*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75962 ***
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
The original book _Mare Liberum_ was first published in 1608 in
renaissance latin. The latin of this book is based on a later 1633
printing. The english translation carefully maintains the meaning,
and clarifies the context, of the original latin.
In this 1916 book, following the Introductory Note and Preface, the
latin text and the translated english text were on alternate pages
i.e. the first page of latin text was followed by the first page of
corresponding english text, then the next (second) page of latin
text was followed by the second page of corresponding english text,
and so on.
This etext follows the same alternating pagination. A row of dashes
has been inserted between the english and latin pages to give a
visual separation.
There are three different sets of Footnotes.
(a) The five Footnotes in the Introductory Note have anchors [A]
to [E].
(b) The 192 Footnotes associated with the latin text have anchors
[1a] [2a] through [192a].
(c) The 192 Footnotes associated with the english text have anchors
[1] [2] through [192].
All these Footnotes have been placed after the Index at the end of
the book.
In addition there are 17 Notes, distinct from Footnotes, which
are anchored with * or †. These Notes by the translator have been
placed at the end of the paragraph containing the anchor.
Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}.
Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.
HVGONIS GROTII
MARE LIBERVM
SIVE
DE IVRE QVOD BATAVIS
COMPETIT
AD INDICANA COMMERCIA,
DISSERTATIO
1608
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
OR
THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH
TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE
A DISSERTATION BY
HUGO GROTIUS
TRANSLATED WITH A REVISION OF THE LATIN TEXT OF 1633
BY
RALPH VAN DEMAN MAGOFFIN, PH.D.
Associate Professor of Greek and Roman History
The Johns Hopkins University
EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
BY
JAMES BROWN SCOTT
DIRECTOR
NEW YORK
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN BRANCH: 35 WEST 32ND STREET
LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY
HUMPHREY MILFORD
1916
COPYRIGHT 1916
BY THE
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
RAHWAY, N. J.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Since the month of August, 1914, the expression “Freedom of the
Seas” has been on the lips alike of belligerent and neutral, and
it seems as advisable as it is timely to issue--for the first time
in English--the famous Latin tractate of Grotius proclaiming,
explaining, and in no small measure making the “freedom of the
seas.”[A]
The title of the little book, first published, anonymously, in
November, 1608, explains the reason for its composition: “The Freedom
of the Seas, or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in
the East Indian trade.” It was an open secret that it was written by
the young Dutch scholar and lawyer, Hugo Grotius. It was a secret
and remained a secret until 1868 that the _Mare Liberum_ was none
other than Chapter XII of the treatise _De Jure Praedae_, written by
Grotius in the winter of 1604-5, which first came to light in 1864
and was given to the world four years later.[B]
The publication of the treatise on the law of prize is important
as showing that the author of the _Mare Liberum_ was already an
accomplished international lawyer, and it proves beyond peradventure
that the masterpiece of 1625 on the “Law of War and Peace” was not
a hurried production, but the culmination of study and reflection
extending over twenty years and more. More important still is the
fact that neither the law of prize nor the _Mare Liberum_ was a
philosophic exercise, for it appears that Grotius had been retained
by the Dutch East India Company to justify the capture by one of
its ships of a Portuguese galleon in the straits of Malacca in the
year 1602; that the treatise on the law of prize, of which the _Mare
Liberum_ is a chapter, was in the nature of a brief; and that the
first systematic treatise on the law of nations--The Law of War
and Peace--was not merely a philosophical disquisition, but that
it was the direct outgrowth of an actual case and of professional
employment.[C]
The Spaniards, as is well known, then claimed the Pacific Ocean
and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal claimed, in like manner, the
Atlantic south of Morocco and the Indian Ocean, and both nations, at
this time under a common sovereign, claimed and sought to exercise
the right of excluding all foreigners from navigating or entering
these waters. The Dutch, then at war with Spain, although not
technically at war with Portugal, established themselves in 1598 in
the island of Mauritius. Shortly thereafter they made settlements
in Java and in the Moluccas. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company
was formed, and, as it attempted to trade with the East Indies, its
vessels came into competition with those of the Portuguese engaged
in the Eastern trade, which sought to exclude them from the Indian
waters. One Heemskerck, a captain in the employ of the Company, took
a large Portuguese galleon in the Straits of Malacca. To trade with
the East Indies was one thing, to capture Portuguese vessels was
quite another thing. Therefore, some members of the Company refused
their parts of the prize; others sold their shares in the company,
and still others thought of establishing a new company in France,
under the protection of King Henry IV, which should trade in peace
and abstain from all warlike action. The matter was therefore one of
no little importance, and it appears that Grotius was consulted and
wrote his treatise on the law of prize, which is in the nature of a
brief and is, at any rate, a lawyer’s argument.[D]
In 1608 Spain and Holland began negotiations which, on April 9, 1609,
resulted in the truce of Antwerp for the period of 12 years, and, in
the course of the negotiations, Spain tried to secure from the United
Provinces a renunciation of their right to trade in the East and West
Indies. The Dutch East India Company thereupon, it would appear,
requested Grotius to publish that part of his brief dealing with the
freedom of the seas. This was done under the title of _Mare Liberum_,
with such changes as were necessary to enable it to stand alone.
It will be observed that the _Mare Liberum_ was written to refute
the unjustified claims of Spain and Portugal to the high seas and to
exclude foreigners therefrom. The claims of England, less extensive
but not less unjustifiable, were not mentioned, and yet, if the
arguments of Grotius were sound, the English claims to the high seas
to the south and east of England, as well as to undefined regions to
the north and west, would likewise fall to the ground. Therefore the
distinguished English lawyer, scholar, and publicist, John Selden by
name, bestirred himself in behalf of his country and wrote his _Mare
Clausum_ in 1617 or 1618, although it was not published until 1635,
to refute the little tractate, _Mare Liberum_.[E] In the dedication
to King Charles I, Selden said: “There are among foreign writers,
who rashly attribute your Majesty’s more southern and eastern sea to
their princes. Nor are there a few, who following chiefly some of
the ancient Caesarian lawyers, endeavor to affirm, or beyond reason
too easily admit, that all seas are common to the universality of
mankind.” The thesis of Selden was twofold: first, “that the sea, by
the law of nature or nations, is not common to all men, but capable
of private dominion or property as well as the land”; second, “that
the King of Great Britain is lord of the sea flowing about, as an
inseparable and perpetual appendant of the British Empire.”
In this battle of books, to use the happy expression of Professor
Nys, the Dutch Scholar has had the better of his English antagonist.
If it cannot be said that Grotius wears his learning “lightly like
a flower”, the treatise of Selden is, in comparison, over-freighted
with it; the _Mare Liberum_ is still an open book, the _Mare Clausum_
is indeed a closed one, and as flotsam or jetsam on troubled waters,
Chapter XII of the Law of Prize rides the waves, whereas its rival,
heavy and water-logged, has gone under.
In the leading case of The Louis (2 Dodson 210), decided in 1817,
some two hundred years after Selden’s book was written, Sir William
Scott, later Lord Stowell and one of Selden’s most distinguished
countrymen, said, in rejecting the claim of his country to the
exercise of jurisdiction beyond a marine league from the British
shore:
I have to observe, that two principles of public law are
generally recognized as fundamental.
One is the perfect equality and entire independence of all
distinct states. Relative magnitude creates no distinction of
right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or casual, gives no
additional right to the more powerful neighbor; and any advantage
seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great
foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the peace
of mankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to
preserve inviolate.
The second is, that all nations being equal, all have an equal
right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the
ocean for their navigation. In places where no local authority
exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of
entire equality and independence, no one state, or any of its
subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over the
subjects of another.
In closing the preface to the _Mare Clausum_, Selden used language,
which the undersigned quotes, albeit in an inverse sense, as a fit
ending to this subject:
“Other passages there are everywhere of the same kind. But I enlarge
myself too much in a thing so manifest. Therefore I forbear to light
a candle to the sun. Farewell reader.”
JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
_Director of the Division of_
_International Law_.
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
_February 28, 1916_.
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
_The Latin Text_
The Latin Text is based upon the Elzevir edition of 1633, the
modifications being only such as to bring the Latin into conformity
with the present day Teubner and Oxford texts.
References in the notes to classic authors are given in unabbreviated
form, following in other respects the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae
Index. Citations to the Civil Law are given in the modern notation,
which is followed, in parentheses, by the older method of reference.
The text used is that of Mommsen, Krueger, Schoell et Kroll. The
Canon Law is cited from the Friedberg edition of 1879-81. The
abbreviations used are explained below.
_The Translation_
The translator wishes to make due acknowledgment for the passages
from classic writers quoted from standard translations, to which
references are also made in the notes. He has also consulted the
French translation of Grotius by A. Guichon de Grandpont (1845). But
his chief acknowledgment is to his colleague and friend, Professor
Kirby Flower Smith of The Johns Hopkins University, to whom he read
the translation, and who gave him the benefit of his knowledge of
Latin and his taste in English, in a number of troublesome passages.
Many niceties of the translation belong to Professor Smith, but
mistakes in interpretation belong to the translator alone.
Acknowledgment and thanks are also due to Professor Westel Woodbury
Willoughby of Johns Hopkins, who has been so good as to read the
translation through in galley proof and give the translator the
benefit of his technical knowledge of law; to his Johns Hopkins
colleague, Professor Wilfred P. Mustard, who has helped him out
of a number of difficulties; to Bishop Shahan, Rector of the
Catholic University of America, who has given of his time to help
expand several of Grotius’ abbreviated references to theological
or canonical authors; to John Curlett Martin, Johns Hopkins Fellow
in Greek, who has been of great assistance in the verification of
references; and to the men of the Quinn and Boden Company for their
courteous assistance while the book was going through the press.
_List of Abbreviations_
Auth., Authenticum.
Clem., Constitutiones Clementis Papae Quinti.
Dist., Distinctio Decreti Gratiani.
Extravag., Constitutiones XXD. Ioannis Papae XXII.
Lib. VI, Liber sextus Decretalium D. Bonifacii Papae VIII.
Other abbreviations should offer no difficulties.
_Notes of Explanation_
The words and phrases in the Latin text in capitals follow the type
of the Elzevir text.
In order that both text and translation may be complete in
themselves, the notes below the translation follow the notes of the
text in shortened or expanded form, or in duplicate, as the occasion
would seem to demand. The notes in Grotius’ Latin text are in a most
abbreviated form, and the references are seldom specific. They have
been expanded without further explanation.
[ ] in the translation, text, or notes, inclose additions made by the
translator.
Error est non minus vetus quam pestilens, quo multi mortales, ii
autem maxime qui plurimum vi atque opibus valent, persuadent sibi,
aut, quod verius puto, persuadere conantur, iustum atque iniustum non
suapte natura, sed hominum inani quadam opinione atque consuetudine
distingui. Itaque illi et leges et aequitatis speciem in hoc inventa
existimant, ut eorum qui in parendi condicione nati sunt dissensiones
atque tumultus coerceantur; ipsis vero qui in summa fortuna sunt
collocati, ius omne aiunt ex voluntate, voluntatem ex utilitate
metiendam. Hanc autem sententiam absurdam plane atque naturae
contrariam auctoritatis sibi nonnihil conciliasse haud adeo mirum
est, cum ad morbum communem humani generis, quo sicut vitia ita
vitiorum patrocinia sectamur, accesserint adulantium artes quibus
omnis potestas obnoxia est.
Sed contra exstiterunt nullo non saeculo viri liberi, sapientes,
religiosi, qui falsam hanc persuasionem animis simplicium evellerent
ceteros autem eius defensores impudentiae convincerent. Deum quippe
esse monstrabant conditorem rectoremque universi, imprimis autem
humanae naturae parentem, quam ideo, non uti cetera animantia, in
species diversas, variaque discrimina segregasset, sed unius esse
generis, una etiam appellatione voluisset contineri,
TO THE RULERS AND TO THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF CHRISTENDOM
The delusion is as old as it is detestable with which many men,
especially those who by their wealth and power exercise the greatest
influence, persuade themselves, or as I rather believe, try to
persuade themselves, that justice and injustice are distinguished
the one from the other not by their own nature, but in some fashion
merely by the opinion and the custom of mankind. Those men therefore
think that both the laws and the semblance of equity were devised
for the sole purpose of repressing the dissensions and rebellions of
those persons born in a subordinate position, affirming meanwhile
that they themselves, being placed in a high position, ought to
dispense all justice in accordance with their own good pleasure,
and that their pleasure ought to be bounded only by their own view
of what is expedient. This opinion, absurd and unnatural as it
clearly is, has gained considerable currency; but this should by
no means occasion surprise, inasmuch as there has to be taken into
consideration not only the common frailty of the human race by which
we pursue not only vices and their purveyors, but also the arts of
flatterers, to whom power is always exposed.
But, on the other hand, there have stood forth in every age
independent and wise and devout men able to root out this false
doctrine from the minds of the simple, and to convict its advocates
of shamelessness. For they showed that God was the founder and ruler
of the universe, and especially that being the Father of all mankind,
He had not separated human beings, as He had the rest of living
things, into different species and various divisions, but had willed
them to be of one race and to be known by one name; that
dedisset insuper originem eandem, similem membrorum compagem, vultus
inter se obversos, sermonem quoque et alia communicandi instrumenta,
ut intelligerent omnes naturalem inter se societatem esse atque
cognationem. Huic autem a se fundatae aut domui aut civitati summum
illum principem patremque familias suas quasdam scripsisse leges,
non in aere aut tabulis, sed in sensibus animisque singulorum, ubi
invitis etiam et aversantibus legendae occurrent his legibus summos
pariter atque infimos teneri, in has non plus regibus licere, quam
plebi adversus decreta decurionum, decurionibus contra praesidium
edicta, praesidibus in regum ipsorum sanctiones. Quin illa ipsa
populorum atque urbium singularum iura ex illo fonte dimanare, inde
sanctimoniam suam atque maiestatem accipere.
Sicut autem in ipso homine alia sunt quae habet cum omnibus communia,
alia quibus ab altero quisque distinguitur, ita earum rerum quas in
usum hominis produxisset natura alias eam manere communes, alias
cuiusque industria ac labore proprias fieri voluisse, de utrisque
autem datas leges, ut communibus quidem sine detrimento omnium omnes
uterentur, de ceteris autem quod cuique contigisset eo contentus
abstineret alieno.
Haec si homo nullus nescire potest nisi homo esse desierit, haec si
gentes viderunt quibus ad verum omne caecutientibus sola naturae fax
illuxit, quid vos sentire ac facere aequum est, principes populique
Christiani?
furthermore He had given them the same origin, the same structural
organism, the ability to look each other in the face, language too,
and other means of communication, in order that they all might
recognize their natural social bond and kinship. They showed too
that He is the supreme Lord and Father of this family; and that for
the household or the state which He had thus founded, He had drawn
up certain laws not graven on tablets of bronze or stone but written
in the minds and on the hearts of every individual, where even the
unwilling and the refractory must read them. That these laws were
binding on great and small alike; that kings have no more power
against them than have the common people against the decrees of the
magistrates, than have the magistrates against the edicts of the
governors, than have the governors against the ordinances of the
kings themselves; nay more, that those very laws themselves of each
and every nation and city flow from that Divine source, and from that
source receive their sanctity and their majesty.
Now, as there are some things which every man enjoys in common with
all other men, and as there are other things which are distinctly
his and belong to no one else, just so has nature willed that some
of the things which she has created for the use of mankind remain
common to all, and that others through the industry and labor of each
man become his own. Laws moreover were given to cover both cases so
that all men might use common property without prejudice to any one
else, and in respect to other things so that each man being content
with what he himself owns might refrain from laying his hands on the
property of others.
Now since no man can be ignorant of these facts unless he ceases
to be a man, and since races blind to all truth except what they
receive from the light of nature, have recognized their force, what,
O Christian Kings and Nations, ought you to think, and what ought you
to do?
Si quis durum putat ea a se exigi quae tam sancti nominis professio
requirit, cuius minimum est ab iniuriis abstinere, certe quid sui
sit offici scire quisque potest ex eo quod alteri praecipit. Nemo
est vestrum qui non palam edicat rei quemque suae esse moderatorem
et arbitrum: qui non fluminibus locisque publicis cives omnes uti
ex aequo et promiscue iubeat, qui non commeandi commercandique
libertatem omni ope defendat.
Sine his si parva illa societas, quam rempublicam vocamus, constare
non posse iudicatur (et certe constare non potest) quamobrem non
eadem illa ad sustinendam totius humani generis societatem atque
concordiam erunt necessaria? Si quis adversus haec vim faciat,
merito indignamini, exempla etiam pro flagiti magnitudine statuitis,
non alia de causa nisi quia ubi ista passim licent status imperi
tranquillus esse non potest. Quod si rex in regem, populus in
populum inique et violente agat, id nonne ad perturbandam magnae
illius civitatis quietem et ad summi custodis spectat iniuriam?
Hoc interest, quod sicut magistratus minores de vulgo iudicant,
vos de magistratibus, ita omnium aliorum delicta cognoscenda vobis
et punienda mandavit rex universi, vestra excepit sibi. Is autem
quamquam supremam animadversionem sibi reservat, tardam, occultam,
inevitabilem, nihilominus duos a se iudices delegat qui rebus humanis
intersint, quos nocentium felicissimus non effugit, conscientiam
cuique suam, et famam sive existimationem
If any one thinks it hard that those things are demanded of him which
the profession of a religion so sacred requires, the very least
obligation of which is to refrain from injustice, certainly every
one can know what his own duty is from the very demands he makes of
others. There is not one of you who does not openly proclaim that
every man is entitled to manage and dispose of his own property;
there is not one of you who does not insist that all citizens have
equal and indiscriminate right to use rivers and public places; not
one of you who does not defend with all his might the freedom of
travel and of trade.
If it be thought that the small society which we call a state cannot
exist without the application of these principles (and certainly it
cannot), why will not those same principles be necessary to uphold
the social structure of the whole human race and to maintain the
harmony thereof? If any one rebels against these principles of law
and order you are justly indignant, and you even decree punishments
in proportion to the magnitude of the offense, for no other reason
than that a government cannot be tranquil where trespasses of that
sort are allowed. If king act unjustly and violently against king,
and nation against nation, such action involves a disturbance of the
peace of that universal state, and constitutes a trespass against the
supreme Ruler, does it not? There is however this difference: just
as the lesser magistrates judge the common people, and as you judge
the magistrates, so the King of the universe has laid upon you the
command to take cognizance of the trespasses of all other men, and
to punish them; but He has reserved for Himself the punishment of
your own trespasses. But although He reserves to himself the final
punishment, slow and unseen but none the less inevitable, yet He
appoints to intervene in human affairs two judges whom the luckiest
of sinners does not escape, namely, Conscience, or the innate
estimation of oneself, and Public Opinion, or the estimation of
others.
alienam. Haec tribunalia illis patent quibus alia praeclusa sunt; ad
haec infirmi provocant; in his vincuntur qui vincunt viribus, qui
licentiae modum non statuunt, qui vili putant constare quod emitur
humano sanguine, qui iniurias iniuriis defendunt, quorum manifesta
facinora necesse est et consentiente bonorum iudicio damnari, et sui
ipsorum animi sententia non absolvi.
Ad utrumque hoc forum nos quoque novam causam afferimus; non hercule
de stillicidiis aut tigno iniuncto, quales esse privatorum solent, ac
ne ex eo quidem genere quod frequens est inter populos, de agri iure
in confinio haerentis, de amnis aut insulae possessione; sed de omni
prope oceano, de iure navigandi, de libertate commerciorum. Inter
nos et Hispanos haec controversa sunt: Sitne immensum et vastum mare
regni unius nec maximi accessio; populone cuiquam ius sit volentes
populos prohibere ne vendant, ne permutent, ne denique commeent
inter sese; potueritne quisquam quod suum numquam fuit elargiri, aut
invenire quod iam erat alienum; an ius aliquod tribuat manifesta
longi temporis iniuria.
In hac disceptatione ipsis qui inter Hispanos praecipui sunt divini
atque humani iuris magistri calculum porrigimus, ipsius denique
Hispaniae proprias leges imploramus. Id si nihil iuvat, et eos quos
ratio certa convincit cupiditas vetat desistere, vestram principes
maiestatem, vestram fidem quotquot estis ubique gentes appellamus.
Non perplexam, non intricatam movemus quaestionem. Non de ambiguis in
religione capitibus, quae plurimum
These two tribunals are open to those who are debarred from all
others; to these the powerless appeal; in them are defeated those
who are wont to win by might, those who put no bounds to their
presumption, those who consider cheap anything bought at the price
of human blood, those who defend injustice by injustice, men whose
wickedness is so manifest that they must needs be condemned by the
unanimous judgment of the good, and cannot be cleared before the bar
of their own souls.
To this double tribunal we bring a new case. It is in very truth no
petty case such as private citizens are wont to bring against their
neighbors about dripping eaves or party walls; nor is it a case such
as nations frequently bring against one another about boundary lines
or the possession of a river or an island. No! It is a case which
concerns practically the entire expanse of the high seas, the right
of navigation, the freedom of trade!! Between us and the Spaniards
the following points are in dispute: Can the vast, the boundless
sea be the appanage of one kingdom alone, and it not the greatest?
Can any one nation have the right to prevent other nations which
so desire, from selling to one another, from bartering with one
another, actually from communicating with one another? Can any nation
give away what it never owned, or discover what already belonged to
some one else? Does a manifest injustice of long standing create a
specific right?
In this controversy we appeal to those jurists among the Spanish
themselves who are especially skilled both in divine and human law;
we actually invoke the very laws of Spain itself. If that is of no
avail, and those whom reason clearly convicts of wrong are induced
by greed to maintain that stand, we invoke your majesty, ye Princes,
your good faith, ye Peoples, whoever and wherever ye may be.
It is not an involved, it is not an intricate question that I am
raising. It is not a question of ambiguous points of
habere videntur obscuritatis, quae tantis tam diu animis decertata,
apud sapientes hoc fere certum reliquerunt, nusquam minus inveniri
veritatem quam ubi cogitur assensus. Non de statu nostrae
reipublicae, et libertate armis haud parta sed vindicata; de qua
recte statuere ii demum possunt qui iura patria Belgarum, mores
avitos, et institutum non in leges regnum, sed ex legibus principatum
accurate cognoverint, in qua tamen quaestione aequis iudicibus
extremae servitutis depulsa necessitas, subtilius inquirentibus
decreti* tot nationum publica auctoritas, infensis etiam et malevolis
adversariorum confessio nihil dubitandum reliquit.
* [decreta (?); decreti is the reading of the 1633 and 1720 texts].
Sed quod hic proponimus nihil cum istis commune habet, nullius
indiget anxiae disquisitionis, non ex divini codicis pendet
explicatione, cuius multa multi non capiunt, non ex unius populi
scitis quae ceteri merito ignorant.
Lex illa e cuius praescripto iudicandum est, inventu est non
difficilis, utpote eadem apud omnes; et facilis intellectu, utpote
nata cum singulis, singulorum mentibus insita. Ius autem quod petimus
tale est quod nec rex subditis negare debeat, neque Christianus non
Christianis. A natura enim oritur, quae ex aequo omnium parens est,
in omnes munifica, cuius imperium in eos extenditur qui gentibus
imperant, et apud eos sanctissimum est qui in pietate plurimum
profecerunt.
Cognoscite hanc causam principes! cognoscite populi! si quid iniquum
postulamus, scitis quae vestra et e vobis eorum qui viciniores nobis
estis apud nos semper fuerit auctoritas!
theology which seem to be wrapped in the deepest obscurity, which
have been debated already so long and with such heat, that wise men
are almost convinced that truth is never so rarely found as when
assent thereto is forced. It is not a question of the status of our
government and of independence not won by arms but restored. On
this point those can reach a right decision who have an accurate
knowledge of the ancestral laws and hereditary customs of the people
of the Netherlands, and who have recognized that their state is not
a kingdom illegally founded but is a government based upon law. In
this matter, however, just judges no longer compelled to subordinate
their convictions have been persuaded; the public authority of many
nations has entirely satisfied those who were seeking a precedent;
and the admissions of our adversaries have left even the foolish and
malevolent no room for doubt.
But what I here submit has nothing in common with these matters. It
calls for no troublesome investigation. It does not depend upon an
interpretation of Holy Writ in which many people find many things
they cannot understand, nor upon the decrees of any one nation of
which the rest of the world very properly knows nothing.
The law by which our case must be decided is not difficult to
find, seeing that it is the same among all nations; and it is easy
to understand, seeing that it is innate in every individual and
implanted in his mind. Moreover the law to which we appeal is one
such as no king ought to deny to his subjects, and one no Christian
ought to refuse to a non-Christian. For it is a law derived from
nature, the common mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all, and
whose sway extends over those who rule nations, and which is held
most sacred by those who are most scrupulously just.
Take cognizance of this cause, ye Princes, take cognizance of it,
ye Nations! If we are making an unjust demand, you know what your
authority and the authority of
Monete, parebimus. Quin si quid a nobis hac in re peccatum est, iram
vestram, odium denique humani generis non deprecamur. Sin contra se
res habet, quid vobis censendum, quid agendum sit, vestrae religioni
et aequitati relinquimus.
Olim inter populos humaniores summum nefas habebatur armis eos
impetere qui res suas arbitris permitterent, contra qui tam
aequam condicionem recusarent, ii non ut unius sed ut omnium
hostes ope communi comprimebantur. Itaque eam in rem videmus icta
foedera, iudices constitutos. Reges ipsi validaeque gentes nihil
aeque gloriosum ac magnificum deputabant, quam aliorum coercere
insolentiam, aliorum infirmitatem atque innocentiam sublevare.
Qui si mos hodieque obtineret, ut humani nihil a se alienum*
homines arbitrarentur, profecto orbe non paulo pacatiore uteremur;
refrigesceret enim multorum audacia, et qui iustitiam utilitatis
causa nunc negligunt, iniustitiam damno suo dediscerent.
* [Cf. Terence, Hautontimorumenos 77].
Sed hoc ut in causa istac non frustra forte speramus, ita illud certo
confidimus, bene rebus expensis existimaturos vos omnes imputari
nobis non magis posse pacis moras, quam belli causas; ac proinde
uti hactenus amici nobis faventes atque benevoli fuistis, ita vos
aut etiam magis in posterum fore, quo nihil optatius iis potest
contingere qui primam partem felicitatis putant bene facere, alteram
bene audire.
those of you who are our nearer neighbors has always been so far as
we are concerned. Caution us, we will obey. Verily, if we have done
any wrong in this our cause, we will not deprecate your wrath, nor
even the hatred of the human race. But if we are right, we leave to
your sense of righteousness and of fairness what you ought to think
about this matter and what course of action you ought to pursue.
In ancient times among the more civilized peoples it was held to be
the greatest of all crimes to make war upon those who were willing
to submit to arbitration the settlement of their difficulties; but
against those who declined so fair an offer all others turned, and
with their combined resources overwhelmed them, not as enemies of
any one nation, but as enemies of them all alike. So for this very
object we see that treaties are made and arbiters appointed. Kings
themselves and powerful nations used to think that nothing was so
chivalrous or so noble as to coerce the insolent and to help the weak
and innocent.
If today the custom held of considering that everything pertaining to
mankind pertained also to one’s self, we should surely live in a much
more peaceable world. For the presumptuousness of many would abate,
and those who now neglect justice on the pretext of expediency would
unlearn the lesson of injustice at their own expense.
We have felt that perhaps we were not entertaining a foolish hope for
our cause. At all events we are confident that you will all recognize
after duly weighing the facts in the case that the delays to peace
can no more be laid to our charge than can the causes of war; and as
hitherto you have been indulgent, even favorably disposed to us, we
feel sure that you will not only remain in this mind, but be even
more friendly to us in the future. Nothing more to be desired than
this can come to men who think that the first condition of happiness
is good deeds; the second, good repute.
_Iure gentium quibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem_
Propositum est nobis breviter ac dilucide demonstrare ius esse
Batavis, hoc est, Ordinum Foederatorum Belgico-Germaniae subditis
ad Indos, ita uti navigant navigare, cumque ipsis commercia colere.
Fundamentum struemus hanc iuris gentium, quod primarium vocant
regulam certissimam, cuius perspicua atque immutabilis est ratio;
licere cuivis genti quamvis alteram adire, cumque ea negotiari.
Deus hoc ipse per naturam loquitur, cum ea cuncta quibus vita
indiget, omnibus locis suppeditari a natura non vult: artibus etiam
aliis alias gentes dat excellere. Quo ista, nisi quod voluit mutua
egestate et copia humanas foveri amicitias, ne singuli se putantes
sibi ipsis sufficere, hoc ipso redderentur insociabiles? Nunc factum
est ut gens altera alterius suppleret inopiam, divinae iustitiae
instituto, ut eo modo (sicut Plinius dicit[1a]) quod genitum esset
uspiam, apud omnes natum videretur. Poetas itaque canentes audimus:
_By the Law of Nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever_
My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the
Dutch--that is to say, the subjects of the United Netherlands--have
the right to sail to the East Indies, as they are now doing, and to
engage in trade with the people there. I shall base my argument on
the following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of
Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of
which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to
travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.
God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and
inasmuch as it is not His will to have Nature supply every place with
all the necessaries of life, He ordains that some nations excel in
one art and others in another. Why is this His will, except it be
that He wished human friendships to be engendered by mutual needs and
resources, lest individuals deeming themselves entirely sufficient
unto themselves should for that very reason be rendered unsociable?
So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that one
people should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the
Roman writer says,[1] that in this way, whatever has been produced
anywhere should seem to have been destined for all. Vergil also sings
in this wise:
“_Not every plant on every soil will grow_,”[2]
and in another place:
“_Let others better mould the running mass
Of metals_,” etc.[3]
Hoc igitur qui tollunt, illam laudatissimam tollunt humani generis
societatem, tollunt mutuas benefaciendi occasiones, naturam denique
ipsam violant. Nam et ille quem Deus terris circumfudit Oceanus,
undique et undique versus navigabilis, et ventorum stati aut
extraordinarii flatus, non ab eadem semper, et a nulla non aliquando
regione spirantes, nonne significant satis concessum a natura cunctis
gentibus ad cunctas aditum? Hoc Seneca[4a] summum Naturae beneficium
putat, quod et vento gentes locis dissipatas miscuit, et sua omnia in
regiones ita descripsit, ut necessarium mortalibus esset inter ipsos
commercium. Hoc igitur ius ad cunctas gentes aequaliter pertinet:
quod clarissimi Iurisconsulti[5a] eo usque producunt, ut negent ullam
rempublicam aut Principem prohibere in universum posse, quo minus
alii ad subditos suos accedant, et cum illis negotientur. Hinc ius
descendit hospitale sanctissimum: hinc querelae:
_Quod genus hoc hominum? quaeve hunc tam barbara morem
Permittit patria? hospitio prohibemur harenae._[6a]
Et alibi
_litusque rogamus
Innocuum et cunctis undamque auramque patentem._[7a]
Et scimus bella quaedam ex hac causa coepisse, ut Megarensibus
Those therefore who deny this law, destroy this most praise-worthy
bond of human fellowship, remove the opportunities for doing mutual
service, in a word do violence to Nature herself. For do not the
ocean, navigable in every direction with which God has encompassed
all the earth, and the regular and the occasional winds which blow
now from one quarter and now from another, offer sufficient proof
that Nature has given to all peoples a right of access to all
other peoples? Seneca[4] thinks this is Nature’s greatest service,
that by the wind she united the widely scattered peoples, and yet
did so distribute all her products over the earth that commercial
intercourse was a necessity to mankind. Therefore this right belongs
equally to all nations. Indeed the most famous jurists[5] extend
its application so far as to deny that any state or any ruler can
debar foreigners from having access to their subjects and trading
with them. Hence is derived that law of hospitality which is of the
highest sanctity; hence the complaint of the poet Vergil:
“_What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,
What laws, what barbarous customs of the place,
Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,
And drive us to the cruel seas again._”[6]
And:
“_To beg what you without your want may spare--
The common water, and the common air._”[7]
We know that certain wars have arisen over this very matter; such for
example as the war of the Megarians against the
in Athenienses.[8a] Bononiensibus in. Venetos,[9a] Castellanis etiam
in Americanos has iustas potuisse belli causas esse, et ceteris
probabiliores Victoria putat,[10a] si peregrinari et degere apud
illos prohiberentur, si arcerentur a participatione earum rerum quae
iure gentium aut moribus communia sunt, si denique ad commercia non
admitterentur.
Cui simile est quod in Mosis[11a] historia et inde apud Augustinum
legimus,[12a] iusta bella Israelitas contra Amorrhaeos gessisse,
quia innoxius transitus denegabatur; qui IVRE HVMANAE SOCIETATIS
aequissimo patere debebat. Et hoc nomine Hercules Orchomeniorum,
Graeci sub Agamemnone Mysorum Regi arma intulerunt,[13a] quasi libera
essent naturaliter itinera, ut Baldus dixit.[14a] Accusanturque
Athenians,[8] and that of the Bolognese against the Venetians.[9]
Again, Victoria[10] holds that the Spaniards could have shown just
reasons for making war upon the Aztecs and the Indians in America,
more plausible reasons certainly than were alleged, if they really
were prevented from traveling or sojourning among those peoples,
and were denied the right to share in those things which by the Law
of Nations or by Custom are common to all, and finally if they were
debarred from trade.
We read of a similar case in the history of Moses,[11] which we find
mentioned also in the writings of Augustine,[12] where the Israelites
justly smote with the edge of the sword the Amorites because they had
denied the Israelites an innocent passage through their territory,
a right which according to the Law of Human Society ought in all
justice to have been allowed. In defense of this principle Hercules
attacked the king of Orchomenus in Boeotia; and the Greeks under
their leader Agamemnon waged war against the king of Mysia[13] on the
ground that, as Baldus[14] has said, high roads were free
a Germanis apud Tacitum[15a] Romani, quod colloquia congressusque
gentium arcerent, fluminaque et terras et coelum quodam modo ipsum
clauderent. Nec ullus titulus Christianis quondam in Saracenos magis
placuit, quam quod per illos terrae Iudaeae aditu arcerentur.[16a]
Sequitur ex sententia Lusitanos etiamsi domini essent earum regionum
ad quas Batavi proficiscuntur, iniuriam tamen facturos si aditum
Batavis et mercatum praecluderent.
Quanto igitur iniquius est volentes aliquos a volentium populorum
commercio secludi, illorum opera quorum in potestate nec populi isti
sunt, nec illud ipsum, qua iter est, quando latrones etiam et piratas
non alio magis nomine detestamur, quam quod illi hominum inter se
commeatus obsident atque infestant?
by nature. Again, as we read in Tacitus,[15] the Germans accused the
Romans of ‘preventing all intercourse between them and of closing up
to them the rivers and roads, and almost the very air of heaven’.
When in days gone by the Christians made crusades against the
Saracens, no other pretext was so welcome or so plausible as that
they were denied by the infidels free access to the Holy Land.[16]
It follows therefore that the Portuguese, even if they had been
sovereigns in those parts to which the Dutch make voyages, would
nevertheless be doing them an injury if they should forbid them
access to those places and from trading there.
Is it not then an incalculably greater injury for nations which
desire reciprocal commercial relations to be debarred therefrom
by the acts of those who are sovereigns neither of the nations
interested, nor of the element over which their connecting high road
runs? Is not that the very cause which for the most part prompts us
to execrate robbers and pirates, namely, that they beset and infest
our trade routes?
_Lusitanos nullum habere ius dominii in eos Indos ad quos Batavi
navigant titulo inventionis_
Non esse autem Lusitanos earum partium dominos ad quas Batavi
accedunt, puta Iavae, Taprobanae, partis maximae Moluccarum,
certissimo argumento colligimus, quia dominus nemo est eius rei
quam nec ipse umquam nec alter ipsius nomine possedit. Habent
insulae istae quas dicimus et semper habuerunt suos reges, suam
rempublican, suas leges, sua iura; Lusitanis mercatus, ut aliis
gentibus conceditur; itaque et tributa cum pendunt, et ius mercandi
a principibus exorant, dominos se non esse, sed ut externos advenire
satis testantur; ne habitant quidem nisi precario. Et quamquam ad
dominium titulus non sufficiat, quia et possessio requiritur, cum
aliud sit rem habere, aliud ius ad rem consequendam, tamen ne titulum
quidem dominii in eas partes Lusitanis ullum esse affirmo, quem non
ipsis eripuerit Doctorum, et quidem Hispanorum sententia.
Primum si dicent inventionis praemio eas terras sibi cessisse, nec
ius, nec verum dicent. Invenire enim non illud est oculis usurpare,
sed apprehendere, ut Gordiani epistola
_The Portuguese have no right by title of discovery to sovereignty
over the East Indies to which the Dutch make voyages_
The Portuguese are not sovereigns of those parts of the East Indies
to which the Dutch sail, that is to say, Java, Ceylon,* and many of
the Moluccas. This I prove by the incontrovertible argument that no
one is sovereign of a thing which he himself has never possessed,
and which no one else has ever held in his name. These islands of
which we speak, now have and always have had their own kings, their
own government, their own laws, and their own legal systems. The
inhabitants allow the Portuguese to trade with them, just as they
allow other nations the same privilege. Therefore, inasmuch as the
Portuguese pay tolls, and obtain leave to trade from the rulers
there, they thereby give sufficient proof that they do not go there
as sovereigns but as foreigners. Indeed they only reside there on
suffrance. And although the title to sovereignty is not sufficient,
inasmuch as possession is a prerequisite--for having a thing is
quite different from having the right to acquire it--nevertheless I
affirm that in those places the Portuguese have no title at all to
sovereignty which is not denied them by the opinion of learned men,
even of the Spaniards.
* [Taprobane was the ancient name of Ceylon. Milton speaks of it in
Paradise Regained IV, 75:
“And utmost Indian Isle Taprobane.”]
First of all, if they say that those lands have come under their
jurisdiction as the reward of discovery, they lie, both in law and in
fact. For to discover a thing is not only to seize it with the eyes
but to take real possession thereof,
ostenditur;[17a] unde Grammatici[18a] invenire et occupare pro
verbis ponunt idem significantibus; et tota Latinitas quod adepti
sumus, id demum invenisse nos dicit, cui oppositum est perdere. Quin
et ipsa naturalis ratio, et legum diserta verba, et eruditiorum
interpretatio[19a] manifeste ostendit, ad titulum dominii parandum
eam demum sufficere inventionem quae cum possessione coniuncta est,
ubi scilicet res mobiles apprehenduntur, aut immobiles terminis atque
custodia sepiuntur;[20a] quod in hac specie dici nullo modo potest.
Nam praesidia illic Lusitani nulla habent. Quid quod ne reperisse
quidem Indiam ullo modo dici possunt Lusitani, quae tot a saeculis
fuerat celeberrima. Iam ab Horati tempore:[21a]
_Impiger extremos currit mercator ad Indos
Per mare pauperiem fugiens._
Taprobanes pleraque quam exacte nobis Romani descripsere?[22a] Iam
vero et ceteras insulas ante Lusitanos non
as Gordian[17] points out in one of his letters. For that reason
the Grammarians[18] give the same signification to the expressions
‘to find’ and ‘to occupy’; and all Latinity applies the phrase
‘we have found’ only to the thing which ‘we have seized’; and the
opposite of this is ‘to lose’. However, natural reason itself, the
precise words of the law, and the interpretation of the more learned
men[19] all show clearly that the act of discovery is sufficient
to give a clear title of sovereignty only when it is accompanied
by actual possession. And this only applies of course to movables
or to such immovables as are actually inclosed within fixed bounds
and guarded.[20] No such claim can be established in the present
case, because the Portuguese maintain no garrisons in those regions.
Neither can the Portuguese by any possible means claim to have
discovered India, a country which was famous centuries and centuries
ago! It was already known as early as the time of the emperor
Augustus as the following quotation from Horace shows:
“_That worst of evils, poverty, to shun
Dauntless through seas, and rocks, and fires you run
To furthest Ind_,”[21]
And have not the Romans described for us in the most exact way the
greater part of Ceylon?[22] And as far as the other islands are
concerned, not only the neighboring
finitimi tantum Persae et Arabes, sed Europaei etiam, praecipue
Veneti noverant.
Praeterea inventio nihil iuris tribuit, nisi in ea quae ante
inventionem nullius fuerant.[23a] Atqui Indi cum ad eos Lusitani
venerunt, etsi partim idololatrae, partim Mahumetani erant,
gravibusque peccatis involuti, nihilominus publice atque privatim
rerum possessionumque suarum dominium habuerunt, quod illis sine
iusta causa eripi non potuit.[24a] Ita certissimis rationibus post
alios auctores maximi nominis concludit Hispanus Victoria:[25a] ‘Non
possunt’, inquit, ‘Christiani saeculares aut Ecclesiastici potestate
civili et principatu privare infideles, eo dumtaxat titulo, quia
infideles sunt, nisi ab eis alia iniuria profecta sit’.
Fides enim, ut recte inquit Thomas[26a] non tollit ius naturale aut
humanum ex quo dominia profecta sunt. Immo credere infideles non esse
rerum suarum dominos, haereticum est; et res ab illis possessas illis
ob hoc ipsum eripere furtum est et rapina, non minus quam si idem
fiat Christianis.
Recte igitur dicit Victoria[27a] non magis ista ex causa Hispanis ius
in Indos quaesitum, quam Indis fuisset in Hispanos, si qui illorum
priores in Hispaniam venissent. Neque vero sunt Indi Orientis amentes
et insensati, sed
Persians and Arabs, but even Europeans, particularly the Venetians,
knew them long before the Portuguese did.
But in addition to all this, discovery _per se_ gives no legal
rights over things unless before the alleged discovery they were
_res nullius_.[23] Now these Indians of the East, on the arrival
of the Portuguese, although some of them were idolators, and some
Mohammedans, and therefore sunk in grievous sin, had none the less
perfect public and private ownership of their goods and possessions,
from which they could not be dispossessed without just cause.[24] The
Spanish writer Victoria,[25] following other writers of the highest
authority, has the most certain warrant for his conclusion that
Christians, whether of the laity or of the clergy, cannot deprive
infidels of their civil power and sovereignty merely on the ground
that they are infidels, unless some other wrong has been done by them.
For religious belief, as Thomas Aquinas[26] rightly observes, does
not do away with either natural or human law from which sovereignty
is derived. Surely it is a heresy to believe that infidels are not
masters of their own property; consequently, to take from them their
possessions on account of their religious belief is no less theft and
robbery than it would be in the case of Christians.
Victoria then is right in saying[27] that the Spaniards have no more
legal right over the East Indians because of their religion, than the
East Indians would have had over the Spaniards if they had happened
to be the first foreigners to come to Spain. Nor are the East Indians
stupid and unthinking; on the contrary they are intelligent and
shrewd,
ingeniosi et solertes, ita ut ne hinc quidem praetextus subiciendi
possit desumi, qui tamen per se satis est manifestae iniquitatis.
Iam olim Plutarchus πρόφασιν πλεονεξίας fuisse dicit ἡμερῶσαι
τὰ βαρβαρικὰ,* improbam scilicet alieni cupiditatem hoc sibi
velum obtendere, quod barbariem mansuefacit. Et nunc etiam color
ille redigendi invitas gentes ad mores humaniores, qui Graecis
olim et Alexandro usurpatus est, a Theologis omnibus, praesertim
Hispanis,[28a] improbus atque impius censetur.
so that a pretext for subduing them on the ground of their character
could not be sustained. Such a pretext on its very face is an
injustice. Plutarch said long ago that the civilizing of barbarians
had been made the pretext for aggression, which is to say that
a greedy longing for the property of another often hides itself
behind such a pretext. And now that well-known pretext of forcing
nations into a higher state of civilization against their will, the
pretext once seized by the Greeks and by Alexander the Great,* is
considered by all theologians, especially those of Spain,[28] to be
unjust and unholy.
* [Cf. Plutarch, Of the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great I,
5].
_Lusitanos in Indos non habere ius dominii titulo donationis
Pontificiae_
Secundo si Pontificis Alexandri Sexti divisione utentur, ante omnia
illud attendendum est, volueritne Pontifex contentiones tantum
Lusitanorum et Castellanorum dirimere, quod potuit sane, ut lectus
inter illos arbiter, sicut et ipsi Reges iam ante inter se ea de re
foedera quaedam pepigerant;[29a] et hoc si ita est, cum res inter
alios acta sit, ad ceteras gentes non pertinebit; an vero prope
singulos mundi trientes duobus populis donare. Quod etsi voluisset,
et potuisset Pontifex, non tamen continuo sequeretur dominos eorum
locorum esse Lusitanos, cum donatio dominum non faciat, sed secuta
traditio;[30a] quare et huic causae possessio deberet accedere.
Tum vero si quis ius ipsum sive divinum sive humanum scrutari volet,
non autem ex commodo suo metiri, facile
_The Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over the East Indies by
virtue of title based on the Papal Donation_
Next, if the partition made by the Pope Alexander VI* is to be
used by the Portuguese as authority for jurisdiction in the East
Indies, then before all things else two points must be taken into
consideration.
* [The Cambridge Modern History, I, 23-24, has a good paragraph upon
this famous Papal Bull of May 14, 1493 (modified June 7, 1494, by
treaty of Tordesillas).]
First, did the Pope merely desire to settle the disputes between the
Portuguese and the Spaniards?
This was clearly within his power, inasmuch as he had been chosen
to arbitrate between them, and in fact the kings of both countries
had previously concluded certain treaties with each other on this
very matter.[29] Now if this be the case, seeing that the question
concerns only the Portuguese and Spaniards, the decision of the Pope
will of course not affect the other peoples of the world.
Second, did the Pope intend to give to two nations, each one third of
the whole world?
But even if the Pope had intended and had had the power to make such
a gift, still it would not have made the Portuguese sovereigns of
those places. For it is not a donation that makes a sovereign, it is
the consequent delivery of a thing[30] and the subsequent possession
thereof.
Now, if any one will scrutinize either divine or human law, not
merely with a view to his own interests, he will
deprehendet donationem eiusmodi ut rei alienae nullius esse momenti.
Disputationem de potestate Pontificis, hoc est Episcopi Romanae
Ecclesiae, hic non aggrediar, nec quicquam ponam nisi ex hypothesi,
hoc est, quod confitentur homines inter eos eruditissimi, qui
plurimum Pontificiae tribuunt auctoritati, maxime Hispani, qui cum
pro sua perspicacia facile vident Dominum Christum omne a se terrenum
imperium abdicasse,[31a] mundi certe totius dominium, qua homo fuit,
non habuisse, et si habuisset, nullis tamen argumentis astrui posse
ius illud in Petrum, aut Romanam Ecclesiam Vicarii iure translatum;
cum alias etiam certum sit, multa Christum habuisse in quae Pontifex
non successerit,[32a] intrepide affirmarunt (utar ipsorum verbis)
Pontificem non esse dominum civilem aut temporalem totius orbis.[33a]
Immo etiam si quam talem potestatem in mundo haberet, eam tamen non
recte exerciturum, cum spirituali sua iurisdictione contentus esse
debeat, saecularibus autem Principibus eam concedere nullo modo
posse. Tum vero si quam habeat potestatem, eam habere, ut loquuntur
in ordine ad spiritualia.[34a] Quocirca nullam illi esse potestatem
in populos infideles, ut qui ad Ecclesiam non pertineant.[35a]
Unde sequitur ex sententia Caietani et Victoriae et
easily apprehend that a donation of this kind, dealing with the
property of others, is of no effect. I shall not enter here upon any
discussion as to the power of the Pope, that is the Bishop of the
Roman Church, nor shall I advance anything but a hypothesis which
is accepted by men of the greatest erudition, who lay the greatest
stress on the power of the Pope, especially the Spaniards, who with
their perspicacity easily see that our Lord Jesus Christ when he
said “My kingdom is not of this world” thereby renounced all earthly
power,[31] and that while He was on earth as a man, He certainly
did not have dominion over the whole world, and if He had had such
dominion, still by no arguments could such a right be transferred
to Peter, or be transmitted to the Roman Church by authority of the
‘Vicar of Christ’; indeed, inasmuch as Christ had many things to
which the Pope did not succeed,[32] it has been boldly affirmed--and
I shall use the very words of the writers--that the Pope is neither
civil nor temporal Lord of the whole world.[33] On the contrary, even
if the Pope did have any such power on earth, still he would not be
right in using it, because he ought to be satisfied with his own
spiritual jurisdiction, and be utterly unable to grant that power
to temporal princes. So then, if the Pope has any power at all, he
has it, as they say, in the spiritual realm only.[34] Therefore he
has no authority over infidel nations, for they do not belong to the
Church.[35]
potioris partis tam Theologorum quam Canonistarum,[36a] non esse
idoneum titulum adversus Indos, vel quia Papa dederit provincias
illas tamquam dominus absolute, vel quia non recognoscunt dominium
Papae; atque adeo ne Saracenos quidem isto titulo umquam spoliatos.
Cajetan and Victoria and the more authoritative of the Theologians
and writers on Canon Law,[36] that there is no clear title against
the East Indians, based either on the ground that the Pope made an
absolute grant of those provinces as if he were their sovereign,
or on the pretext that the East Indians do not recognize his
sovereignty. Indeed, and in truth, it may be affirmed that no such
pretext as that was ever invoked to despoil even the Saracens.
_Lusitanos in Indos non habere ius dominii titulo belli_
His igitur sublatis cum manifestum sit, quod et Victoria
scribit,[37a] Hispanos ad terras remotiores illas navigantes nullum
ius secum attulisse occupandi eas provincias, unus dumtaxat titulus
belli restat, qui et ipse si iustus esset, tamen ad dominium
proficere non posset, nisi iure praedae, hoc est post occupationem.
Atqui tantum abest ut Lusitani eas res occupaverint, ut cum plerisque
gentibus quas Batavi accesserunt, bellum eo tempore nullum haberent.
Et sic igitur nullum ius illis quaeri potuit, cum etiam si quas ab
Indis pertulissent iniurias, eas longa pace et amicis commerciis
remisisse merito censeantur.
Quamquam ne fuit quidem quod bello obtenderent. Nam qui Barbaros
bello persequuntur ut Americanos Hispani, duo solent praetexere, quod
ab illis commercio arceantur, aut quod doctrinam verae religionis
illi nolent agnoscere. Et commercia quidem Lusitani ab Indis
impetrarunt,[38a] ut hac in parte nihil habeant quod querantur.
_The Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over the East Indies by
title of war_
Since it is clear, (as Victoria also says),[37] from the refutation
of any claim to title from the Pope’s Donation, that the Spaniards
when they sailed to those distant lands did not carry with them any
right to occupy them as provinces, only one kind of title remains to
be considered, namely, that based upon war. But even if this title
could be justified, it would not serve to establish sovereignty,
except by right of conquest, that is to say, occupation would be
a prerequisite. But the Portuguese were as far as possible from
occupation of those lands. They were not even at war with most of
the peoples whom the Dutch visited. So therefore no legal claim
could be established there by the Portuguese, because even if they
had suffered wrongs from the East Indians, it might reasonably be
considered by the long peace and friendly commercial relations that
those injuries had been forgiven.
Indeed there was no pretext at all for going to war. For those
who force war upon barbarous peoples, as the Spaniards did upon
the aborigines of America, commonly allege one of two pretexts:
either that they have been refused the right to trade, or that the
barbarians are unwilling to acknowledge the doctrines of the True
Faith. But as the Portuguese actually obtained from the East Indians
the right to trade,[38] they have, on that score at least, no
Alter vero obtentus nihilo est iustior, quam ille Graecorum in
Barbaros, quo Boëthius respexit:[39a]
_An distant quia dissidentque mores,
Iniustas acies, et fera bella movent,
Alternisque volunt perire telis?
Non est iusta satis saevitiae ratio._
Ista autem et Thomae et Concili Toletani et Gregori et Theologorum,
Canonistarum, Iurisprudentiumque fere omnium conclusio est:[40a]
Quantumcumque fides annuntiata sit Barbaris (nam de his qui
subditi ante fuerunt Christianis Principibus item de Apostatis
alia est quaestio) probabiliter et sufficienter, et si noluerint
eam respicere, non tamen licere hac ratione eos bello persequi, et
spoliare bonis suis.[41a]
Operae pretium est in hanc rem ipsa Caietani verba describere:[42a]
‘Quidam’, ait, ‘infideles nec de iure nec de facto subsunt secundum
temporalem iurisdictionem Principibus Christianis, ut inveniuntur
pagani, qui numquam imperio Romano subditi fuerunt, terras
habitantes, in quibus Christianum numquam fuit nomen. Horum namque
domini, quamvis infideles, legitimi domini sunt, sive regali sive
politico regimine gubernantur; nec sunt propter infidelitatem a
dominio suorum privati, cum dominium sit
grounds of complaint. Nor is there any better justification for
the other pretext than the one alleged by the Greeks against the
barbarians, to which Boëthius makes the following allusion:
“_Unjust and cruel wars they wage,
And haste with flying darts the death to meet or deal.
No right nor reason can they show;
’Tis but because their lands and laws are not the same._”[39]
Moreover the verdict of Thomas Aquinas, of the Council of Toledo, of
Gregory, and of nearly all theologians, canonists, and jurists, is as
follows:[40] However persuasively and sufficiently the True Faith has
been preached to the heathen--former subjects of Christian princes
or apostates are quite another question--if they are unwilling to
heed it, that is not sufficient cause to justify war upon them, or to
despoil them of their goods.[41]
It is worth while on this point to quote the actual words of
Cajetan:[42] ‘There are some infidels who are neither in law nor in
fact under the temporal jurisdiction of Christian princes; just as
there were pagans who were never, subjects of the Roman Empire, and
yet who inhabit lands where the name of Christ was never heard. Now
their rulers, though heathen, are legitimate rulers, whether the
people live under a monarchical or a democratic régime. They are not
to be deprived of sovereignty over their possessions
ex iure positivo, et infidelitas ex divino iure, quod non tollit ius
positivum, ut superius in quaestione habitum est. Et de his nullam
scio legem quoad temporalia. Contra hos nullus Rex, nullus Imperator,
nec Ecclesia Romana potest movere bellum ad occupandas terras eorum,
aut subiciendos illos temporaliter; quia nulla subest causa iusta
belli, cum Iesus Christus Rex Regum, cui data est potestas in caelo
et in terra, miserit ad capiendam possessionem mundi, non milites
armatae militiae, sed sanctos praedicatores, sicut oves inter lupos.
Vnde nec in testamento veteri, ubi armata manu possessio erat
capienda, terrae infidelium inductum lego bellum alicui propter hoc
quod non erant fideles, sed quia nolebant dare transitum, vel quia
eos offenderant, ut Madianitae, vel ut recuperarent sua, divina
largitate sibi concessa. Vnde GRAVISSIME PECCAREMVS, si fidem Christi
Iesu per hanc viam ampliare contenderemus; nec essemus LEGITIMI
DOMINI illorum, sed MAGNA LATROCINIA committeremus, et teneremur
ad restitutionem, utpote INIVSTI DEBELLATORES AVT OCCVPATORES.
Mittendi essent ad hos praedicatores boni viri, qui verbo et exemplo
converterent eos ad Deum; et non qui eos opprimant, spolient,
scandalizent, subiciant, et duplo gehennae filios faciant, more
Pharisaeorum’.
Et in hanc formam audimus saepe a Senatu in Hispania, et Theologis
praecipue Dominicanis decretum fuisse, sola verbi praedicatione non
bello Americanos ad fidem traducendos; libertatem etiam quae illis eo
nomine erepta esset,
because of their unbelief, since sovereignty is a matter of positive
law, and unbelief is a matter of divine law, which cannot annul
positive law, as has been argued above. In fact I know of no law
against such unbelievers as regards their temporal possessions.
Against them no King, no Emperor, not even the Roman Church,
can declare war for the purpose of occupying their lands, or of
subjecting them to temporal sway. For there is no just cause for war,
since Jesus Christ the King of Kings, to whom all power was given in
heaven and on earth, sent out for the conquest of the world not armed
soldiers, but holy disciples, “as sheep in the midst of wolves.” Nor
do I read in the Old Testament, when possession had to be obtained
by force of arms, that the Israelites waged war on any heathen land
because of the unbelief of its inhabitants; but it was because the
heathen refused them the right of innocent passage, or attacked them,
as the Midianites did; or it was to recover the possessions which
had been bestowed upon them by divine bounty. Wherefore we should be
most miserable sinners if we should attempt to extend the religion
of Jesus Christ by such means. Nor should we be their lawful rulers,
but, on the contrary, we should be committing great robberies, and
be compelled to make restitution as unjust conquerors and invaders.
There must be sent to them as preachers, good men to convert them to
God by their teaching and example; not men who will oppress them,
despoil them, subdue and proselytize them, and “make them twofold
more the children of hell than themselves,”* after the manner of the
Pharisees’.
* [Matthew XXIII, 15].
Indeed I have often heard that it has been decreed by the Council
of Spain, and by the Churchmen, especially the Dominicans, that the
Americans (Aztecs and Indians) should be converted to the Faith by
the preaching of the Word alone, and not by war, and even that their
liberty of
restitui debere, quod a Paulo tertio Pontifice, et Carolo V
Imperatore Hispaniarum Rege comprobatum dicitur.
Omittimus iam Lusitanos in plerisque partibus religionem nihil
promovere, ne operam quidem dare, cum soli lucro invigilent. Immo et
illud ibi verum esse, quod de Hispanis in America Hispanus scripsit,
non miracula, non signa audiri, non exempla vitae religiosae, quae
ad eandem fidem alios possent impellere, sed multa scandala, multa
facinora, multas impietates.
Quare cum et possessio et titulus deficiat possessionis, neque res
dicionesque Indorum pro talibus haberi debeant quasi nullius ante
fuissent, neque cum illorum essent, ab aliis recte acquiri potuerint,
sequitur Indorum populos, de quibus nos loquimur, Lusitanorum
proprios non esse, sed liberos, et sui iuris; de quo ipsi doctores
Hispani non dubitant.[43a]
which they had been robbed in the name of religion should be
restored. This policy is said to have received the approval of Pope
Paul III, and of Emperor Charles V, King of the Spains.
I pass over the fact that the Portuguese in most places do not
further the extension of the faith, or indeed, pay any attention to
it at all, since they are alive only to the acquisition of wealth.
Nay, the very thing that is true of them, is the very thing which has
been written of the Spaniards in America by a Spaniard, namely, that
nothing is heard of miracles or wonders or examples of devout and
religious life such as might convert others to the same faith, but on
the other hand no end of scandals, of crimes, of impious deeds.
Wherefore, since both possession and a title of possession are
lacking, and since the property and the sovereignty of the East
Indies ought not to be considered as if they had previously been
_res nullius_, and since, as they belong to the East Indians, they
could not have been acquired legally by other persons, it follows
that the East Indian nations in question are not the chattels of the
Portuguese, but are free men and _sui juris_. This is not denied even
by the Spanish jurists themselves.[43]
_Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandi non esse proprium Lusitanorum
titulo occupationis_
Si ergo in populos terrasque et diciones Lusitani ius nullum
quaesiverunt, videamus an mare et navigationem, aut mercaturam
sui iuris facere potuerint. De mari autem prima sit consideratio,
quod cum passim in iure aut nullius, aut commune, aut publicum
iuris gentium dicatur, hae voces quid significent ita commodissime
explicabitur, si Poetas ab Hesiodo omnes, et Philosophos; et
Iurisconsultos veteres imitati in tempora distinguamus, ea, quae
tempore forte haud longo, certa tamen ratione, et sui natura discreta
sunt. Neque nobis vitio verti debet si in iuris a natura procedentis
explicatione auctoritate et verbis eorum utimur quos constat naturali
iudicio plurimum valuisse.
Sciendum est igitur in primordiis vitae humanae aliud quam nunc est
dominium, aliud communionem fuisse.[44a] Nam dominium nunc proprium
quid significat, quod scilicet ita est alicuius ut alterius non sit
eodem modo. Commune autem dicimus, cuius proprietas inter plures
consortio
_Neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs
to the Portuguese by title of occupation_
If therefore the Portuguese have acquired no legal right over the
nations of the East Indies, and their territory and sovereignty,
let us consider whether they have been able to obtain exclusive
jurisdiction over the sea and its navigation or over trade. Let us
first consider the case of the sea.
Now, in the legal phraseology of the Law of Nations, the sea is
called indifferently the property of no one (_res nullius_), or
a common possession (_res communis_), or public property (_res
publica_). It will be most convenient to explain the signification of
these terms if we follow the practice of all the poets since Hesiod,
of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certain
epochs, the divisions of which are marked off perhaps not so much by
intervals of time as by obvious logic and essential character. And we
ought not to be criticised if in our explanation of a law deriving
from nature, we use the authority and definition of those whose
natural judgment admittedly is held in the highest esteem.
It is therefore necessary to explain that in the earliest stages of
human existence both sovereignty and common possession had meanings
other than those which they bear at the present time.[44] For
nowadays sovereignty means a particular kind of proprietorship, such
in fact that it absolutely excludes like possession by any one else.
On the other hand, we call a thing ‘common’ when its ownership
quodam aut consensu collata est exclusis aliis. Linguarum paupertas
coegit voces easdem in re non eadem usurpare. Et sic ista nostri
moris nomina ad ius illud pristinum similitudine quadam et imagine
referuntur. Commune igitur tunc non aliud fuit quam quod simpliciter
proprio opponitur; dominium autem facultas non iniusta utendi re
communi, quem usum Scholasticis[45a] visum est facti non iuris
vocare, quia qui nunc in iure usus vocatur, proprium est quiddam, aut
ut illorum more loquar, privative ad alios dicitur.
Iure primo Gentium, quod et Naturale interdum dicitur, et quod poetae
alibi aetate aurea, alibi Saturni aut Iustitiae regno depingunt,
nihil proprium fuit; quod Cicero dixit: ‘Sunt autem privata nulla
natura’. Et Horatius:[46a]
_Nam PROPRIAE telluris ERVM NATVRA neque illum
Nec me nec quemquam statuit._
Neque enim potuit natura dominos distinguere. Hoc igitur significatu
res omnes eo tempore communes fuisse dicimus, idem innuentes quod
poetae cum primos homines in medium quaesivisse, et Iustitiam casto
foedere res medias tenuisse* dicunt; quod ut clarius explicent,
negant eo tempore campos limite partitos, aut commercia fuisse ulla.
* [in medium quaerebant, Vergil, Georgica I, 127; medias casto res
more tenebas, Avienus, Aratus, 298 (W. P. Mustard)].
_promiscua rura per agros
Praestiterant cunctis COMMVNIA cuncta VIDERI._[47a]
or possession is held by several persons jointly according to a kind
of partnership or mutual agreement from which all other persons are
excluded. Poverty of language compels the use of the same words for
things that are not the same. And so because of a certain similarity
and likeness, our modern nomenclature is applied to that state of
primitive law. Now, in ancient times, ‘common’ meant simply the
opposite of ‘particular’; and ‘sovereignty’ or ‘ownership’, meant
the privilege of lawfully using common property. This seemed to the
Scholastics[45] to be a use in fact but not in law, because what now
in law is called use, is a particular right, or if I may use their
phraseology, is, in respect to other persons, a privative right.
In the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural
Law, and which the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a
Golden Age, and sometimes in the reign of Saturn or of Justice, there
was no particular right. As Cicero says: ‘But nothing is by nature
private property’. And Horace:[46] ‘For nature has decreed to be
the master of private soil neither him, nor me, nor anyone else’.
For nature knows no sovereigns. Therefore in this sense we say that
in those ancient times all things were held in common, meaning what
the poets do when they say that primitive men acquired everything in
common, and that Justice maintained a community of goods by means
of an inviolable compact. And to make this clearer, they say that
in those primitive times the fields were not delimited by boundary
lines, and that there was no commercial intercourse. [As Avienus
says]:[47] ‘The promiscuity of the fields had made everything seem
common to all’.
The word ‘seemed’ is rightly added, owing to the changed meaning of
the words, as we have noted above.
Recte additum est ‘videri’ propter translationem ut diximus vocabuli.
Communio autem ista ad usum referebatur:[48a]
_pervium cunctis iter,
COMMVNIS VSVS omnium rerum fuit._
Cuius ratione dominium quoddam erat, sed universale, et indefinitum;
Deus enim res omnes non huic aut illi dederat, sed humano generi,
atque eo modo plures in solidum eiusdem rei domini esse non
prohibebantur; quod si hodierna significatione sumamus dominium,
contra omnem est rationem. Hoc enim proprietatem includit, quae tunc
erat penes neminem. Aptissime autem illud dictum est:[49a]
_omnia rerum
Vsurpantis erant,_
Ad eam vero, quae nunc est, dominiorum distinctionem non impetu
quodam, sed paulatim ventum videtur, initium eius monstrante natura.
Cum enim res sint nonnullae, quarum usus in abusu consistit, aut
quia conversae in substantiam utentis nullum postea usum admittunt,
aut quia utendo fiunt ad usum deteriores, in rebus prioris generis,
ut cibo et potu, proprietas statim quaedam ab usu non seiuncta
emicuit.[50a] Hoc enim est proprium esse, ita esse cuiusquam ut et
alterius esse non possit; quod deinde ad res posterioris, generis,
vestes puta, et res mobiles alias aut se moventes ratione quadam
productum est.
Quod cum esset, ne res quidem immobiles omnes, agri
But that kind of common possession relates to use, as is seen from a
quotation from Seneca:[48]
“_Every path was free,
All things were used in common._”
According to his reasoning there was a kind of sovereignty, but it
was universal and unlimited. For God had not given all things to
this individual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus
a number of persons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from
being substantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing, which is
quite contradictory to our modern meaning of sovereignty. For it now
implies particular or private ownership, a thing which no one then
had. Avienus has said very pertinently:[49] ‘All things belonged to
him who had possession of them’.
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of
ownerships did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself
pointing out the way. For since there are some things, the use of
which consists in their being used up, either because having become
part of the very substance of the user they can never be used again,
or because by use they become less fit for future use, it has become
apparent, especially in dealing with the first category, such things
as food and drink for example, that a certain kind of ownership is
inseparable from use.[50] For ‘own’ implies that a thing belongs to
some one person, in such a way that it cannot belong to any other
person. By the process of reasoning this was next extended to things
of the second category, such as clothes and movables and some living
things.
When that had come about, not even immovables, such,
puta, indivisae manere potuerunt; quamquam enim horum usus non
simpliciter in abusu consistat, eorum tamen usus abusus cuiusdam
causa comparatus est, ut arva et arbusta cibi causa, pascua etiam
vestium; omnium autem usibus promiscue sufficere non possunt.
Repertae proprietati lex posita est, quae naturam imitaretur. Sicut
enim initio per applicationem corporalem usus ille habebatur, unde
proprietatem primum ortam diximus, ita simili applicatione res
proprias cuiusque fieri placuit. Haec est quae dicitur occupatio,
voce accommodatissima ad eas res quae ante in medio positae fuerant;
quo Seneca Tragicus alludit:[51a]
_IN MEDIO est scelus
POSITVM OCCVPANTI._
Et Philosophus:[52a] ‘Equestria OMNIVM equitum Romanorum sunt.
In illis tamen locus meus fit PROPRIVS, quem OCCVPAVI’. Hinc
Quintilianus dicit,[53a] quod omnibus nascitur, industriae esse
praemium; et Tullius,[54a] factas esse veteri occupatione res eorum
qui quondam in vacua venerant.
Occupatio autem haec in his rebus quae possessioni renituntur, ut
sunt ferae bestiae, perpetua esse debet, in aliis sufficit, corpore
coeptam possessionem animo retineri. Occupatio in mobilibus est
apprehensio, in immobilibus
for instance, as fields, could remain unapportioned. For although
their use does not consist merely in consumption, nevertheless
it is bound up with subsequent consumption, as fields and plants
are used to get food, and pastures to get clothing. There is,
however, not enough fixed property to satisfy the use of everybody
indiscriminately.
When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was
established to imitate nature. For as that use began in connection
with bodily needs, from which as we have said property first arose,
so by a similar connection it was decided that things were the
property of individuals. This is called ‘occupation’, a word most
appropriate to those things which in former times had been held in
common. It is this to which Seneca alludes in his tragedy Thyestes,
“_Crime is between us to be seized by one._”[51]
And in one of his philosophical writings he also says:[52] ‘The
equestrian rows of seats belong to all the equites; nevertheless,
the seat of which I have taken possession is my own private place’.
Further, Quintilian remarks[53] that a thing which is created for
all is the reward of industry, and Cicero says[54] that things which
have been occupied for a long time become the property of those who
originally found them unoccupied.
This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things which
resist seizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted
or perpetually maintained, but in the case of other things it is
sufficient if after physical possession is once taken the intention
to possess is maintained. Possession of movables implies seizure, and
possession of
instructio aut limitatio; unde Hermogenianus cum dominia distincta
dicit, addit, agris terminos positos, aedificia collocata.[55a] Hic
rerum status a poetis indicatur:
_Tum laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco
Inventum._
_Tum primum subiere domos._[56a]
_COMMVNEMQVE PRIVS, ceu lumina solis et auras
Cautus humum longo signavit LIMITE mensor._[57a]
Celebratur post haec, ut Hermogenianus indicat, commercium cuius
gratia
_Fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae._[58a]
Eodem autem tempore et respublicae institui coeperunt. Atque ita
earum quae a prima communione divulsa erant duo facta sunt genera.
Alia enim sunt publica, hoc est, populi propria (quae est genuina
istius vocis significatio) alia mere privata, hoc est, singulorum.
Occupatio autem publica eodem modo fit, quo privata. Seneca:[59a]
‘Fines Atheniensium, aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter se
vicini privata terminatione distinguunt’. Gens enim unaquaeque
immovables either the erection of buildings or some determination of
boundaries, such as fencing in. Hence Hermogenianus, in speaking of
separate ownerships, adds the boundaries set to the fields and the
buildings thereon constructed.[55] This state of things is described
thus by the poets Vergil and Ovid:
“_Then toils for beasts, and lime for birds, were found_,”[56]
_Then first men made homes._
“_Then landmarks limited to each his right,
For all before was common as the light._”[57]
In still another place, as Hermogenianus points out, Ovid praises
commerce, for the sake of which:[58]
‘_Ships in triumph sail the unknown seas_’.
At the same time, however, states began to be established, and so
two categories were made of the things which had been wrested away
from early ownership in common. For some things were public, that
is, were the property of the people (which is the real meaning of
that expression), while other things were private, that is, were the
property of individuals. Ownership, however, both public and private,
arises in the same way. On this point Seneca says:[59] ‘We speak in
general of the land of the Athenians or the Campanians. It is the
same land which again by means of private boundaries is divided among
individual owners’.
_PARTITA FINES regna constituit, novas
Extruxit VRBES._[60a]
Hoc modo dicit Cicero agrum Arpinatem Arpinatium dici, Tusculanum
Tusculanorum: ‘similisque est’, inquit, ‘privatarum possessionum
discriptio. Ex quo quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant
COMMVNIA, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat’.[61a] Contra autem
Thucydides[62a] eam terram quae in divisione populo nulli obvenit,
ἀόριστον hoe est, indefinitam, et limitibus nullis circumscriptam
vocat.[63a]
Ex his quae hactenus dicta sunt duo intelligi possunt. Prius est,
eas res quae occupari non possunt, aut occupatae numquam sunt,
nullius proprias esse posse; quia omnis proprietas ab occupatione
coeperit. Alterum vero, eas res omnes, quae ita a natura comparatae
sunt, ut aliquo utente nihilominus aliis quibusvis ad usum promiscue
sufficiant, eius hodieque condicionis esse, et perpetuo esse
debere cuius fuerant cum primum a natura proditae sunt. Hoc Cicero
voluit:[64a] ‘Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos,
omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad
communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas’. Sunt
autem omnes res huius generis, in quibus sine detrimento alterius
alteri commodari potest. Hinc illud esse dicit Cicero:[65a] ‘Non
prohibere aqua profluente’. Nam aqua profluens qua talis non qua
flumen
‘For each nation’, Seneca says in another place, ‘made its
territories into separate kingdoms and built new cities’.[60]
Thus Cicero says: “On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said
to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and
similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch
as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common
property became the property of individuals, each one should retain
possession of that which has fallen to his lot.”[61] On the other
hand Thucydides[62] calls the land which in the division falls
to no nation, ἀόριστος, that is, undefined, and undetermined by
boundaries.[63]
Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The
first is, that that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been
occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all property
has arisen from occupation. The second is, that all that which has
been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person
it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today
and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when
it was first created by nature. This is what Cicero meant when he
wrote: “This then is the most comprehensive bond that unites together
men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all
things that nature has produced for the common use of man is to be
maintained.”[64] All things which can be used without loss to any one
else come under this category. Hence, says Cicero, comes the well
known prohibition:[65] ‘Deny no one the water that flows by’. For
running water considered as such and not as a
est, inter communia omnium a Iurisconsultis refertur: et a Poeta:[66a]
_Quid prohibetis AQVAS? VSVS COMMVNIS aquarum est.
Nec solem PROPRIVM NATVRA nec AERA fecit.
Nec tenues VNDAS: in PVBLICA munera veni._
Dicit haec non esse natura propria, sicut Vlpianus[67a] natura
omnibus patere, tum quia primum a natura prodita sunt, et in nullius
adhuc dominium pervenerunt (ut loquitur Neratius[68a]); tum quia ut
Cicero dicit, a natura ad usum communem genita videntur. Publica
autem vocat tralatitia significatione, non quae ad populum aliquem,
sed quae ad societatem humanam pertinent, quae publica Iuris gentium
in Legibus vocantur, hoc est, communia omnium, propria nullius.
Huius generis est Aër, duplici ratione, tum quia occupari non potest,
tum quia usum promiscuum hominibus debet. Et eisdem de causis commune
est omnium Maris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita, ut possideri non
queat, et omnium usibus accommodatum: sive navigationem respicimus,
sive etiam piscaturam. Cuius autem iuris est mare, eiusdem sunt si
qua mare aliis usibus eripiendo sua fecit, ut arenae maris, quarum
pars terris continua litus dicitur.[69a] Recte igitur Cicero:[70a]
‘quid tam COMMVNE quam Mare fluctuantibus,
stream, is classed by the jurists among the things common to all
mankind; as is done also by Ovid:[66] ‘Why do you deny me water? Its
use is free to all. Nature has made neither sun nor air nor waves
private property; they are public gifts’.
He says that these things are not by nature private possession, but
that, as Ulpian claims,[67] they are by nature things open to the
use of all, both because in the first place they were produced by
nature, and have never yet come under the sovereignty of any one, as
Neratius says;[68] and in the second place because, as Cicero says,
they seem to have been created by nature for common use. But the poet
uses ‘public’, in its usual meaning, not of those things which belong
to any one people, but to human society as a whole; that is to say,
things which are called ‘public’ are, according to the Laws of the
law of nations, the common property of all, and the private property
of none.
The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is
not susceptible of occupation; and second, its common use is destined
for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because
it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and
because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from
the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Now, the same right
which applies to the sea applies also to the things which the sea
has carried away from other uses and made its own, such for example
as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the land is
called the coast or shore.[69] Cicero therefore argues correctly:[70]
‘What is so common as
LITVS eiectis’? Etiam Vergilius auram, undam, litus cunctis patere
dicit.
Haec igitur sunt illa quae Romani vocant communia omnium iure
naturali[71a] aut quod idem esse diximus, publica iurisgentium, sicut
et usum eorum modo communem, modo publicum vocant. Quamquam vero
etiam ea nullius esse, quod ad proprietatem attinet, recte dicantur,
multum tamen differunt ab his quae nullius sunt, et communi usui
attributa non sunt, ut ferae, pisces, aves; nam ista si quis occupet,
in ius proprium transire possunt, illa vero totius humanitatis
consensu proprietati in perpetuum excepta sunt propter usum, qui cum
sit omnium, non magis omnibus ab uno eripi potest, quam a te mihi
quod meum est. Hoc est quod Cicero dicit inter prima esse Iustitiae
munera, rebus communibus pro communibus uti. Scholastici dicerent
esse communia alia affirmative, alia privative. Distinctio haec non
modo Iurisprudentibus usitata est, sed vulgi etiam confessionem
exprimit; unde apud Athenaeum convivator mare commune esse dicit, at
pisces capientium fieri. Et in Plautina Rudente servo dicenti,[72a]
‘Mare quidem commune certost omnibus’, assentit piscator, addenti
autem, ‘In mari inventust communi’ recte occurrit:
_Meum quod rete atque hami nancti sunt, meum potissimumst._
the sea for those who are being tossed upon it, the shore for those
who have been cast thereon’. Vergil also says that the air, the sea,
and the shore are open to all men.
These things therefore are what the Romans call ‘common’ to all men
by natural law,[71] or as we have said, ‘public’ according to the
law of nations; and indeed they call their use sometimes common,
sometimes public. Nevertheless, although those things are with reason
said to be _res nullius_, so far as private ownership is concerned,
still they differ very much from those things which, though also _res
nullius_, have not been marked out for common use, such for example
as wild animals, fish, and birds. For if any one seizes those things
and assumes possession of them, they can become objects of private
ownership, but the things in the former category by the consensus
of opinion of all mankind are forever exempt from such private
ownership on account of their susceptibility to universal use; and
as they belong to all they cannot be taken away from all by any one
person any more than what is mine can be taken away from me by you.
And Cicero says that one of the first gifts of Justice is the use
of common property for common benefit. The Scholastics would define
one of these categories as common in an affirmative, the other in a
privative sense. This distinction is not only familiar to jurists,
but it also expresses the popular belief. In Athenaeus for instance
the host is made to say that the sea is the common property of all,
but that fish are the private property of him who catches them. And
in Plautus’ Rudens when the slave says:[72] ‘The sea is certainly
common to all persons’, the fisherman agrees; but when the slave
adds: ‘Then what is found in the common sea is common property’, he
rightly objects, saying: ‘But what my net and hooks have taken, is
absolutely my own’.
Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura
commune hoc esse non permittit, sed iubet, immo ne litus quidem;[73a]
nisi quod haec addenda est interpretatio; ut si quid earum rerum per
naturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea
occupatione usus ille promiscuus non laeditur. Quod merito receptum
est; nam cum ita se habet, cessat utraque exceptio per quam evenisse
diximus, ne omnia in eius proprium transcriberentur.
Quoniam igitur inaedificatio species est occupationis, in litore
licet aedificare, si id fieri potest sine ceterorum incommodo,[74a]
ut Pomponius loquitur, quod ex Scaevola explicabimus, nisi usus
publicus, hoc est communis impediretur. Et qui aedificaverit, soli
dominus fiet, quia id solum nec ullius proprium, nec ad usum communem
necessarium fuit. Est igitur occupantis; sed non diutius quam durat
occupatio, quia reluctari mare possessioni videtur, exemplo ferae,
quae si in naturalem se libertatem receperit, non ultra captoris est,
ita et litus postliminio mari cedit.
Quicquid autem privatum fieri occupando, idem et publicum, hoc est
populi proprium posse ostendimus.[75a] Sic litus Imperi Romani
finibus inclusum, populi Romani esse Celsus
Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any
one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use.[73]
Neither can the shore become the private property of any one. The
following qualification, however, must be made. If any part of these
things is by nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the
property of the one who occupies it only so far as such occupation
does not affect its common use. This qualification is deservedly
recognized. For in such a case both conditions vanish through which
it might eventuate, as we have said, that all of it would pass into
private ownership.
Since therefore, to cite Pomponius, building is one kind of
occupation, it is permissible to build upon the shore, if this can
be done without inconvenience to other people;[74] that is to say (I
here follow Scaevola) if such building can be done without hindrance
to public or common use of the shore. And whoever shall have
constructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become
the owner of the ground upon which said building is; because this
ground is neither the property of any one else, nor is it necessary
to common use. It becomes therefore the property of the occupier, but
his ownership lasts no longer than his occupation lasts, inasmuch
as the sea seems by nature to resist ownership. For just as a wild
animal, if it shall have escaped and thus recovered its natural
liberty, is no longer the property of its captor, so also the sea may
recover its possession of the shore.
We have now shown that whatever by occupation can become private
property can also become public property, that is, the private
property of a whole nation.[75] And so Celsus considered the shore
included within the limits of the Roman Empire to be the property of
the Roman people.
existimat; quod si ita est, minime mirandum est, eundem Populum
subditis suis occupandi litoris modum per Principem aut Praetorem
potuisse concedere. Ceterum et haec occupatio non minus quam privata
ita restringenda est, ne ulterius porrigatur, quam ut salvus sit usus
Iurisgentium. Nemo igitur potest a Populo Romano[76a] ad litus maris
accedere prohiberi, et retia siccare, et alia facere, quae semel
omnes homines in perpetuum sibi licere voluerunt.
Maris autem natura hoc differt a litore, quod mare nisi exigua sui
parte nec inaedificari facile, nec includi potest; et ut posset, hoc
ipsum tamen vix contingeret, sine usus promiscui impedimento. Si quid
tamen exiguum ita occupari potest, id occupanti conceditur. Hyperbole
est igitur[77a]
_Contracta pisces aequora sentiunt
Iactis in altum molibus._
Nam Celsus iactas in mare pilas eius esse dicit qui iecerit.[78a]
Sed id non concedendum si deterior maris usus eo modo futurus sit.
Et Vlpianus eum qui molem in mare iacit, ita tuendum dicit si nemo
damnum sentiat. Nam si cui haec res nocitura sit, interdictum utique,
‘Ne quid in loco publico fiat’ competiturum. Vt et Labeo, si quid
tale in mare struatur, interdictum vult competere, ‘Ne quid in mari,
quo portus, statio, iterve navigiis deterius sit, fiat’.[79a]
There is not therefore the least reason for surprise that the Roman
people through their emperors or praetors were able to grant to its
subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation,
however, no less than private occupation, was subject to the
restriction that it should not infringe on international rights.
Therefore the Roman people could not forbid any one from having
access to the seashore,[76] and from spreading his fishing nets there
to dry, and from doing other things which all men long ago decided
were always permissible.
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore,
because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither
easily be built upon, nor inclosed; if the contrary were true yet
this could hardly happen without hindrance to the general use.
Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea can be thus occupied,
the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horace must be
quoted here: “The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers of
rock laid in their depths.”[77]
Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man
who drove them.[78] But such an act is not permissible if the use
of the sea be thereby impaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds
a breakwater must be protected if it is not prejudicial to the
interests of any one; for if this construction is likely to work an
injury to any one, the injunction ‘Nothing may be built on public
property’ would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any such
construction should be made in the sea, the following injunction
is to be enforced: ‘Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the
harbor, the roadstead, or the channel be rendered less safe for
navigation’.[79]
Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis
maneat omnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo
piscandi locum sibi palis circumsepiat, atque ita privatum faciat;
sicut Lucullus exciso apud Neapolim monte ad villam suam maria
admisit.[80a] Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum
Varro et Columella meminerunt. Nec Martialis alio spectavit, cum de
Formiano Apollinaris loquitur:[81a]
_Si quando NEREVS sentit Aeoli regnum,
Ridet procellas tuta de SVO mensa._
Et Ambrosius:[82a] ‘Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint
belluae’. Hinc apparere potest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum
dicit,[83a] si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, _uti
possidetis_ interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc interdictum ad
privatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam
ea comprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hic
iam agi de iure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica,
sive communi. Nam teste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari
potuit,[84a] id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli
causa, si quis Lucullum aut Apollinarem in privato suo, quatenus
diverticulum maris incluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis
interdictum
Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to
fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless
there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with
stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so
establish a private preserve. Thus Lucullus once brought the water
of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through a mountain near
Naples.[80] I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish
mentioned by Varro and Columella were of this sort. And Martial
had the same thing in mind when he says of the Formian villa of
Apollinaris:[81] ‘Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the
table safe in its own resources laughs at the gale’. Ambrose also
has something to say on the same subject:[82] ‘You bring the very
sea into your estates that you may not lack for fish’. In the light
of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says[83] that if
any one has a private right over the sea, the rule _uti possidetis_
applies. This rule however is applicable only to private suits,
and not to public ones, among which are also to be included those
suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. But
here the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in
a private suit, but not in a public or common one. For according
to the authority of Marcianus whatever has been occupied and can
be occupied[84] is no longer subject to the law of nations as the
sea is. Let us take an example. If any one had prevented Lucullus
or Apollinaris from fishing in the private fish ponds which they
had made by inclosing a small portion of the sea, according to the
opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringing
Paulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, ob causam scilicet
privatae possessionis.[85a]
Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo fluminis, si locum
talem occuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxime si animum privatim
possidendi plurium annorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum
eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut ex Marciano colligimus, non aliter quam
in lacu qui mei domini est. Quod verum quam diu durat occupatio,
quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extra diverticulum idem non
erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur.[86a]
Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeant
usurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus
contempta ea usurpatione si quis prohibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi
posse[87a] Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris
rationem mutavit, voluitque πρόθυρα, hoc est, vestibula maritima
eorum esse propria, qui oram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi
habere;[88a] quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam
remoratoriis quas ἐποχάς Graeci vocant, locus ille occuparetur;
existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam maris portionem alteri
invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certe ut
quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus
eripiat, non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus
invehitur:[89a]
an injunction, not merely an action for damages based on private
ownership.[85]
Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet
of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there,
especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have
given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall
certainly prevent any one else from enjoying the same rights. I
gather from Marcianus that this case is identical with that of the
ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupation lasts, as
we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this will
not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered.[86]
Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town
house or country seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one,
although Ulpian, who rather makes light of this usurpation, does
say that if any one is so prevented he can bring an action for
damages.[87] The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to
the intent of the law, changed this, and declared that the entrances,
or vestibules as it were, to the sea, were the private property of
those who inhabited the shore, and that they had the right of fishing
there.[88] However he attached this condition, that the place should
be occupied by certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the
Greeks call ἐποχαἰ, thinking doubtless that no one who was himself
allowed to fish anywhere in the sea would grudge any one else a small
portion of it. To be sure it would be an intolerable outrage for any
one to snatch away, even if he could do so, from public use a large
area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by the Holy
Man,[89] who says: ‘The lords of the earth claim for
‘SPATIA MARIS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII, pisciumque iura sicut
vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiecta commemorant. Iste,
inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividunt elementa sibi
potentes’.
Est igitur Mare in numero earum rerum quae in commercio non
sunt,[90a] hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde
sequitur si proprie loquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio
populi alicuius posse censeri. Quod ipsum Placentinus sensisse
videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse commune, ut in nullius dominio sit
nisi solius Dei; et Ioannes Faber, cum mare asserit relictum in suo
iure, et esse primaevo, quo omnia erant communia.[91a] Alioquin nihil
differrent quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publica proprie
dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, ut
inclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.
Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia
ex occupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis
distinguit inter litora,[92a] quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit,
ita tamen ut usui communi non noceretur, et mare quod pristinam
naturam retinuit. Nec ulla lex diversum indicat.[93a] Quae vero leges
a contrariae
themselves a wide expanse of sea by _jus mancipii_, and they regard
the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the
same as that over their slaves. That gulf, says one, belongs to me,
and that gulf to some one else. They divide the very elements among
themselves, these great men’!
Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article of
merchandise,[90] and which cannot become private property. Hence it
follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered
as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have
recognized this when he said: ‘The sea is a thing so clearly common
to all, that it cannot be the property of any one save God alone’.
Johannes Faber[91] also asserts that the sea has been left _sui
juris_, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were
common. If it were otherwise there would be no difference between the
things which are ‘common to all’, and those which are strictly termed
‘public’; no difference, that is, between the sea and a river. A
nation can take possession of a river, as it is inclosed within their
boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.
Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just
as private property arises out of the occupation of individuals. This
is recognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between
the shores of the sea,[92] which the Roman people could occupy in
such a way that its common use was not harmed, and the sea itself,
which retained its primitive nature. In fact no law intimates a
contrary view.[93] Such laws as are cited by writers who are of
sententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulis loquuntur, quas clarum
est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communis est, sed proprie
publicus.
Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum ita
interpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem
et iurisdictionem non procedere; quod illi ius a proprietate
distinguunt; nec forte satis animadvertunt idipsum quod Populus
Romanus classes praesidio navigantium disponere potuit, et
deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non ex proprio, sed ex communi
iure accidisse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in mari habent. Illud
interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, ut capti
in maris hac vel illa parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudicium
subirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis
in mari fines describi, quod ipsos quidem eam sibi legem ferentes
obligat,[94a] at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius
proprium facit, sed in personas contrahentium ius constituit.
Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani
responso quodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum
maritimorum dominus, alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset
imponere, ne inde in certo maris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem
quidem ipsam, mare scilicet, servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia
per naturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cum bona fides contractus legem
venditionis servari exposceret, personas possidentium et in ius eorum
succedentium per istam legem obligari.
the contrary opinion apply either to islands, which evidently could
be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ‘common’, but ‘public’,
that is, ‘national’.
Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people
explain their statement to mean that the right of the Romans did
not extend beyond protection and jurisdiction; this right they
distinguish from ownership. Perchance they do not pay sufficient
attention to the fact that although the Roman People were able to
maintain fleets for the protection of navigation and to punish
pirates captured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but
by the common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea.
We recognize, however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates
captured in this or in that part of the sea should come under the
jurisdiction of this state or of that, and further that certain
convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction have been apportioned
on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who are parties to
it,[94] but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it
make the delimited area of the sea the private property of any one.
It merely constitutes a personal right between contracting parties.
This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed
by a reply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner
of two maritime estates could on selling either of them impose on it
such a servitude as the prohibition of fishing in a particular part
of the sea, he replied that the thing in question, evidently the sea,
could not be subjected to a servitude, because it was by nature open
to all persons; but that since a contract made in good faith demands
that the condition of a sale be respected, the present possessors and
those who succeed to
Verum est loqui Iurisconsultum de praediis privatis, et lege privata,
sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hic est ratio, quia populi
respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.
Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium
numero censentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut piscationem, sed
personas obligant.[95a] Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas
Reipublicae aut Principi ex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli
forte poterunt; sed exteris ius piscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne
servitus imponatur mari quod servire non potest.
Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est:[96a] quod cum sit
publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populo aut
principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit,
etiam interdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo,
addita condicione si is cui locandi ius fuerit, fruendum alicui
locaverit;[97a] quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum
qui ipsam piscationem numerant inter Regalia, ne quidem illum locum
quem interpretabantur satis inspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non
latuit.
Demonstratum est[98a] nec populo nec privato cuipiam ius
their rights were bound to observe that condition. It is true that
the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, but in
speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the same
reasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human
race peoples are treated as individuals.
Similarly, revenues levied on maritime fisheries are held to belong
to the Crown, but they do not bind the sea itself or the fisheries,
but only the persons engaged in fishing.[95] Wherefore subjects, for
whom a state or a ruler is by common consent competent to make laws,
will perhaps be compelled to bear such charges, but so far as other
persons are concerned the right of fishing ought everywhere to be
exempt from tolls, lest a servitude be imposed upon the sea, which is
not susceptible to a servitude.
The case of the sea is not the same as that of a river,[96] for as
a river is the property of a nation, the right to fish in it can
be passed or leased by the nation or by the ruler, in such a way
(and the like is true with the ancients) that the lessee enjoys the
operation of the injunction _de loco publico fruendo_ by virtue of
the clause ‘He who has the right to lease has leased the exclusive
right of enjoyment’.[97] Such a condition cannot arise in respect to
the sea. Finally those who count fishing among the properties of the
Crown have not examined carefully enough the very passage which they
cite to prove their contention, as Isernia* and Alvotus† have noticed.
* [Andrea d’Isernia (c. 1480-1553), an Italian commentator, called
often Feudistarum Patriarcha.]
† [Probably a misprint for Alvarus (Alvarez).]
It has therefore been demonstrated[98] that neither a nation nor an
individual can establish any right of private ownership
aliquod proprium in ipsum mare (nam diverticulum excipimus) competere
posse, cum occupationem nec natura, nec usus publici ratio permittat.
Huius autem rei causa instituta fuerat haec disputatio, ut appareret
Lusitanos mare quo ad Indos navigatur sui iuris non fecisse. Nam
utraque ratio quae proprietatem impedit, in hac causa est quam in
ceteris omnibus infinito efficacior. Quod in alii difficile videtur,
in hac omnino fieri non potest; quod in aliis iniquum iudicamus, in
hac summe barbarum est, atque inhumanum.
Non de mari interiore hic agimus, quod terris undique infusum alicubi
etiam fluminis latitudinem non excedit, de quo tamen satis constat
locutos Romanos Iurisconsultos, cum nobiles illas adversus privatam
avaritiam sententias ediderunt; de Oceano quaeritur, quem immensum,
infinitum, rerum parentem, caelo conterminum antiquitas vocat, cuius
perpetuo humore non fontes tantum et flumina et maria, sed nubes, sed
ipsa quodammodo sidera pasci veteres crediderunt; qui denique per
reciprocas aestuum vices terram hanc humani generis sedem ambiens,
neque teneri neque includi potest, et possidet verius quam possidetur.
In hoc autem Oceano non de sinu aut freto, nec de omni quidem eo quod
e litore conspici potest controversia est. Vindicant sibi Lusitani
quicquid duos Orbes interiacet, tantis spatiis discretos, ut plurimis
saeculis famam sui non potuerint transmittere. Quod si Castellanorum,
qui in eadem sunt
over the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea), inasmuch as its
occupation is not permissible either by nature or on grounds of
public utility. The discussion of this matter has been taken up for
this reason, namely, that it may be seen that the Portuguese have not
established private ownership over the sea by which people go to the
East Indies. For the two reasons that stand in the way of ownership
are in this case infinitely more powerful than in all others. That
which in other cases seems difficult, is here absolutely impossible;
and what in other cases we recognize as unjust is here most barbarous
and inhuman.
The question at issue then is not one that concerns an INNER SEA, one
which is surrounded on all sides by the land and at some places does
not even exceed a river in breadth, although it is well known that
the Roman jurists cited such an inner sea in their famous opinions
condemning private avarice. No! the question at issue is the OUTER
SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of water which antiquity describes as
the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of
all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetually
supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but
by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the
ocean which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human
race, with the ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized
nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses the earth than is by it
possessed.
Further, the question at issue does not concern a gulf or a strait
in this ocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible from
the shore. [But consider this!!] The Portuguese claim as their own
the whole expanse of the sea which separates two parts of the world
so far distant the one from the other, that in all the preceding
centuries neither one has so much as heard of the other. Indeed, if
we take into account the share of the Spaniards, whose claim
causa, portio accedat, parvo minus omnis Oceanus duobus populis
mancipatus est, aliis tot gentibus ad Septentrionum redactis
angustias; multumque decepta est Natura, quae cum elementum illud
omnibus circumfudit, omnibus etiam suffecturum credidit. In tanto
mari si quis usu promiscuo solum sibi imperium et dicionem exciperet,
tamen immodicae dominationis affectator haberetur; si quis piscatu
arceret alios, insanae cupiditatis notam non effugeret. At qui etiam
navigatum impedit, quo nihil ipsi perit, de eo quid statuemus?
Si quis ab igni qui totus suus est, ignem capere, lumen suo de
lumine, alterum prohiberet, lege hunc humanae societatis reum
peragerem: quia vis ea est istius naturae:
_Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenderit._[99a]
Quid ni enim quando sine detrimento suo potest, alteri communicet, in
iis quae sunt accipienti utilia, danti non molesta.[100a]
Haec sunt quae Philosophi[101a] non alienis tantum, sed et ingratis
praestari volunt. Quae vero in rebus privatis invidia est, eadem in
re communi non potest non esse immanitas, improbissimum enim hoc est,
quod naturae instituto, consensu gentium, meum non minus quam tuum
est, id te ita intercipere, ut ne usum quidem mihi concedas, quo
concesso nihilominus id tuum sit, quam antea fuit.
is the same as that of the Portuguese, only a little less than the
whole ocean is found to be subject to two nations, while all the rest
of the peoples in the world are restricted to the narrow bounds of
the northern seas. Nature was greatly deceived if when she spread the
sea around all peoples she believed that it would also be adequate
for the use of them all. If in a thing so vast as the sea a man
were to reserve to himself from general use nothing more than mere
sovereignty, still he would be considered a seeker after unreasonable
power. If a man were to enjoin other people from fishing, he would
not escape the reproach of monstrous greed. But the man who even
prevents navigation, a thing which means no loss to himself, what are
we to say of him?
If any person should prevent any other person from taking fire from
his fire or a light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating
the law of human society, because that is the essence of its very
nature, as Ennius has said:
“_No less shines his, when he his friend’s hath lit._”[99]
Why then, when it can be done without any prejudice to his own
interests, will not one person share with another things which are
useful to the recipient, and no loss to the giver?[100] These are
services which the ancient philosophers[101] thought ought to be
rendered not only to foreigners but even to the ungrateful. But the
same act which when private possessions are in question is jealousy
can be nothing but cruelty when a common possession is in question.
For it is most outrageous for you to appropriate a thing, which both
by ordinance of nature and by common consent is as much mine as
yours, so exclusively that you will not grant me a right of use in it
which leaves it no less yours than it was before.
Tum vero etiam qui alienis incumbunt, aut communia intercipiunt,
certa quadam possessione se tuentur. Quia enim prima, ut diximus,
occupatio res proprias fecit, idcirco imaginem quandam dominii
praefert quamvis iniusta detentio. At Lusitani num sicuti terras
solemus, sic mare illud impositis praediis ita undique cinxerunt,
ut in ipsorum manu esset quos vellent excludere? An vero tantum hoc
abest, ut ipsi etiam, cum adversus alios populos mundum dividunt, non
ullis limitibus aut natura, aut manu positis, sed imaginaria quadam
linea se tueantur? quod si recipitur et dimensio talis ad possidendum
valet, iamdudum nobis Geometrae terras, Astronomi etiam caelum
eriperent.
Vbi hic igitur est ista, sine qua nulla dominia coeperunt,
corporis ad corpus adiunctio? Nimirum apparet in nulla re verius
dici posse, quod Doctores nostri prodiderunt,[102a] Mare cum sit
incomprehensibile, non minus quam aër, nullius populi bonis potuisse
applicari.
Si vero ante alios navigasse, et viam quodammodo aperuisse, hoc
vocant occupare, quid esse potest magis ridiculum? Nam cum nulla
pars sit maris, in quam non aliquis primus ingressus sit, sequetur
omnem navigationem ab aliquo esse occupatam. Ita undique excludimur.
Quin et illi qui terrarum orbem circumvecti sunt, totum sibi Oceanum
acquisivisse dicendi erunt. Sed nemo nescit
Nevertheless, even those who lay burdens upon foreigners, or
appropriate things common to all, rely upon a possession which is
to some extent real. For since original occupation created private
property, therefore detention of a thing, though unjust, gives an
appearance of ownership. But have the Portuguese completely covered
the ocean, as we are wont to do on land, by laying out estates on
it in such a way that they have the right to exclude from that
ocean whom they will? Not at all! On the contrary, they are so far
from having done so, that when they divide up the world to the
disadvantage of other nations, they cannot even defend their action
by showing any boundaries either natural or artificial, but are
compelled to fall back upon some imaginary line. Indeed, if that
were a recognized method, and such a delimitation of boundaries were
sufficient to make possession valid, our geometers long since would
have got possession of the face of the earth, our astronomers of the
very skies.
But where in this case is that corporal possession or physical
appropriation, without which no ownerships arise? There appears to
be nothing truer than what our learned jurists have enunciated,
namely,[102] that since the sea is just as insusceptible of physical
appropriation as the air, it cannot be attached to the possessions of
any nation.
But if the Portuguese call _occupying_ the sea merely to have sailed
over it before other people, and to have, as it were, opened the way,
could anything in the world be more ridiculous? For, as there is no
part of the sea on which some person has not already sailed, it will
necessarily follow that every route of navigation is occupied by some
one. Therefore we peoples of today are all absolutely excluded. Why
will not those men who have circumnavigated the globe be justified in
saying that they have acquired for themselves the possession of the
whole ocean! But there
navem per mare transeuntem non plus iuris, quam vestigii relinquere.
Verum etiam quod sibi sumunt neminem ante ipsos eum Oceanum
navigasse, id minime verum est. Magna enim pars eius de quo agitur
maris, ambitu Mauritaniae, iam olim navigata est; ulterior et in
orientem vergens victoriis Magni Alexandri lustrata est, usque in
Arabicum sinum.[103a]
Olim autem hanc navigationem Gaditanis percognitam fuisse, multa
argumento sunt. Caio Caesare Augusti filio in Arabico sinu res
gerente signa navium ex Hispaniensibus naufragiis agnita. Et quod
Caelius Antipater tradidit, vidisse se qui ex Hispania in Aethiopiam
commercii gratia navigasset. Etiam Arabibus, si verum est, quod
Cornelius Nepos testatus est, Eudoxum quendam sua aetate cum Lathyrum
Regem Alexandriae fugeret, Arabico sinu egressum Gades usque
pervectum. Poenos autem, qui re maritima plurimum valuerunt, eum
Oceanum non ignorasse longe clarissimum est, cum Hanno Carthaginis
potentia florente circumvectus a Gadibus ad finem Arabiae,
praeternavigato scilicet promontorio quod nunc Bonae Spei dicitur,
(vetus videtur nomen Hesperion ceras fuisse) omne id iter, situmque
litoris et insularum scripto complexus sit, testatusque ad ultimum
non mare sibi, sed commeatum defuisse.
Ab Arabico autem sinu ad Indiam, Indicique Oceani insulas, et auream
usque Chersonesum, quam esse Iapanem credunt plerique, etiam re
Romana florente navigari solitum, iter a Plinio descriptum,[104a]
legationes ab Indis ad
is not a single person in the world who does not know that a ship
sailing through the sea leaves behind it no more legal right than it
does a track. And as for the assumption of the Portuguese that no one
has sailed that ocean before themselves, that is anything but true.
For a great part of that sea near Morocco, which is in dispute, had
already been navigated long before, and the sea as far east as the
Arabian gulf has been made famous by the victories of Alexander the
Great, as both Pliny and Mela tell us.[103]
There is also much to substantiate the belief that the inhabitants
of Cadiz were well acquainted long ago with this route, because when
Gaius Caesar,* the son of Augustus, held command in the Arabian
gulf, pieces were found of shipwrecks recognized as Spanish. Caelius
Antipater also has told us in his writings that he himself saw a
Spaniard who had sailed from Spain to Ethiopia on a commercial
voyage. Also the Arabians knew those seas, if the testimony of
Cornelius Nepos is to be believed, because he says that in his own
day a certain Eudoxus, fleeing from Lathyrus, king of Alexandria,
sailed from the Arabian gulf and finally reached Cadiz. However, by
far the most famous example is that of the Carthaginians. Those most
famous mariners were well acquainted with that sea, because Hanno,
when Carthage was at the height of her power, sailing from Cadiz
to the farthest confines of Arabia, and doubling the promontory
now known as the Cape of Good Hope (the ancient name seems to have
been Hesperion Ceras), described in a book the entire route he had
taken, the appearance of the coasts, and the location of the islands,
declaring that at the farthest point he reached the sea had not yet
given out but his provisions had.
* [Strictly speaking, Gaius was the grandson of Augustus, but was
adopted as his son.]
Pliny’s description of the route to the East,[104] the embassies
Augustum, ad Claudium etiam ex Taprobane insula, deinde gesta Traiani
et tabulae Ptolemaei satis ostendunt. Iam suo tempore Strabo[105a]
Alexandrinorum mercatorum classem ex Arabico sinu, ut Aethiopiae
ultima, ita et Indiae, petiisse testatur, cum olim paucis navibus id
auderetur. Inde magna populo Romano vectigalia; addit Plinius[106a]
impositis sagittariorum cohortibus piratarum metu navigatum; solamque
Indiam quingenties sestertium, si Arabiam addas et Seres, millies
annis omnibus Romano Imperio ademisse; et merces centuplicato
venditas.
Et haec quidem vetera satis arguunt primos non fuisse Lusitanos. In
singulis autem sui partibus Oceanus ille et tunc cum eum Lusitani
ingressi sunt, et numquam non cognitus fuit. Mauri enim, Aethiopes,
Arabes, Persae, Indi, eam maris partem cuius ipsi accolae sunt,
nescire neutiquam potuerunt.
Mentiuntur ergo qui se mare illud invenisse iactant.
Quid igitur, dicet aliquis, parumne videtur, quod Lusitani
intermissam multis forte saeculis navigationem primi repararunt, et,
quod negari non potest, Europaeis gentibus ignotam ostenderunt, magno
suo labore, sumptu, periculo?
from the Indies to Augustus, and those from Ceylon to the emperor
Claudius, and finally the accounts of the deeds of Trajan, and the
writings of Ptolemaeus, all make it quite clear that in the days
of Rome’s greatest splendor voyages were made regularly from the
Arabian gulf to India, to the islands of the Indian ocean, and even
so far as to the golden Chersonesus, which many people think was
Japan. Strabo says[105] that in his own time a fleet of Alexandrian
merchantmen set sail from the Arabian gulf for the distant lands of
Ethiopia and India, although few ships had ever before attempted that
voyage. The Roman people had a large revenue from the East. Pliny
says[106] that cohorts of archers were carried on the boats engaged
in trade as protection against pirates; he states also that every
year 500,000 sesterces* were taken out of the Roman empire by India
alone, or 1,000,000 sesterces if you add Arabia and China; further,
that merchandise brought from the East sold for one hundred times its
original cost.
* [A Roman sestertius was about four cents.]
These examples cited from ancient times are sufficient proof that
the Portuguese were not the first in that part of the world. Long
before they ever came, every single part of that ocean had been long
since explored. For how possibly could the Moors, the Ethiopians,
the Arabians, the Persians, the peoples of India, have remained in
ignorance of that part of the sea adjacent to their coasts!
Therefore they lie, who today boast that they discovered that sea.
Well then, some one will say, does it seem to be a matter of little
moment that the Portuguese were the first to restore a navigation
interrupted perhaps for many centuries, and unknown--as cannot be
denied--at least to the nations of Europe, at great labor and cost
and danger to themselves?
Immo vero si in hoc incubuerunt ut quod soli reperissent id omnibus
monstrarent, quis adeo est amens, qui non plurimum se illis debere
profiteatur? Eandem enim gratiam, laudemque et gloriam immortalem
illi promeruerint, qua omnes contenti fuerunt rerum magnarum
inventores, quotquot scilicet non sibi, sed humano generi prodesse
studuerunt. Sin Lusitanis suus ante oculos quaestus fuit, lucrum quod
semper maximum est in praevertendis negotiationibus, illis sufficere
debuit. Et scimus itinera prima proventus interdum quater decuplos,
aut etiam uberiores dedisse, quibus factum ut inops diu populus ad
repentinas divitias subito prorumperet, tanto luxus apparatu, quantus
vix beatissimis gentibus in supremo progressae diu fortunae fastigio
fuit.
Si vero eidem in hoc praeiverunt, ne quisquam sequeretur, gratiam
non merentur, cum lucrum suum respexerint; lucrum autem suum dicere
non possunt, cum eripiant alienum. Neque enim illud certum est
nisi ivissent eo Lusitani, iturum fuisse neminem. Adventabant enim
tempora, quibus ut artes paene omnes, ita et terrarum et marium situs
clarius in dies noscebantur. Excitassent vetera, quae modo retulimus,
exempla, et si non uno impetu omnia patuissent, at paulatim promota
velis fuissent litora alio semper aliud monstrante. Factum denique
fuisset,
On the contrary, if they had laid weight upon the fact that they were
pointing out to all what they alone had rediscovered, there is no
one so lacking in sense that he would not acknowledge the greatest
obligation to them. For the Portuguese will have earned the same
thanks, praise, and immortal glory with which all discoverers of
great things have been content, whenever they have striven to benefit
not themselves but the whole human race. But if the Portuguese
had before their eyes only their own financial gain, surely their
profit, which is always the largest for those first in a new field
of enterprise, ought to have satisfied them. For we know that
their first voyages returned a profit sometimes of forty times the
original investment, and sometimes even more. And by this overseas
trade it has come about that a people, previously for a long time
poor, have leaped suddenly into the possession of great riches, and
have surrounded themselves with such outward signs of luxurious
magnificence as scarcely the most prosperous nations have been able
to display at the height of their fortunes.
But if these Portuguese have led the way in this matter in order
that no one may follow them, then they do not deserve any thanks,
inasmuch as they have considered only their own profit. Nor can they
call it their profit, because they are taking the profit of some one
else. For it is not at all demonstrable that, if the Portuguese had
not gone to the East Indies, no one else would have gone. For the
times were coming on apace in which along with other sciences the
geographical locations of seas and lands were being better known
every day. The reports of the expeditions of the ancients mentioned
above had aroused people, and even if all foreign shores had not been
laid open at a single stroke as it were, yet they would have been
brought to light gradually by sailing voyages, each new discovery
pointing the way to the next. And so there would finally
quod fieri potuisse Lusitani docuerunt, cum multi essent populi non
minus flagrantes mercaturae et rerum externarum studio. Venetis qui
multa iam Indiae didicerant, cetera inquirere promptum fuit. Gallorum
Brittonum indefessa sedulitas, Anglorum audacia coepto non defuisset.
Ipsi Batavi multo magis desperata aggressi sunt.
Nulla igitur aequitatis ratio, ne probabilis quidem ulla sententia a
Lusitanis stat. Omnes enim qui mare volunt imperio alicuius subici
posse, id ei attribuunt qui proximos portus et circumiacentia litora
in dicione habet.[107a] At Lusitani in illo immenso litorum tractu
paucis exceptis praesidiis nihil habent quod suum possint dicere.
Deinde vero etiam qui Mari imperaret, nihil tamen posset ex usu
communi deminuere, sicut Populus Romanus arcere neminem potuit, quo
minus in litore imperi Romani cuncta faceret, quae iure gentium
permittebantur.[108a] Et si quicquam eorum prohibere posset,
puta piscaturam qua dici quodammodo potest pisces exhauriri, at
navigationem non posset, per quam mari nihil perit.
Cui rei argumentum est longe certissimum, quod ex Doctorum sententia
ante retulimus, etiam in terra, quae cum populis, tum hominibus
singulis in proprietatem attributa est, iter tamen, certe inerme et
innoxium, nullius gentis
have been accomplished what the Portuguese showed could be done,
because there were many nations with no less ardor than theirs to
engage in commerce and to learn of foreign things. The Venetians, who
already knew much about India, were ready to push their knowledge
farther; the indefatigable zeal of the French of Brittany, and
the boldness of the English would not have failed to make such an
attempt; indeed the Dutch themselves have embarked upon much more
desperate enterprises.
Therefore the Portuguese have neither just reason nor respectable
authority to support their position, for all those persons who assume
that the sea can be subjected to the sovereignty of any one assign it
to him who holds in his power the nearest ports and the circumjacent
shores.[107] But in all that great extent of coast line reaching to
the East Indies the Portuguese have nothing which they can call their
own except a few fortified posts.
And then even if a man were to have dominion over the sea, still
he could not take away anything from its common use, just as the
Roman people could not prevent any one from doing on the shores of
their dominions all those things which were permitted by the law
of nations.[108] And if it were possible to prohibit any of those
things, say for example, fishing, for in a way it can be maintained
that fish are exhaustible, still it would not be possible to prohibit
navigation, for the sea is not exhausted by that use.
The most conclusive argument on this question by far however is the
one that we have already brought forward based on the opinions of
eminent jurists, namely, that even over land which had been converted
into private property either by states or individuals, unarmed
and innocent passage is not justly to be denied to persons of any
country, exactly as the right to drink from a river is not to be
hominibus iuste negari; sicut et potum ex flumine. Ratio apparet,
quia cum unius rei naturaliter usus essent diversi, eum dumtaxat
gentes divisisse inter se videntur, qui sine proprietate commode
haberi non potest, contra autem eum recepisse, per quem domini
condicio deterior non esset futura.
Omnes igitur vident eum qui alterum navigare prohibeat nullo
iure defendi, cum eundem etiam iniuriarum teneri Vlpianus
dixerit;[109a] alii autem etiam interdictum utile prohibito competere
existimaverint.[110a]
Et sic Batavorum intentio communi iure nititur, cum fateantur omnes,
permissum cuilibet in mari navigare etiam a nullo Principe impetrata
licentia; quod Legibus Hispanicis diserte expressum est.[111a]
denied. The reason is clear, because, inasmuch as one and the same
thing is susceptible by nature to different uses, the nations seem
on the one hand to have apportioned among themselves that use which
cannot be maintained conveniently apart from private ownership; but
on the other hand to have reserved that use through the exercise of
which the condition of the owner would not be impaired.
It is clear therefore to every one that he who prevents another from
navigating the sea has no support in law. Ulpian has said[109] that
he was even bound to pay damages, and other jurists have thought
that the injunction _utile prohibito_ could also be brought against
him.[110]
Finally, the relief prayed for by the Dutch rests upon a common
right, since it is universally admitted that navigation on the sea is
open to any one, even if permission is not obtained from any ruler.
And this is specifically expressed in the Spanish laws.[111]
_Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo
donationis Pontificiae_
Donatio Pontificis Alexandri, quae a Lusitanis mare aut ius navigandi
solis sibi vindicantibus, cum inventionis deficiat titulus, secundo
loco adduci potest, satis ex iis quae ante dicta sunt vanitatis
convincitur. Donatio enim nullum habet momentum in rebus extra
commercium positis. Quare cum mare aut ius in eo navigandi proprium
nulli hominum esse possit, sequitur neque dari a Pontifice neque a
Lusitanis accipi potuisse. Praeterea cum supra relatum sit ex omnium
sani iudicii hominum sententia Papam non esse dominum temporalem
totius orbis, ne Maris quidem esse satis intelligitur; quamquam etsi
id concederetur, tamen ius annexum Pontificatui in Regem aliquem aut
populum pro parte nulla transferri debuisset. Sicut nec Imperator
posset Imperi provincias in suos usus convertere, aut pro suo
arbitrio alienare.[112a]
Illud saltem nemo negaturus est, cui aliquid sit frontis, cum ius
disponendi in temporalibus Pontifici nemo concedat, nisi forte
quantum eius rerum spiritualium necessitas requirit, ista autem
de quibus nunc agimus, mare scilicet et ius navigandi, lucrum et
quaestum merum, non pietatis negotium
_Neither the Sea nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the
Portuguese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation_
The Donation of Pope Alexander, inasmuch as the title based on
discovery is seen to be deficient, may next be invoked by the
Portuguese to justify their exclusive appropriation of the sea
and the right of navigation thereon. But from what has been said
above, that Donation is clearly convicted of being an act of empty
ostentation. For a Donation has no effect on things outside the
realm of trade. Wherefore since neither the sea nor the right of
navigating it can become the private property of any man, it follows
that it could not have been given by the Pope, nor accepted by
the Portuguese. Besides, as has been mentioned above, following
the opinion of all men of sound judgment, it is sufficiently well
recognized that the Pope is not the temporal lord of the earth, and
certainly not of the sea. Even if it be granted for the sake of
argument that such were the case, still a right attaching to the
Pontificate ought not to be transferred wholly or in part to any king
or nation. Similarly no emperor could convert to his own uses or
alienate at his own pleasure the provinces of his empire.[112]
Now, inasmuch as no one concedes to the Pope in temporal matters a
_jus disponendi_, except perhaps in so far as it is demanded by the
necessity of spiritual matters, and inasmuch as the things now under
discussion, namely, the sea and the right of navigating it, are
concerned only with money and profits, not with piety, surely no one
can have
respiciant, sequi nullam hac in re fuisse illius potestatem. Quid,
quod ne Principes quidem, hoc est, domini temporales possunt ullo
modo a navigatione aliquem prohibere, cum si quod habent ius in mari
id sit tantum iurisdictionis ac protectionis? Etiam illud notissimum
est apud omnes, ad ea facienda quae cum lege Naturae pugnant, nullam
esse Papae auctoritatem.[113a] Pugnat autem cum lege Naturae, ut
mare aut eius usum quisquam habeat sibi proprium, ut iam satis
demonstravimus. Cum denique ius suum auferre alicui Papa minime
possit, quae erit facti istius defensio, si tot populos immerentes,
indemnatos, innoxios ab eo iure quod ad ipsos non minus quam ad
Hispanos pertinebat uno verbo voluit excludere?
Aut igitur dicendum est nullam esse vim eiusmodi pronuntiationis,
aut quod non minus credibile est, eum Pontificis animum fuisse, ut
Castellanorum et Lusitanorum inter se certamini intercessum voluerit,
aliorum autem iuri nihil diminutum.
the face to insist that the Pope had any jurisdiction here. What of
the fact that not even rulers, that is to say, temporal lords, can
prohibit any one from navigation, since if they have any right at all
upon the sea it is merely one of jurisdiction and protection! It is
also a fact universally recognized that the Pope has no authority to
commit acts repugnant to the law of nature.[113] But it is repugnant
to the law of nature, as we have already proved beyond a doubt, for
any one to have as his own private property either the sea or its
use. Finally, since the Pope is wholly unable to deprive any one of
his own rights, what defense will there be for that Donation of his,
if by a word he intended to exclude so many innocent, uncondemned,
and guiltless nations from a right which belongs no less to them than
to the Spaniards?
Therefore, either it must be affirmed that a pronunciamento of this
sort has no force, or, as is no less credible, that it was the desire
of the Pope to intercede in the quarrel between the Spaniards and the
Portuguese, and that he had no concomitant intention of violating the
rights of others.
_Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo
praescriptionis aut consuetudinis_
Vltimum iniquitatis patrocinium in praescriptione solet esse aut
consuetudine. Et huc igitur Lusitani se conferunt; sed utrumque
illis praesidium certissima iuris ratio praecludit. Nam praescriptio
a iure est civili, unde locum habere non potest inter reges, aut
inter populos liberos;[114a] multo autem minus ubi ius naturae aut
gentium resistit, quod iure civili semper validius est. Quin et ipsa
lex civilis praescriptionem hic impedit.[115a] Vsucapi enim, aut
praescriptione acquiri prohibentur, quae in bonis esse non possunt,
deinde quae possideri vel quasi possideri nequeunt, et quorum
alienatio prohibita est. Haec autem omnia de mari et usu maris vere
dicuntur.
Et cum publicae res, hoc est populi alicuius nulla temporis
possessione quaeri posse dicantur, sive ob rei naturam, sive ob
eorum privilegium adversus quos praescriptio ista procederet, quanto
iustius humano generi, quam uni populo id beneficium dandum fuit in
rebus communibus? Et hoc est
_Neither the Sea nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the
Portuguese by title of prescription or custom_
The last defense of injustice is usually a claim or plea based on
prescription or on custom. To this defense therefore the Portuguese
have resorted. But the best established reasoning of the law
precludes them from enjoying the protection of either plea.
Prescription is a matter of municipal law; hence it cannot be applied
as between kings, or as between free and independent nations.[114]
It has even less standing when it is in conflict with that which is
always stronger than the municipal law, namely, the law of nature
or nations. Nay, even municipal law itself prevents prescription in
this case.[115] For it is impossible to acquire by usucaption or
prescription things which cannot become property, that is, which
are not susceptible of possession or of quasi-possession, and which
cannot be alienated. All of which is true with respect to the sea and
its use.
And since public things, that is, things which are the property of a
nation, cannot be acquired by mere efflux of time, either because of
their nature, or because of the prerogatives of those against whom
such prescription would act, is it not vastly more just that the
benefits accruing from the enjoyment of common things should be given
to the entire human race than to one nation alone? On this point
quod Papinianus scriptum reliquit,[116a] ‘praescriptionem longae
possessionis ad obtinenda loca iurisgentium publica concedi non
solere’; eiusque rei exemplum dat in litore, cuius pars imposito
aedificio occupata fuerat. Nam eo diruto, et alterius aedificio in
eodem loco postea exstructo, exceptionem opponi non posse; quod
deinde similitudine rei publicae illustrat, nam et si quis in
fluminis diverticulo pluribus annis piscatus sit, postea, interrupta
scilicet piscatione, alterum eodem iure prohibere non posse.
Apparet igitur Angelum et qui cum Angelo dixerunt[117a] Venetis
et Genuensibus per praescriptionem ius aliquod in sinum maris suo
litori praeiacentem acquiri potuisse, aut falli, aut fallere, quod
sane Iurisconsultis nimium est frequens, cum sanctae professionis
auctoritatem, non ad rationes et leges, sed ad gratiam conferunt
potentiorum. Nam Martiani quidem responsum, de quo et ante egimus,
si recte cum Papiniani verbis comparetur,[118a] non aliam accipere
potest interpretationem, quam eam quae et Iohanni olim et Bartolo
probata est, et nunc a doctis omnibus recipitur:[119a] ut scilicet
ius prohibendi procedat quamdiu durat occupatio,
Papinian has said:[116] ‘Prescription raised by long possession is
not customarily recognized as valid in the acquisition of places
known to international law as “public”’. As an example, to illustrate
this point, he cites a shore some part of which had been occupied by
means of a building constructed on it. But if this building should be
destroyed, and some one else later should construct a building on the
same spot, no exception could be taken to it. Then he illustrates the
same point by the analogous case of a _res publica_. If, for example,
any one has fished for many years in a branch of a river, and has
then stopped fishing there, after that he cannot prevent any one else
from enjoying the same right that he had.
Wherefore it appears that Angeli[117] and his followers who have said
that the Venetians and Genoese were able to acquire by prescription
certain specific rights in the gulfs of the sea adjacent to their
shores, either are mistaken, or are deceiving others; a thing which
happens all too frequently with jurists when they exercise the
authority of their sacred profession not for justice and law, but in
order to gain the gratitude of the powerful. There is also an opinion
of Marcianus, already cited above in another connection, which, when
carefully compared with the words of Papinian,[118] can have no
other interpretation than the one formerly adopted by Johannes and
Bartolus,* and now accepted by all learned men,[119] namely, that the
_jus prohibendi_ is in effect only while occupation lasts; it loses
its force if occupation
non autem si ea omissa sit; omissa enim non prodest, nec si per
mille annos fuisset continuata, ut recte animadvertit Castrensis.
Et quamvis hoc voluisset Martianus, quod minime credendus est
cogitasse, in quo loco occupatio conceditur, in eodem praescriptionem
concedi, tamen absurdum erat quod de flumine publico dictum erat
ad Mare commune, et quod de diverticulo ad sinum proferre, cum
haec praescriptio usum qui est Iuregentium communis, impeditura
sit, illa autem publico usui non admodum noceat. Alterum autem
Angeli argumentum quod ex aquaeductu sumitur,[120a] eodem Castrensi
monstrante, ut a quaestione alienissimum, ab omnibus merito
exploditur.
Falsum igitur est talem praescriptionem etiam eo tempore gigni,
cuius initium omnem memoriam excedat. Vbi enim lex omnem omnino
tollit praescriptionem, ne istud quidem tempus admittitur, hoc
est, ut Felinus loquitur,[121a] materia impraescriptibilis tempore
immemoriali non fit praescriptibilis. Fatetur haec vera esse
Balbus;[122a] sed Angeli sententiam receptam dicit hac ratione,
quia tempus extra memoriam positum idem valere creditur privilegio,
cum titulus amplissimus ex tali tempore praesumatur. Apparet hinc
non aliud illos sensisse, quam si pars aliqua reipublicae, puta
Imperi Romani, supra omnem memoriam usa esset tali iure, ei dandam
praescriptionem hoc colore, quasi Principis
cease; and occupation once interrupted, even if it had been
continuous for a thousand years, loses its rights, as Paul de
Castro† justly observes. And even if Marcianus had meant--which
certainly was not in his mind at all--that acquisition by
prescription is to be recognized wherever occupation is recognized,
still it would have been absurd to apply what had been said about a
public river to the common sea, or what had been said about an inlet
or a river branch to a bay, since in the latter case prescription
would hinder the use of something common to all by the law of
nations, and in the former case would work no great injury to public
use. Moreover, another argument brought forward by Angeli based on
the use of aqueducts,[120] has quite properly been rejected by every
one, being, as de Castro pointed out, entirely aside from the point.
* [Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357) the most famous of the
Post-glossators, was called by many of his biographers ‘Optimus
auriga in hac civili sapientia’.]
† [The celebrated Italian jurist (?-1420 or 1437) of whom Cujas
said: “Si vous n’avez pas Paul de Castro, vendez votre chemise pour
l’acheter.” (Note from page 55 of the French translation of Grotius
by de Grandpont.)]
It is not true then that such prescription rises even at a time
beyond the period of the memory of man. For since the law absolutely
denies all prescription, not even immemorial time has any effect on
the question; that is, as Felinus[121] says, things imprescriptible
by nature do not become prescriptible by the mere efflux of
immemorial time. Balbus admits the truth of these arguments,[122] but
says that the opinion of Angeli is to be accepted on the ground that
time immemorial is believed to have the same validity as prerogative
for setting up a title, since a perfect title is presumed from such
efflux of time. Hence it appears that the jurists thought if some
part of a state, say of the Roman empire for example, at a period
before the memory of man had exercised such a right, that a title by
prescription would
concessio praeiisset. Quare cum nemo sit dominus totius generis
humani, qui ius illud adversus homines omnes homini, aut populo
alicui potuisset concedere, sublato illo colore, necesse est etiam
praescriptionem interimi. Et sic ex illorum etiam sententia inter
reges aut populos liberos prodesse nihil potest lapsus infiniti
temporis.
Vanissimum autem et illud est quod Angelus docuit, etiamsi ad
dominium praescriptio proficere non potest, tamen dandam esse
possidenti exceptionem. Nam Papinianus disertis verbis exceptionem
negat:[123a] et aliter non potuit sentire, cum ipsius saeculo
praescriptio nihil esset aliud quam exceptio. Verum igitur est
quod et leges Hispanicae exprimunt[124a] in his rebus quae communi
hominum usui sunt attributae, nullius omnino temporis praescriptionem
procedere, cuius definitionis illa praeter ceteras ratio reddi
potest, quod qui re communi utitur, ut communi uti videtur, non autem
iure proprio, et ita praescribere non magis quam fructuarius potest
vitio possessionis.[125a]
Altera haec etiam non contemnenda est, quod in praescriptione
temporis cuius memoria non exstat, quamvis titulus et bona fides
praesumantur, tamen si re ipsa appareat titulum omnino nullum dari
posse, et sic manifesta sit fides mala, quae in populo maxime quasi
uno corpore perpetua esse
have to be admitted on that ground, exactly as if there had been a
previous grant from a Prince. But inasmuch as there is no one who
is sovereign of the whole human race with competence to grant to
any man or to any nation such a right against all other men, with
the annihilation of that pretext, title by prescription is also
necessarily destroyed. Therefore the opinion of the jurists is that
not even an infinite lapse of time is able to set up a right as
between kings or independent nations.
Moreover Angeli brought forward a most foolish argument, affirming
that even if prescription could not create ownership, still an
exception ought to be made in favor of a possessor. Papinian however
in unmistakable words says there is no exception,[123] nor could
he think otherwise, because in his day prescription was itself an
exception. It is therefore true, as expressed also in the laws of
Spain,[124] that prescription based on no matter how immemorial a
time, sets up no title to those things which are recognized as common
to the use of mankind. One reason among others which can be given for
this definition is that any one who uses a _res communis_ does so
evidently by virtue of common and not private right, and because of
the imperfect character of possession he can therefore no more set up
a legal title by prescription than can a usufructuary.[125]
A second reason not to be overlooked is that although a title and
good faith are presumed in a prescriptive right created by the efflux
of immemorial time, nevertheless if it appears from the nature of the
thing itself that no title at all can be established, and if thus
there becomes evident bad faith--a thing held to be permanent in a
nation as well as in an individual--then prescription fails because
of a
censetur, et ex duplici defectu praescriptio corruit.[126a] Tertia
vero, quia res haec est merae facultatis, quae non praescribitur, ut
infra demonstrabimus.
Sed nullus est finis argutiarum. Inventi sunt qui in hoc argumento
a praescriptione consuetudinem distinguerent, ut illa scilicet
exclusi, ad hanc confugerent. Discrimen autem quod hic statuunt sane
ridiculum est: ex praescriptione aiunt ius unius quod ab eo aufertur
alteri applicari;[127a] sed cum aliquod ius ita alicui applicatur
ut alteri non auferatur, tum dici consuetudinem; quasi vero cum ius
navigandi quod communiter ad omnes pertinet, exclusis aliis ab uno
usurpatur, non necesse sit omnibus perire quantum uni accedit. Errori
huic ansam dederunt Pauli verba non recte accepta, qui cum de iure
proprio maris ad aliquem pertinente loqueretur,[128a] fieri hoc posse
dixit Accursius per privilegium aut consuetudinem: quod additamentum
ad Iurisconsulti textum nullo modo accedens mali potius coniectoris
esse videtur quam boni interpretis. Mens Pauli supra explicata
est. Ceterum illi si vel sola Vlpiani verba,[129a] quae paulo ante
praecedunt, satis considerassent, longe aliud dicturi erant. Fatetur
enim ut quis ante aedes meas piscari prohibeatur, esse quidem
double defect.[126] Also a third reason is that we have under
consideration a merely facultative right which is not prescriptible,
as we shall show below.*
* [See chapter XI.]
But there is no end to their subtilties. There are jurists who in
this case would distinguish custom from prescription, so that if they
are debarred from the one, they may fall back upon the other. But
the distinction which they set up is most absurd. They say that the
right of one person which is taken away from him is given to another
by prescription;[127] but that when any right is given to any one
in such a way that it is not taken away from any one else, then it
is called custom. As if indeed the right of navigation, which is
common to all, upon being usurped by some one to the exclusion of all
others, would not necessarily when it became the property of one be
lost to all!
This error receives support from misinterpretation of what Paulus
has to say about a private right of possession on the sea.[128]
Accursius† said that such a right could be acquired by privilege or
custom. But this addition which in no way agrees with the text of
the jurist seems to be rather the interpretation of a mischievous
guesser than of a faithful interpreter. The real meaning of the
words of Paulus has been already explained. Besides, if more careful
consideration had been given to the words of Ulpian[129] which almost
immediately precede those of Paulus, a very different assertion would
have been made. For Ulpian acknowledges that if any one is prohibited
from fishing in front of
usurpatum;[130a] hoc est receptum consuetudine, sed nullo iure,
ideoque iniuriarum actionem prohibito non denegandam.
Contemnit igitur hunc morem, et usurpationem vocat, ut et inter
Christianos Doctores Ambrosius.[131a] Et merito. Quid enim clarius
quam non valere consuetudinem, quae iuri naturae, aut gentium ex
adverso opponitur?[132a] Consuetudo enim species est iuris positivi,
quod legi perpetuae obrogare non potest. Est autem lex illa perpetua
ut Mare omnibus usu commune sit. Quod autem in praescriptione
diximus, idem in consuetudine verum est, si quis eorum qui diversum
tradiderunt sensus excutiat, non aliud reperturum, quam consuetudinem
privilegio parari. Atqui adversus genus humanum concedendi
privilegium nemo habet potestatem; quare inter diversas respublicas
consuetudo ista vim non habet.
Verum omnem hanc quaestionem diligentissime tractavit Vasquius,[133a]
decus illud Hispaniae, cuius nec in explorando iure subtilitatem,
nec in docendo libertatem umquam desideres. Is igitur posita thesi:
‘Loca publica et iure gentium communia praescribi non posse’, quam
multis firmat auctoribus; exceptiones deinde subiungit ab Angelo et
aliis confictas, quas supra retulimus. Haec autem examinaturus recte
iudicat istarum rerum veritatem pendere a vera iuris, tam naturae
quam gentium cognitione. Ius enim naturae cum a
my house, such prohibition is a usurpation of right,[130] allowed,
it is true, by custom, but based on no law, and that an action for
damages could not be denied the person thus prohibited from fishing.
† [Franciscus (?) Accursius (?-1259) (a pupil of the famous Monarcha
juris Azzo), with whose name the Glossa Magna is almost synonymous.
He was called Advocatorum Idolum.]
He therefore condemns this practice, and calls it a usurpation;
of the Christian jurists Ambrose[131] does likewise, and both are
right. For what is clearer than that custom is not valid when it
is diametrically opposed to the law of nature or of nations?[132]
Indeed, custom is a sort of affirmative right, which cannot
invalidate general or universal law. And it is a universal law that
the sea and its use is common to all. Moreover what we have said
about prescription applies with equal truth and force to custom; and
if any one should investigate the opinions of those who have differed
upon this matter, he would find no other opinion but that custom is
established by privilege. No one has the power to confer a privilege
which is prejudicial to the rights of the human race; wherefore such
a custom has no force as between different states.
This entire question however has been most thoroughly treated by
Vasquez,[133] that glory of Spain, who leaves nothing ever to be
desired when it comes to subtle examination of the law or to the
exposition of the principles of liberty. He lays down this thesis:
‘Places public and common to all by the law of nations cannot
become objects of prescription’. This thesis he supports by many
authorities, and then he subjoins the objections fabricated by Angeli
and others, which we have enumerated above. But before examining
these objections he makes the just and reasonable statement that the
truth of all these matters depends upon a true conception both of the
law of nature and the law of nations.
divina veniat providentia, esse immutabile. Huius autem iuris
naturalis partem esse ius gentium, primaevum quod dicitur, diversum
a iure gentium secundario sive positivo, quorum posterius mutari
potest. Nam si qui mores cum iure gentium primaevo repugnent, hi non
humani sunt ipso iudice, sed FERINI, corruptelae et abusus, non leges
et usus. Itaque nullo tempore praescribi potuerunt, nulla lata lege
iustificari, nullo multarum etiam gentium consensu, hospitio, et
exercitatione stabiliri, quod exemplis aliquot et Alphonsi Castrensis
Theologi Hispani testimonio confirmat.[134a]
‘Ex quibus apparet’, inquit, ‘quam suspecta sit sententia eorum,
quos supra retulimus, existimantium Genuenses, aut etiam Venetos
posse non iniuria prohibere alios navigare per Gulfum aut pelagus
sui maris, quasi aequora ipsa praescripserint, id quod non solum
est contra leges,[135a] sed etiam est contra ipsum ius naturae, aut
gentium primaevum, quod mutari non posse diximus. Quod sit contra
illud ius constat, quia non solum maria aut aequora eo iure communia
erant sed etiam reliquae omnes res immobiles. Et licet ab eo iure
postea recessum fuerit ex parte, puta quoad dominium et proprietatem
terrarum, quarum dominium iure Naturae commune, distinctum et
divisum, sicque ab illa communione segregatum fuit; tamen[136a]
diversum fuit et est in dominio maris,
For, since the law of nature arises out of Divine Providence, it is
immutable; but a part of this natural law is the primary or primitive
law of nations, differing from the secondary or positive law of
nations, which is mutable. For if there are customs incompatible
with the primary law of nations, then, according to the judgment of
Vasquez, they are not customs belonging to men, but to wild beasts,
customs which are corruptions and abuses; not laws and usages.
Therefore those customs cannot become prescriptions by mere lapse
of time, cannot be justified by the passage of any law, cannot be
established by the consent, the protection, or the practice even of
many nations. These statements he confirms by a number of examples,
and particularly by the testimony of Alphonse de Castro[134] the
Spanish theologian.
‘It is evident therefore’, he says, ‘how much to be suspected is the
opinion of those persons mentioned above, who think that the Genoese
or the Venetians can without injustice prohibit other nations from
navigating the gulfs or bays of their respective seas, as if they
had a prescriptive right to the very water itself. Such an act is
not only contrary to the laws,[135] but is contrary also to natural
law or the primary law of nations, which we have said is immutable.
And this is seen to be true because by that same law not only the
seas or waters, but also all other immovables were _res communes_.
And although in later times there was a partial abandonment of that
law, in so far as concerns sovereignty and ownership of lands--which
by natural law at first were held in common, then distinguished and
divided, and thus finally separated from the primitive community of
use;--nevertheless[136] it was different as regards sovereignty over
the sea, which from the beginning of the world down to this
quod ab origine Mundi, ad hodiernum usque diem est, fuitque semper in
communi, nulla ex parte immutatum, ut est notum’.
‘Et quamvis ex LVSITANIS magnam turbam saepe audiverim in hac
esse opinione ut eorum Rex ita praescripserit navigationem INDICI
Occidentalis (forte Orientalis) eiusdemque VASTISSIMI MARIS, ita
ut reliquis gentibus aequora illa transfretare non liceat, et ex
nostrismet HISPANIS VVLGVS in eadem opinione fere esse videtur,
ut per VASTISSIMVM IMMENSVMQVE PONTVM ad Indorum regiones quas
potentissimi Reges nostri subegerunt reliquis mortalium navigare
praeterquam Hispanis ius minime sit, quasi ab eis id ius praescriptum
fuerit, tamen istorum omnium non minus INSANAE sunt opiniones, quam
eorum qui quoad Genuenses et Venetos in eodem fere SOMNIO esse
adsolent, quas sententias INEPTIRE vel ex eo dilucidius apparet,
quod istarum nationum singulae contra seipsas nequeunt praescribere:
hoc est, non respublica Venetiarum contra semetipsam, non respublica
Genuensium contra semetipsam, non Regnum Hispanicum contra
semetipsum, non Regnum Lusitanicum contra semetipsum.[137a] Esse enim
debet differentia inter agentem et patientem’.
‘Contra reliquas vero nationes longe minus praescribere possunt,
quia ius praescriptionum est mere civile, ut fuse ostendimus supra.
Ergo tale ius cessat cum agitur inter principes vel populos,
superiorem non recognoscentes in temporalibus. Iura enim mere civilia
cuiuscumque regionis,
very day is and always has been a _res communis_, and which, as is
well known, has in no wise changed from that status.
‘And although’, he continues, ‘I have often heard that a great many
Portuguese believe that their king has a prescriptive right over
the navigation of the vast seas of the West Indies (probably the
East Indies too) such that other nations are not allowed to traverse
those waters; and although the common people among our own Spaniards
seem to be of the same opinion, namely, that absolutely no one in
the world except us Spaniards ourselves has the least right to
navigate the great and immense sea which stretches to the regions
of the Indies once subdued by our most powerful kings, as if that
right has been ours alone by prescription; although, I repeat, I
have heard both these things, nevertheless the belief of all those
people is no less extravagantly foolish than that of those who are
always cherishing the same delusions with respect to the Genoese and
Venetians. Indeed the opinions of them all appear the more manifestly
absurd, because no one of those nations can erect a prescription
against itself; that is to say, not the Venetian republic, nor the
Genoese republic, nor the kingdom of Spain nor of Portugal can raise
prescriptions against rights they already possess by nature.[137] For
the one who claims a prescriptive right and the one who suffers by
the establishment of such a claim must not be one and the same person.
‘Against other nations they are even much less competent to raise a
prescription, because the right of prescription is only a municipal
right, as we have shown above at some length. Therefore such a right
ceases to have any effect as between rulers or nations who do not
recognize a superior in the temporal domain. For so far as the merely
municipal laws of any place are concerned, they do not
quoad exteros populos, nationes, vel etiam homines singulos, non
magis sunt in consideratione, quam si re vera esset tale ius, aut
numquam fuisset, et ad ius commune gentium primaevum vel secundarium
recurrendum est, eoque utendum, quo iure talem maris praescriptionem
et usurpationem admissam non fuisse satis constat. Nam, et hodie
usus aquarum communis est, non secus quam erat ab origine Mundi.
Ergo et in aequoribus et aquis nullum ius est aut esse potest humano
generi, praeterquam quoad usum communem. Praeterea de iure naturali
et divino est illud praeceptum, ut _Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri
non facias_. Vnde cum navigatio nemini possit esse nociva nisi
ipsi naviganti, par est ut nemini possit, aut debeat impediri,
ne in re sua natura libera, sibique minime noxia navigantium
libertatem impediat, et laedat contra dictum praeceptum et contra
regulam praesertim cum omnia intelligantur esse permissa, quae non
reperiuntur expressim prohibita.[138a] Quinimo non solum contra ius
naturale esset, velle impedire talem navigationem, sed etiam tenemur
contrarium facere, hoc est, prodesse iis quibus possumus, cum id sine
damno nostro fieri potest’.
Quod cum multis auctoritatibus tam divinis quam humanis confirmasset,
subiungit postea:[139a] ‘Ex superioribus etiam apparet suspectam esse
sententiam Iohannis Fabri, Angeli, Baldi, et Francisci Balbi, quos
supra retulimus, existimantium loca iuris gentium communia, et si
acquiri non possint praescriptione, posse tamen acquiri consuetudine,
affect foreign peoples, nations, or even individuals, any more
than if they did not exist or never had existed. Therefore it was
necessary to have recourse to the common law of nations, primary as
well as secondary, and to use a law which clearly had not admitted
any such prescription and usurpation of the sea. For today the use of
the waters is common, exactly as it has been since the creation of
the world. Therefore no man has a right nor can acquire a right over
the seas and waters which would be prejudicial to their common use.
Besides, there is both in natural and divine law that famous rule:
‘Whatsoever ye would that men should not do to you, do not ye even
so to them’. Hence it follows, since navigation cannot harm any one
except the navigator himself, it is only just that no one either can
or ought to be interdicted therefrom, lest nature, free in her own
realm, and least hurtful to herself, be found impeding the liberty
of navigation, and thus offending against the accepted precept and
rule that all things are supposed to be permitted which are not found
expressly forbidden.[138] Besides, not only would it be contrary to
natural law to wish to prevent such free navigation, but we are even
bound to do the opposite, that is, bound to assist such navigation
in whatever way we can, when it can be done without any prejudice to
ourselves’.
After Vasquez had established his point by the help of many
authorities both human and divine, he added:[139] ‘It appears then,
from what has gone before that the opinion held by Johannes Faber,
Angeli, Baldus, and Franciscus Balbus, whom we have cited above, is
not to be trusted, because they think that places common by the law
of nations, even if not open to acquisition by prescription, can
nevertheless be acquired by custom; but this is entirely false, and
quod omnino FALSVM est, eaque traditio CAECA ET NVBILA est, OMNIQVE
RATIONIS LVMINE CARENS, legemque verbis non rebus imponens.[140a] In
exemplis enim de Mari Hispanorum, LVSITANORVM, Venetorum, Genuensium,
et reliquorum, constat consuetudine ius tale navigandi, et alios
navigare prohibendi non magis acquiri quam praescriptione.[141a]
Vtroque enim casu ut apparet, eadem est ratio. Et quia per iura et
rationes supra relatas id esset contra naturalem aequitatem, nec
ullam induceret utilitatem, sed solam laesionem, sicque ut lege
expressa introduci non possent, ita etiam nec lege tacita, qualis
est consuetudo.[142a] Et tempore id non iustificaretur, sed potius
deterius et iniurius in dies fieret’.
Ostendit deinde ex prima terrarum occupatione posse populo ut venandi
ius, ita piscandi in suo flumine competere, et postquam illa semel ab
antiqua communione separata sunt, ita ut particularem applicationem
admittant, praescriptione temporis eius, cuius initi memoria non
exstet, quasi tacita populi concessione acquiri posse. Hoc autem
per praescriptionem contingere, non per consuetudinem, quia solius
aequirentis condicio melior fiat, reliquorum vero deterior. Et
cum tria enumerasset quae requiruntur, ut ius proprium in flumine
piscandi praescribatur:
‘Quid autem’, subdit, ‘quoad mare? Et in eo magis est
is a teaching which is both obscure and vague, which lacks the
faintest glimmer of reasonableness, and which sets up a law in word
but not in fact.[140] For it is well established from the examples
taken from the seas of the Spaniards, Portuguese, Venetians, Genoese,
and others, that an exclusive right of navigation and a right of
prohibiting others from navigation is no more to be acquired by
custom than by prescription.[141] And it is apparent that the reason
is the same in both cases. And since according to the laws and
reasons adduced above this would be contrary to natural equity and
would not bring benefit but only injury, therefore as it could not
be introduced by an express law, neither could it be introduced by a
tacit or implied law, and that is what custom is.[142] And far from
justifying itself by any lapse of time, it rather becomes worse, and
every day more injurious’.
Vasquez next shows that from the time of the earliest occupation of
the earth every people possessed the right of hunting in its own
territory, and of fishing in its own rivers. After those rights
were once separated from the ancient community of rights in such
a way that they admitted of particular attachments, they could be
acquired by prescription based upon such an efflux of time that
“the memory of its beginning does not exist,” as if by the tacit
permission of a nation. This comes about, however, by prescription
and not by custom, because only the condition of him who acquires is
bettered, while that of all other persons is made worse. Then after
Vasquez had enumerated three conditions which are requisite in order
that a private right of fishing in a river may become a right by
prescription, he continues as follows:
‘But what are we to say as regards the sea? There is
quod etiam concursus istorum trium non sufficeret ad acquirendum ius.
Ratio differentiae inter mare ex una parte, et terram et flumina
ex altera, quia illo casu ut olim ita et hodie, et semper, tam
quoad piscandum quam quoad navigandum mansit integrum ius gentium
primaevum, neque umquam fuit a communione hominum separatum, et
alicui, vel aliquibus applicatum. Posteriore autem casu, nempe in
terra vel fluminibus aliud fuit, ut iam disseruimus’.
‘Sed quare ius gentium secundarium, ut eam separationem quoad terras
et flumina facit, quoad mare facere desiit? respondeo, quia illo casu
expediebat. Constat enim quod si multi venentur, aut piscentur in
terra vel flumine, facile nemus feris, et flumen piscibus evacuatum
redditur, id quod in mari non est. Item fluminum navigatio facile
deterior fit et impeditur per aedificia, quod in mari non est. Item
per aquaeductus facile evacuatur flumen, non ita in mari;[143a] ergo
in utroque non est par ratio’.
‘Nec ad rem pertinet, quod supra diximus, communem esse usum
aquarum, fontium etiam et fluminum. Nam intelligitur quoad bibendum
et similia, quae fluminis dominium aut ius habenti vel minime vel
levissime nocent.[144a] Minima enim in consideratione non sunt. Pro
nostris sententiis facit, quia iniqua nullo tempore praescribuntur,
et ideo lex iniqua nullo tempore praescribitur, aut iustificatur’.
Mox: ‘Et
more to say about it, because even the combination of the three
conditions mentioned is not sufficient here for the acquisition of
such a right. The reason for the difference between the sea on one
hand and land and rivers on the other, is that in the case of the sea
the same primitive right of nations regarding fishing and navigation
which existed in the earliest times, still today exists undiminished
and always will, and because that right was never separated from the
community right of all mankind, and attached to any person or group
of persons. But in the latter case, that of the land and rivers, it
was different, as we have already set forth.
‘But why, it is asked, does the secondary law of nations which brings
about this separation when we consider lands and rivers cease to
operate in the same way when we consider the sea? I reply, because in
the former case it was expedient and necessary. For every one admits
that if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a river, the
forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but
such a contingency is impossible in the case of the sea. Again, the
navigation of rivers is easily lessened and impeded by constructions
placed therein, but this is not true of the sea. Again, a river is
easily emptied by means of aqueducts but the sea cannot be emptied
by any such means.[143] Therefore there is not equal reason on both
sides.
‘Neither does what we have said above about the common use of waters,
springs, and rivers, apply in this case, for common use is recognized
in them all for purposes of drinking and the like, such usages namely
as do not injure at all or in the slightest degree him who owns a
river or has some other right in one.[144] These are trifles for
which we have no time. What makes for our contention is the fact that
no lapse of time will give a prescriptive right to anything unjust.
Therefore an unjust law is not capable of
quae sunt impraescriptibilia ex legis dispositione, nec per mille
annos praescriberentur’; quod innumeris doctorum testimoniis
fulcit.[145a]
Nemo iam non videt, ad usum rei communis intercipiendum nullam
quantivis temporis usurpationem prodesse. Cui adiungendum est
etiam eorum qui dissentiunt auctoritatem huic quaestioni non posse
accommodari. Illi enim de Mediterraneo loquuntur, nos de Oceano; illi
de sinu, nos de immenso mari, quae in ratione occupationis plurimum
differunt. Et quibus illi indulgent praescriptionem, illi litora mari
continua possident, ut Veneti et Genuenses, quod de Lusitanis dici
non posse modo patuit.
Immo et si prodesse posset tempus, ut quidam posse putant in publicis
quae sunt, populi, tamen non ea adsunt quae necessario requiruntur.
Primum enim docent omnes desiderari, ut is qui praescribit
huiusmodi actum, eum exercuerit non longo dumtaxat tempore, sed
memoriam excedente; deinde ut tanto tempore eundem actum nemo alius
exercuerit, nisi concessione illius, vel clandestine; praeterea ut
alios uti volentes prohibuerit, scientibus quidem et patientibus
erecting a prescriptive right or of being justified by efflux
of time’. A little farther on Vasquez says: ‘Things which are
imprescriptible by the disposition of the law, may not become objects
of prescription even after the lapse of a thousand years’. This
statement he supports by countless citations from the jurists.[145]
Every one perceives that no usurpation no matter how long continued
is competent to intercept the use of a _res communis_. And it must
also be added, that the authority of those who hold dissenting
opinions cannot possibly be applied to the question here at issue.
For they are talking about the Mediterranean, we are talking about
the Ocean; they speak of a gulf, we of the boundless sea; and from
the point of view of occupation these are wholly different things.
And too, those peoples, to whom the authorities just mentioned
concede prescription, the Venetians and Genoese for example, possess
a continuous shore line on the sea, but it is clear that not even
that kind of possession can be claimed for the Portuguese.
Further, even if mere lapse of time, as some think, could establish
a right by prescription over public property, still the conditions
absolutely indispensable for the creation of such a right are in this
case absent. The conditions demanded are these: first, all jurists
teach that he who sets up a prescriptive right of this sort shall
have been in actual possession not only for a considerable period,
but from time immemorial; next, that during all that time no one
else shall have exercised the same right of possession unless by
permission of that possessor or clandestinely; besides that, it is
necessary that he shall have prevented other persons wishing to use
his possession from so doing, and that such measures be a matter of
common knowledge and done by the suffrance of those concerned in the
matter. For even if
iis ad quos ea res pertinebat; nam etsi exercuisset semper, et
quosdam exercere volentes prohibuisset semper, non tamen omnes, quia
alii fuerunt prohibiti, alii vero libere exercuerunt, id quidem non
sufficeret, ex Doctorum sententia.
Apparet autem debere haec omnia concurrere, tum quia praescriptioni
publicarum rerum lex inimica est, tum ut videatur praescribens iure
suo non autem communi usus, idque non interrupta possessione.
Cum autem tempus postulatur, cuius initi non exstet memoria,
non semper sufficit, ut optimi interpretes ostendunt, probare
saeculi lapsum; sed constare oportet famam rei a maioribus ad nos
transmissam, ita ut nemo supersit qui contrarium viderit, aut
audierit. Occasione rerum Africanarum in ulteriora primum Oceani
inquirere coeperunt regnante Iohanne Lusitani,[146a] anno salutis
millesimo quadringentesimo septuagesimo septimo. Viginti post annis
sub Rege Emanuele promontorium Bonae spei praeternavigatum est,
seriusque multo ventum Malaccam, et insulas remotiores, ad quas
Batavi navigare coeperunt anno millesimo quingentesimo nonagesimo
quinto, non dubie intra annum centesimum. Iam vero etiam eo quod
intercessit tempore aliorum usurpatio adversus alios etiam omnes
impedivit praescriptionem, Castellani ab anno millesimo quingentesimo
decime nono possessionem Lusitanis maris circa Moluccas ambiguam
he had continuously exercised his right of possession, and had always
prevented from using his possession _some_ of those who wished to
do so, but not _all_; then, because _some_ had been prevented from
exercising and _others_ freely allowed to exercise that use, that
kind of possession according to the opinion of the jurists, is not
sufficient to establish a right by prescription.
It is clear therefore that all these conditions should be present,
both because law is opposed to the prescription of public things,
and in order that he who sets up such a prescription may seem to
have used his own private right, not a public right, and that too by
continuous possession.
Now, inasmuch as time beyond the period of the memory of man is
demanded for the creation of a prescriptive right, it is not always
sufficient, as the best commentators point out, to prove the lapse of
a hundred years, but the tradition handed down to us by our ancestors
ought to be undisputed, provided no one is left alive who has seen
or heard anything to the contrary. It was during the reign of King
John,[146] in the year of our Lord 1477, at the time of the wars in
Africa, that the Portuguese began to push their discoveries first
into the more distant parts of the Ocean. Twenty years later, during
the reign of King Emmanuel, they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and
somewhat later yet, reached Malacca, and the islands beyond, the very
islands, indeed, to which the Dutch began to sail in the year 1595,
that is, well within a hundred years of the time that the Portuguese
first arrived. And in truth even in that interval, the usurpation
of rights there by other parties had interrupted the competence of
everybody else to create a prescriptive right. For example, from the
year 1519, the Spaniards rendered the possession by the Portuguese of
the sea around the Moluccas a very uncertain one. Even the French and
fecere. Galli etiam et Angli non clanculum, sed via aperta eo
perruperunt. Praeterea accolae totius tractus Africani, aut Asiatici
partem maris quisque sibi proximam piscando et navigando perpetuo
usurparunt, numquam a Lusitanis prohibiti.
Conclusum igitur sit, ius nullum esse Lusitanis quo aliam quamvis
gentem a navigatione Oceani ad Indos prohibeant.
English made their way to those newly discovered places not secretly,
but by force of arms. And besides these, the inhabitants of the
entire coast of Africa and Asia constantly used for fishing and
navigation that part of the sea nearest their own several coasts, and
were never interdicted from such use by the Portuguese.
The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that the Portuguese
are in possession of no right whereby they may interdict to any
nation whatsoever the navigation of the Ocean to the East Indies.
_Iure gentium inter quosvis liberam esse mercaturam_
Quod si dicant Lusitani cum Indis commercia exercendi ius quoddam
proprium ad se pertinere, eisdem fere omnibus argumentis refellentur.
Repetemus breviter et aptabimus.
Iure Gentium hoc introductum est, ut cunctis hominibus inter se
libera esset negotiandi facultas, quae a nemine posset adimi.[147a]
Et hoc, sicut post dominiorum distinctionem continuo necessarium
fuit, ita originem videri potest antiquiorem habuisse. Subtiliter
enim Aristoteles μεταβλητικὴν dixit, ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
αὐταρκείας,[148a] hoc est, negotiatione suppleri id quod naturae
deest, quo commode omnibus sufficiat. Oportet igitur communem esse
iure gentium non tantum privative, sed et positive, ut dicunt
magistri, sive affirmative.[149a] Quae autem illo modo sunt iuris
gentium, mutari possunt: quae hoc modo, non possunt. Id ita intelligi
potest.
Dederat natura omnia omnibus. Sed cum a rerum multarum usu, quas vita
desiderat humana, locorum intervallo homines arcerentur, quia ut
supra diximus, non omnia ubique
_By the Law of Nations trade is free to all persons whatsoever_
If however the Portuguese claim that they have an exclusive right
to trade with the East Indies, their claim will be refuted by
practically all the same arguments which already have been brought
forward. Nevertheless I shall repeat them briefly, and apply them to
this particular claim.
By the law of nations the principle was introduced that the
opportunity to engage in trade, of which no one can be deprived,[147]
should be free to all men. This principle, inasmuch as its
application was straightway necessary after the distinctions of
private ownerships were made, can therefore be seen to have had a
very remote origin. Aristotle, in a very clever phrase, in his work
entitled the Politics,[148] has said that the art of exchange is
a completion of the independence which Nature requires. Therefore
trade ought to be common to all according to the law of nations,
not only in a negative but also in a positive, or as the jurists
say, affirmative sense.[149] The things that come under the former
category are subject to change, those of the latter category are not.
This statement is to be explained in the following way.
Nature had given all things to all men. But since men were prevented
from using many things which were desirable in every day life because
they lived so far apart,
proveniunt, opus fuit traiectione; nec adhuc tamen permutatio erat,
sed aliis vicissim rebus apud alios repertis suo arbitrio utebantur;
quo fere modo apud Seres dicitur rebus in solitudine relictis sola
mutantium religione peragi commercium.[150a]
Sed cum statim res mobiles monstrante necessitate, quae modo
explicata est, in ius proprium transissent, inventa est permutatio,
qua quod alteri deest ex eo quod alteri superest suppleretur.[151a]
Ita commercia victus gratia inventa ex Homero Plinius probat.[152a]
Postquam vero res etiam immobiles in dominos distingui coeperunt,
sublata undique communio non inter homines locorum spatiis discretos
tantum, verum etiam inter vicinos necessarium fecit commercium; quod
ut facilius procederet, nummus postea adventus est, dictus ἀπὸ τοῦ
νόμου quod institutum sit civile.[153a]
Ipsa igitur ratio omnium contractuum universalis, ἡ μεταβλητική
a natura est; modi autem aliquot singulares ipsumque pretium, ἡ
χρηματιστική ab instituto;[154a] quae vetustiores iuris interpretes
non satis distinxerunt. Fatentur
and because, as we have said above, everything was not found
everywhere, it was necessary to transport things from one place to
another; not that there was yet an interchange of commodities, but
that people were accustomed to make reciprocal use of things found
in one another’s territory according to their own judgment. They say
that trade arose among the Chinese in about this way. Things were
deposited at places out in the desert and left to the good faith and
conscience of those who exchanged things of their own for what they
took.[150]
But when movables passed into private ownership (a change brought
about by necessity, as has been explained above), straightway there
arose a method of exchange by which the lack of one person was
supplemented by that of which another person had an over supply.[151]
Hence commerce was born out of necessity for the commodities of life,
as Pliny shows by a citation from Homer.[152] But after immovables
also began to be recognized as private property, the consequent
annihilation of universal community of use made commerce a necessity
not only between men whose habitations were far apart but even
between men who were neighbors; and in order that trade might be
carried on more easily, somewhat later they invented money, which, as
the derivation of the word shows, is a civic institution.[153]
Therefore the universal basis of all contracts, namely exchange, is
derived from nature; but some particular kinds of exchange, and the
money payment itself, are derived from law;[154] although the older
commentators on the law have not made this distinction sufficiently
clear. Nevertheless all
tamen omnes proprietatem rerum, saltem mobilium a iure gentium
primario prodire, itemque contractus omnes quibus pretium non
accedit.[155a] Philosophi[156a] τῆς μεταβλητικῆς quam translationem
vertere licebit, genera statuunt duo: τὴν ἐμπορικιὴν καὶ τὴν
καπηλικήν quarum ἐμπορική quae ut vox ipsa indicat inter
gentes dissitas, ordine naturae prior est, et sic a Platone
ponitur.[157a] Καπηλική eadem videtur esse quae παράστασις[158a]
Aristoteli, tabernaria sive stataria negotiatio inter cives. Idem
Aristoteles[159a] τὴν ἐμπορικήν dividit in ναυκληρίαν et φορτηγίαν
quarum haec terrestri itinere, illa maritimo merces devehit.
Sordidior autem est καπηλική contra honestior ἐμπορική et maritima
maxime, quia multa multis impertit.[160a]
Vnde navium exercitionem ad summam rempublicam pertinere dicit
Vlpianus; institorum non eundem esse usum; quia illa omnino secundum
naturam necessaria est. Aristoteles:[161a] ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ
πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ
δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ‘est enim translatio rerum
omnium coepta ab initio, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, cum homines
partim haberent plura, quam sufficerent, partim etiam pauciora’.
Seneca:[162a] ‘quae emeris, vendere; gentium ius est’.
Commercandi igitur libertas ex iure est primario gentium,
authorities agree that the ownership of things, particularly of
movables, arises out of the primary law of nations, and that all
contracts in which a price is not mentioned, are derived from the
same source.[155] The philosophers[156] distinguish two kinds of
exchange using Greek words which we shall take the liberty to
translate as ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ trade. The former, as the Greek
word shows, signifies trade or exchange between widely separated
nations, and it ranks first in the order of Nature, as is shown
in Plato’s Republic.[157] The latter seems to be the same kind of
exchange that Aristotle calls by another Greek word[158] which means
retail or shop trade between citizens. Aristotle makes a further
division of wholesale trade into overland and overseas trade.[159]
But of the two, retail trade is the more petty and sordid, and
wholesale the more honorable; but most honorable of all is the
wholesale overseas trade, because it makes so many people sharers in
so many things.[160]
Hence Ulpian says that the maintenance of ships is the highest duty
of a state, because it is an absolutely natural necessity, but that
the maintenance of hucksters has not the same value. In another place
Aristotle says: “For the art of exchange extends to all possessions,
and it arises at first in a natural manner from the circumstance that
some have too little, others too much.”[161] And Seneca is also to be
cited in this connection for he has said that buying and selling is
the law of nations.[162]
Therefore freedom of trade is based on a primitive right of nations
which has a natural and permanent cause; and
quod naturalem et perpetuam causam habet, ideoque tolli non potest,
et si posset non tamen posset nisi omnium gentium consensu: tantum
abest ut ullo modo gens aliqua gentes duas inter se contrahere
volentes iuste impediat.
so that right cannot be destroyed, or at all events it may not be
destroyed except by the consent of all nations. For surely no one
nation may justly oppose in any way two nations that desire to enter
into a contract with each other.
_Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lusitanorum titulo
occupationis_
Primum inventio aut occupatio hic locum non habet, quia ius mercandi
non est aliquid corporale, quod possit apprehendi; neque prodesset
Lusitanis etiamsi primi hominum cum Indis habuissent commercia, quod
tamen non potest non esse falsissimum. Nam et cum initio populi in
diversa iere, aliquos necesse est primos fuisse mercatores, quos
tamen ius nullum acquisivisse certo est certius. Quare si Lusitanis
ius aliquod competit, ut soli cum Indis negotientur, id exemplo
ceterarum servitutum, ex concessione oriri debuit aut expressa aut
tacita, hoc est praescriptione; neque aliter potest.
_Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by
title of occupation_
Neither discovery nor occupation [which have been fully treated
in Chapters II and V], is to be invoked on the point here under
consideration, because the right of carrying on trade is not
something corporal, which can be physically seized; nor would
discovery or occupation help the case of the Portuguese even if
they had been the very first persons to trade with the East Indies,
although such a claim would be entirely untenable and false. For
since in the beginning peoples set out along different paths, it was
necessary that some become the first traders, nevertheless it is
absolutely certain that those traders did not on that account acquire
any rights. Wherefore if the Portuguese have any right by virtue of
which they _alone_ may trade with the East Indies, that right like
other servitudes ought to arise from concession, either express or
tacit, that is to say, from prescription. Otherwise no such right can
exist.
_Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lusitanorum titulo donationis
Pontificiae_
Concessit nemo, nisi forte Pontifex, qui non potuit.[163a] Nemo
enim quod suum non est concedere potest. At Pontifex, nisi totius
Mundi temporalis sit Dominus, quod negant sapientes, ius etiam
commerciorum universale sui iuris dicere non potest. Maxime vero
cum res sit ad solum quaestum accommodata, nihilque ad spiritualem
procurationem pertinens, extra quam cessat, ut fatentur omnes,
Pontificia potestas. Praeterea si Pontifex solis illud Lusitanis ius
tribuere vellet idemque adimere hominibus ceteris, duplicem faceret
iniuriam: Primum Indis, quos ut extra Ecclesiam positos Pontifici
nulla ex parte subditos esse diximus. His igitur cum nihil quod
ipsorum est adimere possit Pontifex, etiam ius illud quod habent cum
quibuslibet negotiandi adimere non potuit. Deinde aliis hominibus
omnibus Christianis et non Christianis, quibus idem illud ius adimere
non potuit sine causa indicta. Quid quod ne temporales quidem Domini
in suis imperiis prohibere possunt commerciorum libertatem, uti
rationibus et auctoritatibus ante demonstratum est?
Sicut et illud confitendum est, contra ius perpetuum naturae
gentiumque, unde ista libertas originem sumpsit in omne tempus
duratura, nullam valere Pontificis auctoritatem.
_Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by
virtue of title based on the Papal Donation_
No one has granted it except perhaps the Pope, and he did not have
the power.[163] For no one can give away what he does not himself
possess. But the Pope, unless he were the temporal master of the
whole world, which sensible men deny, cannot say that the universal
right in respect of trade belongs to him. Especially is this true
since trade has to do only with material gains, and has no concern
at all with spiritual matters, outside of which, as all admit, Papal
power ceases. Besides, if the Pope wished to give that right to the
Portuguese alone, and to deprive all other men of the same right,
he would be doing a double injustice. In the first place, he would
do an injustice to the people of the East Indies who, placed as we
have said outside the Church, are in no way subjects of the Pope.
Therefore, since the Pope cannot take away from them anything that is
theirs, he could not take away their right of trading with whomsoever
they please. In the second place, he would do an injustice to all
other men both Christian and non-Christian, from whom he could not
take that same right without a hearing. Besides, what are we to say
of the fact that not even temporal lords in their own dominions are
competent to prohibit the freedom of trade, as has been demonstrated
above by reasonable and authoritative statements?
Therefore it must be acknowledged, that the authority of the Pope has
absolutely no force against the eternal law of nature and of nations,
from whence came that liberty which is destined to endure for ever
and ever.
_Mercaturam cum Indis non esse Lusitanorum propriam iure
praescriptionis aut consuetudinis_
Restat praescriptio, seu consuetudinem mavis dicere.[164a] Sed
nec huius nec illius vim esse aliquam inter liberas nationes, aut
diversarum gentium Principes, nec adversus ea quae primigenio iure
introducta sunt, cum Vasquio ostendimus. Quare et hic ut ius mercandi
proprium fiat, quod proprietatis naturam non recipit, nullo tempore
efficitur. Itaque nec titulus hic adfuisse potest, nec bona fides,
quae cum manifesto desinit, praescriptio secundum Canones non ius
dicetur, sed iniuria.
Quin et ipsa mercandi quasi possessio non ex iure proprio contigisse
videtur, sed ex iure communi quod ad omnes aequaliter pertinet; sicut
contra, quod aliae nationes cum Indis contrahere forte neglexerunt,
id non Lusitanorum gratia fecisse existimandi sunt, sed quia sibi
expedire crediderunt; quod nihil obstat quo minus ubi suaserit
utilitas, id facere possint, quod antea non fecerint. Certissima enim
illa regula a doctoribus traditur,[165a] in his quae sunt arbitrii
seu merae facultatis, ita ut per se actum tantum facultatis eius,
non autem ius novum operentur, nec praescriptionis nec consuetudinis
titulo annos etiam mille valituros: quod et
_Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by
title of prescription or custom_
Last of all, prescription, or if you prefer the term, custom.[164] We
have shown that according to Vasquez, neither prescription nor custom
had any force as between free nations or the rulers of different
peoples, or any force against those principles which were introduced
by primitive law. And here as before, mere efflux of time does not
bring it to pass that the right of trade, which does not partake of
the nature of ownership, becomes a private possession. Now in this
case neither title nor good faith can be shown, and inasmuch as good
faith is clearly absent, according to legal rules prescription will
not be called a right, but an injury.
Nay, the very possession involved in trading seems not to have
arisen out of a private right, but out of a public right which
belongs equally to all; so on the other hand, because nations perhaps
neglected to trade with the East Indies, it must not be presumed that
they did so as a favor to the Portuguese, but because they believed
it to be to their own best interests. But nothing stands in their
way, when once expediency shall have persuaded them, to prevent them
from doing what they had not previously done. For the jurists[165]
have handed down as incontestable the principle that where things
arbitrable or facultative are such that they produce nothing more
than the facultative act _per se_, but do not create a new right,
that in all such cases not even a thousand years will create a title
by prescription or custom.
affirmative et negative procedit, ut docet Vasquius. Nec enim quod
libere feci facere cogor, nec quod non feci omittere.
Alioquin quid esset absurdius quam ex eo quod singuli non possumus
cum singulis semper contrahere, salvum nobis in posterum non esse
ius cum illis, si usus tulerit, contrahendi? Idem Vasquius et illud
rectissime, ne infinito quidem tempore effici, ut quid necessitate
potius, quam sponte factum videatur.
Probanda itaque Lusitanis foret coactio, quae tamen ipsa cum hac in
re iuri naturae sit contraria, et omni hominum generi noxia, ius
facere non potest.[166a] Deinde illa coactio durasse debuit per
tempus, cuius initii non exstet memoria; id vero tantum hinc abest,
ut ne centum quidem anni exierint, ex quo tota fere negotiatio Indica
penes Venetos fuit, per Alexandrinas traiectiones.[167a] Debuit etiam
talis esse coactio, cui restitum non sit. At restiterunt Galli et
Angli, aliique. Neque sufficit aliquos esse coactos, sed ut omnes
coacti sint requiritur, cum per unum non coactum servetur in causa
communi libertatis possessio. Arabes autem et Sinenses a saeculis
aliquot ad hunc usque diem perpetuo cum Indis negotiantur.
This, as Vasquez points out, acts both affirmatively and negatively.
For I am not compelled to do what I have hitherto done of my own free
will, nor am I compelled to stop doing what I have never done.
What moreover could be more absurd than to deduce from the fact that
we as individuals are not able always to conclude a bargain with
other individuals, that there is not preserved to us for the future
the right of bargaining with them if opportunity shall have offered?
The same Vasquez has also most justly said that not even the lapse
of infinite time establishes a right which seems to have arisen from
necessity rather than choice.
Therefore in order to establish a prescriptive right to the trade
with the East Indies the Portuguese would be compelled to prove
coercion. But since in such a case as this coercion is contrary to
the law of nature and obnoxious to all mankind, it cannot establish
a right.[166] Next, that coercion must needs have been in existence
for so long a time that “the memory of its beginning does not exist”;
that, however, is so far from being the case that not even a hundred
years had elapsed since the Venetians controlled nearly the entire
trade with the East Indies, carrying it via Alexandria.[167] Again,
the coercion ought to have been such that it was not resisted; but
the English and the French and other nations besides, did resist
it. Finally, it is not sufficient that _some_ be coerced, but it
is indispensable that _all_ be coerced, because the possession of
freedom of trade is preserved to all by a failure to use coercion
upon even one person. Moreover, the Arabians and the Chinese are at
the present day still carrying on with the people of the East Indies
a trade which has been uninterrupted for several centuries.
_Nulla aequitate niti Lusitanos in prohibendo commercio_
Ex his quae dicta sunt satis perspicitur eorum caeca aviditas, qui,
ne quemquam in partem lucri admittant, illis rationibus conscientiam
suam placare student, quas ipsi magistri Hispanorum qui in eadem
sunt causa manifestae vanitatis convincunt.[168a] Omnes enim qui in
rebus Indicis usurpantur colores iniuste captari quantum ipsis licet,
satis innuunt, adduntque numquam eam rem serio Theologorum examine
probatam. Illa vero querela quid est iniquius, quod dicunt Lusitani
quaestus suos exhauriri copia contra licentium? Inter certissima enim
Iuris enuntiata est, nec in dolo eum versari, nec fraudem facere, ne
damnum quidem alteri dare videri, qui iure suo utitur; quod maxime
verum est, si non ut alteri noceatur, sed rem suam augendi animo
quippiam fiat.[169a] Inspici enim debet id quod principaliter agitur,
non quod extrinsecus in consequentiam venit. Immo si proprie loquimur
cum Vlpiano, non ille damnum dat, sed lucro quo adhuc alter utebatur
eum prohibet.
Naturale autem est et summo iuri atque etiam aequitati
_The Portuguese prohibition of trade has no foundation in equity_
From what has been said thus far it is easy to see the blind cupidity
of those who in order not to admit any one else to a share in their
gains, strive to still their consciences by the very arguments which
the Spanish jurists, interested too in the same case, show to be
absolutely empty.[168] For they intimate as clearly as they can
that as regards India all the pretexts employed, are far fetched
and unjust. They add that this right was never seriously approved
by the swarm of theologians. Indeed, what is more unjust than the
complaint made by the Portuguese that their profits are drained off
by the number of their competitors? An incontrovertible rule of law
lays down that a man who uses his own right is justly presumed to be
contriving neither a deceit nor a fraud, in fact not even to be doing
any one an injury. This is particularly true, if he has no intention
to harm any one, but only to increase his own property.[169] For
what ought to be considered is the chief and ultimate intent not the
irrelevant consequence. Indeed, if we may with propriety agree with
Ulpian, he is not doing an injury, but he is preventing some one from
getting a profit which another was previously enjoying.
Moreover it is natural and conformable to the highest law as well
as equity, that when a gain open to all is concerned every person
prefers it for himself rather than for
conveniens, ut lucrum in medio positum suum quisque malit quam
alterius, etiam qui ante perceperat.[170a] Quis ferat querentem
opificem quod alter eiusdem artis exercitio ipsius commoda evertat?
Batavorum autem causa eo est iustior, quia ipsorum hac in parte
utilitas cum totius humani generis utilitate coniuncta est, quam
Lusitani eversum eunt.[171a] Neque hoc recte dicetur ad aemulationem
fieri, ut in re simili ostendit Vasquius: aut enim plane hoc negandum
est, aut asseverandum non ad bonam modo, verum etiam ad optimam
aemulationem fieri, iuxta Hesiodum:[172a] ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι
‘bona lis mortalibus haec est’. Nam etiam si quis pietate motus,
inquit ille, frumentum in summa penuria vilius venderet, impediretur
improba duritie eorum hominum, qui saeviente penuria suum carius
fuerant vendituri. Verum est talibus modis minui aliorum reditus: nec
id negamus, ait, ‘sed minuuntur cum universorum hominum commodo: ET
VTINAM omnium PRINCIPVM et TYRRANORVM ORBIS reditus ita minuerentur’.
Quid ergo tam iniquum videri potest, quam Hispanos vectigalem habere
Terrarum Orbem, ut nisi ad illorum nutum nec emere liceat nec
vendere?[173a] In cunctis civitatibus dardanarios odio atque etiam
poenis prosequimur; nec ullum tam nefarium vitae genus videtur, quam
ista annonae flagellatio.[174a] Merito quidem. Naturae enim faciunt
another, even if that other had already discovered it.[170] Who
would countenance an artisan who complained that another artisan was
taking away his profits by the exercise of the same craft? But the
cause of the Dutch is the more reasonable, because their advantage in
this matter is bound up with the advantage of the whole human race,
an advantage which the Portuguese are trying to destroy.[171] Nor
will it be correct to say, that this is done in rivalry, as Vasquez
shows in a similar case. For clearly we must either deny this or
affirm that it is done not only in honorable but in most honorable
rivalry, for, as Hesiod says, ‘This rivalry is honorable for mortal
men’.[172] For, says Vasquez, if any one should be so moved by love
for his fellow man as to offer grain at a time of great scarcity for
a lower price than usual, he would be prevented by the wicked and
hardhearted men who had the intention of selling their grain at a
higher price than usual, because of the pinch caused by the scarcity.
But, some one will object, by such methods the profits of others will
be made less. ‘We do not deny it’, says Vasquez, ‘but they are made
less to the corresponding advantage of all other men. And would that
the profits of all Rulers and Tyrants of this world could be thus
lessened’!
Indeed can anything more unjust be conceived than for the Spaniards
to hold the entire world tributary, so that it is not permissible
either to buy or to sell except at their good pleasure?[173] In all
states we heap odium upon grain speculators and even bring them to
punishment; and in very truth there seems to be no other sort of
business so disgraceful as that of forcing up prices in the grain
market.[174] That is not
iniuriam, quae in commune fecunda est:[175a] neque vero censeri
debet in usus paucorum reperta negotiatio, sed ut quod alteri deest
alterius copia pensaretur, iusto tamen compendio omnibus proposito,
qui laborem ac periculum transferendi in se suscipiunt.
Hoc ipsum igitur quod in republica, id est, minore hominum conventu,
grave et perniciosum iudicatur, in magna illa humani generis
societate ferendumne est? ut scilicet totius mundi monopolium faciant
populi Hispani? Invehitur Ambrosius in eos qui maria claudunt,[176a]
Augustinus in eos qui itinera obstruunt; Nazianzenus in[177a]
coemptores suppressoresque mercium, qui ex inopia aliorum soli
quaestum faciunt, et ut ipse facundissime loquitur καταπραγματεύονται
τῆς ἐνδείας. Quin et divini sapientis sententia publicis diris
devovetur sacerque habetur, qui alimenta supprimendo vexat annonam: ὅ
συνέχων σῖτον δημοκατάρατος.
Clament igitur Lusitani quantum, et quam diu libebit: ‘Lucra nostra
deciditis’. Respondebunt Batavi: ‘Immo nostris invigilamus. Hocne
indignamini in partem nos venire ventorum et maris? Et quis illa
vobis lucra mansura promiserat? Salvum est vobis, quo nos contenti
sumus’.
to be wondered at, for such speculators are doing an injury to
nature, who, as Aristotle says, is fertile for all alike.[175]
Accordingly it ought not to be supposed that trade was invented for
the benefit of a few, but in order that the lack of one would be
counterbalanced by the oversupply of another, a fair return also
being guaranteed to all who take upon themselves the work and the
danger of transport.
Is the same thing then which is considered grievous and pernicious
in the smaller community of a state to be put up with at all in
that great community of the human race? Shall the people of Spain,
forsooth, assume a monopoly of all the world? Ambrose inveighs
against those who interfere with the freedom of the sea;[176]
Augustine against those who obstruct the overland routes; and Gregory
of Nazianzus[177] against those who buy goods and hold them, and thus
(as he eloquently says) make profits for themselves alone out of
the helplessness and need of others. Indeed in the opinion of this
wise and holy man any person who holds back grain and thus forces up
the market price ought to be given over to public punishment and be
adjudged worthy of death.
Therefore the Portuguese may cry as loud and as long as they shall
please: ‘You are cutting down our profits’! The Dutch will answer:
‘Nay! we are but looking out for our own interests! Are you angry
because we share with you in the winds and the sea? Pray, who had
promised that you would always have those advantages? You are secure
in the possession of that with which we are quite content’.
_Batavis ius commercii Indicani qua pace, qua indutiis, qua bello
retinendum_
Quare cum et ius et aequum postulet, libera nobis ita ut cuiquam
esse Indiae commercia, superest, ut sive cum Hispanis pax, sive
indutiae fiunt, sive bellum manet, omnino eam, quam a natura
habemus libertatem tueamur. Nam ad pacem quod attinet, notum
est eam esse duorum generum: aut enim pari foedere, aut impari
coitur. Graeci[178a] istam vocant συνθήκην ἐξ ἴσου hanc σπονδὰς ἐξ
ἐπιταγμάτων illa virorum est, haec ingeniorum servilium. Demosthenes
in oratione de libertate Rhodiorum:[179a] καί τοι χρὴ τοὺς
βουλομένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων συνθήκας φεύγειν,
ὡς ἐγγὺς δουλείας οὔσας, ‘eos qui volunt esse liberi oportet omnes
condiciones quibus leges imponuntur ita fugere tamquam quae proximae
sunt servituti’. Tales autem sunt omnes quibus pars altera in iure
suo imminuitur, iuxta Isocratis definitionem[180a] vocantis τὰ τοὺς
ἑτέρους ἐλαττοῦντα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. Si enim, ut inquit Cicero,[181a]
‘suscipienda bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace
vivatur’, sequitur eodem auctore*, pacem esse vocandam, non pactionem
servitutis, sed tranquillam libertatem; quippe cum et Philosophorum
et Theologorum
_The Dutch must maintain their right of trade with the East Indies by
peace, by treaty, or by war_
Wherefore since both law and equity demand that trade with the East
Indies be as free to us as to any one else, it follows that we are to
maintain at all hazards that freedom which is ours by nature, either
by coming to a peace agreement with the Spaniards, or by concluding
a treaty, or by continuing the war. So far as peace is concerned, it
is well known that there are two kinds of peace, one made on terms of
equality, the other on unequal terms. The Greeks[178] call the former
kind a compact between equals, the latter an enjoined truce; the
former is meant for high souled men, the latter for servile spirits.
Demosthenes in his speech on the liberty of the Rhodians[179] says
that it was necessary for those who wished to be free to keep away
from treaties which were imposed upon them, because such treaties
were almost the same as slavery. Such conditions are all those by
which one party is lessened in its own right, according to the
definition of Isocrates.[180] For if, as Cicero says,[181] wars
must be undertaken in order that people may live in peace unharmed,
it follows that peace ought to mean not an agreement which entails
slavery, but an undisturbed liberty, especially as peace and justice
according to
complurium[182a] iudicio pax et iustitia nominibus magis quam re
differant, sitque pax non qualiscumque, sed ordinata concordia.
* [Philippica XII, 14: cum iis facta pax non erit pax, sed pactio
servitutis.]
Indutiae autem si fiunt satis apparet ex ipsa indutiarum natura non
debere medio earum tempore condicionem cuiusquam deteriorem fieri,
cum ferme interdicti uti possidetis instar obtineant.
Quod si in bellum trudimur hostium iniquitate, debet nobis causae
aequitas spem ac fiduciam boni eventus addere. Nam[183a] ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄν
ἐλαττῶνται μεχρὶ δυνατοῦ πάντες πολεμοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν
οὐχ οὕτως, ‘pro his in quibus iniuria afficiuntur omnes quantum
omnino possunt depugnant: at propter alieni cupiditatem non item’;
quod et Alexander Imperator ita expressit: τὸ μὲν ἄρχειν ἀδίκων ἒργων
οὐκ ἀγνώμονα ἔχει τὴν πρόκλησιν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὀχλοῦντας ἀποσείεσθαι ἔκ
τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς συνειδήσεως ἔχει τὸ θαῤῥαλέον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
ἀλλ’ ἀμύνασθαι ὑπάρχει τὸ εὔελπι, ‘eius a quo coepit iniuria,
provocatio maxime invidiosa est; at cum depelluntur aggressores,
sicut bona conscientia fiduciam secum fert, ita quia de vindicanda
non de inferenda iniuria laboratur, spes etiam adsunt optimae’.
Si ita necesse est, perge gens mari invictissima, nec tuam tantum,
sed humani generis libertatem audacter propugna.
_Nec te, quod classis centenis remigat alis,
Terreat: INVITO labitur illa MARI:
Quodve vehunt prorae Centaurica saxa minantes,
Tigna cava et pictos experiere metus.
Frangit et attollit vires in milite causa;
Quae nisi iusta subest, excutit arma pudor._[184a]
the opinion of many philosophers and theologians[182] differ more in
name than in fact, and as peace is a harmonious agreement based not
on individual whim, but on well ordered regulations.
If however a truce is arranged for, it is quite clear from the very
nature of a truce, that during its continuance no one’s condition
ought to change for the worse, inasmuch as both parties stand on the
equivalent of a _uti possidetis_.
But if we are driven into war by the injustice of our enemies, the
justice of our cause ought to bring hope and confidence in a happy
outcome. “For,” as Demosthenes has said, “every one fights his
hardest to recover what he has lost; but when men endeavor to gain at
the expense of others it is not so.”[183] The Emperor Alexander has
expressed his idea in this way: ‘Those who begin unjust deeds, must
bear the greatest blame; but those who repel aggressors are twice
armed, both with courage because of their just cause, and with the
highest hope because they are not doing a wrong, but are warding off
a wrong’.
Therefore, if it be necessary, arise, O nation unconquered on the
sea, and fight boldly, not only for your own liberty, but for that of
the human race. “Nor let it fright thee that their fleet is winged,
each ship, with an hundred oars. The sea whereon it sails will have
none of it. And though the prows bear figures threatening to cast
rocks such as Centaurs throw, thou shalt find them but hollow planks
and painted terrors. ’Tis his cause that makes or mars a soldier’s
strength. If the cause be not just, shame strikes the weapon from his
hands.”[184]
Si iusta multi, et ipse Augustinus,[185a] arma crediderunt eo nomine
suscipi, quod per terras alienas iter innoxium negaretur, quanto illa
erunt iustiora, quibus maris, quod naturae lege commune est, usus
communis et innoxius postulatur? Si iuste oppugnatae sunt gentes quae
in suo solo commercia aliis interdicebant, quid illae quae populos
ad se nihil pertinentes per vim distinent, ac mutuos earum commeatus
intercludunt? Si res ista in iudicio agitaretur, dubitari non potest
quae a viro bono expectari deberet sententia, ait Praetor:[186a]
‘Quo minus illi in flumine publico navem agere, ratem agere, quove
minus per ripam exonerare liceat, vim fieri veto’. De mari et litore
in eandem formam dandum interdictum docent interpretes, exemplo
Labeonis, qui cum interdiceret Praetor:[187a] ‘Ne quid in flumine
publico ripave eius facias, quo statio iterve navigio deterius sit,
fiat’; simile dixit interdictum competere in mari:[188a] ‘Ne quid in
mari inve litore facias, quo portus, statio, iterve navigio deterius
sit, fiat’.
Immo et post prohibitionem, si quis scilicet in mari navigare
prohibitus sit, aut non permissus rem suam vendere, aut re sua uti,
iniuriarum eo nomine competere actionem Vlpianus respondit.[189a]
Theologi insuper et qui tractant casus, quos vocant, conscientiarum,
concordes tradunt,
If many writers, Augustine himself[185] among them, believed it was
right to take up arms because innocent passage was refused across
foreign territory, how much more justly will arms be taken up against
those from whom the demand is made of the common and innocent use
of the sea, which by the law of nature is common to all? If those
nations which interdicted others from trade on their own soil are
justly attacked, what of those nations which separate by force and
interrupt the mutual intercourse of peoples over whom they have
no rights at all? If this case should be taken into court, there
can be no doubt what opinion ought to be anticipated from a just
judge. The praetor’s law says:[186] ‘I forbid force to be used in
preventing any one from sailing a ship or a boat on a public river,
or from unloading his cargo on the bank’. The commentators say that
the injunction must be applied in the same manner to the sea and to
the seashore. Labeo, for example, in commenting on the praetor’s
edict,[187] ‘Let nothing be done in a public river or on its bank, by
which a landing or a channel for shipping be obstructed’, said there
was a similar interdict which applied to the sea, namely,[188] ‘Let
nothing be done on the sea or on the seashore by which a harbor, a
landing, or a channel for shipping be obstructed’.
Nay more, after such a prohibition, if, namely, a man be prevented
from navigating the sea, or not allowed to sell or to make use of his
own wares and products, Ulpian says that he can bring an action for
damages on that ground.[189] Also the theologians and the casuists
agree that he who prevents another from buying or selling, or who
puts his
eum qui alterum vendere aut emere impediat, utilitatemve propriam
publicae ac communi praeponat, aut ullo modo alterum in eo quod est
iuris communis impediat, ad restitutionem teneri omnis damni viri
boni arbitrio.
Secundum haec igitur vir bonus iudicans, Batavis libertatem
commerciorum adiudicaret, Lusitanos et ceteros, qui eam libertatem
impediunt, vetaret vim facere, et damna restituere iuberet. Quod
autem in iudicio obtineretur, id ubi iudicium haberi non potest,
iusto bello vindicatur. Augustinus:[190a] ‘Iniquitas partis adversae
iusta ingerit bella’. Et Cicero:[191a] ‘Cum sint duo genera
decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, confugiendum ad
posterius, si uti non licet priore’. Et Rex Theodoricus: ‘Veniendum
tunc ad arma, cum locum apud adversarium iustitia non potest
reperire’. Et quod proprius est nostro argumento,[192a] Pomponius
eum qui rem omnibus communem cum incommodo ceterorum usurpet, MANV
PROHIBENDVM respondit. Theologi quoque tradunt, sicuti pro rerum
cuiusque defensione bellum recte suscipitur, ita non minus recte
suscipi, pro usu earum rerum quae naturali iure debent esse communes.
Quare ei qui itinera praecludat, evectionemque mercium impediat,
etiam non expectata ulla publica auctoritate, _via facti_, ut
loquuntur, posse occurri.
Quae cum ita sint, minime verendum est, ne aut Deus
private interests before the public and common interests, or who
in any way hinders another in the use of something which is his by
common right, is held in damages to complete restitution in an amount
fixed by an honorable arbitrator.
Following these principles a good judge would award to the Dutch
the freedom of trade, and would forbid the Portuguese and others
from using force to hinder that freedom, and would order the payment
of just damages. But when a judgment which would be rendered in a
court cannot be obtained, it should with justice be demanded in a
war. Augustine[190] acknowledges this when he says: ‘The injustice
of an adversary brings a just war’. Cicero also says:[191] “There
are two ways of settling a dispute; first, by discussion; second,
by physical force; we must resort to force only in case we may not
avail ourselves of discussion.” And King Theodoric says: ‘Recourse
must then be had to arms when justice can find no lodgment in an
adversary’s heart’. Pomponius, however, has handed down a decision
which has more bearing on our argument[192] than any of the citations
already made. He declared that the man who seized a thing common to
all to the prejudice of every one else must be forcibly prevented
from so doing. The theologians also say that just as war is
righteously undertaken in defense of individual property, so no less
righteously is it undertaken in behalf of the use of those things
which by natural law ought to be common property. Therefore he who
closes up roads and hinders the export of merchandise ought to be
prevented from so doing _via facti_, even without waiting for any
public authority.
Since these things are so, there need not be the slightest
eorum conatus secundet, qui ab ipso institutum ius naturae
certissimum violant, aut homines ipsi eos inultos patiantur, qui solo
quaestus sui respectu communem humani generis utilitatem oppugnant.
fear that God will prosper the efforts of those who violate that
most stable law of nature which He himself has instituted, or that
even men will allow those to go unpunished who for the sake alone of
private gain oppose a common benefit of the human race.
CVM SVB HOC TEMPVS PLVRIMAE REGIS HISPANIARVM LITTERAE IN MANVS
NOSTRAS VENISSENT, QVIBVS IPSIVS ET LVSITANORVM INSTITVTVM
MANIFESTE DETEGITVR, OPERAE PRETIVM VISVM EST EX IIS, QUAE
PLERAEQVE EODEM ERANT ARGVMENTO, BINAS IN LATINVM SERMONEM
TRANSLATAS EXHIBERE.
Domine Martine Alphonse de Castro, Prorex amice, ego Rex multam tibi
salutem mitto:
Cum hisce litteris perveniet ad te exemplum typis impressum Edicti
quod faciendum curavi, quo, ob rationes quas expressas videbis,
aliasque meis rebus conducentes prohibeo commercium omne externorum
in ipsis partibus Indiae aliisque regionibus transmarinis.
Quandoquidem res haec est momenti atque usus maximi, et quae effici
summa cum industria debeat, impero tibi, ut simulatque litteras
has et edictum acceperis, publicationem eius omni diligentia
procures in omnibus locis ac partibus istius imperi, idque ipsum
quod edicto continetur exsequaris sine ullius personae exceptione,
cuiuscumque qualitatis, aetatis, condicionisve sit, citra omnem
moram atque excusationem, procedasque ad impletionem mandati via
merae exsecutionis, nullo admisso impedimento, appellatione, aut
gravamine in contrarium, cuiuscumque materiae generis aut qualitatis.
Iubeo itaque hoc ipsum impleri per eos ministros ad quos exsecutio
pertinet, iisque significari, non modo eos qui contra fecerint malam
operam mihi navaturos, sed eosdem me puniturum privatione officiorum
in quibus mihi serviunt.
Quia autem relatum est mihi commorari in istis partibus
As several letters of the King of Spain have come of late into our
hands, in which his design and that of the Portuguese is clearly
disclosed, it seemed worth while to translate into Latin two of them
which had particular bearing upon the controversy at issue, and to
append them here.
LETTER I
_To Don Martin Alfonso de Castro, our beloved viceroy, I, the King,
send many greetings:_
Together with this letter will come to you a copy printed in type
of an edict which I have taken much pains to draw up, by which, for
reasons which you will see expressed, and for other reasons which are
consonant with my interests, I prohibit all commerce of foreigners
in India itself, and in all other regions across the seas. As this
matter is of the greatest importance and serviceableness, and ought
to be carried out with the highest zeal, I command you, as soon as
you shall have received this letter and edict, to further with all
diligence its publication in all places and districts under your
jurisdiction, and to carry out the provisions of the edict without
exception of any person whatsoever, no matter what his quality, age,
or condition, and without delay and excuse, and to proceed to the
fulfilment of this command with the full power of your authority, no
delay, appeal, or obstacle to the contrary, being admitted, of any
kind, sort, or quality.
Therefore I order that this duty be discharged by those
externos multos variarum nationum, Italos, Gallos, Germanos, Belgas,
quorum pars maior, quantum intelligimus, eo venit per Persida et
Turcarum imperium, non per hoc regnum, adversus quos si ex huius
Edicti praescripto ac rigore procedatur, posse inde nonnullas
difficultates sequi, si illi ad Mauros inimicos perfugiant,
vicinisque munitionum mearum dispositionem indicent, rationesque
monstrent quae rebus meis nocere possent, exsequi te hoc edictum
volo prout res et tempus ferent, atque ea uti prudentia, qua illae
difficultates evitentur, curando ut omnes externos in potestate tua
habeas eosque custodias pro cuiusque qualitate, ita ut adversus
imperium nostrum nihil valeant attentare, utque ergo omnino eum finem
consequar quem hoc Edicto mihi proposui.
Scriptae Vlyssipone XXVIII Novembris, Anno MDCVI. Subsignatum erat
Rex. Inscriptio. Pro Rege. Ad Dominum Martinum Alfonsum de Castro
Consiliarium suum, et suum Proregem Indiae.
Prorex amice Rex multam salutem tibi mitto:
Etsi pro certo habeo tua praesentia, iisque viribus cum quibus in
partes austrinas concessisti, perduelles Hollandos,
officers to whom its execution belongs, and that they be informed
that not only will those who disobey serve me ill, but that I will
punish them by depriving them of the offices in which they now serve
me.
Further, inasmuch as it has been reported to me that within your
jurisdiction there are sojourning many foreigners of different
nations, Italians, French, Germans, and men of the Low Countries,
the larger part of whom as we know came there by way of Persia and
Turkey, and not through our realm; and inasmuch as, if this edict
be rigidly enforced against those persons to the letter, some
inconveniences might follow, if they should escape to the Moors,
our enemies, and make known to our neighbors the disposition of
my forces, and thus show ways that they might be able to harm my
dominion: Therefore, I wish you to carry out the provisions of this
edict as the exigencies of circumstances and occasion demand, and
to use all prudence necessary in order to avoid those difficulties,
taking especial pains to keep all foreigners in your power, and to
guard them in accordance with their individual rank, so that they may
have no opportunity to attempt anything prejudicial to our power,
that thus I may attain fully that end which I have set forth in this
edict.
Given at Lisbon, on the 28th of November in the year of our Lord,
1606. Signed by the king, and addressed: For the king, to Don Martin
Alfonso de Castro, his Councillor, and Viceroy for the East Indies.
LETTER II
_To our beloved viceroy, I, the King send many greetings:_
Although I consider it absolutely certain that your presence and the
forces which you took with you into those Eastern regions, guarantee
that our enemies, the Dutch,
qui illic haerent, nec minus indigenas qui eis receptum praebent,
ita castigatos fore, ut nec hi, nec illi tale quicquam in posterum
audeant; expediet tamen, ad res tuendas, ut iustam classem, eique
operi idoneam, cum tu Goam redibis, in istis Maris partibus
relinquas, eiusque imperium et summam praefecturam mandes Andreae
Hurtado Mendosae, aut si quem ei muneri aptiorem iudicabis,
quemadmodum pro tuo in me affectu confido, ea in re non aliud te
respecturum quam quod rebus meis erit utilissimum.
Scriptae Madritii XXVII Ian. MDCVII. Signatum Rex. Inscriptio. Pro
Rege. Ad Dominum Martinum Alfonsum de Castro suum Consiliarium, et
suum Proregem Indiae.
who infest those quarters as well as the natives who give them a
welcome reception, will be so thoroughly punished that neither the
one nor the other will ever dare such practices in the future: still
it will be expedient for the protection of our interests, that,
when you shall return to Goa, you leave in those parts of the sea
a fleet large and capable enough to do the business, and also that
you delegate the supreme command of that fleet to Andrea Hurtado de
Mendoza, or to any one else whom you shall consider better fitted
for this post. I rely upon your affection for me, knowing that in
this matter you will do nothing but what will be most useful to my
interests.
Given at Madrid the 27th day of January in the year of our Lord
1607. Signed by the king, and addressed: For the king, to Don Martin
Alfonso de Castro, his Councillor, and Viceroy for the East Indies.
Donation of Pope Alexander VI, reference to, 15, 18, 45, 66.
Donellus, H. (Doneau), biographical note, 12 n. 2.
Dryden, J., translations from, 7, 8, 26.
Duarenus, biographical note, 27 n. 4.
Dutch, answer to Portuguese, 71;
East India trade to be maintained by, 72;
navigation by, 59;
reasonable claims of, 70.
East Indies, mention of, 65;
not chattels of Portuguese, 21, 60, 68;
Portuguese claim of exclusive right to trade in, 61;
Portuguese not first in, 41;
right of trade to be kept with, 72;
way is free to, 37.
Emmanuel, King of Portugal, mention of, 59.
English, mention of, 43.
Ennius, quoted, 38.
Equity, chapter on, 69.
Estius, biographical note, 9 n. 5.
Exchange, art of, defined, 61;
derivation of, 62.
Exhaustion, question of, 57.
Expediency, 1.
Faber, J., biographical note, 34 n. 2;
reference to, 34, 55.
Fachinham, N., biographical note, 50 n. 3.
Felinus, M. S., biographical note, 49 n. 2;
cited, 49.
Fishing, an ancient national right, 56;
free to all, 32, 38;
not legal to prevent, 33, 51;
revenues from, 36;
a servitude, 34.
Fleets, maintenance of, 35.
Free navigation, chapter on, 7.
Freedom of trade, basis of, 63;
chapter on, 61;
Dutch should have, 75.
Law of Nations, 7, 9, 28, 31, 61, 63;
right conception of, 52.
Law of Nature, 2, 5, 23;
right conception of, 52.
Law of property, 25.
Legitimate rulers, 19.
Leo, Emperor, cited, 33.
Lucullus, mention of, 32.
Mair, A. W., translation from, 70.
Malacca, mention of, 59.
Marcianus, cited, 32, 48, 49;
reference to, 33.
Martial, quoted, 32.
Martin, J. C., xii.
Megarians, mention of, 8.
Mendoza, A. H. de, mention of, 79.
Miller, W., translations from, 27, 38, 75.
Milton, quoted, 11 n. *.
Moluccas, mention of, 11.
Monopoly, question of, 71.
Morocco, mention of, 40.
Natural Law, 2, 5, 23, 53.
Navigation, Dutch, 59;
free to all, 7, 32, 38, 44, 46, 55, 56;
Portuguese, 59;
prescriptive right claimed by Portuguese, 54, 60;
protection of, 35.
Nazianzenus, see Gregory of Nazianzus.
Neratius, reference to, 28.
Nonius Marcellus, quoted, 12 n. 2.
Occupation, definition of, 25, 39, 48;
mention of, 27, 34;
not to affect common use, 30.
Oldradus (Oldrado de Ponte), biographical note, 74 n. 5.
Osorius, H., biographical note, 59 n. 1.
Outer sea, as distinguished from inner sea, 37.
Ovid, quoted, 26, 28.
Ownership, common, 26;
private, 29, 33, 62;
transition to, 24.
Panormitanus, cited, 67 n. 2.
Papal Donation, chapters on, 15, 45, 66.
Papinian, cited, 60;
quoted, 48.
Paul III, Pope, reference to, 21.
Paulus, cited, 32, 51.
Personal right, 35.
Peter, St., mention of, 16.
Philip III of Spain, letters of, 77.
Pickard-Cambridge, translation from, 73.
Pirates, treatment of, 35.
Placentinus, quoted, 34.
Plato, cited, 63.
Plautus, quoted, 29.
Pliny, cited, 12, 32, 40, 41, 62;
quoted, 7.
Plutarch, reference to, 14.
Polus Lucanus, cited, 73 n. 1.
Pomponius, cited, 30, 75.
Pomponius Mela, quoted, 40 n. 1.
Pope, The, no right in temporal matters, 45;
no authority against law of nature and of nations, 66.
Portuguese, arrogant pretensions of, 39, 40, 43, 75;
claim of exclusive right to trade, 61;
claim to ocean, 37;
desire for profits, 42, 69, 71;
mention of, 56, 65;
not first in East Indies, 41.
Prescription, acquisition by, 49, 59;
chapters on, 47, 67;
definition of, 47;
failure of, 50, 51;
immemorial time no help to, 49, 58;
reference to, 4, 52.
Pretexts for war, 18.
Private possessions, reference to, 28.
Privative right, 23.
Propertius, quoted, 73.
Property, origin of, 27.
Ptolemaeus, cited, 41.
Public opinion, 3.
Public territory, origin of, 34.
Quintilian, quoted, 25.
Revenues, on fisheries, 36.
Right of innocent passage, 20, 43, 74.
Right of navigation, not Portuguese because of Papal Donation, 45.
Rivalry, comment on, 70.
Roman Church, mention of, 19.
Sandeus, see Felinus.
Saracens, reference to, 10, 17.
Scaevola, mention of, 30.
Scott, J. B., Introductory note by, v.
Sea, The, common to all, 28, 30, 34, 37, 43, 44, 52, 55;
defined by law of nations, 22;
nature of, 31, 39;
not exhausted by use, 43, 57;
not merchandise, 34;
not Portuguese by Papal Donation, 45;
not subject to servitude, 35, 36;
sovereignty of, 53.
Seashore, common to all, 28, 30;
how to be used, 30, 34;
right of Roman people to, 31.
Seneca, cited, 63;
quoted, 8, 24, 25, 26, 27.
Shahan, Bishop, xii.
Sigonius, C., biographical note, 9 n. 2.
Silvestris, cited, 46 n. 1.
Silvius, F., biographical note, 17 n. 1;
reference from, 17.
Smith, K. F., xi.
Sovereignty, grant by reason of, 17;
matter of positive law, 20;
Papal Donation gives no right to, chapter on, 15;
a particular proprietorship, 22, 24;
by right of conquest, 18;
by right of discovery, 11;
title to, 11;
universal, 24.
Vasquius, F. M. (Vasquez), biographical note, 52 n. 4;
cited, 53, 67, 68;
quoted, 52, 55, 56, 58, 70.
Venetians, mention of, 9, 43, 48, 53, 54, 56, 58.
Vergil, quoted, 7, 8, 26;
reference to, 29.
Victoria, F. de, biographical note, 9 n. 3;
reference to, 9, 13, 17, 18.
War, pretexts for, 18, 20.
Water, common to all, 28.
West Indies, claimed by Portuguese, 54.
Willoughby, W. W., xii.
World monopoly, question of, 71.
Zuarius, R., biographical note, 44 n. 3.
FOOTNOTES:
[A] For the freedom of the seas and the relation of Grotius to the
doctrine, see Ernest Nys’s _Les Origines du Droit International_
(1894), pp. 379-387, and the same author’s _Etudes de Droit
International et de Droit Politique_, 2^e série (1901), _Une Bataille
de Livres_, pp. 260-272. For an account in English see Walker’s
_History of the Law of Nations_, Vol. I (1899), pp. 278-283.
For an interesting sketch of the illustrious author of the _Mare
Liberum_, see Motley’s _The Life and Death of John of Barneveld_,
Vol. II, Chap. XXII; for an analysis of Grotius’ views on the law of
nations, see Hallam’s _Introduction to the Literature of Europe_ (4th
edition), Vol. II, Part III, Chap. IV, Sec. III; for an account of
Grotius as a humanist, see Sandys’ _History of Classical Scholarship_
(1908), Vol. II, pp. 315-319.
[B] _Hugonis Grotii De Jure Praedae_, edited, with an introduction,
by H. G. Hamaker, and published at The Hague in 1868 by Martinus
Nijhoff.
[C] In support of the view that Grotius appeared as counsel in cases
arising out of captures made by vessels in the service of the Dutch
East India Company, and that the treatise, _De Jure Praedae_, is a
legal brief, see R. Fruin’s _Een Onuitgegeven Werk van Hugo De Groot_
in _Verspreide Geschriften_, Vol. III, pp. 367-445. The following
passages are quoted from this remarkable essay:
“While busy with the sale of the goods [of the captured merchantman
_Catherine_, which had been unloaded in the Amsterdam arsenal], the
process of adjudicating the booty before the admiralty court was
conducted in the usual forms. Claimants: Advocate General of Holland,
the Board of eight Aldermen, and Admiral Heemskerck; ... on Thursday,
September 9, 1604, final sentence was rendered, and ‘the merchantman
together with the goods taken from it were declared forfeited and
confiscated’” (pp. 389-390).
“Hulsius in some measure replaces what the fire at the Marine Arsenal
has robbed us of; among other records he has preserved for us in
his _Achte Schiffart_ the sentence pronounced in this matter by the
admiralty, and of which we have knowledge from no other sources.
From it we learn the grounds upon which the claimants demanded
the adjudication of the booty. These grounds are the same twelve
which De Groot discusses in his book.... This concordance can be
explained on the ground that De Groot must have had acquaintance
with the sentence; but he was not a man merely to repeat what others
had before him witnessed. I should be inclined to feel that in the
process he had served as counsel for the Company, and that he himself
was one of the authors of the written claim upon which the sentence
was based. It would not then be surprising if in his book he should
develop at greater length and throw light upon what had already been
set forth in the claim” (pp. 390-391).
“I cannot state definitely that Hugo De Groot was persuaded by the
Directors to write such an argument; I have been unable to discover
any evidence to that end. That he was in close relations with the
Company, he himself says in a letter of later date, addressed to his
brother. Nor can there be any doubt that in writing his work he made
use of the archives of the United Company and of its predecessor. If
the supposition, which I have elsewhere ventured to make is correct,
that is to say, that in the conduct of the case he appeared as
advocate for the Company, it would then appear most probable that,
after consultation with the directors, he set about writing his book,
which was to be a second plea in their behalf” (p. 403).
[D] For the account which Grotius himself gives of the incident, see
his _Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis ab Obitu Philippi Regis
usque ad Inducias Anni_ 1609, written in 1612, but first published in
1658, Book 1, p. 429.
For a fuller account of the circumstances under which the treatise
on the law of prize was written, see Hamaker’s edition of the _De
Jure Praedae_, pp. vii-viii. The distinguished historian and scholar,
Robert J. Fruin, after an exhaustive examination of the evidence,
informed Hamaker that Grotius was retained by the Company to prepare
the commentary on the law of prize. The English translation of
Hamaker’s exact statement reads as follows: “Fruin is of the opinion
that he [Grotius] undertook this work at the instance of the Company,
and that he appeared in it as their spokesman.”
For an analysis of the commentary _De Jure Praedae_ and the
circumstances under which it was written, see Jules Basdevant’s study
on Grotius, pp. 131-137, 155-179, in Pillet’s _Les Fondateurs du
Droit International_ (1904).
[E] Selden’s _Mare Clausum_ was not the only defense of England,
nor was the _Mare Liberum_ the only lance which Grotius broke for
the freedom of the seas. In 1613 William Welwod, professor of Civil
Law at the University of Aberdeen, published a little book entitled
_An Abridgement of all the Sea-Lawes_, in which he maintained the
English side of the question, of which Title XXVII, pp. 61-72, deals
with the community and property of the seas. Two years later Welwod
published a second work, this time in Latin, entitled _De Dominio
Maris Juribusque ad Dominium praecipue Spectantibus Assertia Brevis
ac Methodica_.
Grotius prepared, but did not publish, a reply to Welwod’s first
attack, entitled _Defensio Capitis Quinti Maris Liberi Oppugnati
a Gulielmo Welwodo Juris Civilis Professore, Capite XXVII ejus
Libri Scripti Anglica Sermone cui Titulum Fecit Compendium Legum
Maritimarum_. It was discovered at the same time as the commentary
_De Jure Praedae_ and was published in 1872 in Muller’s _Mare
Clausum, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der rivaliteit van Engeland en
Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw_.
FOOTNOTES:
[1a] Panegyricus 29, 2: quod genitum esset usquam, id apud omnes
natum esse videtur.
[2a] Vergil, Georgica II, 109.
[3a] Vergil, Aeneis VI, 847-853.
[4a] Naturales Quaestiones III, IV.
[5a] Institutes II, 1 (De rerum divisione, § 1); Digest I, 8, 4 (eod.
tit., L. Nemo igitur); cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19; cf. Code
IV, 63, 4 (De commerciis, L. Mercatores).
[10a] Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1-7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum, §
9, n. 4, ibi Quinta.
[11a] Numbers XXI, 21-26.
[12a] Augustinus, Locutionum IV (de Numeris), 44; Et Estius, c. ult.
23, 4, 2.
[13a] Sophocles, Trachiniae.
[14a] Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293.
[15a] Tacitus, Historiae IV, 64.
[16a] Andreas Alciatus, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c.
Peccatum, p. 2 § 9; Bartolus on Code I, 11 (De paganis, L. 1).
[17a] Code VIII, 40, 13 (De fideiussoribus, L. Si Barsagoram).
[18a] Nonius Marcellus, De varia significatione sermonum, in verbo
‘occupare’ (p. 562, Lindsay); cf. Connanus, Commentarii juris civilis
III, 3; cf. Donellus, Commentarii de jure civili IV, 10.
[19a] Institutes II, 1, 13 (De rerum divisione, § Illud quaesitum
est).
[20a] Digest XLI, 2, 3 (De adquirenda possessione, § Neratius).
[21a] Epistulae I, 1, 44-45.
[22a] Pliny, Naturalis historia VI, 22.
[23a] Digest XLI, 1, 3 (De adquirendo rerum dominio).
[24a] Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 10, n. 2, 4, 5.
[25a] De potestate civili I, 9.
[26a] Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 12.
[27a] De Indis I, n. 4-7, 19.
[28a] Vasquius, Preface (n. 5) to Controversiae illustres.
[29a] Cf. Osorium.
[30a] Institutes II, 1, 40 (De rerum divisione, § Per traditionem).
[31a] Luke XII, 14; John XVIII, 36; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 25.
[32a] Victoria XVI, n. 27.
[33a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 21; Turre Cremata II,
c. 113; Hugo on Dist. XCVI, C. VI (Cum ad verum); Bernhardus, De
consolatione ad Eugenium III; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 27; Covarruvias
in c. Peccatum § 9, n. 7.
[34a] Matthew XVII, 27; XX, 26; John VI, 15.
[35a] Victoria, De Indis I, n. 28, 30; Covarruvias on I Corinthians V
in fine; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 12, a. 2; Ayala, De Jure I,
2, 29.
[36a] Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De
infidelibus § 7; Innocentius on Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, III,
34, 8 (De voto, c. Quod super his); Victoria, De Indis I, n. 31.
[37a] De Indis I, n. 31.
[38a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis
II, n. 10.
[39a] De consolatione philosophiae IV, carmen 4, 7-10.
[40a] Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V (De
Iudeis), C. III (Qui sincera); Innocentius, cf. note 1, page 17;
Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1 (De paganis); Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, §
9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.
[41a] Matthew X, 23.
[42a] On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8.
[43a] Victoria, De Indis II, 1.
[44a] Castrensis on Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc
iure); Dist. I, C. VII (Ius naturale).
[45a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 1, n. 10; Lib. VI, V, 12,
3 (De verborum significatione, c. Exiit, qui seminat); Clem. V, 11
(De verborum significatione, c. Exivi de paradiso).
[50a] Digest VII, 5 (De usu fructu earum rerum, quae usu consumuntur
vel minuuntur); Extravag. XIV, 3 et 5 (De verborum significatione, c.
Ad conditorem, et c. Quia quorundam); Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II,
q. 78.
[51a] Thyestes 203-204 (F. CXXII).
[52a] De beneficiis VII, 12, 3.
[53a] Ps. Quintilianus, Declamatio XIII (Pro paupere).
[54a] Cicero, De officiis I.
[55a] Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure).
[56a] Vergil, Georgica I, 139-140; Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 121.
[57a] Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 135-136.
[58a] Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 134 (exsultavere, Magnus).
[59a] De beneficiis VII, 4, 3.
[60a] Octavia 431-432.
[61a] De officiis I, 21.
[62a] Thucydides I, 139, 2.
[63a] Duarenus on Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum).
[64a] De officiis I, 51.
[65a] De officiis I, 52.
[66a] Ovid, Metamorphoses VI, 349-351 (aquis, 349, and ad publica,
351, Merkel).
[67a] Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor).
[68a] Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in
litore); Comines, Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2; Digest XLI, 3, 49
(De usucapionibus).
[69a] Digest I, 8, 10 (De divisione rerum, L. Aristo).
[70a] Cicero, Loco citato. [Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino 26, 72].
[71a] Institutes II, 1, 1 et 5 (De rerum divisione, § Et quidem
naturali; § Litorum); Digest I, 8, 1, 2, 10 (De rerum divisione);
Digest XLI, 1, 14 et 50 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in
litore, et L. Quamvis); Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L.
Iniuriarum § si quis me); Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco
publico, L. Litora) et 4-7.
[72a] 975, 977, 985 (IV, 3).
[73a] Donellus IV, 2.
[74a] Digest XXXIX, 2, 24 (De damno infecto, L. Fluminum); other
references same as note 1, page 29.
[75a] Donellus IV, 2 et 9; also references in note 1, page 29.
[76a] Digest I, 8, 4 (De divisione rerum, L. Nemo igitur); XLIII, 8,
3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).
[77a] Horace, Carmina III, i, 33-34.
[78a] Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (as in note 1); 8, 2 (eod. tit., L. Praetor,
§ Adversus).
[79a] Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. Ait praetor, § Si in
mari).
[80a] Pliny, Naturalis historia IX, 54, 170.
[81a] Martial, Epigrammata X, 30, 19-20.
[82a] De Nabuthe, cap. 3.
[83a] Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane si maris).
[84a] Cf. note 1, page 31.
[85a] Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis, L. Si quisquam).
[86a] Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus, L, Praescriptio).
[87a] Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § Si quis me).
[91a] Joannes Faber on Institutes II, 1 (§ Litorum); Digest XIV, 2, 9
(De Lege Rhodia, L. Ἀξίωσις).
[92a] Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).
[93a] Digest V, 1, 9 (De iudiciis, L. Insulae); XXXIX, 4, 15 (De
publicanis, L. Caesar); Gloss. on Digest I, 8, 2 (De divisione rerum,
L. Quaedam); Institutes II, 1; Baldus on Quaedam (above).
[94a] Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, c. In principio, 2 col;
Code XI, 13, 1; Angelus on Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L.
Sane); Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor fundi) et
4 (L. Caveri).
[95a] C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis.
[96a] Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.
[97a] Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § 7, v.
conductori); XLIII, 9, 1 (De loco publico fruendo).
[98a] Cf. note 1.
[99a] Ennius: ‘Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit’.
Vahlen,[100a] Fab. Inc. 398 (Telephus?).
[100a] Cicero, De officiis I, 51.
[101a] Seneca, De beneficiis III, 28 [IV, 28].
[102a] Johannes Faber on Institutes II, 1, 5 (De rerum divisione, §
Litorum).
[103a] Pliny, Naturalis historia II, 69; VI, 27 [(31) Vol. 1, pp.
482-488 Mayhoff]; Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III.
[104a] Pliny, Naturalis historia VI, 20 (23).
[105a] Geographica II et XVII.
[106a] Pliny, Naturalis historia XII, 19 [VI, 23].
[107a] Gloss. on Lib. VI, I, 6, 3 (De electione, c. Ubi periculum, §
Porro); on Digest II, 12, 3 (De feriis, L. Solet [Grotius has Licet]).
[108a] Digest I, 8, 4 (De divisione rerum, L. Nemo igitur); Gentilis,
De jure belli I, 19.
[109a] Digest XLIII, 8, 2 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Praetor ait, §
Si quis in mari).
[110a] Gloss. on Digest XLIII, 14 (Ut in flumine publico).
[111a] Baldus on Digest I, 8, 3 (De divisione rerum, L. Item
lapilli); Zuarius, Consilia duo de usu maris I, 3, part. tit. 28, L.
10 et 12.
[112a] Victoria, De Indis I (II?), n. 26.
[113a] Silvestris, In verbo Papa. n. 16.
[114a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 51.
[115a] Donellus, V, 22 et seq.; Digest XVIII, 1, 6 (De contrahenda
emptione, L. Sed Celsus); XLI, 3, 9 (De usucapionibus, L.
Usucapionem), 25 (L. Sine); Lib. VI, V, 12 (De regulis iuris, Reg.
Sine possessione); Digest L, 16, 28 (De verborum significatione, L.
‘Alienationis’); XXIII, 5, 16 (De fundo dotali, L. Si fundum).
[116a] Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus); Code VIII, 11, 6 (De
operis publicis, L. Praescriptio); XI, 43, 9 (De aquaeductu, L.
Diligenter); Digest XLIII, 11, 2 (De via publica, L. Viam); XLI, 3,
49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult.).
[117a] Consilia 286; Thema tale est: inter caetera capitula pacis.
[118a] Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis temporalibus praescriptionibus,
L. Si quisquam).
[119a] Duarenus, De usucapionibus, c. 3; Cuiacius on Digest XLI, 3,
49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult.); Donellus V, 22 on Digest XLI, 1, 14
(De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore).
[120a] Code XI, 43, 4 (De aquaeductu, L. Usum aquae); cf. eod.
tit., L. Diligenter; cf. Digest XLIII, 20, 3 (De aqua cottidiana et
aestiva, L. Hoc iure, § Ductus aquae).
[121a] On Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, II, 26, 11 (De
praescriptionibus, c. Accedentes).
[122a] De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6, n. 8.
[123a] On Digest XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult.).
[124a] Par. 3, tit. 29, I. 7 in c. Placa.; Zuarius, Consilia, num. 4.
[125a] Fachinham VIII, c. 26 et c, 33; Duarenus, De
praescriptionibus, parte 2, § 2, n. 8; § 8, n. 5 et 6.
[126a] Fachinham VIII, c. 28.
[127a] Angelus Aretinus in rubr. Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum);
Balbus, l. c., n. 2; cf. Vasquium, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n.
38.
[128a] On Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane).
[129a] Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § ult.)
[130a] Cf. Gloss. eodem loco.
[131a] De officiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19 (sub finem).
[132a] Auth. Ut nulli Iudicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine.
[133a] Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 et seq.
[134a] De potestate legis poenalis II, 14, part. 572.
[135a] Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in
litore); XLI, 3 (De usucapionibus, L. fin. in prin.); Institutes II,
1, 2 (De rerum divisione, § Flumina, v. omnibus); Digest XLIV, 3, 7
(De diversis temporalibus praescriptionibus, L. Si quisquam); XLVII,
10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane si maris).
[136a] Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure);
Institutes I, 2 (De iure naturali et gentium et civili, § 2, v. ius
autem gentium).
[137a] Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27) (De usucapionibus, L. Sequitur § Si
viam); Institutes IV, 6, 14 (De actionibus, § Sic itaque); Ut dictis
juribus et L. cum filio, ubi multa per Bartolum et Jason on Digest
XXX, 11 (De Legatis I, L. Cum filio; part. I in pr. qu. 3 et 4).
[138a] Digest I, 5, 4 (De statu hominum, L. Libertas); Institutes
I, 3, 1 (De iure personarum, § Et libertas); Digest XLIII, 29, 1
et 2 (De homine libero exhibendo); XLIV, 5, 1 (Quarum rerum actio
non datur, L, Iusiurandum, § Quae onerandae); Code III, 28, 35 (De
inofficioso testamento, L. Si quando, § Illud, v. adstringendos);
Digest IV, 6, 28 (Ex quibus causis maiores, L. Nec non, § ‘Quod
eius’).
[139a] Code III, 44, 7 (De religiosis et sumptibus funerum, L.
Statuas).
[140a] Code VI, 43 (Communia de legatis, Contra L. 2, cum vulgatis).
[141a] Digest IX, 2, 32 (Ad legem Aquiliam, L. Illud).
[142a] Dist. IV, C II (Erit autem lex); Digest I, 3, 1 et 2 (De
legibus), 32 (eod. tit., L. De quibus, cum seq.); Decretales Gregorii
Papae IX, II, 26, 20 (De praescriptionibus, c. Quoniam).
[143a] Digest XLIII, 13 (Ne quid in flumine publico fiat).
[144a] Digest IV, 4, 3 (De minoribus, L. 3, § Scio); Vasquius, De
successionum progressu I, 7.
[145a] Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5 in pr. in qu. 11, illius 5,
quaest. pr. Gl. in cap. inter caetera 16, q. 3; Castrensis, De
potestate legis poenalis II, 14; Balbus, and Angelus, on Code VII,
39, 4 (De praescriptione XXX vel XL annorum, L. Omnes).
[146a] Osorius, De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae I.
[147a] Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); et ibi
Bartolus.
[148a] Aristotle, Politica I, 9 (1257^a 30).
[149a] Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.
[150a] Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.
[151a] Digest XVIII, 1, 1 (De contrahenda emptione, L. Origo).
[152a] Naturalis historia XXXIII, 1.
[153a] Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 5, 5, 11 (1133^a 20): οὐ φύσει
ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί; Politica I, 9 (1257^b 10).
[154a] Dist. I, C. VII (Ius naturale); Aristotle, l. c.
[155a] Castrensis ex Cino et aliis n. 20 et 28 on Digest I, 1, 5 (De
iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure).
[156a] Plato, Sophista 223^d.
[157a] Plato, Republic II (p. 371) cited in Digest L, 11, 2 (De
nundinis).
[158a] Politica I, 11 (1258^b 22-23).
[159a] καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία, φορτηγία, παράστασις are the
exact words.
[160a] Cicero, De officiis I, 150-151; Aristotle, Politica I, 9.
[161a] L. c. (1257^a 14-17).
[162a] De beneficiis V, 8.
[163a] Cf. cap. III et VI.
[164a] Cf. cap. VII.
[165a] Gloss. et Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 11, 2 (De via publica, L.
Viam publicam); Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus on Decretales
Gregorii Papae IX, III, 8, 10 (De concessione praebendae, c. Ex parte
Hastenen.); Digest XLI, 2, 41 (De adquirenda possessione, L. Qui
iure familiaritatis); Covarruvias in c. possessor. 2, § 4; Vasquius,
Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 10 et 12.
[166a] Vasquius, l. c. n. 11.
[167a] Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia XIX.
[168a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 10, n. 10; Victoria,
De Indis I, 1, n. 3; Digest VI, 1, 27 (De rei vindicatione, L. Sin
autem, § penult.) L, 17, 55 et 151 (De diversis regulis, L. Nullus
videtur, et L. Nemo damnum); XLII, 8, 13 (Quae in fraudem creditorum,
L. Illud constat); XXXIX, 2, 24 (De damno infecto, L. Fluminum, §
ult.); Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L, 1, § 5);
Castrensis on Code III, 34, 10 (De servitutibus, L. Si tibi); Digest
XXXIX, 3, 1 (De aqua, L. Si cui, § Denique).
[169a] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 3 et seq.; Digest
XXXIX, 2, 26 (De damno infecto, L. Proculus).
[170a] Vasquius, l. c.
[171a] Vasquius, l. c. n. 5.
[172a] Εργα καὶ Ἡμέραι 24.
[173a] Code IV, 59 (De monopoliis, L. 1).
[174a] Caietanus on Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3.
[175a] Aristotle, Politica I, 9.
[176a] Hexameron V, 10, 4, q. 44.
[177a] In funere Basilii.
[178a] Thucydides, Isocrates, Andocides.
[179a] Isocrates, Archidamos 51.
[180a] Panegyricus 176.
[181a] De officiis I, 35.
[182a] Polus Lucanus apud Stobaeum, De iustitia (III, p. 362
Wachsmut-Hense); Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromateis; Augustinus, De
civitate Dei IV, 15.
[183a] Demosthenes, De libertate Rhodiorum XV, 10 (p. 193 R.).
[184a] Propertius IV, vi, 47-52.
[185a] De civitate Dei V, 1.
[186a] Digest XLIII, 14, 1 (Ut in flumine publico navigare liceat).
[187a] Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. 1, in principio).
[188a] Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. 1, § Si in mari
aliquid).
[189a] Digest XLIII, 8, 2 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. 2, § Si quis);
XLVII, 10, 13 et 24 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum actio, et L. Si quis
proprium); Silvestris, In verbo ‘restitutio’, 3 sub finem; Oldradus
et Archidiaconus on Digest XLVIII, 12, 2 (De lege Iulia de annona),
and XLVII, 11, 6 (De extraordinariis criminibus. L. Annonam).
[190a] De civitate Dei IV.
[191a] De officiis I, 34.
[192a] Digest XLI, 1, 50 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quamvis
quod in litore); Henricus von Gorcum, De bello justo 9.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Panegyric 29, 2.
[2] Georgics II, 109 [Dryden’s translation, II, 154].
[5] Institutes II, 1; Digest I, 8, 4; cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I,
19; cf. Code IV, 63, 4 [Grotius refers particularly to his famous
predecessor Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608), an Italian who came to
England and was appointed to the chair of Regius Professor of Civil
Law at Oxford. He published his De Jure Belli in 1588].
[6] Aeneid I, 539-540 [Dryden’s translation, I, 760-763].
[8] Diodorus Siculus XI; Plutarch, Pericles XXIX, 4. [The Athenian
decree prohibiting the Megarians from trading with Athens or any
part of the Athenian Empire was one of the leading causes of the
Peloponnesian War.]
[9] Carlo Sigonio [(1523-1584), an Italian humanist, in his work] On
the Kingdom of Italy.
[10] Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1-7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum,
§ 9, n. 4, ibi Quinta [Franciscus de Victoria (1480-1546), the
famous Spanish Scholastic, a Dominican, and Professor of Theology at
Salamanca from 1521 until his death. His thirteen Relectiones (De
Indis is no. V) were published (‘vitiosa et corrupta’) in 1557 after
his death; the 1686 Cologne edition is held to be the best.
Diego Covarruvias (1512-1577), styled the Bartolo of Spain. He should
probably be credited with formulating the reform decrees of the
Council of Trent. The 5 vol. Antwerp 1762 edition of his works is the
best.]
[11] Numbers XXI, 21-26.
[12] Locutionum IV (on Numbers), 44; Estius, c. ult. 23, 4, 2 [Estius
(?-1613) was a Dutch commentator on the Epistles of St. Paul and on
the works of St. Augustine].
[13] [Grotius refers to the Trachiniae of Sophocles, but probably
from memory, for there is no such reference in that play.]
[14] Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293 [Baldus (1327-1406) was a
pupil of the great Bartolus].
[15] Histories IV, 64 [In connection with the revolt of Civilis].
[16] Andrea Alciati, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c.
Peccatum, p. 2 § 9; Bartolus on Code I, 11 [Alciati (1492-1550)
was made Comes Palatinus by the Emperor Charles V, and offered a
Cardinal’s hat by Pope Paul III, which he refused, but he did become
a Protonotarius Apostolicus].
[17] Code VIII, 40, 13 [Probably Fabius Claudius Gordianus Fulgentius
(468-533), a Benedictine monk, one of the Latin Fathers].
[18] Nonius Marcellus, On the various significations of speech, under
the word ‘occupare’; cf. Connan, Commentaries on the civil law III,
3; Donellus [Doneau], Commentaries on the civil law IV, 10. [François
de Connan (1508-1551), a French jurisconsult, a pupil of Alciati;
Hugues Doneau (1527-1591) a famous jurisconsult, who wrote many
volumes of commentaries on the Digest and the Code.]
[19] Institutes II, 1, 13.
[20] Digest XLI, 2, 3.
[21] Letters I, 1, 44-45 [Francis’s translation, English Poets XIX,
726].
[22] Pliny, Natural History, VI, 22.
[23] Digest XLI, 1, 3.
[24] Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 10, n. 2, 4, 5.
[25] De potestate civili I, 9.
[26] Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 12 [Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274), one of
the most famous of the Schoolmen and Theologians, spoken of often as
Aquila Theologorum, and Doctor Angelicus].
[27] De Indis I, n. 4-7, 19.
[28] Vasquius, Preface (n. 5) to Controversiae illustres.
[29] [Grotius cites Osorius, but gives no reference.]
[30] Institutes II, 1, 40.
[31] Luke XII, 14; John XVIII, 36; Victoria, De Indis I, n, 25.
[32] Victoria XVI, n. 27.
[33] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 21; Torquemada II, c. 113;
Hugo on Dist. XCVI, C. VI; St. Bernard, Admonitory epistle to Pope
Eugene III, book 2; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 27; Covarruvias in c.
Peccatum § 9, n. 7.
[34] Matthew XVII, 27; XX, 26; John VI, 15.
[35] Victoria, De Indis I, n. 28, 30; Covarruvias on I Corinthians V,
at the end; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 12, a. 2; Ayala, De Jure
I, 2, 29 [Best edition of Ayala is in The Classics of International
Law, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 2 vol., 1912].
[36] Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De
infidelibus § 7; Innocent on the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, III,
34, 8; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 81. [Franciscus Silvius, or Sylvius,
or du Bois (1581-1649), was a Belgian theologian.]
[37] De Indis I, n. 31.
[38] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis II,
n. 10.
[39] On the Consolation of Philosophy IV, 4, 7-10 [H. R. James’
translation, page 194].
[40] Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V,
C. III; Innocent, see note 1, page 17; Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1;
Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.
[41] Matthew X, 23.
[42] On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8 [Thomas
de Cajetan (1469-1534), an Italian cardinal, wrote voluminous
commentaries on Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Bible].
[43] Victoria, De Indis II, 1.
[44] Paul de Castro on Digest I, 1, 5; Dist. I, C. VII.
[45] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 1, n. 10; Lib. VI, V, 12,
3; Clem. V, 11.
[46] Satires II, 2, 129-130.
[47] Aratus 302-303.
[48] Octavia 413-414 [Translation by E. I. Harris (Act II, Scene 1)].
[49] Aratus 302.
[50] Digest VII, 5; Extravagantes of Pope John XXII, XIV, 3 and 5;
Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 78.
[51] 203-204 [E. I. Harris’ translation (Act II, Scene 1)].
[52] De beneficiis VII, 12, 3.
[53] Speech XIII, In behalf of the poor man.
[54] De officiis I.
[55] Digest I, 1, 5.
[56] Vergil, Georgics I, 139-140 [Dryden’s translation I, 211]; Ovid,
Metamorphoses I, 121.
[57] Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 135-136 [Dryden’s translation I (English
Poets XX, 432)].
[58] Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 134.
[59] De beneficiis VII, 4, 3.
[60] Octavia 431-432 [Grotius here takes a slight liberty with the
context].
[61] De officiis I, 21 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 23].
[62] History I, 139, 2.
[63] Duaren [a French humanist (1509-1559)], on Digest I, 8.
[64] De officiis I, 51 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 55].
[65] De officiis I, 52.
[66] Metamorphoses VI, 349-351.
[67] Digest VIII, 4, 13.
[68] Digest XLI, 1, 14; Comines, Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2;
Digest XLI, 3, 49. [Philippe de Comines (1445-1509), a French
historian, and one of the negotiators of the treaty of Senlis (1493).]
[69] Digest I, 8, 10.
[70] Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino 26, 72.
[71] Institutes II, 1, 1 and 5; Digest I, 8, 1, 2, 10; XLI, 1, 14 and
50; XLVII, 10, 13; XLIII, 8, 3, and 4-7.
[72] Act IV, Scene 3 (975, 977, 985).
[73] Donellus IV, 2.
[74] Digest XXXIX, 2, 24; other references same as note 1, page 29.
[75] Donellus IV, 2 and 9; also references in note 1, page 29.
[76] Digest I, 8, 4; XLIII, 8, 3.
[77] Odes III, i, 33-34 [Bennett’s (Loeb) translation, page 171].
[78] Digest XLIII, 8, 3; 8, 2.
[79] Digest XLIII, 12, 1.
[80] Pliny, Natural History IX, 54, 170.
[81] Epigrams X, 30, 19-20.
[82] De Nabuthe, cap. 3.
[83] Digest XLVII, 10, 14.
[84] See note 1, page 31.
[85] Digest XLIV, 3, 7.
[86] Digest XLI, 3, 45.
[87] Digest XLVII, 10, 13.
[88] Novels of Leo, 102, 103, 104; See also Cujas XIV, 1.
[89] Hexameron V, 10, 27 [St. Ambrose (c. 333-397), Bishop of Milan,
is meant].
[90] Donellus IV, 6.
[91] On Institutes II, 1; Digest XIV, 2, 9 [Johannes Faber (c.
1570-c. 1640) was Bishop of Vienna, and Court preacher to Emperor
Ferdinand. He was known popularly as ‘Malleus Haereticorum’].
[92] Digest XLIII, 8, 3.
[93] Digest V, 1, 9; XXXIX, 4, 15; Glossators on Digest I, 8, 2;
Institutes II, 1; Baldus on L. Quaedam, in Digest I, 8, 2.
[94] Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, chapter beginning In
principio, second column; Code XI, 13, 1; Angeli on Digest XLVII, 10,
14; Digest VIII, 4, 13 and 4.
[95] C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis.
[96] Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.
[97] Digest XLVII, 10, 13; XLIII, 9, 1.
[98] See note 1.
[99] [Quoted in Cicero, De officiis I, 51, and here taken from Walter
Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 55.]
[100] Cicero, De officiis I, 51.
[101] Seneca, De beneficiis IV, 28.
[102] Johannes Faber on Institutes II, 1, 5.
[103] Pliny, Natural History II, 69; VI, 27; Pomponius Mela, De situ
orbis III.
[104] Natural History VI, 20.
[105] Geography II and XVII.
[106] Natural History VI, 23.
[107] Glossators on Lib. VI, I, 6, 3; on Digest II, 12, 3.
[108] Digest I, 8, 4; Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19.
[109] Digest XLIII, 8, 2.
[110] Glossators on Digest XLIII, 14.
[111] Baldus on Digest I, 8, 3; Zuarius, Consilia duo de usu maris I,
3, 28, L. 10 and 12. [Rodericus Zuarius, Consilia published in 1621].
[121] On the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, II, 26, 11 [Felinus Maria
Sandeus (c. 1427-1503), Bishop of Lucca].
[122] De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6, n. 8 [Johannes Franciscus
Balbus, a priest and jurisconsult at Muentz-hof].
[123] On Digest XLI, 3, 49.
[124] Par. 3, tit. 29, I. 7 in c. Placa.; Zuarius, Consilia, num. 4.
[125] Fachinham VIII, c. 26 and c. 33; Duaren, De praescriptionibus,
parte 2, § 2, n. 8; § 8, n. 5 and 6, [Nicholas Fachinham (?-1407), a
Franciscan, who taught Theology at Oxford.]
[126] Fachinham VIII, c. 28.
[127] Angelus Aretinus on Digest I, 8; Balbus, De praescriptionibus
IV, 5, q. 6, n. 2; see Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n. 38.
[128] On Digest XLVII, 10, 14.
[129] Digest XLVI, 10, 13.
[130] Glossators on the reference in note 4, page 51.
[131] De officiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19.
[132] Auth. Ut nulli Iudicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine.
[133] Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 ff. [Ferdinand Manchaea
Vasquez (1509-1566) the famous Spanish jurisconsult, who held many
high honors of the realm].
[134] De potestate legis poenalis II, 14, part 572 [Alphonse de
Castro (?-1558). Theologian at Salamanca, confessor to the Emperor
Charles V.].
[137] Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27); Institutes IV, 6, 14; Bartolus and
Jason on Digest XXX, 11.
[138] Digest I, 5, 4; Institutes I, 3, 1; Digest XLIII, 29, 1-2;
XLIV, 5, 1; Code III, 28, 35; Digest IV, 6, 28.
[139] Code III, 44, 7.
[140] Code VI, 43.
[141] Digest IX, 2, 32.
[142] Dist. IV, C. II; Digest I, 3, 1-2, 32; Decretals of Pope
Gregory IX, II, 26, 20.
[143] Digest XLIII, 13.
[144] Digest IV, 4, 3; Vasquius, De successionum progressu I, 7.
[145] Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5, 11; 16, 3; Alphonse de Castro,
De potestate legis poenalis II, 14; Balbus and Angelus on Code VII,
39, 4.
[146] Osorius, De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae I [Hieronymus
Osorius (1506-1580) was known as the Portuguese Cicero].
[147] Digest I, 1, 5.
[148] I, 9 (1257^a 30).
[149] Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.
[150] Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.
[151] Digest XVIII, 1, 1.
[152] Natural History XXXIII, 1.
[153] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5, 5, 11 (1133^a 20); Politics
I, 9 (1257^b 10) [Nummus--νόμος. The fact that this is an incorrect
derivation does not of course affect the argument].
[154] Dist. I, C. VII; Aristotle, see note 4 above.
[155] Castrensis from Cinus and others on Digest I, 1, 5.
[156] Plato, Sophista 223^{d}.
[157] II (p. 371) cited in Digest L, 11, 2.
[158] Politics I, 11 (1258^{b} 22-23).
[159] [The text here is somewhat expanded.]
[160] Cicero, De officiis I, 150-151; Aristotle, Politics I, 9.
[161] Politics I, 9 (1257^{a} 14-17) [Jowett’s translation, Vol. I,
page 15].
[162] De beneficiis V, 8 [Not a quotation, but a summing up of the
chapter].
[163] See chapters III and VI.
[164] See chapter VII.
[165] On Digest XLIII, 11, 2; Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus
on the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, III, 8, 10; Digest XLI, 2,
41; Covarruvias in c. possessor. 2, § 4; Vasquius, Controversiae
illustres c. 4, n. 10 and 12.
[166] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 11.
[167] Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia XIX.
[168] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 10, n. 10; Victoria, De
Indis I, 1, n. 3; Digest VI, 1. 27; L, 17, 55, 151; XLII, 8, 13;
XXXIX, 2, 24; Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 12, 1; Castrensis on Code
III, 34, 10; Digest XXXIX, 3, 1.
[169] Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 3 ff.; Digest XXXIX,
2, 26.
[170] Vasquius, same reference.
[171] Vasquius, same reference, n. 5.
[172] In his Works and Days [The entire passage as translated by A.
W. Mair (Oxford translation, page 1) is: “For when he that hath no
business looketh on him that is rich, he hasteth to plow and to array
his house: and neighbour vieth with neighbour hasting to be rich:
good is this Strife for men.”].
[173] Code IV, 59.
[174] Cajetan on Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3.
[175] Politics I, 9.
[176] Hexameron V, 10, 4, q. 44.
[177] In funere Basilii.
[178] Thucydides, Isocrates, Andocides.
[179] Isocrates, Archidamos 51 [Grotius probably quoted here from
memory].
[180] Panegyric 176.
[181] De officiis I, 35.
[182] Polus Lucanus apud Stobaeum, De iustitia; Clemens Alexandrinus,
Stromateis; Augustine, City of God IV, 15.
[183] On the liberty of the Rhodians XV, 10 [Pickard-Cambridge’s
translation I, page 59].
[184] Propertius IV, vi, 47-52 [Butler’s (Loeb) translation, page
305].
[185] City of God V, 1.
[186] Digest XLIII, 14, 1.
[187] Digest XLIII, 12, 1.
[188] Digest XLIII, 12, 1.
[189] Digest XLIII, 8, 2; XLVII, 10, 13 and 24; Silvestris, on the
word ‘restitutio’; Oldradus and Archidiaconus on Digest XLVIII, 12,
2, and XLVII, 11, 6 [Oldrado de Ponte (?-1335), a Bologna canonist.
Archidiaconus is probably the Italian decretalist Guido Bosius.]
[190] City of God IV.
[191] De officiis I, 34 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 37].
[192] Digest XLI, 1, 50; Heinrich von Gorcum, De bello justo 9.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Footnote [100a] is referenced twice, from page 38 and from the
prior Footnote [99a].
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 16 (Fn 33a): ‘Eugenium II;’ replaced by ‘Eugenium III;’.
Pg 16 (Fn 35a): ‘Corinthinas V,’ replaced by ‘Corinthians V,’.
Pg 31: ‘praetors was able’ replaced by ‘praetors were able’.
Pg 44: ‘this is specificially’ replaced by ‘this is specifically’.
Pg 68: ‘more absurd then’ replaced by ‘more absurd than’.
Pg 80 (Index): ‘Baldis’ replaced by ‘Baldus’.
