Subject: RISKS DIGEST 13.22

Subject: RISKS DIGEST 13.22
REPLY-TO: [email protected]

RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Tuesday 3 March 1992 Volume 13 : Issue 22

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS
ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Contents:
RISKS in Test Standards -- A 900,000-mile Oldsmobile? (Andrew C. Green)
ATMs gobble bankcards in Colorado (Rex E. Gantenbein)
Re: Virus news-bite omits crucial information (Vesselin Bontchev)
Re: Not quite anonymous FTP (Jonathan I. Kamens)
FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL on A320's VOR... (Robert Dorsett)
RSA Laboratories announces RSAREF free cryptographic toolkit (Burt Kaliski)

The RISKS Forum is moderated. Contributions should be relevant, sound, in
good taste, objective, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is
welcome. CONTRIBUTIONS to [email protected], with relevant, substantive
"Subject:" line. Others may be ignored! Contributions will not be ACKed.
The load is too great. **PLEASE** INCLUDE YOUR NAME & INTERNET FROM: ADDRESS,
especially .UUCP domain folks. REQUESTS please to [email protected].
Vol i issue j, type "FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM<CR>login anonymous<CR>AnyNonNullPW<CR>
CD RISKS:<CR>GET RISKS-i.j<CR>" (where i=1 to 13, j always TWO digits). Vol i
summaries in j=00; "dir risks-*.*<CR>" gives directory; "bye<CR>" logs out.
The COLON in "CD RISKS:" is essential. "CRVAX.SRI.COM" = "128.18.10.1".
<CR>=CarriageReturn; FTPs may differ; UNIX prompts for username, password.
ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY.
Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues
of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Tue, 03 Mar 1992 08:34:59 CST
From: [email protected]
Subject: RISKS in Test Standards -- A 900,000-mile Oldsmobile?

Here in northern Illinois, we must have our cars tested periodically (usually
once a year) for exhaust emissions. The test operator has to enter the current
mileage of the vehicle into the computer, which then sets the proper standards
that the vehicle must meet. High-mileage cars are permitted to spew out
slightly more pollutants (within reason) than low-mileage ones. Up until this
year, the operator could only enter five digits, so any car exceeding 100,000
miles on the odometer was listed at 99,000. This year, they've revised the
system to handle six digits, and things got interesting.

Last week I brought my 90,000-mile 1982 Oldsmobile in for its test. The
test operator said, "What's the first two digits on your mileage?"
"Nine, Zero", I replied. He punched it in and the test proceeded.

I wondered at the time how they deal with cars having SEVEN digit
odometers. Seems like the operator would have to know whether to punch
in a leading zero, but from the wording of the question, it sounded like
he could only enter two digits no matter what. The owner of a 90,000-mile
Honda (whose odometer reads "090,000.0") might have answered "Zero, Nine"
to that question, and get stuck trying to meet a 9,000-mile emission
standard instead of a 90,000-mile setting. On the other hand, maybe I
would be the lucky recipient of a 900,000-mile testing standard? If my
car fails THAT, I thought, I'm definitely getting a tuneup.

Well, the car passed with flying colors, and as I drove off, I glanced at the
printout of results given to me with my new 1-year emissions sticker. Sure
enough, the indicated test mileage read "900,000", complete with the comma in
the middle.

Other than the obvious RISK, that of flunking the test because of a goofed-up
mileage entry, I wonder if the odometer reading for emissions testing is
tracked from year to year. Data on the printout shows that the computer is
indeed tied into the registration information for the car. The mileage IS
listed on the car's Title of Ownership to catch rollbacks between purchase and
later sale, but I don't know if any discrepancies are flagged automatically.
Hope not, anyway. I wonder if the operator who gets the test mileage correct
next year, say at 99,000 miles, will get a message from the computer asking
what happened to the other 801,000?

Andrew C. Green, Datalogics, Inc., 441 W. Huron, Chicago, IL 60610
(312) 266-4431 Internet: [email protected] UUCP: ..!uunet!dlogics!acg

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1992 16:20 MST
From: "Rex E. Gantenbein 307-766-4226" <[email protected]>
Subject: ATMs gobble bankcards in Colorado

Source: Denver Post, 19 Feb 1992

About 1,000 Colorado ATM users had their Visas and Mastercards abruptly
terminated in February by an out-of-control computer system.

For 90 minutes during the President's Day weekend, the Rocky Mountain Bankcard
System software told ATMS around the state to eat the cards instead of dishing
out cash or taking deposits. The "once-in-a-decade" glitch went unnoticed
because it occurred as programmers were patching in a correction to a different
problem.

The company is rushing new plastic and letters of apology to customers who got
terminated.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 3 Mar 92 10:30:29 +0100
From: [email protected] (Vesselin Bontchev)
From: [email protected] (Mr. News)
Subject: Re: Virus news-bite omits crucial information

[email protected] writes:

> AT NO TIME DURING THE PIECE DID ANYONE MENTION THAT THE VIRUS
> AFFECTS MS-DOS CLONE MACHINES ONLY.

Sigh... Sorry, but this is FALSE! The Michelangelo virus attacks any IBM PC
compatible computers. There is no need that they are MS-DOS machines. You can
get a 80386 and install only Xenix on it, without any MS-DOS partitions. The
virus will still infect it and will destroy the information on the hard disk on
March 6. Of course, Xenix won't be able to boot after the infection, but this
is another story...

Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
[email protected] Fachbereich Informatik - AGN, rm. 107 C
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: -226 Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, D-2000, Hamburg 54

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 3 Mar 92 10:21:19 -0500
From: "Jonathan I. Kamens" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Not quite anonymous FTP (Rucklidge, RISKS-13.21)

The risk is not so much that the logs are made, but more that the service
is presented as "anonymous", leading people to believe that it actually is.

Not convinced. It is standard operating procedure to ask users of anonymous
ftp to specify their E-mail address when prompted for a password. In fact,
pretty much every document I've seen that describes anonymous ftp mentions this
practice, and explains that the purpose of it is to allow system administrators
to monitor the usage of anonymous ftp.

Given such a widespread, accepted convention, it seems clear to me that users
of anonymous ftp have no reason to expect their usage to be completely
anonymous. Furthermore, if the provide a fake or bogus E-mail address when
prompted for an ftp password, they are doing something considered anti-social
on the Internet, and I think it is completely reasonable for the addresses of
connecting sites to be logged in case it becomes necessary to follow up on such
anti-social behavior.

I don't see any risk here. I see a system that worked the way it was designed
to work, and the users who were caught allegedly doing something wrong had no
"right" to expect otherwise.
Jonathan Kamens [email protected]

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 2 Mar 92 15:32:34 CST
From: [email protected] (Robert Dorsett)
Subject: FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL on A320's VOR...

Since the Air Inter A320 crashed January 20, there have been a number of
comments on shifted map displays, and that Lufthansa had banned the use of
VOR/DME approaches for the previous year.

Obligatory technolingo:

A VOR is a ground-based electronic broadcasting station, which transmits
radial "spokes." These range from 0 to 359 degrees. An airplane can check
to see which "spoke" it's on; this data can then be used for navigation
purposes. This is contrasted with an NDB (non-directional station), which,
like an AM radio station, simply broadcasts in all directions; direction-
finding equipment on board the airplane can then be used to find it. VOR's
are generally more reliable over longer ranges, and less susceptible to
interference. The operational difference is that airplane instrumentation
points TO an NTB, but shows what radial the airplane is ON with a VOR.

Comments in brackets []. Some are sarcastic, some are technical clar-
ifications; there are a few mistakes in this.

>From FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, "New VOR antenna will solve A320 problem",
Feb. 19, 1992, p. 10:

"Airbus Industrie, workin with Lufthansa, has developed a new VOR (VHF
omnirange) antenna for its A320s.

"The resulting modification programme will overcome the occasional poor air-
craft reception of VOR beacon signals, which had caused Lufthansa, in Sept-
ember 1991, to suspend VOR/DME (distance measuring equipment) airfield ap-
proaches in its A320s.

"On 8 February Air France and Air Inter took a voluntary decision to suspend
VOR/DME approaches in their A320s because of an incident in an Air Inter
A320 on approach to Bordeaux airport three days earlier.

"The symptom for the Lufthansa problem was oscillation of the VOR indicator
in the A320 cockpit displays. Also, the Bendix DME equipment in Boeing 747-
400s--the same as in the A320s--had once shown a fault which had been re-
produced on the test bench.

"Work at Bendix has not yet produced a modificaiton, but the fault has not
recurred in the 747 or occurred ever in Lufthansa's A320s. Air France uses
Bendix VOR/DME, Air Inter has Collins.

"Airbus senior vice-president of engineering, Bernard Ziegler, says that the
antenna problem was related to the position of metal lightning-protection
strips in the composite aerial.

"In the Air Inter incident on 5 February, the A320 captain, carrying out a VOR/
DME procedure for Bordeaux, but flying manually in perfect visual conditions,
noticed that the flight management system (FMS)-produced map on his navigation
display was displaced. Ziegler confirms it was displaced by 2.2 cm (1.2 nm),
pointing out that such a degree of displacement, while unsatisfactory, was
within the published system accuracy. [!!!] [!]

"Lufthansa emphasizes that it had not experienced map displacement, only VOR
indicator oscillation.

"Lufthansa's letdown procedure involves one pilot flying to the compass arc/
map display, the other to the VOR compass rose display, to enable cross-check-
ing. The raw VOR/DME data on both displays is correct even if the map is
displaced. [but does anyone use the raw data when the map is so much more
convenient?]

"Ziegler says the Bordeaux map display displacement was caused partly by an
Air Inter database error entered in the aircraft's FMS, which produces the
display map from its integral inertial navigation system (INS) [actually,
ADIRS]. The INS [FMS] depends on VOR/DME for its accuracy updating. If
fewer than two DMEs are in range (and during descent this often occurs),
then the INS [FMS] updates using a co-located VOR/DME. The Air Inter
database says the Bordeaux VOR and DME are co-located when they are not [!],
so the FMS was cleared to updated, using incorrect information and affecting
the map. [GIGO rules!]

"The navigation display, Ziegler says, displays the FMS update sources at all
times: 'If you see that the source is VOR/DME and your VOR needle is oscil-
lating, obviously you know you can expect map shift.' [obviously.]

"The French Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) will not ban
A320 VOR/DME letdowns, but empahsises the need to crosscheck the map displays
with the raw navigation data available.

"The DGAC also points out that there is no evidence of any connection between
the Bordeaux event and the Air Inter A320 crash near Starsbourg on 20 January.
The authority has, however, warned all A320 crews to be careful when they sel-
ect the autopilot descent mode, because there is a possibility that the
Strasbourg crew may have selected a steep 3300 fpm (16.7 m/s) rate of descent
when they meant to select the shallower 3.3 degree angle of descent.

Robert Dorsett Internet: [email protected] UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 2 Mar 92 16:27:21 PST
From: [email protected] (Burt Kaliski)
Subject: RSA Laboratories announces RSAREF free cryptographic toolkit

RSAREF(TM):
A Cryptographic Toolkit for Privacy-Enhanced Mail

RSA Laboratories
(A division of RSA Data Security, Inc.)
March 2, 1992

This document copyright (C) 1992 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data
Security, Inc. License is granted to reproduce, copy, post, or distribute in
any manner, provided this document is kept intact and no modifications,
deletions, or additions are made.

WHAT IS IT?

RSAREF is a cryptographic toolkit designed to facilitate rapid deployment of
Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) implementations. RSAREF represents the
fruits of RSA Data Security's commitment to the U.S. Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to provide free cryptographic source
code in support of a PEM standard. RSA Laboratories offers RSAREF in
expectation of PEM's forthcoming publication as an Internet standard.

Part of RSA's commitment to DARPA was to authorize Trusted Information Systems
of Glenwood, MD, to distribute a full PEM implementation based on RSAREF. That
implementation will be available this spring.

RSAREF supports the following PEM-specified algorithms:

o RSA encryption and key generation, as defined by RSA
Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)

o MD2 and MD5 message digests

o DES (Data Encryption Standard) in cipher-block chaining mode

RSAREF is written in the C programming language as a library that can be called
from an application program. A simple PEM implementation can be built directly
on top of RSAREF, together with message parsing and formatting routines and
certificate-management routines. RSAREF is distributed with a demonstration
program that shows how one might build such an implementation.

The name "RSAREF" means "RSA reference." RSA Laboratories intends RSAREF to
serve as a portable, educational, reference implementation of cryptography.

WHAT YOU CAN (AND CANNOT) DO WITH RSAREF

The license at the end of this note gives legal terms and conditions.
Here's the layman's interpretation, for information only and with no
legal weight:

1. You can use RSAREF in personal, noncommercial applications,
as long as you follow the interface described in the RSAREF
documentation. You can't use RSAREF in any commercial
(moneymaking) manner of any type, nor can you use it to
provide services of any kind to any other party. For
information on commercial licenses of RSAREF-compatible
products, please contact RSA Data Security.

2. You can distribute programs that interface to RSAREF,
but you can't distribute RSAREF itself. Everyone must
obtain his or her own copy of RSAREF. (However, free
licenses to redistribute RSAREF are available. For
information, please send electronic mail to
<[email protected]>.)

3. You can modify RSAREF as required to port it to other
operating systems and compilers, as long as you give a copy
of the results to RSA Laboratories. You can't otherwise
change RSAREF.

4. You can't send RSAREF outside the United States, or give it
to anyone who is not a United States citizen and doesn't
have a "green card." (These are U.S. State and Commerce
Department requirements, because RSA and DES are
export-controlled technologies.)

The restrictions on the distribution of RSAREF are the consequence of
export-control law. Similar constraints are placed on those redistributing
RSAREF under free license from RSA Laboratories. Without the export-control
law, RSAREF would be available by anonymous FTP.

HOW TO GET IT

To obtain RSAREF, read the license at the end of the note and return a copy of
the "acknowledgement and acceptance" paragraph by electronic mail to
<[email protected]>.

RSAREF is distributed by electronic mail in a UNIX(TM) "uuencoded" TAR format.
When you receive it, store the contents of the message in a file, and run your
operating system's "uudecode" and TAR programs.

For example, suppose you store the contents of your message in the file
'contents'. You would run the commands:

uudecode contents # produces rsaref.tar
tar xvf rsaref.tar

RSAREF includes about 60 files organized into the following
subdirectories:

doc documentation on RSAREF and RDEMO
install makefiles for various operating systems
rdemo RDEMO demonstration program
source RSAREF source code and include files
test test scripts for RDEMO

USERS' GROUP

RSA Laboratories maintains the electronic-mail users' group
<[email protected]> for discussion of RSAREF applications, bug fixes, etc.
To join the user's group, send electronic mail to
<[email protected]>.

REGISTRATION

RSAREF users who register with RSA Laboratories are entitled to free RSAREF
upgrades and bug fixes as soon as they become available and a 50% discount on
selected RSA Data Security products. To register, send your name, address, and
telephone number to <[email protected]>.

INNOVATION PRIZES

RSA Laboratories will award cash prizes for the best applications built on
RSAREF. If you'd like to submit an application, or want to be on the review
panel, please send electronic mail to <[email protected]>.

PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATION

RSA Data Security offers public-key certification services conforming to
forthcoming PEM standards. For more information, please send electronic mail to
<[email protected]>.

OTHER QUESTIONS

If you have questions on RSAREF software, licenses, export restrictions, or
other RSA Laboratories offerings, send electronic mail to
<[email protected]>.

AUTHORS

RSAREF was written by the staff of RSA Laboratories with assistance from RSA
Data Security's software engineers. The DES code is based on an implementation
that Justin Reyneri did at Stanford University. Jim Hwang of Stanford wrote
parts of the arithmetic code under contract to RSA Laboratories.

ABOUT RSA LABORATORIES

RSA Laboratories is the research and development division of RSA Data Security,
Inc., the company founded by the inventors of the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
RSA Laboratories reviews, designs and implements secure and efficient
cryptosystems of all kinds. Its clients include government agencies,
telecommunications companies, computer manufacturers, software developers,
cable TV broadcasters, interactive video manufacturers, and satellite broadcast
companies, among others.

RSA Laboratories draws upon the talents of the following people:

Len Adleman, distinguished associate - Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley; Henry Salvatori professor of computer
science at University of Southern California; co-inventor of
RSA public-key cryptosystem; co-founder of RSA Data Security, Inc.

Taher Elgamal, senior associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
director of engineering at RSA Data Security, Inc.; inventor of
Elgamal public-key cryptosystem based on discrete logarithms

Marty Hellman, distinguished associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University;
co-inventor of public-key cryptography, exponential key exchange;
IEEE fellow; IEEE Centennial Medal recipient

Burt Kaliski, chief scientist - Ph.D., MIT; former visiting assistant
professor at Rochester Institute of Technology; author, Public-Key
Cryptography Standards; general chair, CRYPTO '91

Cetin Koc, associate - Ph.D., University of California, Santa
Barbara; assistant professor at University of Houston

Ron Rivest, distinguished associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
professor of computer science, MIT; co-inventor, RSA public-key
cryptosystem; co-founder, RSA Data Security, Inc.; member, National
Academy of Engineering; director, International Association for
Cryptologic Research; program co-chair, ASIACRYPT '91

ADDRESSES

RSA Laboratories RSA Data Security, Inc.
10 Twin Dolphin Drive 100 Marine Parkway
Redwood City, CA 94065 Redwood City, CA 94065
USA USA

(415) 595-7703 (415) 595-8782
(415) 595-4126 (fax) (415) 595-1873 (fax)

PKCS, RSAREF and RSA Laboratories are trademarks of RSA Data
Security, Inc. All other company names and trademarks are not.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

RSA LABORATORIES
PROGRAM LICENSE AGREEMENT

RSA LABORATORIES, A DIVISION OF RSA DATA SECURITY, INC. ("RSA"), IS WILLING TO
LICENSE THE "RSAREF" PROGRAM FOR YOUR USE ONLY ON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET
FORTH BELOW. YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
BY RETURN ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO YOU OF THE
RSAREF PROGRAM.

1. LICENSE. RSA is willing to grant you a non-exclusive,
non-transferable license for the "RSAREF" program (the
"Program") and its associated documentation, subject to all of
the following terms and conditions, but only:

a. to use the Program on any computer in your possession, but
on no more than one computer at any time;

b. to make one copy of the Program for back-up purposes only;

c. to incorporate the Program into other computer programs only
through interfaces described in the RSAREF Library
Reference (the file "rsaref.txt" which accompanies the
Program) (any such incorporated portion of the Program to
continue to be subject to the terms and conditions of this
license) both solely for your own personal or internal use
or to create Application Programs; and

d. to modify the Program for the purpose of porting the Program
to any other operating systems and compilers, but only on
the conditions that: (i) you do not alter any Program
interface, except with the prior written consent of RSA;
and (ii) you provide RSA with a copy of the ported version
of the Program by electronic mail.

"Application Programs" are programs which interface with the
Program but which do not incorporate all or any portion of the
Program, whether in source code or object code form.

2. LIMITATIONS ON LICENSE.

a. RSA owns the Program and its associated documentation and
all copyrights therein. YOU MAY NOT USE, COPY, MODIFY OR
TRANSFER THE PROGRAM, IN EITHER SOURCE CODE OR OBJECT CODE
FORM, ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION, OR ANY COPY,
MODIFICATION OR MERGED PORTION THEREOF, IN WHOLE OR IN
PART, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT OR
WITH THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF RSA. WITHOUT LIMITING THE
GENERALITY OF THE FOREGOING, YOU MAY NOT PLACE THE PROGRAM
ON ANY ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEM (BBS) OR MAKE THE
PROGRAM AVAILABLE THROUGH ANY FILE TRANSFER PROTOCOL (FTP).
YOU MUST REPRODUCE AND INCLUDE RSA'S COPYRIGHT NOTICES ON
ANY COPY OR MODIFICATION, OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, OF THE
PROGRAM AND ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION.

b. The Program is to be used only in connection with a single
computer. You may physically transfer the Program from one
computer to another, provided that the Program is used in
connection with only one computer at any given time. You
may not transfer the program electronically from one
computer to another over a network except in connection
with your own personal or internal use of the Program. You
may not distribute copies of the Program or its associated
documentation. IF YOU TRANSFER POSSESSION OF ANY COPY,
MODIFICATION OR MERGED PORTION OF THE PROGRAM, WHETHER IN
SOURCE CODE OR OBJECT CODE FORM, OR ITS ASSOCIATED
DOCUMENTATION TO ANOTHER PARTY, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED FOR IN THIS LICENSE, YOUR LICENSE SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED.

c. The Program is to be used only for non-commercial purposes.
You may not use the Program to provide services to others
for which you are compensated in any manner. You may not
license, distribute or otherwise transfer the Program or
any part thereof in any form, whether you receive
compensation or not.

d. You may not translate the Program into any other computer
language.

e. You may not incorporate the Program into other programs
through interfaces other than the interfaces described in
the RSAREF Library Reference.

3. NO WARRANTY OF PERFORMANCE. THE PROGRAM AND ITS ASSOCIATED
DOCUMENTATION ARE LICENSED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY AS TO THEIR
PERFORMANCE, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE OF
THE PROGRAM IS ASSUMED BY YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE
DEFECTIVE, YOU (AND NOT RSA OR ITS DISTRIBUTOR) ASSUME THE
ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.

4. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN
SECTION 5 HEREINUNDER, NEITHER RSA NOR ANY OTHER PERSON WHO HAS
BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CREATION, PRODUCTION, OR DELIVERY OF THE
PROGRAM SHALL BE LIABLE TO YOU OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON FOR ANY
DIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY DAMAGES FOR LOST DATA, RE-RUN TIME, INACCURATE
INPUT, WORK DELAYS OR LOST PROFITS, RESULTING FROM THE USE OF
THE PROGRAM OR ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF RSA HAS
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

5. PATENT INFRINGEMENT INDEMNITY. RSA shall indemnify and hold you
harmless from any and all liability, damages, costs or expenses
(including reasonable attorneys' fees) which you may incur as
the result of any claim that the unmodified Program infringes a
United States patent in the field of cryptography. RSA shall
have no obligation to you pursuant to this Section 5 unless: (i)
you give RSA prompt written notice of the claim; (ii) RSA is
given the right to control and direct the investigation,
preparation, defense and settlement of the claim; and (iii) the
claim is based on your use of the unmodified Program in
accordance with this license. THIS SECTION 5 SETS FORTH RSA'S
ENTIRE OBLIGATION AND YOUR EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES CONCERNING CLAIMS
FOR PROPRIETARY RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT.

NOTE: PORTIONS OF THE PROGRAM PRACTICE METHODS DESCRIBED IN AND
ARE SUBJECT TO U.S. PATENTS #4,218,582 AND #4,405,829, ISSUED TO
LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY AND MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY RESPECTIVELY. EXCLUSIVE LICENSING RIGHTS ARE HELD BY
PUBLIC KEY PARTNERS OF SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA.

6. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN RESHIPMENT. THIS LICENSE IS EXPRESSLY
MADE SUBJECT TO ANY LAWS, REGULATIONS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF
THE PROGRAM OR OF ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROGRAM WHICH MAY BE
IMPOSED FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA. YOU MAY NOT EXPORT OR REEXPORT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, THE PROGRAM OR INFORMATION PERTAINING THERETO.

7. TERM. The license granted hereunder is effective until
terminated. You may terminate it at any time by destroying the
Program and its associated documentation together with all
copies, modifications and merged portions thereof in any form.
It will also terminate upon the conditions set forth elsewhere
in this Agreement or if you fail to comply with any term or
condition of this Agreement. You agree upon such termination to
destroy the Program and its associated documentation, together
with all copies, modifications and merged portions thereof in
any form.

8. GENERAL

a. You may not sublicense the Program or its associated
documentation or assign or transfer this license. Any
attempt to sublicense, assign or transfer any of the
rights, duties or obligations hereunder shall be void.

b. This agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
California.

c. Address all correspondence regarding this license to RSA's
electronic mail address <[email protected]>, or
to

RSA Laboratories
ATTN: RSAREF Administrator
10 Twin Dolphin Drive
Redwood City, CA 94065
USA

d. TO RECEIVE THE PROGRAM AND ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION BY
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION, YOU MUST TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING
ACCEPTANCE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO RSA'S ELECTRONIC MAIL
ADDRESS <[email protected]>:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ACCEPTANCE

I acknowledge that I have read the RSAREF Program License Agreement and
understand and agree to be bound by its terms and conditions, including without
limitation its restrictions on foreign reshipment of the Program and
information related to the Program. The electronic mail address to which I am
requesting that the program be transmitted is located in the United States of
America and I am a United States citizen or a permanent resident of the United
States. The RSAREF License Agreement is the complete and exclusive agreement
between RSA Laboratories and me relating to the Program, and supersedes any
proposal or prior agreement, oral or written, and any other communications
between RSA Laboratories and me relating to the Program.

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 13.22
************************