Subject: RISKS DIGEST 17.44

Subject: RISKS DIGEST 17.44

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Weds 8 November 1995 Volume 17 : Issue 44

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, etc. *****

Contents:
Flock of birds jams FAA radar (Andy Goldstein)
Airport Hacker (Neil Harding)
Melbourne Airport RF Interference (Paul Menon)
Nagoya crash lawsuit for 25.7 B yen (Stephen L Nicoud)
Message of day may have revealed encrypted user passwords (David English)
Risk of built-in eavesdropping features (Martin Virtel)
Risks of putting off until tomorrow, PBX division (Max Stern)
FBI Requests Much Larger Wiretapping Capability (Educom)
Bill Gates vs. the Germans (Alonzo Gariepy)
Re: Bill Gates: MS software essentially bug-free (Li Gong)
Re: Gates interview (Klaus Brunnstein)
Re: Traffic Signaling Problems in Chicago Train/Bus Crash (Michael J. Zehr)
Submarine Nuclear Power (James Lyons)
Error in Digital video (DeForest, RISKS-17.42) (Lawrence H Smith)
Re: SMTP chicken and the social contract (Fergus Henderson)
Re: "core" files (Fergus Henderson)
ABRIDGED info on RISKS (comp.risks)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 6 Nov 95 14:56:53 EST
From: Andy Goldstein - VMS Development <[email protected]>
Subject: Flock of birds jams FAA radar

>From The Boston Globe, Saturday, November 4:

FAA suspects birds jammed radar

Kansas City, MO - A several-hour shutdown of radar systems in three
midwestern cities may have been caused by unseasonably large flocks of
migrating birds, aviation officials said yesterday. No disruptions or
delays to air traffic were caused by the failures Thursday in Omaha, Des
Moines and Kansas City, MO, which shifted to back-up radar coverage, said an
FAA spokeswoman, Sandra Campbell. The Federal Aviation Administration is
investigating the shutdown but officials say they suspect migrating birds
were responsible. "There's been an extremely rare and large hatch of
migratory birds this year, especially waterfowl," Campbell said. "That is
suspected as the problem but we don't know for sure." Radar systems
identify and track airborne targets but some are susceptible to shutting
down if they track a maximum of 700 targets at a given time, Campbell said.
Immediately before the system in Omaha shut down, it had identified more
than 29,000 targets, she said. "Not all of those were migratory birds, but
we also didn't have 29,000 airplanes in the sky at that time," Campbell
said.

[What may have confused the radar was that too many of the birds had the
same squawk. - ACG]

[Also reported by Philip R. Moyer <[email protected]>. PGN]

[At the Software Engineering Institute's Software Risks conference in
Monterey earlier this week (I was the keynote speaker), someone asked me
whether the "illustrative risks" summary list of one-liners that I
maintain (and which will appear in the January 1996 Software Engineering
Notes) and indeed those in the Risks Forum are really representative.
Yes, I do tend to suppress some of the many similar cases such as the
n+1st instance of "ATC system failed, cutover to backup succeeded." I
also suppress some of the more repetitive and less interesting cases,
but sometimes decide that we really do continually need to be reminded
of the fact that similar cases just do manage to recur, continually --
such as another case of air-traffic controller spoofings, as in the next
message, and another case of RF interference, as in the message
following that. Sorry if it seems repetitious, but there is a lesson
therein. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 1 Nov 95 18:05 GMT
From: [email protected] (Neil Harding)
Subject: Airport Hacker

I've just seen a report about a 'hacker' who is sending false radio messages
to plane. It was reported on the local teletext news. "Pilots have been
ordered to double check air traffic control messages to beat bogus
transmissions. Transport Secretary George Young said the hacker is thought
to be using a hand-held, battery-operated transmitter on sale for #600
($900). The hacker has given out false information to aircraft about to land
at Manchester airport." The risks are obvious, but some I would think some
form of scrambling by using digital signals would help prevent this type of
thing. Apparently the police in Manchester are supposed to be switching to a
digital system to stop criminals with scanners from listening in on them.

Neil Harding

[We have had a bunch of similar incidents in past RISKS issues,
but not recently. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 3 Nov 1995 15:53:17 +1100 (EST)
From: Paul Big-Ears Menon <[email protected]>
Subject: Melbourne Airport RF Interference

This occurred a few weeks back, so my memory is a little fuzzy on the
_exact_ details. Uncertainty is noted below.

Melbourne Air Traffic control received complaints from pilots coming in to
land that one [or more] of their comms channels was picking up interference
to the point that it/they were unusable (I'm now not sure whether this was
voice comms or guidance signals).

The interference was sporadic.

Investigators ran around the place with trackers, but their task was
hindered by the intermittent nature of the jamming. It appeared to be
originating (roughly) under a flight path. An initial conclusion was that
someone had a rogue transmitter and was deliberately jamming the band(s) for
a short while, and then going quiet to avoid anyone pinpointing their
location. A flurry of news items on various media highlighting that the
prankster's deeds were a serious threat to life had no effect on the
jamming.

It literally took weeks for tracker vans to finally home in on a suburban
house one evening. The startled man was duly impressed with all the
technical equipment parked outside his door.

He claimed innocence.

The investigators did their search of the premises and eventually found the
transmitter.

It was a Video Cassette Recorder (VCR).

I kid you not.

Under certain conditions (pressing certain buttons in a particular
sequence), the unit transmitted an RF signal which was sufficient to
interfere with Air Traffic Comms. The house was under an approach to
Melbourne Airport. The Airport authorities offered to replace the unit.
They reported that the man was most co-operative and indeed, amused by the
whole incident.

The authorities didn't release the VCR's brand name or model. Hopefully,
they've effected a silent recall of all such units.

[My Comments follow -- pnm]

Three things spring to mind:

(1) It is dangerous to assume that jamming/interference is
always intentional. I'd say the original media reports were
a gamble to frighten the 'pirate' into ceasing his/her
activities. A warranted move, certainly, but thankfully
the authorities persevered with their tracking.

(2) How the blazes can a VCR produce a signal that strong to interfere
with something so crucial? I've heard of singing toasters, but
this is ridiculous. This thing became a transmitter, not just
a receiver, and (I assume) a strong one at that.

(3) Quality control. Hmmm... What's the equivalent of the FCC
in Australia?

Paul Menon, Dept of Computer Science, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology,
124 Latrobe Street, Melbourne 3001, Victoria, Australia +61 3 9660 3209/2348

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 1 Nov 95 11:48:16 PST
From: Stephen L Nicoud <[email protected]>
Subject: Nagoya crash lawsuit for 25.7 B yen [See RISKS-16.16, 16.35]

NEWS DIGEST, 1 November 1995. Reuter.

REUTER - Japanese and Taiwanese relatives of almost half the 264 people
killed in the 1994 crash of a Taiwanese Airbus filed a suit with a court in
Japan on Wednesday seeking 25.7 billion yen in damages. It was the biggest
single damages suit in connection with an air crash in Japan. Relatives of
121 victims -- 92 Japanese and 29 Taiwanese -- of the crash at Nagoya
airport in central Japan filed the suit at the Nagoya District Court, a
court spokesman said. They demand that China Airlines and Airbus Industrie
pay 100 million yen in damages for each victim, plus compensation for their
lost earnings.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 10:35:06 +0000
From: David English <[email protected]>
Subject: Message of day may have revealed encrypted user passwords

The following is an excerpt from a news posting to demon.service . It was
followed by an invitation to change your password if you are worried, and
lots of good advice about how to choose a new one.

Demon Internet is a leading ISP in the UK. All credit to them for owning up
to this possible security risk.

In this particular case, I think most of the trust has to be in the
password encryption, rather than the Radius database. I understand that
Demon only store one-way encrypted passwords.

In article <[email protected]>, Jim Segrave
<[email protected]> writes
>
>On Tuesday evening, 31 October, one of the three Radius servers
>appears to have corrupted its pointer to the message of the day
>text. The result of this was that users logging in saw a dump of a
>section of the Radius database rather than the message of the day. The
>Radius database includes encrypted copies of user passwords. It is not
>possible to determine which portions of the database may have been
>made visible by this fault. I am currently looking at the Radius
>server code to try to determine the cause of this problem and to add
>safeguards so that it does not recur.

Dave English 250/256 High Street, DORKING, Surrey, UK. RH4 1QT

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 04 Nov 1995 15:53:13 +0100
From: [email protected] (Martin Virtel)
Subject: Risk of built-in eavesdropping features

The German federal labour court has ruled that employers may monitor their
employees telephone conversations, but only if the internal telephone system
of the company has built-in eavesdropping capabilities

I had to read that report twice.

Apparently, the court's point was that if the telephone system had built-in
eavesdropping, the eavesdropping itself does not constitute a violation of
the German criminal law, because the laws requires the use of an
"eavesdropping device" for the eavesdropping to be a criminal offence.
(Obviously, this restriction is there because you wouldn't punish people who
listen to others peoples conversations, say, at the bus stop).

(cynical remark) This may be a good point for the makers of telephone
systems: if you want to sell your system in Germany, please build in
eavesdropping capabilities and remind your customers of this court ruling.

There are two risks here. 1: outdated laws that do not always match the
problems arising with today's technology. 2: the "self-fulfilling-prophecy"
characteristics of built-in features of technology. In other words: you
never asked anybody to include eavesdropping in your telephone system. But
once it's there, you will use it at some point. And if you're in Germany,
you're even allowed to.

(I know that this is no news to US residents, as employers there may
eavesdrop you as they choose. Still, this is not the case everywhere in
the rest of the world.)

References:
Par. 201 Abs.1 Punkt 1 Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Law)
S|ddeutsche Zeitung, 4. Nov 95
Bundesarbeitsgericht, AZ 1 ABR 4/95 (Reference code of the court ruling)

Martin Virtel

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 3 Nov 95 14:50:14 PST
From: Max Stern <[email protected]>
Subject: Risks of putting off until tomorrow, PBX division

The Dallas Morning News carried the following on November 1, according to
the in-house network news at AT&T:

o The federal government and the phone industry -- anticipating
big problems with new area codes -- are launching a
nationwide advertising campaign [today] to educate businesses
and consumers about the changes. The No. 1 warning? If you
work at a business with a private switchboard, known as a
PBX, you may not be able to place a call to any of the new
area codes unless you go through an outside operator. That's
because the new codes, unlike the existing ones, don't have a
zero or a one in the middle. Private switchboards don't
recognize these new codes. [Dallas Morning News]

This sounds dismayingly like the year-2000 calendar bite we have been
reading and writing about for a long time.

Years ago, when the convention of dialing a '1' before the area code
was first introduced, it was clearly stated that one reason for this
was to make the area code recognizable without relying on the middle
digit. Or is my memory faulty? How could the pbx suppliers have
failed in all these years to prepare for the "new area codes"?

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 23:52:07 -0500 (EST)
From: Educom <[email protected]>
Subject: FBI Requests Much Larger Wiretapping Capability

The Federal Bureau of Investigation wants Congressional approval for a plan
that would increase its wiretapping about 2,000% from current capabilities,
giving it the ability to monitor as many as 1 in every 100 phone lines in
certain high-crime areas. In contrast, fewer than 1 in 174,000 phone lines
received court-authorized taps in recent years. The FBI says the plan is
"absolutely essential for law enforcement and public safety." (*The New
York Times* 2 Nov 1995, p. A1) [A subsequent correction in the Times noted
that it was really ONLY 1 in 1000. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 14:12:56 -0800
From: Alonzo Gariepy <[email protected]>
Subject: Bill Gates vs. the Germans

In RISKS-17.43 Klaus Brunnstein takes on Bill Gates over the realities of
commercial software development. Engineering is about knowing the risks
accurately, as Bill Gates clearly does.

Microsoft engineers products to optimize very considerable development costs
for the uses to which the product will actually be put. You can't fly a 747
through a hurricane, and Microsoft Word will not do everything for
everybody. Microsoft is constantly improving their designs and engineering,
often in response to user feedback. But Microsoft does not ship a product
out the door until they know it is viable.

The 777 is not a bug-fix release of the 747. The 747 does its job well
enough and many of its petty annoyances will never be fixed. The same is
true of Microsoft Word. On the rare occasion when a serious design flaw is
discovered, it is fixed. It is true that software becomes obsolete much more
quickly then a jet, but fortunately it is priced so that people can keep up
to date. Sometimes that means buying a bigger hangar and adding a runway.
If you don't need to lower your costs or up your carrying capacity, by all
means stay with the older technology.

The risk is in thinking that an evolving computer system of any size will
ever be free of risk. Engineering is about understanding the limitations of
a system and how that understanding is itself limited. This is where Klaus
may pose a risk to himself. Perhaps he should take up Mr. Gates on his
offer to listen in on support calls.

Alonzo Gariepy [email protected]

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 31 Oct 95 16:47:38 -0800
From: Li Gong <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Mr.Bill Gates: MS software essentially bug-free

In RISKS-17.43, Klaus Brunnstein relayed a Bill Gates interview at German
weekly magazine FOCUS where, when asked "There are always bugs in programs",
Gates was quoted as saying: "No. There are no essential bugs ("keine
bedeutenden Fehler") in our software which a significant number fo users
might wish to be removed."

This reminds me of the book, Writing Solid Code (MS Press), which is
hailed as the classic on the MS way of programming. In its lecture
number 2 (or was it 3), the author gave an example to copy memory.
The essence is as follows (I put it in an easier to read language):

if (allocate_memory(some_length) != NULL)
then copy_memory to new place

The author then says that, although this code captures the bug when
memory allocation fails (when it returns a NULL pointer), the code to
check the pointer not being NULL doubles the code size and slows
things down. His advice? Define the "extra" checking only when you
are debugging, and then remove iy from the "slick" code you ship.

Li GONG <[email protected]> 1-415-859-3232 http://www.csl.sri.com/~gong/
SRI International, Computer Science Lab, Menlo Park, California 94025, USA

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 4 Nov 1995 15:28:33 +0100
From: Klaus Brunnstein <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Gates interview [RISKS-17.42]

Following my report on Mr. Gates` interview in FOCUS (RISKS-17.42), some
colleagues assumed that my translation might have adversely change Mr.
Gates` original words, or the German interviewer may have misunderstood some
phrases. The interviewer, Dr. Juergen Scriba <[email protected]> was
born in USA and grew up there, so his English qualification should be good.
The interview was in English, translated and "redactionally adapted" in
German (e.g. to remove redundancies and polish sentences, as is usually done
in such interviews). Finally, the German version was authorised by a German
employee of Microsoft.

Dr. Scriba was so kind to read my "translation back to English". Though some
of my phrases differed from Mr. Gates original speak (due to "polishing"), he
regarded my text as semantically essentially correct, with one exception: I
mistranslated "Maschinenstuermer" as "machine addict" but the correct
translation is "Luddite". Apologies for this serious fault :-)

Dr. Scriba sent me "original Mr. Gates", so I append this "raw text". In
comparing the published interview with the spoken one, I regard the journalist
having been really friendly with Bill :-)

Enjoy Mr. Gates` original speak. Klaus Brunnstein (November 4,1995)

----- Original interview text of Mr. Bill Gates before translation
and adaptation; German (not this English) version was authorized -------

FOCUS: Every new release of a software which has less bugs than the older
one is also more complex and has more features...
Gates: No, only if that is what'll sell!

FOCUS: But...
Gates: Only if that is what'll sell! We've never done a piece of software
unless we thought it would sell. That's why everything we do in
software ... it's really amazing: We do it because we think that's
what customers want. That's why we do what we do.

FOCUS: But on the other hand - you would say: Okay, folks, if you don't
like these new features, stay with the old version, and keep the bugs?
Gates: No! We have lots and lots of competitors. The new version - it's not
there to fix bugs. That's not the reason we come up with a new version.

FOCUS: But there are bugs an any version which people would really like to
have fixed.
Gates: No! There are no significant bugs in our released software that any
significant number of users want fixed.

FOCUS: Oh, my God. I always get mad at my computer if MS Word swallows the
page numbers of a document which I printed a couple of times with page
numbers. If I complain to anybody they say "Well, upgrade from
version 5.11 to 6.0".
Gates: No! If you really think there's a bug you should report a bug. Maybe
that you're not using it properly. Have you ever considered that?

FOCUS: Yeah, I did...
Gates: It turns out Luddites don't know how to use software properly, so
you should look into that. - The reason we come up with new versions
is not to fix bugs. It's absolutely not. It's the stupidest reason to
buy a new version I ever heard. When we do a new version we put in lots
of new things that people are asking for. And so, in no sense, is
stability a reason to move to a new version. It's never a reason.

FOCUS: How come I keep being told by computer vendors "Well, we know about
this bug, wait till the next version is there, it'll be fixed"? I hear
this all the time. How come? If you're telling me there are no
significant bugs in software and there is no reason to do a new version?
Gates: No. I'm saying: We don't do a new version to fix bugs. We don't. Not
enough people would buy it. You can take a hundred people using Microsoft
Word. Call them up and say "Would you buy a new version because of bugs?"
You won't get a single person to say they'd buy a new version because of
bugs. We'd never be able to sell a release on that basis.

FOCUS: Probably you have other contacts to your software developers. But if
Mister Anybody, like me, calls up a store or a support line and says,
"Hey listen, there's a bug" ... 90 percent of the time I get the answer
"Oh, well, yeah, that's not too bad, wait to the next version and it'll
be fixed". That's how the system works.

Gates: Guess how much we spend on phone calls every year.
FOCUS: Hm, a couple of million dollars?

Gates: 500 million dollars a year. We take every one of these phone calls
and classify them. That's the input we use to do the next version.
So it's like the worlds biggest feedback loop. People call in - we
decide what to do on it. Do you want to know what percentage of those
phonecalls relates to bugs in the software? Less than one percent.

FOCUS: So people call in to say "Hey listen, I would love to have this and
that feature"?
Gates: Actually, that's about five percent. Most of them call to get advice
on how to do a certain thing with the software. That's the primary thing.
We could have you sit and listen to these phone calls. There are millions
and millions of them. It really isn't statistically significant. Sit in
and listen to Win 95 calls, sit in and listen to Word calls, and wait,
just wait for weeks and weeks for someone to call in and say "Oh, I
found a bug in this thing".
..

FOCUS: So where does this comon feeling of frustration come from that
unites all the PC users? Everybody experiences it every day that these
things simply don't work like they should.
Gates: Because it's cool. It's like, "Yeah, been there done that - oh,
yeah, I know that bug." - I can understand that phenomenon
sociologically, not technically.

Original text with kind permission of Interviewer: Dr. Juergen Scriba (FOCUS)

------------------------ end of raw interview ---------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 2 Nov 95 11:34:11 -0500
From: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Traffic Signaling Problems in Chicago Train/Bus Crash (Hartung)

But even if the system can be made to work perfectly, there are risks from
outside of the system. For example, what if the last two cars going through
the yellow lights collide right in front of the bus? The bus drive could be
staring at a green light for a minute and still not be able to clear the
tracks.

I'm surprised there hasn't been more commentary in the media about a
fail-safe mechanism -- never have traffic stopped on rail tracks, regardless
of how the lights and switches are connected. In fact, I thought most
states had laws requiring buses to come to a complete stop before at-grade
rail crossings, look both ways, and only proceed if they can completely
clear the tracks before having to stop for something else.

-Michael J. Zehr

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 02 Nov 95 08:48:59 -0800
From: JAMES LYONS <[email protected]>
Subject: Submarine Nuclear Power

In the interests of accuracy;

The reactors on a submarine cannot undergo a nuclear explosion. (Nuclear
explosion, (yield), assumes that the bulk of the energy comes from
fission reactions.)

A melt down with an associated steam explosion is possible. A steam
explosion or leak leading to a meltdown is possible. But not a nuclear
detonation. (The exact progression of the accident is difficult to predict
without much more knowledge of the configuration of the system.)

This is not to say that a steam explosion and/or meltdown and the
associated side effects are not dangerous in and of themselves.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 6 Nov 1995 14:45:10 -0500
From: [email protected] (Lawrence H Smith)
Subject: Error in Digital video (DeForest, RISKS-17.42)

>or (with Columbia University's "CU See Me") to videoconference over a 14kb

The Risk? Name your software product poorly, and someone will misattribute
it. Since 17.43 has come out without this being pointed out, I think that
Craig will find, if he checks the credits on CU-SeeMe, that Cornell, not
Columbia, is the "C" in CU-SeeMe.

Below is an extract from the abstract at the info-mac hyperarchive at MIT:

Subject: CU-SeeMe070b1.sit.hqx - Video Conferencing Software
CU-SeeMe - Video Teleconferencing for the Mac, from Cornell University!

-Lawrence H Smith, Academic Computing Specialist for the Sciences
Williams College Center for Computing, 313 Jesup Hall (413) 597-3073

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 7 Nov 1995 19:10:32 +1100
From: [email protected] (Fergus Henderson)
Subject: Re: SMTP chicken and the social contract (Giles)

There is an existing technical solution to this problem. Autoresponders are
supposed to

(1) Make sure that all mail they send out has "Precedence: bulk"
in the headers

(2) Don't reply to any mail which has "Precedence: bulk"
in the headers

I'm not sure if this convention is documented in any of the RFCs.
Obviously, any other header would do as well as "Precedence: bulk".
(Perhaps I am misremembering; it may have been "Precedence: junk" or
something else.)

Of course, this solution only works if autoresponders adopt this
convention.

Fergus Henderson WWW: http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~fjh
[email protected] PGP: finger [email protected]

[Noted by MANY OTHERS. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 7 Nov 1995 17:00:21 +1100
From: [email protected] (Fergus Henderson)
Subject: Re: "core" files (Oliver, RISKS-17.41)

According to recent mail on the gnu-win32 mailing list, the latest
release of the GNU BFD (Binary File Descriptor) package for Windows NT
was missing the file `core.c'.

I shudder to think how this happened, but since this Windows NT release was
cross-compiled from a machine running Linux, I suspect it may have something
to do with the fact that recent versions of Linux put some additional
information in the core files names, so that core files are now named
`core.*'.

Fergus Henderson WWW: http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~fjh
[email protected] PGP: finger [email protected]

[Lots of other comments on this topic too. TNX. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: 6 September 1995 (LAST-MODIFIED)
From: [email protected]
Subject: ABRIDGED info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest. Its USENET equivalent is comp.risks.
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------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 17.44
************************