Subject: RISKS DIGEST 16.67
REPLY-TO: [email protected]

RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest  Friday 23 December 1994  Volume 16 : Issue 67

  FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
  ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** SEASONS' GREETINGS from the PEripaTEtic Risks moderator.       *****
***** NOTE, THE SRI RISKS ARCHIVE SOURCE has moved to unix.sri.com.  *****
***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, etc.       *****

 Contents:
Software glitch snares Social Security Administration (Mike Manos)
Cancelbot Derails Online Promo (WSJ via Edupage)
Ben & Jerry's expects first loss (Arthur D. Flatau)
Proliferation of Cockpit Warning Signals (David Walter)
Year 2000 date problems already happening now (Elana)
Re: Prevention of Oral Hacking (Brad G. Parks)
Re: Pentium FDIV problem - so what's new? (Mark Brader)
Intelligent Commentator on McNeil-Lehrer (D.P. Schneider)
Financial Payment Systems (Jeff Stapleton)
Possible solution to the (electronic) meme problem (Bob Mehlman)
Advertising on the Net (Mich Kabay)
Risk Takers Among Management (Tom Kaiser)
Re: Koppel et al. (Peter da Silva)
Re: Microsoft and the Catholic Church (John Stevenson)
EDUPAGE on the WWW (Timothy Hunt)
Public CM WAIS Server to end operation (WAIS Admin)
Call for Papers and Panels: National Information Systems Security Conf.
 (Jack Holleran)
Info on RISKS (comp.risks), contributions, subscriptions, FTP, etc.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 21 Dec 1994 14:49:13 EST
From: Mike Manos <[email protected]>
Subject: Software glitch snares the Social Security Administration

[from Federal Computer Week, 21 Nov 1994]

The Social Security Administration has uncovered a software coding error
that over the years nickeled and dimed Social Security recipients out of
$478.5 million.  The problem occurred in 1978, when SSA wrote new code
because employers began reporting earnings annually rather than quarterly.
The software program, with its 76 sets of variables, had a few holes in it.
Over 16 years, about 426,000 people did not receive appropriate payment
increases.

------------------------------

Date:   Tue, 20 Dec 1994 18:15:26 -0500
From: [email protected] (Edupage)
Subject: Cancelbot Derails Online Promo (WSJ via Edupage 12/20/94)

CANCELBOT DERAILS ONLINE PROMO
Messages promoting "Netchat," a new book by Michael Wolff, have been
unceremoniously wiped out by someone calling him/herself "Cancelmoose." The
vigilante, who used a program called a cancelbot, worked through a computer
in Finland that enables a mail sender to remain anonymous, and claims to
have performed similar services more than a dozen times in the past.
(*Wall Street Journal*, 20 Dec 1994, p. B7)

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 21 Dec 94 08:52:14 CST
From: [email protected] (Arthur D. Flatau)
Subject: Ben & Jerry's expects first loss

According to an article (page F2) in the Tuesday December 20, 1994 issue of
the Austin American Statesman (from the Associated Press) Ben & Jerry's
Homemade Inc. is going to report its first quarterly loss since it went
public.  Quoting some of the relevant to risks part of the article:

       Adding to the bad news, the company said Monday that recurring
       problems in a comuterized handling system will force it to
       delay opening a new, more efficient manufacturing plant in
       St. Albans, Vt. until the middle of next year.  [...]

       "While out earnings have been negatively impacted in 1994 by
       the inefficiencies in the company's production planning,
       purchasing and inventory management systems ... the
       anticipated loss in the current quarter is due primarily to
       lower than expected sales lever," [Ben & Jerry's President
       Chuck] Lacy said in a written statement.  [...]

       At the new St. Alban's plant, a computerized system that was
       supposed to automate handling of ice cream after it has been
       packed into pints has software problems, forcing the company
       to substitute a more conventional system.
       That likely will require installation of different equipment
       and more employees for handling, although the company said it
       will still be more efficient than current manufacturing.

       The St. Albans plant is designed to consolidate all of Ben &
       Jerry's manufacturing in Vermont again.  The company hires
       Edy's [a major competitor] of Fort Wayne, Ind. to make about
       37 percent of its ice cream, [Ben & Jerry's spokesman Rob]
       Michalak said.

Art  [email protected]  Computational Logic, Inc.  Austin, Texas

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 21 Dec 94 13:54:23 GMT
From: [email protected]
Subject: Proliferation of Cockpit Warning Signals

The avionics thread seems to have gone quiet, perhaps because none of the
several recent airliner crashes has involved an A320 aircraft. Here is an
account of an incident I came across recently which highlights the problem
of proliferation of warning signals in complex human-machine interfaces.

The incident involved a Continental Airlines 727 which came perilously
close to landing gear-up at Chicago O'Hare about a year ago.

Initial investigation indicated that the crew had become distracted
from their landing check-list by TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance
System) warnings which sounded repeatedly as they flew through the busy
airspace around O'Hare. The 727's gear warning did not trigger because
the flap setting was 25 degrees instead of the usual 27.5 (in order to
maintain speed on approach as requested by air traffic control). A ground
proximity warning did sound at 500 ft, but lack of gear is only one of
a number of possible causes for this warning.

A taxiing American Airlines pilot saw the 727 on short final with no gear.
The tower radio transcript makes hair-raising reading:

       American:       "Tower, Continental's got no gear!"

       Tower:          "Who's got no gear?"

       American:       "Continental, just about ready to touch down
                       on two-seven left"

       The ground controller shouted to his colleague who was controlling
       Continental's approach, who warned:

                       "Go around, go around Continental. No gear!"

The 727 succeeded in executing a go-around, but not before scraping the rear
third of the fuselage on the runway. It landed normally out of the second
approach.

David Walter

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 23 Dec 1994 05:48:33 GMT
From: [email protected] (Elana who?)
Subject: Year 2000 date problems already happening now

A few months ago, there was an excellent article in RISKS about the problems
of the year date rolling from xx/xx/99 to xx/xx/00 and how it could affect
computer systems. Today I mentioned the article in passing to a rep at
my local bank as I was making a routine deposit.  She said:  "It's happening
already."  Apparently there is a problem with some of the credit cards
they have been issuing to their customers.  The expiration date on them
is the year 2000, and for some tech reason she could not explain, two
major stores here in town refuse to take them "because that weird date
messes up their computers."

I regret that I cannot offer more info than this, but it is serious food
for thought...

-Elana

  [See the latest American Scientist, Jan-Feb 1995, which has a very
  nice article by Brian Hayes, spanning the entire subject.  (Much of
  it is drawn from the RISKS Archives.)  PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 94 11:21 CST
From: [email protected] (Brad G. Parks)
Subject: Re: Prevention of Oral Hacking

  I am a big fan of Voice Recognition Technology, however trite
and useless people may say it is.  And one thing that people have
failed to mention so far that there are ways to prevent/discourage
oral hacking (at least with Macintosh's general program).
  With the Mac program there is an option that allows the user to
name the computer something other than "Computer."  There is another
option for setting an "Attention Key" to basically give the program
earplugs until that key is pressed again.  There is also a voice
recognizing option that sets how precise your language must be.
  It is doubtful, at least to me, that somebody running around the
office yelling "Computer, Restart, Yes" would restart my Mac, whose
name is Alfred, has the precision level set rather high, and also
has the voice recognition asleep until i press Keypad-0.

Brad G. Parks ([email protected])    [Software Engineer, O-Programmer]
Introl Corporation (612)-631-7810    2675 Patton Rd. St.Paul, MN  55113

 [Ah, now we know!  And we can record your normal voice and replay it. PGN]

------------------------------

Date:   Wed, 21 Dec 1994 14:03:47 -0500
From: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Pentium FDIV problem - so what's new? (Peterson, Risks-16.66)

It occurs to me that the English vocabulary might be related to why
people have reacted so strongly to the existence of this bug -- which,
let's face it, is not all that devastating *relative to other bugs*.
The term "computer" suggests that computation is the most important
and fundamental thing that the machine does, and because of this, any
bug directly related to computation is seen as more serious than others.

In French the machine is called an "ordinateur", which is related to our
word "ordinal" and conveys connotations of *organizing* data.  What we
mostly call computer science, they call "informatique" -- the study of
information.  And if you think about what computers are used for today,
you will see that these terms are at least as fitting as the English ones.
In English when we really mean that computation is the important part of
the work, we use terms like "numerical" in addition to "computing".

Would English speakers have reacted equally strongly to a -- no pun intended
-- comparable bug in the instructions for comparing and branching?  I think
they would not.

(No, you don't need to tell me that a large part of the reaction in this
case was to Intel's reaction, not to the original problem.)

Mark Brader  [email protected]  SoftQuad Inc., Toronto

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 94 16:34:00 PST
From: [email protected]
Subject: Intelligent Commentator on McNeil-Lehrer

A recent McNeil-Lehrer report (I'm pretty sure it was Tuesday night's  --
12/20/1994) had an intelligent commentator as an interviewee on the Pentium
situation.

I agree with his comments about the Pentium (that the problem was probably
more severe than Intel admitted and less severe than IBM trumpetted), but
the reason I'm pointing this interview out is because Robin McNeil asked
something to the effect, "So the issue is also that we shouldn't trust an
answer just because the computer gave it to us?"  The interviewee answered
that this was just so, and that we should keep asking for and demanding
proof that the computer is giving good answers.

There were also what I thought were intelligent comments on the difficulty
of thoroughly testing such complex parts, and that testing had to involve
strategies to maximize the confidence obtained.

I hope that one of your other submitters has given (or will give) the
identity of the interviewee, and some exact quotes.  I was impressed by his
grasp of the big picture, and that he managed to convey it to the
interviewer, too.  (I think the choice of interviewer helped, but even
intelligent interviewers can't be prepared to understand all issues, and
McN-L tend to have more news on political and economic issues than on
technical issues).

Hope you caught the interview, too!

/dps

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 1994 10:56:25 -0600
From: [email protected]
Subject: Financial Payment Systems

In regards to RISKS-16.64 here are some thoughts and concerns about
financial payments on the World Wide Web, CommerceNet, the Internet, and
electronic media in general:

Debit card payments today require an additional piece of authenticating data
- the Personnel Identification Number or PIN. There are ISO (9564) and ANSI
(X9.8) standards which tell us how to securely formulate a PIN block and
encrypt it using the Data Encryption Algorithm or DEA (X3.92).  Credit card
payments may soon also require the PIN.  However, we have no standards today
telling us how to encrypt PINs using public key algorithms.  True, the
advent of the smartcard may eliminate the transmission of PINs, but not for
a while yet (years?).

Speaking of public key cryptosystems, there ARE existing ISO and ANSI
standards available today:
    ISO-CD 11568 parts 4 and 5 just completed the public ballot process.
    ANSI X9.30 part 1 - The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
    ANSI X9.30 part 2 - The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
    ANSI X9.30 part 3 - Certificate Management for the DSA is completing its
                        public ballot process.

However, due to the legal problems between Cylink Corporation and RSA Data
Security on fair licensing agreements for the RSA patents, the matching set
of ANSI standards (X9.31 parts 1, 2, and 3) for RSA may be put on hold by
the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9 - for further details, call:
    X9 secretariat, American Bankers Association (ABA), 202-663-5284
    X9F chairman, Marty Ferris, 202-622-1110
    X9F1 chairman, Blake Greenlee, 203-762-8580

Although the standard addresses the DSA, X9.30-3 Certificate Management is
rather generic and deals with the roles and responsibilities of the
asymmetric key pair owners, the certificate authority(s), and the public key
users.  Interesting stuff and can (and should be) used for implementing any
public key cryptosystem.  Copies can be purchased from the ABA (plug).

Jeff J. Stapleton - MasterCard International

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 21 Dec 1994 18:43:08 PST
From: rmehlman%[email protected]
Subject: Possible solution to the (electronic) meme problem

Keith Henson (RISKS 14.63) points out that computer viruses and human fads
fit Richard Dawkins' concept of a meme, adding

 What computers and fast communications have done is to radically change the
 replication constants for memes, and to make unworkable the controls society
 has tried to put on such things.

In "Mind Viruses" (American Scientist, Jan-Feb 1995, p.26), Michael Szpir
discusses 'human information parasites', such as the St. Jude 1 chain letter,
likened to memes by Dawkins and Oliver Goodenough (Nature, Sept 1, 1994).

Some years ago, I received an electronic chain letter, complete with lengthy
sequential history of previous senders.  These letters differ from the old-
fashioned kind -- they always have return addresses.  It occurred to me that
the appropriate response was to SEND IT BACK, and encourage the sender and all
others to do likewise, hoping an avalanche of returned mail would eventually
swamp the original sender, if it didn't bring the network to its knees.

No such luck.  I actually tried it, forwarding the letter back to the
sender with subject LET'S SEND IT BACK.  Unfortunately, he returned it
immediately, longer by two headers, with subject THAT'S NOT FAIR...IT'S
GOT TO BE 5 OTHER PEOPLE.  I did not repeat the experiment, though I tried
unsuccessfully to get others to do so.

Still, I wonder, next time a chain letter or other intentional meme spreads
through the Internet, if everyone returned their copies to the sender ...

Bob Mehlman, UCLA/IGPP

------------------------------

Date: 22 Dec 94 14:25:04 EST
From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op]" <[email protected]>
Subject: Advertising on the Net

In the 05 Dec 1994 issue of _Network World_ on p. 41, "John Doe" recounts
his tale of woe after advertising on the Internet ("Ad leads to a nightmare
on Cyber-Street).  In brief, his main points are

* Placed ads in several USENET groups.
* Swamped with email abuse and flames in the groups as a result.
* Someone posted his 800- number in alt.sex groups as a phone-sex #.
* Switchboard swamped with requests for phone sex; operators horrified.
* One switchboard op quit because of what callers were saying.
* All 800- calls switched to the originator of the advertising as punishment.
* Impractical to cancel 800- service because of special letter combinations.

Moral:  don't advertise on the Net.

<<Comments by MK:

One issue is whether it's good or bad to advertise on the Net.

Another is whether it's good or bad to respond to advertising on the Net in the
ways demonstrated in this case.

Yet another is that exactly the same techniques could be used against any
organization even if it _doesn't_ advertise on the Net.>>

M.E.Kabay,Ph.D./DirEd/Natl Computer Security Assn

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 1994 23:22:43 -0500
From: [email protected] (Tom Kaiser)
Subject: Risk Takers Among Management

Subject: Upper Managements View of Information Security(Infoworld 12/19/94)

The following extract from _INFOWORLD_ 12/19/94 demonstrates some of the
risks inherent in human management. (I read this shortly before reading
RISKS 16.66 and the posts calling for papers and serious work in all areas
of network and computer security).

42% of senior management at U.S. companies consider information security to
be only "somewhat important" or "not important," according to a survey by
Ernst and Young LLP, with 15% of companies devoting no full time resources
to security. This though even more than half the respondents reported
information-related losses.  Also , among respondents who said they were
running "mission-critical applications" on their LAN's, half reported that
security was unsatisfactory. What will it take to make security a priority
in industry? The Stealth bomber blueprint on place mats in Pizza Hut?  (end
copy)

We can only hope that some of the recent antics and activities on the
network cause these top managers to focus some their energies, and resources
on the protection of their (our?) data.  Analysis of all probable problems
and or threats should precede implementation of any changes to or
introduction any systems.  I think most readers of RISKS would enjoy reading
the entire poll and possibly having helped in phrasing some of those obscure
questions, and "open to interpretation answers."

Thomas Kaiser [email protected]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 1994 17:51:54 -0600
From: [email protected] (Peter da Silva)
Subject: Re: Koppel et al. (RISKS-16.66)

I seem to recall someone with the name of "Hughes" being forced to change
the name of his hotel because Howard Hughes objected. Be glad your name
doesn't match someone like that.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 23 Dec 1994 22:53:37 +0000
From: John Stevenson <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Microsoft and the Catholic Church (RISKS-16.66)

>Microsoft has no plans to acquire Catholic Church (from EDUPAGE)

Surely the big RISK here is that the world is infested with people who lack
even a trace of a sense of humour. Hoax? I believe 'Microsoft to acquire
Catholic Church' was what we writers call 'a joke'.

John Stevenson   [email protected]   [email protected]

  [I would call it a *parody*.  RISKS readers seem to be a cut above the
  average in terms of not being fooled so easily, especially by such obvious
  parodies.  But remember there are a lot of nontech folks out there with
  very bad spoof-suspicion thresholds.  Even the most *obvious* humor
  sometimes gets taken seriously.  Remember what happened to Piet
  Beertema's Chernenko hoax!  Many people took it very seriously.  Some
  might have even attempted to spoof the spoofer by pretending to take it
  seriously.  At any rate, best wishes for a happy new year, with its own
  collection of good humor.  PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 21 Dec 94 14:55:07 +0000
From: "Timothy Hunt [Assistant Unix Systems Manager]" <[email protected]>
Subject: EDUPAGE on the WWW

Noticing the article that made reference to EDUPAGE [Microsoft has no plans to
acquire Catholic Church], RISKS readers may be interested to know that EDUPAGE
is available via the Web, with URL : http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/edupage

Timothy J. Hunt, Joint Dept. of Physics, The Inst. of Cancer Research, Downs
Road, Sutton, Surrey England SM2 5PT [email protected] +44(0)181 642 6011 x3312

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Dec 94 11:36:41 EST
From: [email protected] (Wais Administrator account)
Subject: Public CM WAIS Server to end operation

The Public CM WAIS Server, which has provided a searchable database of past
RISKS traffic as risks-digest.src, will cease operation on 27 December 1994.
Please update the "Info on RISKS" item and inform your readers of the change.

 [Here we come a-WAIS-ailing!  And many thanks for your past serv-ice!  PGN]

------------------------------

Date:  Thu, 22 Dec 94 20:13 EST
From: Jack Holleran <[email protected]>
Subject:  Call for Papers and Panels: National Information Systems Security

CALL FOR PAPERS AND PANELS
18TH NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY CONFERENCE
         (formerly the National Computer Security Conference)

Co-sponsored by the National Computer Security Center and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Baltimore Convention Center, Baltimore MD
October 10-13, 1995

The National Information Systems Security Conference audience represents a
broad range of information security interests spanning government, industry,
commercial, and academic communities.  Papers and panel discussions typically
cover:

(  research and development for secure products and systems presenting
     the latest thinking and directions;
(  practical solutions for real-world information security concerns;
(  implementation, accreditation, and operation of secure systems
     in a real-world environment;
(  evaluation of products, systems, and solutions against trust criteria;
(  security issues dealing with rapidly changing information technologies;
(  network security issues and solutions;
(  management activities to promote security in IT systems including
     security planning, risk management, and awareness and training;
(  international harmonization of security criteria and evaluation;
(  social and legal issues such as privacy, ethics, investigations,
     and enforcement;
(  tutorials on security basics and advanced issues; and
(  highlights from other security forums.

We invite the submission of papers and proposals for panel discussions in any
of the above areas as well as other topics related to IT system security.  We
especially encourage student papers written by individuals in degree programs.
The student should not have been previously published, and the paper shall be
endorsed by an academic advisor.

BY MARCH 1, 1995: Eight (8) copies of your draft should arrive at the
following address.  See instruction on reverse side regarding the format of
your submission and accompanying information required.
                   National Information Systems Security Conference
                   Attn: Conference Secretary, APS XI
                   National Computer Security Center
                   Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

BY JUNE 1, 1995: Authors and Panel chairs selected to participate in the
Conference will be notified and advised when final papers and panel statements
are due.

For additional information on submissions, please call (410) 850-0272 or send
Internet messages to [email protected].  For other
information about the National Information Systems Security Conference, please
call (301) 975-2775.

PREPARATION OF CONFERENCE SUBMISSIONS

Cover Sheet:  Type of submission (paper, panel, tutorial)
             Title or Topic
             Abstract (not to exceed 250 words)
             Author(s)
             Organizational Affiliation
             Phone numbers (voice and fax, if available)
             Internet address, if available
             Point of Contact, if more than one author

Submissions related to work under U.S.  Government sponsorship must also
include the following information:

             U.S. Government Program Sponsor or Procuring Element
             Contract Number (if applicable)
             U.S. Government Publication Release Authority

Classified material or topics must NOT be submitted.

Draft Papers:
             10 page maximum, including figures and references.
             Include title, abstract, and keywords on first page.
             No more than 12 characters/inch and 6 inches/line.
             One-inch margins all around.

Since the paper referee process will be anonymous, names and affiliations of
authors should appear only on the separate cover sheet.  All submissions are
treated as proprietary information belonging to the authors.

Release for Publication and Copyright: Authors are responsible for obtaining
government or corporate releases for publication.  Written release will be
required for all papers to be published.  Papers developed as part of official
U.S.  Government duties may not be subject to copyright.  Papers that are
subject to copyright must be accompanied by written assignment for multi-media
publication to the National Information Systems Security Conference Committee.


PANEL PROPOSALS:
(  Panels are limited to 90 minutes, including time for prepared
     remarks, discussion, and audience interaction.
(  Proposals are not to exceed two pages but should summarize the topic,
     issues, viewpoints and questions that will be addressed by the panel.
(  Proposals are to include the names of panelists, panel chair, and
     affiliation of each participant.
(  Each panel is limited to *five (5)* persons, including panel chair
     and four (4) panelists.
(  Panels will be selected by the Conference Committee.  Panel chairs
     and panelists will be expected to provide written statements for
     inclusion in the Conference Proceedings.
(  Panel proposals *must be* received by March 1, 1995.

------------------------------

Date: 23 December 1994 (LAST-MODIFIED)
From: [email protected]
Subject: Info on RISKS (comp.risks), contributions, subscriptions, FTP, etc.

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------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 16.67
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