Subject: RISKS DIGEST 17.65

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Monday 22 January 1996  Volume 17 : Issue 65

  FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
  ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, etc.       *****

 Contents:
Stolen computers from the U.N. (Brian Mulvaney)
Hey, your mailing list is sending me viruses! (Jon Callas)
Cryo-risks (Charles P. Schultz)
Spugs, BellWeckers & Chin'95... (T H Pineapple)
Cost to crack Netscape security falls from $10,000 to $584 (David Golombek
   via Lance J. Hoffman)
Japanese fighter plane shot down another plane (Chiaki Ishikawa)
Re: Galileo fault protection software (Kevin Maguire)
Re: X-31 crash follow up (Roy Wright)
Call Signs are unambiguous [Delta 153] (Peter Ladkin)
"Year 2000" conference (Mark Seecof)
[Spammed "Learning Machine" item removed from archive copy]
US export regulations (Wilhelm Mueller)
RISKS of personalized Windows mail readers (A. Padgett Peterson)
Time glitch clarification (Ivars Peterson)
Reminder, ISOC 1996 Symp. Netw. & Distr. Sys. Security (Christopher Klaus)
ABRIDGED info on RISKS (comp.risks)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 17 Jan 96 08:37:56 EST
From: [email protected]
Subject: Stolen computers from the U.N.

The *Wall Street Journal* 17 Jan 1996 had a short headline that reads:

"U.N. officials said four computers containing most of the data on human
rights violations in Croatia were stolen in New York.  Officials said the
theft was a 'very heavy blow' to efforts to prosecute war crimes."

The risk:  The usual hazards of not having a good data backup plan?

------------------------------

To: [email protected]
From: [email protected] (Jon Callas)
Subject: Hey, your mailing list is sending me viruses!

[Editor's note: The names sending this to me were deleted, to protect
everyone. This is a fascinating letter, for a number of reasons. What
happened was that some mail message blew up the AOL mailer, causing the host
machine to crash, and the poor schlep getting the mail message complained to
the listmom, assuming that said person was a programmer and not simply
someone who maintains a mailing list. On the one hand, we can laugh at it,
on the other hand, that the bug exists in both the Mac and Windows versions
means that they are doing some really cool cross-platform development. On
the third hand, I'm sure there are a lot of people who would love to know
what plaintext mail message will crash an AOL account. For the
mischief-minded, let me say in advance that I don't know. -- jdcc]

Real e-mail from a real AOLer to a local mailing list manager.

Names removed to protect the ignorant.  :-)

-----

>>Some of the mail I receive from the ** mailing list does not open properly
>>in my mail reader, AOL for Windows, 2.5.  When I click on an e-mail from the
>>** mailing list, AOL freezes and I have to reboot the system.  It doesn't
>>happen with every single piece of ** e-mail, only some of them.  The same
>>thing also happens on my husband's AOL account.  He has AOL for Macintosh,
>>2.6.
>
>Please refer this problem to AOL tech support.  I don't believe
>the problem is with the mail message.  It's much more likely to be with
>the mailer reader.

**, this is NOT an AOL tech support problem.  My husband was able to solve
the problem for me, and for himself, by going through each message
downloaded, one at a time, until he hit the one that made AOL freeze.  After
deleting this message, all problems were gone.  I would therefore suggest to
you, that if it is at all possible, run some sort of virus checker or
something on postings to the list before you send them out.  I am not a
programmer, so I am not sure how to go about this, or if it is even
possible, so please don't flame me again.  Just see what you can do to get
the list working properly.  Thanks.

------------------------------

Date: 19 Jan 96 09:54:11 -0600
From: [email protected]
Subject: Cryo-risks

While skipping through the web one day, I came across a Cryonics web page.
It certainly seems like its important for everything to work right while you
or a loved one are being preserved, and the web page contains a number of
statements to reassure the potential customer. On the other hand, for RISKS
Digest readers, the statements made may not be so much reassuring, but
rather showing a sense of false confidence.

For example:
"CryoSpan...employs multiply redundant, fail-safe computer monitoring of
liquid levels in patient dewars that are situated in reinforced-concrete
underground vaults."

- Is "fail-safe" meant to imply "defect-free"? Are all the redundant
computers sharing communication or power lines? Are these
reinforced-concrete underground vaults as good as the sometimes-leaky ones
used to store nuclear and other hazardous waste?

"These vaults offer unprecedented protection against earthquakes, fires,
floods, and vandalism."

- What about power outages? Communications cables chewed through by rodents?
Faults due to inadequate workmanship, such as coolant leaks?

I'd be interested in knowing if there have already been anecdotes recorded
about failures in cryo-preservation environments.

Charles P. Schultz

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 22 Jan 96 15:35 GMT
From: [email protected] (T H Pineapple)
Subject: Spugs, BellWeckers & Chin'95...

Looks as if MicroSoft ran their Win95 install system thru their Word
smellchucker, too.  `Upgrading' our CDR-machine from WfWg3.11 to W'95
gave the kick-stab-thrash-gouge-alt-delete instruction as:

  `Press Ctlt-Ds Ctlt-Del a to reboour reboour mach'

<and for an encore, w'95 has [for the moment] now shafted our ability
to cut disks.  yay.>

http://steev@almathera.uk.tech.masochists
[PC: win'95 Companion] [Amiga: Photogenics, EuroScene 2 n a bunch of stuff]

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 19 Jan 1996 12:38:29 -0500 (EST)
From: "Lance J. Hoffman" <[email protected]>
Subject: IP: Single computer breaks 40-bit RC4 in under 8 days (fwd)

  [Intermediate forwardings deleted.  PGN]

>Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 20:45:33 -0500
>From: [email protected] (David Golombek)
>To: [email protected]
>Subject: Single computer breaks 40-bit RC4 in under 8 days
>
>MIT Student Uses ICE Graphics Computer
>To Break Netscape Security in Less Than 8 Days:
>Cost to crack Netscape security falls from $10,000 to $584
>
>CAMBRIDGE, Mass., January 10, 1996 -- An MIT undergraduate and part-time
>programmer used a single $83,000 graphics computer from Integrated Computing
>Engines (ICE) to crack Netscape's export encryption code in less than eight
>days. The effort by student Andrew Twyman demonstrated that ICE's advances
>in hardware price/performance ratios make it relatively inexpensive -- $584
>per session -- to break the code.
>
>While being an active proponent of stronger export encryption, Netscape
>Communications (NSCP), developer of the SSL security protocol, has said that
>to decrypt an Internet session would cost at least $10,000 in computing time.
>
>Twyman used the same brute-force algorithm as Damien Doligez, the French
>researcher who was one of the first to crack the original SSL Challenge.
>The challenge presented the encrypted data of a Netscape session, using the
>default exportable mode, 40-bit RC4 encryption.  Doligez broke the code in
>eight days using 112 workstations.
>
>"The U.S. government has drastically underestimated the pace of technology
>development," says Jonas Lee, ICE's general manager.  "It doesn't take a
>hundred workstations more than a week to break the code -- it takes one ICE
>graphics computer. This shuts the door on any argument against stronger
>export encryption."
>
>Breaking the code relies more on raw computing power than hacking expertise.
>Twyman modified Doligez's algorithm to run on ICE's Desktop RealTime Engine
>(DRE), a briefcase-size graphics computer that connects to a PC host to
>deliver performance
>of 6.3 Gflops (billions of floating point instructions per second).
>According to Twyman, the program tests each of the trillion 40-bit keys
>until it finds the correct one. Twyman's program averaged more than 830,000
>keys per second, so it would take 15 days to test every key.  The average
>time to find a key, however, was 7.7 days.  Using more than 100
>workstations, Doligez averaged 850,000 keys per second.ICE used the
>following formula to determine its $584 cost of computing power: the total
>cost of the computer divided by the number of days in a three-year lifespan
>(1,095), multiplied by the number of days (7.7) it takes to break the code.
>
>ICE's Desktop RealTime Engine combines the power of a supercomputer with the
>price of a workstation.  Designed for high-end graphics, virtual reality,
>simulations and compression, it reduces the cost of computing from $160 per
>Mflop (millions of floating point instructions per second) to $13 per Mflop.
>ICE, founded in 1994, is the exclusive licensee of MeshSP technology from
>the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
>
>###
>
>INTEGRATED COMPUTING ENGINES, INC.
>460 Totten Pond Road, 6th Floor
>Waltham, MA 02154
>Voice: 617-768-2300, Fax: 617-768-2301
>
>FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
>
>Bob Cramblitt, Cramblitt & Company
>(919) 481-4599; [email protected]
>
>Jonas Lee, Integrated Computing Engines
>(617) 768-2300, X1961; [email protected]
>
>Note: Andrew Twyman can be reached at [email protected].

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 22:01:20 +0900 (JST)
From: Chiaki Ishikawa <[email protected]>
Subject: Japanese fighter plane shot down another plane

During October 1995 a Japanese air force fighter plane shot down another
fighter plane involved in a combat training by mistake.

What happened was this.

Two F-15 planes took off for combat training.  One of them apparently was
carrying LIVE missiles.  The main switch that activates firearms on the
airplane was off by instruction.  However, somehow, when the pilot triggered
fire button during the interception training, the sidewinder missile was
fired and shot down the other fighter plane nicely.  The pilot escaped by
parachute safely.

Of course, the main question is why on earth an airplane in a training needs
to carry live munition, sidewinders missile at that. Airforce officials
claim that the airplane in question is routinely used for scramble mission
to intercept possible intruders and thus the taking the missiles off the
airplane and reloading for occasional training is a time consuming task to
be avoided. Newspaper article pointed out that the airplane needs refueling
before and after the mission that takes time and missiles might as well be
taken off and reloaded anyway for the training.

An article regarding the tentative investigation report appeared in
newspaper last week.  According to the report,

- There seems to have been a electrical mishap caused by static
  electric charge buildup. This seems to activate the firearms system
  although the master firearm switch was in off position.  Further
  investigation is planned.

- With detailed briefing of the pilot, who accidentally fired the missile,
  it is now believed that the firearm computer displayed "lock cue" or
  whatever that is, on the firearm status screen when the pilot
  locked on the friend's airplane  as part of the training.

According the article, the "lock cue" or whatever is shown ONLY WHEN
the master firearm is turned ON.  With other signals displayed on the
screen, this particular symbol or message (I am not sure what that is
from what I read in the newspaper) indicates that the master firearm
system is activated and the pilot can fire the missile really.

Now the airforce officials are said to wonder if the pilot in
question could somehow sense that something was amiss with the
onboard firearm computer system and aborted the lock-on training
prematurely. (Presumably deducing that firearm master switch is off,
and "lock cue" should no appear, and why am I seeing it on the screen!?)

Now the risk, of course, is obvious.

The plane should not have carried the live missile in the first place
since this was not the intended part of this routine training.
(Airforce officials were saying that they would have disarmed the
airplane if they felt they had enough time.)

Secondly,  we should not depend on the stressed operator of computers
(in this case, the pilot) to detect the anomaly of the computer
operation so casually.
If the operator sits in a comfortable chair at a desk looking at
computer display in a quiet environment, we may be justified in
expecting the operator to notice a strange message on the screen.
But a fighter plane pilot in a combat exercise is hardly in a position
to notice that something is wrong with the on-board computer!? ("What
is the message on the screen? SYSERR 1043. Hmm stack overflow of
numerical signal processor that computes the trajectory of missile?")

As a matter of fact, there was even a speculation that the poor pilot
had not turned off the main firearm switch as instructed and he was the prime
culprit until these initial charges turned groundless.
Poor guy.

I feel that Japanese authorities tend to focus on human error side of
these accidents when, in fact, there may be inherent systems problems.
I don't know if this is true in other countries.

Since I noticed that there seem to be a lot of readers of Risks who seem to
have background in the military and/or military-related industries,
the above may be of some interest.

PS: Regarding the Japanese breeder reactor accident on Dec. 8th, 1995,
I reported last year, someone questioned the wisdom of using
chemically active sodium for the secondary loop. Well, the breeder
DOES use Sodium (Natrium, Na) for both primary and secondary cooling
loop.  It is a decision made by the Japanese design team.
French breeder reactor used sodium only for the primary loop.

Japanese investigators who have been analyzing the fracture of the
secondary pipe, from which hot liquid sodium escaped, found that the
fractured casing of temperature sensor broke the inserted sensor as a
whole and liquid sodium escaped from the hole punched there. A part of
sensor casing is missing. It is believed to get stuck somewhere in the
secondary loop piping. The fracture itself is believed to be caused by
metal fatigue: the casing must have vibrated about half a billion
times during the operation. The vibration is caused by the interaction
of the sodium flow and the vortex behind the sensor.

Some heads rolled because there was an effort to cover up the severity
of the accident by the on-site managers (and possibly people in the
headquarters of the operating corporation). It has been a big scandal
for the last three weeks or so.

A video taken by the operating crew immediately after the accident was
edited and the juicy part of the video was NOT shown to the public
until the video taken by the alarmed local town official was broadcast
over and over on Japanese TV. Someone finally fessed up and three
(initially reported two, but I think it now counts three) different
VCR tapes recorded immediately after the accident were found in the
desks/locker of some of the employees. Old timers might recall the
movie "China Syndrome", in which an operating company tried to hide
the structural weakness of a reactor caused by sloppy construction and
checking.

A tragedy is that one man of the operating company who handled the
interviews concerning the hiding of these key tapes committed suicide.  It
seems that he could not handle the pressure of interviewing his former
colleagues and underlings and nailing the culprit of concerted efforts to
hide the tapes. Also, he had to answer tough questions from journalists at a
widely broadcast PR conference.  (Maybe another risk: Don't let someone in
the suspected organization to police itself if the charges are serious
enough. They may not go down to the bottom of the problem, and in the
Japanese case, someone might commits suicide!)

Well, the truth has caught up the fiction and may surpass it in Japan.

Chiaki Ishikawa, Personal Media Corp., Shinagawa, Tokyo, Japan 142
[email protected]

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jan 1996 19:19:38 GMT
From: [email protected] (Kevin Maguire)
Subject: Re: Galileo fault protection software (http. RISKS-17.64)

During the critical engineering sequence, the sequence of commands that
controlled the spacecraft during the Probe Relay and Jupiter Orbit
Insertion, most of the spacecraft commands were issued twice (in case of
problems with the first issuance).

When the command to fire the main engine for the insertion burn was
issued for the second time, a "command constraint violation" was issued,
since that command is illegal in the state the software entered after
the command was issued the first time.  This was expected, and not
a problem.

When a command constraint violation is issued, a bit is set in a
status word, and remains set until cleared by a direct command.  The
particular bit in question was scheduled to be cleared after the turn
during which we had the incident.

The standard package of commands used to perform the turn, however, contains
a command that checks the fault status word for non-zero bits.  When it
found one, it cancelled the active sequence of commands, and called a
subroutine that safes the instruments, configures the telecom system to
maximize commandability, and widens the deadbands that must be exceeded for
the spacecraft to perform autonomous attitude and spin rate maintenance.

Kevin Maguire, Galileo Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem
[email protected]

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 15:26:43 -0600
From: [email protected] (Roy Wright)
Subject: Re: X-31 crash follow up (Mellor, RISKS-17.60)

BTW, the NTSB report showed the cause of the crash to be miscommunication.
I.e., the original pitot tube that had pitot heat had been replaced with one
that did not.  This information was not properly communicated to the test
team.  The pilot had recognized the pitot was icing, turned on pitot heat
and requested ground control to remind him to turn it off.  Ground control
acknowledged his request.  There was a backup flight mode that did not
depend on airspeed that would have been engaged if it was known at the time
that the pitot tube did not have a heater.  Ground support then informed the
controller that there was no pitot heat, twice.  Too late.

Fault was found with not correctly recognizing and communicating the risk of
substituting the pitot tube.

Source - Aviation Week.  Note the above has some risk since it was recalled
from volatile organic memory.

Roy Wright, Texas Instruments  [email protected]  214-575-6691

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 17 Jan 1996 22:43:54 +0100
From: [email protected]
Subject: Call Signs are unambiguous [Delta 153] (Lucero, RISKS-17.64)

Because Delta 153 thought a take-off clearance for American 153 was
instead for them, there was a near-miss at JFK on 5 Jan 96. Scott Lucero
(RISKS-17.64) saw two RISKS:

 1) not designing systems to recognize these [..] situations, and
 2) a risk [with] a growing number of customers in a limited address space.
    As airports get busier, [..] incidents [..] could happen more often.

I quote from the FAA Airman's Information Manual 4-34. Aircraft Call Signs.

 a. Precautions in the Use of Call Signs--
    1. Improper use of call signs can result in pilots executing a clearance
       intended for another aircraft. Call signs [begin italics] should
       never be abbreviated on an initial contact or at any time when other
       aircraft call signs have similar numbers/sounds or identical
       letters/numbers [end italics] [...]
    2. Pilots, therefore, must be certain that aircraft identification is
       complete and clearly identified [sic] before taking action on an
       ATC clearance. ATC specialists will not abbreviate call signs of air
       carrier or other civil aircraft having authorized call signs.

The call sign of American 153 is `American one-five-three', and Delta's is
similar. Either the controller breached regulations and abbreviated the call
sign or Delta 153 breached AIM 4-34.2. The procedures are there.  Thus
Lucero's Risk 1) does not pertain. His Risk 2) only pertains if based on an
assumption that as traffic increases, the number of aircraft handled by a
single controller will increase. This is not so--there's an upper limit to
traffic handled by a single controller.

Peter Ladkin

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 14:24:04 -0800
From: Mark Seecof <[email protected]>
Subject: "Year 2000" conference

I got a solicitation from "Software Productivity Group, Inc." 508-366-3344
to attend their commercial conference ($1K/2 days--NB:  I have NO connection
with these people and NO opinion on the value of their product) presenting
and discussing plans and methods for coping with 1 Jan 2000 system-date
problems.  Advertising like this helps attract management attention to the
RISKS, I think...  and it's clear that a lot of vendors and consultants are
promoting work on the issues, so maybe 1/1/00 won't be the day the world
ends after all.

------------------------------

Date: 18 Jan 1996 15:29:31 +0100
From: [email protected] (Wilhelm Mueller)
Subject: US export regulations

Today we received a following letter from a computer manufacturer concerning
a (Un*x) operating system upgrade.  It contained the following lines (words
in [...] are manufacturer or product names in the original text; typos and
an attempt at a translation to English by me):

   [...]

   Zu unserem Bedauern muessten wir feststellen, dass sich ein Problem
   beim Zusammenstellen dieser Produkte auf diesem Datentraeger
   ergeben hat. Die Zusammenstellung erfolgte in einer Weise, die
   nicht in Uebereinstimmung mit den Exportbestimmungen der USA ist.

   Wenn Sie Ihre Systeme noch nicht mit [Produkte] aktualisiert
   haben, zerstoeren Sie bitte den Datentraeger. [Firma] wird Ihnen
   eine aktualisierte Version dieser Produkte innerhalb der naechsten
   Monate zusenden. Falls Sie Ihre Systeme fuer diese Produkte bereits
   aktualisiert haben, setzen Sie sich bitte umgehend mit [Kundendienst]
   in Verbindung, um den korrigierten Datentraeger zugeschickt zu erhalten.
   [...]

   Aktualisieren Sie bitte nach Empfang des korrigierten Datentraegers
   Ihre Systeme mit ihm und zerstoeren Sie den Datentraeger mit
   [Produkte].

   [...]

The German is quite formal and cautious; I can't translate it in the same
style.  [And PGN tried to fix the garbled nonASCII chars with customary
equivalents.]  It says the following:

   [...]

   We regret that we had to discover that a problem occurred when
   putting together the products on the media.  The composition was
   carried out in a manner which does not conform to the export
   regulations of the USA.

   If you have not yet upgraded your systems with [products], please
   destroy the media.  [Company] will send you an updated version of
   these products during the next months.  In case you have already
   upgraded your systems for these products, please contact
   immediately [service] to obtain corrected media.

   Please update your systems after receipt of the corrected media
   and destroy the media with [products].

   [...]

Wilhelm M|ller, Am Wall 139, D-28195 Bremen  [email protected]
Tel. (B|ro/off.)  +49-421-361-10629      Tel. (priv./home) +49-421-169 2525

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 19 Jan 96 10:24:18 -0500
From: [email protected] (A. Padgett Peterson)
Subject: RISKS of personalized Windows mail readers

Lately I have been seeing a broad spectrum of postings from people,
some that seem to go only part
of the way across the terminal
and some others that not only use up the entire eighty characters on the screen but keep
going far past the end of the line and wrap [or get lost] on most 80 character terminals.

I was helping my wife do some research on the net and came across one of her
postings that wrapped. Seems she had been using Eudora with a tiny font
setting that was not wrapping until 90 characters had been sent. Playing
with the fonts, I found a large one that wrapped with only forty characters
on the line. Both appeared to be using the whole screen.

Might mention that Eudora/Windows seems to be the mail reader of choice for
the "free software" most ISPs are providing for new netters.

Suspect that the different wraps in postings really are telling us a lot more
about the posters visual acuity than they may really want the world to know.

Padgett

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 19 Jan 96 09:02:10
From: [email protected] (Ivars Peterson)
Subject: Time glitch clarification

My apologies to the National Institute of Standards and Technology for
inadvertently implicating NIST in the New Year's Day time glitch. The
problems at AP broadcast services involved time signals that originated at
the U.S. Naval Observatory.

Ivars Peterson, Math/Physics Editor, Science News, 1719 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2888  [email protected] Tel: 202-785-2255  Fax: 202-659-0365

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 12:54:51 +1494730 (EST)
From: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]>
Subject: Reminder, ISOC 1996 Symp. Netw. & Distr. Sys. Security (RISKS-17.52)

               THE INTERNET SOCIETY 1996 SYMPOSIUM ON
               NETWORK AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM SECURITY
                              (NDSS '96)
                         22-23 FEBRUARY 1996
           SAN DIEGO PRINCESS RESORT, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

FOR MORE INFORMATION on registration contact Donna Leggett by phone at
703-648-9888 or via e-mail to [email protected].
FAX to NDSS'96 Registration (703) 648-9887.
NDSS96, 12020 Sunrise Valley Drive, Suite 210, Reston, VA, 22091, USA

WEB PAGE - Additional information about the symposium and San Diego,
as well as an on-line registration form, are available via the Web at:
             http://www.isoc.org/conferences/ndss96

Christopher William Klaus, Internet Security Systems, Inc., Suite 115,
5871 Glenridge Dr, Atlanta, GA 30328   http://iss.net/   (404)252-7270

------------------------------

Date: 11 January 1996 (LAST-MODIFIED)
From: [email protected]
Subject: ABRIDGED info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest.  Its USENET equivalent is comp.risks.
SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) on
your system, if possible and convenient for you.  BITNET folks may use a
LISTSERV (e.g., LISTSERV@UGA): SUBSCRIBE RISKS or UNSUBSCRIBE RISKS.  [...]
DIRECT REQUESTS to <[email protected]> (majordomo) with one-line,
  SUBSCRIBE (or UNSUBSCRIBE) [with net address if different from FROM:]
  INFO     [for further information]

CONTRIBUTIONS: to [email protected], with appropriate,  substantive Subject:
line, otherwise they may be ignored.  Must be relevant, sound, in good taste,
objective, cogent, coherent, concise, nonrepetitious, and without caveats
on distribution.  Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks.  [...]
ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY.
Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues
of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise.

RISKS can also be read on the web at URL http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks

RISKS ARCHIVES: "ftp ftp.sri.com<CR>login anonymous<CR>[YourNetAddress]<CR>
cd risks<CR> or cwd risks<CR>, depending on your particular FTP.  [...]
[Back issues are in the subdirectory corresponding to the volume number.]
  Individual issues can be accessed using a URL of the form
    http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html      [i.e., VoLume, ISsue]
    ftp://unix.sri.com/risks  [if your browser accepts URLs.]

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 17.65
************************