirement
change for one element may affect all the others. For example, in
the 1988 Phase I architecture, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System had a
requirement to combine their tracking data to provide targeting
information for the Space-Based Interceptor. This combined data
would also be transmitted to the ground-based elements to help them
identify targets. The interfaces must be precisely defined to
support such data sharing. If the Space Surveillance and Tracking
System's mission changes, then all the elements must reflect the
change as well. Accordingly, to ensure integrated system
development, each element developer must be aware of all the other
elements and the respective interfaces when designing each system.
Brilliant Pebbles Destabilizes Phase I Architecture
---------------------------------------------------
Major program restructuring is going on to incorporate Brilliant
Pebbles and stabilize the architecture. Brilliant Pebbles is now
the focal point of SDIO's efforts. Its effect on the Phase I
architecture is far-reaching.
As discussed in chapter 1, the 1988 Phase I architecture was made
up of seven highly integrated elements. Command and control
relied on rapid communication and data sharing among elements.
For example, during a battle, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System would begin tracking boosters and would be one of several
systems to alert national decision-makers. The Boost Surveillance
and Tracking System would then transfer the information to the
Space Surveillance and Tracking System, which would begin tracking
and pass intercept information to the Space-Based Interceptor. At
the same time, battle information would be sent to the ground-based
weapons and sensors. The Ground Surveillance and Tracking System
and the Ground-Based Radar would continue tracking and the Ground-
Based Interceptor would destroy the warheads before they reenter
the earth's atmosphere. Throughout the battle, command and control
information would be centralized at the ground-based Command
Center Element.
The addition of Brilliant Pebbles fundamentally changed this
highly-integrated approach to strategic defense. Brilliant
Pebbles provides for several thousand self-contained interceptors
that can detect and destroy missiles independently of the other
Phase I elements. As a consequence, interfaces, sensing and
tracking capabilities, communications, and the numbers of elements
needed--both in terms of types and constellations (numbers of
satellites)--will have to be reassessed. For example, the Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System may not be required as a Phase I
18
element, and Brilliant Pebbles will add thousands of independent
interceptors to the system. Furthermore, Brilliant Pebbles will
eliminate the need for the Space-Based Interceptor, could reduce
tracking requirements placed on the Space Surveillance and Tracking
System, and could expand the mission requirements for the Ground
Surveillance and Tracking System. Unlike the Space-Based
Interceptor, whose battle management functions were highly
dependent on ground-based command and control instructions,
Brilliant Pebbles, after being turned on by the commander, could be
autonomous.
Phase I Architecture Remains Uncertain
--------------------------------------
Defense officials have stated that the elements that will make up
the Phase I architecture have not yet been solidified. However,
several scenarios have been given. An Office of the Secretary of
Defense official stated that a space-based system made up of the
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System and Brilliant Pebbles could
be initially deployed as the Phase I architecture, followed by the
Phase I ground-based elements. Another scenario is that the Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System and Brilliant Pebbles would be
deployed with a terminal interceptor#9 (the High Endoatmospheric
Interceptor), which is not currently included in the Phase I
design.
In April 1990, the Director of SDIO told the Congress that because
of Brilliant Pebbles potential for independent operation, the Phase
I architecture may not require the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System or may
require less capability from them. However, in May 1990, SDIO
officials stated that the Phase I architecture will include
Brilliant Pebbles and all the 1988 Phase I architecture elements,
with the exception of the Space-Based Interceptor. The
differences among such scenarios and the uncertain architecture
point to the instability of basic concepts underlying the Strategic
Defense System.
Unless the architecture is stabilized and the respective elements
are developed, designed, and tested as an integrated system, SDIO
will not know whether the system will work as planned. The
process of interconnecting the Phase I elements so that together
they can effectively accomplish the strategic defense mission is
called system integration. Successful system integration should
result in the design and delivery of complete elements that will
work in concert with the other Phase I elements. Two of the
elements, however, are preceding the rest of the system. Because
of presidential guidance, SDIO has expedited the research and
development of Brilliant Pebbles. Consequently, Brilliant Pebbles
has been placed in an accelerated acquisition program. The Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System, which may or may not be needed if
Brilliant Pebbles is successful, is approaching a full-scale
development decision. Defense has requested $265 million for
9Terminal interceptors are intended to destroy warheads after they
have entered the earth's atmosphere.
19
full-scale development of the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System in fiscal year 1991. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System is a multi-missioned satellite that supports other Defense
programs. Defense documents show that SDIO will provide $1.3
billion (or 99 percent) of the system's funding through fiscal year
1991. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking System's specific
functions for the Strategic Defense System are to detect missile
launches, acquire and track boosters, and assess the number of
boosters and warheads that have been destroyed. If Brilliant
Pebbles and the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System are allowed
to advance before the requirements of the other elements are
clearly defined, significant integration problems and costs could
emerge.
Phase I System Test Plans and
-----------------------------
Results May Be Moot
-------------------
SDIO test and evaluation officials claim that including Brilliant
Pebbles in Phase I has destabilized the architecture and that a
firm design will not be available before 1991. For example, they
have stated that a Preliminary Systems Requirements Review that was
scheduled for May 1990 will be deferred for at least a year.
Furthermore, SDIO test and evaluation officials are rewriting test
plans to incorporate Brilliant Pebbles. Because most of the test
and evaluation efforts have been based on the 1988 Phase I
architecture, much of the data and analysis may no longer be
relevant. For example, if, as mentioned above, the Space
Surveillance and Tracking System's mission is changed and it no
longer provides tracking information, then all of the modeling and
simulation done so far is useless because all the interfaces and
data paths have changed. Any change to one element causes this
rippling effect across the system.
Further, system-level tests and the resulting requirements have
not included Brilliant Pebbles. Accordingly, system tests must be
rewritten and actual simulations rerun to include them. Because
the other Phase I elements have not included Brilliant Pebbles in
their tests, analyses, and development, element test plans and
simulations must also be reassessed.
SDIO WILL NOT PERFORM INTEGRATED SYSTEM-
----------------------------------------
LEVEL TESTING PRIOR TO 1993
---------------------------
SDIO-funded studies and test plans cite the importance of
conducting integrated system-level tests in real time, using actual
system hardware and software with human intervention. For
example, the Advanced Simulation Framework Study recommended that
component hardware and software models at various geographic
locations be tested and evaluated to see how they work in real-time
operations. Moreover, SDIO's Integrated Test Plan notes the
importance of such tests before making a decision on full-scale
development. According to the plan, integrated system testing
minimizes costs by integrating and building upon existing
experiment assets, data, and results, and sharing a common test
bed. However, an integrated system-level test in real time using
hardware and software and a human-in-the-loop will not be
20
demonstrated prior to the planned 1993 decision on deployment.
SDIO officials feel they will be able to support a presidential
deployment decision with less information than was originally
desired, but state that this will be done at increased risk.
Value of Integrated System-Level Testing
----------------------------------------
Integrated system-level testing will help confirm whether the
individual elements and the strategic defense commander can
successfully interact in real time. Actual hardware and software
in the test environment will provide significantly more information
about system performance than a model. Such testing would put
system components in a realistic system environment for detecting
problems early during design and development. SDIO officials
decided that such testing will be performed in the System Simulator
(or some other simulation framework) and will provide the basis for
system design studies and end-to-end validation of overall system
performance. Simply put, the System Simulator will increase SDIO's
confidence that when the independently designed and developed
elements become operational, they will integrate effectively into a
Strategic Defense System.
In 1988 SDIO established the Stellar Task Force to address the
question of how best to evolve to such an integrated system test
environment. While the task force fully supported the use of the
System Simulator for system-level tests, it concluded that trying
to start off using only one test environment was too complex an
undertaking. It recommended breaking the problem into pieces and
developing several test beds.#10 By using several test beds, the
system could be broken into units, each focusing on a different
part of the system. For example, a communications test bed would
enable SDIO to conduct a series of tests on all of the elements'
abilities to effectively communicate.
The task force's rationale for this approach was that detailed
test results from each test bed could be entered into the System
Simulator's data bases for more accurate system-level testing.
The elements will be represented at the System Simulator by
software models rather than actual element hardware and software.
SDIO does plan to use several test beds and then evolve to
integrated system-level testing at the System Simulator,
incorporating actual element hardware and software in a real-time
environment. However, integrated testing will not occur before the
President's scheduled 1993 decision.
System-Level Test Results Based
-------------------------------
on Immature Element Models
--------------------------
A stable architecture with defined system and element requirements
is required before software models can be developed to validate
10These test beds are the Surveillance and Tracking Test Bed, the
Communications Network Test Bed, the Pilot Command Center, the
Gaming Test Bed, and the System Simulator, all of which are
described in appendix III.
21
each of the elements and the system as a whole. However, even
prior to the inclusion of Brilliant Pebbles, the SDIO Phase I
System Engineer had stated that detailed system requirements for
all Phase I elements will probably not be set until 1994 or 1995.
Therefore, element software models cannot sufficiently demonstrate
how the various elements will work until detailed requirements are
defined. As things stand, test results available in 1993 will be
based on limited software representations of the elements. For
example, Air Force officials have stated that they have not been
provided detailed ballistic missile defense requirements for the
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System. Without such requirements,
system developers cannot develop an accurate software
representation for system-level testing. Consequently, it is
unclear whether detailed requirements will be determined, a model
developed, system testing completed, and results analyzed in
sufficient time to support the 1993 deployment decision.
Therefore, not only will system-level tests not be conducted in
real time or be integrated with pieces of hardware and software,
but the tests will be based on simulations involving immature,
possibly inaccurate element models.
SDIO ASSERTS FUNDING CUTS WILL REDUCE INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------
NEEDED FOR AN INFORMED DECISION IN 1993
---------------------------------------
According to SDIO, an informed executive decision on deployment is
contingent, in part, on minimum funding levels. At one time, this
decision was to occur in the same time frame as Defense's formal,
full-scale development decision. In most major acquisitions, a
deployment decision is made after full-scale development is
completed and the system has moved into the next stage. (See app.
I.) According to SDIO's Director, an informed decision on
deployment is contingent on funding levels of $4.6 billion for
fiscal year 1990 and $33 billion over fiscal years 1990-1994. He
stated that any funding reduction would reduce confidence in the
deployment decision and would have increasingly serious
consequences for the SDI program. For example, the Director stated
that a 20 percent funding cut would reduce the confidence in making
a decision on deployment due to cutbacks in research. He further
stated that emerging concepts, especially Brilliant Pebbles, would
not be fully explored. Hence, the space-based architecture would
not be completely defined, and initial system development and
deployment schedules would be delayed at least 2 years.
The Congress reduced SDIO's fiscal year 1990 budget request by 20
percent (from $4.6 billion to $3.6 billion) because of
congressional concern for overall fiscal constraints and SDIO's
major uncertainties for fiscal year 1990. Consequently, SDIO
initiated a major replanning and restructuring strategy to
identify program priorities and impacts, and SDIO delayed its full-
scale development decision for 2 years. Many contracts were
reduced, delayed, or cancelled, resulting in scaled-back
demonstration and validation activities that, according to SDIO,
will provide less information than was originally envisioned to
support an informed 1993 deployment decision. For example, the
identification of system-level demonstration and validation
requirements in support of system-level tests will not be
22
established until fiscal year 1992; and by 1993, testing on command
and control functions will not be as thorough as originally
planned. Further, because the new Phase I architecture will not be
defined until 1991, the elements will be less developed and their
designs less detailed, therefore, less able to support system-level
testing. Finally, the system's communications network will not be
tested for real-time operations. Nevertheless, SDIO officials have
stated that they will be able to support a presidential deployment
decision but with increased risk.
23
CHAPTER 3
---------
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
----------------------------
HAS BEEN REDUCED
----------------
SDI program decisions have been made without the formal review and
approval of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), increasing the
risk that program objectives will not be achieved. Defense,
recognizing the complexity, uniqueness, and cost of the Strategic
Defense System, required additional DAB oversight and directed
additional monitoring of SDIO's operational test and evaluation
activities. Despite the more stringent oversight requirements, the
1989 annual DAB review did not occur as planned. Consequently,
fundamental changes to the Phase I architecture and reductions in
test and evaluation requirements have occurred without formal DAB
review and oversight.
OVERSIGHT FOR PHASE I MORE STRINGENT
------------------------------------
THAN TYPICAL ACQUISITION
------------------------
As discussed in chapter 1, the DAB oversees major Defense
acquisition programs. As part of its oversight responsibility, the
DAB conducts formal reviews at major program milestones to ensure
that programs are ready to proceed into more advanced stages of
development and that proposed program plans for later stages follow
sound acquisition management practices. Among the issues typically
considered in a DAB milestone review are cost, requirements
growth, schedule delays, threat assessment, acquisition strategy,
and test and evaluation plans and results. As part of the Defense
acquisition process, DAB reviews are to help reduce the risks
associated with major systems acquisitions.
Phase I, however, is not a typical acquisition. The complexity,
cost, and uniqueness of the Strategic Defense System has prompted
the need for a more stringent acquisition process. For example,
in 1987 the DAB developed a guidance document called the
Implementor which provides a framework for additional oversight.
Although formal acquisition reviews by the DAB are usually only
required at major milestones, the Implementor expanded the DAB's
oversight responsibility to include yearly reviews, and lists
additional documentation SDIO must submit to the DAB to ensure
program goals are being met.
In addition to the increased DAB oversight, Defense also decided in
1987 to establish an oversight group under its Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation to monitor SDIO's test and
evaluation activities. Each stage of the acquisition process, as
well as each milestone decision, is to be supported by test and
evaluation. The purpose of test and evaluation is to help ensure
the timely development, production, and fielding of systems that
meet the users' requirements and perform as intended. The DAB
relies on information from test and evaluation activities to
determine whether a system is ready to enter the next stage of
development.
24
1989 ANNUAL DAB REVIEW DID NOT OCCUR; DECISIONS
-----------------------------------------------
HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT DAB REVIEW AND APPROVAL
----------------------------------------------
The Implementor the DAB imposed on the SDI program states that the
Phase I program baseline must be reviewed annually by the DAB.
These annual reviews were to include cost, schedule, technical
performance, and operational assessments. The annual DAB review
scheduled for October 1989 was delayed until December and later
cancelled. According to Defense officials, the review was
cancelled because the fiscal year 1990 budget had not yet been
finalized, and because Defense was reassessing the amount of
oversight needed for the Strategic Defense System acquisition. The
review has been rescheduled for June 15, 1990. Further,
significant issues have not been formally reviewed by the DAB as to
their impact on the SDI program. These issues include the October
1989 Space-Based Architecture Study's conclusions and
recommendations and the dramatic effect of incorporating Brilliant
Pebbles into Phase I.
The Space-Based Architecture Study was initiated to review the
feasibility and consequences of incorporating Brilliant Pebbles
into Phase I with special emphasis on the space-based elements--the
Space-Based Interceptor, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System, and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System. The study
concluded that Brilliant Pebbles was feasible, but recommended that
research continue on both Brilliant Pebbles and the Space-Based
Interceptor. Additionally, the study concluded that if Brilliant
Pebbles were incorporated, major changes should be made to system
requirements that could significantly affect program cost and
schedule. For example, the study concluded that (1) the Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System's ballistic missile defense
requirements could be reduced; (2) the Space Surveillance and
Tracking System is an essential asset for Phase I but may need to
be modified; and (3) the Ground Surveillance and Tracking System's
capability will have to be increased. While SDIO officials have
considered the study's results, the DAB has not formally reviewed
the study and determined its consequences on the program's design,
cost, and schedule.
Under Defense's current approach, major changes to Phase I have
occurred without high-level Defense oversight and management
review. Although the study recommended that research continue on
both space-based weapons, SDIO decided to include Brilliant Pebbles
in the Phase I architecture. This fundamental change to the
program baseline was made without formal DAB review and oversight.
As noted in chapter 1, this addition will have far-reaching impacts
that will ripple across the Strategic Defense System; system
interfaces, sensing capabilities, communications, and element
requirements will all change significantly.
SDIO has also reduced the testing requirements for both the System
Simulator and the Pilot Command Center without DAB review. SDIO
initially established stringent System Simulator requirements that
would demonstrate an end-to-end, real-time system test with
hardware-, software-, and human-in-the loop in support of a full-
scale development decision. However, the System Simulator is now
only required to demonstrate an end-to-end simulation using
software representations of the system elements instead of actual
25
pieces of hardware and actual system software operating in real
time. Further, the Pilot Command Center, SDI's test bed to
demonstrate battle management and command, control, and
communications functions in real time, was to include actual sensor
and weapon hardware-in-the-loop testing. Current test plans do not
include actual sensor and weapon interfaces. Since these
significant reductions in demonstration and validation
requirements have not been subject to DAB review, high-level
Defense Department officials have not passed judgment on whether
this proposed approach will provide sufficient information to make
an informed deployment decision.
CONGRESS CUTS FUNDING FOR OPERATIONAL TESTING AND EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------
UNTIL ARCHITECTURE IS SOLIDIFIED
--------------------------------
The Congress has shown long-standing interest in how major weapon
systems perform and the adequacy and timeliness of operational test
and evaluation. As early as 1971, the Congress enacted legislation
requiring Defense to provide the Congress with data on operational
test and evaluation results of major weapon systems before
committing major production dollars.
In 1983, Congress enacted additional legislation creating the
Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Defense directed this office to provide an independent assessment
of system-level testing for the Strategic Defense System. This
office is to provide independent oversight, coordinate the military
services' planning and execution of operational tests, and
objectively report on test results to Defense and congressional
decision-makers.
The Congress expects independent oversight and objective reporting
of operational test results before it is willing to commit to
production decisions. However, the Congress, in November 1989,
expressed concern about the constantly changing design of the
Strategic Defense System and, given these changes, questioned what
value the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation could provide
to the Strategic Defense System at that time. According to the
1990 Authorization Act conferees,#11
...the need for a Strategic Defense Initiative
operational test and evaluation activity is premature in
view of the shifting SDI architectures, plans and
priorities. Accordingly, the conferees agree to reduce
the operational test and evaluation authorization by
$12.415 million from the requested amount and direct the
Department of Defense not to obligate any appropriated
funds for such an activity until it has been formally
authorized in law.
11Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1990 for Military
Activities of the Department of Defense, House of Representatives
Report No. 101-331, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Conference Report).
26
We agree that such testing is premature given the fluid and
constantly changing nature of the Strategic Defense System
architecture. However, once the architecture is set, early
system-level operational test and evaluation will help ensure that
the acquisition process, which includes system-level test plans and
methodologies, is not only monitored but also assessed.
Furthermore, such oversight will help ensure that complex system-
level test results, justifying a full-scale development decision,
will be understood.
27
CHAPTER 4
---------
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is engaged in one of
the most complex and technologically challenging efforts ever
undertaken. Tens of billions of dollars will be needed to develop
and deploy the first phase of a Strategic Defense System. The
first phase is designed to protect the United States from only a
portion of a massive Soviet nuclear ballistic missile attack.
The Phase I architecture of the Strategic Defense System remains in
a state of flux, primarily because Brilliant Pebbles, a new space-
based weapon, was added to the system. The importance of a stable
architecture cannot be overstated. An architecture that is not
well defined runs the risk that system requirements will not be met
and that the system will not perform as intended. Unless the
individual Strategic Defense System elements are designed,
developed, and tested as an integrated system, SDIO will not know
whether the system will work as intended.
Brilliant Pebbles has greatly changed the Phase I architecture and
highlights the instability of SDIO's design for the Strategic
Defense System. Instead of the highly integrated, interdependent
architecture envisioned for Phase I, Brilliant Pebbles is to
provide more autonomy and require less interdependence among
elements. As a result, element interfaces, surveillance and
tracking capabilities, communications, and the numbers of elements
will change. According to the Phase I System Engineer, even before
the addition of Brilliant Pebbles to the architecture, detailed
system requirements for all Phase I elements would probably not be
completely defined until 1994 or 1995. Nevertheless, Defense has
requested $265 million for full-scale development of the Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System in fiscal year 1991. While the
system is being developed to meet other Defense missions, we
believe that a decision to enter full-scale development for the
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System before the Phase I
architecture had been solidified and its ballistic missile defense
requirements defined would be premature. Such decisions in other
Defense programs have led to significant cost increases, schedule
delays, and performance shortfalls.
Phase I system-level test and evaluation activities will be
significantly affected as well. System-level testing and
evaluation are critical to making decisions on the continued
development and deployment of a Strategic Defense System.
However, the majority of system test and evaluation efforts so far
have been based on an earlier Phase I architecture that did not
include Brilliant Pebbles. Consequently, much of the current test
data and analyses will not be applicable to the new architecture,
and many of the tests will likely have to be redesigned and
repeated. Even though initial SDIO test plans required that real-
time integrated system-level tests be performed prior to a full-
scale development decision and a presidential deployment decision,
SDIO officials now claim such tests will not be conducted prior to
either decision. We believe SDIO's initial plans could
28
significantly reduce the risks involved in making critical
development and deployment decisions for such a costly and
technically complex system.
The President is scheduled to make a decision in 1993 on deploying
Phase I of the Strategic Defense System. The President will have a
range of options including deploying, delaying, or cancelling the
Phase I system. Public Law 99-145 states that the system may not
be deployed unless the President determines that the system is
sufficiently capable of fulfilling its mission. Given that the
architecture continues to change, the program is falling behind
schedule, and the amount of test and evaluation data has been
reduced, we do not believe that SDIO will be able to give the
President enough information to support a 1993 decision to deploy
Phase I.
We are not alone in raising concerns about the Strategic Defense
System's changing architecture. The Congress has been troubled by
the constantly changing design of the Phase I system and has
questioned the value of operational test and evaluation oversight
at this time. The Congress was so concerned that for fiscal year
1990 it not only reduced SDI program funding by 20 percent (from
$4.6 billion to $3.6 billion), but also cut funding for the Office
of Operational Testing and Evaluation, citing such activities as
premature in view of the shifting Strategic Defense System
architecture, plans, and priorities.
The federal government has repeatedly found that major
acquisitions such as the Strategic Defense System are extremely
difficult and complex undertakings, fraught with high risks.
Indeed, many have floundered. A principal element needed to
successfully design and develop highly integrated systems is the
commitment and oversight of agency leaders. To provide that
oversight they must have the information they need--such as program
cost, requirements growth, schedule delays, acquisition strategy,
and test and evaluation plans and results--to effectively guide the
acquisition effort.
High-level oversight of the SDI program, however, is not
occurring. The Defense Acquisition Board, which oversees major
Defense acquisition programs, has not reviewed major changes to the
Phase I architecture and to the system's test and evaluation
requirements. The DAB's 1989 annual program review was cancelled.
According to Defense officials, the review was cancelled because
the fiscal year 1990 budget had not yet been finalized, and because
Defense was reassessing the amount of oversight needed for the
Strategic Defense System acquisition. We do not believe these
reasons justify cancelling scheduled oversight reviews considering
the dramatic, fundamental changes in the Phase I design and the
significant reductions in system-level test and evaluation
requirements. As a result, significant changes, such as the
addition of Brilliant Pebbles to the Phase I architecture and the
results of the October 1989 Space-Based Architecture Study, have
not been subject to formal review.
29
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
-------------------------------------------
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense advise the President to
defer a decision to deploy any element of the Phase I system until
SDIO has stabilized the architecture and has demonstrated the
effectiveness of the system through integrated system-level tests
in real time, using system hardware and software prototypes with
human intervention. Additionally, the Secretary should ensure
that required oversight by the Defense Acquisition Board be
followed. The Board should more closely monitor system design,
development, testing, and evaluation. Finally, when the program's
architecture is stable, the Secretary should request that the
Congress reinstate funding for the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation to provide an independent system-level assessment for
the Strategic Defense System.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
------------------------------
We recommend that the Congress not fund full-scale development for
any element of Phase I until SDIO has stabilized the architecture
and has demonstrated the effectiveness of the system through
integrated system-level tests in real time, using hardware and
software prototypes with human intervention. This would include
not providing $265 million for the Boost Surveillance and Tracking
System in fiscal year 1991. However, if Defense needs the Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System for another mission, independent
and separate from the Strategic Defense System, it should be
justified and funded to meet that mission and should no longer be
considered an element of the Strategic Defense System.
30
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
---------------------
MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION STAGES
--------------------------------
Mission area analysis and program initiation generally precede the
five Department of Defense acquisition stages. Defense components
continually analyze their assigned mission areas to identify
deficiencies (needs) and determine if new systems or major
upgrades to existing systems are necessary. These analyses often
result in recommendations to initiate new acquisition programs
through the validation of a need to correct the deficiency. Once a
need has been identified and validated and Defense initiates an
acquisition program, the program enters the concept formulation
stage.
CONCEPT FORMULATION STAGE
-------------------------
In this stage, potential requirements and alternative approaches to
satisfy the need are identified and evaluated. Various types of
analyses considering trade-offs among performance, life-cycle cost,
and schedule are conducted to select among possible concepts to
satisfy the need. Once a concept has been selected, it is
presented to Defense for approval.
DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION STAGE
----------------------------------
In this stage, feasibility and desirability of the selected
requirements and the system concept are further analyzed, generally
using techniques like computer simulation, hardware prototyping,
development test and evaluation, operational test and evaluation,
or a combination of test methods. When the feasibility of the
concept has been convincingly demonstrated and validated, the
program enters the full-scale engineering and development stage.
FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT STAGE
----------------------------
In this stage, the system, including every item necessary for its
logistic and operational support, is designed, fabricated, and
tested. At the conclusion of this stage, the system is ready to be
produced.
FULL-RATE PRODUCTION AND INITIAL DEPLOYMENT STAGE
-------------------------------------------------
During this stage the proposed system is built and released to the
user. At this point, the system becomes operational.
OPERATIONS SUPPORT STAGE
------------------------
This stage immediately follows deployment and extends until the
system is removed from Defense inventory. Two major Defense
reviews are conducted in this stage. The first takes place 1 to 2
years after deployment to determine if operational readiness and
support objectives are being achieved and maintained. The second,
occurring 5 to 10 years after deployment, evaluates system
31
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
capabilities and assesses whether major upgrades are needed or if
the system should be replaced.
32
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM
------------------------
ELEMENTS OF PHASE I
-------------------
General Specific
System element function functions
-------------- -------- ---------
Boost Surveillance Sensor Detect missile launches;
and Tracking acquire and track
System boosters; assess kills
Space Surveillance Sensor Acquire and track warheads
and Tracking and satellites; assess
System kills
Ground Sensor Track warheads and decoys;
Surveillance and discriminate warheads from
Tracking System decoys; assess kills
Ground-Based Sensor Acquire and track warheads
Radar and decoys; discriminate
warheads from decoys
Space-Based Weapon Destroy boosters and
Interceptor warheads
Ground-Based Weapon Destroy warheads
Interceptor
Command Center Human decision-making;
communications and
guidance for defense
system
33
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III
TEST BEDS SUPPORTING DEMONSTRATION AND
--------------------------------------
VALIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM
------------------------------------------
The Surveillance and Tracking Test Bed will evaluate tracking and
discrimination function performance for accuracy, computational
requirements, speed, robustness. It will also validate
surveillance algorithms and integrated system performance.
The Communications Network Test Bed will validate communications
network operations and management and validate security of the
Strategic Defense System's communications design.
The Pilot Command Center will validate command structure, hardware-
in-the-loop, and demonstrate proof of concept for mobile and fixed
physical configurations with selected software performance.
The Gaming Test Bed will evaluate proposed command and control
operational concepts, build operator and user confidence in
hardware-in-the-loop decision tools to support the development of
the Pilot Command Center.
The System Simulator will provide the basic vehicle for system
design studies and end-to-end validation of overall system
performance. It will also provide validate software and
integration capabilities.
34
APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
---------------------------------
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael T. Blair, Assistant Director
Leonard J. Latham, Technical Advisor
Sally M. Obenski, Site Senior
Victoria L. Miller, Evaluator
Teresa M. Schlee, Writer-Editor
DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE
----------------------
Barry A. Tidwell, Evaluator-in-Charge
Yvonne J. Rodriguez, Evaluator
