Report No.: GAO/HR-93-17 Date: December 1992
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Author: United States General Accounting Office
Addressee: High-Risk Series
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Overview
- Problems and Remedies
- Open or Emerging Issues
Seized and Forfeited Assets
- Special Funds Established to Pay Asset Forfeiture-related Expenses
- Improved Seized Cash Management
- Improved Management Information and Financial Reports
- Faster Forfeiting of Uncontested Cash Seizures
- Agreement to Test Feasibility of Consolidating Property Management
and Disposition
- More Informed Seizures Being Made
Conclusions and Action Needed
Related GAO Products
High-Risk Series
- Lending and Insuring Issues
- Contracting Issues
- Accountability Issues
Office of the Comptroller General
Washington, DC 20548
December 1992
The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
In January 1990, in the aftermath of scandals at the Departments of Defense
and Housing and Urban Development, the General Accounting Office began a
special effort to review and report on federal government program areas that
we considered "high risk."
After consulting with congressional leaders, GAO sought, first, to identify
areas that are especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement. We then began work to see whether we could find the fundament
al
causes of problems in these high-risk areas and recommend solutions to the
Congress and executive branch administrators.
We identified 17 federal program areas as the focus of our project. These
program areas were selected because they had weaknesses in internal controls
(procedures necessary to guard against fraud and abuse) or in financial
management systems (which are essential to promoting good management,
preventing waste, and ensuring accountability). Correcting these problems is
essential to safeguarding scarce resources and ensuring their efficient and
effective use on behalf of the American taxpayer.
This report is one of the high-risk series reports, which summarize our
findings and recommendations. It describes the substantial progress that has
been made in the management and disposition of seized and forfeited assets b
y
the Department of Justice and the U.S. Customs Service. In a period of about
10 years, Justice and Customs have transformed their problem-ridden seized
property programs into more businesslike operations that generate revenues
totaling about $900 million annually. This report focuses on the program
changes made and highlights those areas where sustained management attention
is needed.
Copies of this report are being sent to the President-elect, the Democratic
and Republican leadership of the Congress, congressional committee and
subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members, the Director-designate of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Attorney General-designate, and the
Secretary-designate of the Treasury.
The federal government has had the authority to take property through
forfeiture for more than 200 years. It was not until about 1980, however, th
at
it began to apply the asset forfeiture laws as powerful weapons against drug
traffickers and other organized crime figures. The number and value of
seizures soon grew dramatically. In 1979, the total value of seized property
inventories at the Department of Justice and the U.S. Customs Service was $3
3
million. By 1992, the inventories were valued at $1.9 billion. They now
include 16,000 cars; 5,200 real properties; other property (such as planes,
boats, jewelry, and antiques) valued at about $360 million; and $550 million
in cash.
Initially, Justice and Customs focused more on taking the property away from
the criminal and less on managing the property that was taken. But today,
property management is an integral part of these agencies' total program
operations, and while sustained management attention is still needed and
further system modifications may eventually be appropriate, the two agencies
now have systems in place to help ensure that their property management
programs are run in a businesslike manner.
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===
PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES
Following are three examples of major problem areas in which Justice and
Customs have made improvements in the past several years.
In July 1982, we reported that seized property was improperly cared for,
resulting in a loss of revenue for the United States. The agencies had to pa
y
expenses related to seizure and forfeiture out of money appropriated for
salaries and expenses, which gave them little incentive to make use of asset
forfeiture laws or properly manage and maintain seized property. Following o
ur
recommendation, however, Congress established asset forfeiture funds at
Justice and Customs. Proceeds from seizure activities are deposited in these
funds and are used to finance program expenses. The funds are self-supportin
g;
in fiscal year 1991, receipts exceeded expenses by more than $715 million.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, we reported that millions of dollars in seized
cash was being held unnecessarily in agency vaults and safe deposit boxes
before being deposited in designated U.S. Treasury accounts. This prevented
the federal government from obtaining economic benefits from the money and
increased the administrative costs and risks of holding the cash. In 1987,
Justice and Customs established policies to minimize the delay and have sinc
e
established systems for overseeing seized cash operations.
We first reported in 1977 that the asset forfeiture programs were operating
without sufficient program information to make informed management decisions
Congressional oversight was also hampered by the lack of reliable informatio
n.
Justice and Customs have since made considerable progress in establishing
systems to produce reliable inventory data.
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OPEN OR EMERGING ISSUES
Now that major operational problems relating to the management and dispositi
on
of seized and forfeited assets have been identified and corrective actions
have been initiated, sustained oversight is needed to see these problems
through to resolution.
In addition, the incoming Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury
should continue to pursue a recent initiative involving consolidation. In
1991, we reported that the two agencies could reduce their program
administration costs by about 11 percent annually by consolidating the
management and disposition of their noncash seized property inventories. The
recommended consolidation has not yet taken place, but the two agencies have
agreed to a pilot program.
Interest in the asset forfeiture programs is now broadening to include the
question of whether the agencies are applying the asset forfeiture laws
appropriately and effectively. Adequate safeguards are needed to ensure that
federal agencies do not become overzealous in their use of the asset
forfeiture laws or too dependent on the funds derived from seizures. The
system must include appropriate checks and balances; otherwise, asset
forfeiture programs run the risk of being seriously curtailed. The first in
a
series of congressional hearings on this issue took place in September 1992.
We expect to do considerable work on it in the future.
SEIZED AND FORFEITED ASSETS
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The government seizes property for violations of law and regulation and take
s
title to that property through either an administrative or judicial process,
depending on the type and value of the property, the violation for which it
was seized, and whether a bond has been posted. Posting a bond automatically
requires that the forfeiture be done through a judicial process. Anyone havi
ng
a legal interest in the seized property has the option of posting a bond.
After forfeiture, noncash property may be sold, put into official use, or
shared with state and local law enforcement agencies participating in the
seizure. Forfeited cash and the proceeds from the sale of noncash properties
may also be shared with state and local law enforcement agencies.
The federal government has had the ability to take property through forfeitu
re
for more than 200 years, although this was rarely done before the 1980s.
Beginning about 1980, the number and value of seizures started growing
dramatically as law enforcement agencies began relying more heavily on
forfeiture as a means of fighting drug traffickers and other organized crime
figures. In addition, in 1984 the Comprehensive Crime Control Act expanded t
he
federal government's seizure authority and established funds to finance the
management and disposition of seized and forfeited assets. More recently, th
e
asset forfeiture laws were expanded to cover crimes associated with money
laundering and financial institutions-related offenses. Collectively, these
changes have resulted in the value of Justice's and Customs' seized property
inventories growing from $33 million in 1979 to $1.9 billion in 1992.
This explosive growth in the asset forfeiture programs resulted in a nightma
re
for the seizing agencies. Before the mid-1980s, they were either unmotivated
to take, or unable to gain, control of the asset management side of their
programs. Most of what they did was reactionary. They did not have effective
means for dealing with the management problems associated with the
ever-increasing amount of property and money seized. The agencies were, in
essence, victims of their own success--the more successful they became in
employing asset forfeiture as a law enforcement tool, the larger their
problems grew in managing and disposing of the assets.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the programs matured, and the agencie
s
gained more control. Accomplishing this, however, was no easy task because i
t
involved changing their organizations' cultures. What was once viewed as a
by-product of a law enforcement responsibility is now viewed as an integral
part of overall operations.
Some of the more significant changes affecting property management and
disposition are highlighted in the following sections. While these changes
have made a tremendous difference in the management and disposition of seize
d
properties, we believe the agencies have one more major hurdle that needs to
be overcome. That hurdle involves consolidating the management and dispositi
on
of noncash seized properties in one agency. Recently, Justice and Customs
agreed on a plan to begin testing the merits of consolidation, but continued
oversight will be necessary to complete the consolidation effort. Continued
oversight is also needed to address some of the other corrective actions tha
t
have been initiated.
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SPECIAL FUNDS ESTABLISHED TO PAY ASSET FORFEITURE-RELATED EXPENSES
In July 1983, we reported that property was not properly cared for after it
was seized, resulting in lost revenue for the government. We reported that t
he
seizing agencies had little incentive to properly manage and maintain seized
property. They had to pay expenses related to the seizure and forfeiture out
of money appropriated for salaries and expenses. If seized property was
forfeited and sold, agencies could recover seizure- and forfeiture-related
expenses from sales proceeds. If the property was not forfeited, or if costs
exceeded whatever proceeds were realized, the seizing agencies had to divert
money from other law enforcement operations to cover these costs.
We recommended that the Congress enact legislation establishing special fund
s
to pay asset forfeiture-related expenses. In 1984, such legislation was
enacted, establishing asset forfeiture funds in the Department of Justice an
d
the U.S. Customs Service. This change removed the budgetary disincentive to
the aggressive use of forfeiture as a weapon in the war against crime.
Proceeds from seizure activities are deposited in these funds and are used t
o
finance program expenses such as those incurred in the care, custody, and
disposal of seized and forfeited assets; payments of liens and mortgages; an
d
purchases of evidence and rewards for information related to asset seizure.
These funds have always operated on a self-supporting basis--that is, each
year fund receipts have exceeded expenses. For fiscal year 1991, receipts
exceeded expenses by more than $715 million.
Year-end surpluses in Customs' fund are transferred to the general fund of t
he
Treasury. Year-end surpluses in Justice's fund have historically been used f
or
other law enforcement purposes, such as building prisons or hiring more U.S.
Attorney office personnel, or transferred to a special forfeiture fund under
the control of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. O
n
October 6, 1992, the President signed into law a bill replacing the Customs
fund with a Treasury-wide forfeiture fund. The newly created Treasury fund w
as
basically modeled after the Department of Justice's forfeiture fund.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, we reported on several occasions that millions o
f
dollars in seized cash was being held unnecessarily in agency vaults and saf
e
deposit boxes before being deposited into designated U.S. Treasury accounts.
We reported that the deposit delays prevented the government from obtaining
economic benefits from the idle cash and increased the administrative costs
and risks in handling, storing, accounting for, and safeguarding the cash fr
om
theft and abuse.
In late 1986 and early 1987, we reviewed 129 seized cash cases involving abo
ut
$39 million and found deposit delays in 107, or 83 percent, of the cases. We
considered a delay to occur if the money was not deposited within 14 days
after forfeiture or 14 days after a decision that it was no longer necessary
to hold the cash as evidence. The deposit delays varied from 2 days to almos
t
5 years.
We reported that there were several causes for the delays, including the lac
k
of a national policy on seized cash management. In addition, the agencies
lacked information necessary to oversee and monitor seized cash operations.
In 1987, Justice and Customs established policies designed to minimize the
unnecessary holding of cash. Their policies stressed the need to promptly
identify and deposit all seized cash not needed as evidence. Furthermore,
agency policies discouraged retaining seized cash for evidence unless it was
absolutely critical to the case.
Both agencies have also established systems for overseeing and monitoring
seized cash operations. These systems, along with the new policies, have led
to major improvements in managing seized cash. However, aggressive monitorin
gof seized cash may be necessary for some time to help ensure compliance wit
h
established cash management policies. For example, the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Inspector General recently reported that Customs was no
t
depositing seized cash in a timely manner. In response, the Assistant
Commissioner, Commercial Operations, issued a memo reminding employees that
seized cash is to be deposited unless there is documentation in the file fro
m
the appropriate U.S. Attorney's office stating that the cash is needed as
evidence and should not be deposited.
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IMPROVED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL REPORTS
The lack of reliable program information has been a major contributor to
program deficiencies. For many years, the asset forfeiture programs operated
without sufficient information necessary to make informed management
decisions. Congressional oversight was also hampered by the lack of reliable
information.
Major improvements have been made in this area by both Justice and Customs.
Additionally, both agencies have embarked upon ambitious efforts to further
improve their information systems. These efforts are, however, long term and
require sustained oversight.
Beginning with our first report on asset forfeiture in 1977, we have reporte
d
on many occasions the need to improve program information. Also, a 1983
Department of Justice internal report, which addressed the management of
seized assets departmentwide, stated that forfeiture operations were conduct
ed
without the information needed to monitor, oversee, or evaluate the initiati
ve
and recommended that Justice ensure the availability of useful asset seizure
and forfeiture case tracking and inventory data. Only recently, however, hav
e
Justice and Customs been able to put systems in place that provide them with
the information necessary to make data-driven decisions. For many years,
Justice and Customs had to scramble to meet their information needs.
With the number of seizures growing exponentially in the early 1980s, the
agencies had to move quickly to establish even the most rudimentary
information systems. Responding to this need, the U.S. Marshals Service--the
custodian for seized property within the Department of Justice--
urchased personal computers, which were used primarily for inventory control
The intention was to use these computers in the short term while a needs
assessment was done and a more sophisticated system put in place. Because of
budget constraints and other program priorities, however, the new system was
slow in coming. It was not until 1987 that the Marshals Service issued a
request for proposals for the design and installation of a new system, and i
t
was not until 1991 that the new system was fully operational in all Marshals
Service districts.
Establishing a system capable of producing reliable inventory data fulfilled
only part of Justice's and Customs' information needs. Financial and other
management information, such as case tracking data, is needed to effectively
manage the asset forfeiture program. To satisfy this need, Justice embarked
on
a major effort to develop an information system that would be used by all
federal agencies participating in Justice's asset forfeiture program. As
envisioned, this system would tie together asset forfeiture personnel in ove
r640 locations throughout the United States. It would replace the many
incompatible systems now being used by the various seizing agencies. A
prototype of the system has been developed and demonstrated to several user
groups. Implementation is expected in 1993.
Customs took a different path to fulfill its need for inventory information.
Customs awarded a contract for the nationwide management of its seized
property inventory and as part of that contract required that the contractor
develop a seized property information system. That system was put in place i
n
early 1987 and remained virtually under the exclusive control of the
contractor for the duration of the contract, which ran until 1991. At the
conclusion of the contract, the system was turned over to Customs. At that
time, Customs made a number of system improvements, including documenting th
e
system and adding edit checks, and began to integrate its management and
accounting systems. As of September 1992, those efforts were still under way
Customs has also begun an effort to completely redesign its seized property
case tracking system. This effort is expected to take about 4 years.
It will be some time before Justice's and Customs' seized property informati
on
systems are state-of-the-art. The agencies, however, have made considerable
progress in improving seized property information and have efforts under way
to make other substantive improvements. However, without sustained oversight
these efforts may flounder, especially in times of tight budgets. It is
critically important that these efforts not be sidelined but rather receive
the attention they deserve.
Accounting system weaknesses have also been a particularly troublesome issue
for both Justice and Customs. Given the nature of the seized property
programs, we have recommended since 1987 that Justice and Customs annually
produce audited forfeiture fund financial statements. Such statements would
help instill a more businesslike discipline in program operations and make
apparent other information shortcomings. Justice started producing such
statements beginning with its fiscal year 1989 operations and Customs with i
ts
fiscal year 1990 operations. In addition, legislation was enacted in 1990 th
at
should ensure continued production of such statements.
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FASTER FORFEITING OF UNCONTESTED CASH SEIZURES
In 1989 and again in 1990, we reported that millions of dollars in seized ca
sh
was being forfeited through the judicial system even though no one was
contesting the forfeiture. At the time of our review, the law required that
all cash seizures over $100,000 be forfeited judicially. We reported that th
is
requirement delayed forfeiture, added an unnecessary burden on the district
courts, and contributed to inefficient use of U.S. Attorney resources. We
recommended that the law be changed so that all uncontested cash seizures
could be forfeited administratively, regardless of amount.
That recommendation was implemented in 1990. The seizing agencies reported
that this change in law has resulted in seized cash being forfeited much
faster without affecting individual due process rights. Contested cases
continue to be resolved judicially.
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AGREEMENT TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF CONSOLIDATING PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND
DISPOSITION
In 1991, we reported that program administration costs could be reduced by
about 11 percent annually if Justice and Customs consolidated the postseizur
e
management and disposition of their noncash seized property inventories. We
also reported that additional savings would likely accrue from lower vendor
costs due to economies of scale. The recommended consolidation has not yet
taken place, but the two agencies have agreed to a pilot test.
Given the similarities in Justice's and Customs' seized property programs,
consolidation makes sense. Both agencies seize similar types of assets, and
those assets are generally located in the same geographic areas. However,
under the current operating structure, each agency maintains separate and
distinct programs for managing and disposing of its property. Justice, throu
gh
the Marshals Service, contracts directly with vendors that provide the
service. Customs has a nationwide contractor that provides custodial service
s
either directly or through subcontracts with other vendors.
In April 1992, the Marshals Service and Customs signed a memorandum of
understanding to test consolidation beginning in October 1992. The Marshals
Service will manage both agencies' real property, and Customs will manage th
e
agencies' vessels. The agencies will manage vehicles, with the location and
number of vehicles being the determining factor in which agency handles them
After 1 year, the agencies will conduct a cost analysis and evaluation of th
e
pilot test. We see this pilot project as a positive step forward. However,
sustained management attention and support will be necessary to see this
effort through; otherwise, problems that might be encountered along the way
have the potential of derailing the project.
Following this consolidation theme, in July 1992 we recommended that Justice
and Customs develop mutually agreeable guidelines for asset sharing and
jointly develop policies and procedures and assign responsibilities for
federal oversight of asset sharing. In fiscal year 1991, Justice shared more
than $287 million and Customs shared $95.2 million with state and local law
enforcement agencies that assisted the federal government in making seizures
Under current guidance, Justice and Customs allow different uses of shared
proceeds. Officials in some state and local agencies find the guidance vague
and confusing. A recent Justice Management Division study concluded that mor
e
practical guidance and oversight mechanisms were needed to ensure that state
and local agencies comply with federal guidance on using shared proceeds. Bo
th
Justice and Customs agreed with our recommendations and plan to work togethe
r
to develop clearer asset-sharing guidelines and to develop oversight policie
s
and procedures, including assigning responsibilities for federal oversight o
f
asset sharing.
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More Informed Seizures Being Made
In September 1987, we reported that the failure to obtain title searches on
real properties before seizure often resulted in seizures with very low or
nonexistent defendant equity. We recognize that there are cases--such as cra
ck
houses and clandestine labs--in which, for law enforcement reasons, it is
desirable to seize properties with little or no defendant equity. However,
seizures that are designed to financially punish a violator should only be
made when it can be shown there is something of value to be forfeited.
Otherwise, the seizure may end up costing the government more than it hurts
the violator.
As Justice's asset forfeiture program has grown and more emphasis has been
given to its management, title searches, which identify legal owners and
encumbrances, have been done on a more regular basis. [ Footnote 1: About 9
8
percent of the real property seizures are made by Justice. ] The need for,
and importance of, title searches has been stressed to the seizing agencies
through increased Justice oversight of seizure activities and guidance to th
e
field as well as through training. In recent discussions, Justice officials
indicated that very few real properties are now being brought into inventory
without first having had a title search. For cases in which the investigatio
n
would be jeopardized by doing a title search before seizure, Justice's polic
y
is to do one immediately after seizure. Justice officials also acknowledged
that some of their earlier less-than-ideal seizures remained in inventory.
Justice's Executive Office of Asset Forfeiture is currently incorporating
these new preseizure planning policies into a soon to be issued directive
entitled "Guidelines for Pre-seizure Planning." That directive is expected t
o
be issued by the end of 1992.
CONCLUSIONS AND ACTION NEEDED
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Seized property management today is very different from what it was just a f
ew
years ago. Congress and the press have recognized the improvements as
evidenced by the dramatic decrease in the number of congressional hearings a
nd
news items relating to poor property management practices.
Notwithstanding improved property management practices, the seized property
programs remain highly visible and are subjected to continued scrutiny. The
focus today, however, is not on property management but rather on how the
asset forfeiture laws are being used. The first in a series of planned
hearings on this subject was held on September 30, 1992, by the Legislation
and National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations
Concerns have been raised about agencies becoming overzealous in their use o
f
the asset forfeiture laws or too dependent on the funds derived from such
seizures. The new Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury need to
ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to help prevent such
developments. A system with proper checks and balances must be in place;
otherwise, the asset forfeiture programs risk being seriously curtailed. Our
future work will focus more heavily on these aspects of the asset forfeiture
programs. We will also continue monitoring property management activities.
