MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY

1940




WHAT YOU MUST DO



OH



17 Jsoto



This 3d. official pamphlet, comprising
24 pages with 1 1 illustrations, tells you
how, with a few simple materials easily
obtained, or readily available in most
households, a refuge room can be made
in any ordinary dwelling-house that will
give almost as good protection as a
steel or brick garden shelter.



3



ON SALE AT EVERY POST OFFICE,
ORDER IT FROM ANY NEWSAGENT
Or send 4d. in stamps to the address below.



LONDON. PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1940
To be purchased from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses:
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2;
26 York Street, Manchester I ; I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;
80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through an/ bookseller



MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY



AIR RAIDS

What You must know
What You must do

Crown Copyright Reserved



LONDON: H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE

Price 3d. Net or 10s. for 50.



CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD 6

CHAPTER 1.— THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES.

Introductory . . . . • • • • ^

Organisation of Civil Defence 7

The Warning System 8

Air Raid Wardens 8

Auxiliary Fire Service 8

First Aid Parties 8

First Aid Posts and Hospitals • • • • 9

Rescue Parties . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • 7

Demolition and Repair Parties 9

Gas Identification Service 9

Decontamination Squads • • 9

Treatment of Unexploded Bombs and Wrecked Aircraft . . . . 10

Report and Control Centres 10

A.R.P. Controllers 10

CHAPTER 2.— SELF-PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH EXPLOSIVE

BOMBS, AND BEHAVIOUR DURING A RAID.

High Explosive Bombs and TTieir Effects 1 1

Splinters . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • ..Is

Blast . . . . • • ... • • • • • • • • * ■

Types of H.E. Bombs . . . . . . . • • • • • . . 12

High Bombing Attacks 12

Low Flying Attacks and Machine Gunning 12

Other Falling Projectiles 13

The Importance of Shelter 13

Provision of a Refuge in the House 13

Selection of a Refuge 13

Protection of Windows and Doors 14

Protection against Splinters 14

Protection against Blast 15

Keeping Out Wind and Rain when Windows are Broken . . . . 16

Provision of a Shelter Outside the House 17

Types of Shelter Independent of Buildings 17

Trenches . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . 17

Government Steel (Anderson) Shelters 17

Surface Shelters . . . . . . . . • . . . • • ..18

General Notes on Shelters 18

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Page

Independent Lighting . . . . . • . . • • • • . . 19

Water Supply • • • • . , 19

Flooding . . . . ■ ■ • • . • • * • • • • . . 19

Sanitary Arrangements . . . . . . . . . • • . . 20

Tools . . . . • • « • « • • • • • • • * • 20

Comforts and Occupation 20

Action to be Taken on the Sounding of a Warning and Behaviour During

a Raid . . . . . . . . . • . • . . • • . . 20

After the Raid . . . . . . . . . - • • . . 21

■

CHAPTER 3. — INCENDIARY BOMBS.

Incendiary Bombs and Their Characteristics 23

Incendiary Agents . . . . . . . . • • • • . . 23

Incendiary Bomb Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Penetration and Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Characteristics of Light Magnesium Bomb . . 24

Methods of Controlling the Bomb and Dealing with Incipient Fires . . 25

The Use of Water 25

Stirrup Hand Pump . . . . . . .25

Methods of Use .26

Sequence of Action 26

Alternative Methods . . . . . . . . • • • . . . 28

Use of Chemical Extinguishers 30

Larger Fires . . . . . . . . • . • • • • . . 30

Precautions to be Taken in Advance 34

CHAPTER 4.— WAR GASES.

The Nature of War Gases 36

Non-Persistent Gas 36

Persistent Gas 36

Effects of War Gases on the Body 36

Lung Irritants (Choking Gases) . . . . . . . . . . 36

Eye Irritants (Tear Gases) 36

Nose Irritants (Sneezing Gases) . . . , 37

Blister Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 37

Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Gas Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 37

Behaviour of Gas 38

Respirators for the General Public 39

The Civilian Respirator 39

Description . . . . . . . . 39

Putting on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Adjusting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Testing Fit . . . . 41

Size «• « « « . • * *. »* •* *• • • 41

Checking 41

Securing . . 41

Rcmov&i • • • « « » » » • • • • ** 42

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Page

The Small Child's Respirator

Description

Putting on and Removal
Adjustment and Testing. .

The Baby's Protective Helmet
Description

Fitting and Operation . .
Use and Care of Respirators



Treatment to Prevent Misting of Eyepieces 47

Carriers for the Civilian and Small Child's Respirators 47

Gasproof Accommodation 48

Protection of the Body Against Blister Gases . . 49

Decontamination of Contaminated Articles of Personal Apparel . . 50

Ordinary Clothing 50

Leather Boots and Shoes 50

Respirators . . 50

CHAPTER 5.— SIMPLE FIRST AID.

Introductory . . . . . . 51

Wound Shock .. .. ..51

Bleeding (Haemorrhage) 52

Types of Haemorrhage . . . . 52

Symptoms of Haemorrhage . . . . 52

Treatment of External Haemorrhage . . 53

Treatment of Internal Haemorrhage 53

Wounds in the Abdomen 53

Fractures . . . . . . 53

Simple Fractures 53

Compound Fractures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Complicated Fractures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Simple First Aid Treatment of Fractures 54

Improvised Splints . . • 54

Improvised Bandages for Securing Splints . . . . . . 54

Improvised Slings 54

Unconsciousness (Insensibility) 56

Suffocation (Asphyxia) . . , 56

Removal from Electrical Contact .56

Burns (other than from Gas) and Scalds 57

Gas Casualties . . 57

Blister Gas .. 57

Lung Irritant Gas . . . . .58

Nose Irritant Gas 58

Summary 5S

Notes on Improvised Splints 60

APPENDIX. TABLE OF WAR GASES 62

SELECTION OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS . . . . 64

4



42

42

43

43

43

44

45



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS



Improvised window protection — using books

A completed Anderson shelter

Emergency exit from cellar

Chart illustrating protection obtained by taking cover . .
Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb
Stirrup Hand Pump

Controlling fire with jet

Directing spray on the bomb . .

Shovelling sand on the bomb

The bomb almost completely controlled by sand

The Redhill Container, long-handled scoop, and hoe .

Opening the door of a burning room

Rescuing an insensible person from a burning room
Bringing an insensible person downstairs
Smothering the flames when clothing is on fire . .
Preparing to escape from an upstairs window

Dropping from an upstairs window

Putting on the Civilian Respirator

Back of head with respirator in position

Preparing to remove the Civilian Respirator
Small Child's Respirator

Baby's Anti-Gas Helmet

Testing rubber of mask

Examining rubber disc

Civilian Respirator correctly packed in carton . .

Artificial respiration — backward swing

Artificial respiration — forward swing

Improvised splint for fractured thigh bone

Improvised splint for fractured shin bone

Improvised splint for fractured forearm



5



FOREWORD

BY

SIR JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., M.P.

Minister of Home Security.

This book is written to help you and your family and your friends.

There has been built up in the last few years a vast organisation for Civil
Defence; and, thanks to the devotion of a great army of volunteers, the services
which it comprises have been welded into a highly efficient force. This organi-
sation is briefly described in the first chapter, which has been included in this
book for two reasons; first, because I may, in the near future, have to call
on many of you to give some part of your time to one or other of these
services, and secondly, because you may need the help of the services and
should therefore understand something about them.

But the Civil Defence services alone cannot protect you from the conse-
quences of air raids. Your own protection and the protection of your family
must, in large measure, depend on your taking certain necessary precautions.
You can yourself do much to minimise risk to yourself and to those dependent
on you.

A great deal of information has been collected as a result of experience
gained in actual air raids, and from this and from research and experiment
the basic principles on which the protection of life and limb and property
depends have been worked out and are set down here for your guidance.
They are simple to understand and easy to carry out; and if you will act on
them you will be able to face the dangers of air raids with the sure conviction
that you have done all in your power for the safety of those depending on
you, and with the calmness and assurance that come from a knowledge of the
way in which these dangers can be met. In this way you will be helping not
only yourself, but the Nation, for it is through the strengthening of your
powers of resistance that the people of this country will be enabled to defeat
every attempt the enemy may make to weaken its morale and paralyse its
war effort.

In this war every man and woman is in the front line. A soldier at the
front who neglects the proper protection of his trench does more than endanger
his own life; he weakens a portion of his country's defences and betrays the
trust which has been placed in him. You, too, will have betrayed your trust
if you neglect to take the steps which it is your responsibility to take for the
protection of yourself and your family.

This is a contribution to the winning of final victory which you personally
can make and which no one else can make for you. I am confident that you
will make it.




June, 1940.



Ministry of Home Security.

6



CHAPTER 1



THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES.
Introductory.

The object of enemy air raids is to dislocate the war effort of the nation.
The attainment of this object may be sought by deliberate attacks on targets
of military significance, a term having a wide application in these days, or by
unrestricted and indiscriminate bombing of the civil population. The primary
responsibility for resisting the enemy's efforts lies with the active defence
services. But it is essential to have available a nation-wide organisation, the
purpose of which is to minimise the effects of air raids by such aircraft as
succeed in penetrating the active defences. Such an organisation, known as
Civil Defence, has been built up and forms what might now be referred to as
the Fourth Defence Service. The operation of this service is the responsibility
of local authorities in the United Kingdom, working under the general
direction of the Ministry of Home Security.

The tactics of bombing from the air vary from mass raids by large numbers
of bombers to attacks by small numbers of aircraft or even by single machines.
Attacks may be launched in single raids with long intervals between each
raid, or in successive raids following closely upon each other both by day
and by night, and maintained over an extended period.

Whatever form aerial attack takes, damage of some kind is inevitable, and
the lives of many civilians will be endangered, unless certain essential
elementary knowledge is previously gained, and a number of simple pre-
cautions observed.

The most effective weapon for causing major damage from the air is
probably the high explosive bomb. Its destructive effects are immediate, and
it is a difficult weapon against which to provide complete protection except
at a very high cost. To cause numerous major fires simultaneously over a wide
area may also be an enemy objective, and this may be done by means of
incendiary bombs, particularly those of the lighter type, thousands of which
could be dropped at one time upon a densely built-up area. Machine-gun fire
also may be directed from low-flying aircraft upon persons exposed to the
raiders. The possibility of poison gas being used, though it is forbidden by the
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, cannot be overlooked, and such attacks might
be made either by bomb or spray or both.

All these weapons of air attack may be used by themselves or in effective
combinations devised to cause the greatest dislocation of the war effort of
the nation, and to threaten the morale of the people.

The Organisation of Civil Defence.

There is much that citizens can do, and which no one can do for them, to
help themselves, their families, and the nation, but it has been necessary to
set up in addition the great organisation of Civil Defence, built principally on
unpaid voluntary service, for the discharge of the many skilled duties described
below. Everyone should understand this organisation, both so that he may



7



be able to help so far as he is able, and so that he may not fail to take
advantage, in case of need, of the services which have been set up.

The Warning System.

A means by which warning of an approaching raid can be given to the
general public is of first importance, and this is provided by a national
system. Warning messages are sent out to the districts where air attack may
materialise, and in those districts only is the "Action Warning" sounded by
sirens. The signal is a "warbling" note given on a variable-pitch siren, or
a succession of 5-second blasts sounded on a fixed-pitch hooter followed by
intervals of 3 seconds. The warning is then taken up locally by sharp blasts
on police and wardens' whistles.

When the raid has passed or is no longer expected, this is announced by
a continuous blast, known as the "Raiders Passed" signal. All siren signals
are sounded for a period of two minutes.

If the presence of gas is suspected, warning of it is given locally by wardens'
hand-rattles; and when the area is known to be safe again, this warning is
cancelled by the ringing of wardens' handbells. Handbells may also be
sounded to inform the public when it is again safe to emerge from shelter, if
sirens are put out of action as the result of a raid.

Air-Raid Wardens.

There will be a great need in time of air raids*for persons of courage and
personality, with a sound knowledge of the locality, to advise and help their
neighbours, and generally to serve as a link between the public and the
authorities. To provide for this, the Air Raid Wardens' Service has been
organised, based on a large number of local Posts.

Wardens have important duties to carry out, including assessing air-raid
damage, reporting it concisely and correctly, guiding and assisting the A.R.P.
services sent to deal with it, and giving general assistance and guidance to
members of the public. Their functions are in some respects allied to those
of the police, with whom they will need to co-operate closely; and, though
they are not part of the police or special constabulary, the wardens* service
is generally placed by the local authority under the executive control of the
Chief Constable.

It is important that everyone should know the names and addresses of the
nearest Wardens and the position of the Warden's reporting post, since it may
be necessary as a result of air-raid damage to make immediate contact with
a Warden, or to arrange for the making of an urgent report.

Auxiliary Fire Service.

It is important that fires should be tackled as soon as they are started, as
they are very much more easily put out at this stage than later. Incendiary
bombs may cause fires in such large numbers in a comparatively restricted
area that the normal resources of the Fire Brigade will be inadequate. An
Auxiliary Fire Service has therefore been formed and trained to reinforce the
regular fire brigades. The fire brigade equipment has also been increased by
the provision, on loan to the local authorities, of large numbers of pumping
units, mainly trailer pumps, drawn by cars, taxis, vans or lorries, but including
also self-propelled units where required. Emergency fire floats have also been
added to the fire brigade equipment in a number of areas.

First-Aid Parties.

There may be injured who must be given attention where they lie; some
will require removal for further treatment. For this work there are First Aid



8



(or Stretcher) Parties, each consisting of four men with a driver and transport
for themselves and vehicles for the injured provided by the Ambulance
Service.

First-Aid Posts and Hospitals.

There must be places where the lightly and seriously injured can be
treated, and this is done at First-Aid Posts and Hospitals. First-Aid Posts
are normally in buildings adapted and equipped for this work. They are
supplemented by Mobile Units, consisting of vehicles in which the appropriate
equipment and staff are conveyed to scenes of damage in order that temporary
First-Aid Posts may be established nearby.

In rural districts First-Aid Points are established, and consist of a first-aid
box placed in some central building where attention to the injured can be
given.

The position of First-Aid Posts and Points should be known to all who
live in the vicinity, for it may be necessary for slightly wounded persons to
go there on foot, or for uninjured persons to convey a neighbour, for the
purpose of obtaining first aid.

Rescue Parties.

Those who have been trapped in shelters or under buildings must be
released. This work requires experience and care, since debris unskilfully
moved might release other parts of the structure, and so cause it to crash
upon both rescuers and those to be rescued.

This work is done by Rescue Parties, who will also undertake the
temporary shoring up or the demolition of partly collapsed buildings where
these are a source of immediate danger and the work is within their scope.
As it is probable that many of the trapped will be injured, at least four
members of each Rescue Party are also trained and equipped to render
first aid.

For certain parts of rescue party work, for example, the removal by
manhandling of piled-up debris, Rescue Parties may ask for the assistance of
able-bodied members of the public who are available nearby.

Demolition and Repair Parties.

After an air raid extensive demolition work may have to be done, streets
cleared of wreckage, craters filled in, and fractured gas, water, and electricity
mains and sewers may need repair. Such work may have to be carried out
urgently in order to remove danger, or for the purpose of restoring essential
services. Work of this kind will be undertaken by parties obtained from local
authorities' staffs or the staffs of public utilities as required, or from
contractors, according to the particular work to be undertaken.

In clearing wreckage, demolition and repair parties may, like Rescue
Parties, utilise the services of members of the public who are willing to help.

Gas Identification Service.

If poison gas is used, wardens will immediately report the fact. They will
also warn the public. There may arise problems in connection with gas
warfare, however, which require the services of experts, and to provide for this
a local Gas Identification Service, consisting of specially trained chemists antl
assistants^ has been formed and equipped with apparatus suitable for their

Decontamination Squads.

Areas where persistent gas has fallen are said to be contaminated, and are
dangerous until the gas has been neutralised or removed. The work of



9



decontamination is related generally to that of the Street Cleansing Services,
and special Decontamination Squads, consisting of a foreman and five men
with the addition of a driver, have been recruited, principally from these
services, for the work.

Treatment of Unexploded Bombs and Wrecked Aircraft,

Bombs from enemy aircraft or shells from our own anti-aircraft guns may
fall without exploding; these are a potential source of danger, and their
presence and exact position should be immediately reported to a Warden or
the Police. They will then be removed or destroyed by parties specially trained
in this work, and in the meantime they should not be touched.

Similarly, a crashed enemy aircraft is also dangerous. If it catches fire, the
petrol, ammunition, and any bombs still remaining in their racks may explode.
If the aircraft is not on fire, there still remains a possible danger of explosion.

It will be the duty of Wardens and the Police to keep the public away from
unexploded bombs, shells, and crashed enemy aircraft, and to arrange, as
necessary, that nearby buildings are vacated until the area has been made safe
by the appropriate means.

Report and Control Centres.

For the operation and control of all A.R.P. services, there must be local
headquarters to receive damage reports and to issue instructions for the
despatch of the necessary parties to scenes of damage. For this purpose
Report and Control Centres have been established. These are manned by
telephonists, messengers, clerks, and representatives of the various A.R.P.
services, who are co-ordinated by an Officer-in-Charge.

A Report and Control Centre may be combined, or there may be one or
more Report Centres linked to the Control Centre, which is the nerve-centre
of the local organisation and the headquarters from which local operations are
directed.

A.R.P. Controllers.

The local A.R.P. services are under the general charge of an A.R.P.
Controller, whose duty it is to maintain the smooth and efficient working of
the various A.R.P. services of the local organisation and who is supremely
responsible for their operations in times of raiding.



10



CHAPTER 2



SELF-PROTECTION AGAINST HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS, AND

BEHAVIOUR DURING A RAID-
High Explosive Bombs and Their Effects

A high explosive bomb consists of a charge of high explosive mixture
contained in a steel case fitted with a fuse and exploder.

The destructive effects are twofold : those of blast, i.e. the air pressure and
waves created by the explosion, and those of fragmentation, i.e. the breaking
up of the steel case of the bomb into jagged pieces or splinters.

Splinters.

The average size of these splinters is about 1 in. across, and they are
projected in large numbers in every direction at about twice the speed of a
rifle bullet. On striking a hard surface they may be arrested or, if deflected
in their path, may cause damage from an unexpected direction.

The effective range of splinters can be considerable, and unless sufficient
resistance is encountered in their path, they may inflict fatal injury at points as
far distant as half a mile from the fall of the bomb.

Blast.

Blast is more freakish in the havoc it brings and a detailed treatment of the
subject would involve a technical description of scientific phenomena. It is
sufficient to say here that on the bursting of a bomb there is a violent outward
movement of air in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, followed instantly
by a great inrush of air causing a momentary suction. A shock- wave is created
and travels at a velocity, in the first instant, greater than that of sound ; but it
quickly becomes weaker as it goes. If the explosion takes place after penetra-
tion of the ground surface, corresponding waves are also set up in the earth.

In the immediate vicinity of the bomb, shock-waves may completely
destroy buildings or may partially destroy them by causing the collapse of
wall panels, roofs, doors, and windows. These are the 44 near effects,*' caused
by pressure or suction.

Further away, only structures of light construction, such as prominent
balconies, and roof tiles and slates, plaster from ceilings, and window glass are
likely to be affected. These are the " distant effects," caused by violent
shaking.

It can never be predicted, especially in the case of doors and windows
subjected to the near effects of blast, whether they will be blown violently
inwards or sucked outwards. It can, however, be said that the glass of
unprotected windows wiU almost certainly be shattered, and that the flying
jagged pieces will be a source of the utmost danger.

Window glass subjected to distant effects of blast may also be shattered,
but with considerably less violence, the fracture being caused by the resonance
set up in the panes by the shock wave. If windows are left wide open they are
less likely to be broken. It is advisable, however, to close them if a gas warning
is given, and bombing is not in progress at the time.



11



Far greater areas are exposed to the distant effects of bombs than to the
near effects, and consequently the chance of a house being subjected to distant
effects is far greater than that of its suffering nearer effects.

Types of H.E. Bombs.

There are certain types of H.E. bombs, such as anti-personnel and armour-
piercing bombs, designed for attack on specific objectives, but the most
commonly used are the General Purpose types. The latter, as the name
implies, are employed for general bombardment purposes and are used, for
example, against factories and buildings of ordinary construction.

These bombs may be fitted with fuses to detonate them on impact or after
a delay varying within a considerable time range; normally they have fuses
giving a delay action of a few tenths of a second in order that the target may
be penetrated before detonation, but the delay can be increased to many
minutes or even longer periods.

The weights of bombs vary greatly. In detenruning the size of bomb to be
used, account has to be taken of the carrying capacity of the aircraft, the
weight of fuel required, and the destructive effect of the different weights of
bombs. In the present circumstances, the bombs most generally in service are
of about 100 lb., 250 lb M and 500 lb.; such bombs are between 4 and 5 feet
long; and from 9 to 15 ins. in diameter.

High Bombing Attacks.

Hostile aircraft will be subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire from our
home defence units. Over certain vulnerable parts of the country, barrage
balloons, too, will add to the hazards with which they must contend, and at
all times there will be the Fighter machines of the R.A.F. launching fierce
attacks upon the enemy.

These defences will tend to cause raiding units to keep as far out of range
as they can, consistent with the requirements of their plan of bombing. In
many cases, therefore, the majority of bombing attacks over this country may
be expected to be launched from a considerable height.

There are two points arising from this source which are of special interest
to the civilian population.

Firstly, even if it could be assumed that the enemy would confine his
attention to military targets, the small measure of accuracy obtainable when
bombs are released from a great height leaves a wide margin as regards the
possible positions where the bombs might actually fall. Some may fall in the
areas at which they are aimed, whilst others would almost certainly fall in
residential areas, the suburbs of cities, or even in parks, fields, or rivers. Every
citizen, then, must realise that he and his family are among the potential
victims of air attack, and that he must take all possible steps to secure pro-
tection.

Secondly, bombs released from modern aircraft flying at great heights and
speeds must be released well before the target is reached. Anyone who waits
till he sees aeroplanes overhead before taking cover is thus running the
gravest risk of being injured by the bursting of a bomb dropped before the
bomber comes into sight— for in congested areas in particular it is most
unlikely that there will be clear view of the sky for many miles in all directions.

Low Flying Attacks and Machine Gunning.

Where there is no balloon barrage, attacks may be made from very low
altitudes, or bv dive-bombing, and aircraft may skim over the roof-tops
spraying unprotected persons in the streets and at windows with machine-gun
bullets.



12



Other Falling Projectiles.

In addition to the dangers resulting from H.E. and machine gun attacks,
and from incendiary bomb and gas attacks described in later chapters, there
are other falling missiles inseparable from the presence of hostile aircraft over
this country. Anti-aircraft shells are designed to explode in the air, and the
fragments of metal, including the heavy nose-cap, will descend upon the
country below. Expended machine gun bullets resulting from aerial combat
will also fall to the ground.

The Importance of Shelter.

These, then, are some of the dangers which air raids will bring. Outside
the very small area in which the severest consequences of a direct hit are felt,
there is a large area in the case of each bomb explosion in which there are the
gravest dangers to life for the unprotected, as has been explained in the fore-
going pages, but against which it is perfectly practicable to provide protection
simply and cheaply. Every time a bomb explodes in a congested area, for a
large number of people in the vicinity it may make the difference between life
and death whether or not they have provided themselves with shelter and, on
hearing the sirens, have taken refuge in it.

A vital responsibility therefore lies on each householder to ensure that
adequate shelter is available for himself and his dependents. In order to assist
persons who wish to avail themselves of expert advice as regards the selection
of the form of shelter best suited to their own case, certain of the Professional
Institutions have arranged, with the approval of the Government, to set up a
panel of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors who are competent to give
technical advice to householders. For the sum of 10s. 6d. a member of the
panel will inspect the house and give the householder a brief written report as
to the best place for a shelter and the best way within his means to provide
protection.

A list of consultants on the panel has been furnished to certain local
authorities and on application to the authority a householder may obtain a
list of consultants from which to choose. If the authority has no such list,
application should be made to The Secretary, Central Board, 1-7 Great
George Street, Westminster, London, S.W.I, who will provide the name or
names of consultants available near the householder who applies.

Provision of a Refuge in the House.

In many cases it will be found that the most convenient means of providing
a shelter is to adapt some part of the existing premises for the purpose, and
this is something which very often a handy man can do for himself, using
largely materials which he can find in his own house or garden.

Full-scale experiments conducted with 500-lb. bombs have shown that,
outside a radius of 50 ft. from the point of burst, the average well-built house
of normally substantial construction should give its occupants substantial
protection against the effect of blast and splinters, as well as against machine-
gun bullets and light missiles, subject to certain provisions being made.
Windows and doorways should be blocked up or protected in some other
way; ceilings must be supported in case of the collapse of the roof or upper
storey; where walls are thinner than 1 3£ ins. of sound brickwork or stonework
or the equivalent of this, they must be reinforced by the addition of further
material, such as earth in boxes piled beside the wall to a height of at least
6 ft.

Selection of a Refuge.

The considerations may broadly be divided into two parts; those of
lateral protection, that is, protection from blast and splinters provided bv



13



side walls, and those of overhead protection against light incendiary bombs,
fragments of anti-aircraft shells, machine gun bullets, etc., and against the
fall of debris, should the upper parts of the building collapse.

Basement and semi-basement rooms offer the best natural protection, since
lateral protection is generally wholly or partly provided by their sunken
position, and they probably have fewer windows to be blocked or protected
than other rooms. As regards overhead protection, there are all the floors and
the roof of the building above them to give protection from falling objects,
though they may not possess adequate strength to take the load of the building
should it collapse. It is desirable to obtain professional guidance as to whether
the ceiling is capable of taking the weight of falling debris, and, if not, how
best it can be strengthened for the purpose.

Where there is no basement, it will usually be advisable to select a room
on the ground floor or one of the lower floors, in order to ensure good over-
head protection against falling missiles; wherever possible there should be
two floors and a roof above the shelter. Rooms on higher floors are incon-
venient to adapt, since it may be necessary to protect the floor from splinters
striking up through a window of the room below, and the strengthening of the
ceiling also is most difficult and often impossible to arrange.

In the case of rooms at or above ground level, it is necessary to consider the
thickness of the walls upon which lateral protection will depend. A shelter
should, if possible, be protected by 13| in. of sound brickwork or stonework
on all sides. It is not necessary that the walls of the shelter room itself should
everywhere be of this thickness, provided there are other walls within a
distance of about 30 ft. which give on all sides a total thickness equivalent to
13£ ins. of solid brick or stone; if in any direction this degree of protection is
not afforded by the premises as they stand, additional material should if
possible be added. If it is not practicable to provide a thickness of 13£ ins.
in all directions, a single 9-in. wall of sound brick or stone will give consider-
able protection.

Other things being equal, rooms facing soft ground, such as gardens and
fields, are more suitable for use as shelters than those looking out on a street
or hard paving, since the destructive effects of a bomb bursting in soft soil are
not so great as those of one in contact with a hard surface.

Persons living in the upper storeys of houses converted into flats will need
to come to some arrangement with the other occupants so that common pro-
tection can be secured for all in the manner most suitable to all the circum-
stances. Those living on the ground floor or in the basement might give up
space in an entrance hall or passage, whilst others might provide material and
labour for blocking up a window or making other structural adaptations, or it
might be possible to adapt quite simply a common staircase for use as a
refuge by all.

Protection of Windows and Doors.

After a suitable room has been selected as a refuge, the windows and any
outside doors will need to be given special protection. Windows in particular
are highly vulnerable to both splinters and blast, and even when situated
below ground, and thus protected against splinters, they may still be affected
by blast. Moreover, they may be broken by the vibrations set up by distant
effects in situations where no splinters can reach them.

Protection against Splinters.

One method of protecting windows against splinters is to remove the
window frame and fill in the opening with brickwork of the same thickness as
the wall. Another method is to build, outside the window, a wall of brickwork



14



13$ inches thick, or of earth or sand 30 inches thick, or of ballast or broken
bricks 24 inches thick ; where materials other than brick are used, they may be
contained in boxes, or held between boards or corrugated sheet iron. Pro-
tection can also be improvised by placing boxes tightly packed with books to
a thickness of at least 24 inches against the inside of the window.

Protective walls for windows should extend completely across the opening,
overlapping it by one foot on each side and at the top also.

A saving can be made in the materials used to provide protection by
erecting them on a strong platform or table placed at least one foot below
the window to obviate building up the walling from the ground level.

As far as bomb splinters are concerned, protection need not extend above
6 feet from the floor, as persons in the refuge will then be safe from such
splinters, though the window will, of course, be vulnerable to blast.

Similar protection can be given to doorways in outside walls, provided the
entrances do not have to be used, except possibly under force if other ways of
exit become blocked. Where the door is a regular means of entrance and must
be kept free, a substantial traverse should be built to a height of at least 6 feet
and to a width greater than that of the doorway, and 3 or 4 feet away from it.

Protection against Blast.

Windows and doors which are fully protected against splinters by the fore-
going methods will generally be protected against blast. But there will be




A stout book-case, stuffed tightly with old books, protects one window. Or a
table can be used with books 2 ft. 6 in. thick piled on it. If the books are loose

they should be roped down firmly.



15



many windows of a house, notably those of rooms other than the one adapted
for use as a shelter, which will cause great inconvenience if shattered. No
protection can be obtained simply for these against near effects, but some
measure of reinforcement can be given to them against distant effects and the
risk of small pieces of glass flying about reduced by one of the following
means : —

(1) A piece of fabric such as muslin, calico, cotton, or linen sheeting may
be pasted all over the glass. A variety of adhesives can be used, such as
office paste, gum, size, paperhanger's paste, or ordinary flour paste
with an addition of treacle or glycerine in the proportion of one part of
treacle or glycerine to twenty parts of the adhesive. Waterglass
(sodium silicate) should not be used. The glass should be well coated
with the adhesive. Where the loss of light does not matter, a strong
cardboard may be pasted over the glass. In order to make the card-
board stick, its natural curvature should be noted and it should be
placed with its hollow side, which may also be coated with the adhesive,
facing the glass and then be pressed firmly in contact. When there is
not enough cardboard available a strong wrapping paper can be used,
but it will not be equally effective.

(2) The inner face of the glass may be sprayed or painted with a liquid
composition of which special varieties can be bought. These materials
mostly have only a limited life, and may have to be renewed after about
two or three months.

(3) A transparent film of the kind used for wrapping may be applied to
the inner face of the glass. It can be pasted over the whole window, or
it can be applied in strips at right-angles. There are several materials
of this kind and each requires the proper adhesive. The makers*
directions should be followed closely.

(4) Where none of the above recommendations can be followed, materials
can be applied in strips, though they do not prevent glass from
splintering quite so well as all-over coverings. Surgical plaster or
insulating tape are useful and are best pressed on with a warm iron.
Strips of wrapping paper are not so satisfactory because they tear more
easily. The strips should not be more than 6 inches apart.

In all cases in which glass is retained in the windows of refuge rooms,
unless the opening has been wholly blocked, it is essential to arrange protection
against the violent scattering of broken glass by one or other of the foregoing
methods.

Keeping out wind and rain when windows are broken.

If window panes are shattered, it will be necessary to keep out wind and
rain and possibly poison-laden air. For this purpose, a shutter made of wall-
boarding, plywood, or other stout material fixed to a light wooden frame,
accurately fitting the window opening and having felt or thick cloth tacked
around the edges, is recommended. This wall-board shutter should not be
secured in position except by the friction of its close fit assisted by the felt
around its edges; it will thus not offer resistance to blast, and, if blown away
from the window, will fall into the room undamaged and can be easily
replaced. It will be found useful to attach the top edge of the shutter to the
wall by two lengths of stout rubber about 18 inches long, so that, while it is
left free to swing from the window, it will be prevented from flying across the
room.



16



Alternatively, shutters made of wood 2 inches thick throughout may be
fixed on the outside of the window. These wooden shutters must be firmly
clamped to the wall, for instance, by iron bars fixed across them with the ends
securely fastened to the wall. While such shutters will not prevent the glass
from being broken by blast, they will themselves normally withstand the
effects of blast, and, if fitted with the necessary gaskets, will also keep out
poison-laden air.

Provision of a Shelter Outside the House.

In some cases it may be decided to provide a shelter of special construction
outside the house. Such a shelter may take one of several forms and may be
situated in the garden, if there is one, or nearby, wherever accommodation
permits.

Arrangements may be made with neighbours for two or more householders
to share the expenditure of a commercially built structure situated con-
veniently to all.

The entrance of such shelter must always be protected from splinters
either by means of a substantial traverse or by proximity to a substantial
building or wall. The shelter should be sited not nearer to any building than
half the height of that building. Where this cannot be achieved, the roof of
the shelter must be made strong enough to resist the fall of debris.

Generally it is found that the proper siting and erection of outside shelters
are matters for the building and contracting profession. For that reason, only
brief notes are given in the pages which follow on the various types of outside
shelters, sufficient to indicate the kind of problems to be tackled. Those
wishing to provide for themselves specially made shelters are recommended
to make contact direct with the profession or to approach the local Council
for guidance, whichever is more appropriate.

Types of Shelters independent of Buildings.

Shelters independent of buildings may take the form of covered trenches
or they may be special constructions, lined for example with steel or concrete.

Trenches.

Being constructed wholly or partly below ground, trenches afford excellent
lateral protection, but they must be given overhead cover against light falling
missiles. This requires a head cover of 5 inches of concrete or 18 to 24 inches
of earth. More earth should not be used, because, in the event of collapse, the
occupants of the shelter might be so deeply buried as to be unable to extricate
themselves.

Trenches should provide not less than 6 feet of head room and should be
fitted with seats. They must be lined with strong materials to prevent the walls
from collapsing, and should be provided with a form of floor covering, such
as duckboards or shingle.

Arrangements must be made to drain away any water which may seep
into the trench.

Government Steel Shelters (" Anderson Shelters ")•

Corrugated steel shelters made in sections to accommodate four or more
persons made to Government specification have been distributed in large
numbers in the more vulnerable areas.

The sections of these shelters fit together in the form of an arch designed to
carry the necessary covering of earth for overhead protection against falling



17



A Completed Anderson Shelter.

splinters and debris. Where possible, they should be sunk about 3 feet into
the ground, and should invariably be covered with earth to a minimum depth
of 15 ins. over the arch. These shelters do not provide the required protection
unless covered by at least this thickness of earth. The shelter should be sited
from 6 to IS feet away from a building in such a position that the building
protects the entrance from splinters.

Surface Shelters.

These are built entirely above the ground; they may be constructed of
15 inches of concrete, 12 inches of reinforced concrete, or 13} inches of brick-
work. Overhead cover must be provided against the fall of light missiles, and
for this purpose reinforced concrete 5 inches thick may be used.

General Notes on Shelters.

Before a refuge or shelter can be considered to be completed and equipped,
there are certain points to which attention must be directed. It is important

18



that these matters be attended to immediately the accommodation is available
and not left until just before or during an air raid, when it may be too late.

Entrance and Exit.

Where possible two entrances, or a main entrance and an emergency exit,
such as a window, should exist; they should be as far apart as possible, so that
both are not likely to be blocked at the same time.

Independent Lighting.

As the normal source of electricity may be damaged, it is important to
provide alternative means of lighting. In small shelters torches, or even
candles and night-lights, may be used for alternative lighting.

Water Supply.

An adequate supply of drinking water should be available.
Flooding.

Steps should be taken where necessary to prevent the entry of rain water
or water from mains damaged in a raid.

This may be done, for example, by provision of tide boards or by the
heightening of parapets round the site of the shelter. Underground shelter
accommodation should not be discarded solely on account of the fear of
flooding, if means can be provided for the safe escape of its occupants.




An enlarged coal shute protected from debris can be arranged as an emergency

exit from cellars.



19



Sanitary Arrangements.

For this purpose, chemical closets may be used if water closets are not
available. Some provision, however, is essential.

Tools.

A number of tools such as picks, shovels, and crowbars should be kept in
a shelter to be used in forcing a way out if the occupants are trapped. When
the accommodation is being fitted out, it should be discovered where the
weakest part of the structure is, or where it would be most suitable to work,
should it become necessary to break a way out. This position should be
clearly marked for the benefit of all.

Comforts and Occupation.

Chairs or other seating arrangements are required, and a table, if it can be
accommodated, is desirable. Rugs and a stove will be found most welcome
during night raids and in the winter months. A radio or gramophone, some
books, table games, and toys where children are concerned, will also be found
useful adjuncts to shelter equipment. The provision of a kettle, a safe means
of boiling it, some tea or coffee, a few biscuits in tins and perhaps some tinned
food in addition, will all help to make less irksome the time passed in the
shelter.

Tt is important that persons in shelters should be given an occupation
preferably of the mind, since this will help to divert attention from the noise
accompanying an air raid and to prevent idle speculations on what is going
on outside. Vigorous activity in a shelter should be discouraged, since it
increases the consumption of oxygen out of the air and unnecessarily raises
the humidity.

If a dog is taken into the shelter, it is desirable that it should be muzzled.

Action to be taken on the Sounding of a Warning and Behaviour during an

Air Raid.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is most dangerous to give way
to the temptation to watch what is going on in an air raid, and to remain out
of doors or at a window instead of taking cover. Even if the raid is a con-
siderable distance away, fragments of anti-aircraft shells may fall many miles
from the scene of action, and in addition, with aircraft travelling at several
miles a minute, a person watching a raid at some distance may find himself
without warning in the middle of falling bombs. Owing to the great speed of
modern aircraft, the bombs are released many miles before the target aimed
at is reached, and the person who waits to see the bombers before taking
cover may pay for his curiosity with his life.

When an air raid warning is heard, or the sound of gunfire or falling bombs
is heard m the absence of any warning being sounded, it is of the utmost
importance that everyone should seek cover at once, taking care that he has
his respirator with him.

After a warning is sounded, the period before the raid begins is likely to be
short. Persons in or near their own homes should betake themselves, with their
dependents, m an orderly fashion, to the refuge; and employees at their place
ot business should take cover in the shelter provided. Those caught in the
streets at the time of an air-raid warning should not attempt to go home
unless they can get there within five minutes. The local authorities, assisted
by the Government, have provided public shelters for use by those persons
tor whom it would be unsafe to try to reach home. The presence of these
shelters is clearly marked, and in congested areas they are situated at close
intervals.



20



It is obvious that no time should be lost in finding the nearest shelter.
This may not be difficult in daylight, but in the dark — perhaps on a moonless
night — it might prove an almost hopeless task if no thought had been given
to it beforehand. Signs are provided indicating the location of public shelters,
and it should be made a matter of habit to look out, wherever one may be,
for these notices, so that in case of sudden need arising to seek shelter no time
may be lost in trying to find it.

Where persons are indoors on the announcement of an air raid, even where
no refuge is provided, they should remain on the premises and should not
make their way to a public shelter. Public shelters are provided for the safety
of those who find themselves in the streets and far from home at the time of
a raid. It is much safer to remain in an unprotected house than to be caught
in the street when bombs are falling.

If a person in the street has not been able to find a public shelter before the
raid begins, it is necessary to make the best use of any nearby buildings or
other local features which can be turned to advantage as a means of providing
cover. Partial protection from flying splinters and debris may be obtainable
in archways, doorways, basement yards, under balconies, and against walls.
Bodily contact with solid matter, such as with the wall of a basement area, a
shelter, or a house, should be avoided since there is a danger of being hurt
through the violent percussion or earth shock set up in the ground by the
force of a bomb exploding nearby.

Protection of the lungs against blast can be secured to some extent by
keeping the mouth slightly open, and this can best be done by gripping
firmly between the teeth a piece of india rubber, a piece of soft wood, or a
handkerchief rolled up tightly into a ball.

To protect the eardrums from shock it is useful to put a small pad of
loosely packed cotton wool in the ears.

In the case of a bomb which penetrates the ground before exploding, the
sides of the crater tend to confine the path of splinters to an upward direction,
and even in the case of bombs which explode without penetration there is a
zone of comparative safety near the ground. It is therefore safer to sit down
than to stand up, and safer to lie than to sit. Thus, if a person finds himself
in the open in an air raid and no shelter is available, he should lie fiat,
preferably in a ditch or in a fold of the ground, with face downwards, support-
ing his head in his folded arms. Protection should be given in any possible
way to vital parts of the body against the fall of light objects.

The chart on page 22 gives an idea of the great reduction in the risk of
injury which can be secured by acting on the simple precautions described.

After the Raid.

After the action warning has been sounded it is important not to emerge
from the shelter until the M Raiders Passed " signal is given. It is even more
important that an exit should not be made where gas has previously been
announced by Warden's rattle until, in addition to the " Raiders Passed "
message sounded by the siren, the 44 All Clear " is rung on Warden's
handbells.

On emerging from shelter, it may often be the first impulse to wish to
make inquiries by telephone as to how others in the vicinity have fared.
This must not be done, since the communication system of the locality will
certainly be required by the Civil Defence Authorities for the purpose of
transmitting and receiving reports and for ordering out assistance to the
scenes of damage, where the factor of time is of paramount importance.
Those whose welfare is causing the most concern may unhappily be involved



21



at a scene of damage, and the delay in getting help
to them caused by unnecessary blockage of the lines of
communication may be a deciding factor in their ultimate
safety.

During a raid and, indeed, at all times in an emer-
gency, it is necessary to keep calm, and to act swiftly,
with the knowledge of the right course which must be
gained beforehand.
Standing in When it is safe to do so after a raid, it is better to go

Street. out and help others than to stay at home and fret.



Lying in
Street.



Lying Behind
Low Cover

or in
Doorway.




Sheltering in
House or

Other Place
Affording
Head and

Side Cover
away from
Windows.



In shelter of
approved
type, e.g.,
Anderson
Shelter,
Covered
Trench,
Strutted Base-
ment, or
Surface
Shelter.




This diagram is based on a large number of reports of the results of recent air raids
and is an approximate indication of the difference in the degree of risk resulting

from taking cover in various ways.

22



CHAPTER 3.

INCENDIARY BOMBS.
Incendiary Bombs and Their Characteristics.

Incendiary Agents,

Many incendiary agents, such as petrol, thermite, phosphorus, and
magnesium, have been used in war, but the most effective as a projectile
is the Magnesium Bomb, which consists of a magnesium alloy exterior and a
core of thermite priming composition.

The chief advantages of this type of bomb are that the whole of it is
combustible with the exception of the striker mechanism and the sheet-iron
tail fin, and that it remains active longer than most other forms of incendiary
bomb of equal weight.

Incendiary Bomb Attack.

Generally speaking, the object of incendiary bomb attack from the air is
to cause many fires over a large area at once. To do this each aircraft must
carry as large a number as possible of the lightest bombs which will effectively
start a fire; for this purpose the " kilo " or 2£-lb. magnesium bomb offers
great advantages since a large bomber can carry 1,000 or more of these
bombs.

They may be released in salvos of 10 or 20, and if 15 per cent, of the
bombs dropped in a normally built-up area actually hit buildings, a reasonable
proportion for such an area, and only half of these started fires, at least 75
fires could be caused by a single aircraft.

If there were 10 aircraft 750 fires might thus be started simultaneously.

Penetration and Protection.

The light incendiary bomb has been designed to penetrate any ordinary
roof material, such as slate or tile, and to become lodged in upper storeys,
where a fire may result. Unless the bomb enters through a window, it will
probably be arrested by the first boarded floor below the roof, where it will
start a fire and then, burning its way through the floor, start a further fire on
the floor below.

To lessen this risk, it is important to remove inflammable materials in
attic or roof spaces. In addition, to prolong the resistance of woodwork to
burning, it is helpful to apply liberally on upper roof timbers in these spaces
one of the many recognised flame-resisting paints or plasters in accordance
with the directions of the manufacturer. It is not difficult, however, and it is
certainly far cheaper, to buy the ingredients of such a composition and
prepare the mixture at home. For those who may wish to do so, the formula
is : —

1 J lb. of Kaolin (china clay) to 1 lb. 2 oz. of sodium silicate in syrup
form, mixed in 1 pint of water.

It should be understood that the application of flame-resisting paints and
plasters do not prevent fire, but simply prolong the resistance of dry woodwork
to burning, thus giving the fire-fighter more time to get to the bomb before

23



the surroundings are set alight. The resistance to burning in a floored roof
space or attic can be greatly increased by covering the floor with 2 ins. of
dry sand (if the ceiling structure will support the weight) or with some other
suitable material.

Characteristics of Light Magnesium Bomb,

On impact the thermite core of the bomb is ignited and burns at a
temperature sufficient to ignite the magnesium casing. In the initial period,




Typical Kilo Magnesium Typical Kilo Magnesium

Incendiary Incendiary
Bomb. Bomb — Sectional Drawing.



24



normally lasting about one minute, a violent spluttering takes place and
molten incendiary matter is thrown a considerable distance, often about 30 ft.
This may cause any inflammable material within reach to catch fire. After
the initial stage the bomb will have become a small pool of molten magnesium,
which will continue to burn with intense heat, but without spluttering, for
about 10 minutes or more.

If left alone the magnesium will tend to trickle through floor
boarding, burning its way as it goes, and so start further fires in the room
below.

When, therefore, an incendiary bomb has penetrated a building, it
becomes immediately necessary : —

(i) To subdue and localise the fire resulting from the bomb, since the
mam damage is caused by the fire;

(ii) To control the bomb and prevent it from burning through the floor.
Methods of Controlling the Bomb and Dealing with Incipient Fires.

The Use of Water.

The effect of applying water to burning magnesium is to increase the rate
of burning by supplying oxygen, with the result that the bomb is rapidly burnt
out.

Water should not, however, be thrown from a bucket or otherwise
projected in quantity on a magnesium bomb, since this will cause very violent
spluttering and scattering of the molten metal. Even a light jet of water will
cause spluttering, and should not, therefore, be used on the bomb.

The best method of dealing
with a magnesium bomb is by
the application of water in a
suitable spray, such as that
produced by the stirrup hand
pump; this enables the bomb to
be dealt with at close quarters
without any spluttering, and
reduces the time of burning
from about 10 minutes to a
minute or so.

Stirrup Hand Pump.

The appliance specially re-
commended for dealing with
incendiary bombs and the result-
ant fires is the stirrup hand pump.
It is fitted with a dual-purpose
nozzle which can produce either
a spray or an fr-in. jet of water
as desired. The jet will normally
carry effectively to a range of
about 30 ft., and the spray to
about 15 ft. It is supplied with
30 ft. of hose.

The advantages of the stirrup
hand pump may be summarised

as follows : Stirrup Hand Pump.




25



(i) It provides within a single appliance a safe means of attacking both
the fire and the bomb; the former with the spray, the latter with the
jet. To change from a jet to spray it is necessary only to press a
button in the base of the nozzle.

(ii) It enables the person operating the pump to keep well away from the
intense heat and smoke.

(iii) It is economical in water consumption. Not more than 6 to 8 gallons
of water are required to extinguish the bomb and any resultant fire
in the room, provided the situation is tackled promptly.

(iv) It is a valuable means of fighting incipient domestic fires not neces-
sarily resulting from incendiary bombs, and it may also be found to
have other uses, for instance in the garden or garage.

Methods of Use.

The appliance may be operated effectively by two people, but three are
preferable and they can best work as a team as follows :—

No. 1 takes charge of the fire-fighting and operates the nozzle at the end
of the line of hose;

No. 2 pumps the water from a bucket at the other end of the hose;

No. 3 keeps the bucket replenished with water and relieves Nos. 1 and 2
as necessary.

No. 3 should also watch for the possible outbreak of fire in the floor
below and in other likely places.

When the team consists of only two persons, the duties of No. 2 and No. 3
should be combined.

An independent source of water supply should be arranged in case water
mains are damaged or the pressure of water in them is reduced owing to fire
brigade activities elsewhere.

For this purpose, water should be stored beforehand in tanks or buckets
or used bath water may be retained in the bath during periods of heavy
raiding.

To approach the fire without being overcome by smoke, fumes, and heat,
No. 1 of the team should lie down and keep his face near the floor, where it
will be found easier to breathe and to see. He should have a fireman's axe
or light domestic hatchet conveniently available for dealing with obstacles
in his approach to the bomb, and also an electric torch for use in the final
search for smouldering remains. A wet blanket folded and slung across the
left arm will help to provide protection against the heat and against spluttering
magnesium.

Sequence of Action.

After the initial period of intense spluttering, the situation should be
tackled as follows : —

(i) The fire caused by the bomb should normally be controlled first by
means of the jet. Until this has been done the operator may not be
able to approach the bomb sufficiently closely to direct the spray
upon it.

(it) The spray should then be directed on the bomb, and during this
period the operator should gradually work nearer to the bomb so
that he is finally attacking it from 6 ft. He should continue to direct
the spray upon the bomb until it is entirely consumed, but it may be
necessary to stop spraying the bomb occasionally so as to keep the
resultant fire under control with the jet.

26



Shovelling Sand on the Bomb.



(iii) As soon as the bomb is extinct, the operator should extinguish any
burning parts which remain in the surrounding space.

(iv) As there is danger of fire creeping into unseen places where it may
remain unnoticed in a smouldering condition, a thorough search
must be made; for this purpose it may be necessary to lift floor
boards or to remove panelling and skirting from the walls.

Alternative Methods.

Where an incendiary bomb is found burning upon an incombustible
surface, such as the tiled or concrete floor of a kitchen or scullery, an



28



The Bomb Almost Completely Controlled by Sand.



alternative technique may be used if the surrounding area has not already
been set alight. The principle of this technique is to control the combustion
by smothering the bomb with dry sand. A close approach can then be made
and the bomb may safely be scooped into a receptacle containing a few
inches of sand and so removed outside.

The best appliances for use with this method are the Redhill container
and long-handled scoop and hoe. The container should be kept full with dry
sand and situated together with the scoop and hoe conveniently near the
place where it may have to be used.



29



If no other appliances are available, a bucket or coal-scuttle, and a shovel
or garden spade, may serve the purpose, provided that a supply of sand, earth,
or domestic ash is readily accessible, with which to smother the bomb and to
provide a protective layer of a few inches thickness in the base of the
improvised container. When the bomb is completely smothered, it may be
scooped into the container and removed, care being taken to scoop up every
particle of burning molten metal.

Use of Chemical Extinguishers.

Many chemical extinguishers are excellent for the purpose for which they
have been designed, but would have certain disadvantages in meeting the
situation caused by an incendiary bomb.

The average soda-acid ex-
tinguisher is of the 2-gallon
type. A single extinguisher of
this type would not, as a general
rule, be capable of dealing with
the bomb and the resultant fire.
In addition, it would be difficult
to handle when thick smoke
made it necessary for the fire-
fighter to keep close to the
ground.

Some extinguishers designed
for special purposes would actu-
ally be dangerous; for example,
carbon tetrachloride, which is
used in some, generates phos-
gene, a poisonous gas, when in
contact with the burning mag-
nesium.

Larger Fires.

If an incendiary bomb is not
dealt with quickly, a serious
fire may result and the situ-
ation will probably call for the
resources of the organised fire
service. In order to prevent the spread of fires, it is essential that the fire
service, if required, should be called without delay. It is of vital importance,
therefore, that everyone should know the fire organisation in his locality and
the quickest way of obtaining assistance. Telephone lines and fire alarms
may well be congested or out of order, and it would be wise to have a notice
pinned up near the door stating where the nearest fire station or auxiliary fire
station is or the route followed by the fire patrols.

In addition, the following notes may be found useful by householders for
dealing with a situation where a serious fire has been started.

(a) In searching a house for occupants, a start should be made at the
top and continued downwards.

(b) To avoid smoke and heat, a person should lie down and crawl with
head low. This method applies equally to life-saving and fire-fighting.

(c) Doors and windows must be kept closed to restrict the supply of fresh




The Redhill Container. The Long-handled

Scoop and Hoe.
These are joined together for shovelling sand
on the bomb, as shown in the illustration
on page 28.



30



air to the fire. The door of a room in which there is believed to be a
fire should not be opened until appliances are ready and in position
to attack the fire.

(d) Passages or stairways on fire should not be used if rescue from outside
can be effected through the window.

(e) When using stairways and passages, or crossing rooms, a person should
keep near the walls where there is greater support for the floor.

if) If the door of a burning room opens outwards, it is important to
control its swing by placing the foot a few inches back from the closed
door, so that it may be opened steadily and used as a shield for the
body against the outrush of flame and smoke which might otherwise
overcome the person about to enter. After this a prone position should
be adopted.




Opening the Door of a Burning Room.



(g) To move an insensible person, the body should be laid with the face
uppermost and the wrists tied together. The rescuer should then
kneel astride the body and insert his head through the loop of the
arms thus tied, and crawl.



31



Rescuing an Insensible Person from a Burning Room.




Smothering the Flames when Clothing is on Fire.

To move the body downstairs, it should be placed face uppermost
with the head down the stairs. The rescuer should then lead down-
stairs by crawling backwards, helping the body down with his hands
placed under the armpits.

(h) If a person's clothing is on fire, he should clap his hands over his
mouth, lie down and roll.

If the clothing of another is on fire, the rescuer should make him
lie down with the burning part uppermost. He should then approach
the victim, holding in front of himself a blanket, rug, overcoat, or any
other article suitable for smothering the flames, and cover the flames
with the material. The victim should then be rolled until the flames
have been put out.

(0 To escape from a window without a rope, the proper procedure is to
sit on the sill, turn round, lower the body to the full extent of the
arms, and then drop with the knees bent, endeavouring to spring
slightly away from the walls.



33



Preparing to Escape from an Upstairs Dropping from an Upstairs Window.
Window.

Precautions to be Taken in Advance

Fire brigades throughout the country have been augmented for the
purpose of dealing with incendiary bomb attack. But in spite of this the fire
brigade services might be severely strained in the event of a heavy incendiary
bomb attack and water for their use may temporarily cease to be available
locally owing to heavy demands elsewhere.

It is therefore of vital importance that as many of the public as possible
should be in a position to deal with fires on their own property before they
become unmanageable; there is no household in which this can be neglected
with impunity.

The following are the more important precautions which should be taken
in advance in order to deal with incendiary bombs : —

(1) In every household, each adult should be made familiar with the
methods of tackling both the bomb and the resultant fire, and duties
should be allotted to each person in advance.

(2) The appropriate appliances should be obtained before they are
required; the cost of doing so may often conveniently be shared
between neighbouring households. Supplies of water, independent of
the mains, and of sand or dry earth, should always be ready to hand,

34



and everyone should know where these supplies and any stirrup hand
pump or other appliance which is available are to be found.

(3) Preliminary drill is essential; each person should practise the special
duties which he has undertaken to perform, and when he is proficient
he should also practise the duties of others, so that each may be inter-
changeable with the other.

(4) Spaces under the roof, such as attics, in which incendiary bombs are
most likely to lodge, should be cleared of combustible material before-
hand, and ready access to attics and roof spaces should be provided
and made known to the persons concerned.

It should be constantly borne in mind that every incendiary bomb which
is promptly brought under control, besides saving water supplies which may
be of vital importance for dealing with major fires, averts the risk of a
conflagration which may end with the extensive destruction of property and
life.



CHAPTER 4.

WAR GASES.
The Nature of War Gases.

The term " gas," in reference to warfare, covers any chemical substance,
whether solid, liquid, or vapour, used to produce poisonous or irritant effects
upon the human body. A war gas may be used by itself or in combination
with other gases so that the presence of any one of them may be masked and
its identification made more difficult.

Gases are generally classified in two main categories : non-persistent and
persistent.

Non-persistent Gas.

Non-persistent gases are so called because, in whatever form they are
released, they are almost instantly converted into gas or smoke which is
gradually dissipated by dilution with the atmosphere when the air is in
movement. They are effective, therefore, for only a comparatively short
time except when there is no air movement, in which case the process of
dilution with the surrounding atmosphere is impeded, and the gas remains
effective for a longer period.

Some non-persistent gases are visible at the point of release, and wherever
the concentration is sufficiently high.

Persistent Gas.

Persistent gases are usually liberated in the form of liquids, and are called
persistent because the process of conversion of the liquid into vapour is
prolonged; the liquid itself is dangerous to touch, and any area on which it
has fallen will continue to give off vapour in dangerous concentrations until
the liquid has completely evaporated or been removed or neutralised.

The vapour of persistent gas is normally invisible, and like non-persistent
gases, drifts with the wind, gradually becoming dissipated by dilution the
further it moves from the source.

Effects of War Gases on the Body.

War gases may also be classified by their effects on the body to form two
general categories, non-blister and blister.
Non-blister gases may further be classified as follows.

Lung Irritants {Choking Gases).

In dangerous concentrations these gases immediately produce smarting
and watering of the eyes, irritation of the throat, and violent coughing and
retching (this is specially marked with chlorine and chloropicrin). Breathing
strong concentrations of them, even for a very short time, may cause death.
Phosgene is one of the most deadly of these gases.

Lung irritants are usually non-persistent gases.

Eye Irritants (Tear Gases).

These gases, even in low concentrations, cause extreme smarting and

36



watering of the eyes. Their effects are only temporary and pass off soon after
withdrawal from the affected area or after the respirator is put on. They are
effective as harassing agents and might be employed to cause panic and
threaten morale.

Tear gases may be either persistent or non-persistent. Their appearance in
liquid form is similar to that of blister gas, and they may be mixed with this
type of gas in order to mask its presence.

Nose Irritants {Sneezing Gases).

These gases are non-persistent, and consist of solid arsenical compounds
liberated as very fine particles in the form of a dust or " smoke." They are
generally invisible except near the source, and have practically no smell.
They produce intense irritation and pain in the nose, mouth, throat, and
chest, which is often accompanied by sneezing and headaches.

These effects may be slightly delayed, and in severe cases may be accom-
panied by feelings of acute mental distress. As immediate relief is not felt
after the respirator has been put on, a false belief may arise that the appliance
is failing in its purpose. This, and the nauseating effect of the gas, will create
a strong impulse to discard the respirator, which in no circumstances should
be permitted. The effects will normally pass off quickly if the respirator has
been promptly put on and kept on. Permanent injury is most unlikely to be
caused by this type of gas.

Blister Gases.

These gases, whether in the form of liquid or vapour, have the effect of
burning and blistering the skin, and may cause injuries to any part of the
body which will take long to heal. In both liquid and vapour form they will
readily penetrate ordinary clothing. Prolonged exposure to the vapour will
cause injury to the eyes and the entry of liquid into the eyes may even cause
blindness. If the vapour is inhaled in large quantities or contaminated food
eaten, serious internal injuries may be caused. Nevertheless, short exposure
to a low concentration of blister gas vapour need have no ill effects.

The two most important blister gases are mustard gas and lewisite.
Mustard gas is the better known of these and, unlike lewisite, it produces no
immediately noticeable effects on contact or inhalation, and so the need for
protection against it may not be appreciated until it is too late. If liquid
enters the eye, however, this would immediately be felt.

Contamination.

The word contamination has been adopted to imply the pollution of any
substance by war gas in any form, whether solid, liquid, or vapour. This
contamination, which is of particular importance in the case of blister gas, is
insidious and far-reaching in its effects. Both the liquid and the vapour are
absorbed by all porous substances which, when contaminated, continue both
to be dangerous to touch and also to give off poisonous vapour after all
visible evidence of contamination may have disappeared. Any person touch-
ing or walking on a contaminated surface becomes contaminated and would
not only suffer injury himself but would carry contamination elsewhere.
Likewise contamination may be spread by animals or vehicles.

Foodstuffs which have been subjected to blister gas in any form become
agents of contamination, and as such are dangerous; in the worse cases they
will have to be destroyed.

Gas Attacks.

One way in which gas can be released from aircraft is by being dropped in



37



bombs. The casing of a gas bomb is usually of thin material, and may contain
a small explosive charge sufficient to burst it and release the gas. The sound
of the explosion is only slight as compared to that of a high explosive bomb
of similar weight, and so normally it would not be mistaken. On the
bursting of the bomb, a dangerous concentration of vapour is produced
and a considerable area around the point of burst will also be made
dangerous by splashes of the liquid.

Persistent gas can also be released in the form of spray from a container
in the aircraft. From a low altitude the spray of liquid gas would be heavy,
but the area covered by the spray from one aeroplane would be limited to a
comparatively narrow zone corresponding to the path of flight and the
direction of the wind. Spray from high altitudes would fall upon a much
larger area, but owing to its fineness when it reaches the ground it would
be of little effect except when it fell directly on to human beings.

Behaviour of Gas.

The effectiveness of gas is markedly influenced by the characteristics of
the area in which it is used, and by the weather conditions prevailing at the
time.

Unlike coal gas. war gases are generally heavier than air, it being an impor-
tant requirement that they shall remain near to the ground where they will
be effective and that they shall not be too rapidly dissipated by dilution.
Consequently they will normally tend to remain longer on low-lying ground
in hollows such as the basement areas of houses, where, to a large extent,
they will be sheltered from the dissipating effects of the surrounding air
movements.

The principal weather conditions affecting the behaviour of gases are
wind, temperature, and rain.

The effect of wind is to carry gas along with it and to accelerate the rate
of dispersal. In the case of a persistent gas, the liquid continues to give off
dangerous vapour, but the local concentration is lower than it would be in the
absence of wind. In built-up areas the free movement of air is to some extent
restricted, and consequently gas will tend to remain in these areas longer than
elsewhere.

Temperature chiefly affects persistent gases. In warm weather the danger
from vapour is increased. If it is sufficiently cold, the liquid will freeze and
become solid; there will be little danger from vapour while the gas is in a
frozen condition, but in the case of blister gases direct contact with the
frozen liquid, or with any contaminated object which is frozen, will still
produce skin burns.

Light rain has little effect upon gases, but heavy rain tends to wash gas
out of the air, and to wash away and destroy any liquid gas lying upon the
ground or other exposed surface.

Non-persistent gas is thus most dangerous when used in calm, dry weather,
and persistent gas in dry weather with a high ground temperature and
a light breeze; and the danger of both is further increased in a built-up
area.

Where there is any movement of air, the areas affected by the gas will be
downwind from the point of burst. It is most important, therefore, that
persons who find themselves in the open in the presence of gas should
immediately make their way diagonally upwind, so as to reach an area of
safety beyond the point of release. They should, of course, not walk towards



38



the point of release where the concentration will be greatest, but move
laterally out of the path of travel of the gas.

Respirators for the General Public.

Respirators have been issued by the Government to the whole population.
They are the property of the Crown, and as such they may not be maltreated
or used for any purpose other than that for which they are intended. It is
essential that they shall be worn by everyone who comes within range of war
gases dropped by the enemy except those within gasproof shelter.

These respirators will give protection to the eyes and lungs under any
conditions likely to arise from the use of any war gas in air raids. None of
them is designed to protect the wearer against domestic and other noxious
gases which are not used in warfare.

There are three principal types of civilian respirator designed to suit the
different ages of wearer. They are the General Civilian Respirator, the Small
Child's Respirator for children from about 4 years down to 18 months, and
the Anti-gas Helmet for Babies, designed for infants in arms.

The Civilian Respirator.

Description. This respirator has a window of non-inflammable trans-
parent material let into a facepiece of thin sheet rubber which covers the
eyes, nose, and mouth, and which is held in position by head-harness. To
this facepiece is attached a container which holds activated charcoal to absorb
gases from the incoming air, and a filter to prevent the passage of the fine
particles of poisonous smokes; the standard of protection against these
smokes is now being improved by the fitting of an additional filter known as
Contex. Those areas in which Contex filters have not already been supplied
will receive them in due course. The local authorities will notify the public
when they are available. The fitting of Contex should be carried out only by
wardens or other A.R.P. officials.




Thrusting the Chin into the Civilian Adjusting the Civilian

Respirator. Respirator.

39



Back of the Head with Respirator in Position,shewing central position of buckle .

Air is drawn in through the container, and the exhaled air is prevented
from passing back through the same channel by a simple non-return valve
consisting of a flat rubber disc attached to the inner end of the container. The
exhaled air forces its way out by lifting the thin rubber of the facepiece at its
edges, so that a separate outlet valve is unnecessary.

The facepiece of this respirator is provided in three sizes — " Small/'
*' Medium,** and ** Large ** — and the size is marked on the head-straps, or
moulded on the brow of the facepiece. The same container is fitted to all
sizes.

The " Small ** size of the civilian respirator will normally fit a child
from 4 years upwards, but in many cases it may be found that a child is
sufficiently developed below this age to be likewise accommodated.

A stout cardboard carton is provided, and when not in use the respirator
should always be kept in this or in one of the types of carrier referred to later.



40



Putting on. Before putting on the respirator it is first necessary to stop
breathing and remove any headdress. The respirator should be held in front
of the face by each of the side straps with the thumbs under the straps; the
chin should be thrust into the facepiece, the straps being drawn over the head
as far as they will comfortably reach. The breath should then be released in
order to expel any gas inside the facepiece, and normal breathing resumed.
The headdress may then be replaced.

Spectacles or pince-nez must always be removed before the respirator is
put on since they will interfere with the fit and so admit poison gas.

Adjusting. If the respirator is properly adjusted it should be quite
comfortable in use, and provide a gastight fit in all positions of the head.
If the rubber facepiece is stretched too tightly it will be uncomfortable
because of the pressure on the face and the undue resistance to the exhaled
air, which must pass between the rubber facepiece and the face, usually at
the cheeks. This resistance to breathing will be found most exhausting, and
the defect may be overcome either by the fitting of a larger size of respirator,
if it is not already the large size, or by the proper manipulation of the
adjustable head-harness.

Testing Fit. If the fit is too loose or incorrect, air may be breathed in
without passing through the purifying materials held in the container. This
can be tested by holding a flat surface, such as a piece of paper or cardboard
or a cork mat, against the outer end of the container, and attempting to inhale.
If the intake of air is found to be impossible and the facepiece is sucked in
against the cheeks, it can be assumed that a gastight fit is provided.

If Contex has been fitted, a piece of stiff paper or card will not seal the
holes, because the end of the Contex is corrugated. A thin cellophane jam
jar cover may be used instead, or a piece of very thin, good-quality paper.

Size. The correct size of respirator can be judged by the position of the
transparent window in relation to the eyes, which should be on a line about
midway between the upper and lower edges of the panel. If the eyes are
considerably above this line, the respirator is too small ; if they are much

below, it is too large.

Checking. In making tests,
and always when wearing the
respirator, it must be ensured that
the edges of the rubber facepiece
are not doubled under and that
the straps are not twisted. The
buckle should be centred at the
back at the crown of the head and
the facepiece should be straight
on the face with the two side
straps horizontal.

Women should adjust their
hair so that it does not lie under
the facepiece, and it may also be
necessary to remove hairpins to
ensure a safe and comfortable fit.

Securing. When the correct
adjustment of the head-straps has
been found, the safety-pins pro-
vided should be used to ensure that
it is maintained. In the case of
children, to make sure that the
respirator remains comfortable,




Preparing to Remove the Civilian
Respirator.



41




adjustments may be
necessary from time to
time, in accordance
with the growth of the
child.



Removal. To re-
move the respirator,
the thumb should be
inserted under the
buckle at the back of
the head and the straps
drawn forward over the
top of the head and
then in a downward
direction. Any other
method may cause
damage to the face-
piece, and must not be
attempted.



The Small Child's



Respirator.



Small Child's Respirator.



Children do not, as
a general rule, take well
to wearing respirators,
and the difficulties their
parents and guardians



may have in this connection, together with the other dangers of air raids,
should be avoided where possible by the evacuation of children from the more
vulnerable areas. The possibility of air raids, even in the comparatively safe
reception areas, cannot, however, be wholly discounted, and the Government
have therefore made a general distribution of the Small Child's Respirator.

Description. An attempt has been made in the design of this respirator
to make it as acceptable as possible to young children. The colours have been
made attractive; it has been made as light in weight as possible; the head-
Harness will not weaken in use, is gentle in its pull on the facepiece, and is so
designed that it prevents the respirator from being easily pulled off. Since the
child breathes much less air than an adult, a less bulky and lighter container
than that of the ordinary Civilian Respirator has been included, and this is
screwed into the facepiece.

The container causes only a negligible resistance to the child's breathing,
and the air breathed out passes out of the facepiece through a soft rubber
valve which opens freely under the pressure of the breath. Contex may be
added to this container also.

The facepiece is made of soft rubber so that it readily takes the shape of
the child's face and makes close contact with the skin. Eyepieces are fitted in
place of the transparent window found in the Civilian Respirator.

Putting on and Removal. The respirator is put on in the same way as the
adult respirator. Many children quickly learn to put it on themselves if they
are shown how to thrust the chin forward into it. If it is put on by a second
person it is better to do so from behind, with the back of the child's head
resting against the chest of the adult, so that the child's neck is supported
against the action of pulling the spring harness over the head. To remove the
respirator, it should first be unhooked at the back of the head, and the



42



instructions for putting it on then reversed, the movements following closely
those given for the removal of the adult type.

Adjustment and Testing. The head-harness is suitable for all sizes of heads
without adjustment. If the respirator is properly put on with the harness
secured by means of the hook and eye at the back, the fit of the respirator
is automatically ensured if the child's face is of the correct size for it, and the
close contact between the rubber and the face can clearly be seen. It is
unnecessary, therefore, to test for gas-tightness, as suggested in the case of the
Civilian Respirator, and this is not recommended.

There is only one size of Small Child's Respirator. If there is difficulty in
stretching the head harness over the head, or the eyes are unduly high in the
eyepieces, this type of respirator is too small for the child, and a small
Civilian type should be used. If the facepiece of the Small Child's Respirator
puckers at the edges or is loose on the face, or the eyes are unduly low in the
eyepieces, the child is too small for this type, and the special appliance,
known as the Baby's Anti-Gas Protective Helmet, should be used.

The Baby's Protective Helmet.

Infants in arms up to the age of about 18 months and young children
who show a marked distaste for the Small Child's Respirator, or are other-
wise temperamentally or physically unfitted to wear this type, may be accom-
modated by the Baby's Helmet.

Description. It consists of a hood, made of impervious fabric and fitted
with a large window, which encloses the head, shoulders, and arms, and is
closed around the waist by means of a draw tape. A baby, when in it, is thus
able to get its hand to its mouth. The hood is surrounded by and fastened to
a light metal frame, which is lengthened on the underside and fitted with a
tail-piece which can be adjusted by means of two screws turned with a coin,
so as to form a support and protection for the baby's back. The length should
be such that the baby's face is opposite the middle of the' window. It can be
made extra long, if required, by overlapping the tailpiece on the last two screw
holes only and using an extra screw and nut in the hole which has no fixed
nut. A spare screw and nut for this purpose will be found on the domed top
of the frame.

The tailpiece is turned up at the end to form a seat which prevents the
occupant from slipping out of the hood. The baby is made secure in the
helmet by means of a T-shaped supporting strap connected to the end of the
tailpiece. The metal frame and supporting strap may be varied in length to
suit all sizes of babies and children up to about 5 years of age.

The hood is padded on the underside where the baby rests. Padding has
been omitted from the tailpiece since babies are likely to soil any padding in
this position. If required, mothers can supply some washable padding, e.g.,
a folded towel or napkin, for this part of the frame.

Folding legs are provided on the metal frame for use when the helmet
is not being carried or nursed. The legs will prevent the helmet from rolling
over if it is laid down with a child in it, and they are for use when a baby is
being put into the helmet.

Air is supplied to the inside of the hood by means of a rubber bellows
placed conveniently for the right hand. The air passes through a container
which removes all poison gas from it, and enters the hood at the top through a
specially shaped orifice which deflects the air upwards so that it sweeps out all
vitiated air from the hood and also prevents the stream of air from blowing
directly on the baby's head. A slow and steady rate of pumping of about
40 strokes a minute is adequate for keeping out gas and supplying enough
purified air even for a child of 4-5 years of age. The space in the hood is large



43



Baby's Anti-Gas Helmet.



enough to allow pumping to be stopped for several minutes if required without
causing discomfort. When pumping, the operator should be careful not to
obstruct the intake holes which lie in the disc at the movable end of the
bellows under the palm of the hand.

There is no limit to the time during which a child may remain in the
helmet if steady pumping is maintained.

Contex may be fitted to the container in a baby's helmet, but only by
properly qualified persons. The helmet should never be taken to pieces by
an unskilled person because there is a risk of its being reassembled wrongly,
so that it will not protect the baby against gas.

Fitting and Operation. To put the baby into the helmet it is necessary to
proceed as follows : —

(1) The wire legs of the helmet should be opened and clicked back.

(2) The helmet should be laid down with the skirt of the bag open and
the top turned back over the window. The wide strap attached to the
turned-up end of the metal tailpiece should be out of the way, so that
the baby will not lie upon it.

(3) The baby should be placed in the helmet so that its seat rests in the
curve of the tailpiece with one leg on each side.

(4) The skirt should then be pulled down over the baby and it should
be ensured that both arms are free and are put up inside the bag
before the tape is tied. The ends should then be drawn snugly, but
not too tightly, around the infant's waist, and finally finished off by
tying in a bow.

(5) The supporting piece should now be brought up between the legs and
the ends of the canvas strap attached to the buckles on each side of



44



the frame so as to hold the baby firmly in place. If the frame is being
used in one of the shorter positions of adjustment, it may be necessary
to shorten the supporting piece in order to hold the child securely.
This may be done by folding down the top end either once or twice,
as required, and passing the ends of the canvas strap out through the
metal slots.

(6) When the baby has thus been safely secured in the helmet, the bellows
should be operated. First, at least twelve sharp strokes are required
to clear out the air in the helmet, and then a slow and steady rate
should be maintained.
The baby in its bag can be nursed on the lap or carried in the arms in the
normal way; if it must be taken some distance, the legs of the frame should be
folded underneath, and a wide shawl used as a sling to support the baby from
the mother's shoulders.

It is desirable that the complete drill described should be practised both in
daylight and in darkness, and when the parent or guardian is herself wearing a
respirator.

Since the growth of infants is sometimes rapid, frequent adjustments may
be necessary to the length of the helmet in order that the child may at all
times be comfortable and fully protected.

The carton in which the baby's helmet is supplied is only large enough,
with the normal method of packing, to take the helmet with the tailpiece
unextended, and the extension of the tailpiece to keep pace with the baby's
growth will therefore present a problem from the point of view of packing.
It is desirable that the helmet should be kept with the tailpiece extended to
the proper length, and at the same time it is important to avoid mutilation of
the carton, in view of the need for economy of cardboard. The following
method of packing, which will be demonstrated to parents of babies by
wardens, should therefore be used when it is necessary to extend the tailpiece
of the helmet.

The flap of one end of the carton should be turned down inside the carton
and the helmet inserted upside down in the carton with the extended tailpiece
sticking out over the end of the turned-down flap. The other end-flap should
then be closed and the side-flaps closed over the top, a piece of string being
tied round the whole carton. The carton will then enclose the whole helmet
and keep it reasonably free from light and dust, even though the end of the
tailpiece protrudes at one end.

Use and Care of Respirators.

On all occasions when gas is present and a gas-protected room or refuge
is not available or has to be vacated, the respirator must be put on without
delay. In order to ensure this it is necessary to take the respirator on all
journeys on which the wearer will be more than five minutes away from the
place where it is ordinarily kept. It is also necessary to practise putting on and
taking off the respirator both by daylight and in darkness, so that this may
be done when required with the minimum delay. Furthermore, it is desirable
to become accustomed to the wearing of a respirator, and to be sure that the
respirator is comfortable in practical use over a period of time, since it must
not be removed for adjustment in the actual presence of gas.

After use, whether for practice or otherwise, the inside of the facepiece or
bag should always be wiped dry before the respirator is returned to its carrier.
If wet from exposure to rain the outside should also be wiped.

Occasionally it may be necessary to clean the appliance more thoroughly.
This may be done by means of a small sponge or soft cloth dipped in a rich
solution of toilet soap and lukewarm water and wrung out thoroughly before

45



swabbing. The appliance
should then be sponged in
the same way with clean
water, well wrung out. Great
care must be taken, however,
to prevent the entry of any
moisture into the container,
since this will damage its
contents and impair its
efficiency.

Respirators of all types
should always be put away
quite dry. Those of the
general civilian type should
be folded in such a way as to
prevent kinking or unduly
bending the delicate trans-
parent window. All res-
pirators should be kept in a
cool, dry place, away from a
strong light or heat; they
should never be left in front
of a fire, near a radiator, or
in the sun. Respirators
other than the baby's helmet
should not be carried or
Testing Rubber of Mask. hung suspended from the

straps, nor should they be
confined to their carrier for
long periods without being taken out periodically, since this may affect the
fit through prolonged distortion of the facepiece.

Occasional inspections should be carried out by the holders of respirators
to make sure that they are in good condition, but it must be stressed that
any undue tampering with the delicate sections is likely to do more harm than
good.

The following are a few general points, applicable in particular to the
general civilian respirator, which should be looked at occasionally; if any
faults are disclosed the local warden should immediately be consulted :—
The transparent window is the most easily damaged part, and cracks
or weaknesses should be looked for by holding before a light. The
stitching round the edges must be secure. At the same time the thin
rubber of the facepiece can be tested for punctures, tears, and signs of
perishing, by gently stretching it so that a section of an inch is expanded
to about 2 inches. Chafing caused by friction against the sides of the
carrier, especially where this is not of the Government pattern, is almost
always responsible for any weaknesses detected here.

The thin rubber disc fitted centrally to the valve pin on the inside
end of the metal container should be soft, pliable, and flat. If it is concave
it should be taken off the pin and reversed. If it has hardened, it should be
renewed.

The rubber band joining the facepiece of the general civilian respirator
to the metal container should be perfectly fresh and elastic. If it shows
cracks, it is perishing and should be renewed. Stitching generally should
be sound. The container of the Small Child's Respirator screws into the
facepiece; it should be ensured that this is tightly done up.




46



Examining Rubber Disc.



A severely dented container, or one which is perforated, or into which
moisture has entered (as may be detected by the discolouration of the
white filter material visible through the air holes at the outer end of the
container), should be further examined by a competent official of the
local A.R.P. organisation.

In all cases, whether further advice or a new part of a respirator is
required, the local warden should be consulted.

Treatment to Prevent Misting of Eyepieces.

When respirators are worn, moisture from the breath will condense inside
them and vision will tend to be obstructed by misting of the transparent
window or eyepieces. This can be avoided by the application of a thin film
of toilet soap lightly smeared with the finger upon the inside of the window.

It is suggested that this treatment should always be applied on putting
the respirator away after use so that it will be immediately ready to put on
when required. If the respirator is not worn, the treatment remains effective
for a week, after which time the window should be lightly sponged and dried,
and a fresh treatment applied.

Carriers for the Civilian and Small Child's Respirators.

Respirators should be kept and carried in the cardboard carton provided
for them. They should be inserted with the container leading; the container
of the Civilian Respirator should be inserted into the recess at the bottom of
the carton, the facepiece being folded over so that the transparent eyepiece
lies evenly on the top of the container at full length, without any deformation.

In order to preserve the carton and to protect it from rain, it is recom-
mended that it should be enclosed in a waterproof satchel, or other durable
form of cover, fitted with a suitable shoulder strap. The satchel should be so
designed that rain cannot enter between the flap and the body, and so that
access to the respirator is impeded as little as possible. For instance, the flap

47



should be secured by means of press studs and not by tie-tapes, which might
be difficult to untie in a hurry, and the flap of the satchel should be positioned
so as to coincide with the lid of the carton.

No other article of any description, such as first-aid outfit, electric torch,
anti-gas ointment, lipstick, face-powder, etc., must be carried in the carton
with the respirator. If, for convenience, it is desired to combine carriage of
such articles with that of the respirator, provision must be made for them in
separate pockets or compartments in the satchel.

If no satchel or cover is used, the cardboard carton can be strengthened
at the bottom joint, at the corners and the hinge of the lid with adhesive tape.
The carrying cord should be threaded outside the bottom of the carton to
prevent the bottom slipping loose. The water-resistance of the carton can be
improved by painting it, on the outside only, with any good-quality oil
paint. In rain the carton, if not provided with a waterproof cover, should be
carried under the coat or mackintosh.

Alternative forms of carrier to the official carton may be purchased, but
great care must be exercised before using such alternatives that no damage or
deterioration of the respirator is likely to ensue. The following general
principles must be observed when choosing a carrier : —

(1) The carrier must be designed and made of material which is sufficiently
rigid to protect the respirator from being crushed, e.g., in a dense
crowd, or against a seat in a moving omnibus, or if the carrier is
dropped to the ground.

(2) The carrier must have a smooth interior with no inward projection,
such as a rim, lip, or sharp rivet head, which would either scratch or
catch against the edge of the eyepiece during insertion, withdrawal, or
ordinary carriage of the respirator.

(3) The respirator must not be a very loose fit in the carrier, so that it
rattles and gradually abrades the rubber around the container.

(4) The carrier must be of such a size and shape that it neither causes nor
allows gross distortion of the facepiece, e.g., it must not require the
facepiece to be turned inside out, or be such that the container either
rests or can become inverted on to the facepiece.

(5) If the carrier forms part of a hold-all, e.g., if combined with a shopping
bag or a handbag, it must
allow of direct and rapid
access to the respirator
without the necessity of
first removing other
articles.

Gasproof Accommodation.

In view of the universal pro-
vision of respirators, gasproof
accommodation in the ordinary
house is not essential, but where
it is possible to do so it is an
advantage to make the refuge or
shelter gasproof. The main
principle to be observed in this
connection is the blockage of all
sources of draught into the room.
Such places as the fireplace or Civilian Respirator Correctly Packed in
ventilator gratings in the walls Carton.




48



encourage draught, and consequently it is difficult to prevent the entry of air
(and gas, if present) under doorways, between the floorboards, through
cracks in walls, and, where windows have not been bricked in, between frames
and window, unless these natural ventilators are first blocked. If this is done,
quite simple means, such as pasting layers of brown paper over cracks in
walls and flooring and over gratings and plugging other places with
tightly rolled newspaper or pieces of. felt, will answer the purpose adequately,
and no undue expense or preparation is consequently necessary.

Whether or not a gasproof refuge is available, the respirator must always
be taken there during air raids, since even the distant effects of blast from
H.E. bombs may destroy the gas-tightness of the chamber, and if gas were
used the respirator would then immediately be required.

Where the provision of gas-tightness in a refuge renders the room other-
wise untenable for ordinary use, and so presents a source of difficulty or
embarrassment to the householder, it is suggested that the materials required
for the purpose be immediately obtained and left in the refuge, but that they
need not be applied until it is clear that the enemy propose to use gas against
this country in air raids or they have already done so. At such a time there
should be no further delay in completing the preparations.

Generally, when gas is announced in an area by the warden's rattle, if no
gasproof accommodation is available, or the gas-tightness of a refuge has been
destroyed by the effects of the raid, respirators should immediately be put on.
Normally they need be kept on only until the warden's handbell announces
the region " All Clear " and free of gas. But if gas has penetrated the building,
it will be necessary to clear this by adequate ventilation, employing means of
forcing the air to circulate freely throughout the building, so that the
premises can be made safe for normal habitation without the use of respira-
tors. In spite of the sounding of handbells, therefore, respirators, when worn,
should not be taken off until it is certain the air is free from gas. The purity
of the air can be tested by lifting the side of the facepiece of the respirator by
inserting two Angers at the cheek and gently sniffing the unfiltered air;
a fairly full breath should be taken in before the facepiece is lifted, and
vigorously expelled after the test has been made, in order to blow any con-
taminated air from the respirator. If there is any doubt as to whether gas is
present or not, the respirator should be kept on until this doubt can be
removed. A rough guide to the smells of various gases is given in the
Appendix " Table of War Gases " ; they cannot be implicitly relied upon,
however, since the presence of other constituents in existing known gases may
alter their smell and so confuse detection. Any unusual smell should be
regarded with suspicion, and where any doubt is felt it is recommended that
the warden be consulted and asked for assistance.

Protection of the Body Against Blister Gases.

Protection of the body against blister gas, when this is present, may best
be ensured by remaining under cover after a gas alarm has been sounded,
until such time as the ringing of handbells by wardens pronounces the area
" All Clear." There may, however, be cases in which contamination by
misadventure may take place or be suspected, and it is necessary, therefore,
to know the way in which the dangers might arise and the immediate steps
necessary to overcome or to minimise the possible consequences.

The two principal blister gases are mustard gas and lewisite, and further
information concerning them, including indications of the way in which their
presence may be recognised, are given in the Appendix.

The respirator container will prevent the passage of the vapour of
mustard gas and lewisite, and will thus protect the face, eyes, and

49



respiratory system, but the remainder of the body will be liable to injury by
exposure to the liquid or vapour. Ordinary clothing is of some value in that
it delays penetration by vapour, or (to a less extent) liquid, and therefore the
full effects of any contamination are not immediately produced on the skin.
If such clothing is removed quickly and the skin thoroughly washed with
warm water and soap, injury may be avoided, or very much reduced.

This procedure is intended to be followed by persons who are contami-
nated, or who suspect they have been contaminated, and are near their own
homes or places of work, so that they can treat themselves promptly. Where,
however, there might be delay, the outer clothing should be removed at once,
and treatment sought at a public First-Aid Post. Here it will be possible for
the person to wash, to put on clean garments, and to receive such first-aid
treatment as his case may demand.

Persons who intend treating themselves in their own homes must remove
their boots and outer clothing before entering the house, so as to avoid
spreading the contamination and causing further casualties. Such discarded
clothing and boots should be placed outside the house in a dustbin or other
metal container with close-fitting lid, and steps taken at once for their removal
and decontamination in accordance with local arrangements.

Decontamination of Contaminated Articles of Personal Apparel.

Ordinary Clothing.

Articles of ordinary clothing, such as overcoats, hats, coats, trousers,
dresses, etc., which have been contaminated with vapour, should be hung in
the open air for at least 24 hours. If the clothing still smells of the gas after
24 hours it should be placed outside the house in a container described above.

Light dresses and underclothing contaminated with vapour should be
washed with soap and warm water, after preliminary airing, for at least 15
minutes.

Clothing which is, or is suspected of being, contaminated with liquid
mustard gas should not be decontaminated at home, but should be placed
outside the house in a container as already described.

Leather Boots and Shoes.

The decontamination of leather boots or shoes is a difficult problem, and
all possible care should be taken to prevent their becoming seriously contami-
nated, by avoiding, for example, stepping into splashes or pools of liquid gas.

Persons who have walked through contaminated areas should in any case
examine the soles and uppers of their boots to make sure that the boots are
not contaminated with liquid mustard gas, taking care while doing so that
they do not contaminate their hands. If any trace of mustard gas can be seen
or smelt, the boots must be removed at once and taken as soon as possible
to the appropriate place for treatment; meanwhile they should be left out of
doors and not worn again until decontaminated.

Respirators.

Respirators which have been worn in blister-gas vapour should be
thoroughly aired before being put away. If there is any sign of liquid contami-
nation, the respirator must at once be returned to the appropriate quarter of
the local authority, where another will be issued in its place.



CHAPTER 5.



SIMPLE FIRST AID
Introductory.

A complete organisation has been set up to deal with all types of injury
caused by air raids, consisting of First Aid or Stretcher Parties, an Ambulance
Service, First Aid Posts, and specially earmarked Hospitals.

Any injured person requiring treatment should go, if he is able, to the
nearest First Aid Post. For those more seriously injured, First Aid Parties
will render first aid and arrange where necessary for removal to a first-aid
post or hospital.

There may, however, be occasions after heavy raiding when the services
of first aid parties are not immediately available at all places where they
are required. Often simple measures, if quickly taken, will save life; for
example, in cases of extreme haemorrhage (bleeding) or of true asphyxia
(suffocation). Accordingly some of the elements of First Aid are described
in the following pages, in order to enable those available at the scene of
damage to assist the wounded while trained parties are on their way.

Wound Shock.

Every injury is followed by a condition known as Shock or Wound Shock,
which is a failure of vitality varying in degree from transient faintness to
extreme and dangerous prostration. In air raid cases Shock is likely to be
very marked.

The condition can be divided into two stages, Primary Shock, which
immediately follows the injury, and Secondary Shock, which may develop
later as a result of excessive pain or bleeding or cold for a prolonged period
or through clumsy or incorrect handling. Primary Shock may lead to
Secondary Shock, if proper care is not taken, and this, if allowed to develop,
may be dangerous to life.

Primary Shock can be treated, and Secondary Shock to a large extent
prevented, by simple means :—

(i) Pain must be relieved ; for example, by gentle adjustment of the
casualty's position, or by suitable support to the injured part before
removal.

(ii) The patient must be protected from chill, since in cases of Shock
body temperature falls rapidly. Unnecessary removal of clothing
should be avoided, and the casualty should be wrapped in blankets
or coats, with at least one layer between him. and the ground.

(iii) Loss of blood must be checked.

(iv) Fractures or badly injured limbs or joints should be secured.

(v) Gentleness and smoothness are always essential in handling, lifting,
and removing the patient.

(vi) Warm sweet drinks, such as sweetened tea, are of advantage to
patients suffering from Shock, but it is dangerous to give any drink



51



or food to an unconscious person, or to one who has a wound in
the belly, or who complains or gives evidence of abdominal pain.

Hot water bottles are useful for protecting casualties from chill. They
should be placed where they can best warm the circulating blood, for example,
between the body and outspread arms, or the upper part of both thighs,
since in each of these regions main arteries are relatively close to the surface
and the warmth is circulated through the body by means of the blood
stream. In doing this, care should be taken, by wrapping the hot water
bottles in woollen or other material, to avoid burning the patient. They
should never be laid directly on the bare skin.

Where a domestic hot water bottle is not available, an ordinary glass
bottle, or similar container, wrapped in any piece of material or article of
clothing, would make a suitable substitute. If an ordinary glass bottle is
used, it should not be filled with boiling water, especially if the bottle is
cold, as it may thus become cracked and subsequently break ; care should
be taken in moving the casualty to prevent the bottle being broken and the
casualty cut.



Bleeding (Haemorrhage).

Profuse bleeding from a large artery immediately endangers life. Loss
of blood is in any case one of the main causes of both Primary and Secondary
Shock, and even the continued oozing of blood from an extensive area of
the body may lead, if neglected, to collapse and finally to death.

Types of Haemorrhage.

Haemorrhage may be either external, in which case it is easily discovered,
or it may be internal, caused by injury to blood vessels inside the body,
from which the blood escapes into internal organs or cavities of the chest
or abdomen. In the latter case, no blood is visible externally, unless it is
coughed up or vomited.

Symptoms of Haemorrhage.

The signs and symptoms of severe uncontrolled bleeding, either external
or internal, are as follows : —

(i) There is rapid loss of strength, accompanied by giddiness and
faintness, especially if the patient is raised to a sitting or standing
position.

(ii) The face and lips become pallid, and the skin cold and clammy.

(iii) Breathing becomes hurried and laboured, and may be accompanied
by yawning and sighing.

(iv) The pulse quickly becomes so weak and rapid as not to be felt at
the wrist.

(v) The patient becomes thirsty.

(vi) He may become restless and throw his arms about or tug at clothing
round the neck ("air hunger"), unlike a patient suffering from
Shock without serious bleeding, who will lie very still.

(vii) Finally, the patient may become wholly unconscious.

If these signs are observed, but no external cause is apparent, the case
should be regarded as one of severe internal haemorrhage.

52



Treatment of External Haemorrhage

Blood escapes with less force if the patient is sitting and still less if he is
lying, and the position of a casualty with external haemorrhage should be
adjusted accordingly. Except in the case of a fractured limb, the bleeding
part should, where possible, be raised, to lessen the flow of blood to it.
Firm, even bandaging with a pad of cotton wool or other soft material
placed over the wound will normally help to check the bleeding.

In the case of a severely lacerated limb, bleeding should be dealt with by
bandaging over a splint even though no fracture has been definitely
recognised.

Treatment of Internal Haemorrhage.

Internal haemorrhage can only be treated on the operating table. The
first aid urgently needed is warmth, extremely gentle handling and lifting,
and rapid but smooth removal for surgical attention. Where there is even
a suspicion of internal haemorrhage, the patient should on no account be
allowed to eat or drink.

Wounds in the Abdomen.

Casualties with wounds in the abdomen are more comfortable and less
liable to further damage in moving if they are placed on the back, with the
abdominal wall relaxed by bending the knees over a box, haversack, or
rolled coat, and with the head and shoulders slightly raised. If any organs
protrude, no attempt should be made to replace them, but they should be
covered with lint, a soft towel, cotton wool, clean soft flannel, or similar
material for protection, and the covering secured firmly, but not too tightly,
with a broad bandage. It is desirable for the material used in contact with
the wound to be wrung out of warm water to which, if it is readily available,
table salt may be added in the proportion of one teaspoonful of table salt
to a pint of clean hot water. On no account should a patient with an
abdominal wound be given anything to drink.

Fractures.

Simple Fractures.

When bone is fractured (broken) and the surrounding flesh is undamaged,
the injury is a simple fracture.

Compound Fractures.

When bone is broken and in addition there is a flesh wound at the site
of the fracture, the fracture is said to be compound.

Complicated Fractures.

When bone is broken, and in addition there is damage to some important
organ, the injury is a complicated fracture.

The following signs and symptoms may be present in cases of fracture : —

(i) Pain at or near the point at which the bone is broken.

(ii) Loss of power of movement in the affected limb.

(iii) Swelling around the part affected.

(iv) Deformity, the limb falling into an unnatural position and having
an abnormal shape. It may be shortened by the over-lapping of the
broken ends of the bone.

(v) Irregularity : if the bone is close to the surface, a bump may be
felt at the break and, if the fracture, is compound, the bone may be
exposed and visible.



53



Simple First Aid Treatment of Fractures.

(i) The first object is to prevent further damage being done by injudicious
movement or by careless handling, and especially to avoid converting
a simple fracture into a compound one, or causing an uncomplicated
fracture to become complicated.

(ii) Unless the circumstances are such that danger to life is threatened,
or that there is danger of further injury being caused if the patient is
not immediately removed, the fracture should be attended to where
the patient lies. The injured limb should be secured by splints or
in some other way, and then the patient may be carefully moved.

(iii) If there is severe bleeding which is immediately endangering life,
this must be controlled first.

(iv) Warmth and air are required to guard against shock which will
certainly accompany the fracture. Blankets or coats should be
wrapped round the patient, care being taken not to disturb him
unduly. Merely covering the patient is often not enough to prevent
him from becoming chilled.

(v) The limb should be placed in as natural a position as possible with
great care and without using force. In the case of a compound
fracture with a protruding fragment of bone, no attempt must be
made to replace it.

(vi) If there is no material for splinting, a fractured leg may be secured
by careful bandaging to the opposite leg, or a fractured arm by
bandaging to the trunk.

(vii) Splints, real or improvised, must be sufficiently firm, and long
enough to keep the joints immediately above and below the fracture
at rest. The bandages must be firm, but not so tight as to interfere
with the circulation of the blood.

(viii) Splints should be put on over the clothing and should, if practicable,
be padded in places where there is risk of rubbing, or where there
would be gaps between the splint and the body. Any suitable
material which is available, such as clothing, handkerchiefs, or
newspaper may be used as padding.

Improvised Splints.

Serviceable splints may be improvised from such things as laths from a
Venetian blind, from rifles, walking sticks, pieces of wood or cardboard, rolled
up linoleum or newspaper, and a number of other articles, provided that
the resulting improvisation gives sufficiently rigid support for the limb,
and is long enough to prevent movement of the joints immediately above
and below the fracture.

Improvised Bandages for Securing Splints.

Where the proper bandages, such as a triangular bandage, cannot be
obtained, scarves, such as those worn by Boy Scouts, or pieces of cloth
can be used. Ties, braces, straps, belts, or lengths of rubber tubing may
be employed to secure splints or dressings.

Improvised Slings,

Slings may be improvised by pinning the sleeves of the coat to the garment,
or by turning up the lower edge and pinning it to the main body of the coat.
Improvisation may also be successfully effected by passing the hand inside
the coat or waistcoat, which should then be buttoned. Scarves, ties, or belts
ioosely slung around the neck will also provide support.



54



Unconsciousness (Insensibility).

As a general rule, an insensible person should be laid on the back,
wrapped in coats or blankets, with the head turned to one side ; if he has
false teeth, they should be removed. If the face is flushed, the head and
shoulders should be slightly raised ; if it is pale, they should be kept low.
Any tight clothing, especially at the neck, chest, or waist should be loosened.
Nothing must be given through the mouth to a person who is partly or
wholly insensible. If an insensible person must be moved, smoothness and
care are essential.

Suffocation (Asphyxia).

Anything which prevents the body from getting sufficient oxygen will
cause a condition known as asphyxia, which, if unrelieved, will lead to
insensibility and death.

Common causes of asphyxia under air raid conditions include
electrocution ; continued pressure on the chest or obstruction of the upper
breathing passages, for example, by debris ; confinement in a poisoned
atmosphere (for instance, in an enclosed space containing domestic coal
gas, exhaust fumes, or after-damp); and drowning.

The first action is to remove the cause of the asphyxia, or to move the
casualty from the cause, whichever is the more suitable, and then immediately
to begin artificial respiration, preferably by the Schafer method, which is as
follows : —

The patient should be placed face down with his head turned to one
side and his arms forward. The helper should kneel beside the patient
facing towards the head and should place his hands on the small of the
back, with wrists nearly touching, thumbs together, and fingers passing
over the loins on either side. He should swing rhythmically backwards
and forwards from the knees at the rate of about twelve double-swings
per minute, keeping his arms straight, so that his weight presses the
patient's abdomen against the ground and forces his abdominal organs
against his diaphragm on the forward swing, pressure being entirely
released on the backward swing. The pressure period should occupy
two seconds and the period of relaxation three seconds ; to ensure re-
gularity the rescuer should count evenly up to five on each double swing.
This should be continued until natural breathing returns, when the
rhythmic swing of the helper should coincide with the patient's respiratory
movements.

Artificial respiration may have to be continued for an hour or longer,
relays of helpers being employed if necessary.

While artificial respiration is being performed, other helpers should undo
all tight clothing and wrap coats or blankets round the casualty.

Removal from Electrical Contact.

In cases of injury due to an electric current, the current should, if possible,
be switched off at once. If this is not possible, it is necessary that the helper
should himself be protected from becoming electrocuted, and for this reason
he must place non-conducting materials between himself and the casualty,
and between himself and an earth. Non-conducting materials, which may
be available include rubber, linoleum, wood, glass, clothing, or newspaper.
They should all be dry.

The injured person may be dragged away from the electric medium
with a hooked walking stick or a loop of dry rope ; an umbrella should not
be used since the metal parts will conduct electricity. Metal and moisture
are good conductors of electricity, and therefore the helper should avoid



56



touching the hands, armpits, wet clothing, nailed boots, or metal equipment
of the injured person.

Burns (other than from Gas) and Scalds.

A burn is caused by dry heat, for example by a flame, hot metal, or a strong
acid or alkali. A scald is caused by wet heat, for example by steam, boiling
water, or boiling oil.

General rules for the treatment of all burns or scalds are : —

(a) Air should be excluded from the affected part as soon as possible.
It should either be immersed in water, preferably at body temperature,
or covered with clean cotton wool, lint, or soft clean cloths, and
then bandaged. These are only temporary measures to meet the
situation until suitable first aid dressings are prepared.

(b) If clothing has to be removed great care should be used. If it sticks,
it is necessary to cut around the pieces of cloth which adhere to the
flesh so as to leave them in position when the garment is removed.
If blisters have formed, they must not be broken or punctured, but
should as far as possible be protected and kept intact.

(c) Suitable first aid dressings may be made from strips of lint or linen
about 2 inches wide ; they should be : —

either (i) soaked in warm strong tea and allowed to dry ;

or (ii) soaked in a lotion made by stirring baking soda in clean
warm water. In this case the strips must be kept wet by
repeated damping with the lotion which can be poured
on over the bandage without necessitating its removal each
time. The strength of the lotion should be about 2 tea-
spoonfuls of soda to a pint of water ;

or (iii) smeared with tannic acid jelly on the surface to be applied
to the skin.

The dressings, which should slightly overlap, should be covered with cotton
wool or soft cloth and lightly bandaged, and the affected part supported.

In severe or extensive burns, Shock will be marked and will require
attention. The patient must be kept warm.

Gas Casualties.

Blister Gas.

If the eyes have been exposed to vapour or liquid gas, they should
immediately be thoroughly washed with warm water or with a weak solution
of salt or bicarbonate of soda; the strength in each case should be about one
teaspoonful to a pint of water. If apparatus for eye-douching cannot be readily
obtained, one of the following improvised procedures should be followed: —
(i) The casualty should bend over a bowl containing warm water or one
of the mild fluids referred to above, and put the eyes, each in turn,
well under water. They should be opened under water and the head
moved from side to side.

(ii) The eyes should be opened in turn under a gentle stream of water
from a tap, or from a rubber or other tube attached to a tap or hot
water bottle, the head being moved slightly from side to side, and each
eye opened and closed from time to time. Care should be taken to
avoid contaminating an unaffected eye.
Any part of the skin contaminated with liquid blister gas should be dealt
with at once. Where special anti-gas ointment is available, this should be
instantly applied in accordance with the directions. In the majority of cases,
however, this ointment will only be found at First Aid Posts and Cleansing

57



Stations and in the first aid equipment of Wardens and Casualty Service
workers. An alternative method of treatment is therefore suggested employ-
ing solvents which are more usually in the possession of the ordinary citizen.

Liquid contamination may be removed from the skin by solvents such as
petrol, spirit, or naphtha, and, since early treatment is vital, any of these
should be used if it is more quickly available than ointment. To apply the
solvent, a small piece of cotton wool or rag should be twisted into a pad and
held between the finger and thumb, only the end being immersed in the sol-
vent; as a further precaution against contaminating the fingers, a pair of
oilskin or rubber gloves should be worn if they are available. It is important
to avoid spreading the contamination by rubbing or by using an excess of
solvent. The solvent only removes the blister gas by dissolving it; it does not
destroy it. For this reason a succession of swabs should be used, and the
contaminated swabs should be burnt or buried since they are dangerous.

Localised areas of contamination on the body should be treated as de-
scribed, if the reagents required are readily available ; if not, the affected part
should be thoroughly scrubbed with soap and water. In all cases where
there has been contamination, it is advisable for the casualty to be washed
completely with soap and water, in addition to the treatment described for
the affected part.

In the case of exposure to vapour only, thorough washing with soap and
warm water is sufficient.

It must be emphasised that the success of any method of preventive
treatment depends upon the speed with which it is applied.
Lung Irritant Gas.

Whether symptoms are present or not, any person who has been exposed
to a lung irritant gas must, from the outset, be spared any further exertion.
He must be kept lying down and be protected from chill. He should be
removed as a stretcher case.

Nose Irritant Gas.

The appearance of symptoms from exposure to nose irritant gases is
slightly delayed, with the result that they may be felt a few minutes after the
respirator has been adjusted. Any temptation to discard the respirator while
still exposed to gas must be resisted. If vomiting occurs, the facepiece must
not be removed ; affected persons should bend forward, turning the head to
one side, and slightly raise the corner of the face-piece at the angle of the jaw
while actual vomiting is taking place, dropping it into place between expulsive
spasms. It is important that the facepiece should be allowed to fall back into
place immediately, before the involuntary intake of breath which follows.

Summary

Where there are casualties requiring treatment and the Casualty Services
are not immediately available, those on the spot, even if they do not know
the precise treatment required, will very often be able, with elementary
knowledge, to relieve the sufferings and possibly even to save the lives of the
wounded.

The first consideration must always be to deal with any immediate danger
to life. Examples of such dangers are excessive bleeding, interference with
normal breathing (through pressure on the chest, obstruction of the air
passages by debris or by electrocution), or nearness to moving machinery,
tottering buildings, a spreading fire, or a poisoned atmosphere. In all such
cases the source of danger must be removed from the casualty or the casualty
moved away from the source of danger. After immediate danger to life, the
second consideration is to try to avert or minimise injury, and the third to
reduce pain and shock and make the casualty as comfortable as possible.



58



It may be convenient to sum up briefly some of the main guiding principles
in elementary first aid : —

(i) Severe bleeding should be attended to at the earliest possible moment.
This does not mean that every cut or wound should have prior
attention. Discrimination should be used : the rule applies to pro-
fuse bleeding, the continuance of which would endanger life.

(ii) The casualty must be able to breathe normally : any cause of difficult
breathing must be dealt with ; and artificial respiration, if needed,
must be started promptly and maintained.

(iii) In cases of gross injury to a limb, whether or not a fracture is recog-
nised, and in all cases of injury involving joints, the affected part
should be supported and secured by simple methods before the
casualty is moved, unless for any reason his life is in danger.

(iv) Any person who is, or Jias been, entrapped or buried under debris
must be treated on the assumption that the severest crush injuries
have been received. These might include fracture of the thigh,
pelvis, or spine.

(v) A person who is wholly or partly unconscious, or one who is even
suspected of suffering from internal injury, must not be given anything
to eat or drink.

(vi) The indiscriminate use of alcohol in first aid can be dangerous ; it
should not be given to persons suffering from any type of injury
except on the direct order of a doctor.

(vii) All injured persons will be suffering from Primary Shock ; Secondary
Shock, coming on some time after injury, may be fatal. Secondary
Shock can, to a large extent, be prevented by the simple measures
mentioned in this chapter ; it may be brought on or made worse
by rough handling and clumsy movement.

(viii) Chill should always be prevented ; and the casualty should at all times
be handled and moved with the greatest care and gentleness.



59



NOTES ON IMPROVISED SPLINTS

When the proper splints are not available, it will often be possible to
improvise suitable substitutes in a number of different ways, which will at
least serve temporarily while trained persons with proper equipment are on
their way. A few examples showing how articles in common use may be
made to serve as improvised splints are given in the illustrations which follow.



If sufficient bandages are not available to correspond with the illustration,
it should be remembered that the important points are to bandage above and
below the fracture, and to ensure that the limb is kept rigid.




Sketch I. — Simple fracture through middle third of right femur (thigh-bone).



A broom used as a thigh splint by placing the handle along the injured limb, with
the head of the broom at the feet. Loosely folded pieces of newspaper or other
material may be used as padding, placed between the ankle and knee joints, and

also at the hip.



Folded triangular bandages are shown in the illustration, but the improvised
splint may be secured by any other material of sufficient length, such as, for

example, neck-ties, belts, or scarves.




Sketch //.—Simple fracture through middle third of tibia (shin-bone).



The illustration shows an umbrella used as a splint. The ankles and knee joints are

padded with loosely folded newspaper.



60



Sketch III. Simple fracture through one or both bones of the forearm.

The illustration shows the use of newspaper, folded to the approximate size of
an arm splint, so as to be stiff enough to give rigid support.



61



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63



SELECTION OF
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

The series of Air Raid Precautions Handbooks and Memoranda has been
produced by the Ministry of Home Security with the assistance of the Govern-
ment Departments and other bodies concerned.

The Handbooks are designed to describe a scheme of precautions which
it is hoped will prove effective in preventing avoidable injury and loss of life,
or widespread dislocation of national activities. They aim at giving the best
available information on methods of passive defence against air attack, and
will be revised from time to time in the light of future developments.

The Memoranda deal with various aspects of the organisation to be
provided by local authorities for public air raid precautions services.

HANDBOOKS.

No. 1. " Personal Protection Against Gas " (2nd Edition). 6d. (8d.)

Gives rules of personal protection, and general knowledge of the
nature and dangers of war gases.

No. 2. " First Aid and Nursing for Gas Casualties " {3rd Edition). 4d. (5d.)
Provides information of both a general and technical nature required
by nurses, first-aid parties, and the personnel of first-aid posts, to enable
them to carry out their respective duties. Complementary to Handbook
No. 1.

No. 4. " Decontamination of Materials " (1st Edition). 6d. (8d.)

Explains the general principles governing the methods of counter-
acting contamination arising from war gases. A text-book for the training
of the members of decontamination services.
No. 4A. " Decontamination of Clothing, including Oilskin Anti-Gas Clothing,
and Equipment from Blister Gases " (1st Edition). 3d. (4d.)

This Handbook may be regarded as supplementary to Handbook
No. 4, in which it will eventually be incorporated. For this reason, the
Handbook is provisional only.

No. 8. " The Duties of Air Y/wteas " (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.)

Gives an outline of the duties of air-raid wardens, and of the
organisation under which they work.

No. 9. " Incendiary Bombs and Fire Precautions " (1st Edition). 6d. (8d.)
This handbook, though written primarily for instructors, is designed
also to serve as a general textbook on methods of dealing with incendiary
bombs and the resultant fires. Demonstrates how the danger from
incendiary bombs can be minimised, and why this can only be achieved
with the co-operation of the general public and industry.

No. 10. " Training and Work of First Aid Parties "(1st Edition). 6d. (8d.)
Concerns the organisation, training and work of First Aid Parties.

No. 12. " Air Raid Precautions for Animals ** (1st Edition). 3d. (4d.)

Intended for the guidance of persons engaged in the care and
management of animals.

64



MEMORANDA.

No.l. " Organisation of Air Raid Casualties Service " (2nd Edition). 6d. (8d.)

No. 2. 44 Rescue Parties and Clearance of Debris " (3rd Edition). 2d. (3d.)

No. 3. 44 Organisation of Decontamination Services" (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.)
No. 4. 44 Organisation of Air Raid Wardens' Service" (2nd Edition). 2d. (3d.)

No. 6. 44 Local Communications and Reporting of Air Raid Damage" (2nd
Edition). 6d. (8d.)

No. 7. 41 Personnel Requirements for Air Raid General and Fire Precautions
Services and the Police Service " (1st Edition). 2d. (3d.)

No. 11. 4 Gas Detection and Identification Service " (1st Edition). 3d. (4d).

No. 12. 44 Protection of Windows in Industrial and Commercial Buildings "

(1st Edition). 4d. (6d.)

No. 13. 44 Care and Repair of Respirators" (1st Edition). 2d. (3d.)

Prices are net



Copies may be obtained at the addresses given on page iv of the cover,
or through any bookseller. Prices In brackets include postage.



Wt950. 6/40. 500M S.E.Co. 51/7188



S.O. Code No. 34-9999



SHELTER at home




ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY
d. AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATfoNERY OFFICE




June 1941



SHELTER at home




AT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY
OGL AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE



Introduction



Not everyone wants to leave home for shelter. Some people can't. Lots
of people just prefer to remain in their own house anyway. This inclination
is a natural one. It is a sound instinct too, if some protection can be found
against the collapse of walls and ceilings.

Shelter indoors allows you to sleep at night in reasonable security and in
the warmth and comfort of your house. It also provides handy cover should
there be a sudden raid in the day time.

A direct hit cannot be guarded against in any form of home shelter, but
the risk of such a direct hit is very small compared with that of a bomb
bursting near enough to damage the house or to demolish it. Protection can
be obtained in a house even if a bomb demolishes most of it.

The walls, floors and roof of an ordinary house give quite a lot of protection
against splinters and blast from a bomb. The idea of an indoor shelter is to
make use of this protection and to add safeguards against the other effects
of bombs.

The chief of these is the danger of the house falling down. People have
often been rescued unhurt from the ruins of demolished houses because they
had taken shelter under staircases, or tables, that had by chance been strong
enough to protect them from the falling ruins of the house. The chief purpose
of the indoor shelters described in this pamphlet is to protect the occupants
against injury when the bedroom floor, the roof and other debris fall on them.

They do not provide such easy emergency escape as a garden shelter, but
if you are trapped they protect you from the debris till the Rescue Party
releases you. Very often, however, though the house has fallen you will be
able to release yourself and walk out.

The indoor shelters with which this pamphlet deals are unsuitable for
houses with more than two storeys above the shelter room. They are intended
chiefly for use in ordinary two-storey houses, but have a margin of strength
that will take the weight of an extra storey.

3



TYPES OF INDOOR SHELTER



Having chosen and prepared your refuge room, the next question is what
sort of a shelter you will put in it. Three alternatives are dealt with in this
pamphlet :

1 . The Government steel indoor shelter

2. A commercially made shelter

3. A home-made timber-framed structure v/hich the technical services of

the Ministry of Home Security have designed.



Government shelters

The Government are distributing free to eligible householders an indoor
shelter made of steel. It will also be on sale to householders not eligible for
free shelter. These shelters, whether free or on sale, will be distributed first
in the more exposed areas. Public announcement is made in each area when
the local council is ready to receive applications for shelters.

The model at present being issued consists of a strong frame, a flat top, a
spring mattress forming a floor, and sides of open mesh.

The top of the shelter is sheet steel, and the shelter can be used as a table.
The mattress is attached to the frame, so that should the shelter be moved
when struck by debris, the occupants will be carried with it. The fact that
the shelter can move a little helps it to resist the weights falling on it. The
four steel mesh sides are so made that they resist blows from debris, such as
loose bricks from a demolished wall, but they can all easily be opened from
inside. This " table " shelter has been thoroughly tested.

The shelter will be supplied in sections and you must put it together your-
self. This does not require any special skill or strength. A leaflet of simple
instructions, and the necessary tools, will be supplied with the shelter.



10



I

ILLUSTRATION NO. 8,

The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel
table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to
reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The
whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris.
In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It
would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out
unaided.



Top of beams in contact with
ceiling or a lew inches below




4 # x f * Braces nailed
lo beams, ties and posts
with not less than
3 J* wire nails



/ Hoop iron straps
screwed to beams
and posts

(alternative to dogs)



iocr joists



A. Posts taken 1
down through
to concrete an<
nailed to tloor joists




Dog or hoop iron strap
screwed to post and sill



ILLUSTRATION NO. 11. Independent timber framewor* lor a refuge
room. If the pos*s are more than 6 ft. 6 in. apart, 8 in. x 4 in. beams

are desirable.



A home-made shelter



You will have noticed earlier in this booklet the statement that people
have often been rescued from demolished houses because they had taken
shelter under an ordinary table. This was because the table had by chance
been strong enough to bear the weight of the falling bedroom floor. A timber
framework can be built inside a refuge room to do the same thing, but with
certainty, illustration no. ii shows a completed framework in squared
14



timber, illustrations nos 12 and - r -*«**m 1

13 show how it goes into a refuge
room. As, however, squared timber is
more difficult to get, the use of round
poles, as shown in illustration
no. 14, is specially recommended.
(Poles of larch and Scotch fir can
be obtained fairly easily in many
districts.) illustration no. 15
shows how this is put together. A
refuge room with a framework of
this kind to hold up the floor, and a
properly barricaded window, gives a
high degree of safety. It is best to
sleep in the middle of the room under
the framework, as there is less chance
of your being hurt if parts of the
wall fall inwards, though walls moie often subside or fall outwards.

The framework is quite different in principle from propping up a floor.
When a floor falls it gives a sideways push which is likely to knock props over.
The framework is specially designed to be self-supporting and to withstand




ILLUSTRATION NO. 13.

Plan of a typical refuge room with an independent timber framework.
The room is the same as the dining room in Illustration No. i.



At leasl 6 clearance




*5




ILLUSTRATION NO. 14. Alternative construction of timber framework to that shown
in Illustration No. n. Round poles are used instead of squared timber.

this. You can make the framework in several ways, so long as the general prin-
ciples given here are followed. The dimensions should be such that the posts
stand at a distance from the walls approximately one quarter of the width
or length of the room ; thus, if the room is 10 ft. wide by 12 ft. long, the posts
will be about 2 ft. 6 in. from the side walls and 3 ft. from the end walls. The
dimensions can be varied a little if necessary, but do not overdo it.
The posts may either be passed through small openings in the floor boards

16



\" x Y (min.) hoop iron slrap




Plate Washer
(corners may be
clenched after
lightening bolt)



Blocking piece



)>" diam. Bolt



1* x Y (min ) hoop iron strap



ILLUSTRATION NO. 15. How the framing of
round poles is put together.

17



to bear on the solid concrete below, or fixed to a beam or heavy plank screwed
to the floor, as shown in illustration no. ii. If the space under the
floor is deeper than 18 in. the posts must extend down to the concrete. The
two highest beams of the framework must be placed at right angles to the
ceiling joists ; their ends should not be nearer to the walls than about 6 in.,
so as to be safe from the chance of being struck heavily by the wall should
it collapse. You can tell which way the ceiling joists run by observing the
line of nails in the floor boards in the room above. The beams of the frame-
work need not touch the ceiling, but they should not be more than 2 or 3 in.
below.

Falls of ceiling plaster seldom cause serious injuries, but plaster can be
brought down by blast, even if the walls and floors are not damaged. It is
a simple matter to catch the pieces of plaster by fixing a layer of wire netting,
fishing net, or something similar, over the top of the framework, and fixing
it to the walls all round the room. Dust sheets, paper, etc., spread over the
netting will prevent most of the smaller pieces coming through the netting.
If you cannot get a strong netting, a canopy can be arranged by means of a
dust sheet or bed sheet, supported on cords stretched tight from wall to wall
over the framework.

The construction of the framework is a straightforward job, involving not
much more than a saw, hammer and nails. The amateur carpenter or handy-
man should be able to do it with someone to help him put up the framework
in the room. As none of the pieces of wood is as long as the dimension of the
room along which it is to be placed, there should be no difficulty in getting
everything into the room. Any local builder or carpenter would be able to do
the job in a day or two, using the illustrations as working drawings.



Material



As rough timbers in 5 in. to 6 in. diameters are not much in demand
persons requiring material for A.R.P. purposes should not, as a rule, experi-
ence difficulty in obtaining the necessary permit from the Ministry of Supply
Timber Control Department, for the purchase of small quantities The
same applies to " limbs » in home-grown hardwoods, which are also available
in many areas. The Timber Control Orders permit a purchaser to buy up to
20s. worth of timber per calendar month without a licence. Amounts in
excess of this require a licence, which can be obtained from the Timber-
Control Area Officer.



ILLUSTRATION NO. 16. The ho use on the right had a timber framework in the front rooo. The 1,,-ne.

work has shghtly twisted but held up the debris. The house on de left has no framewT*
and has collapsed. This w.,s an experiment simila, to that in lUustration^o 8



18



As there are only about 12 cu. ft. of timber in a ceiling support as shown
iniLLUSTRATiONNO.11, suitable for a room measuring up to 12 ft. by 12 ft.
by 9 ft. high, it should not be a difficult matter for anyone to obtain the small
quantity of green timber required, especially if a tree, or part of one, is
purchased before it is felled, so as to obtain as much timber as possible within
the 20$. limit. Alternatively, it is possible to obtain from some Local Authori-
ties timber of suitable sizes salvaged from bombed houses.

Obtained in the ordinary way, the timber for a single framework costs
about £4 ; to this must be added the cost of transporting it to your house.
The same amount of salvaged timber should cost from £1 to £3, but will
probably need cutting to the right sizes ; transport costs will be extra to this.



How to obtain skilled advice



For a fee of half a guinea, a consultant appointed by one of the professional institutions
of architects, engineers or surveyors will inspect your house and give you a written report
stating the best room for a refuge in your house and describing ways within your means
by which the protection it gives can be improved. If you want the services of such a
consultant ask your Local Authority to show you a list of consultants from which you can
choose. If your local council has no such list, you can apply for information to the

Secretary, Central Board of Advisory Panel of Professional Consultants,

1-7 Great George Street,

Westminster,

London, S.W.i.



ALWAYS HAVE YOUR CAS MASK
WITH YOU — DAY AND NIGHT
LEARN TO PUT IT ON QUICKLY



PRACTISE PUTTING ON YOUR CAS MASK




1. Hold your breath.

To breathe in gas may be fatal.)

2. Hold mask in front of face,
thumbs inside straps.

3. Thrust chin well forward into
mask. Pull straps as far over head
as they will go.

4. Run finger round face-piece
taking care head-straps are not
twisted.



MAKE SURE IT FITS

See that the rubber fits snugly at
sides of jaw and under chin. The
head-straps should be adjusted to
hold the mask firmly. To test for
fit, hold a piece of paper to end
of mask and breathe in. The paper
should stick.




Arrows i ndtca te points needm g|
particular attention J



Nov. 25, 1944



AN ANALYSIS OF 259 OF THE RECENT
FLYING-BOMB CASUALTIES

BY

R. C. BELL, M.B., M.R.C.S.

Resident Surgical Officer to an EM.S. Hospital

In all we dealt with 222 out-patients and 259 in-patients,
with 18 deaths. Our story began in June, 1944, when the
first large incident occurred near by. Twenty-six casualties
were admitted and 12 required theatre treatment. This propor-
tion remained fairly constant throughout the series. Altogether
we had 83 theatre cases out of 259 admissions, and had to
send 35 cases on untreated, most of whom required the theatre.
In this first incident no fewer than 16 of the casualties were
due to flying glass. It was noticeable how the proportion
of glass injuries dropped as the importance of taking adequate
cover was realized, while the percentage of crush injuries
increased from people being trapped by falling masonry.

A. Flying Glass

This was the most frequent cause of injury, totalling over
100 casualties in all. Many included severe damage to the
eyes. It is noticeable that most of the injuries were above
the nipple line, chiefly of the face and neck : a large proportion
were received when looking out of windows — a modern version
of curiosity killing the cat. We had five cases of perforating
wounds of both eyes and ten perforating wounds of one eye.
The globe was usually completely destroyed. Many of these
injuries were avoidable, and therein lay their great sadness.

The penetrating power of flying glass is, in the main, low.
It is unusual for it to pierce the deep fascia: usually it lies
just under the skin in the fat, but when present in hundreds
of pieces it presents a problem which has not yet acquired
a satisfactory solution ; nor has the condition made its way into
the textbooks of war surgery.

Table I. — Glass



Description


No.


Remarks


Deaths


Lacerations of face, scalp, and neck . .
Perforating wounds of eye


77
15


19 T
5 cases bilateral
2T

1 T




Cut hands

Severe multiple lacerations

Other injuries . .


9
6
5


1



HOME OFFICE



AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

DIRECTIONS
FOR THE ERECTION AND SINKING
OF THE GALVANISED CORRUGATED

STEEL SHELTER

February 1939

Cmn Ccfjrigif tttmvtd

(ANDERSON SHELTER)

A.R.P. (O) IO



\ \ N \
\ \ x

\ i

CLIP FIXING IjOR
REMOVABLE |
SHEET Y_



SHEET FIXING
Nut. — 4§2

Washer



Bolt;



SPANNER



Back, side sheets.

Back, centre bottom sheet.

angle section.

•Back, centre top sheet (Removable sheet)
rved sheets of centre arch,
jrved sheets of back arch.
Curved sheets of front arch.
Front f centre top sheet.

/Front angle section.



— "t. —



\ J.



>ls.



Side chart
Encjl tjee sections.^



FRAME FIXKjJG
\

\



\



Rivet.



Front, side sheets: \



Front, centre bottom sheet.



Rat-tailed handle
for use as a tommy bar.



Fig. 3. — The Individual Parts




Fig. 4, — Stage 12. Covering the Shelter with Earth. Fig. 4. — Stage 13. The Shelter Complete with Earth Cover.



Anderson shelter survives hit: Norwich 27 April 1942




EARTH ARCHING USED TO
STRENGTHEN SHELTERS



ORNL-5037




Mound height =
v half trench width



A familiar example of effective earth arching is
its use with sheet metal culverts under roads. The
arching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walled
culvert prevents it from being crushed by the weight
of heavy vehicles.



15 Sept 1940: Anderson shelter occupants
survived air raid, Ransome Way, Liverpool



Anderson shelter occupants survive air raid destruction at Purfleet




17 June 1944: Anderson shelter absorbs blast from VI
at Elsenham Rd, East End, London



j Family survive without injury in wrecked Anderson shelter (note earth blown off)
during London Blitz in 19 40. Damage to the shelter a bsor bed the bla st energy.





7 July 1944: Anderson shelter occupants survive at Tennyson Ave, Plashet Grove



Anderson shelter survives, Croydon, October 1 940





that me Anderson garden shelter could withstand a house collapsing on It can be seen In
>icture Mr, and Mrs Claque bless their Insistence on going to ground whan
homes and those of their neighbours were xluced to rubble

Anderson shelter survives at Latham Street,
Poplar London, 28 July 1941:





My..






Anderson shelter beside crater (August 1940)



And They Came Out
of It Alive . . .

The edge of this bomb crater,
30ft. deep, In a household
garden near London, U only
4ft. from the Anderson shelter.
But the two people in the
shelter during London 9 ! six
hour raid— Mrs. Clark and
Miss Clark—were unhurt. You
see Miss Clark in the picture
the damage to the



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CD/SA 12



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER



A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED PER TONNE 0? BCMBS
r WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II



For World War II the average bomb weight was between 150 - 200 kg,
(R.C. 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were
12 or 50 kg.

TABLE 5

Relative safeties in World War II deduced from
population and casualty distribution





In the
open


Under
cover


In


Population exposure
Location people killed
Relative safety

RELATIVE DANGER!


%
\%
72$


62?


10#



(1 ) A house about 3£ times as safe as in the open.

(2) A shelter about twice as safe as a house.



Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each
of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on
this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 191 6, in which the total
number killed was 59, 69»5# of the Pe°p3- e killed in the Pity were in the
open.



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November 1940 design by C. A. Joy, M. Inst. Me. & C. E.,
Bexley Borough Engineer (UK National Archives: HO 205/257)



ANDERSON SHELTER

(Indoors to avoid groundwater
flooding, damp and cold)

4.5" partition
wall



9" wall



Floor boards
and joists




4" x 2"



4.5" sleeper
wall



6" site concrete



MORRISON SHELTER
(indoor table shelter)



4" x 2" floor joists



Table shelters allowed escape from any
side easily, reducing fire risks




Patent specification by Prof. John Fleetwood Baker,
Ministry of Home Security (National Archives HO 356/10)




Structural Defense, 1945, by D. G. Christopher son, Ministry of

Home Security, RC 4-50, (1946); Chapters VIII and IX (Confidential). National Archives

Chapter VIII summarizes the literature on the design and HO 195/16

types of British shelters and analyzes their effectiveness.




Two tier-Morrison shelters



UK National Archives: CAB 167 1917



27



( THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HI8 BRITANNIC MAJESTY* 3 GOVERNMENT ) .



6. Shelter In the homo; The Anderson shelter was originally
intended for indoor uso but for a number of reasons Including the
danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted* Experience has
shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson

or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought
and two designs have been produced whioh can be erected indoors
without support. Those new types, although they may give slightlj
less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors,
would fill the needs of a largo section of the public , especially
the middle class* One design allows the use of the shelter as
part of the furniture of the room*

7. I regard sheltors of this typo as of the first importance and
wish to provide them on a big scale*- Each shelter will use over
3 owt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to
two children to sleep inside* For an outlay of about 65,000 tons
of ateel, as a first instalment* I could therefore produce
400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000
persons* I should wish to complete such a programme within the
first three months of production and thereafter at a similar or
increasing rate. From enquirios I believe that manufacture can
bo arranged provided steel is suppliod and if the Cabinet approves
my policy I shall require their dirootion that the steel he

made available*

10* Conclusions .

I ask for a general endorsement of the policy I have
outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of
my colleagues:



(i) that proposals for building shelters of massive
construction should be rejected;

(ii) that steel should be made available to carry out
the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the
provision of stool shelters indoors;

(ill) that the limit of income for the provision of
free shelter for insured persons should be
raised from £250 to £350 por annum*



,.P.(Q)(41)7.
January 15th. 1941*



6v



WAR CABINET .
AfR RATT* ftfl ftLTER POLICY .
Memorandum by the Minister cf Home Security*



H.M.



MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY.
January 15th. 1941 *



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2




ILLUSTRATION NO. 8.

The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel
table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to
reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The
whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris.
In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It
would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out
unaided.



0)

E
o



o




Morrison shelter saves lives of Mr McGregor pictured
beside Morrison shelter, as well as his wife and lodger, in
collapsed house, York 1942 air raid



Effectiveness of Some
Civil Defense Actions in Protecting
Urban Populations (u)



Appendix B of
Defense of the US
against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u)

0R0-R-17, Appendix B



2 is, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




2 4 6 8 10 12 U 16 18 20

DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES



Fig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance
from Center of City for Three Evacuation Times



Issued for the Ministry of Home Security
by the Ministry of Information



M)MT EDMI

1940- 41

The Official Story of the
CIVIL DEFENCE
of Britain



1942

London : His Majesty's Stationery Office



THE MAN IN THE STREET 67

So far was all this from panic that it took
three months for the population of the
twenty-eight central boroughs to drop by
about 25 percent, from a little over 3,000,000
(the figure before heavy bombing began) to
2,280,000 at the end of November. In a
group of the most heavily bombed eastern
lx)roughs the pre-war population of 800,000
had fallen to 582,000 before the blitz began ;
for four months it had dropped steadily to
444,000 ; by 31st December a fall of 23 per
cent. These figures do not spell panic, and
a further substantial fall in 1941, after con-
tinuous heavy raiding had ceased, completes
the evidence that those who went did so in
cold blood, for practical reasons as valid
for their hard-pressed city as for their
private selves.

But what did all this mean to the average
Londoner? In November, inner London
(the county) contained some 3,200,000
people. Not more than 300,000 of these
were in public shelter of any kind, half of
that number at most in those larger shelters
on which the limelight shone so exclusively
Nor is this all ; in domestic shelter (Ander-
sons, small brick shelters and private rein-
forced basements) there were no more than



68



FRONT LINE



1,150,000 people. Thus of every hundred
Londoners living in the central urban areas,
nine were in public shelter (of whom possibly
four were in " big " shelters), 27 in private
shelter, and 64 in their own beds — possibly
moved to the ground floor — or else on duty.
Particular big shelters, and for a few nights
the tubes, were overcrowded, but there was
public shelter for twice the number who
made use of it. In outer London, with a
population of some 4,600,000, there were in
November 4 per cent, in public shelter,
26 per cent, in domestic shelter, and 70 per
cent, at home or on duty.

In the last great war there had been out-
bursts of hate against the distant enemy,
and shops with German names had been
wrecked. This time the citizens did not
stop for such things. After the first shock
of realisation they found no more need for
direct recrimination than does the soldier.
Like him, they got on with the job and
waited their chance. Neither in this nor in
any other way was there a sign of instability ;
no panic running for shelter, no white faces
in the streets (though plenty of taut, grim
ones), no nerve disease. In all London, the
month of October saw but twenty-three
neurotics admitted to hospital. The mind-
doctors had rather fewer patients than usual.




BLOCKED ROADS. The morning of 12th May :
each raid sets the police still another traffic problem.




ENORMOUS CRATERS. At the Bank, where
the road collapsed into the subway beneath.
A temporary bridge was thrown right across it.



The outcome may be seen in the following
table, which shows coastal bombing to
November, 1941, in round figures.



Town.


Number

•

of Raids.


Civilians Houses
Killed. Damaged.


Fraserburgh


.. 18


40


700


Peterhead


16


36


700


Aberdeen


.. 24


68


2,000


Scarborough


17


30


2,250


Bridlington


.. 30


24


3,000


Grimsby ...


.. 22


18


1 ,700


Gt. Yarmouth


.. 72


110


II, 500


Lowestoft


.. 54


94


9,000


Clacton ...


.. 31


10


4,400


Margate


.. 47


19


8,000


Ramsgate


.. 41


71


8,500


Deal


17


12


2,000


Dover


.. 53
(and shelling)


92


9,000


Folkestone


.. 42


52


7,000


Hastings ...


.. 40


46


6,250


Bexhill ...


.. 37


74


2,600


Eastbourne


.. 49


36


3,700


Brighton
Hove


} 1


1 27


4,500


Worthing


.. 29


20


3,000


Bournemouth


.. 33


77


4,000


Weymouth


.. 42


48


3,600


Falmouth


.. 33


31


I,I00



CITY OF COV ENTRY

PREVENTION of TYPHOID HB

in view oi prr^ent damage to DRAINAGE
communication* in the City. %peetal precaution*
again** Typhoid Fever arn adviaed:

OIL ALL

DRINKING
WATER





In 12 months, 1940-1, the Blitz stray dog Rip (discovered by
civil defence rescuers in Poplar, East London after an air
raid) sniffed out 100 trapped casualties in London rubble.




Irma. Margaret Griffin used Irma and Psyche to find 233 trapped persons



STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE



STANFORD, CALIFORNIA



June, 1953



al Report



IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II:
SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING

Evaluation of Source Materials

Br

Robert 0« Shreve
SRI Project 669

Prepared for
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington, D. C.



For m)« by the 8uperint*ml*nt of Documents, U. 8. Qovtrnmcnt Prlntinc Ofllce



Approved :




Weldon B. Gibson, Director
Economics Research Division



Table 1



Report Outline - USSBS Project

IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II:
SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING



Division I - PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONS

Volume 1 Summary of Civil Defense Experience
Volume 2 Analytical Studies (Restricted)

Volume 3 Causes of Fire from Atomic Attack (Secret) — VITAL! !



The documents which should be given wide distribution for civil
defense use are listed below, with a brief description:

a. USSBS Reports

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan
(3 volumes)*

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
(3 volumes)*

These reports constitute two case studies of atomic bombing*
Civil defense planners should be aware of the facts these
documents record in great detail* Their distribution to all
civil defense planners and analysts is highly desirable*

=9=

Effects on Labor in Clydebank of Clydeslde Raids of March 1941 .
(REN 23l>) USSBS Target Int. (REN 236) Ministry of Home Security

A study of the effects on labor of bombing in a town of 50,000 people
in which 76% of houses were rendered uninhabitable, 73% of the popula-
tion homeless* An equivalent of 65 city days was utilized in the
reconstruction.



Ministry of Home Security

Effects of German Air Force Raids on Coventry (REN IMl)

The city, the attack, casualties, repairs and reconstruction (cost),
absenteeism, population movements, and housing occupancy. Six pages
and charts and graphs* Twenty percent of houses rendered uninhabi-
table or destroyed, a total reconstruction cost of h 3,492,000.
Average time lost by worker after November raid was eleven days;
average after April raid was 7 days* Nine percent of the workers
evacuated to points within roach of the city*



An eminent chemist
gives the facts about poison gas

and air bombing




tltc §redy !



THE TRUTH
ABOUT POISON GAS

7 antes jCenaall
MJL, D.Sc. F.R.S.

Professor of Chemistry, University of Edinburgh



The civilian has been told that he will have
to bear the brunt of another war, that within a few
hours from the outset enemy bombers will destroy
big cities and exterminate their inhabitants with
high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs.
What is the truth?

Here, in this book, written in language
everyone can understand, is the considered
opinion of an authority on chemical warfare.



Breathe Freely !

THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS
JAMES KENDALL

M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S.

Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh ;
formerly Lieutenant-Commander in the United
States Naval Reserve, acting as Liaison Officer
with Allied Services on Chemical Warfare

J938

52 GAS IN THE LAST WAR

CASUALTIES IN INITIAL GAS ATTACKS

Amount Lethal

Used Concentra- Non-fatal

Gas Date In Tons tion * injuries Deaths

Chlorine Apr. 22, 191 5 168 5 6 15,000 5,000

Phosgene Dec. 19, 1 915 88 5 1,069 120

Mustard July 12, 1917 125 015 2,490 87

(* mg/litre for 10 minutes exposure unprotected)

between September 15 and November 11,
19 1 8, 2,000,000 rounds of gas shell, containing 4,000
tons of mustard gas, were fired against the advancing
British troops ; our losses therefrom were 540 killed and
24,363 injured. Gas defence had progressed to the
point where it took nearly 8 tons of mustard gas to kill
a single man !

A GAS ATTACK ON LONDON 109

The first

salvo of gas shells often reaches the trenches before the
occupants^doirtheir masks, whereas the Londoner will
receive ample warning of the approaching danger.

IIO GAS IN THE NEXT WAR

Th e alarmist and the ultra-pacifist love to quote the
fact that one ton oi mustard gas is sufficient to kill
45,000,000 people. This would indeed be true if the
45,000,000 people all stood in a line with their tongues
out" waiting for the drops to be dabbed on, but they
are hardly likely to be so obliging. One steam-
rolIer~would~suffice to flatten out all the inhabrtants of
Londo n_if they lay down in rows in front of it, but
nobody panics at the sight of a steam-roller.



11

Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have
been delugmg~the long-suffering British public with
lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination

These three classes are pure sensa-
tionalists, ultra-pacifists and military experts.

12 PANIC PALAVER

perpetrators of such articles may not recognize them-
selves that ivhat they are writing is almost entirely
imagin ary, ~hut they do want to get their manuscript
"accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the
We ekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the
horrors thick, and they certainly do their best

The amount of damage done by such alarmists can-
not be calculated, but it islmdoubtedly very great.

poison gas has a much greater
news value. It is still a new and mysterious form of
warfare, it is something which people do not under-
stand, and what they do not understand they can
readily be made to fear.

The recent film Things to Come, in particular, has
provided a picture of chemical warfare of the future
which shows how simply and rapidly whole populations
will be wiped out. Millions of people, perhaps, have
been impressed by the authority and reputation of
Mr. H. G. Wells into believing that this picture repre-
sents the plain truth.
17

Exhibit <B' is the work of the ultra^pacifist. He
abominates war and everything connected with war to
such an extent that he paints a highly coloured picture
ot its ho rrors, in t he most extreme Surrealistic style, with
the objecF of frightening the public to the point where
they^will relinquish, in the hope of escaping war, even
the right ot^seuHJefence. His motives may be praise-
worthy, but his methods are to be deplored.



French family at Marbache, Meurthe et Moselle, France, September 1918.
Gas masks were compulsory in the village, due to nearby gas attacks.
Photo is the frontispiece of the October 1921 reprint of Will Irwin's
book "The Next War" (Dutton, N.Y. , 19th printing Oct 1921; first
published April 1921.)

J. Davidson Pratt, "Gas Defence from the Point of View of the Chemist"
(Royal Institute of Chemistry, London, 1937): "... during the Great
War, French and Flemish . . . living in the forward areas came unscathed!
through big gas attacks by going into their houses, closing the doors
- the windows were always closed in any case - and remaining there ..."



OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY



IF THE GAS RATTLES SOUND




Put on mask, holding your breath until mask is in position. Turn
up collar. Put on gloves or keep hands in pockets. Take cover
in nearest building quickly. Put up umbrella if you have one.



IF YOU GET GASSED

by Vapour Gases

1. Keep your mask on even if you feel discomfort.

2. If discomfort continues, go to First Aid Post.
by Liquid or Blister Gas

1. Dab, but don't rub the splash with your hand-
kerchief. Then destroy the handkerchief.

2. Rub No. 2 Ointment well into place (buy a 6d.
jar now from any chemist). In an emergency,
chemists will supply Bleach Cream free.

3. If you can't get the Ointment or Cream within
5 minutes, wash the affected place with soap and
warm water.

4. Take off at once any garment splashed with gas.

HOW TO PUT ON YOUR MASK

1. Hold your breath. 2. Hold mask in front of
face, thumbs inside straps. 3. Thrust chin well
forward into mask. Pull straps as far over head
as they will go. 4. Run finger round face-piece
taking care head-straps are not twisted.

War Gas Leaflet (HO 186/2247)



Hand pumped
(asthmatic



Hospital patient's



Baby's




Police Civilian Soldier's
/warden until 1942



Small child's
(mickey mouse)



OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY TUK MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY




In a gas attack, first put on
your own mask, then you will
be better able to help baby.



HINTS TO

MOTHERS

^ Learn to put on baby's
gas helmet quickly, while
wearing your own mask.
Your Health Visitor will
show you how. If you don't
know her address ask at
Town Hall or at the Child
Welfare Centre.

it With more than one
baby you need help. Arrange
with a neighbour, or find
out if your local W.V.S. has
a Housewives' Service.

If Toddlers soon learn to
put on their own masks.
Let them make a game of it
and they will wear their gas
masks happily.



MAKE SURE YOUR FAMILY
HAVE THEIR GAS MASKS
WITH THEM NIGHT & DAY



Gas Helmets for Babies (HO 186/2247)



London baby gas mask tests (3 March 1939)



Hitler will send
no warning -

so always cany
your gas mask

ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY



UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES RER: CAB / 66 / 14 / 37

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT



Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1941 .



SECRET. Copy No.

W.P. (41) 15.
January 24, 1041.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special oare may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.



WAR CABINET.



ANTI-GAS PRECAUTIONS.



Memorandum by Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

FOLLOWING the discussion at the War Cabinet* on the 20th January,
1941, I circulate the following note about anti-gas measures for the civil popula-
tion. The note has been drawn up on the assumption that there should be no press
and broadcast publicity about anti-gas precautions. I appreciate that there are
good reasons for such a course of action, but I feel bound to say that the absence
of publicity will make it more difficult to secure a rapid and widespread improve-
ment in the preparedness of the civil population to meet a sudden gas attack.
The value of a respirator, for example, lies only partly in the efficiency of the
respirator itself. The balance — and no small balance — depends on the extent to
which the public are practised in the habit of putting it on quickly and wearing it.

Even with the aid of advance publicity it is impossible to guarantee that the
first onset of a gas attack will not result in casualties. The risk must inevitably
be increased — possibly quite seriously in view of the immunity we have hitherto
enjoyed — if there is no public warning of the increased likelihood of gas attack
in tne near future. I suggest, therefore, that the War Cabinet should review
their policy in this matter.

H. M.

Home Office, January 24, 1941.



NOTE.
Personal Protection.

(a) General public.

1. Every member of the public should be in possession of a respirator. All
respirators have been fitted with an additional niter known as " Contex " to
increase their protection against particulate gases, i.e., arsenical smokes. There
are over 10 million respirators in national reserve in addition to 3 million
reserves in the hands of local authorities.

2. In March 1940 arrangements were made through the Wardens' organi-
sation for a special inspection of respirators in the hands of the public. Local
authorities were then asked to institute a system of inspection by Wardens at

• W M. (41) 8, item 4.

[22150]



2

regular intervals. The issue of "Contex," which began in May and continued
until September, gave a special opportunity for inspection by Wardens, and there
is reason to believe that this inspection was largely carried out.

3. The number of faulty respirators reported at the March 1940 inspection
was surprisingly small, and the number of unserviceable respirators returned by
local authorities in the period April to December 1940, was at the rate of less
than 4 per cent, a year.

4

as the view has been taken that it was unnecessary to have decontamination
squads always standing by. They are in the main drawn from the men belonging
to the cleansing departments of the local authorities.

At present these men are reserved by reason of their primary occupation at
25, bat it is proposed by the Man-Power Committee and the Ministry of Labour
and National Service to raise the age to 35. It will be necessary therefore that
there should be some deferment of the calling-up of a proportion of the men
under 35, and discussions are already taking place on this with the Ministry of
Labour.

Anti-Gas Precautions in Shelters.

17. In July 1940, instructions were issued that arrangements should be
made for securing that public shelters could be made gas-proof. Now that shelters
are being used for sleeping, adequate ventilation is of the first importance. It is
impracticable to reconcile this with efficient gas-proofing. Local authorities are
therefore being informed that further steps to provide gas-proofing in naturally
ventilated shelters should not be taken for the present and that reliance must be
placed on the respirator as the first line of defence.



Tel. No. : Victoria 6836

Any communication on the subject
of this letter should be addressed (



The Under Secretary of State,
Home Office {A.R.P. Dept.),
Horse ferry House,
Thorney Street,

London, S.W.i.

and the following number quoted : —
701,603/109




HOME OFFICE,
Air Raid Precautions Dept.,
HORSEFERRY HOUSE,
THORNEY STREET,

LONDON, S.W.i.

31s* December, 1937.



Sir,

Experiments in Anti-Gas Protection of Houses

I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the
information of your Council, the annexed Report describing in
detail the experiments to which reference was made by the Par-
liamentary Under Secretary of State in his speech on the second
reading of the Air Raid Precautions Bill in the House of
Commons on the 16th November.

The experiments were conducted by the Chemical Defence
Research Department under the aegis of a special Sub-Com-
mittee of the Chemical Defence Committee. That Sub-
Committee was composed of eminent experts not in Government
employment, and included a number of distinguished University
professors and scientists.

I am,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

R. R. Scott.

The Clerk of the County Council.
The Town Clerk.

The Clerk to the District Council.



Issued to all
County Councils

County Borough Councils (and the Corporation of the City of
London)

Metropolitan Borough Councils

Municipal Borough Councils

Urban and Rural District Councils

in England and Wales

Copies sent for information to Chief Officers of Police in
England and Wales.



2

Crown Copyright Reserved
PROTECTION AGAINST GAS
REPORT OF EXPERIMENTS CARRIED OUT BY
THE CHEMICAL DEFENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Handbook No. i issued by the Air Raid Precautions Depart
ment of the Home Office describes the steps which the public
are advised to take in order to protect themselves against the
effects of any chemical warfare gases which might be employed
by enemy aircraft in time of war.

The gist of these recommendations is : —
First, to go indoors.

Secondly, to arrange for the room into which you go to
be made as gas-proof as possible.

Thirdly, to take with you the respirator which will
have been issued to you.

Whilst it has never been claimed that any one of these steps
by itself will make an individual completely safe, experiments
and trials have shown that each of these measures is by itself
of considerable value and that when all of them are adopted
a very high degree of protection is obtained. An outline is
given below of certain typical experiments which have been
carried out.

These particular experiments were carried out with four
different types of actual war gas. The first four experiments
to be described will show the degree of protection that is obtained
from each type of gas merely by going indoors and shutting the
doors and windows.

As explained in Handbook No. i*, a chemical warfare gas
may be dropped from aircraft either as spray or in bombs.
In the former case the liquid drops fall like rain, and it is
obvious that by going indoors the public will avoid them. On
the other hand, if gas bombs are dropped, people who have
gone indoors will avoid being splashed by the chemical in the
bomb, and even in an ordinary room they will receive some
protection from the gas cloud. The amount of protection
obtained in a house which has not been treated in any way
can be gathered from the following experiments.

(a) Protection obtained in a house which has not been treated
in any way.

The house employed was a gamekeeper's cottage with three
rooms on the ground floor and three rooms upstairs. It had
been unoccupied for about 15 years but was in a reasonable
state of repair. It was to a large extent sheltered by belts of

* A.R.P. Handbook No. 1, " Personal Protection against Gas ", price 6d. ;
(8d. post free) : published by H.M. Stationery Office (see back page).



3



trees which reduced the strength of the wind in the vicinity of
the cottage to about one-eighth of that in the open. In this
respect therefore the location of the cottage resembled a house
in a town. In one experiment over a ton of actual chlorine gas
was released 20 yards from the house so that the wind carried 1
it straight on to the unprotected room. A very strong gas cloud
was thus maintained outside the house for about 40 minutes,
during which time the gas gradually penetrated to the inside.
A fire was burning in the hearth the whole time, and the only
measures taken to exclude the gas consisted of closing the
doors and windows in the normal way.

Human beings who occupied this unprotected room found
that gas penetrated slowly into the room, and after about seven
minutes is became necessary for them to put on their respirators.
Had these men been outside the house, they would have been
compelled to put on their respirators immediately, since other-
wise the very intense gas cloud would have caused instantaneous
incapacitation and ultimate death.

If the gas, which with its containers weighed about 2 J tons,
had been released more quickly, the strength of the gas cloud
would have been greater but the time during which the house
was enveloped by it would have been correspondingly shorter.

It is important to appreciate properly the severity of this
trial. The quantity of gas concentrated on this house could
under practical conditions only be obtained by several large
bombs dropping very close to the building. The period of
exposure to the maximum effects of the gas was also many times
longer than would normally be experienced under most prac-
tical conditions, since the initial cloud from a gas bomb soon
begins to be diluted and dispersed by the action of even quite :
moderate winds. It is clear that conditions similar to those of
the experiment are extremely severe, and are such as would
be likely to occur very rarely indeed and to a very small
number of houses.

It should also be noted that the cottage used in this experi-
ment had no carpets or other floor coverings. Most of the gas
which leaked in came through the spaces between the floor
boards, and it is therefore clear that much less would have got
into an ordinary room in which there was a carpet, linoleum,
or a solid floor.

In another experiment the house was surrounded at a dis-
tance of 20 yards by large shallow trays which were filled with
mustard gas, the trays being spaced a few yards apart. By
this means the vapour given off by the mustard gas was carried
on to the house no matter how the direction of the wind varied.
As the weather at the time was not very warm, the conditions
of the experiment were made more severe by producing a fine <
spray of mustard gas at a point 10 yards to windward of



4

the house so that the house was enveloped in the resultant cloud
of mustard gas for a period of an hour. The cloud produced
in this way was about a hundred times as strong as that caused
by the evaporation of the mustard gas from the trays. Animals
were placed in an unprotected room in the house and remained
there during the spraying period and for a further 20 hours
while the house was subjected to the vapour of mustard gas
given off from the trays. Observations made upon the animals
during the three subsequent days and also post mortem examina-
tion showed that none of them was seriously harmed by the
mustard gas.

The third type of gas used was tear gas. In this experiment
the same cottage was enveloped for an hour in an intense
atmosphere of tear gas produced by spraying the gas into the
air at a point 10 yards upwind of the house. Men who were
stationed 200 yards downwind from the house and in the track
of the gas cloud were incapacitated in about a minute, and in
some cases in 20 seconds. On the other hand, men who occu-
pied rooms in the house which had received no treatment
beyond the closing of the windows and doors found no need
to put on their respirators for the first 13 minutes. The tear
gas gradually penetrated into these unprotected rooms, although
after three-quarters of an hour the strength of the gas inside
the house was still very much less than that outside.

In the fourth experiment the cottage was enveloped for
20 minutes in a dense cloud of arsenical smoke. Men occupy-
ing an unprotected room of the house found that the arsenical
smoke penetrated into the room, but the strength of the cloud
inside was much less than that outside. When Civilian
respirators were worn in this room, complete protection was
obtained. Men who were stationed 200 yards downwind of the
house and in the path of the gas cloud were rapidly affected,
but when they wore Civilian respirators no effects were felt.

The above four examples clearly demonstrate that, apart from
the protection which a house provides against falling airplane
spray, some measure of protection is afforded even by an
ordinary unprotected room against gas clouds such as are pro-
duced by bombs close to the building.

(b) Protection afforded by a house treated in accordance with
Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 1.

A brief account will now be given of four further experi-
ments with the same four war gases in order to illustrate the
added protection which can be obtained by treating a room in
accordance with the instructions given in Air Raid Precautions
Handbook No. 1. These experiments were also conducted with
the cottage already mentioned. The room selected for treat- -
ment was situated on the ground floor on the windward side



5



of the house so that it was subjected to the full effect of the gas
and the wind. It measured about 12 feet square. The Air Raid
Precautions instructions for excluding gas were carried out by
unskilled men, the official procedure being rigidly followed.
As the house was not provided with carpets or other floor
covering, it became necessary to seal up the joints between the
boards over the whole of the floor of the selected room. This
was done by pasting strips of paper along the joints between
the floor boards. Some of these strips became displaced by
the boots of the men who were inside the room, and an appre-
ciable leakage of gas into the room undoubtedly occurred due
to this cause. Two tons of chlorine were released 20 yards
from the house, the time of emission being an hour. Animals
were placed in the house, some in the " gas protected " room
and others in rooms which had received no such treatment.
The latter set of animals were killed by the gas which pene-
trated into the unprotected rooms under these very severe
conditions. The animals in the " gas protected " room, how-
ever, were unaffected and remained normal, notwithstanding
the severity of the trial.

An experiment with mustard gas, similar to that already
described, was also carried out after the ground floor room on
the windward side of the house had been treated in accordance
with the Air Raid Precautions Department's procedure.
Animals were placed in the room, which was then subjected to
the same exposure of mustard gas spray and vapour as before.
At the end of 20 hours the animals were removed and a most
thorough examination of them showed no evidence of the
effects of the gas at all. Animals placed outside the house during
the first hour of the experiment were, of course, very seriously
affected. The amount of mustard gas penetrating into the
room was also measured by chemical methods and it was found
that the amount of gas inside the room was so small that a
man could have remained there for the whole 20 hours without
its being necessary for him to wear a respirator and without any
subsequent ill-effects.

The experiment with tear gas previously described was also
performed against the " gas protected " room. A number of
men occupied this room and found they were able to remain
there without its being necessary for them to put on their
respirators at any time during the hours that this very severe
experiment lasted.

An experiment with arsenical smoke, similar to that already
described, was also carried out against the " gas protected "
room. The occupants found that the arsenical smoke penetrated
the room to an extent which caused some irritation of the nose
and throat and eventually rendered the wearing of respirators
desirable to ensure comfort. After putting on the respirator, no



6



discomfort was felt throughout the remainder of the experiment.
Men who left the " gas protected " room wearing their Civilian
respirators were able to traverse the densest part of the cloud
without discomfort. Under these severe conditions the presence
of the arsenical smoke could be detected, but the effects were
insignificant.

It is important to appreciate fully the severity of the condi-
tions imposed in the two trials with arsenical smoke. A very
high concentration of the irritant smoke was maintained around
the house for 20 minutes. Under practical conditions such a
high concentration could be produced only by a large and
efficiently designed bomb falling close to the building, and then
only for a short period. The conditions of the trials were there-
fore extremely severe and represent a situation which would
only rarely be met, and in which only a small number of houses
would be involved.

From this second series of experiments it will be seen that
treating a room in accordance with the recommendations of the
Air Raid Precautions Department does reduce very consider-
ably the amount of gas penetrating into the room, and that
a room so treated is correspondingly safer than a room which
has received no such treatment.

Indeed, in the case of the experiments with mustard gas and
tear gas, the amount of gas which was able to penetrate into
the gas protected room was so small that no further measures
of protection were necessary.

In the experiment with chlorine, although the amount of gas
which entered the treated room was insufficient to injure the
animals, human beings who occupied the room during this
extremely severe test could smell the gas. They were provided
with Civilian respirators, and they found that by putting these
respirators on they were completely protected against every
trace of gas. Some of these individuals then left the " gas
protected " room, passed out of the house, and traversed the
lethal cloud of gas which enveloped it. Although they deli-
berately stood in the densest part of the cloud for some minutes,
no trace of the gas passed through their respirators.

Similarly the experiments with arsenical smoke show that
although, under the most severe conditions, the cloud may
penetrate into the " gas protected " room in sufficient quantity
to be detected, or even to cause some irritation, the effects
are materially reduced in a room so treated. It is also demon-
strated that wearing a Civilian respirator affords complete
protection against any smoke which may gain access to the
room. The respirator also enabled individuals to pass through
an extremely dense cloud of arsenical smoke in complete
safety.



7

The experiments which have been outlined in this statement
were purposely designed to represent the most severe conditions
likely to be met. The results all combine to show that if the
instructions given in Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. I are
carried out a very high standard of protection is obtained.
With regard to the first precaution it has been shown that going
indoors and closing the doors and windows affords some
measure of protection, even though the room occupied has not
been specially prepared. In these circumstances there is ample
time to put on the respirator at leisure if this should be
necessary. If the second precaution of rendering the room as
gas-proof as possible has been carried out, then the occupants
will normally be able to remain in complete safety and comfort
without further protection. Under the most severe conditions
sufficient gas may penetrate such protected rooms to be recog-
nized or even to cause slight irritation. When this occurs the
respirator can be put on though in many cases this will be as
a matter of convenience and extra precaution rather than real
necessity. With regard to the Civilian respirator it has been
shown that this will, in conjunction with the above precautions,
provide complete safety for any period for which it is likely
to be required. It has further been demonstrated that this
respirator will enable the wearer to reach a place of safety
even if he should for a time be exposed to the most dangerous
situation — for example if he is caught out of doors in a gas
cloud, or if his gas-protected room becomes damaged and he
is compelled to seek shelter elsewhere.



(47178—34 Wt. 3276—aaS 20,000 12/37 P- St G. 37 j



LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:
Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2;
26 York Street, Manchester 1; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;

80 Chichester Street, Belfast;
or through any bookseller

1937

Price 2d. net



S.O. Code No. 34-9999



HOME OFFICE

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS 1
OPERATIONAL NOTES



RESTRICTED

The information given in this document
is not to be communicated, either
directly or indirectly, to the Press or
to any person not authorised to receive
it.



Crown Copyright 1965



Notes on BW and CW



ON23:i



General

Toxicological warfare can consist either of a tactical attack with
chemical weapons producing an immediate incapacitating effect, or of a
strategic attack with biological weapons which have a delayed effect.

The new Civilian Respirator (C7), with pneumatic tube face
fitting which is comfortable for long periods of wearing, affords
excellent protection against BW and CW attacks.

BW

In attacks on populations, since the airborne hazard is the main
one, only agents of high inf ectivity and high virulence (i.e. a small
number of organisms required to produce infection and cause severe
illness), combined with viability for many hours in the atmosphere, are
likely to prove effective.

Some representative pathogenic micro-organisms

{Anthrax (lethal, very persistent spores
but relatively low infectivity)
Brucellosis (incapacitating)
Tularaemia (incapacitating or lethal)

* Rickettsial Q fever (like typhus)

* Viruses Encephalomyelitis (brain fever)

Smallpox (epidemic)

ON23:2

Personal protection

Respirators and discardible covers for head and body may be used.
Extreme personal cleanliness is necessary. Total dosage can be
reduced very considerably in a closed room in a house by sealing
window cracks and door gaps before the arrival of contamination and
ventilating the room fully as soon as it has passed.

Decontaminat ion

Where appropriate the following measures may be taken :-
(a) weathering for a few days will destroy most bacterial

agents other than anthrax spores
(by use of bleach solution

(c) scattering petrol and firing it on open contaminated
ground.

£SL

Mustard gas and anticholinesterase agents (persistent and
non-persistent nerve gases) are the CW agents most likely to be
encountered in a tactical battle.



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ORNL/TM-10423



Technical Options for
Protecting Civilians from
Toxic Vapors and Gases



C. V.Chester



Date Published - Hay 1988



Prepared for
Office of Program Manager
for

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland



ORNL-DWG 88M-7585




DOWN WIND DISTANCE (km)



Fig, 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some
Very Toxic Gases



ORNL-OWG 88M-7584
1 1 1 I I I




CLOUD PASSAGE (h)

Fig e 2 Protection Factor of Leaky Enclosures




O y- *~

■

"~ o
d-M) 31VH 30NVH0X3-tilV



ORNL/TM-2001/154



Energy Division



Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work?
Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place



John H. Sorensen
Barbara M. Vogt



Date Published— August 2001



Prepared for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program



Prepared by
OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6285
managed by
UT-BATTELLE, LLC
for the

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725



Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the
amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be
significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and
contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For
this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the
window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in
place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall.

Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in
weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil
(0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then
heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than
plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced
tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct
tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink-
wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance.



3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN?



Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to
effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical
warfare agents.

3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY

Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent
simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal
et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of
10 mil (0.01 -in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the
simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organoposphorous
pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave
similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be
confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that "duct tape exhibits
reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP
(210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and
DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient
material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents" (Pal et al.
1993, p. 140).



3.2 PLASTIC SHEETING PERMEABILITY



Tests of the permeability of plastic sheeting (polyethylene) challenged with live chemical
warfare agents were conducted at the Chemical Defense Establishment in Porton Down,
England in 1970 (NATO 1983, p. 133), Agents tested included H and VX, but not GB,
Four types of polyethylene of varying thickness were tested; 2.5, 4, 10 and 20 mil
(0.0025, 0.004 in., 0.01 in., and 0.02 in.). The results of these tests are shown in Table 1.



Table 1: Permeability of plastic sheeting to liquid agent


Breakthrough time (h)


Thickness


VX H


0.0025


3 0.3


0.004


7 0.4


0.01


30 2


0.02


48 7



Source: NATO 1983, p. 136.



The data shows that at thickness of 10 mil or greater, the plastic sheeting provided a good
barrier for withstanding liquid agent challenges, offering better protection against VX
than for H. Because the greatest challenge is from a liquid agent, the time to permeate the
sheeting will be longer for aerosols and still longer for vapors, but the exact relationship
is unknown due to a lack of test data.

NATO Civil Defense Committee 1983. NATO Handbook on Standards and Rules for the
Protection of the Civil Population Against Chemical Toxic Agents, AC/23 -D/680,
2nd rev.

Pal, T., G.Griffin, G. Miller, A. Watson, M. Doherty, and T. Vo-Dinh. 1993. "Permeation
Measurements of Chemical Agent Simulants Through Protective Clothing
Materials,"/. Haz. Mat. 33:123-141.



UNCLASSIiafiB no. 9 1- 3

ASSISTANT w»,.^C'«0R
FOR

SATIOSA'- INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES



NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE



THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF
BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF
ATTACKS UPON THE US

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM




NIE-18
Published 10 January 1951



CENTRAL



INTELLIGENCE



AGENCY



APPBNDIX B



GA AND GB NERVE GASES



1. General. GA and GB are colorless, odor-
less, low viscosity liquids, somewhat more
volatile than kerosene. They become ef-
fective anti-personnel agents when dis-
persed as a vapor or invisible fog. GB is
approximately 2% times more toxic than
GA.

2. Quantities Required for Effective Em-
ployment.

2.1 Military Attack.

2.11 Approximately 5 tons of GB used
in present munitions would be re-
quired to obtain a concentration
for 50% lethality, in an open area
of one square mile, under favorable
weather conditions as described in
paragraph 2.14 below. Theoret-
ically, some 2V4 times more GA
would be required for comparable
effectiveness. However, dissemina-
tion of GA by munitions to date
does not approach this ideal and
15 to 20 times more GA than GB
may be needed for 50% lethality.

2.12 The quantities of GA and GB de-
livered on the target in a military
attack may well be sub-lethal.
However, even with as little as
1/10 of the lethal quantity, effec-
tive incapacitation and demorali-
zation can be obtained.

2.13 Inasmuch as the nerve gases are
anti-personnel weapons they would
be employed against population
centers and military and indus-
trial installations where the ob-
jective is primarily incapacitation
of personnel as contrasted with
physical destruction. However,
CW may also be employed to sup-
plement AW and high explosives.

2.14 Effective dissemination of GA and
GB against the foregoing targets
requires the following conditions.



2.141 Low or medium wind veloc-
ity.

2.142 Shallow layer of cool air be-
low a warm layer.

2.143 Openings in the buildings
through which outside air
can penetrate, such as win-
dows or air conditioning in-
let ducts (openings can be
obtained by employing high
explosive munitions concur-
rently with CW agents).

2.15 The atmospheric conditions usual-
ly present on many cloudy days
and at times when inversion is
present are suitable for a gas at-
tack. Night conditions in times
of fair weather are generally more
favorable for a CW attack than
day conditions. Sunny, hot days
in summer time with little or no
wind are unsuitable and the use
of toxic agent clouds at these
times would be inefficient.

2.2 Sabotage Attack.

2.21 When effectively disseminated
throughout a confined space of
100,000 cubic feet, about one ounce
of GA or about one-half ounce of
GB are sufficient to incapacitate
or kill substantially all of the
people in the area. The most like-
ly method of dissemination would
be by means of an aerosol bomb
type container similar to those
used for insecticides. These bombs
operate with an auxiliary volatile
liquid, which together with the
weight of the container would
make the weight of the dispenser
about five times the weight of the
agent; that is, for 100,000 cubic
feet the dispenser would weigh
about % pound.



TOP ODOnil ' P



11



2.22 In the case of thje Pentagon, which
has 75,000,000 .cubic feet of en-
closed space, 50 lbs of GA or 20 lbs
of GB would have to be dispersed
throughout the ^ building to cause
the above results, assuming no
significant extraction by the air
conditioning system. This would
require 50-10 pound bombs of
about 0.6 gallon capacity for GA.
Fewer bombs or smaller ones in

■

the ration of 24Vfc to 1 would be

needed for GB. i

i

3. Effects Produced and Protective Meas-
ures. I

3.1 GA and GB produce characteristic
physiological effects, jsuch as, contrac-
tion of the pupil of the eye, twitching
eyelids, tightness of the chest, difficulty
in breathing, blurring of vision, twitch-
ing of muscles, headache, nausea, vom-
iting, salivation and diarrhea. In the
case of a lethal dose 1 , the victim loses
muscular power and Coordination. In
addition to intensification of the fore-
going effects, convulsions occur and
there is involuntary defecation and
urination; distressed breathing; pa-
ralysis; unconsciousness; heart slowing,
dilating and eventually stopping due
to heart muscle failure and asphyxia.
In general, death occurs within an hour
after exposure to the 1 lethal concentra-
tion.

3.2 The physiological effects are greatest
when absorbed through the respiratory
system following inhalation of the va-
pors. However, the 'same effects can
be produced by larger doses through
mucous membranes, open wounds, and
even by a small drop oif the liquid touch-
ing the skin. The liquid will penetrate
ordinary clothing, i

3.3 Theoretically, complete protection
against the nerve gases requires not



only a well fitted gas mask but also
special impermeable clothing. How-
ever, except in the immediate vicinity"
of bursts, the concentrations which
probably will be encountered will be
"such that gas masKs wiu proviae aae-
"quate protection for all but a few of the
"personnel in the target area, on the
other hand, at present there is no quick
method of detection of GA and GB for
warning and identification.

3.4 GA and GB are easily decomposed by
any acid and they hydrolyze very rap-
idly in alkaline solutions. Effective de-
contamination can be carried out with
alcohol solutions of sodium and potas-
sium hydroxide, and solutions or pastes
of washing soda, lime bleach, and bak-
ing soda. Even scrubbing with soap
and water is effective to a degree.

3.5 Immediate injection of atropine is ex-
tremely effective in counteracting the
physiological effects of these gases.

4. References. '

Additional information which may be of
assistance to civil defense planning will be
found in the following:

4.1 Presentation to the Secretary of De-
fense's Ad Hoc Committee on CEBAR
27 January 1950. Submitted by Office
of Chief, Chemical Corps.

4.2 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
BW, CW, and RW (Stephenson Com-
mittee) to the Secretary of Defense, 30
June 1950.

4.3 Summary Technical Report of NDRC
Division 9, Volume 1, Parts I & H. and
Division 10, Volume I, Part II.

4.4 Chemical and Toxicologic Data on CW
Agents by E. L. Wardell and C. A. Rou-
iller. Information Branch, Technical
Service Division, Office of the Chief,
Chemical Corps, 25 May 1948.



UNITED STATES NAVY



lie

WARFARE DEFENSE
ASHORE




TECHNICAL PUBLICATION

NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2
REVISED
APRIL 1960



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS

WASHINGTON 2 5, D. C.



TABLE 3-2

Median Lethal and Median Incapacitating Dosages for Selected War Gases



Name and symbol


Median lethal dosage
(ms -min/m3)


Median incapacitat-
ing dosage
(mg-min/m3)


Tabun (GA)


400 for resting men


300 for resting men


Sarin (GB)


100 for resting men


75 for resting men


Soman ff5D\


GB. GA ran Are


GB. GA ran ae


Distilled mustard (HD)


600 to 1,000 by inhalation;
10,000 by skin exposure


200 by eye effect;
2,000 by skin effect


Nitrogen mustard (HN-1)


1,500 by inhalation;
20,000 by skin exposure


200 by eye effect;
9,000 by skin effect


Nitrogen mustard (HN-2)


3,000 by inhalation


Less than HN-1, but
more than HN-3


Nitrogen mustard (HN-3)


1,500 by inhalation;
10,000 by skin exposure
(estimated)


200 by eye effect;
2,500 by skin effect
(estimated)


Mustard (H)


600 to 1,000 by inhalation;
10,000 by skin exposure


200 by eye effect;
2,000 by skin effects


Lewisite


1,200 to 1,500 by inhalation;
100,000 by skin exposure


300 by eye effect;
1,500 by skin effect


Phosgene (CG)


3,200


1,600


Cyanogen Chloride (CK)


11,000


7,000


Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)


Approximately 2,600


Approximately 2,600



The level to which the contamination
must be reduced depends on the CW agent that
is employed and the type of protective gear
that is provided. For example, the Let 50
respiratory dose from GB is 100 mg-min/m^,
while the Let 50 dose through the skin of an
unclothed person is 12,000 mg-min/m^, and
the Let 50 dose through the skin of a person
wearing ordinary clothing is 15,000 mg-
min/nw. Thus, if personnel can wear masks
and still carry out their mission, decontami-
nation need not be as complete as if they did
not wear masks.

TABLE 4-2



RW Contamination



Building surfaces
or

paved, areas


1 hour
Radiation
dose rate
Ir/nr)


Residual


Firehosing or

mm mm mmm m^ ,«fe.4t* Al m m mm Ik « - — mmf

street xlusmng


Asphaltic
concrete


300
1,000
\ nnn


0.07

0.03
01


Portland
cement
concreie


300

1,000
% nnn


0.04

0.02
n nn ft


Tar-and-gravel
roofing


300
1,000
^ nnn


0.03

0.02
n m


Composition
roofing


300
1,000
3,000


0.04
0.03
0.01


Wood
shingle


300
1,000
3,000


0.17
0.10
0.04


Galvanized
corrugated
steel


300
1,000

3,000 |


0.05
0.02
0.006


Smooth painted
surface


300
1,000
3,000


0.04
0.01
0.004



4-50



STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE



STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
June, 1953



IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK I N WORL D WAR II:
SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING

Division II t Effects on the General Econca

Volume 1: Economic Effects - Germany

Part One

SRI Project 669

Prepared for

Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington, D. C.



roved s





William Jo
Industrial



ftt, Chairman
Lanning Research




Weldon B* Gibson, Director
Economics Research Division



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. O. - Price $1.25



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<T5



THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



The Effects
of

Strategic Bombing

on

German Morale



VOLUME I



Morale Division
Dates Of Survey:
March-July, 1945
Date of Publication:
May 1947



A TTACKS OH GERMANY Tablk 1- ~ Ph v 9ioal ^ ccU °f bombing

Killed 305,000

Wounded 780,000

Homes destroyed 1,865,000



P.— |94J

■"mill



ktl
month




CONVENTIONAL KILOTONS/MONTH DROPPED IN WWII BY ALLIES



IN WWII, 2,697,473 TONS
OF BOMBS WERE DROPPED
BY THE USAAF AND RAF
IN OCCUPIED EUROPE



200



50.3% FELL ON GERMANY



100



SOURCE: USSBS, OVERALL REPORT
(EUROPEAN WAR), Charts 1 & 4
30 September 1 945



THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Effects
of

Air Attack

ON

Japanese Urban Economy

SUMMARY REPORT



Urban Areas Division
March 1947



Table 5. — Damage to urban areas



Total built-up area


square miles


'411


Target area


do


'192


Area destroyed


do


lf 178


Total population




21,928,000


Bombs dropped (74 percent incendiary)






tons


121,458


Buildings destroyed




2,094,374


Persons killed




252,769


Persons injured




298,650


Persons rendered homeless




8,324,000


Planned evacuations




2,100,000


1 Operational summary, Twentieth


Airforce. Refers only to 66 cities



which were targets of planned urban area missions.
3 45 percent total built-up area for 66 cities.

The cities of Japan, like those in Germany, presented a spectacle of
enormous destruction. Although the over-all total damage was somewhat
greater in Germany than in Japan the extent of destruction was compar-
able. Only 160,800 tons of bombs were dropped on Japan's home islands as
compared with 1,360,000 tons dropped within Germany's own borders.
One hundred and four thousand tons of bombs were dropped on 66 Jap-
anese cities as compared with 542,554 tons of bombs that were dropped on
61 German cities.

As in Germany, the air attacks against Japanese cities were not the
cause of the enemy's defeat. The defeat of Japan was assured before the
urban attacks were launched. But this defeat, before it could be trans-
lated into the terms of surrender, might have required a costly invasion of
the home islands had not the effect of the air attacks, both precision and
urban, on Japan's industries and people exerted sufficient pressure to bring
about unconditional surrender on 15 August. The city raids contributed
substantially to that pressure by their impact on the social and economic
structure of Japan.

The insufficiency of Japan's war economy was the underlying cause
of her defeat. Before the air attacks against the cities began, war produc-
tion had been steadily declining because of the ever-increasing shortages
of raw materials, skilled labor, and an ill conceived dispersal program
which was initiated too late. The Survey estimated that, even without air
attacks, over-all production, by August 1945, would not have exceeded 60
percent and might have been as low as 50 percent of the 1944 peak. v



THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



Final Report

Covering Air-Raid Protection and
Allied Subjects in

JAPAN



Civilian Defense Division
Dates of Survey:
1 October 1945—1 December 1945
Date of Publication:

February 1947



EXHIBIT A-3.
Total tons of bombs dropped on Japan by
U. S. Army Air Forces — By months

AIR FORCE



Data



1944



June.
July.
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Deo.



1946



Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

June..

July

Aug. (15 days).

Totals. .




28
183
5
159
766
002



1.261
1.884
12 . 788
16.150
25.065
27.497
43 . 422
23.687

153.887



Incendiary



55



68
298
495



435
929
10,023
3.967
18.699
18.172
31 .670
13.655

98 . 466



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CIVIL DEFENCE

RESCUE MANUAL



LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

I9S2



CHAPTER XI. USE OF HEAVY MECHANICAL
PLANT IN RESCUE, DEMOLITION AND
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS



In the last war it was found that at major incidents the use of heavy
mechanical plant was frequently necessary in support of rescue opera-
tions. Such equipment was used to help in the quick removal of debris ;
to lift heavy blocks of brickwork or masonry ; to take the weight of
collapsed floors and girders so that voids could be explored and
casualties extricated ; to haul off twisted steelwork and other debris
and to break up sections of reinforced concrete.

In future all these tasks may be required and heavy clearance may
have to be effected to enable rescue and other Civil Defence vehicles




8 March 1 945 Fjg 2 o 1 ton of TNT equivalent



Using heavy mechanical plant at the Smithfield Market V.2 incident.

97



to approach within measurable distance of their tasks. The problem
of debris will in fact be a major factor in Civil Defence operations.

Heavy mechanical plant may be required for the following purposes :

(a) To assist in the removal of persons injured or trapped. At
this stage mainly heavy plant is needed, particularly mobile
cranes with sufficient length of boom or jib to reach for long
distances over the wreckage of buildings.

(b) To force a passage for Civil Defence vehicles and fire appliances
to enable them to reach areas where major rescue and other
problems exist and require urgent operational action.

(c) To take certain safety measures — e.g., to pull down unsafe
structures.

(d) To clear streets and pavements to help restore communications
and to afford access for the repair of damaged mains and pipes
beneath the streets.

(e) For the final clearance of debris and the, tidying of sites.
This is a long term and not an operational requirement.

Urgent Rescue Operations

During rescue operations in London in the last war the machines
used with great success included heavy 3J-5 ton mobile cranes, mounted
on road wheels, with a 30-40 ft. jib ; medium heavy 2-3 \ ton mobile
cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 26 ft. jib ; heavy crawler
tractor bulldozers ; medium crawler tractor bulldozers ; mechanical
shovels and compressors, three stage, mounted on road wheels.

In the case of a large or multiple incident where access was obstructed
by considerable quantities of scattered debris, a bulldozer or tractor
was first employed in order to clear one or more approaches by which
other equipment and personnel could reach the scene of operations.

Next, all debris of manhandling size was loaded into one-yard skips
and discharged by the crane into lorries, giving increased manoeuvring
space to the Services operating on the site.

Heavy mobile cranes were then brought up to the incident where,
used under the skilled direction of the rescue party Leader, they were
invaluable for removing girders and large blocks of masonry which
obstructed access to casualties or persons trapped. The necessary
chains and wire ropes for these operations formed part of the standard
equipment of the heavy and medium-heavy mobile cranes.

The work was, of course, carried out in close co-operation with the
Rescue Parties who also used various forms of light mechanical equip-
ment, such as jacks and ratchet lifting tackle for work in confined spaces.

Compressors sometimes proved valuable for breaking up large
masonry such as fallen walls, into sections of a size and weight within
the handling and lifting capacity of the cranes. This method was only
used when it was known that there were no casualties under the
masonry.

98



(THIS DOCUMENT 18 THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
g | C R E T . CABINET . Copy No,

CP. 108(57).

Memorandum by the Hone Secretary.

1* I circulate herewith, for the approval or the Cabinet,
the Handbook which the Air Bald Precautions Department have
prepared for ieeue to members of the general public, setting out
the Information which they should have to enable them to provide
such protection in their homes as may be possible.

The issue of this Handbook should be free and distribution
should be made to every householder in Great Britain on a basis
similar to that of the Highway Code. Additional copies would be
obtainable at any time at the price of Id* at all Post Off lees.

8. The Department have been engaged for the best part of
twelve i months in the compilation of the text and the layout of the
book. Assistance has been given by a firm of publicity agente
and, in addition, a wide range of outside people has been consulted.
A number of Ministers have also been good enough to give the benefit
of their advice to the Air Raid Precautions Department. In fact,
every step has been taken that is possible to ensure that the book,
while containing the eesentlal information which the general public
require, is presented in the beet form possible, having regard to
its purport and its. message*

The Treasury have been consulted at every stage and have seen
a draft of this covering note.

8* At the request of the Treasury I wish to put before
my Colleagues the question of the Inclusion of advertisements.
There is space on the cover for two advertisements at least, and
the Treasury inform me they are satisfied that a revenue of



£6,000 net could 1m obtained from these two pages alone.

Care would of course be exercised in the selection of firms
for the purpose; but it Is thought that no objection could be*
taken to the inclusion of advertisements by firms of such standing
as H.M.V. and Bovril, both of whom are, in foot, known to be
willing to pay at the rate mentioned above for these pages.
Alternatively, there is the possibility of using the space for
advertisements by Qovex-nment Departments such as the Post Office
or by the Milk Marketing Board, to be paid for at the market rate

♦

out of their authorised grants for publicity.

4* I am disposed to recommend that, with a view to
reducing the cost Of the Handbook as far as possible, the principle
of inserting advertisements should be approved, but that in the
first place efforts should be made to use the space for
advertisements of this latter kind; but that if the whole space
cannot be disposed of at a fair rate in this way, offers should
be accepted from commercial firms or other bodies of first class
reputation.

It is estimated that the cost of production and
distribution would be between £30,000 and £35,000, reducible by,
say, £5,000 if advertisements are accepted.

5. Owing to the length of time which must be allowed for the
printing of the enormous number of copies required (say 14 millions),
It would, in any case, be impossible for the issue of the book to
take place before July, and for various reasons it might be
desirable to postpone its issue until after the summer holidays.
If my Colleagues approve, I should be glad to have discretion as
to the actual time, I would, of course, give them Information of
the date which I would select.

The very greatest importance is attached to the issue
of this Handbook, not only because of its value in instructing the
public in the simple measures which they can take for their own




vital and important part of our National Defence Schemes, I trust
that my Colleagues will agree with me that the Handbook in its
present form will fulfil the purpose for which it is required*

31st Maroh, 1937.



yd Proof



HOME OFFICE



THE PROTECTION
OF YOUR HOME
AGAINST AIR RAIDS




" In the protection of your home
lies the security of your country "

KEEP THIS BOOK CAREFULLY




Why this book has
been sent to you

In the factory precautions are taken against unexpected accident.
Cinemas and theatres are built so as to guard against the dangers
of fire. The health of the community i$ safeguarded by pre-
cautions against the spread of epidemics. We have a great record
in our country for common-sense, for the kind of forethought
that reduces the ordinary risks of Hfe to a minimum. The house-
holder is now called upon to take precautions against a possibility
we all hope will never arise. It would be folly to know of the
existence of such a possibility, however remote, without acknow-
lodging the need f« preaotion, tgHn*t it.
The Government is taking precautions against air raids and 3 with
the help of Local Authorities everywhere, is organising measures
to reduce the effects as far as possible. But the householder
must play his pan. This book is being sent to you in the con-
fident belief that you will regard it as your duty to read it, to keep
it by you, and to act upon it in any premises for which you ate
responsible ; so that if your home or place of business were ever
in danger of being attacked from the air, you would know what
to do for your own safety and the safety of those who depend
upon you. i

If ever we are exposed to hostile air attack, we must look to the
combination of active defence and civil air raid precautions to
defeat the aims of the enemy. There is a duty on every citizen
to bear his part in these civil precautions, but those who for any
reason cannot take them for themselves need not be worried.
They will not be overlooked.

(Signal)



Pag*l



o




THE PROTECTION
OF YOUR HOME
AGAINST AIR RAIDS



READ THIS BOOK THROUGH

THEN
KEEP IT CAREFULLY



THINGS TO DO NOW



HOW TO CHOOSE A REFUGE-ROOM

Almost any room will serve as a refuge-room if it is soundly
constructed, and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its
windows should be as few and small as possible, preferably
facing a building or blank wall, or a narrow street. If a ground
floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open
ground is chosen, the windows should if possible be specially
protected (see pages 30 and 31). The stronger the walls, floor,
and ceiling are, the better. Brick partition walls are better than
lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling
is better than a wooden one. An
internal passage will form a very
good refuge-room if it can be closed
at both ends.

The best floor for a refuge-room

A cellar or basement is the best
place for a refuge-room if it can be
made reasonably gas-proof and if
there is no likelihood of its becoming
flooded by a neighbouring river that
may burst its banks, or by a burst

water-main. If you have any doubt ^J^S^fS
about the risk of flooding ask for con be made reasonably gas-
advice from your local Council t>™of
Offices.

Alternatively, any room on any floor
below the top floor may be used. Top
floors and attics should be avoided as
they usually do not give sufficient
protection overhead from small in-
cendiary bombs. These small bombs
would probably penetrate the roof but
be stopped by the top floor, though In a house with only two floors

they might burn through to the floor and witho " £ Q ctU ?l> choose *
, / .Jr . j 1 room on the ground floor so tha%

below if not quickly dealt With. Y0U have protection overhead

PageS





IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR



Strengthening the room

If your refiige-room is on the ground floor or in the base-
ment, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an
additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing
this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting
to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting
on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece
of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling
joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above.
How

to support
a ceiling



The illus-
tration
below
shows the
detail of
how to fix
the props




The smaller illustration shows how the
posts are held in position at the top by
two blocks of wood on the ceiling
beam. The posts are forced tight by
two wedges at the foot, driven in
opposite ways. Do not drive these
wedges too violently, otherwise you
may lift the ceiling and damage it. If
the floor of your refuge-room is solid,
such as you might find in a basement,
you will not need a plank across the whole floor, but only
a piece of wood a foot or so long under each prop.

Page ij













■ ■ '






EXTRA PRECAUTIONS



EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST
EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

trenches. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you
can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench
provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting
bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be
given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air
raid wardens will also be able to advise.

sandbags. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your
walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on
a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick.
Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If
you can completely close the window opening with a wall of
sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an
explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window
must still be sealed inside against gas.



t,m , i,i, EE5EE




nviiitj.



L



A basement window protected by boxes of earth

Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for
cement, will do for sandbags. But if they are large, don't fill

Page 30





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NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION




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SLAB THICKNESS (INCHES)



NEUTRON DOSE TRANSMISSION








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S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1 964




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_ ifol 'ef&g&rwte £/*€ie&r



ORNL-TM-3396

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED
FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS

J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson, R, L, French,
F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. St raker

Table 8. Fi»ion-Product Gamma Ray Exposure During the First 60 Seconds
from a Typical TN Weapon at a 100-M Burst Height



Slant Range
(m)



Shock Arrival
(sec)



Percent Before
Shock



Percent After
Shock



100 KT



538
740
1030
1446
2097



0.3678
0.8187
1.822
4.055
11.02



13.8
20.4
36.2
63.1
95.7



86.2
79.6
63.8
36.9
4.3



300 KT



771
1060
1472
206S
2995



0.5488
1.221
2.718
6.049
16.44



13.7
20.5
38.6
69.8
98.8



86.3
79.5
61.4
30.2
1.2



1 MT



1146
1576
2190
3075
4458



0.8187
1.822
4.055
9.024
24.53



11.1
18.3
38.2
75.3
99.8



88.9
81.7
61.8
24.7
0.2



THE EFFECTS OF
THE ATOMIC BOMBS
AT HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI

♦:♦

REPORT OF THE BRITISH
MISSION TO JAPAN



PUBLISHED

FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

LONDON

1946



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Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA. Typical, part below ground, earth-
covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the
right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been
structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to " flashburn."
Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have
caused casualties.




Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard
shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage,
which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas*
nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were
damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from thecentre of damage.





Kill

flip








ij


2 1 cms


The National Archives


ins 1


1


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2




Ref.:


HO 21S/\\b











3rd October, 1 963 . RCSTRICTCD^^




HOME OFFICE
SCIENTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH ^ , 1 6

HBSBARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS
With Speolal Referenoa to the Use of London Tubes as Shelter

by P. H. Pavry

Summary and Conclusions

The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises
many problems, and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken place from
time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were avail-
able - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide
relatively safe shelter or not.

The more recent research here described showed for the first time that
a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure only
about ^ as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground, (in
addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.)

Large-Scale Field Test ( 1 /40) at Suf field, Alberta

(6)

The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. report ^ . The decision of
the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high
explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was
welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E.
used the 100-ton explosion in 1S?6l to test, among other items, the model
length of the London tube, at 1/40th scale, that had already been tested
at Vl17 scale.



Blast Entry from Stations

There was remarkable agreement with the */n7th scale trials:
"maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of yrd the
corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pres-
sures in the stations were about V6th those in the corresponding incident
blast

(6) 1 /W>th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on
the London Underground System. A.W.R.E. Report E^/62.

(Official Use Only.)



100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London
Underground tube at Suf field, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961



Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "1/ 40th Scale Experiment to
Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System" ,
Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.)



200 FT FROM


GROUND ZERO 400


FT


FROM GROUND ZERO


100 PSI


OUTSIDE


20


PSI OUTSIDE


30 PSI


IN TUBES


7.


2 PSI IN TUBES


15 PSI


IN TUBE STATIONS


4.


3 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS




Aldwych Underground tube station as Blitz shelter, 8 October 1940




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Crown Copyright Reserved



AIR MINISTRY

AP 3349



RESTRICTED

The information given in this document
is not to be communicated, either directly
or indirectly, to the Press or to any person
not authorized to receive it.



WO

Code No.



26/GS Trg Publications/2329



PRECAUTIONS
AGAINST

NUCLEAR ATTACK



1957



(Superseding Precautions Against Atomic Attack, 1952 (WO Code No.
8769))



Promulgated by Command of
the Army Council,



Promulgated by Command of
the Air Council,




Telegraph pole burnt on the side facing the flash. Note where

foliage has acted as a shield




Shelter 100 yards from the centre of damage — Nagasaki



Protection against fall-out

101. Except in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear explosion a reasonably
accurate prediction of the area of fall-out can be made in time for a
warning to be issued to units in the areas in which it is likely to fall. Given
a reasonable warning it may be possible to evacuate the area before the
fall-out arrives. In any case simple precautionary measures can greatly
reduce the hazard to life.



102. Exposure to the radio-active radiations from fall-out can be reduced
by taking sheltei and by using simple decontamination procedures until
such time as persons can leave the area. In areas where radio-active contami-
nation is heavy it may be necessary to remain under cover for as long as
48 hours before the radiations will have fallen, by natural decay, to levels
at which it will be safe for persons to move about, either to leave the aiea,
or, in the case of rescue teams from other areas, to enter it.

103. The estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation
to be obtained from buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area is shown
at Table 7



Table 7. Estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation to be
obtained from various buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area



Type of building or shelter



Slit trench with light board or

corrugated iron overhead
Slit trench with 1 ft of earth overhead
Slit trench with 2 ft to 3 ft of earth

overhead
Nissen hut

One storey brick house
Two storey brick house
Three storey brick house

Average two storey house in a built
up area
Basements



INSIDE dose expressed as a
fraction of the OUTSIDE dose



i

vii5 to shs
i

A to its
, At to T in



zhf to sis



dependent upon wall
thickness and shield-
ing afforded by neigh-
bouring houses



dependent upon shield-
ing afforded by
neighbouring houses



DOMESTIC

NUCLEAR
SH ELTERS



Advice on
domestic shelters
providing protection
against

nuclear explosions



A Home Office guide



A



&



r



/





Type la earth -covered doors-over trench shelter
Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch (Home
Defence College, Easingwold, York, 1 980)



HI




Type 2 indoor Morrison shelter



UK Ministry of Home Security, "How to
Put Up Your Morrison 'Table' Shelter/
Fig. 3, 1942:




UK Home Office, "Domestic
Nuclear Shelters: Technical
Guidance," Fig. 80, 1982:




Fallout radiation
is shielded by
dense materials
on and around
shelter



Type 3 outdoor Anderson shelter




Type 4 reinforced concrete shelter (Nevada bomb test)
Fig. 12.54 in Glasstone Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1957




Tl/53



copy No. Id

14 PACES



UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/1

T I /53 mJSSSL^j





I



MINISTRY OF SUPPLY



ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT



REPORT No. Tl/53



DECLASSIFIED FOR PR.'
BY AWE ALDERMASTOfv



TOP SECRET ^

Sf. W B.M ^KOVERrslf-fCt^X. and ir'Suended
only for the perianal information of

hka



and of thote .office n under hirtV whoie duu'u
it »n ecn.^H. ts personally responsible for iu



MM CUMdh and that iu concerns arVdiscloted
to_tl>etfe officers and to them only. >v

document will be kept in a lockeVufe
not in actual use. \



A..W.R.E.

Aldermaston Berks.



May. 1953



3.2 Blast D»ro»p* Outdoor peak overpressure was 51 psi at 500 yds,

25 psi at 665 yds and 1 psi at 1 ,000 yds
3* 2. 1 Anderson S helters 3 psi extended to 2,000 yds

Standard Anderson Shelters, with sandbag covering and "blast
wall construction were located at 460, 510, 600, 920 and 1,130 yards
from ground zero* Mean blast pressures, in pounds/sq. inch, recorded
inside the shelters are shown in the following table.



Distance (yds. )


Presentation


Front


Side


Rear


460


m


NR


NR


510


38


27


40


600


28


21


28


920


16


7


14


1130


8.5


4


5-5



Front presentation implies blast wall facing towards event.
Rear « » •» »• M away from event.

Side " " shelter side on to event.

Shelters at 460, 510 and 600 yards suffered damage including
demolition of blast walls, removal of sandbag covering and some
displacement of the corrugated iron.

At 920 and 1,130 yards the shelters suffered relatively little
damage.

Civil defence authorities consider that there might have been
aome 50^ survival from blast damage of personnel in shelters at
460 yards and some 90 per cent at 600 yards, fatal casualties being_ _
mainly due to seoor ^"^y friA gt effects (e.g. deb ris) and not to oirecl,
eff ects on the person of the blast pressure itself. ~ The front
presentation appears the most hazardous, due to the collapse of the
blast wall into the shelter. At such distances, however, the
survival from the effects' of gamma flash would have been virtually

^ (Mode eMxft oveK /s tnei>e?> tp&frTttffT)

At 920 and 1,130 yards there would have been no casualties from
blast, and incidentally, little risk from the effect of gamma flash.



-5-



UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2

ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR

NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP)

AWRE-Tl/54, 27 Aug. 1954

SECRET -GUARD

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT
(formerly of Ministry of Supply)

SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE
(Monte Bello Islands, Australia— October, 1952)

130 x 10" 7 7x 10 6 13- 5 x 10°
p_ R 3 + R 2 + R

p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet




Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right:
Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 2760 ft.



12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shelters Sandbags failed to provide any

earth-arching protection

At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing
towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of
the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full
protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the
explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more
or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3.

At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were
displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the
effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of
the explosion owing to intervening sandhills.



SECRET-GUARD



29



13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash

13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit
Trenches

13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches
provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the
point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most
important results of the trial.

13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were
placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in
radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.

The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz-
fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance,
with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded
by open and covered trenches.

In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel
but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and
one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand.



Table 13.1



Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench



Type of trench


Rectangular
broadside-on
open


Rectan-
gular

end-on
open


Circular open


Rectangular
broadside-on
covered


Distance (yards) ...


1,300


943


733


1,300


1,300


943


943


733


Surface dose

(Roentgens)


300


3,000


14,000


300


300


3,000


3,000


14,000


Depth below ground
level (inches)
6
12

24 • * •

36

48

60

72


150

75

33-3
23
(20)


1,000
430
150
70
43

(37-5)


584
216
100
61

(46-7)


230
150

60

31-6

20

13-6

(8-6)


214
120

54-5

30

17-7

10-7
7


1,200
545
188
86

48-5
(33-3)


(75)
47-6
• 25
13
7-7

(3-5)


(140)
(56)

(31)
(23)

—



Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.




Trench air raid shelter in Kent hop field 15 Aug 1940




Exercise Desert Rock VI (Nevada, 1955), 6 ft trench at 4,000 yds from GZ




1 HB-8

The house at Main and Elm Streets. Two typical colonial two-story center
haft frame dwellings were placed at 3,500 and 7,500 feet from the bomb
tower. I FC 0,4 —Operation Doorstep— Yucca Hot. Nev., Mar. 17, 1953 J



-




1 HA-1 1

House No. I. from the camera tower from which the dramatic collapse pic-
tures were token. The Post Office truck to the left, although it lost all
windows and suffered body damage, was driven away fater, os was the
car in the rear of the house. Entry to the basement was mode through the
corner at lower center. I FCD A— Operation Doorstep— Yucca Flat, Nev.,
Mar. 17, I953J




X-19

This mannequin can only stay in the position in which he was placed, staring
through the window at coming disaster. A real occupant of this house could
IFCDJl—Operafion Doorstep— Yucca Flat, Nev.,



Mar. 17, 1993.1




LSA-2

3,500 feet from ground zero. The house overhead is totally destroyed, some
of it has fallen into the basement, but the mannequin in the lean-to shelter
is undisturbed. The photo was taken from ground level, looking info the
basement through the gap between the basement wall and the broken floor
timbers. I FCD A — Operation Doorstep — Tucea Flat, Nev., Mar. 17, 1953. J



f"



The National Archives ,

HO 12* /Ul HOME OFFICE ^

SCIENTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH

(Paper at Tripartite Thermal Effects Symposium, Dorking, October 1964)

I&NITION AND FIRE SPREAD IN URBAN AREAS
F0LL0V/IN& A NUCLEAR ATTACK



&. R. Stanbury

INITIAL FIRE INCIDENCE



0.72 mlle8-gB=^


c


>C






height "
/ fireball \

/ 1 MT groundburst \








x^Shie^ding^


Thermal pulse precedes the blast wave



Assuming that buildings on opposite aides of a street which is
receiving heat radiation from a direction perpendicular to its length
are of the same height we take the average depth of a floor to be 10 ft.



Effeot of Shielding: Estimation of the number of exposed floors



Distance

from
explosion

miles


Angle

of
arrival

o

oc


Width of street
(units of 10 ft.)


2


3


4


5


6


7


8


3
4
5


13*
10
8


•5
5
•5


•5
5
•5


1

5
• 5


1
1

5


1.5

1

1


1.5

1.5
1


2

1.5
1



SPREAD OF FIRE

From last war experience of mass fire raids in Germany it was concluded
that the overall spread factor was about 2; i.e. about twice as many buildings
were destroyed by fire as were actually set alight by incendiary bombs

Number of fires started per square mile in the
fire -storm raid on Hamburg, 27th/28th July, 1943

102 tons H.E. h8 tons, 4 lb. magnesium 40 tons, 30 lb. gel.
100 fires 27,000 bombs 3,000 bombs

8,000 on buildings 900 on buildings

1 ,600 fires 800 fires

2,500 fires in 6,000 buildings



However, the important thing to note is that the total number of fires
stsrted in each square mile (2,500) was nearly half that of the total number of
buildings; in other words, almost every other building was set on fire

When the figure of 1 in 2 for the German fire storms is oompared wits the
figures for initial fire incidence of ro 1 in 1 5 to 30 obtained in the Birmingham
and Liverpool studies it can only be oonoluded that a nuclear explosion could not
possibly produce a fire storm.



SECONDARY FIRES FROM BLAST DAMAGE IN LONDON

Fire situation from 1 .499 fly bombs in the built-up
part of the London Region

(Fires from 1 ton TNT VI cruise missiles, 1944)





Number
of fly
bombs


Ply Bombs Caused


No fire


Small
fire


Medium
fire


Serious
fire


Major
fire


Grand Totals


1,499


804


609


75


7


4



Th4 large proportion started no fires at all even in the most heavily built-up areas.

All these fly bombs fell in the summer months of 1 944 which were unusually
dry. In winter in this oountry in residential areas there are many open fires
whiob may provide extra sources of ignition. The domes tio occupancy is a low
fire risk however, and as the proportion of such property in the important City
and West End areas is small this should not introduce any serious error, More-
over, in winter, the high atmospherio humidity and the correspondingly high
moisture oontent of timber would tend to retard or even prevent the growth of fire.

Takata, A.N., Mathematical Modeling of Fire Defenses,
IITRI, March 1970, AD 705 388.




20 40 60 80 100 I20

MINUTES AFTER DETONATION



ADA038738

Secondary F1rts

Secondary fires are those that mult from airblest damage. Their
causes include overturned gas appliances , broken gas lines* and elec-
trical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied
secondary fires resulting from the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and compared their results with data from conventional bomb-
ings, explosive disasters, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Their major con-
clusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overail average fre-
quency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided air-
blast peak overpressure is at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary
ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures.



Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings.



FREQUENCY OF SECONDARY IGNITIONS AS A FUNCTION OF MLDING TYPE


Type of Structure


Frequency of Secondary Ignitions

(for each 1 ,000 square feet of floor area)


Mood


0.019


Brick


0.017


Steel


0.004


Concrete


0.002


MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TYPES OF BUILDING OCCUPANCIES


Type of Occupancy


Mult10ly1ng Factor


Public


0.4


Mercantile


0.5


Residential


0.5


Manufacturing


1.0


Miscellaneous


10.0


MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TIME OF DAY


Time of Day


Multiplying Factor


Night


0.5


Day (other than
mealtimes)


1.0


Mealtimes


2.0



1 • Secondary Ignitions in Nuclear Attack , J. McAuliffe and K. Moll,
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California 94025, SRI
Project 5106 (AO 625173), July 1965.



OFFICE OF THE AIR SURGEON



NP-3041



MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS

The Report of the Joint Commission for
the Investigation of the Effects of the
Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI



By

Ashley W. Oughterson
George V. LeRoy
Averill A. Liebow
E. Cuyler Hammond



Henry L. Barnett
Jack D. Rosenbaum
B. Aubrey Schneider



July 6, 1951

[TIS Issuance Date]

Army Institute of Pathology




UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Technical Information Sorvico, Oak Rid go, Tonnossoo



Thle document contains information affect-
ing the national defense of the United
States within the meaning of the Espionage
Act, 50 U. S. C. ?t and 32. as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its
contents In any manner to an unauthorized
parson is prohibited by law.



RESTRICTED




3



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AD689495 MASS BURNS

National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
1969

Dr. Edward L. Alpen (U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory):
About this question of the spectral dependence of radiant energy, I
think Dr. Haynes may have given you the impression that white light
does the trick. There is later work which tends to refute that. The
work done at Virginia used cut-off filters. The effectiveness of all
energy above a certain wave length or below a certain wave length was
measured. At the upper end the most effective and the least effective
were mixed together and made it appear that infrared was not too good
in producing burns. When you subdivide the spectrum, the most effective
energy in producing a flash burn is the infrared above about 1.2 microns.

The importance of this, and the only reason I make an issue of
it, is that a very important source of flash burn, both in civilian
life and under wartime disaster conditions, is radiant energy burns
from flaming sources. We have done a great deal of research on this
subject for the U. S. Forest Service, because radiant energy burns are
important in forest fires.

Energy in the wave lengths of 0.6 to 0.8 micron is about one-
eighth as destructive as the rest of the spectrum. But long wave
length radiation above one micron is extremely destructive, and the
most effective of all.

49

Dr. Alpen : Anything that shields out

radiation above one micron is extremely effective in preventing burns
to the skin.

50



EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY
ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT

Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46

25 April 1955

by

E.L. Alpen
CP. Butler
S.B. Martin
A.K. Davis

U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
San Francisco 24, California

For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for
production of a standard burn are the following:



filter


"A",


X =
max


0.42/..,


r


= 24.4 + 3.5 per cent,


Q


= 3.20 ± 0.37 cal/cm 2 ;


filter


»B",


^max ~


0.55/;,


r


~ 40.9 + 3.8 per cent,


Q


= 3.25 ± 0.28 cal/cm 2 ;


filter


"C",


X max =


0.65/x,


r


= 56.9 + 2.5 per cent,


Q


= 9.9 ± 2.1 cal/cm 2 ;


filter


"D",


Nnax =


0.85^,


r


= 53.4 + 2.2 per cent,


Q


= 14.0 + 1.1 cal/cm 2 ;


filter


"F" (


X max =


1.7 H,


r


= 17 + 0.60 per cent,


Q =


= 2.50 cal/cm 2 (approx.).



The ranges shown are standard deviations.



The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and
the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0.7 to 1.0 has been
presented.



Fatsia japonica shadow on electric pole, Meiji Bridge




RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO



dc-p-1060 NONSEISMIC REINFORCED- CONCRETE BUILDINGS




4 6 8 K) 20 40 60

BLAST EFFECTS overpressure (p«i>



Radii of
MAE's
in feet


8


700
5, 500
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BANK OF JAPAN BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA




GEIBl BANK CO. BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA

Bank of Japan: USSBS Building 24, 1300 ft from GZ
Geibi Bank Co: USSBS Building 59, 4100 ft from GZ
(Table 5 of USSBS report 92 Hiroshima, v2.)



In both, survivors extinguished fire with water buckets.
(Ref: Panel 26 of the "DCPA Attack Environment Manual", Chapter 3.)



Hiroshima




I if.





Commercial Museum (300 meters) before and after



DC- P- 1060



UNSHIELDED PERSONS




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THERMAL EXPOSURE (col/cm 2 )



80 100



Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1



Hellbrann^/. Hamburg



/ INTENSE

/ FIRESTORMS

/
I

Darmstadt



NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
^ (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI)



Aamori



• Barmen *
Freiberg »
Hiroshima • Fukui \

Solingen . Frtadrickshafen I
Aachen . Ulm ' T&yama ;Chosi

Fukuyama

I >



Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered
by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood
Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading
Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy
Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.

1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) =
energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water
- 252 calories

Severe firestorms require
600 BTU/sq. mile/second

FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES



100



200



300



400



500



600



700



800



AVERAGE Fl RE SEVERITY (Millions of 8TU per sq. mile per second)

T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire
Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction, Proceedings of the Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation;
October, 1967.



100



REALISTIC CITY HUMIDITY
(UNLIKE NEVADA DESERT)



CVJ

i

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o




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100 KT
WEAPON YIELD

"technical OBJECTIVE AW-7, critical radiant exposures for persistent

IGNITION", JULY I960, J. BRACCIAVENTI & F DEBOLO AD-249476; DASA-1194



UCRL-TR-231593



Thermal radiation
from nuclear
detonations in



lawrence ur b an environments

LIVERM ORE



NATIONAL
LABORATORY



Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within
buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded
estimates, Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be
greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].

We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a
'radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban
environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction



Jun6 7, 2007 of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.



Thermal radiation shadowing
in modern high-rise cities




RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Durham, North Carolina

Final Report R-85-l

CRASH CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM STUDY
by

AD0403071 \? :

April 30, 1963

Prepared for

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- D-2 -

Feasibility

In the typical household, some materials vlLl generally be available for

covering windows against thermal radiation* One half roll of aluminum foil would

2

cover about 25 ft and would provide very effective covering for 1 to 2 windows
(those most likely to face the blast)* Sufficient quantities of either light
colored paint, Bon Ami, or whiting would be available In most households to
cover windows* Aluminum screens attenuate from 30 - 50% of the thermal radiation
and hence screens should be closed or installed*

2

Hie amount of water per square foot required to dissipate 25 cal/cm of

thermal radiation can quickly be calculated from the heat of vaporization of

water (580 cal/gm)* Allowing 90% losses due to absorption or spillage, one

2

gallon of water Is sufficient to wet 10 ft of material so that It can withstand
2

25 cal/cm of direct thermal radiation (i*c* , the radiation Is normal to the
material surface at all points)* Since the average dally water consumption per
service (Reference 3) Is about 700 gallons, It Is apparent that the wetting of
Interior flammables (piled up curtains , furniture, etc*) Is feasible In most
cases when used In conjunction with the other measures*

3* Statistical Abstracts of the United States * Washington* U* S*
Government Printing Office* 1962*



Message from the Home Secretary
and the Secretary of State for Scotland



For over 30 years our country, with our allies, has sought
to avoid war by deterring potential aggressors. Some
disagree as to the means we should use. But whatever view
we take, we should surely all recognise the need - and
indeed the duty - to protect our civil population if an
attack were to be made upon us ; and therefore to prepare
accordingly.

The Government is determined that United
Kingdom civil defence shall go ahead. The function of
civil defence is not to encourage war, or to put an accept-
able face on it. It is to adapt ourselves to the reality that
we at present must live with, and to prepare ourselves so
that we could alleviate the suffering which war would
cause if it came.

Even the strongest supporter of unilateral disarma-
ment can consistently give equal support to civil defence,
since its purpose and effect are essentially humane.




Why bother with civil defence?

Why bother with wearing a seat belt in a car? Because a
seat belt is reckoned to lessen the chance of serious injury
in a crash. The same applies to civil defence in peacetime.

War would be horrific. Everyone knows the kind of
devastation and suffering it could cause. But while war is
a possibility - however slight - it is right to take measures
to help the victims of an attack, whether nuclear or
'conventional 5 .

But isn't it a waste of money in these days of
nuclear weapons and the dreadful prospects
of destruction?

No. It is money well spent if it shows people how they
can safeguard themselves and their families.

But surely there is no real protection
against a nuclear attack?

Millions of lives could be saved, by safeguards against
radiation especially. But civil defence is not just protection
against a nuclear attack. It is protection against any sort of
attack. NATO experts reckon that any war involving the
UK is likely at least to start with non-nuclear weapons.
Indeed, while no war is likely so long as we maintain a
credible deterrent, the likelihood of a nuclear war is less
than that of a 'conventional' one.

But doesn't civil defence get people more
war-minded, thus increasing the risk of
conflict?

That is like saying people who wear seat belts are expect-
ing to have more crashes than those who do not. Taking
civil defence seriously means seeking to save lives in the
catastrophe of an attack on our country.



To Sum Up

The case for civil defence stands regardless of whether a
nuclear deterrent is necessary or not. Radioactive fallout is
no respecter of neutrality. Even if the UK were not itself
at war, we would be as powerless to prevent fallout from
a nuclear explosion crossing the sea as was King Canute
to stop the tide. This is why countries with a long
tradition of neutrality (such as Switzerland and Sweden)
are foremost in their civil defence precautions.



Civil defence is common sense



Further information:



Nuclear Weapons
ISBN on 34055 X



HMSO £3.50 (net)



Protect and Survive
ISBNo 11 3407289



HMSO sop (net)



Domestic Nuclear Shelters
ISBN on 3407378



HMSO 5op (net)



Domestic Nuclear Shelters -
Technical Guidance
ISBN 1 1 34073786



HMSO £5.50 (net)



Proceedings of the Symposium
held at Washington, D. C.
April 19-23, 1965 by the
Subcommittee on Protective Structures,
Advisory Committee on Civil Defense,
National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council



Protective
Structures

for

CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS

1966



THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION
AFFORDED BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL

BRITISH HOUSE

Daniel T. Jones
Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London



Protective Factors in a Sample
of British Houses (Windows Blocked)



Protective




Factor




< 26


36%


26-39


28%


40-100


29%


> 100


7%



1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on
the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used.

2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand-
bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags
were used.

3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags
along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along
the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used.



KITCHEN



"A very much improved protection could be
constructing a shelter core. This mesas a
walled shelter built preferably inside the
itself, in which to spend the first critical
radiation from fallout would be most dangerous



by
thick-



when the



The full-scale experiments were carried out at the
Civil Defense School at Falfield Park. < 2 )

In the staircase construction, the shelter con-
sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags
being placed on treads above and at the sides.

A 93 curies cobalt- 60 source was used.




gzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz



£2



SITTMG ROOM




Zzzaa



9 in. brick walls




contribution


Protective


The windows and doors were not blocked


r/hr/c/ft 2


Factor




Position


Ground


Roof




House only


£2


15.0


8.4


21


Lean-to


£2


10.4


2.4


39


Staircase cupboard:










Stairs only sandbagged


N2


29.2


5.3


14


Stairs and outer wall sandbagged


N2


16.4


4.6


24


Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall










and corridor partition












N2


6.8


1.8


47



sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 in. x
9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand.



1. Civil Defence Handbook Mo. 10, HMSO, 1963.

2. Perrymaa, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117.













Lean-to shelter






85 polythene
sandbags


partition






wall






between






sitting and




two doors, VC^^


dining rooms




6 ft 6 in. x \S^s






2 ft 8 in. Vt_S






eoAV^S



floor area 21 sq ft.



BLAST AND OTHER THREATS



Harold Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California



Chemical High-Explosive Weapons

As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles
carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable
of extensive damage only when delivered in large
numbers and with high accuracy.

Biological Warfare

Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce;
their effective dissemination over hostile territories
remains the chief deterrent to their effective employ-
ment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can
be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large
area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of
fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at
modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in
virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are
quite perishable in normal open-air environments.
Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can
be quite effective against biological agents, there is
less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a
wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance
of limited employment on population concentrations
—perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with
adequate filtering could insure rather complete
protection to those inside.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are
relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly
insurmountable logistics problems on delivery.
Although chemical agents produce casualties more
rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver
seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale
deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does
not hold promise of the development of significantly
more toxic chemicals for future use.

Radiological Weapons

The advantages of such modifications are much
less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by
missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is
very important. If the total payload is not to be in-
creased, then the inclusion of inert material to be
activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the
explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear
explosives, then more fission-fragment activity can
be created, and it is the net difference in activity
that must be balanced against the loss of explosive
yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most
efficient generator of activity, and greater total
doses are not achieved by injecting special inert
materials to be activated.

Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident
Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation
PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support
Agency Field Command, June 1960.



The Neutron Bomb

The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliber-
ate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neu-
trons, would necessarily be limited to rather small
yields— yields at which the neutron absorption in air
does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast
and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small
yields against large -area targets again runs into the
delivery problems faced by chemical agents and ex-
plosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a
less stringent problem for delivery systems in most
applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy
desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and
to create little local fallout but still kill the populace,
it would be necessary to use large numbers of care-
fully placed neutron-producing weapons burst high
enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low
enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, how-
ever, adequate radiation shielding for the people
would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the
attack to be futile.

The thermal radiation from a surface burst is
expected to be less than half of that from an air
burst, both because the radiating fireball surface
is truncated and because the hot interior is partially
quenched by the megatons of injected crater mate-
rial.

SUPERSEISMIC GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT 5 -FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : ~340 AP S /C L ± 30 per
cent. Here acceleration is measured in g ! s and over-
pressure (AP S ) in pounds per square inch. An em-
pirical refinement requires Cl to be defined as the
seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but
as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil.

OUTRUNNING GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT-10-FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : a ym ~ 2 x 10 5 /C L r 2
+ factor 4 or -factor 2. Acceleration is measured in
g's, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r =
R/wl/3 kft/(mt)l/3.

Data taken on a low air-burst shot in Nevada indicate
an exponential decay of maximum displacement with
depth. For the particular case of a burst of ~~ 40 kt
at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep
as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry
lake bed, which led to the following approximate
decay law, according to Perret.

6 = 6 Q exp (-0.017D),

where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace-
ment induced at depth D, 6q is the maximum dis-
placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet.



MODEL ANALYSIS

Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIE S
Suffield Experimental Station
Canadian Defense Research Board
Ralston, Alberta, Canada

Nuclear- Weapon Tests

In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effec-
tively a "nominal" weapon, at Monte Bello, off north-
west Australia. To the blast loading from this
weapon we exposed a number of reinforced- concrete
cubicle structures that had been designed for the
dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made
the best analysis of response we were competent to
make at that time. Our estimates of effects were
really a dismal failure. The structures were placed
at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we ex-
pected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with
some petaling of the front face, and extensively
cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the
cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had
occurred along both diagonals, and the four tri-
angular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi
level, where we had three cubicles, each with a
different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we ob-
served only light cracking in the front face of that
cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.). The other
two structures were apparently undamaged, as was
the single structure at the 6-psi level.

In 1957, the first proposals were made for
the construction of the underground car park in
Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was inter-
ested in this project since, in an emergency, the
structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently
a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons
Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a
structure that would be resistant to a blast loading
of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model
scale.

Using the various load- deformation curves
obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the
response of the structure to blast loading. Of par-
ticular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons
of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta.




34 p.s.i.

Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles.



A total of seven more models was made; six
were shipped to Canada and placed with the top
surface of the roof flush with the ground and at
positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60,
50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model
was kept in England for static testing at about the
time of firing. The results were not as expected.
In the field, the four models farthest from the charge
were apparantly undamaged; we could see no crack-
ing with the eye, nor did soaking the models with
water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The
model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the
roof panels and beams, and one of the columns
showed slight spalling at the head. This model had
been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi.



Davies, I. LI., Effects of Blast on Reinforced Concrete Slab3,
and the Relationship with Static Loading Characteristics (U).
United Kingdom, Operation BUFFALO - Target Rcsponcc Tests,
AWRE Report T U6/57 ( CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957.

Wood, A, J., The Effect of Earth Covers on the Resistance of
Trench Shelter Roofs (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFF AID-
Target Response Target Response Tests, AWRE Report T 47/57
(CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957.

O f Brien, T. P., Rowe, R. D. , and Hance, R. J., Tho Effect of
Atomic Blast on Wall Panels (U). United Kingdom, IWE-36
( CONFIDENTIAL report), April 1955-

Walley, F. , Operation TDTEM Group 13 Report: Civil Defense
Structures (U)I United Kingdom, JVE-111 ( CONFIDENTIAL report),
May 1957.

Davies, I. LI., and Thumpston, N. S., The Resistance of Civil
Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast (U). United Kingdom, IVE 35
(UNCLASSIFIED report), March 1955.

Davies, I. LI., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to
Atomic Blast: IV Final Report on Experiments vith Reinforced
Models of Heavily Protective Citadel Shelter Type CD12 (U).
United Kingdom, JVE-101 (CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1950.

Davies, I. LI., Performance Test on Model Oarage - Shelter Roof
System. SES 100 Ton TNT Trial-Suf field, Alberta, August 1961
(U). United Kingdom, AWRE Report No. E 2/63 (FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY), March 1963.

Worsfold, W, E. , Effects of Shielding a Building from Atomic
Blast ( U) . United Kingdom, JWE-16U (CONFIDENTIAL report),
Sugust 1958.

Trimer, A., and Maskell, E. G. B., Operation BUFFALO Target
Response Tests - Structures Group Report: The Effect on
Field Defenses (U). United Kingdom, FWE-2^1 (CONFIDENTIAL
report), December 1959*

United Kingdom, The Effects of Atomic Weapons on Structures
and Military Equipment (U). FWE-tt (SECRET report), July 195**.



Foreword

If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat
of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distri-
buted to every household as part of a public information
campaign which would include announcements on tele-
vision and radio and in the press. The booklet has been
designed for free and general distribution in that event.
It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to
know what they would be advised to do at such a time.

May 1980



Protect and Survive
ISBN o 1 1 3407289



If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not
know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be.

If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the
country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the
towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will
bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United
Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the
weapons and the resultant fall-out.

The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can
be reduced if you do as this booklet describes.





If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some
time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the
weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or
holes.

If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover
as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin
and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter.







HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE
Manual of Basic Training

VOLUME II

BASIC METHODS
OF PROTECTION AGAINST
HIGH EXPLOSIVE MISSILES



PAMPHLET No S



LONDON-. HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONER Y OFFICE

1949



SIXPENCE NET



Domestic Shelters (for household use)

(a) anderson shelter. This shelter was designed for erection out-
side the house. It consisted of 14 gauge corrugated steel sheets, steel
angles, ties and channel irons. It was normally sunk about 3 ft. into the
ground and covered over with earth to a minimum depth of 1 5 in., which,
with the 14 gauge corrugated sheet gives the equivalent of 18 in. of earth.

The standard shelter was 6 ft. 6 in. by 4 ft. 6 in. by 6 ft. high. It was
designed to shelter six persons, but was capable of being lengthened to
accommodate eight, ten or twelve persons; or of being shortened to
accommodate four persons.

Unless the entrance was screened (within 1 5 ft.) by a building or existing
wall, a screen wall had to be provided. Trouble was sometimes exper-
ienced due to flooding by subsoil water in which case the below ground
portion was tanked by a lining of cement concrete.

The shelter was, on occasions, erected on the surface, which involved
casing it in cement concrete. The result was efficient but expensive.

(b) morrison shelter. This shelter was designed for use in a house
and its chief function was to protect the occupants from being crushed by
the collapse of the building. Protection against blast and fragments was
provided by the walls of the house, which were sometimes specially
thickened for this purpose.

It consisted of a steel table measuring 6 ft. 4 in. long by $ ft. toj in.
wide. It provided sleeping accommodation for two adults and a child, or
a considerable number of small children in a sitting position, when used
as a school classroom shelter.

(t) STRUTTED REFUGE ROOM — STRUTTED BASEMENT. The object of

this form of shelter was the same as the Morrison shelter, i.e. to provide
strutting to prevent the collapse of the room and to use the walls as pro-
tection against blast and fragments. Strutting was either steel or wood
and the design and strength suited to the weight to be supported.

(d) SMALL TRENCH OR SMALL SURFACE SHELTER IN GARDEN.

This type of shelter needs no special comment.

*3



DNA EM-1
PART I



DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY EFFECTS MANUAL NUMBER 1



CAPABILITIES
OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS



1 JULY 1972




HEADQUARTERS
Defense Nuclear Agency
Washington, D.C. 20305



DNA EM-1
PART I
CHANGE 2
1 AUGUST 1981



DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY EFFECTS MANUAL NUMBER 1



CAPABILITIES
OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PART I
PHENOMENOLOGY



HEADQUARTERS
Defense Nuclear Agency
Washington, D.C. 20305



EDITOR
PHIUP J. OOIAN

SRI INTERNATIONAL



FOREWORD



This edition of the Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons represents the continuing efforts by the Defense
Nuclear Agency to correlate and make available nuclear weapons effects information obtained from nuclear
weapons testing, small-scale experiments, laboratory effort and theoretical analysis. This document presents
the phenomena and effects of a nuclear detonation and relates weapons effects manifestations in terms of
damage to targets of military interest. It provides the source material and references needed for the
preparation of operational and employment manuals by the Military Services.

The Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons is not intended to be used as an employment or design manual by
itself, since more complete descriptions of pheno me no logical details should be obtained from the noted
references. Every effort has been made to include the most current reliable data available on 31 December
1971 in order to assist the Armed Forces in meeting their particular requirements for operational and target
analysis purposes*

Comments concerning this manual axe invited awl should be addressed:



Director

Defense Nuclear Agency
ATTN: STAP
Washington, D, C. 20305




C. H, DUNN
Lt General, USA
Director



•v



Shielding is most effective when the ob-
stacle is between the target and ground zero.

I Obstacles that are considered in the as-
seJSnrcnt of the effects of shielding from air
blast are local obstacles, such as ravines, con-
structed slots, or revetments (the effects of laige
terrain features on blast waves are discussed in
paragraphs 2-38 through 2-41 of Chapter 2). The
importance of shielding is well documented.
Comparisons of damage between shielded and
unshielded vehicles exposed to blast from both
nuclear and chemical explosions are available.
The effectiveness of an obstacle in shielding a
target generally results as much from its capa-
bility to reduce the target movement as from its
ability to modify the blast environment. Figure
14-8 illustrates this point. When the obstacle is
between the blast wave and the target most of
the impulse or translations! force that induces
motion (drag loading) does not act on the target.
When the obstacle is "behind'* the target, the
translational force initially applied to the target
is the same as it would have been without an
obstacle, but the obstacle not only can modify
later translations! forces (as a result of shock
wave reflection), but it can restrict movement,
the major cause of damage. The overpressure
effects of crushing and fracturing still occur in
both cases, and these effects provide lower limits
for damage ground distances.



Most damage resulting from low yield
weapons is caused by overpressure impulse
rather than translation, even for unshielded tar-
gets, and, since overpressure impulse is not alter-
ed drastically by shielding, the effects of shield-
ing are relatively minor for such weapons. How-
ever, most damage caused to non-shielded
targets by higher yield weapons results from the
translational effects of dynamic pressure. Since
shielding can reduce translational effects sub-
stantially, it can be quite effective as a protec-
tion from large yield weapons. Damage to
shielded targets results largely from overpressure
effects, for which damage distances scale as the
cube root of the yield (W 1/3 ), while damage to
unshielded targets results largely from total im-
pulse effects (including those of dynamic pres-
sure), for which damage distances generally scale
as W° A . The effects of shielding are illustrated
in Figure 14-9, in which damage distances for
shielded targets have been scaled as W l/3 , and
those for unshielded targets by W° 4 .



gl^



14-5 Effects of Ground Surface
Conditions ^

Ground surface conditions affect dam-
age in two ways: by modification of the blast
parameters; and by modification of target re-
sponse.



Trom lotionol



Embankment



(a) No translation because Translational
Ferca is not opplisd




(b) No or littla translation because
restricts



Figure 14-8.



The Effect of Shielding



14-12



A parameter that is useful for calculating ther-
mal response of materials is the characteristic
thermal response time r , given by the equation



r o = P c p L2 / k sec >



where k is thermal conductivity (cal-sec* 1
cm'^C 1 ), pC p is heat capacity per unit volume
(p = density in g-cm" 3 and C s specific heat at
constant pressure in cal-g* 1 C l ), and L is the
thickness, in centimeters, of the layer of
material.

The quantity



a This equation is useful, but it is -by no means exact. The
ified heat-flow analysis from which this equation is derived
neglects the effects of radiation and convection heat losses from
the surfaces of the exposed sample. It also assumes an isotropic
medium, i.e.. a medium whose structure and properties in the
neighborhood of any point are the same relative to all directions
through the point. It also neglects the changes in thermal prop-
erties that occur as the exposed material heats, volatifees, chars,
and bursts into flame.



The heat absorbed by the wood before it begins
to scorch is equal to the product of the incident
radiant energy. Q, and the absorption coeffi-
cient, A.



is called thermal diffusivity (cm 2 /sec). Use of
this quantity simplies the previous equation to



9-16



Oi



sec.



For any particular material exposed
to a rectangular pulse of length r, the previous
equation can be transformed to give a character-
istic thickness

6 = \/ckt cm.

for which the characteristic time is equal to the
pulse duration. If a thick slab of this material is
exposed to a pulse of length r. the temperature
rise at the surface is the same as would be pro-
duced by uniformly distributing the absorbed
thermal energy in a slab of thickness 6. and the
peak temperature rise at depth 6 in the thick
slab is about half as great as the peak tempera-
tmejjse at the surface.

For example, consider a block of red
pine that is exposed to 1 5 cal/cm 2 from a rec-
tangular pulse of 3 seconds duration. From
Table 9-1.



6 = y/ocr = V(24 x 10 3 )(3) = 0.085 cm.

9-17



where AT is the peak lemperature rise at the
surface The parameters that define the thermal
pulse may be separated from those that define
the material properties, and

For a fixed rectangular pulse. Q!\'T\s a con-
stant, and the equation may be written



A7*. = (A* »



( V^)



Sustained ignition only occurs
when higher radiant exposures raise the tempera-
ture throughout the thickness of the cellulose to
a level that is sufficiently high to sustain the
flow of combustible gases from breakdown of
the fuel. It is difficult to supply sufficient
energy with short pulses, since a large amount of
the energy that is deposited is carried away by
the rapid ablation of the thin surface layer. This
transient flaming phenomenon is typical of the
response of sound wooden boards to a thermal
pulse.

9-19



Table 9-1.



Thermal Properties of Materials'



Materials



Density, p
(gm/cra 3 )



Specific



Heat, C



(cal/gm * % C) (cal/sec • cm • *C)



Conductivity, k



Diffusivity, ct
(cm 2 /sec)



insulating Materials



Air


OiA v irr*

3P.«tO A JU


OA


0.55 x


KT 4


V.£«;








7Ci


4.0


X




AO

HV*


x 10"*


001M




04


1.2


X


10" 4


25


x 10" 4

-A IV


flrtr^ /rnmtnnn r»st\
E>1 Hit \LUIilJJIUII IW/


1 8


7


Io.


X


10" 4

1 V


18


x 10* 4

A IV


Celluloid


I 4






X


io- 4


10


x IO -4


fVittAn cat**n arppn

VUHUll, gfCCIJ


V, /V


35


1 c


X


IO" 4


2 5


x IO* 4

A J V


Fir Dottolas-
















sorinc growth


0.29


0.4


2.


X


10" 4


17.


x IO" 4


summer growth


1.00


0.4


5.


X


io- 4


12.


x IO" 4


Fir, white


0.45


0.4




X


IO" 4


14.


x 10" 4


Glass window


2 1


0.2


10


X


IO" 4


43


x 10" 4


Granite


2.5


0.19


OO.


v
A


ict 4


140.


x 10* 4


Leather sole


1.0


0.36


3 R


v
A


10" 4


11.


x 10" 4


Maho&anv


0.53


0.36




A


10" 4


16.


x 10" 4


Ma nle

l*Jtl L/l V


0.72


0.4


4.5


X


io- 4


16.


x 10" 4


Oak


0.82


0.4


5.0


X


io- 4


15.


x IO" 4


Pine* white


0.54


0.33


3.6


X


io- 4


18.


x 10"*


Pinp rpd


51


04


5.


X


IO" 4


24


x IO" 4


IxUUUClf 114 J U


1 7


5


3.6


X


to* 4


60


x 10" 4






4


4.1


X


IO" 4


16


x IO* 4


Metals (100°C)
















Aluminum


2.7


0.22


0.49






1.0




Cadmium


8.65


0.057


0.20






0.45




Copper


8.92


0.094


0.92






1.1




Gold


19.3


0.031


0.75






1.2




Lead


11.34


0.031


0.081




0.23




Magnesium


1.74


0.25


0.38






0.87




Platinum


21.45


0.027


0.17






0.29




Silver


10.5


0.056


0.96






1.6




Steel, mild


7.8


0.11


0.107




1.2




Tin


6.55


0.056


0.14






0.38





Miscellaneous Materials

Ice (0*C)
Water

Skin (porcine, dermis, dead)
Skin (human, living, averaged

for upper 0.1 cm)
Polyethylene (black)



0.92


0.492


54.


x IO" 4


120.


x IO" 4


1.00


1.00


14.


x IO" 4


14.


x IO" 4


1.06


0.77


9.


x IO" 4


11.


x 10" 4


1.06


0.75


8.


x io* 4


30.


x 10" 4


0.92


0.55


8.


x icr*


17.


x tar 4



9-18



If the pulse is of long duration, the igni-
tion threshold rises because the exposed material
can dissipate an appreciable fraction of the
energy while it is being received. For very long
rectangular pulses an irradiance of about 0.5 cal *

cm* 2 sec* 1 is required to ignite the cellulose.
Heat supplied to the material at a slow rate is
just sufficient to offset radiative and convective
heat losses, while maintaining the cellulose at
the ignition temperature of about 300°C.

9-19

Most thick, dense materials that ordinar-
ily are considered inflammable do not ignite to
persistent flaming ignition when exposed to
transient thermal radiation pulses. Wood, in the
form of siding or beams, may flame during the
exposure but the flame is extinguished when the
exposure ceases.

■

9-25



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
MARINE CORPS FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL



FM 101-31-1
FMFM 11-4



STAFF OFFICERS' FIELD MANUAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

FEBRUARY 1968



650 rad total dose
contour at H+4
for 100-KT weapon








dU Km


9


«n J



650 rad total dose
contour at H+4
for 10-KT weapon



Initial
effects
circles



i




3^km



3



13 knot steady wind



1% km



650 rad total dose
contour at H+4
for 1-KT weapon



Scale 1:250,000



Figure 4-6. Comparison of initial effects and residual effects from 100-, 10-,

and 1-kiloton surface bursts.



EFFECT


RISK LEVEL


VULNERABILITY CATEGORY


UNWARNED EXPOSED WARNED EXPOSED


T
H
E
R
M
A
L


Negligible


1° burn
2.5 pe
kilotons


s to t
rcent
0.01


tare
0.1


skin
1


10


100


1000


1° burns
2.5 per

W


unde
cent

1


r sui
10


nmer
100


uniform
1000


cal/cm 2


0.85


1.0


1.15


1.3


1.5


1.75


Q


3.6


4.5


6.3


8.8


Moderate


1° burns
5 perce
kilotons


to b
nt

0.01


are s
0.1


kin
1


10


100


1000


1° burns
5 per
W


unde
cent
1


r sui
10


nmer
100


uniform
1000


cal/cm 2


95


1.1


1.3


1.5


1.75


2.0


Q


4


5.2


7.2


10


Emergency


2° burn
5 perc
kilotons


s to 1

ent

0.01


bare
0.1


skin
1


10


100


1000


2° burns
5 perc

W


unde
ent

1


r sui
10


nmer
100


uniform
1000


cal/cm 2


1.5


1.7


1.9


2.2


2.9


4


Q


4.7


6.1


8.8


12.5



Figure 6-1. Troop safety criteria.



FM 101-31-3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL



STAFF OFFICERS FIELD MANUAL

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT




HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FEBRUARY 1963



ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS

on the surface

SEVERE DAMAGE RADII-METERS









YirlA

I tc LU


_KT






Materiel classification


ALFA/
5


BRA VO/
1


DELTA/
5


ECHO/
10


GOLF/
50


HOTEL/
100


Tunnels and mines
Heavy masonry or concrete
dams and bridges


50


50


125


175


225


300


Tanks and artillery
Locomotives
Supply depots
Engineer earthmoving

equip
Field fortifications


75


100


175


250


450


600


Engineer truck-mounted
equip

Earth-covered surface shelters
Blast-resistant reinforced
concrete bldgs


100


100


200


250


400


525


Military vehicles
Railroad cars
Communications equip
Truss and floating bridges
Monumental-type multistory

wall -bearing bldgs
Heavy steel frame industrial

bldgs

Multistory, reinforced concrete
frame bldgs


150


200


375


500


950


1,250


Oil storage tanks

Multistory, reinforced concrete

bldgs (small window area)
Multistory, steel frame office

bldgs

Light steel frame industrial
bldgs


250


300


475


650


1,125


1,425


Multistory, wall-bearing bldgs

(apt house type)
Parked combat aircraft


375


450


800


1,000


1,700


2,125


Wood frame bldgs


375


650


1,050


1,325


2,275


2,875 |



Figure 12. L






FIRE FIGHTING

FOR 1 *™
IOUSEHOLDERS








Folded newspapers may not take
lire, but loosely crumpled ones will.
The* answer? Get rid of trash.

A wet mop or broom will snuff
out small fires. So will a burlap
bag or a small rug soaked in water.



Buckets of water and sand are
essential.

Water Is an effective fire fight-
ing agent because it smothers and
cools at the same time.



A mended Reprint
June, 1940

Crown Copyright Reserved

Air Raid Precautions

HANDBOOK No. 9

(15/ edition)

INCENDIARY BOMBS
AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS

Issued by the
Ministry of Home Security




LONDON

PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE



3




sheet



Plug.

magnesium
alloy




Fig. i — Typical
Kilo Magnesium
Incendiary Bomb.



JSafefypin
-Fuse,

magnesium
alloy

Fig. 2— Typical Kilo
Magnesium Incendiary Bomb.
Sectional Drawing.




Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb 15 Seconds After Ignition.




45 Seconds




Fire Controlled by Water



Clothing on fire.

Never allow a person whose clothes are on fire to
remain standing for a moment. Fatalities nearly always
arise from shock of burning about the face and head.
If the person starts to run, trip him up at once. Roll
him on the floor or in a coat or blanket if you have one
handy. If your own clothes catch fire, clap your hand
over your mouth, and lie down and roll.



FIRE-BOMBS rained on London They did not all fall on roads




THE LUFTWAFFE SOUGHT A KNOCK-OUT BLOW. The first impact of the attack
fell on the docks. The great day raid of 7th September, 1940, which was continued through-
out the night and renewed on many nights after, left miles of fires blazing along either
bank of the Thames. This is St. Katherine's Dock on the night of nth September.



Restricted



For Official Use




Civil Defence



TRAINING PAMPHLET NO. 2
(3rd Edition)



OBJECTS DROPPED
FROM THE AIR




Issued by the Ministry of Home Security



Crown Copyright Reserved



LONDON

HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1944



Copies will be sold only on written application by a Clerk to a local
authority, a Chief Constable, a principal of a public utility company, or by
County Secretaries of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, British Red Cross
Society, and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association to H.M. STATIONERY
OFFICE at any of the following addresses: York House, Kings way, London,
W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh; 39-41 King Street, Manchester 2;
I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 80 Chichester Street, Belfast.




Price 6d. net



INCENDIARY
UNIT



FUZE t
BODYi



T



DELAYED
ACTION
EXPLOSIVE
UNIT



I



diameter



20.7" long



_IN FLAMMABLE
ALLOY CASE

MAIN

INCENDIARY
PILLING



♦CAP (PRIMER)
WHICH FIRES

MAIN INCENDIARY

FILLING.

DETONATOR

^0 F a 6 dNO.A ft y FILLING
AND TRA IN LEADING TO



TIME fuze;

WHICH FIRES

^DETONATOR
WHICH IN TURN FIRES

MAIN

EXPLOSIVE

:harge



STEEL EXPLOSIVE
CONTAINER



NOSE
COVER



Figure 12A



—German Incendiary Bomb with Explosive Nose



MASS BURNS



Proceedings of a Workshop
13 - 14 March 1968



Accession Number : AD0689495



Sponsored
by

The Committee on Fire Research
Division of Engineering
National Research Council

and the

Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army



Published
by

National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
1969



Abridged S0ME principles of protection against burns

FROM FLAME AND INCENDIARY AGENTS



Janice A. Mendelson, M. D. , M. M. Sc., (LTC, MC, U. S. Army)

Chief, Biomedical Department
Biophysics Laboratory
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

Flame agents are special blends of petroleum products, usually in
thickened form, that ignite easily and can be projected to a target.
Methods for the throwing of flame were devised by the Greeks in 429 B.C.
(Siege of Plataea) when destructive flammable mixtures of pitch and sul-
fur were used.

Ml (Napalm) . Ml thickener is a coprecipitated aluminum
soap. The name was derived from the naph thenic and palm itic
acids that were its major constituents.

Napalm B , used by the Air Force, is intended as a replace-
ment for the M2 thickener. It is not true napalm, being com-
posed of polystyrene, gasoline, and benzene. It is not
a gel, but is a sticky, visco-elastic liquid. It has a longer
burning time than the Ml, M2, and M4 thickened fuels, and,
therefore, possibly better incendiary action.

Unlike the Ml, M2, and M4 thickeners, which can be quite
easily brushed off the skin, the Napalm B is sticky and the
polystyrene itself burns, its burning time being longer than
that of the petroleum products. Therefore, this does have the
required characteristics to produce more severe burns than
unthickened fuel.

Troops are instructed to remain covered with no skin exposed until after
the flash and flame in the high heat zone have been dissipated and then
throw off the cover and remove any burning particles from their clothing.
Blankets or items such as an army field jacket have been shown to give
real protection. Two thicknesses of the Army shelter half tent will hold
burning fuel for more than 10 seconds. Tent canvas and truck tarpaulins
which have been treated with fire-resistant material will withstand
direct hits with burning fuel and will hold the burning particles for
sufficient time (more than 30 seconds) to permit personnel to escape.
Foxhole covers improvised of brush with as little as 2 inches of earth
on top will successfully withstand burning fuel. The Army plastic poncho
is not a satisfactory cover because it melts rapidly and burns when hit
with flaming fuel. This would increase the severity of burns received by
an individual. Foxholes and weapon positions can be modified to afford
adequate protection for anything except a direct hit with a fire bomb.



Metal incendiaries include those consisting of magnesium in
various forms, and powdered or granular aluminum mixed with
powdered iron oxide. Magnesium is a soft metal which, when
raised to its ignition temperature (623° = 1,150°F), burns vig-
orously in air. Magnesium has a burning temperature of about
1,982°C (3,600°F) depending upon the rate of heat dissipation,
rate of burning, and other factors. Its melting point is 651°C,
so it melts as it burns. The liquid metal, burning as it flows,
drops to lower levels, igniting combustible materials in its
path. Burning stops if oxygen is prevented from reaching the
metal or if the metal is cooled below the ignition temperature.
Magnesium does not have the highest heat of combustion of the
metals, but none of the other metals have been successfully
used singly as air-combustible incendiaries. In massive form,
magnesium is difficult to ignite. Therefore, a hollow core
in the bomb is packed with thermate and an easily ignited mix-
ture which supplies its own oxygen and burns at a very high
temperature.*

a. Thermite incendiaries . 1 Thermite is essentially a
mixture of about 73 per cent powdered ferric oxide
(Fe2<)3) and 27 per cent powdered or granular aluminum.
The aluminum has a higher affinity for oxygen than iron
has, and if a mixture of iron oxide and aluminum powder
is raised to the combustion temperature of aluminum, an
intense reaction occurs: Fe203+2AL-* AL203+Fe + heat.
Under favorable conditions, the thermite reaction pro-
duces temperatures of about 2,200°C (3,922°F). This is
high enough to turn the newly formed metallic iron into a
white hot liquid which acts as a heat reservoir to prolong
and to spread the heat or igniting action.

Defense against incendiaries, as outlined in a U.S. Army publication
is summarized as follows: Incendiary bomb clusters may contain a per-
centage of high explosive incendiary bombs so precautions should include
this possibility. A brick wall offers adequate protection against small
explosive incendiary bombs. Incendiary bombs can be scooped up with
shovels and thrown into a place where no damage will be done. Sandbags
and sandmats can smother bombs and reduce effects of fragmentation.
Loose sand helps to smother fires started by the bomb.

Prompt defensive and corrective action makes a very great difference
in the severity of injuries resulting from any of these agents.

1. , "Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents." Dept. of the Army

Tech. Man ., TM 3-215, Dept. of the Air Force Manual 355-7, Depts. of
The Army and Air Force, 1963.



Abridged



THE BURN SURFACE AS A PARASITE



WATER LOSS, CALORIC DEMANDS , AND THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS

Carl Jelenko, III, M.D.
Department of Surgery
University of Maryland School of Medicine and Hospital

Baltimore, Maryland

Water is Lost through Burned Skin

If, during the first 48 hours after injury, no more fluid is given to
an extensively burned patient than he would need in health, the un-
compensated loss of fluid from his circulation may cause shock, and if
sufficiently severe, death.

Heat is Lost Necessitating a High Food Intake

To make matters worse, evaporation of moisture from the wound
surface saps not only the body's water stores but its energy stores
as well. When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re-
sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more
water loss and the more heat or energy loss.

How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?

Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for
Thermal Burns

ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News

http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462

August 2008

By Patrice Wendling

Elsevier Global Medical News

CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound
dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.

The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has
advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for
almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician,
explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association.

Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general
surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap
reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely
available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing
removal.




47 kt Greenhouse
Easy, Eniwetok
Atoll, 1951. Brick
house, 3 psi peak
overpressure



0.6 second




Impact + 1.0 second




Afterward




THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



The Effects
of

The Atomic Bomb

on

Hiroshima, Japan



Volume I



Physical Damage Division
May 1947



G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE

1 . Conditions Prior to Attack

The city of Hiroshima was an excellent target
for the atomic bomb from a fire standpoint : There
had been no rain for three weeks; the city was
highly combustible/consisting principally of .Japa-
nese dome* tic- type structures; it was r instructed
over flat terrain; and 13 square miles (including
streets) of the 20.5-square-milc city was more
than 6 percent built up (i. e., covered by plan
■rata of buildings). The remainder of the city
comprised water areas, parks and areas built up
below 5 percent. Sixty-eight percent of the 13-
■quare-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built up
and the 4-equare-mile city center was particularly
dense, 93.6 percent of it being 27 to 42 |M»rcent
built up.

a. Fire Department. Public fire equipment had
been little improved in anticipation of wartime
fires. Private fire equipment had been aug-
mented somewhat but instruction to home occu-
pant* in its use had been limited to training in
combating incendiary bombs.



13



a. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible
structures and materials by heat directly radiated
by the atomic bomb and by other ignition sources
developed the following: (1) The primary fire haz-
ard was present in combustible materials and in
fire-resistive buildings with unshielded wall open-
ings; (2) six persons who had been in re in forced -
concrete buildings within 3/200 feet of air zero
stated that black cotton black-out curtains were
ignited by radiant heat; (3) a few persons stated
that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched
roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immedi-
ately after the explosion; (4) dark clothing was
scorched, and, in some cases, reported to have
burst into flame from flash heat; (5) but a large
proportion of over 1 ,000 persons questioned was in
agreement that a great majority of the original
fires was started by debris falling on kitchen char-
coal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric
short circuits.

A. Hundreds of fires were reported to have
started in the center of the city within ten minutes
after the explosion. Of the total number of
buildings investigated 107 caught fire, and, in 60
instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of
the buildings or their contents was established as
follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the
bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources
and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposing buildings.



14



e. Damage to Rolling Stock. Of the 123 trolley
care operated by the company, 20 percent were
damaged by fire and 45 percent by blast. Of the
86 motor busses, fire damaged 21 percent and
blast 26 percent. Radiant heat from the bomb
ignited cars and busses within 1.500 feet of GZ.
Total damage to cars extended a maximum of
5.700 feet from GZ, heavy damage to 8,400 feet
and alight damage to 12,500 feet. Busses wen*
totally damaged at 4,000 feet and heavily damaged
5,500 feet from GZ.

d. Damage to Overhead Sy*tem. Blast and fire
damaged 11.4 miles of the overhead transmission
system including damage to 500 wood and 100

steel poles. So damage occurred to concrete
poles, the nearest of which were 6,000 feet from
GZ. Wood poles were damaged at a maximum
distance of 4,500 feet from GZ, and steel poles at
3,500 feet. Overhead transmission cable was
downed by blast at 8,000 feet.



21



3. Conditions on Morning of Attack

a. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with
a small amount of clouds at high altitude. Wind
was from the south with a velocity of about 4\i
miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles.

6. An air-raid "alert" was sounded throughout
Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours. Reports of
the number of planes causing this alert were con-
flicting. The governor of the prefecture stated
that four B-29s were sighted, while the Kure Naval
District reported three large planes.

c. The aircraft apparently came out over
Hiroshima from the direction of Bungo Suido and
Kunisaki Peninsula, circled the city, and withdrew

in the direction of Harima-Nada at 0725 hours.
"All-clear" was sounded at 0731 hours.

d. The following circumstances account in part
for the high number of casualties resulting from
the atomic bomb:

(1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid
shelters after the "all-clear" sounded.

(2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the
approach of the planes involved in the atomic-
bomb attack.

(3) The explosion occurred during the morning
rush hours when people had just arrived at work
or were hurrying to their places of business. This
concentrated the population in the center of the
city where the principal business district was
located.

(4) Many persons residing outside the city were
present for reasons of business, travel and pleasure.

(5) National volunteer and school units were
mobilized and engaged in evacuation operations.

84



THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



The Effects
of

The Atomic Bomb

on

Hiroshima, Japan

Volume II



Physical Damage Division
Dates of Survey:
14 October- 26 November 1945
Date of Publication
May 1947



4. The city, consisting principally of Japanese do-
mestic structures, was highly combustible and
densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13-
square-mile city area was 27 to 42 percent built up
and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly
dense, 94 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built
up. All the large industrial plants were located on
the south and southeast edges of the city.

8. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible
structures and materials by directly radiated heat
from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources
was obtained by interrogation and visual inspec-
tion of the entire city. Six persons who had been
in reinf orced-concre te buildings within 3,200 feet
of air zero stated that black cotton black-out
curtains were ignited by flash heat. A few persons
stated that thin rice paper, cedar bark roofs,
thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were
afire immediately after the explosion. Dark
clothing was scorched and, in some cases, was
reported to have burst into flame from flash heat.
A large proportion of over 1,000 persons ques-
tioned was, however, in agreement that a great
majority of the original fires were started by debris
falling on kitchen charcoal fires. Other sources of
secondary fire were industrial-process fires and
electric short circuits.

9. There had been practically no rain in the city
for about 3 weeks. The velocity of the wind on
the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not
more than 5 miles per hour.

10. Hundreds of fires were reported to have
started in the center of the city within 10 minutes
after the explosion.

4



D. THE CONFLAGRATION
1. Start of Fit*

b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. (1) Six
persons wore found who bad been in reinforced*
concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of AZ at the
time of the explosion and who stated that black
cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few sec-
onds later. In two cases it was stated that thin
rice paper on desks close to open windows facing
AZ also burst into flame immediately, although
heavier paper did not ignite. No incidents were
recounted to the effect that furniture or similar
objects within buildings were ignited directly by
radiated heat from the bomb.

21



(8) Scores of persons throughout all sections of
the city were questioned concerning the ignition
of clothing by the flash from the bomb. Replies
were consistent that white silk seldom was af-
fected, although black, and some other colored
silk, charred and disintegrated. Numerous in-
stances were reported in which designs in black or
other dark colors on a white silk kimono were
charred so that they fell out, but the white part
was not affected. These statements were con-
firmed by United States medical officers who had
been able to examine a number of kimonos avail-
able in a hospital. Ten school boys were located
during the study who had been in school yards
about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, re-
spectively, from AZ. These boys had flash burns
on the portions of their faces which had been
directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys 1
stories were consistent to the effect that their
clothing, apparently of cotton materials,
"smoked," but did not burst into flame. Photo
36 shows a boy's coat that started to smolder from
heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ.

24



PHOTO 36: jacket outdoors near City
Hall (building 28) , 3800 ft from AZ




PlltlTl) 3ft IX. JHmmw partly Inarm*! cv*t ** Iwjr »hn
in <hm*i nctr niv Hall (BitUiHnii 2* 9.K00 feci
fiom AZ.

3800 feet from air zero;
3300 feet from ground zero



PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD

IN

VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF BUILT- UPNESS



50



45



40



35



O 50

f

I

§

c

i



i



25



20



15



K>



















/
/
/




















/

/


























Ind
Bu


ustriol
IdingV
























■®


























Dome
" Buildii


stic
»gs
























/


/


















/

/

/


















-i

/
/





















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Probability of Fire Spreod- Percent



90 100



US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



FIRE SPREAD VS. BWLT-UPNESS
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
FIGURE 4 -IT



42



ISO



120



110



100



00



i "

i -

m

• —

Q

60



SO



40



30



CO



10



PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD

ACROSS
VARIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES











\
\

1
1

\




















\
\
\




















— \ —
\

\




















-A










































V




















v
























































































































j








**



Probotiity of Fire Sprodd- Percent



U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



FIRE SPREAD VS. EXPOSURE DISTANCES
HM09HMA, JAPAN
FIGURE 5 -JX



Table 5. — Fire-resistive building data (fire)



Building Ma.


Coordinates


Distance from AZ (feet)


Distance from OZ (feet)


1


4H


2,100


700


2


4H


2, 100


800


6


5H


2. 100


600


7


5H


2,100


600


8


5H


2,100


600


9


5H


2,100


600


10


5H


2,100


600


11


511


2,100


700


12


5H


2,100


700


18


5H


2,200


1,000


10


5H


2,200


1,000


20


5H


2,200


1,000


21


5H


2,300


1,300


22


5H


2,300


1,100


23


5H


2,300


1,200


24


5H


2,400


1,300


25


5H


2.400


1,400


26


5H


3,000


2,300


27


6H


3,100


2,400


28


6H


3,800


3,300


31


6H


5,300


4,900


32A


6H


5, 100


4,700


32B


6H


5,200


4,800


32D


6H


5,000


4,600


32E


6H


4,700


4,200


32F


6H


5,000


4,600


320


6H


5,200


4,800


32H


6U


5,300


4,900


33


6H


5,600


5,300


38


5H


2,900


2,100


39


51


3,200


2.500


40


5H


3,200


2,500


41


5H


2.600


1,700


43


5H


2,800


2,000


44


5H


2,700


1,800


45


5H


2,700


1,800


47


5H


3, 100


2,300


48


5H


3.300


2,600


49


61


3,600


3,000


50


51


3,600


3.000


51


51


3,700


3,200


59


51


4,500


4, 100


61


51


4,000


3,400 1


62


51


4,100


3,600


64


%l


5,300


4,900


65


31


5,300


4,900


67


3H


5,000


4,600


74


3H


6,300


6,000


76


3G


6,200


5,900


79


30


6,100


5,800


85


4G


3,800


3,300


86


50


2,800


2,000


03


SO


2,500


1,500


05


4Q


2,300


1,200


06


50


2,000


400


100


6G


2,100


800


101


50


2,600


1,700


1130


71


7,700


7,400


122


5J


6,700


6,400


120


3G


6,000


5,600


132


6Q


5,700


5,400


133


5J


6,200


5,900


134


4J


6.300


6.000


135


5J


6,800


6,500



Occupancy



Office....

do

do...

Bank-.-

do

Office

do

do

.. .do

Bank

do _

Office

Bank

Office..

do

Bank

Art museum.

Office

Library

Office

Hospital

Classrooms

Library

Classrooms laboratories

Classrooms.

Laboratory

Kitchen

Laboratory

Office

..do

..do

Department store

Classrooms

Telephone exchange. . . .

Department store

Bank

Beer hall

Hospital _

Office _

Newspaper plant

Bank

Office

Radio station

Residence

Hospital.

Office



Electrical laboratory.



do

Telephone exchange

Classrooms

Warehouse

Classrooms

Clothing store

Office

Warehouse

Cigarette i

Bank

do

Warehouse.
Mercantile.

Office

Bank



Fire
shutters
on wall
open-
ings



No

No

Yes....
Yes....
Yes...
Yes ...
Yes...

No

No

Part...
Yes....
Part....
Yes....
Part....

No

Yes

Part....
Part....
Part....

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Part....

No

Part.--

No

No

Part ...

Yes

Yes

No

No

Part

No .....

Part

Part

No

No...
No...
No...
Yes..
No...
Yes...
Yes-
Yes. .
No....
Yes...
No....
No....
No....
Yes.-
No....
Yes...
No...
Yes...
No...
Yes...
Yes...



Unprotected
wall openings
exposed to
AZ at zero



Yes

Yes

Probably no .

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes....

Probably no.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes...

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes.

Yes...

Yea

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes..

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Probably no..
Probably no. .

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Probably no..

Yes

Probably no...

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes



o

20
10

6
10
10
10
30
10
10
20
10
15
10
10
25
10
10
25
50
75
25

5
30
30
12


6
90
20
10
50
20
35
5

20
6

90

40

30
15


30
30
125
30



6
125
125


30
10



5
60

5
12




60
100



Probable
cause of
initial
ignition



Fire spread..

...do

-...do

— .do _

--do



Fire spread.
Primary



Primary.



Fire spread



Primary .



Fire spread...

No fire

Fire spread ...

...do.

Secondary

Fire spread.. .

...do.

do

.-do

—do

—do..

Primary

— .do



Secondary.



Fire spread



(Primary
Fire spread.

Primary

Fire spread.



Fire spread

No lire

Fire spread.

--do

—do

Secondary-.

No fire

Fire spread



Fire spread..

No fire..

Fire spread ....

No lire

Fire spread...

—do

—do.

No fire..



B-2
B-3
B-3
2
3

B-3
2
3

B-3
B-5
B-4
3
2
4

B-7
B-3
2

B-5
4

B-4
B-3
2
2
3
3
1
1
2

B-4

B-3
4

B-7
B-3
3
3
3

B-3
2

7
3

B-3
B-3
2
2

B-2
4
1

B-2
1
2
3
3
2

B-3
B-3

2

2

1

2

B-2
B-i
4

3

B-2



Stories burned (after
blast damage)



1-2

60% B, 100% 1-3. ...

70% B, 100% 1-3. ...

1-2

1-3

1-3

1-2

1-3

B-3

B-5

75% 1-2, 100% 3-4..

1-3

1-2

1-4

1-7....

5% 2, 100% 3

1-2

40% B, 100% 1-5—

1-4

80% B-l, 100% 2-4..

None

1-2 _

1-2

1-3

1-3

1

None

1-2

None

B-3

1-4

B-7

75% B, 100% 1-3 ......

1-3

1-3

1-3

1-3

1-2

1-7

1-3..... _.

15% B, 100% 1-3 ....

None.. -

1-2

1-2

Second only

50% 1-3, 90% 4

None...

70% B-l, 100% 2

1

1-2

25% second only

None

1-2

B-3

1-3

1-2

1-2

None

None..

None

B-l J

1-4

80% 1, 100% 2-3

None



Areas in
thousands




square feet








" JO




a burned


loor area


g
s

1


S


c


&




jj


4.2


3.5


83


27.3


24.3


89


16.6


15.3


92


5.7


5.7


100


9.0


9.0


100


4.9


4.2


86


2.5


2.5


100


9.8


9.8


100


15.8


16.8


100


46.4


46.4


100


29.9


25.2


84


4.5


4.5


100


7.3


7.3


100


20.4


20.4


100


43.3


39.0


90


32.8


5.2


16


5.4


5.4


100


52.0


46.5


88


13.4


13.4


100


93.4


84.9


91


88.6








2.8


2.8


100


3.7


3.7


100


103.3


103.3


100


39.5


39.5


100


2.0


2.0


100


3.0


3.0





3.8


3.8


100


62.6








10.4


10.4


100


32.0


32.0


100


78.9


78.9


100


26.4


25.1


96


36.1


36. 1


100


4.3


4.3


100


8.0


8.0


100


15.3


13.2


86


9 o


2.9


100


14. 7


14. 7


100


9.1 K


24. 5


100


Oft 7


19. 2


72


1A 9
ID. 1







o. 5


8.3


100


2.2


2.2


100


15.9


5.3


33


83.4


50.0


60


1.7








13.2


10.6


80


15.9


15.9


100


14.4


14.4


100


14.2


LI


8


11.5








2.9


2.9


100


49.5


49.5


100


12.4


9.3


75


3.0


3.0


100


4.3


4.3


100


D».








5.1








16.2








15.0


15.0


100


3.0


3.0


100


4.8


4.5


94


9.0









SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan,"
vol. 2 Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3

had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes.



(4) It was reported that a cotton black-out
curtain at an unprotected window in the east stair
tower of Building 85 (3,800 feet from AZ) smoked
and was scorched by radiated beat from the bomb
but it did not burst into flames. All windows
other than those in the stair tower were pro-
tected by closed steel-roller shutters. There was
fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the
second story but this was caused by electrical
short circuits when debris from windows was
blown into the equipment by blast.

(5) A man who was in the third story of building
26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiated heat
from the bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at
unprotected windows in the west wall and thin
rice paper on desks. According to his recollec-
tion, all stories were afire five minutes after the
attack. On the other hand, two men who were
working in Building 28 (3,800 feet from AZ) stated
that there was no primary fire in this building, the
windows of which were not equipped with fire
shutters. Black-out curtains at all windows were
drawn back and no fires started in them. Accord-
ing to the same men, fire spread into the building
by flying brands from the south nearly two hours
after the attack.



47



(10) Fire fighting with water buckets was re-
ported inside only four buildings (24, 33, 59, and 122)
and probably prevented extensive fire damage in
them. In Building 24, fire was started in contents
of a room at the southwest corner of the second
story by sparks from trees on the south side about
1 li hours after the attack. Men inside the building
extinguished the fire and probably prevented
further damage in the first and second stories
(Photo 85). A little later, contents in the thin!
story were ignited by sparks from the outside and
were totally damaged. This fire was beyond
control before it was discovered, but did not
spread downward through open stairs. At Build-
ing 33, sparks from the west exposure, which
burned in early evening, set fire to black-out
curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in
the fourth story of the northwest section of the
building. Twenty persons were on guard in the
building awaiting such an occurrence and the
fires were quickly extinguished while in the
incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks from the
south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in
the first and third stories and black-out curtains
in the first story about 2 hours after the attack.
These fires were extinguished by men inside and
negligible damage resulted. A few window frames
in the east and west walls and 2 or 3 desks in the
first story of Building 122 were ignited by radiated
heat and sparks from the west and northeast
exposures. These fires were extinguished quickly
and damage was negligible.



58



A. SUMMARY

4. The mean areas of effectiveness (MAE) of the
atomic bomb for structural damage about ground
zero (GZ) and the radii of the MAE's for the
several classes of buildings present were computed
to be as follows:





MAE's


Radii ot




in square


MAE's




miles


in feet


Multistory, earthquake-resistant


0.03


500


Multistory, steel- and reinforced-






concrete frame (including both






earthquake- and non-earthquake-






resistant construction)


05


700


1-story, light, steel-frame


3. 4


5, 500


Multistory, load-bearing, bnck-wall _ _


3. 6


5, 700


1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall


6.


7,300


Wood-frame industrial-commercial






(dimension-timber construction)


a 5


8,700


Wood-frame domestic buildings








9. 5


9,200


Residential construction


6.0


7,300



96



STRUCTURAL DAMAGE BY BLAST

TO

MULTI-STORY, STEEL- AND REINFORCED- CONCRETE " FRAME BUILDINGS

(BASED ON TOTAL FLOOR AREA)
MAC FOR ALL STEEL'S REINFrCONCr FRAME BLD6S -0.05 80 Ml
MAC FOR EARTHQUAKE-RESISTANT BL0G8 ONLY »0 .03 80 Ml




Table 1. — Building data, 9teel- and reinf orccd-concrete-f rame
[Areas in thousands of square feat]



i



5H
51
5H
6H
5H
5H
5H
51
51
51
61
51
61
31
31
3H
3Q
40
50
40
50
7J
7J
7J
7J
5J
6H
6H
5H
5H
5H
50
5G
5G
4J
3H
30
71



1


4H


Office


2


4H


do


•


6H


do


8


5H


Bank


1


6H


Office


11


6H


do


18


5H


Bank


19


5H


- — * - - — - m mm mm m m ^mmmmmmm*


20


6H


Office


21


5H


Bank


22


5H


Office


23


5H


do


24


5H


Bank


26


6H


Office


27


5H




28


6H


Office....


81


AH


Hospital


32A


6H




32B


m


Library


82D


6H


Classroom laboratory


32E


AH




33


6H


Office



— do

.-do

Department store...

Classrooms

Telephone exchange
Department store....
Beer hall



Newspaper.



Office

Radio station

Residence

Hospital...

Office

Electrical laboratory .

Warehouse

Telephone t



Clothing store




Type


m
§

s

E


9

E
S

00


>
i

«

2
CQ


>

i
s

«


I

<
8

J

a


El


1.7


2


V-l


R


2.100


El


8.3


2/3


V-l


R


2,200


El


5.1


3


V-l


R


2, 100


El


5.3


1/3


V-l


R


1100


El


2.1


2/3


V-l


R


1100


El


4.6


3


V-l


R


1100


El


10.1


5/2


V-I


R


1200


El


8.8


4


V-l


R


1200


El


1.5


3


V-l


R


1200


El


5.5


1/2


V-l


R


1300


El


4.7


4


V-l


R


1300


El


5.4


7


V-l


R


2,300


El


10.6


3


V-l


R


1400


El


9.2


5


V-l


R


3,000


El


5.3


2/4


V-l


R


3, 100


El


21.3


4


V-l


R


3,800


El


27.5


3/4


V-l


R


5.300


El


L4


2


V-l


R


5, 100


El


1.9


2


V-l


R


5.200


El


34.4


3


V-l


R


5,000


El


13.2


3


V-l


R


4,700


El


11.2


4


V-l


R


5,600


El


2.6


3


V-l


R


1900


El


15.6


3/4


V-l


N/R


3,200


El


9.9


7


V-l


R


3,200


El


7.2


3


V-l


R


1600


El


16.3


1/3


V-l


R


1800


El


2.6


1/3


V-l


R


1700


El


4.8


3


V-l


R


3.100


El


11


7


V-l


R


3,000


El


10.3


2/3


V-l


R


3,000


El


9.9


1/3


V-l


R


3,700


El


4.8


2/3


V-l


R


4,500


El


4.2


2


V-l


R


4,000


El


1.1


2


V-l


R


4, 100


El


6.8


2


V-l


R


5.300


El


20.8


4


V-l


R


5.300


El


6.6


2


V-l


R


6,300


El


7.7


2


V-l


R


6,100


El


4.8


3


V-l


R


3.800


El


3.8


3


V-l


R


1800


El


12.4


?


V-l


R


1300


El


4.1


S


V-l


R


1000


El


23.7


3


V-l


R


8,800


El


23.7


3


V-l


R


8.900


El


23.7


3


V-l


R


9.000


El


23.7


3


V-l


R


9,200


El


2.6


2


V-l


R


6.700


E2


4.5


3


v-a


R


1100


E2


1.6


3


V-3


N


3.100


E2


3.3


2


V-3


R


1400


E2


9


2


V-3


N/C


1800


E2


1.6


2


\-3


R


3.300


E2


1.6


2


V-3


R


1500


E2


1.5


2


V-3


R


1 100


E2


2.2


2


V-3


R


1000


El


9.0


1/2


V-3


N/C


6,600


A14


1.7


1


V-l


R


5,000


A % 4


15.9


1


V-4


R


6,200


A1.2


54.6


1


V-l


R


7,700


A1.2


54.9


1


V-l


R


7,800


AX 4


21.1


1


V-l


R


8,900


A1.2


11.6


1


V-4


R


9.000



3

o



4.2
27.3
16.6
9.0
4.9
9.8
45.0
29.9
4.6
7.3
20.4
43.3
32.8
510
13.4
93.4
88.6
18
3,7
103.3
39.5
616

10.4
310
78.9
26.4
36.1
4.3
15.3
14.7
21.5
26.7
16.2
&3
2.2
15.9
83.4
13.2
14.4
14.2
110
49.5
114
71.1
71.1
71.1
71 1
5.1
15.8
4.1
5.4
1.9
19
19
3.0
4.3
14.0
1.7
15.9
516

54.9

21.1
11.6



Building damage— floor area



I

A


6u


Mixed


Blast


Fire


1.8
1. 1


























j 5. 3










1.










1 1
1.9
2, 7

5. 7
1. 6
4.6














































11
























2






0. 8


























































































4.4
































1.7














































































































A A
W. V






13


















0. 6
3.9






3.0


























































10.8






0.7
4.1
2.1










3
1.9






















1 a














1




4.3
4.9
1.7
19








4.9







































































Superficial



Content <



Internal lire


Peroent


Cause


3 5


90


Fire.


24.3


90


Do.


15.3


95


Do.


9.0


100


Do.


4.2


90


Do.


9.8


100


Do.


46.4


100


Do.


25.2


90


Do.


4.5


100


Do.


7.3


100


Mixed.


204


100


Fire.


39.0


90


Do.


5.2


30


Mixed.


46.6


90


Fire.


13.4


100


Do.


84.9


96


Do.





25


Debris.


18


100


Fire.


3.7


100


Do.


103.3


100


Do.


39.5


100


Do.





15


Blast -de-






bris.


10.4


100


Fire.


310


100


Do.


78.9


100


Do.


25.1


96


Do.


36. 1


100


Do.


4.3


100


Do.


13.2


80


Do.


14.7


100


Do.


24.5


100


Do.


19.2


80


Do.





10


Blast


8.3


100


Fire.


12


100


Do.


5.3


40


Mixed.


50.0


70


Do.


10.6


80


Fire.


14.4


100


Do.


1.1


50


Mixed.





30


Debris.


49.5


100


Fire.


9.3


75


Do.


















A

V


A
V




















15.8


100


Mixed.


16


60


Do.


5,4


100


Fire.


1.9


100


Mixed.


19


100


Fire.


19


100


Mixed.


3.0


100


Fire.


4.3


100


Debris.


14.0


100


Fire.





10


Exposure.


15.9


100


Fire.



































103



EDGE OF
FIRE AREA



GROUND
ZERO



EDGE OF
FIRE AREA




17 k_



22



7




1 inn



j 1 1







V ^^^otffiat ^ MM Ml




N/SM/ FIELD \ it X



Divisions ,
CominanderY j?«*> /A^SM
-Quarters A Oirit^j*- -



M ilitary;. ^~,0fM
Police//





HONK AW A
■BAB*!




umiyobmT




U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No, 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALY8I3



Sheet No* 1

Building No.: 24. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from

(GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400.
NAME: Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforoed-cooerete frame (steel core).
Number of Stories: 8 and basement. JTG class; El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (13-inob) and stone (6-inch).
Floors: Reinforced concrete.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal (exterior) wood (in-
terior). Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Much
stronger — steel core construction.
OCCUPANCY: Bank.

CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishings.
DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage— top story

burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two

lower stories.
Cause* Fife.

To Contents: Destroyed in third story— moderate debris
and blast damage in first and second stories, none in
basement.
Cause: Fire and debris (about equally).

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 32,800. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .
Superficial: — . Contents: 30 percent.

REMARKS: Glass removed from skylight (20 by 20
feet) and light steel-frame structure and roof covered
with 12 to 18 inches of sand and cinders.

Note.— Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.



Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 24. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers.
8hut: Part

Effect of blast: Blown in.

FLOOR OPENING8:

Enclorcd Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast
Stairs: Part Steel rollers No None— doors open.

Elevators: Yes Metal and W. O. No Bent.

EXP08URE:

Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks

N 25' No C Yes M-foot concrete wall be-
tween.

E 25* No K Yes Building 25 (14-foot wall

between).

S — No — — No eiposure.

W I2V Yes C Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex-
posures.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 32,800 square
feet. Floor area burned: 5 f 200 square fee*; 16 percent
(after blast damage).

REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of
second story and in entire third story. No fire in
building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours.
Fire in room in second story extinguished with water
buckets.




217



U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY



PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS



8mr No. 1



Building No.: 69. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (GZ):

4400, (AZ): 4,500.
NAME: Gelbl Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch (in use at

time of bomb ss the Higsshi Police Stat ion) .
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories: See sketch. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: 7-ineh reinforced concrete.
Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete monolithic— medium

window.

Floors: Reinforoed-conerete beam and slab— parquet and
tile.

Framing: Reinforoed-conerete beam and slab.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Sheet metal on
wood framing.

Condition, workmanship and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Appreci-
ably stronger than United States design.
OCCUPANCY: Police station (office).
CONTENTS: Office equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only— sash blown
out and hung ceilings partially stripped.



To contents: Blight dsmage to contents from blast and
debris.
Cause: Blast.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA 'square feet): 16,200* Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building. Structural:

Superficial: Contents: 10 percent.
REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.



Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 59. Fire classification: R.

WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in east wall

and third story of south and west walls (wired glass in

all windows).

Effect of blast: Blown in at west wall, bent at south
wall.

FLOOR OPENINGS:

Auto

Enclosed Fire doors matte Effect or blast
Stain: Yes Metal No Kent slightly.

Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Kemnrks



All exjxwures hurried.



PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex-
posures.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Hour area: 10,200 square
feet. Floor area burned: square feet ; |x»rr<»nt (after
blast damage).

REMARKS: Sparks from south exj>osure ignited few-
pieces of furniture in first atid third stone* and cotton
blackout curtains in first story about 1030 hours. Fires
weic extinguished with water buckets by people inside.
Negligible (ire damage resulted. Some of exposing
buildings had just been removed prior to the bomb.



N


1 SO-


Yea


C


Yes


E


OT


Yes


C


Yes


S


3C


Partial


C


Yes






IOC






w


6C


Yes


C


Yes




341



Accession Number : AD0689495



DC- P- 1060-1



PREDICTION OF UK BAN CASUALTIES AND TIIE MEDICAL LOAD
FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST



L. Wayne Davis



Paper
prepared under

Contract No. N0022867C2276
(Work Unit No. 241 1H)



Sponsored by

Office of Civil Defense
Office of the Secretary of the Army

through

Technical Management Office
U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory



Delivered at

Workshop on Mass Burns
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D. C.
March 13-14, 1968



The Dikewood Corporation
1009 Bradbury Drive, S. E.
University Research Park
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106



A. DEVELOPMENT OF "BLAST" MORTALITY CURVES
FROM JAPANESE AND TEXAS CITY DATA

A great deal of new information has been gathered concerning the
biological effects of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,
during World War II. The data from over 35, 000 case histories were col-
lected on magnetic tape, and the results of the analysis were published in
DC-FR-1054 (Ref. 3).

For people in or shielded by structures in Japan, the blast and
initial-nuclear radiation were the dominant immediate effects.

By examining a set of theoretical initial-nuclear-radiation
mortality curves developed for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and comparing
them with the total mortality curves, it could readily be seen that the
initial- nuclear radiation played a large role in the deaths of thermally-
shielded people located fairly close-in (at the high mortality levels) in
the light structures. It is also an important effect even in the concrete
structures.

By further comparing the mortality curves for Hiroshima and
Nagasaki plotted as a function of overpressure (Figs. 1 and 2), it can
readily be seen that the initial- nuclear radiation was more important or
dominant in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki.

As another boundary condition, the Texas City mortality curves,
given in Fig. 3, show the results of blast alone for a lower yield of 0. 67

kt. [S.S. Grandchamp at Texas City exploded in 1 947. It contained 2.3 kt
of ammonium nitrate in 100-lb paper bags, but only the 0.88 kt in No. 4 hatch
was tamped and exploded after catching fire. TNT equivalent was 0.67 kt.]




(*u«9J«d) AJLIIVIUON




(4U»3J»d) AinvidOW



:£:==== silisrssSr

iiHHIittliiiHi
liifiiiiiiiiiiiii




(4U«3J»d) AXIIVXdOW




(iu»OJ»d) Ainviwow




(4U93JM)) Aanrw wo Ainviaow



FIG. 30

FIRE MORTALITY CURVES




PEAK POWER DENSITY (I0 6 Btu/mi 2 ttc)



22
20
18
x 16



o 14
c



T. E. Lo mm as son and J. A.
Keller. "A macroscopic view
of fire phenomenology and
mortality prediction/ 1
Dikewood Corp., report DC-
TN-1058-1, December 1966
(Paper presented at the
Symposium on Mass Fire
Research conducted
February 6-9, 1967 under the
auspices of the Panel N-3,
Thermal Radiation, of the
Technical Cooperation
Program)*



HeHbrann^/.
Dresden »



Hamburg



I

I INTENSE
/ FIRESTORMS



(GERMAN CELLARS)



NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
j (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI)

* Aamori # \

• Barmen ^%
Freiberg V
Hiroshima *Fukui \

Solingen . Friedrickshafen 1
1 Aachen . uim ' Toyama ; Chosi

Nagasaki Fuku Y<



Darmstadt

\ *
\

Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered
by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood
Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading
Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy
Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.

1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) =
energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water
= 252 calories



Severe firestorms require
600 BTU/sq. mile/second

FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES

i i l



100



200



300



400



500



600



700



800



AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second)



Lommasson and Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality
Predictions, Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN- 1058-1, December 1966.



J, A, Keller, A Study of World War n German Fire Fatalities ,
DC-TN-1 050-3, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966.

R. Schubert, Examination of Building Density and Fire Loading in the
Districts Eimsbuettel and Hammerbrook of the City of Hamburg in the
Year 1943 (20 volumes, in German), Stanford Research Institute;
January, 1966.



L. Wayne Davis, William L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers, Anal-
ysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data, DC- FR- 10 54, The Dikewood
Corporation; April, 1966,

L. Wayne Davis, Donald L. Summers, William L. Baker, and James
A, Keller, Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from
a High- Yield Nuclear Burst , DC- PR- 1060, The Dikewood Corporation;
to be published, (Classified)

Ashley W. Oughterson, et al. , Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs ,
NP-3036 toNP-3041 (Vols. I- VI), Army Institute of Pathology; 1951.

The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, Report No. 92
(Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi-
sion; May, 1947.

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, Report No. 93
(Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi-
sion; June, 1947.

Willard L. Derksen, et al. , O utput Intensities and Thermal Radiation
Skin Injury for Civil Defense Shelter Evaluation , Special Report for
Blast and Thermal Subcommittee of the National Academy of Science,
U. S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; October 16, 1967.

J. Bracciavcnti, W. Derksen, et al. , Radiant Exposures for Ignition
of Tinder by Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Weapons , Final Report
on DAS A Subtnsk 12.009, U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory;
July 5, 1966.

S. B. Martin and N. J. Alvares, Ignition Thresholds for Large-Yield
Nuclear Weapons, USNRDL-TR-1007, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory; April 11, 1966.

G. H. Tryon (Editor), Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition,
National Fire Protection Association, Boston; 1962.

C. C. Chandler, T. Storey, and C. Tangren, Prediction of Fire Spread
Following Nuclear Explosions . PSW-5, U. S. Forest Service, Forest
and Range Experiment Station, Berkeley, California; 1963.

Kathleen F. Earp, Deaths from Fire in Large- Scale Air Attack, with
Special Reference to the Hamburg Firestorm . CD/SA 28, Home Office,
Scientific Advisers' Branch, London; April, 1953.



MEMORANDUM
RM-3079-PR

1963



403 337



DISASTER AND RECOVERY:
A HISTORICAL SURVEY

Jack Hirshleifer



PREPARED FOR:

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND



MlilD,



SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA



•12-



As at Hamburg, people proved
tougher than structures. Almost 70 per cent of the buildings in
Hiroshima were destroyed, compared with around 30 per cent of pop-
ulation.*



The Research Department of the Hiroshima Municipal Office
is reported to have estimated the population in the city as 407,000,
in Hiroshima (Hiroshima Publishing Company, 1949),

1 These proportions are the estimates used by the U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey report. The Hiroshima Municipal Office calculations
show an even greater disparity, reporting 22 per cent of population
killed and missing but some 89 per cent of buildings as destroyed or
needing reconstruction (Hiroshima ) .



-13-

Oci August 7 power was generally restored to

surviving areas, and through railroad service commenced on August 8.

Telephone service started on August 15* Hiroshima was also not a

dead city. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reported that plants

responsible for three* fourths of the city's industrial production

could have resumed normal operations within 30 days (the newer and

larger plants in Hiroshima were on the outskirts of the city, and

both physical premises and personnel generally survived). 1 By

mid* 1949 the population had grown to over 300*000 once more, and

2

70 per cent of the destroyed buildings had been reconstructed*



USSBS, "The Effects of Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki,"

p. 8.



AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL

STRESS



Psychological Studies
of

Bombing and Civilian Defense



Irving L. Janis



The RAND Corporation



First Edition



NEW YORK • TORONTO • LONDON

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

1951



CHAPTER 2
EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB



UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE POPULATION

At both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disaster struck without warning.
Whether intended so or not, an extraordinarily high degree of sur-
prise was achieved by both A-bomb attacks. At the two target cities,
prior to the bombing, there had been relatively little anxiety about
the threat of heavy B-29 raids. When the planes carrying the A-bomb
arrived over their targets, the population was almost completely
unprepared. At the time, not even a light air raid was expected.
People were caught at home, at work, out on the city streets, calmly
going about their usual daily affairs.

When the first A-bomb was dropped, on August 6, 1945, very
few residents of Hiroshima were inside air-raid shelters. An all-clear
signal from a previous alert had sounded less than half an hour
earlier and the normal routine of community life had resumed.
Shortly after eight in the morning, when the explosion occurred, the
working-class population was arriving at the factories and shops.
Many workers were still out-of-doors en route to their jobs. The
majority of school children, along with some adults from the
suburbs, were also outside, hard at work building firebreaks as a
defense against possible incendiary raids. Housewives, especially in
middle-class families, were at home, preparing breakfast. Only a few
minutes later, their flaming charcoal stoves were to create hundreds
of local fires, adding to a general conflagration of such intensity that
even if the assiduous labor of Hiroshima's school children had been
completed, the fire storm still would have been beyond control.

At Nagasaki, three days later, the populace had heard only vague
reports about the Hiroshima disaster. Here again, people were at

4



EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB



5



work in factories and offices, tending their homes, engaging in their
normal daily activities. A few hours earlier a raid alert had been
canceled; before the raid signal could be repeated, the bomb had
already exploded. Only 400 people out of a population of close to a
quarter of a million were inside the excellent tunnel shelters that
could have protected some 75,000 people from severe injury or death.

It is generally recognized that the element of surprise was an
important factor contributing to the unprecedented casualty rates at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of those who were exposed to lethal
gamma radiation, struck down by flying debris, or trapped in col-
lapsed buildings would not have been killed if they had been
warned in time to flee to the outskirts of the city or if they had
been in adequate shelters. Thousands of people who were out-of-
doors or standing in front of windows would have been protected
from incapacitating flash burns if they had been under any sort
of cover. 1

Whether or not they suffered severe injury, those who survived
the explosion were also affected by the element of surprise in quite
another way. The absence of warning and the generally unprepared
state of the population undoubtedly augmented the emotional effects
of the disaster. "I was just utterly surprised and amazed and awed."
This brief remark, by a newspaper reporter who was living in Naga-
saki at the time of the disaster, epitomizes the way in which
survivors described the terrifying events to which they were so
suddenly exposed.

Of great importance in the predispositional set of the population
is the fact that there was not a state of readiness to face danger or
to cope with the harsh exigencies of a major catastrophe. The stage
was well set for extreme emotional responses to dominate the action.
It is against this background of psychological unpreparedness that
the emotional impact resulting from the atomic disasters should
be viewed.



1 USSBS Report, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946.



The Effects of
Nuclear Weapons




Samuel Glasstone
Editor



Revised Edition
Reprinted February 1964



Prepared by the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Published by the
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

April 1962



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. - Price J53.00 (paper bound)



Foreword



This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared
by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department
of Defense in coordination with other cognizant govern-
mental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of
nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact
evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the
combined judgment of a number of the most competent
scientists working on the problem.

There is a need for widespread public understanding
of the best information available on the effects of nuclear
weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as
accurately as possible, within the limits of national
security, a comprehensive summary of this information.




Secretary of Defense




Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission



BASIS FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION



12.11 In Japan, where little evasive action was taken, the survival
probability depended upon whether the individual was outdoors or
inside a building and, in the latter case, upon the type of structure.
At distances between 0.3 and 0.4 mile (530 and 700 yards) from ground
zero in Hiroshima the average survival rate, for at least 20 days after
the nuclear explosion, was less than 20 percent. Yet in two reinf orced-
concrete office buildings, at these distances, almost 90 percent of the
nearly 800 occupants survived more than 20 days, although some died
later from radiation injury.

These facts bring out clearly the greatly improved chances
of survival from a nuclear explosion that could result from the adoption
of suitable warning and protective measures.

Table 12.29— ARRIVAL TIME FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE

Explosion yield

Distance ■

(miles) 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT

(Time in seconds)

1 4. 3 3. 6 3. 7 2. 5 1. 5

2 9 8. 1 7. 4 6. 5 5.

12.35. The major part of the thermal radiation travels in straight
lines, and so any opaque object interposed between the fireball and
the exposed skin will give some protection. This is true even if the
object is subsequently destroyed by the blast, since the main thermal
radiation pulse is over before the arrival of the blast wave.

12.36 At the first indication of a nuclear explosion, by a sudden
increase in the general illumination, a person inside a building should
immediately fall prone, as described in § 12.30, and, if possible, crawl
behind or beneath a table or desk or to a planned vantage point.

12. 72 Because of its particulate nature, fallout will tend to col-
lect on horizontal surfaces, e.g., roofs, streets, tops of vehicles, and the
ground. In the preliminary decontamination, therefore, the main ef-
fort should be directed toward cleaning such surfaces. The simplest
way of achieving this is by water washing, if an adequate supply of
water is available. The addition of a commercial wetting agent
(detergent) will make the washing more efficient. The radioactive
material is thus tranf erred to storm sewers where it is less of a haz-
ard.



S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962:



Explosion yield

20 kilotons 1, 760

1 megaton 6, 500



Time after Distance from

Height of burst detonation ground zero Height of stem

(feet) (seconds) (miles) (feet)

3 0. 87 185

11 3. 2 680



20 KILOTON AIR BURST
3 SECONDS




BLAST WIND 180 MPH



NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION



PRIMARY BLAST WAVE FRONT



REFLECTED BLAST WAVE FRONT



6 PSI

MACH STEM

OVERPRESSURE



MILES q




At 10 seconds after a 20-kiloton explosion at an altitude of 1,760
feet the Mach front is over 2Y 2 miles from ground zero, and 37 seconds
after a 1-megaton detonation at 6,500 feet, it is nearly 9% miles from
ground zero. The overpressure at the front is roughly 1 pound per
square inch, in both cases, and the wind velocity behind the front is
40 miles per hour.



342 THERMAL RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Nevada in 1953.
12 calories per square centimeter ignitable




after exposure to a nuclear explosion



7.59 The value of fire-resistive furnishing in decreasing the num-
ber of ignition points was also demonstrated in the tests. Two
identical, sturdily constructed houses, each having a window 4 feet
by 6 feet facing the point of burst, were erected where the thermal
radiation exposure was 17 calories per square centimeter. One of
the houses contained rayon drapery, cotton rugs, and clothing, and,
as was expected, it burst into flame immediately after the explosion
and burned completely. In the other house, the draperies were of
vinyl plastic, and rugs and clothing were made of wool. Although
much ignition occurred, the recovery party, entering an hour after
the explosion, was able to extinguish the fires.

7.76 It should be noted that the fire storm is by no means a special
characteristic of nuclear weapons. Similar fire storms have been re-
ported as accompanying large forest fires in the United States, and
especially after incendiary bomb attacks in both Germany and Japan
during World War II. The high winds are produced largely by the
updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. They are
thus the equivalent, on a very large scale, of the draft of a chimney
under which a fire is burning. Because of limited experience, the
conditions for the development of fire storms in cities are not well
known. It appears, however, that some, although not necessarily all,
of the essential requirements are the following: (1) thousands of
nearly simultaneous ignitions over an area of at least a square mile,
(2) heavy building density, e.g., more than 20 percent of the area is
covered by buildings, and (3) little or no ground wind. Based on
these criteria, only certain sections — usually the older and slum
areas — of a very few cities in the United States would be susceptible
to fire storm development "



Weapon test report WT-775, Project 8.1 1 b,
ENCORE nuclear test, Nevada, 1953:

Decayed White Decayed +

fence washed trashed




No trash kindling Trash kindling for fire



Effect of 12 calories/sq cm thermal flash:




NO
FIRE



BURNED AFTER
15 MINUTES

6' x 6' wood frame houses



IMMEDIATE
IGNITION




WT- 774

Copy No. 135 A



UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS



March -June 1953



Project 8.11a

INCENDIARY EFFECTS ON BUILDING
AND INTERIOR KINDLING FUELS

( ENCORE EFFECT REPORT )

27 kt at 2,423 feet altitude, 19% humidity
(DASA-1251) (Note: cities humidity is -50-80%)

RESTRICTED DATA

This dc - "it contairs restricted data as
define., ^e Atomic Energy Act oi 1946.
Its Er*. -iHttal or the dfsclosure of its
cent sat* in any manner to an unauthorized
(gersoff is prohibited.




HEAOQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMEO FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
SANOIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO



CONFIDENTIAL



Weapon test report WT-774, Project 8.1 la, Incendiary effects on buildings and interior kindling fuels





ENCORE test, Nevada, 1953
10' x 12' wooden houses with 4' x 6' windows
17 calories/sq. cm thermal flash



Immediate room flashover during thermal pulse
("Encore effect") in inflammables-filled house
while fire-resistant fabrics in other house survived!




LEFT HOUSE: fire-resistant furnishings RIGHT HOUSE: non-fire resistant furnishings

(woolen rugs and clothes, vinyl plastic draperies) plus inflammable magazines and newspapers




■ £ i

Smouldering armchair extinguished 1 hour after detonation, when recovery party arrived at house




EFFECTS OF 1 PSI
OVERPRESSURE ON
IGNITIONS

From: Goodale. Effects of
Air Blast on Urban Fires
URS 7009-14 Dec. 1970

(AD 723 429)



Blast winds both
cool burning
material and
upset flame
convection system.

50% of burning
curtains are
extinguished by
1 psi overpressure

100% are put out by
2.5 psi. Note that
burning LIQUIDS
in high-wall trays
are not put out by
blast waves, but this
is not relevant to
city fires.

Burning beds can
continue to smoulder
until extinguished
with water.



THERMAL RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS



Harold L* Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

P-2745 August 1963

-17-

We have all had the frustrating experience of trying to light a
fire with green, moist, or wet wood. Just as wet wood can't be easily
induced to burn, so thick combustibles are not easily ignited* Even
a dry two-by-four burns reluctantly and stops burning when taken out
of the fire* It is a different matter with a shingle or a bunch of
kindling! Density also plays a role, a heavier combustible being
harder to ignite than lighter-weight material. Of course, the chemistry
of the material to the degree that it influences kindling temperatures
and flammabllity, is an important parameter. Modern plastics tend to
smoke and boil - to ablate but not to ignite in sustained burning -
while paper trash burns readily.



Just as most materials are not particularly sensitive to the
sun* s thermal radiation, and are not highly inflammable nor even
ignitible, the surfaces exposed to the thermal intensity of a nuclear
explosion are generally not given to sustained burning* Very Intense
heat loads may mar or melt surfaces, may char and burn surfaces while
the heat is on, but may snuff out immediately afterward.



-l8-

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FIRES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Although thermal radiation would start many fires in urban and
in most suburban areas, such fires by themselves would seldom con-
stitute a source of major destruction. Outside the region of exten-
sive blast damage, fires in trash piles, in dry palm trunks, in roof
shingles, in auto and household upholstery, drapes, or flammable
stores are normally accessible and readily controllable* By the very
fact that these fires start from material exposed to the incident
light, they can be easily spotted and, in the absence of other dis-
tractions, can be quickly extinguished. Where the blast effects are
severe and damage extensive, little effective fire fighting is likely.



A SURVEY OF THE WEAPONS AND HAZARDS WHICH MAY FACE
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WARTIME



Harold L. Brode
P-3170
June 1965



-15-

Most exposed surfaces in the city ere
non- combustible end much of the remainder is not ignitable by thermal
flash. Although many fires could simultaneously stert wherever build-
ing interiors ere illuminated by the bomb thermal energy, they ere
not likely to be inmed lately beyond control, end will often go out
unattended as they exhaust the available fuel (as in trash barrels or
isolsted wood piles or even pieces of paper on tables or floors) .

Hanging non-flamneble shields over
window openings and removing likely fuels from exposed positions
could also help.



RAND CORPORATION



HIROSHIMA

John Hersey
New Yorker of 31 August, 1946

I

A NOISELESS FLASH

At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning,
on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment
when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima,

Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the
surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross
Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors

He was one step beyond an open window
when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic
photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down
on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese
would, " Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave !" Just then
(the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the
blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was
wearing flew off his face ; the bottle of blood crashed
against one wall ; his Japanese slippers zipped out from
under his feet— but otherwise, thanks to where he
stood, he was untouched.

Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon
and rushed around to the man's office and found him
terribly cut by glass.

Starting east and west
from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September,
made new measurements, and the highest radiation
they found this time was 3.9 times the natural " leak."




SO, LIKE BERT VOL) TO AVOID

THE THINGS FLYING THROUGH THE /AIR...




..AND TO KEEP FROM GETTING

CUT OR EVEN BADLY BURNED.



AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL



STRESS

Psychological Studies
of

Bombing and Civilian Defense

Irving L. Janis

The RAND Corporation

1951

EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB 13
Time from flash to blast = 4 sec at 1 mile:
A substantial proportion of the respondents in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki reported having reacted immediately to the intense flash
alone, as though it were a well-known danger signal, despite the
fact that they were unaware of its significance at the time. A num-
ber of them said that they voluntarily ducked down or "hit the
ground" as soon as the flash occurred and had already reached the
prone position before the blast swept over them.

14 REACTIONS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

From the above discussion, it is apparent that some of the sur-
vivors immediately perceived the flash as a danger signal. It also
appears that for those who were not located near the center there
was an opportunity to take protective action that could reduce
injuries from the secondary heat wave and from flying glass, fall-
ing debris, and other blast effects. It is noteworthy that some
survivors evidently failed to make use of this opportunity, as is to
be expected when there has been no prior preparation for it.

In a later chapter on the problems of civil defense, we shall have
occasion to take account of these findings, since they suggest that
casualties in an A-bomb attack might be reduced if the population
has been well prepared in advance to react appropriately to the
flash of the explosion.



AD Al 05824 DNA5593T

GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS
BROKEN BY AIRBLAST

E. Royce Fletcher

Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki.
3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1m behind
the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave:

10 fragments /m 2 for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure
100 f ragmen ts/m 2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure
1,000 f ragmen ts/m 2 for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure



Figure 10



10



c



5 ■



U



l I



DUCK AND COVER



Window Wall (2.1m behind window)



Measured distribution



density - exp( -0.09374 a



o 6.7 mm thick glass
o 0.2-0.3 mm thick glass




degrees



)



2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Angle below lower edge of window, degrees



AECU-3350

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION



BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM
BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING
MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY
ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS

By

L Gerald Bowen
Donald R. Richmond
Mead B. Wetherbe
Clayton S. White



Table 5, 1 Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data

for Missiles from Traps at Various Ranges from Ground
Zero

30 kt TEAPOT -APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955



Distance from Ground Zero, ft
Maximum overpressure, psi
Number ot traps
Total number of glass missiles
Geometric mean missiles mass, gms
Standard geometric deviation in mass
Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec
Standard geometric deviation in velocity
Per cent of total missiles expected

to penetrate
A verage number of missiles per sq ft
Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate



4,700


5,500


10, 500


5.0


3.8


1.9


6


2


5


2129


320


37


0. 133


0. 580


1.25


3. 01


3. 47


3. 35


170


168


103


1.27


1.25


1.25



3.9* 12.8*

100.9 45.5
3. 9* 5. 3*



0. 4*

2. 1
0. 006*



♦ Computed from individual evaluation of each missile



The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1 964)

GLASS

Peak Median Median Maximum

overpressure velocity mass number per

(psi) (ft/sec) (grams) sqft

1.9 108 1.45 4.3

5. 170 0. 13 388



£ 2,000



8

a
o

H
W

S2



1,000




Peak



1,000 2,000

DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET)

overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst



GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY

Probability of penetration (percent)



Mass of glass
fragments
(grams)

0. 1

1.



60



99



Impact velocity (ft/ sec)

235 410 730

140 245 430



cue



for



surviva



OPERATION CUf

A.E.C. NEVADA TEST SITE
MAY 5, 1955




A report by the FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS



BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN,

Director > Atomic Test Operations, PCD A

The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by
many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of
great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively
large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a
given point*
92

BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION

by dr. herman elwyn pearse, Professor of Surgery at the Uni-
versity of Rochester. Consultant to several Government depart-
ments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of
Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special
Weapons Project

After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the
National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiro-
shima.
140

Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and *we found again that
the wounds healed in the same manner, as those that we had produced in
the laboratory. There was some difference in these lesions from the ordi-
nary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experi-
ments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they
are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char
acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing.

142

For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get
much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers,
you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed
by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first
degree burns at 107 calories.
143

If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent
thousands and thousands of burns.

. . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree
burns on bare skin required 4 calories* When we put 2 layers of cloth in
contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters,
about a fifth of an inch, and it increases, the protective effect 5 times. The
energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second-
degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you
are better off than if your wear tight clothing.
144



OSTI ID: 4411414 «-e&

STUDIES OH FLASH BURNS:
THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BT 2, k AND 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS
George Mixter, Jr c , M Do and Herman E Q Pearse, Mo D*
THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
ABSTRACT

Fabric interposed "between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester
White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ turns*
For the 2, k and 6 layers of fahric studied this increase was 3<>6, 38 and
over 10*1- cal/cm 2 respectively when the inner layer of fabric was in contact
with the skin Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 ram increased
the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 7.t to 29 cal/cm 2 ,
provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation If the outer layer
was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the
thermal buxn

INTRODUCTION

In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study
of flash burns in unshielded skin* It is well known from the atomic bombing
in Japan that this type of bum was modified by clothing „ A laboratory
analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun
(5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com-

binations 1. 2 Layers 2 k Layers

a. light green oxford olive green sateen
knitted cotton underwear thin cotton oxford

wool-nylon shirting

b. light green oxford (HPM) knitted cotton underwear



knitted cotton underwear



3o 6 layers

olive green sateen
thin cotton oxford
mohair frieze
rayon lining
wool-nylon shirting
knitted wool underwear



5o M©rton, J Q EL, Kingsley, Ho D , and Pearse* Ho E c , "Studies on Flash
Bums: The Protective Etfect® of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology
aM Obstetrics , gjj., ^97~5©1 (April 1952)




ADB951 673



WT-770

This document consists of 64 pages

1 QQ

No. - ^ J of 295 copies, Series A



OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

Project 8.5

THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED
TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES

REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR



by



uraat'

------ -•-».. ■»*»«» »*w>>#ft fliK%g



sterling and Staff



Reo«Ai>co..V'.

BV authority 0pW.Jy.&iJ^ZfJ^i^^/j^^ dl9 Aa Reatriotedj^rTn Foreign



BV




fcB|^^ontains restricted data as
definecnnT^ll^fc^^j^rgyAct of 1954.
Its transmittal or^^MM^^^of its

contents in any manner to an unCT^tized



Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories
Army Medical Service Graduate School
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project



4.1.2 Fa ctors Contributing to the Greater Degree of Thermal Protection
in the Field,



There are several conditions encountered in the field, espe-
cially at the higher energy levels, but nob duplicated la, the labora-
tory (at least not up to the present time) that may account for the
fact that like amounts of thermal energy did not produce comparable
results in the laboratory and in the field* First, the thermal energy
is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb
than it is in the laboratory. Second, due to smoke obscuration the
animals in the field actually received a smaller percentage of the
total energy delivered than they did in the laboratory. Third, the
blast wave following the explosion tended to extinguish flames and
remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laboratory tests.
Fourth, where the heat reached the fabric layer next to the skin,
uniform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field.

(2) Motion pictures of clothed animals, exposed to 50.0
and 33.5 cal/cm 2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouds

of black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ms of the explosion.

(3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not
been duplicated in laboratory applications of thermal energy, has two
possible protective effects. First, it can be expected to extinguish
flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated for fire
resistance, thus removing a source of high heat. Although the blast
wave may not actually extinguish bhe flame in all cases,* it can be
expected in general to have this effect. Second, the blast wave would
tend to remove any char which, if allowed to remain, would act as a
heat reservoir and increase the likelihood of a severe burn.

46



Fig. 3.5 Destruction of Outer and Second Layers
of Pigs 1 Uniforms (Shots 9 and 10)



r ioo L



M



ao



eo



§ 40



I toh



HOT - f ET
FIRE RESISTANT 50 /SO

OUTER LAYER



O SECOND LAYER
OH ooo ooo o



g too



5 •©



eo



c 40

o



2 to
I



TEMPERATE

• • *

OUTER LAYER



SECOND LAYER



-L.



X



-4.



tO 40 60 SO 100

col. / so, cm.



O - oo o



tO 40 60 60

col. / sq. cm.



100



WT-1441



f bis document consists of 50 pages.
1



OPERATION



Kl.



1 75



ol 185 copies, Series A



PLUMB BOB




NEVADA TEST SITE
MAY-OCTOBER 1957



Project 8.2




oX the/

7 Mr/965



AVAILABLE COPY WILL NOT ^SflMTT
FULLY LEGIBLE BKP^C^V^uy^"'
rj^HODUCTIOr WILL BE W-i£fr
REQUESTED BY USEH3 Ci DDG



PREDICTION Of THERMAL PROTECTION of
UNIFORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a
STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U)



Issuance Date: May 2, 1960



HEADOUARTEftS FIELD COMMAND
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
SANDIA BASE. AlBUOUERQUE. NEW MEXICO



& jun? iast>



This material contains Information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws
Title 16, U. S. C, Sees. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which In anv
manner m art unauthorised person !.
hlblterl uy law.



1.2.2 Comparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burns to Pigs. The Improved NML skin
simulant, molded from silica-powder-filled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded
at a depth of 0.05 cm In order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment.
The basic criterion is a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human skin or for a
2+ mild burn to pig skin. This criterion is based on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a
minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mild burn in pig skin) to a second-degree burn In
human skin, (2) an initial skin temperature of 81 C, and (3) correspondence of the thermal pro-
perties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of indicent
radiant exposure is estimated to be ± 10 percent. A skin-simulant temperature rise of 20 C or
greater is estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate pig skin burn,
and a rise of 35 C is estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild pig burn. The latter
estimations, probably accurate to ± 20 percent, are based on pig-burn data obtained at the Uni-
versity of Rochester (Reference 6).

12

CONFIDENTIAL



TABLE 2.1 RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN
SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS



Specimen Radiant Absorptancc



Skin simulant, bare 0.72

Skin simulant, blackened 0.95

Poplin, Shade US, S-oz/yd* 0.63

Sateen, gray, 9-oz/yd 2 0.91

15

CONFIDENTIAL




NOTE: These pigs
were strapped
to tables and
could not beat

or roll out outer
garment ignition

unlike humans



4 • 13 16 20

Equivalent Field Rodiont Exposure, col /cm*




Addendum No. 1



/or

DNA 1240H-2, Part 2

HANDBOOK OF
UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

21 January 1974



M. J. Dudagh
DASIAC

General Electric Company-TEMPO

816 State Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93102



CHAPTER TITLE

VOLUME 2 - PART 2

18 SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF
UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL



PAGE



18-1



19 August 1973 CHAPTER 18

16.7 THERMAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS ON SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL

18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria

Table 18-2

CDC NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION CRITERIA



New Thermal Radiation Criteria
Risk Criteria for Burna Under Summer Uniforms to Warned. Exposed Personnel



7. Incidence Mechanism 10KT cal/cm



100KT cal/cm 2 1000KT cal/cm 2



Negligible

Moderate

Emergency



2.5

5

5



1° burn
1 burn
2° burn



3.1
3.7
6.3



4.2
5.0
8.8



5.8
6.8
12



Time to Ineffectiveness


Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns


7. Incidence 10KT cal/cm 2 100KT cal/cm 2 lOOOKT cal/cm 2


24. hr


50 38 53 73



Personnel Risk and Casualty Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects
ACN 4260, U. S. Army Coitfcat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear
Studies. August 1971



When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re-
sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more
water loss and the more heat or energy loss.

How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?

Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for
Thermal Burns

ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News

http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462

August 2008

By Patrice Wendling

Elsevier Global Medical News

CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound
dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.

The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has
advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for
almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician,
explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association.

"Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in
an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap
for burn wounds," he said.

Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general
surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap
reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely
available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing
removal.

"I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We
started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those
criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral
base."

Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial-
and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single
layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then
secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed.

Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as
manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination
before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital,
Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll
to expose a clean surface.



ADA383988



November 2963
Second printing May 1964



Unclassified Version

SURVEY OF THE THERMAL THREAT
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Prepared for:

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

By: Jack C. Rogers and T. Miller
SRI Project No. MU-4021



Approved:



ROBERT A. HARKGR, DIRECTOR
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES DIVISION



OCD REVIEW NOTICE

This report represents the authors' views, which in general are In harmony with the
technical criteria of the Office of Civil Defense. However, a preliminary evaluation
by OCD indicatos the need for further evaluation of the fire threat of nuclear weapons
and formulation of promising research and action programs.



NOTE: discrepancies are due to HUMIDITY differences ,
ENCORE nuclear test (Nevada desert) humidity was ONLY 19%



U

o

4*
cd

U

i *

rH m

c

• (D

: a

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Martin, S. B. , On Predicting the Ignition Susceptibility of Typical Kin-
dling Fuels to Ignition by the Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Det-
onations, Tech. Report 367, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory,
San Francisco, Calif., April 1959. (U)



UCRL-TR-231593



Thermal Radiation from Nuclear
Detonations in Urban
Environments



R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock



June 7, 2007

Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within
buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded
estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in bum injuries may be
greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].



We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a
"radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban
environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction
of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.



6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear
Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment
2007," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt,
R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review.

11



HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS



LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956



The probable fire situation in a British city

35 Japanese houses are constructed of wood and once they were set on
tire they continued to burn even when knocked over. In this country
only about 10 per cent, of all the material in the average house is
combustible, and under conditions of complete collapse, where air
would be almost entirely excluded, it is doubtful whether a fire could
continue on any vigorous scale.

40 It seems unlikely from the evidence available that an initial density
of fires equivalent to one in every other building would be started by a
nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that a much
smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to thermal
radiation and even then it is not certain that continuing fires would
develop. Curtains may catch fire, but it does not necessarily follow that
they will set light to the room; in the last war it was found that only
one incendiary bomb out of every six that hit buildings started a
continuing fire.

From a 10 megaton bomb, with its longer lasting thermal
radiation (see paragraph 21), it takes about 20 calories per square
centimetre to start fires because so much of the heat (spread out over
the longer emission) is wasted by conduction into the interior of the
combustible material and by convection and re-radiation whilst the
temperature of the surface is being raised to the ignition point. But
the distance at which 20 calories per square centimetre can be produced
is only 11 miles, so that the scaling factor for a 10 megaton airburst
bomb is therefore 11 and not 22.

43 For a ground burst bomb, however, several other factors contribute
to a further reduction in the fire range. Apart from an actual loss of
heat by absorption into the ground and from the pronounced shielding
effect of buildings, the debris from the crater tends to reduce the

jadiating temperature or trie fireball ana a greater proportion of the
energy is consequently radiated in the infra red region of the spectrum"

r — this proportion being more easily absorbed b y the atmosphere.

44 An important point in relation to personal protection against the
effects of hydrogen bomb explosions is that because the thermaT
radiation lasts so long there is more time for people who may be
caught in the open, ana who may be well beyond the range of serious
ganger trom blast, to rush to cover and so escape some part of the
exposure. For example, people in the open might receive second
degree burns (blistering) on exposed skin at a range of 16 miles from a
iu megaton ground burst bomb (8X2— see paragraph 24). If.
however, they could take cover m a few seconds they would escape
this damage. Moreover, at this range the blast wave would not arrive
tor another minute and a half so mat any effects due to the blast in
the open (e.g. flying glass, etc.) could be completely avoided .



csnfie:




TECHNICAL LIBRARY
of the



Clftsamcaac'i



&7_9*I Dale - "



ARMED FORCES
SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT



HANDBOOK



o



o

00



on



CAPABILITIES

of

ATOMIC WEAPONS



DJi.. •>.'. . . . !!) A* J^jkv!** 1

interval:- u. Avfi'-- "i.. , rt,v J

DBCL AC ' J '



SECRET

10,3 Damage Criteria

10.31 The tables presented in this section show various target items,
their criteria for different degrees of damage and pertinent
remarks. The items are listed in alphabetical order for each
type of military operation. An attempt is made to give the source
of the data by use of numbers to the right of the damage criteria*
The key of this numbering system is indicated below:

a* full-scale test data (including Hiroshima and Nagasaki • .(1)

b. Estimates made from scale experiments . • • . (2)

c # Theoretical analysis •••••• ••••(3)

d. Consensus of qualified persons •••••••••(b)

10.32 For those items not included in Table VIII, select the listed item
most similar in those characteristics* discussed previously as
being the Important factors in determining the extent of. damage

to be expected. Perhaps the most important item to be remem-
bered when estimating effects on personnel is the amount of
cover actually involved. This cover depends on several items;
however, one factor is all important, namely, the degree of
forewarning, of an Impending atomic attack. It is obvious that
only a few seconds warning is necessary under most conditions
in order to take fairly effective cover. The large number
of casualties in Japan resulted for the most part from the
lack of warning.



- 81 -

SECRET



C IN N I E N T I AL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL TM 23-200

REPARIMENI IF THE NAVY OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.1B

DEPARTMENT RF THE AIR FORCE AFL 136*1

NAVMC 1104 REV



CAPABILITIES

OF

ATOMIC WEAPONS (U)




Prepared by
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY
AND THE AIR FORCE

REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957

C IN N I E N T I AL



46MIULNIIAL



Personnel in structures. A major cause of
personnel casualties in cities is structural
collapse and damage. The number of
casualties in a given situation may be
reasonably estimated if the structural
damage is known. Table 6-1 shows
estimates of casualty production in two
types of buildings for several damage
levels. Data from Section VII may be
used to predict the ranges at which
specified structural damage occurs. Dem-
olition of a brick house is expected to
result in approximately 25 percent mor-
tality, with 20 percent serious injury
and 10 percent light injury. On the
order of 60 percent of the survivors must
be extricated by rescue squads. Without
rescue they may become fire or asphyxi-
ation casualties, or in some cases be
subjected to lethal doses of residual
radiation. Reinforced concrete struc-
tures, though much more resistant to
blast forces, produce almost 100 percent
mortality on collapse. The figures of
table 6-1 for brick homes are based on
data from British World War II expe-
rience. It may be assumed that these
predictions are reasonably reliable for
those cases where the population is in a
general state of expectancy of being
subjected to bombing and that most
personnel have selected the safest places
in the buildings as a result of specific
air raid warnings. For cases of no
prewarning or preparation, the number
of casual ties is expected to be considerably
higher.

6-2



Glass breakage extends to considerably
greater ranges than almost any other
structural damage, and may be expected
to produce large numbers of casualties
at ranges where personnel are relatively
safe from other effects, particularly for
an unwarned population.

Table 6-1. Estimated Casualty Production in Structures
for Various Degrees of Structural Damage



1-2 story brick homes (high ex-
plosive data):

Severe damage

Moderate damage

Light damage



Killed
outright



Percent

25

<5



Serious
Injury
(hospi-
taliza-
tion)



Percent
20
10
<5



Light
injury
(No hos-
pitaliza-
tion)



Pertent
10
5

<5



Kote. These percentages do not include the casualties which may result
from fires, asphyxiation, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped
personnel. The numbers represent the estimated percentage of casualties
expected at the minimum range where the specified structural damage occurs.

Personnel in a prone position
are less likely to be struck by flying mis-
siles than those who remain standing.

6-3

Table 6-2. Critical Radiant Exposures for Burns Under

Clothing

(Expressed in eal/em 2 incident on outer surface of cloth)



Clothing


Burn


1 KT


100 KT


10 MT


Summer Uniform


1°


8


11


14


(2 lavers)


2°


20


25


35


Winter Uniform


1°


60


80


100


(4 lavers)


2°


70


90


120



6-4



LI



SECTION ill
THERMAL RADIATION PHENOMENA



3.1 General

For a surface burst having the same yield as an
air burst, the presence of the earth's surface
results in a reduced thermal radiation emission
and a cooler fireball when viewed from that surface.
This is due primarily to heat transfer to the soil
or water, the distortion of the fireball by the
reflected shock wave, and the partial obscuration
of the fireball by dirt and dust (or water) thrown
up by the blast wave.

UNNULNIIAL 3-1

Measurements from the ground of the total
thermal energy from surface bursts, although not
as extensive as those for air bursts, indicate that
the thermal yield is a little less than half that
from equivalent air bursts. For a surface burst the
thermal yield is assumed to be one-seventh of the
total yield.

3-2



<?— jp cal/sq cm (air burst).

and

n 1.35X 10 6 W(T) , , . .

Q= — cal/sq cm (surface burst).

where Q=radiant exposure (cal/sq cm)
7= atmospheric transmissivity
W 7 = weapon yield (KT)
Z>=slant range (yds).

^AAAIfiftMttXlAL 3"~3

The differences between the air burst and
surface burst curves are caused by the difference
in apparent radiating temperatures (when viewed
from the ground) and the difference in geometrical
configuration of the two types of burst .

50 mile visibility and 5 gm/m 3 water vapor.
10 mile visibility and 10 gm/m 3 water vapor.



3.3 Radiant Exposure vs. Slant Range

a. Spectral- Characteristics. At distances of
operational interest, the spectral (wavelength)
distribution of the incident thermal radiation,
integrated with respect to time, resembles very
closely the spectral distribution of sunlight.
For each, slightly less than one-half of the radia-
tion occurs in the visible region of the spectrum,
approximately one-half occurs in the infrared
region and a very small fraction (rarely greater
than 10 percent) lies in the ultraviolet region of
the spectrum. The color temperature of the sun
and an air burst are both about 6,000° K. A
surface burst, as viewed by a ground observer,
contains a higher proportion of infrared radiation
and a smaller proportion of visible radiation than
the air burst, with almost no radiation in the
ultraviolet region. The color temperature for a
surface burst is about 3,000° K. A surface burst
viewed from the air may exhibit a spectrum more
nearly like an air burst.



2,000 4,000 7,000 10,000 20JOOO 40,000 7Q&O G q

FIGURE 3-5B

ATMOSPHERIC TRANSHISSIVITY
VS. SLANT RANGE-AIR AND




| i i i I 1 1 •

IPOO 2,000 4,000 7,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 70,000

Slant Ron«t (YordO



12.3



r n ii nifcfttiTi 1 1
«HnffrniLN i wii iiL



Table l£-2. Critical Radiant Exposure Values far Various Material*



Material



Tent material:

Canvas, white, 12 oz/yd 1 , untreated

Canvas, OD, 12 oz/yd 1 , flame-proofed

Packaging materials:

Fibreboard, V2S, BT 850 psi, laminated

Fibreboard, V3S, BT 275 psi r laminated

Fibreboard, V3C, BT 850 psi, corrugated

Fibreboard, W5C, BT 200 psi, corrugated

Plywood, douglas fir 0i in.)

Airship material, aluminized, N-113A100, 16 oz/yd 3

Airship material, aluminized, N-113A70, 19.4 oz/yd*

Airship material, aluminized, N-128A170, 8 oz/yd 1

Doped fabrics (used on some aircraft control surfaces) :
Cellulose nitrate covered with 0.0015" thick aluminum
foil.

Cellulose nitrate, aluminized

Plastics:

Laminated methyl methacrylate

USAF window plastic (J4 in.)

Vinylite (opaque), Vi in. thick

Sand:

Coral

Siliceous

Sandbags: Cotton canvas, dry* filled

Wood, white pine ■■

White pine, given protective coating

Construction materials:

Roll roofing, mineral surface

Roll roofing, smooth surface



Damage



Destroyed.
Destroyed.



Flames during exposure

Flames during exposure

Flames during exposure

Flames during exposure

Flames during exposure

Aluminum surface discolored.
Aluminum surface destroyed .

Fabric destroyed

Aluminum surface discolored.
Aluminum surface destroyed-

Fabric destroyed

Delaminates

Fabric destroyed



Sporadic flaming— .
Persistent flaming.



Surface melts...
Bubbling

{Dense smoking.
Flaming



Explosion*

Explosion*

Failure

0.1 mm depth char.
0.1 mm depth char.



Surface melts

Flaming during exposure.

Surface melts

Flaming during exposure.



Critical radiant exposure
Q„ (cal/sq cm)



I KT



12
5

9
7
6
5
9
20
24
27
10
15
20
2
5

60



73
240
3
20

15
11
10
10
40

8

22
4
9



100 KT 10 MT



21 !
9 I

16
13
11
10
16
35
43
47
IS
27
35
4

10
80
6

120
430
4
20

27
19
18
18
71

14
40
7

16



•"Popcoraing."



7.1a



SECTION VII
DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES



7.1 General

Tunnels in solid rock are difficult to destroy by
explosions of nuclear weapons. In this case, the
shock wave is transmitted through the rock.
When it reaches the tunnel the wave is reflected
as a tensile wave, and there is a tendency for the
rock to spall or become detached from the rock-
tunnel interface. Use of tunnel linings materially
reduces this spelling. Mass crushing of the rock
and filling of the tunnel occurs closer to the burst
point.

7.4 Field Fortifications

a- Air Blast Air blast is the controlling
damage-producing mechanism for destruction of
field fortifications, including those reinforced,
revetted or covered. Definitions of severe, mod-
erate, and light damage levels to various types of
field fortifications are given in table 7-4. These
damage levels are based upon various degrees of
collapse and structural failure except for un-
revetted trenches and foxholes, which have dam-
age levels based on degree of filling caused by
collapse of the walls and by filling with dust and
debris. Areas covered with loose material, such
as sand and gravel, may provide sufficient dust
and debris to completely fill a trench or foxhole,
whereas areas with stable vegetation or areas of
dry silty soil may not provide significant quanti-
ties of dust and debris to appreciably fill a trench



or foxhole. Collapse of the walls of foxholes and
trenches by air blast and air induced ground
shock is usually not significant except at ranges
less than those shown for severe damage in figure
7-22*

Table 7-4. Damage Criteria for Field Fortification*
Description Severe

Unrevetted trenches and fox- The trench or foxhole is
holes with or without light at least 50 percent
cover. filled with earth.

FIGURES 7-20—7-22

The curves in figure 7-22 are based on results
of tests run in a consolidated dry sand and gravel
soil. Trenches and foxholes in damp soil with
stable vegetation or dry eilty soil will receive
moderate and severe damage at ranges less than
those shown in figure 7-22. The curves of figure
7-22 are for average rectangular foxholes with the
longitudinal axis perpendicular to the direction of
air blast propagation. Damage will be equal or
less for other orientations.

Given: A 50 KT burst at an altitude of 1,000
feet.

Find: To what horizontal distance there is a
50 percent probability of severe damage
to an unrevetted foxhole in a dry,
consolidated sand and gravel soil.

Solution: 680 yards.

Approximately 20 psl peak overpressure



Table 7-8. Damage Criteria for Underground Structures



Structure


Damage


Damage distance


Remarks


Relatively small, heavy, well designed under-
ground targets.

Relatively long, flexible targets, such as
buried pipelines, tanks, etc.


(Severe

t Light

[Severe

< Moderate...
Light


\%R.

2*

i#R*

2R m

2H to 3ft.


Collapse.

Slight cracking, severance of brittle

external connections.
Deformation and rupture.
Slight deformation and rupture.
Failure of connections. (Use higher value
for radial orientation of connections.)



Note, i?.- Apparent Crater Radius.



UNOBSTRUCTED (DESERT) TERRAIN
(NO ENERGY LOSS

FROM BLAST BY WORK) FIGURE 7-10A

SEVERE DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE FRAME OFFICE BUILDINGS




200 400 000 800 1.000 1.200 1.400 1,600



GROUND RANGE (yard*)



2.1c (1) FIGURE 2-6 GROWTH OF THE MACH STEM




Region of Moch Reflection

Region of Regulor
Reflection



FIGURE 2-7 MACH STEM HEIGHT (I KT)




Horizontal Range (yards)



FIGURE 4-21 JjMHWHTini



4-54





(SUOIOJJH) PJ9JA |D|0± - p|«JA uoittu



4-38




Center Thick- Wind
Yield height ness Radius speed
(kt) <m> (ra) (m) (km/hr)



1 2,840 1760
10 7,000 3060
100 11,700 5340



920 39.6
2400 70.2
6000 72.0



Rainout through entire cloud



1<T



RAINOUT



Precipitation required to de-
posit the vertical integral on
the ground.

Amount of
precipitation (cm)



1-kt
cloud



10 -kt
cloud



100-kt
cloud



4 -l



0.18
100



,-2



2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Vertical integral gamma radiation
Height at stabilization time — km UCRL-51164 December 26, 1971
1 I



1000



Distance from ground zero — km



FIRST CASUALTIES OF THE H-BOMB

by DWIGHT MARTIN



Five weeks out of Yaizu, her home port 120
miles southeast of Tokyo, the 99-ton tuna
trawler Fukuryu Maru ("Fortunate Dragon")
hove to at a position 166°30' east longitude
and 11*52' north latitude. She dropped an-
chor and cast her nets at 5:30 a.m. on March L
The Fortunate Dragons position, though her
skipper and crew did not realize it, was 71 miles
east-northeast of Bikini atoll and 14 miles out*
side the boundary of the restricted zone of the
U.S. government's atomic testing area.

A calm sea was running and the weather was
clear. Sunrise was at 6:09 a.m. and visibility
was excellent. The Fortunate Dragons skipper,




AT HER DOCK the unfortunate Fortunate Drag-
on* still radioactive, floats untended by crewmen.



"We made port in Yaizu at 6 a.m. on March
14. We were now quite sick and frightened,
and we went to see Dr. Toshisuke Oii at Kyo-
ritsu hospital. He said we had severe burns
and gave us some white ointment.' 9



24-year-old Tadaichi Tsutsui, was standing
watch on the bridge, and eight crewmen were
enthusiastically hauling in their first nets. Aft-
er nearly three weeks of poor catches near
Midway Island, the Fortunate Dragon had
finally run into luck in more southern waters
and her hold was already filled with 16,500
pounds of fat tuna. It was just a few seconds
before 6:12 a.m.

lf Then," said Crewman Sanjiro Masuda lat-
er, "we saw flashes of fire, as bright as the sun
itself, rising to the sky. They rose about 10
degrees from the horizon and the sky around
them glowed fiery red and yellow.

But Captain Tsutsui was getting more and
more uneasy: "I thought, The bomb tests
were being conducted over coral reefs. It could
be pulverized coral ash, couldn't it?' " He
thought some more about shi no Ani, then
ordered the crew to up anchor. The trawler
steamed for home, 2,000 miles away.

"On the first night/' said Radioman Aikichi
Kuboyama, "we were unable to eat our sup-
per. We tried drinking some sake (rice wine)
to improve our appetites, but our appetites
would not improve and the sake did not make
us drunk. We were very depressed. Some of
the crew grumbled 'pikadon but others said
it couldn't be. I think someone said it was
probably dust from some volcanic explosion."




Vol. 38, No. 13 March 29, 1954




Fig. 5.10 Shot 1, Fallout Particulate, Station 250.04

This is a raft downwind in Bikini Lagoon, which received
a land equivalent of 113 R/hr (1 hour reference gamma dose
rate), according to Figures 2.2 and 6.1. Land equivalent
dose rates were 7 times the raft dose rate in the lagoon.

According to Table 1 in Carl F. Miller's report USNRDL-466,
250.04 received 33.6 (mg/sq f t) / (R/hr at 1 hr) at 59.5 kft.
Hence, 3.8 grams/sq ft.



SOME EFFECTS OF

Ionizing
Radiation



ON HUMAN BEINGS





Report TID-5358




Case 67 at 28 days and at 6 months after exposure
Beta burns occurred where fallout was retained




Case 72 at 28 days and at 6 months after exposure
Recovery from fallout beta burns to skin and hair



Case 2d at 45 days

Less striking fallout described as "mist-like"
was observed on Ailinginae and Rongerik.
Fallout was not visible on Utirik, which was
contaminated to only a mild degree. The se-
verity of the skin manifestations was roughly
proportional to the amount of fallout observed.

a. Shelter. Those individuals who remained
indoors or under the trees during the fallout
period developed less severe lesions.



Group


Fallout Observed


Skin Lesions and
Epilation


Rongelap_ _
Ailinginae. _
Rongerik__.

Utirik


Heavy (snowlike)

Moderate (mistlike) _
Moderate (mistlike) _

None_


Extensive.
Less extensive.
Slight.

No skin lesions
or epilation.







b. Bathing. Small children who went wad-
ing in the ocean developed fewer foot lesions.

[Clothing prevented fallout retention.]



FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M. (E.S.T.)
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1955



A REPORT

BY THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
ON THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS



FALLOUT PATTERN OF 1954 TEST IN THE PACIFIC



19« Data from this test permits estimates of casual-
ties which would have been suffered within this contaminated
area if it had been populated. These estimates assume: (1)
that the people in the area would ignore even the most ele-
mentary precautions; (2) that they would not take shelter
but would remain out of doors completely exposed for about
36 hours; and (3) that in consequence they would receive
the maximum exposure. Therefore, it will be recognized that
the estimates which follow are what might be termed extreme
estimates since they assume the worst possible conditions.



PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT



26. In an area of heavy fallout uhe greatest radio-
logical hazard is that of exposure to external radiation.
Simple precautionary measure? can greatly reduce the hazard
to life. Exposure can be reduced by taking shelter and by
utilizing simple decontamination measures until such times
as persons can leave the area. Test data indicate that the
radiation level, i.e., the rate of exposure, indoors on the
first floor of an ordinary frame house in a fallout area
would be about one -ha If the level out of doors. Even greater
protection would be afforded by a brick or stone house.
Taking shelter in the basement of an average residence would
reduce the radiation level to about one-tenth that experienced
out of doors.

29. If fallout particles come into contact with the
skin, hair or clothing, prompt decontamination precautions
such as have been outlined by the Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration will greatly reduce the danger. These include
such simple measures as thorough bathing of exposed parts

of the body and a change of clothing .

30. If persons in a heavy fallout area heeded
warning or notification of an attack and evacuated the area
or availed themselves of adequate protective measures, the
percentage of fatalities would be greatly reduced even in
the zone of heaviest fallout.



AD696959 D DAS A 2019-2

Proceedings:

SECOND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE

ON SELECTED EFFECTS OF A GENERAL WAR

VOLUME M

This Conference was sponsored by the Defense Atomic Support
Agency (Controct DASA 01-67-C-0024, NWER Subtask DB003)
through the auspices of the New York Academy of Sciences
Interdisciplinary Communications Program. It was held at
Princeton, New Jersey, during 4-7 October 1 967,

DASIAC Special Report 95
July 1969

SESSION II Wright H. Langham 45

LANG HAM: Fallout was predicted for the Trinity test in I 945 by
the bomb phenologists, Hershfeider and McGee. Stafford Warren
mounted evacuation teams and monitoring teams to cover the poten-
tial fallout area. We didn't have to evacuate anybody; we almost did.
The arbitrary limit chosen for evacuation was an infinite life- time
dose of 50 r. One family approached this limit, and there was much
debate as to whether we should evacuate them or not. They weren't
evacuated.

SESSION II Theodore B. Taylor 51

TAYLOR: I would like to interject something that you challenged,
Staff. You said a moment ago, you can't hear it. Apropos of the
Dog Shot, fallout was clearly audible. There were little beads of
steel from the tower that condensed, and one heard this constant
tinkle, tinkle of steel from the tower hitting the aluminum roofs and
then rolling down the gutters and piling up in little piles on the ground.

76 Lin Root DASA 2019-2

ROOT: Mutual Security Agreement— after Korea. It was terribly
important that Japan become a responsible member of the organiza-
tion. The Yoshida cabinet was entirely favorable to the U.S. and it
looked as if there would not be too much opposition. Then the fish-
ermen arrived. Demonstrations flared up everywhere. You had the
trade unions, three million strong, protesting. The cabinet tried to
counteract the anti- American feeling but a tidal wave of anger inun-
dated the country. It was just diminishing when Koboyama died.
This was portrayed as a radiation death.

FREMONT- SMITH: This is the fisherman that had the transfusion
and the hepatitis?



ROOT: Yes. Japanese doctors give very small blood transfusions,
and Koboyama needed a great many.



2
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15-ktBuffalo-1 ^
(AWRE-T28/57, p. 26)




1 mm




TWO FALLOUT PARTICLES FROM A TOWER SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE
PARTICLE ON THE LEFT IS A PERFECT SPHERE WITH A HIGHLY GLOSSY SURFACE;
THE ONE ON THE RIGHT HAS MANY PARTIALLY-ASSIMILATED SMALLER SPHERES
ATTACHED TO ITS SURFACE. BOTH PARTICLES ARE BLACK AND MAGNETIC AND
HAVE A SUPERFICIAL METALLIC APPEARANCE.




THIN SECTION AND RADIOGRAPH OF A FALLOUT PARTICLE FROM A MODERATE-YIELD
TOWER SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THIS PARTICLE IS COMPOSED OF A
TRANSPARENT GLASS CORE WITH A DARKLY COLORED IRON OXIDE GLASS OUTER
ZONE. MOST OF THE RADIOACTIVITY IS CONCENTRATED IN THE OUTER ZONE




I 1 mm 1

C.E. Adorns. The Hature of Individual Radioactive Particles ♦ IV. Fallout
Particlee From A.B*D- of Operation UPSEOT-KNOTHOIB* U.S» Kaval Badio-
logical Defense Laboratory Beportj USNRDL-ttO, February 2h, 195k



THIN SECTION AND RADIOGRAPH OF A FALLOUT PARTICLE FROM A SMALL-YIELD
SURFACE SHOT AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE PARTICLE IS A TRANSPARENT
YELLOW-BROWN GLASS WITH MANY INCLUSIONS OF GAS BUBBLES AND UNMELTED
MINERAL GRAINS. THE RADIOACTIVITY IS DISTRIBUTED IRREGULARLY THROUGHOUT
THE GLASS PHASE OF THE PARTICLE



1.2 KT JANGLE-SUGAR NEVADA SURFACE BURST




C»E* Adams , »t al. The Nature of Individual Radioactive Particles. I.
Surface and Underground A.B.D. Particles From Operation JANGLE • U.S.
Naval Radiological Defease Laboratory Report, USNRDL-37V, November 28,

1952



thin section and radiograph of an angular fallout particle from a
large-yield surface shot at the eniwetok proving grounds. this particle
is composed almost entirely of calcium hydroxide with a thin outer layer
of calcium carbonate, the radioactivity has collected on the surface
and has diffused a short distance into the particle




1 mm




*




V




USNRDL-TR-IQ49
29 July 198b



AD641480

REMOVAL OF SIMULATED FALLOUT FROM ASPHALT
STREETS BY FIREHOSING TECHNIQUES



by

L.L.Wiltshire
W.L.Owen



In general, removal effectiveness Improves with increased
particle size range and increased mass loading, ibr the expenditure
of an effort of k nozzle-minutes (12 man-minutes) per ICr ft , results
ranged as follows:

Particle Size Range Nominal Mass Loading Removal Effectiveness
(uj (g/ft g ) (Residual Fractio n),

H - 88 4.0 0.16

2k.O 0.07

350 - 700 4.0 0.005

2k.O 0.003



U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE LABORATORY

SAN FRANCISCO * CALIFORNIA 94135




Radiation protection factors in modern city buildings
DCPA Attack Environment Manual, ch. 6, panel 18




TRINITY GROUND ZERO:
8000 R/hr at 1 hour




TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REP CRT - AFSWP NO. 507
RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FROM SURFACE BURSTS OF



VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

by

D . C . Borg

L. D. Gates

T. A. Gibson, Jr.

R. W. Paine, Jr.

MAY 195 k

HEADQUARTERS, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drasti-
cally reduce the lethally hazardous areas. A course of action
involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of
the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer

the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much
as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take
shelter before fall-out commences.

f . Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground
shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub-basement of a large building
could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from
fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when
ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will
permit this to be done safely.



vii
Table II

Total Isodose Contour; 500r from Fall-out to H+50 Hours



Yield (MT)


15


1


10


60


Downwind extent (mi)


180


52


152


3^0


Area (mi 2 )


5hO0


470


3880


17,900



SANDIA REPORT

SAND2009-3299
Unlimited Release
Printed May 2009

Analysis of Sheltering and Evacuation
Strategies for an Urban Nuclear
Detonation Scenario

Larry D. Brandt, Ann S. Yoshimura

Executive Summary

A nuclear detonation in an urban area can result in large downwind areas contaminated with
radioactive fallout deposition. Early efforts by local responders must define the nature and
extent of these areas, and advise the affected population on strategies that will minimize their
exposure to radiation. These strategies will involve some combination of sheltering and
evacuation actions. Options for shelter-evacuate plans have been analyzed for a 10 kt scenario in
Los Angeles.



Results from the analyses documented in this report point to the following conclusions:

• When high quality shelter (protection factor ~1 or greater) is available, shelter-in-place
for at least 24 hours is generally preferred over evacuation.

• Early shelter-in-place followed by informed evacuation (where the best evacuation route
is employed) can dramatically reduce harmful radiation exposure in cases where high
quality shelter is not immediately available.

• Evacuation is of life-saving benefit primarily in those hazardous fallout regions where
shelter quality is low and external fallout dose rates are high. These conditions may
apply to only small regions within the affected urban region.

• External transit from a low quality shelter to a much higher quality shelter can
significantly reduce radiation dose received if the move is done soon after the detonation
and if the transit times are short.



I



Evacuation From SF-10




a

2.



•>150 rem
»>300 rem



10



2 4 6 8

Time Evacuation Begins (hrs)
Figure 12. Departure time sensitivities for informed evacuations from shelters with SF=4



Sandia National Laboratories



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1958;, AEC Report ITR-1477 (Oct. 22, 1957).




The lead shield prevents fallout material from settling directly on detector
"A," while at the same time shielding against the intercepted material



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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT



Printed for the Cabinet. December 1954



The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued
for the personal use of Cf\?:<»r??fc^. .r^ : . .^A^^<':r:-

TOP SECRET Copy No.

C. (54) 389 UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: CAB 129/72

9th December. 1954



CABINET



FALL-OUT



Memorandum by the Minister of Defence

I attach a note on the effects of the explosion of a thermo-nuclear bomb-
Its main purpose is to describe the conditions created by fall-out — the radio-active
contamination which is caused when a bomb bursts at on near ground level. The
effects of other forms of energy released by a thermo-nuclear explosion — blast and
heat — are outlined briefly.

2. This analysis is founded on the latest scientific information we have. It
accords with all that we have been able to find out about the effects of the
experiments by the United States in the Pacific and elsewhere. It is also supported
by a similar analysis carried out by the Canadians. We would naturally like to
have consultation with the United States in order to confirm that the conclusions
reached by our scientists are compatible with those to which American scientists
have come. From the varied contacts which have taken place with the Americans,
we have no reasons to suppose that they would dissent on any point of substance
from the analysis here given. But we cannot be certain of this until our formal
request to the Department of Defence for co-operation and consultation in this
field has been submitted to Congress for approval as required by the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act. I understand that the United States Administration hope to iay the
proposed Agreement before Congress in January. In such event the consequent
constitutional processes should be completed in time to permit of joint consultation
with us early next spring.

3. This means that the United States Authorities will continue to be debarred
from entering into the discussions, which they as well as we agree are necessary,
until after the defence estimates are presented to Parliament for 1955-56.
Regrettable as this is, we should, I think, consider whether there are not certain
aspects on which an approach should be made in the meantime. We need, for
example, to discuss with them the revised strategic concept of the Chiefs of Staff
and the implications which this has for Allied defence policy. Even more urgent
is the need to consult with them on the political problems with which they as well
as we are faced in presenting to the public the changes which the advent of the
hydrogen bomb imposes on our respective preparations for defence.

4. There are indications that the United States Government are now
considering the political implications of the hydrogen bomb for their home front.
But we cannot be sure that they will consult us before making any public announce-
ment about its impact on their defence plans, and, if they should announce their
policy without prior consultation with us, we must be able to show that we are
not unprepared for these problems in our new defensive policy. Moreover, by

47259



2



initiating discussions with the Americans on the aspects which I have suggested,
we should avoid giving the impression that the purpose of our approach is to
obtain information about atomic energy, which they consider themselves unable
to give us without the approval of Congress.

5. Valuable though United States confirmation of our conclusions about
fall-out would be, our scientists are confident that the margin of possible error in
the attached analysis is not wide enough to invalidate its substance. Moreover, the
significance of fall-out for our defence planning would not be materially affected
even if the consequences were later found to be somewhat less bleak than they
appear now. There are no grounds, therefore, for deferring the necessary
re-orientation of our planning until we can check our own conclusions with the
Americans.

6. It is, 1 think, evident that this new information must have a revolutionary
effect over a wide range of our war plans, both military and civil. Thought is
already being given to its implications by the limited circle of Ministers and
officials to whom this scientific appreciation is known. But we cannot ensure that
all our preparations will be properly adjusted to allow for this new factor without
widening the limit within which knowledge of the new implications has so far been
confined. Unless this is arranged much of our planning is bound to get out of gear.

7. If this is done, however, we must accept some risk that people may come
to know quite soon that the Government are planning on this new hypothesis.
Admittedly, almost all the conclusions in the attached note could be reached by
diagnosis of material which has been published. But much of the present
indifference of the public would vanish if they found that the Government had
adopted this basis for their defence plans.

8. I therefore propose that we should now consider : —

(a) The extent to which it is desirable to issue guidance on the implications

of fall-out to Departments concerned with defence preparations.

(b) The manner in which the implications of fall-out for our defence policy

should be presented to the public, bearing in mind that the facts of this
subject are in large measure already available to them and that the
radical changes in Government plans require to take account of fall-
out cannot long be concealed from the public once they are applied to
our defence preparations.

(c) The form and timing of an approach to the United States Government

on problems raised in this paper. The emphasis on the initial
discussions should, I suggest, be on the common political problems
which are raised for the Americans as well as ourselves by the
development of thermo-nuclear weapons, and on the importance
of harmonising the presentation to the public of the changes which we
must each make in our defence policy. It would also be valuable to
exchange views with the Americans, initially perhaps on the Chiefs of
Staff level, on the implications of the latest developments for the
strategic policy of the Western alliance.

H. M.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.I,
7 th December, 1954.



3



ANNEX



EFFECTS OF THE EXPLOSION OF A THERMO NUCLEAR BOMB

The explosion of a hydrogen bomb releases energy in three forms — blast,
heat and nuclear radiation. Their relative importance depends on the distance of
the bomb from the surface at the moment of explosion. Broadly speaking, the
effects of blast and heat are comparatively local in all cases, whereas those of
radiation may be very widespread.

2. Size of the Bomb— There is no technical iimitation to the yield of this
weapon. The analysis which follows is related throughout to a 10-megaton
bomb (10 M.T\). The highest yield achieved in the United States experiments
to date is 30 M.T. The area affected by a bomb of this yield would be about
45 per cent, greater than in the case we are considering.

3. Blast and Heat. — Blast and heat are more intense from an air burst than
from a ground burst. In dull weather damage from the heat wave is somewhat
less extensive than in clear air. The blast and heat resulting from the explosion
of a 10-M.T. bomb would cause destruction on about the following scale : —

Air Burst 10 M.T. Ground Burst

at 20,000 feet 10 M.T.

(Radius in miles) (Radius in miles)

(a) Surface devastation to ordinary brick

houses 1\ 5i

(b} Devastation to facilities and tunnels

below ground Nil J mile in radius

and depth

(c) Major structural damage to brick

houses 9 6J

(d) Surface damage by fire on ordinary

day 8-12 5-9

4. Radiation. — The initial radiation occurring within a few seconds of
detonation of a bomb, whether air burst or ground burst, is probably confined
within a radius of three or four miles. The area thus affected is therefore in any
case devastated by heat and blast.

The residual radiation occurring as an after-effect of the explosion varies very
greatly in its effects, according to the point of burst.

If the bomb bursts too high for the fire ball to reach ground level, the bulk
of the radio-active materials are carried into suspension in the upper atmosphere.
They are then so dispersed that they have no serious local effects when they
eventually settle out.

But if the bomb bursts at or near the ground,* quantities of much heavier
radio-active particles are carried for a while by the winds that blow in differing
directions at different levels. The pattern of precipitation is irregular, varying
with the speed and direction of the air currents in the area, but a high proportion of
the fall-out occurs from very high levels where the winds are more constant in
direction and speed. This tends to elongate the area of contamination in the
direction of the winds there prevailing.

5. Effects of Radiation on Life. — No medical means of curing or even curbing
the effects of radiation on human beings are yet known. On human beings the
effects are cumulative over a considerable period, becoming lethal when a certain
dosage has been absorbed. In the Marshall Islands natives on an atoll 1 10 miles
from the explosion received about one-third of the lethal dose : Americans who
remained in huts 150 miles downwind received over a tenth of the lethal dose.
Both these groups were 20 miles off the nain line of fall-out*

Symptoms of radiation sickness may not show for some days, or even weeks.
But about one-fifth of the lethal dose produces temporary sickness, with increasing
disability as absorption increases beyond this point.

On animals the direct effects are similar. (In the Marshall Islands all animal
life was extinguished on an atoll 110 miles from the explosion.) Moreover, one

* The effects of an explosion on or under the sea are, broadly speaking, intermediate betw
those of a ground burst and of an air burst bomb.



4



of the products of the explosion is radio-active strontium, which has an exceedingly
low rate of decay. If it gains access to the body, it is deposited in the bones like
calcium. Cattle which escaped other effects of radiation would become casualties
if they ate grass, even in small quantities, which was contaminated in this way.
Any milk they produced before they died would be unsafe for human consumption.
Owing to the difficulty of arranging food and cover, most of the sheep and cattle
in the contaminated area would be wiped out.

All growing crops subjected to serious contamination would have to be
destroyed, though root crops might be safe if they could be harvested quickly
without being infected by surface contamination in the process. Similarly, crops
like beans might be safe, provided the pods could be removed without
contaminating the beans themselves. Further investigation of the implications
for agriculture is necessary, but it is certain that it would not be safe to use land
contaminated with strontium for at least a year, and possibly for several years.

Radiation does not in general affect inert matter. Consequently, foodstuffs
outside the inner lethal zone would almost certainly not be impaired, provided
they were under cover and therefore not directly contaminated. It would be
necessary to decontaminate the coverings to ensure the safety of people handling
them and to prevent contamination of the contents.

6. Area of Contamination. — The superficial area which is contaminated will
not vary much in size, but its shape will depend on the prevailing wind structure.
The fall-out from a single ground-burst 10-MT. bomb would cover an area of
5,000 to 6,000 square miles.

7. Persistence. — The radio-activity will decay with the lapse of time. The
rate of decay is very rapid in the early stages, but flattens out thereafter and may
persist for a long time in regions of initial high contamination.

8. Degree of Contamination. — In general, the density of contamination will
diminish as the distance from the point of burst increases, but the shape of the
contour indicating any particular rate of contamination will depend on the
prevailing wind structure.

There will be an inner zone of approximately 270 square miles in area (larger
than Middlesex), in which radiation will be so powerful that all life will be
extinguished, whether in the open or in houses. Because of the persistence of the
radio-active contamination in this inner zone, general relief measures would be
virtually impossible for some weeks, and possibly months. People in specially
deep shelters with their own supply of uncontaminated food and water would have
some chance of survival, provided they were not entombed by other effects of the
explosion. Even so, for at least a week it would not be safe for them to attempt to
emerge and leave the area. Fires in this area would have to be left to burn
themselves out.

Outside this central zone, the density cf radiation will diminish progressively
with distance from the point of burst, but the rate of diminution in any particular
direction depends on the prevailing wind. Within an area of about 3,000 miles,
which with a steady 20-knot wind would be 170 miles long in the direction of the
wind and over 20 miles wide in places, exposure in the open on the first day might
easily be fatal. Rescue operations could commence on the outer fringes on the
second day and thereafter proceed with gathering momentum but the greater
part of the area would be immobilised for several days. Survival in this area
depends on cover. The efficiency of the cover depends on the weight of the
screening material. A thickness of 12 inches of earth would reduce the radiation
dosage rate by a factor of about 15. Suitably screened shelter in an ordinary
well-bricked house can reduce the dosage rate by a factor as high as 20.

There will be an outer area of 2,000-3,000 square miles in which there is a
danger of radiation sickness if no precautions are taken. In general, it would be
sufficient for people to stay indoors for about 12 hours after the onset of
contamination. As this depends on the speed of the wind, fall-out will not occur
until 8-24 hours after the burst, and it might therefore be possible to move some
people out of the main path which fall-out was expected to follow, should such a
step be considered desirable.

9. It will be clear from the above that, if there is more than one burst within
a period of days, the wind structure might be such as to cause an overlapping of
the contaminated areas. In such case, there might well be isolated pockets of high
density contamination at considerable distances from the explosions.



HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS



LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956



Practical protection

88 Large buildings with a number of storeys, especially if they are of
heavy construction, provide much better protection than small single-
storey structures (see Figure 4). Houses in terraces likewise provide
much better protection than isolated houses because of the shielding
effect of neighbouring houses.

GOOD PROTECTION

Solidly constructed multi-storeyed building with occupants well removed from
fall-out on ground and roof. The thickness of floors and roof overhead, and the
shielding effect of other buildings, all help to cut down radiation




Figure 4

Examples of good and bad protection afforded by buildings against fall-out.



89 It is estimated that the protection factor (the factor by which the out-
side dose has to be divided to get the inside dose) of a ground floor
room in a two-storey house ranges from 10 to about 50, depending on
wall thickness and the shielding afforded by neighbouring buildings.
The corresponding figures for bungalows are about 10-20, and for
three-storey houses about 15-100. An average two-storey brick house
in a built-up area gives a factor of 40, but basements, where the radia-
tion from outside the house is attenuated by a very great thickness of
earth, have protection factors ranging up to 20CK300. A slit trench
with even a light cover of boards or corrugated iron without earth
overhead gives a factor of 7, and if 1 ft. of earth cover is added the



37



factor rises to 100. If the trench can be covered with 2 or 3 feet of earth
then a factor of more than 200-300 can be obtained (see Figure 5).




Figure 5

Protection factors in slit trenches (the factor by which the outside dose is divided

to get the inside dose).

Choosing a refuge room

90 In choosing a refuge room in a house one would select a room with a
minimum of outside walls and make every effort to improve the pro-
tection of such outside walls as there were. In particular the windows
would have to be blocked up, e.g. with sandbags. Where possible, boxes
of earth could be placed round an outside wall to provide additional
protection, and heavy furniture (pianos, bookcases etc.) along the in-
side of the wall would also help. A cellar would be ideal. Where the
ground floor of the house consists of boards and timber joists carried
on sleeper walls it may be possible to combine the high protection
of the slit trench with some of the comforts of the refuge room by
constructing a trench under the floor.

Once a trap door had been cut in the floor boards and joists and the
trench had been dug, there would be no further interference with the
peace-time use of the room.

Estimated under-co ver doses in the fall-out area

91 Taking an average protective factor of 40 for a two-storey house in a
built-up area, the doses accumulated in 36 hours for the ranges referred
to in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Report (paragraph 84)
would have been: — %r~ ^ . -

190 miles downwind 7*r

160 „ „ 12*r e^o U nS^

140 „ „ 20r
which are all well below the lowest figure of 25r referred to in Table 1 .
At closer ranges along the axis of the fall-out, the doses accumulated
in 36 hours would have been much higher, but over most of the con-
taminated area — with this standard of protection — the majority of
those affected would have been saved from death, and even from sick-
ness, by taking cover continuously for the first 36 hours.



38



5. Radiation sickness

Assume dose incurred in a single shift (3-4 hours) by the "average"
man, over the whole body:—

25 roentgens — No obvious harm.
100 „ — Some nausea and vomiting.

500 „ —Lethal to about 50 per cent, people

(death up to 6 weeks later).
800 „ or more— Lethal to all (death up to 6 weeks later).
Note: If dose spread uniformly over 2-3 days, then 60 roentgens
could be incurred with no more effect than 25 roentgens in a single
exposure of 3-4 hours.



radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people



DISTANCE FROM G.Z. IN MILES

20



BLAST
(BUILDING
DAMAGE)



DEBRIS
BLOCKAGE




FIRE



HEAT
EFFECTS
(EXPOSED
PEOPLE)



IMMEDIATE
GAMMA RADIATION

(EXPOSED PEOPLE)



N.B. Effect* of residual
radiation (fall-out)
NOT shewn.



Figure 11

Combined effects (excluding residual radioactivity) from a 10 megaton ground
burst bomb. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to

UNPROTECTED people.



55



9" solid brick wall British
pre-war house design

Ridge Tile



Tile
Batten



Rafter




Wall



Floor Joists Walling p|ate$ Bpjck Footing



HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT



MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 2

RADIOACTIVE
FALL-OUT

PROVISIONAL SCHEME OF
PUBLIC CONTROL



LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956



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CRYSTALS
WATER




INSOLUBLE SOLIDS

ENLARGED PARTICLE



WATER SURFACE BURST

A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the
Eniwetok Proving Ground

E. A. Schuert, TJSNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif.

Time variation of the winds aloft
In most of the observations made at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the winds
aloft were not in a steady state. Significant changes in the winds aloft were
observed in as short a period as 3 hours. This variability was probably due to
the fact that proper firing conditions w T hich required winds that would deposit
the fallout north of the proving ground, occurred only during an unstable synoptic
situation of rather short duration.

4.5 megaton Navajo

/HEIGHT LINES

FORECAST "HOT LINE*



60,000




FORECAST AREA
OF FALLOUT



^
/

m



MEASURED ISODOSE
RATE CONTOURS



15,000-

Comparison of fallout forecast with test results



SURFACE ZERO



o



20



40



60



NAUTICAL MILES



HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES
SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS
HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT)



4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 7.54 STAT. MILES W



4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 21.0 STAT. MILES N




100 200 300 400 500

TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN)

Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D.




6 11 16 21

TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR)
Characterization of Fallout, Project 2.63



LAND SURFACE BURST

A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the
Eniwetok Proving Ground

E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif.



2.36 g/cu cm irregular in shape
Falling speeds (feet/hour)



Altitude


75 /x


100/i


200^


350 jit





8,060

3, 360
3,870
4, 200
8, 910


5,040
5, 980
6,910
7, 700
6,960


11,700

14, 400
18,600
24,400
27,800


21,600

27, 100
35, 300
47, 200
61,900


20


40_


60


80



5 megaton Tewa f




75,000



Comparison of fallout forecast with test results



NAUTICAL MILES



HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES
SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS
HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT)



5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 7.84 STAT. MILES WSW

100




5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 59.3 STAT. MILES NW
1




150 300 450 600

TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN)



12 17 22 27 32

TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR)

Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout



WT-1316 <EX)

EXTRACTED VERSION



OPERATION REDWING

Project 2.62a

Fallout Studies by Oceanographic Methods



Pacific Proving Grounds
May- July, 1956

Defense Atomic Support Agency
Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico

February 6, 1961

NOTICE

This is an extract of WT-1316. Operation REDWING,
Project 2.62a, which remains classified Secret/
Restricted Data as of this date.



Extract version prepared for:

Director

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
Washington, D C. 20305
1 February 1980



Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.



TABLE 2.11



Navajo Tewa

Total Yield, Mt 4.50 5.01
Fission proportion 5% 87%



n + a Hour Dose


Area (mi )


Rate fr/hr)


Within Contour


1 AAA
1,UUU


oe y| c a
ZD 450


c%AA
DUU


CC 1 ACA

DO 1,050


1AA


OA 1 CCA

80 1,550


1 AA

100


310 3,500


Two -day


Area (mi 2 )


Dose, R


Within Contour


1,000


20 520


500


30 1,050


300


45 1,500


100


350 3,000



CLEAN BOMB: 3.53 MT (15% FISSION) ZUNI



WT-1316




1 64* 1 -

Figure 2.37 155*



DIRTY BOMB: 5.01 MT (87% FISSION) TEWA



WT-1316




OPERATION HURRICANE— THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE
RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION
25 KT BURST IN SHIP



FIG. 72



I WEST IftLAttO



I HOUR
AFTER EXPLOSION

ROENTGENS PER HOUR



DASA-1251






WIXD DATA




Altitude


Direction


Speed


fMt


degrees


nph


1,000


158.5


17.2


2,000




16.7


3,000


133.0


17.1


1,000


129*0


lU.O


5,000


123.0


12.9


6,000


117.5


12.2


7,000


117-5


11.6


6,000


122.0


10.6


9,000


129.5
138.0


9.7


10,000


9-1



Dose-rate Area
(r/hr) at one hour (Sq. Miles)




AWRE-T1/54,
27 Aug. 1954



5,000



23ktat
90 ft
depth
in 180 ft
water




I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I




OWENS 9.7 kt 500 ft balloon air burst DOPPLER 1 1 kt 1500 ft balloon air burst




DUtqnco From GZ. yords Olttanot From GZ, yords



1*2 kt JANGLE - Sugar Surface burst 19 Nov 1951
CLOUD TOP HEIGHT: 15,000 ft MSL
CRATER DATA: Diameter: SK> ft maximum dose r



Depth:



Maximum dose
rate
Distance
Value from
(r/hr) GZ (ft)



Maximum contour
distance from GZ (ft)



500
r/hr



300
r/hr



100

r/hr



540 900 2200 4900 12,500



21 ft



at crater lip



7500 r/hr at H+l
hour



Contour area
(sq mi)

-^jjjj — Laurino, YL K*, and L G. Poppoff, 1953: Contamination

r/hr r/hr patterns at Operation JANGLE. U. S. Nav. Had. Def.
0.05 0.15 0.55 Lab. Rep. USNRDL-399, 28 pp.



500
r/hr




Olttonet From GZ.Y.r* 1 g mph mean wind speed



1.2 kt SUGAR test (Nevada surface burst)
610 m

Source: weapon test report WT-414
Gamma dose rate (R/hr)



Gamma dose (R)



610 m-



Downwind distance
I 914 m




r 1220 m

1 3350 m

'14650 m

^ ] 1830

2440 m



610 m

* y 914 m
3350 m
4650 m
1220 m

1830 m

2440 m

I



10 100 1000 10*

Time after burst (seconds)



1.2 kt UNCLE test (5.2 m underground, Nevada)



Source: weapon test report WT-414




Gamma dose rate (R/hr)



Gamma dose (R)



1000



Li-



610 m

914 m
1220 m
1830 m-J

2440 m



3350 m~
4270 m

■610 m



43

TR's indicated, on the average, 0.85 ±25 percent of the survey meter readings

60

observed/calculated ratio varies from 0.45 at 11.2 hours

to 0.66 from 100 to 200 hours, to 0.56 between 370 and 1,000 hours.



Stotion



Location




ui



io-i



HOW ISLAND PLATFORM F
HOW ISLANO MONITORING PTS




Height
25 FT
3 FT



Station F at How Island

2.08 x 10" fissions/ft 2 (Table B.27)




■ TABLE


B. 1




Till


nun


r/hr


23


0. 0055


24


0.0086


26


0. 013


27


0. 051


30


0.47


46


1.09


62


2. 67


130


2.17


200


1.17


400


0.54



Instrument not operated




HOW ISLAND STATION
Standard Stotion Minor Array
(Cone height: 10ft)
Station K i



Untvtn

Oround

VP

Standard Platform Major Array
(Platform height: 25 ft
station F .



^OWl.NOST.T.ON^.
I'




Buried Tray and ■
Survey Point Array
(Numbered points indicate
survey and buried AOCt locations!



SCALE (FT)



2 1 j \ '



5:



50 IOO



200



10-3




10



10 s



TIME SINCE ZUNI (HR)



WM317 Figure B.7 G amma-ionization-decay rate. Site How.



10



-8



10



-9



I



Sio

CO



-10



w 10



-11



2



a io" 12



10



-13



10



-14



ZUNI LAGOON
TEWA LAGOON


ZUNI CLOUD

\


RAJ


DIOACTIVE D
SURF


BCAY RATE
ACE BURST





—

\ \o
\\ X v
\ \

\

TEWA LAGOON"


ZUNI CLOUD
\X

X X

\\ ^fe. x
** A ^ x











^ — X

\\ ^ X
' -;\ x *v
\\ X \
X
X

\


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^X X




—




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\\\

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\ y NAVAJO
\\ — X









/ %

TEWA CLOUD
FLATHEAD

TEWA


X^ X
■ X^ X
ovX n X

X V\

w

lagoonNVV


Triffet an

i i nun


d LaRiviere, W

1 i i nun


r-1317 (1961) ,

1 i i Mini


p. 112

i i linn


1 1 llllll



10



1



10 10'
TIME (HR)



10*



10



4




ooo o o *n oj

o «n cm —

3JLVH 3anSOdX3 IVIOI JO lN30d3d




1. Total fission yields add up to 200% (2 fission fragments per fission)
— 2. Minimum (at mass ~115) is shallower for higher neutron energies
3. Data apply to fission by the lowest possible energy (thermal) neutrons

The reason for the peaks at masses -100 and -140 was discovered by Marie

Goeppert Mayer in 1948: nuclei with "magic numbers" of 2, 8, 20, 50, 82, or

■ 1 26 neutrons or protons have high stability due to closed shells of 2, 6, 1 2, 30,

32, and 44 nucleons (nucleons, unlike electrons, have spin-orbital interaction)
— I J 1 I I I I I I I I I I



76 82 88 94 100 106 112 118 124 130 136 142 148 1 54 160

MASS NUMBER



Radioactivity in the Marine Environment (1971), page 13



Specific activity of 15 Mt Bravo fallout




(depletion of volatile decay chains)



10 10* 10

Fallout particle diameter (microns)



a

9

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AFSWP-978

Krypton-89, krypton -90 , and xenon -IkO, which are present during the
formation of the fireball and are precursors for strontium-89, strontium-
90, and barium-l^K), have very little tendency to be incorporated uni-
formly in the particles during the early stage of formation. These
noble gases, when associated with a particle, are deposited unevenly on
the surface layers and distributed along with relatively large deposits
of inactive debris vhich were drawn toward the fireball too late to form
fused radioactive particles.

Ik

Both strontium-89 and strontium-90 are examples of radioisotopes
having gaseous precursors and are thus subject to a high degree of
fractionation.

Krypton-89 9 _£ m ^ Rubidium-89 ,^ mil > Strontium-89

Krypton-90 y% g ec * Kubidium-90 y short^ strontium -9°

31

As expected from the earlier discussion, strontium exhibits very
definite fractionation. On one series of air samples collected at
1*0,000 feet at Operation CASTLE after the Bravo shot, the R value for
strontium-89 was 0.35* For a fall-out sample collected on land at ap-
proximately 80 miles from the burst point, the R value for strontium-89
was O.lU. The R value for strontium-90 using the same fall-out sample was

0.29.

33



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RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN pages 1689-1691



A. B. R. E. HP/R 2017

ATOMIC EXEBGY RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

The Radiological Dose to Persons in the U. K. Due to Debris From Nuclear

Test Explosions Prior to January 1956

By N. G. Stewart, R. N. Crooks, and Miss E. M. R. Fisher

Activity from Neutron Capture

Although several different radioactive elements may be created by the capture
of neutrons in materials close to the reacting core of a weapon, the only signifi-
cant reactions to produce gamma-ray emitters are those associated with the
natural uranium which may be used as the tamper material of the bomb.



neutron (low energy) + U-238



U-239



Np-239



Chemical analysis of the debris shows that in general about one neutron Is
captured in this way for every fission that occurs, both in nominal bombs and
in thermonuclear explosions. The U 239 decays completely before reaching the
U.K. but at four days after time of burst the Np 239 disintegration rate reaches
a peak relative to that of the fission products and accounts for about 60% of
the observed activity at that time.

In addition to this, a smaller number of the neutrons in a thermonuclear
explosion undergo an (n,2n) reaction with U 238 to form 6.7 day U 237 which is
also a 0,7) emitter.



neutron (high energy) + U-238



2 neutrons + U-237



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— Np-239



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PHOTON ENERGY, Mev



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BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR



HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON KADIATION

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEBGY
CONGRESS OP THE UNITED STATES

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
OF NUCLEAR WAR



JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959



PART 1



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy



N

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43338 WASHINGTON : 1959



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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR "WAR 197

the induced radiation in uranium 238. We can refer to a British
report which indicates that around 60 percent of the total activity
at jE days — activity m this case is the number of disintegrations — is
due to the uranium 239 and neptunium 239 j that are produced, as the
British say, in either large or small weapons. 1 believe part of the
hump on the curves m the early times, say around 4 days, is largely
Hue to this.

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 205

Dr. Tkhtet. Yes. I thought this might be an appropriate place to
comment on the variation of the average energy, it is clear when
vou think of shielding, because the eft'ectivenes^soFshieldi ng depends
directly on the averag e energy radiation from the depositeoTiimteriaT
As 1 mentioned, "Dr7 Cook at our laboratory has done quite a bjF ^f.
work on this. What it amounts to is that at one hour the average
energy is about one Mev. This appears, by the way, in the tables that
are in my written statement but that I did not present orally.

Representative Holefield. Mev. means?

Dr. Teiffet. Million electron volts. At 2 hours it drops to 0.95.
At a half day, to 0.6. At 1 week it drops to 0.35. Then it begins to
go up again. At 1 month, it is 0.65, 2 months 0.65. The meaning of
this is simply that there is a period around 1 week when if induced
pro ducts are important m the bomb, there are a lot oi" radiati ons
emanating from these, but the energy is low so it operates to reduce
the average energy m this period and shielding is immensely more
elective.



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 217

Strontium 90, for example, has 33-second
krypton as its birth predecessor ; cesium 137 derives from a fission chain headed
up by 22-seeond iodine, followed by 3.9-minute xenon. Because of their vola-
tile or gaseous ancestry in the fireball or bomb cloud a number of the high-
yield fission products are formed in finely divided particles. Some of these are
so small that they are not subject to gravitational settling, and in fact they
remain suspended in the earth's atmosphere for many years, providing 6 that
they reach the stratosphere at the proper latitude. In any event such fission
products would be depleted in the local fallout.

For example, the irradiation of uranium 238 w ith „low .
Mev_._jyeu trofrs forms neptun ium ^^T^^^^E^^^^^^^J^Ml IZIIIE

^af^r^Bora ygetMaH^r~

At_higher neutron energies, such as ce rta in types of ther monuclear weapons
■produ ce? naturaFuranium unde rgoes an^n^n)~reYcHon

'TagF^sT on in T7^/ The data of R." J. has^a fission

cross, sectio n of OLgJbarn fr^StaBMev., thereafte r climbin g to a plateau
jvai ue oQZF 13T3!eY f ~Atl3.6 Mevrthe re Is ""a threshoIiOor

"the (^n,2n)~r^ctiorrand the reactiojThasa cr^£s ^tion of 1.4 b arns injbh e range
"oTTO Mev. The ready identification of U 237 i n f allout ^points To fast~5ssion of
IfT^g ^s a^iaih ener^ source in high-yield me gaton-class weapons.



6 See E. A. Mar tell, "Atmospheric Circulation; and Deposition of Strontium 90 Debris,"
Air Force Cambridge Research Center paper (July 1958). See also W. F, Libby, "Radio-
active Fallout/' speech of Mar, 13, 1959.

T Variation of Gamma Radiation Rates for Different Elements Following an Underwater
Nuclear Detonation/' J. Colloid, Science, 13 (1958) , p. 829.

e "Reaction Cross Sections of U 238 in the Low Mev, Ranse/' UCRL 5323 (Aug. 15, 1958).



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SPECTROMETRY ANALYSIS OF GAMMA RADIATION
FROM FALLOUT FROM OPERATION REDWING

Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL- TR- 1 46

29 April 1957
by

W. E. Thompson



Nuclear Rc.diation Characteristics
R. L. Mather. Head



Nucleonics Division
A. Guthrie, Head



Scientific Director
P.C. Tompkins



Commanding Officer and Director
Captain Richard S. Mandelkorn, USN



U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
San Francisco 24, California




Fig. I



TABLE 1



Sampl



Site
Designation



Abbreviated
Designation

Std High
Gain Cain



Collector
Type



Collector Location
From GZ



Std Cloud



AA



Shot Cherokee
AB Filter Paper Cloud



Std Cloud


BA


BB


YFNB "Whim" 1


FA




How F. 61


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GB


YAG 40 B- \H


HA


HB


How F-67


1A


IB


YAG 40 B-6


JA


JB


Std Cloud


KA


KB


YAG 3Q C-36


LA


LB


YFNB- 13- E- 56


KiA


MB




NA


NB


Std Cloud


OA


OB


YFNB- 13-E- 54


PA


PB


YFNB- 13-E- 56


RA


RB


YAG 39 C-21


SA




YAG 39 C-36


GA


QB


Std Cloud


TA


TB


YAG 39 C-36


UA


UB


YFNB- 13-E- 56


VA


VB


Y3-T-1C-D


WA




YFNB- 13-E- 54


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XB


YAG 39 C-21


YA


YB



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Filter Paper
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occ( fa )

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Filter Paper

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Filter Paper

OCC

OCC

OCC

OCC

Shot Tewa

Filter Paper

OCC

OCC

Seawater\ c J

OCC
OCC



Cloud
10 mi ENE
13 mi ENE
52 NNW
13 mi ENE
52 mi NNW



Cloud
29 mi NNE
7.5 mi WNW
7.5 mi WNW



Cloud
8.5 mi W
8.5 mi W
21 mi NNW
2 1 mi NNW



Cloud
24 NNW
10 mi SW

10 mi SW
24 mi NNW



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0.15 ft 10



2.2* ft 10
0.92 * 5
0.54 * 5
0,0 ft JO
0.30 * iO
0.21 * 10
Q.iu * IS
0.20 * 20



*0.08 *
*0,07 ft



0.41 ft 10
0.37 * 25
J. 31 4 25
3.27 * 20



0.2b 4 20
0.11 * 10
l). 10 * 30



j. 02 4 50 0.0) * 25

u .oj 4 40 *o.u*iS

0,04 * 30 ,0-11 4 10
0.10*40

>o &.o* • so

*0 42 * 30 2.14 * 10

V24*2o t.*J*IO

0.16 ft 10 1. 11 * 10

0.10 * 40 l.04> * IS

0.05 * 30 0.62 * 15







0.30 ft 20


O.Sl * 10


>0






0.30 * 15


>0


0.01 ft 35


>0


0.22 4 20








0.14 * 25


>0




0.20 ft 3U


0.41 * 30


Q.J4 4 40




0.06 * 40


0.21 * 25






0,01 ft 50


0.10 * 15


>0




0.02 ft 50


0.22 * 20






0.S2 ft 10


0.6<, * 10




0.12 4 35


0.54 * 10


0.41 * 15


>0




0.20 ft 20


0.19 * 20


>0


>0


0.18 ft 20


0.18 * 20


>0




0.05 * 25


0.O5 4 30


>0






0.03 * SO


0.10 * 25




0.24 4 20


0.12 * 20


0.0* 4 20




0.12 ft 20


19 * 10


0.06 ft 30




0.09 ft 24


0.21 * 20


0,04 4 35




0.03 ft 45


0.12 * 35


>0




0.0* * 30


0.10 4 30


>0




O.02 * 30


0.05 ft 40






0.1 1 * 15


0.15 * IS






0.05 * 20


0.0» * 20






0.01 ft 40


0.06 • 25






0.04 * 25


0.06 ft 20




1.93 * 20


i.bi 6 5


4.83 * 5




0,9? * JO


4.09* S


1.66 4 5




>0


3.17 * 10


2.69* 5






2.26 * 10


1.99 ft 10


> >0


0,36 * 25


1.0 3 * 10


0.94 ft 15


>0


>0


0,50 ft IS


0.73 * 15


>0


>0


0.2* ft 25


0.43 * 25




>0


0.09 * 40


0.37 ft 20


0.06 4 40




0.07 ft 45


0.33 * 20


0.05 4 30




0.06 ft 45


0.30 ft 20


0.02 * 40




0.02 * SO


0.10 * 20




>0


0.67* 5


0.6J * 10


>0


0.32 * 40


0.36 ft 15


0.40 ft 15




0.06 * SO


19 * 20


0.2b ft 25




0.04 4 SO


0.10 * 30


0.21 * 20


0.04 6 40


0.02 * 50


0.02 * 40


6.1S * 10




>0


w.jj * 20


50 * 15






0.17 * 30


31 * IS






0.0 b * tO


0.26 * IS






0.05 * 40


0.24 * 20




>0


0.02 * 40


0.24 * IS




0.01 * 50




o.n * to






0.O2 * SO


0.02 * 50


•«.04* 40


>0


0.1S * 25


0.23 * 20


*U.Ob * 50




0,0y • 30


0.1* * 14


Vo* * 40




0.07 * IS


j, 15 ft 15


0.04 * JO




0.03 * *0


u.JO * 2i


0.44 4 30




1.6* 4 IU


2.36 4 10


0.24 * 30


>0


66 * 20


1.61 * )C




0.06 * 40


O.U * 45


0.9b • ID


>0


X)


>0


j.yO * IS




o.o* * »




0.7* * IS






0.07 * 40


0.*1 * 20



>0
>0

O.iO 4 50
0.29 * 40
>.»7 ft 45
'0.20 ft 40
Vlb ft 40
T 0.10 ft 4u



0.10 4
0.07 i
0.0 3 ft



40



0,12 4 40 0.1 1



0.0* ft 15
0.54 * 40
0.01 ft 50

0.37 * 30
0.07 » 40
0,03 * 3*
0.0* * 35



0.1J 4 30 - „

0.15 * 3C 0-0* * >°

0.17 * 30 0-3« * JJ

0.12 * 40 0.36 * 45



0.07 * 40 0-03 * 4Q

O.OS * 50 O Oi * S3
0.02 4 50

0.04 * 20 0-01 * 24



0.29 * 25
0.16 * 45
0.07 * SD



0,09 * 30
0.0* * 10
0.0* * 34
0.03 * 45



>0




>0


0.04 4 40


0.01 • so




0.07 * 45


0.04 4 i




,46 4 i


■>o


0.27 ft 3


tO. 16 * 40


0.0* ft 5


>0


0.09 * 2.


>0


0.05 ft 4;




0.03 «



1 (ft) S*« Tftble 1 or *xpi*m«tk



*6br«n*ta4 <«»|aftUw. (b) LiJftft 4**L|B*lioia w«rir dixft not f»ftc«4«ftr il> r«pr«*ftbl »a acuu^fttft ft..«r*7 cft.U6ri.tion.

T*« ftftftTfy tft r^iadmd oli u> 1M utirtti 10 k*r m«r«ly ft* * llnft »*•* ttfi C*tlw «(Wib«T.



{e) Crrer* i^fttfrd ir« u> *•««**. * ta«Ut»Ut *» «



TABLK 1

I. i* MUiuwi *f Pbawta Par Sacood P*r Lio» tor C*ch Sampl*



410








..


003


960




1 040


1 100


1 170


1240


IJ70




1600


1690


2fV)


-


4.92 * JO


0.** a


7




O.M a 20


-




-












2 5 * 10


-


~


-


0,77 * 6


0,62 a


10


•a

t>,|4 a


Oil * it)


-
















0.25 a 10


-




-


0.46 * 10


0.47 a


1 2




O.OB ± ^0


















0.25 a 10




~




0.29 * 10


24 a


I 5






















0.27 a 10








0.21 * 14


0.22 a


15






Z
















0.2) a l b




z




OJO * 1)


0.18 a


20


-


-


-




-


-


-


-


-




0.23 * IS




-


-


0,13 * 20


0.1* *


20


-




-


















-


-


—


0.10 * 25


0.1) *


20


-




-
















2 a JO


-


-


-


0,05 * 25


0.01 *


40


-




-
















20 a 10






-


0.0* * 2)


0.O7 a


30




-


-
















0.154 1 5






-


9.03 * 54


0.1>6 a


40




-


-
















0.1 1 a 20




~


*


2.57 * 5


2.05 a


10


-


0.54 * 20


>












73 4




fl ..








1.9»4 7


1 .41 a


7




0.3t a 20


0,3^*


I 5


0.21 4 40








0.31 *


1


56 a 5




22 a 20
*




1,32 * 10


1.15 a


ID






0.38 4


20


0.20 a 40




0.27 a 25




0.18 4


1 5


0.62 * 4






-


0.44 A 10


O.S3 *


10






0.24 a


25


J S 4 30


-


0.2? * J 5


-


0.12 a


25


0.6? * 5


-


-




O.ST * 10


0,52 a


20






























e.jfc » is


0.30 a


15




O.Q? * 40


z








0.10 * 30


_






0.54 a 10




z


-


0.07 * 25


0.14 a


20


Jo. 01 4 so




-






-


-


-






0.36 * 1 5


-


-


-


0.04 * 40


0.O9 a


20


0.O7 a 50




-
















ft a In


-




-


0.06 a 35


0.O7 a


30


>0


-


















u . u b a jo






-


0.04 * 40


0.O8 a


30


-


-


-




-


■
















*


-


0.0b a


20


-


-


-




-




>














■>0


4.7Q * 10


6,32 4


10


* 11


0.14 a 20


-




-












6. ft a 5








2.1 t * IS


3.53 «


J


• 11


0.7* a 20


—




Q.66 a 25




1 , 1 a 20


0.59 4 25






3 .62 4 j


0.59 *




38 * 20


1.32 a 20


3.3* a


30


* !


0.67 4 20






50 a ZQ


■


0.9S 4 20


>0






3 .93 a 10






M 4 24


0.11 a 50


2.7b 4


15




0.21 a 30










>0


0.59 4 25






1.60 4 10


0.43 4 35




JL A 15


0.32 a 40


2.*0 *


15


,0.30 * 44


0.30 a 20


-








0.62 * 10


O.bb a 25






1.36 * 15


0,48 4 35




"!i * J*


0.32 • 30


2.90 a


10


# Q.29 4 40


0,2^ 4 10


-








0,50 a 30


0.50 * JO






* >rt


n H * aO








2.79 4


10


♦,•7 4 45


1 1 a 30






~












0,6 3 a 20






41 * 10


015 * JO


2.37 a


1


Jo. 20 a 40


0.09 a 50










34 4 40


0.4 1 * 20








26 * 40




!ji * is*


o!il • 34


1.89 6


10


|0.14 4 40










C'.il a 40


0.30 a 30






0.16 a 25


0.07 4 40


_


26* it


-


1.66 4


10


T e,io 4 40


0.04 4 50


-




-


-


0.2) a 40


0.24 a 40


-




0.07 a 30


O.I 3 4 40


-




0.J0 a 30


0.41 *


J p


0,10 4 40


0,05 * 30


-






-


0.01 a 40


0.12 a 25






0.154 15




—




O.OS * 30


0.39 4


10


0.07 a 40


0.D5 a 30


-








0.08 a 40


0.12 a 25






0,12 4 15






04 * JO




0.33 4


10


0.03 4 40


0.03 a 40










0.08 * 40


0.0* a )0






0.03 * 35




z


OS * 33




0.35 a


10


>0


>0


-




-




0.07 a 40


0.09 * 30


-






-


-




0.2.1 a 20


0.44 4


1 5


0.22 4 40


-


-




-


-


0.15 a 30




-




r 42 4 10








0. 1 T a 40


0.41 a


15


0.14 * 40


-






-


-


-


-


-




0.36 4 10






18 ~


0.0 S 4 30


0.35 a


10


>0




-




-












0.12 4 1 5


0.07 4 30




• *°


0.04 a 40


0.32 a


1 5


-


-


-




~




0.04 * 40








0,06 * ti


0.04 4 35






4.7* * 5


2.21 a


10


0.36 4 30


0.53 4 25


















0.91 i •






IT * tt


0.71 a *


0.42 *




0.2* a 20


0.2 3 4 25


















0.9 -J 4 3








D.42 a 5


0.54 4


5


0.21 4 30


0.14 a 25


-




-


-


-


-


-




0.B1 a 5


-


-






0,43 *


LO


0.12 * 40


O.U a 35


















0.85 « 10








0.14 a IS


O.JO a


lO


>0


0.0* 4 30






z


:




:






0.61 a 10






-


0.04 a 25


0.23 a


10


>0


0.^7 a 40


-




-






-






0.34 * J5


-


-




0.02 a 30


fl*?n *






0.03 a 30


















ft fl\ * 2^








0.02 * 54


0.20 4


20




-


















*






-


0.74 a 7


O.U a


10


>0




_




_


_




_






0.20 a 15


_


-




0.02 a 20


W.OI 4


20


0.03 4 40




















0.08 a 20








O.iO a 20


0.51 4


10


>0




















0. 68 4 ,0










0.30 *


15


0.07 a 40




















0.32 a 10






oj * Si




0.22 4


20


>0


0.03 * 30


















0.18 4 15










0.14 4


25




0.02 4 40


















0.0 r * JO









0.20 a 31/


0.41 *


k 30


0.09 a 5






0.0a * 40


0.23 i


> Z5




0.06 a 35




0.03 4 54


0.30 *


15


>0


0.0 5 a 40




0.02 4 50


0.22 -


r 20


0.04 4 44


0,01 a 50




0.12 4 10


0.6^ *


10


>0


0.07 a 30


Ua 35


0.54 4 10


0.41 *


i IS




0.07 4 40




0.20 a 20


0.19 4


20




0.03 4 34


>•


0.18 4 20


0.18 4


20




0.06 * 35




0.05 a 25


0.05 i


30


0.04 6 35








0.03 i


50


0.02 * 50






0.24 a 20


0.31 ■


20


0.13 4 34






0.12 4 20


19 4


30


0.14 4 )f


0.04 4 JO




0.09 4 25


0.21 4


20


0.17 a 34


0.08 a 30




0.0) a 45


0.12 4


i 35


0,12 4 44


0.06 a 45




0.0* a 30


0.10 4


i 30


0.C4 4 40






0,02 a 30


0.05 i


r 40


0,C3 4 44






O.U a 15


0.15 i


t IS


0.07 * 40


0.03 a 40




0.05 a 20


0.08 -


k 20


0.05 4 40


0.02 a 40




0,01 a 40


0.06 *


k 24


0.02 4 50






0.04 4 25


0,06 4


i 20


0.04 4 20


0.02 4 25


914 10


5.61 4 5


4.83 i


k 5


>0


0.50 a 50


97 4 JO


4.09 * 5


3.66 1


k 5




>0


*4


J. 17 a jo


2 .69 i


k 4


>0


0.70 a 50




2.26 a 10


1.99 i


i 10




d.43 a 2J


34 4 25


1.03 a 10


0.94 i


k 14


0.65 4 44


0.36 4 15


•0


0.50 a 15


0.73 i


k 15


>0


0.20 4 20


•0


0.2* a 25


0.4) 1


k 25


>4


0.14 * 30


»0


0.09 4 40


0.37


k 20


>0


0.11 a 44




0.07 a 45


0.33 1


k 20


0.15 4 44


0.07 a 20




0.06 a 45


0.30 J


k 20


>0


O.OJ a 50




0.02 4 54


0.30


t 20


0.04 4 45







0.47 4 5


0.61 t


k 10


0.29 4 25




12 4 44


0.34 4 IS


0.40 *


k 14


0.16 4 45


0.09 4 30


>4 4 40


0.19 * 20


0.26 *


k 25


0.07 a 50


0.01 a 10


4 a »


0.1O a SO


J. 21 -


k 20


>0


0,04 4 35


2 a 50


0.02 4 44


8.15 i


k 30


0.06 4 SO


0,03 a 45





u.jJ 4 20


0.50 J


k 15




0.08 4 30




0.1 T a 3J


31 '


i 15








0.06 6 *0


0.26 i


k 14


>9






0.J5 4 40


0.24 i


k 20


>0


0.44 * 44




0.02 4 50


U.24


k 15






Jl 4 50




0.17


k 2Q








0.02 4 50


0.02


fc 40


5.02 * 44






0.15 4 25


0.23


h 24


Q.i)7 4 44


0.34 4 i5




0.0? 4 30


U.l*


i 1<








0,07 a 35


j. 14


■ 15








0.03 a 5J


U.10


k 20








1 .68 4 2U


2.36


k 10




0.4b a 24


-4


0.66 a 2g


1.61 i


k 10


>•


0.27 4 30


-4 * 40


012 4 45


0.46 4


k 10


tO. 14 4 44


0.0* 4 50


-4




J.*0 i


k L5


>0


0.0s 4 24


6 M




0.7* <


b 15


>0


0.05 4 40




J. 07 a 44


0.81


k 2<j




0.03 * 44



0.05 a JO
>0



0.40 4 25
0.I8 4 24
0.04 * 30



l.l* 4 lO
0.8b a I0
0.52 a 20
>0



0.46 4 20
0.39 a 30
0.29 4 40
0.20 4 45
0.I4 4 44



TO Ob * 40



0.25 4 SO



fO. 27 * IS
f0.i* 4 25
TO. 01 * 30
TO. 08 4 44
tO.04 4 44
TO. 04 * M



•G.Q* 4 44
40.04 4 44



0.68 a 10
0.27 a J5
0. i 4 a 20
0.04 * 30

0.1 3 * 25
0.14 * 20
0.15 • 25
0.19 * 20
O.tl * 25
0.04 a 40

0.34 a L

0.^1 4 14

0.43 4 15

0.3) a 20

0.06 * 30
0.03 a 30

D.I v * 20
0.16 a 2S
0,09 * 45

0. 09 * 30

1 .58 4 10

1. bOi 5
1.72* 5
1 .81 * 3
1.74 a 5
1.27 * 10
I.Ob * 15
0,79 4 23
0.52 a 20
0.1 9 a JO
0.14 4 30

0.2 7 a 20
0.28 a 20
u.24 a 15
0.21 * 15
O.ib a 25

0.21 a 10
0.1 T * 14
0.14 a 20
0.08 * 24

>0

"0

0.0) * 25

0.18 a 20

J. 16 a 20

0.14 a 25

0.07 a 30

2.41 a 5
1.70* 5
1.06 a 10
0.86 4 24
0.26 * 20
0.14 4 25



0.37 4 24
0.16 4 30



<C> JTrrora iLat«4 *r* pare**. * Ja*it*t4a a* «Mr|r mhklt 20. 34 4«v 6»J*a Ua* 4*a if « 6»a t 8»«Ucj*«i a* a*arfy ■41ft 20-34 m« 4b**a Ua* Aaaifoatioa.



PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF
SLURRY PARTICULATE FALLOUT COLLECTED DURING

OPERATION REDWING



U. S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
San Francisco 24, California



Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-170



5 May 1957



by



N.H. Farlow
W.R. Schell



Table 1 Slurry Fallout Particle Data



Time of

Arrival Ship
Interval station
(H+hr)


No. of
Particles
Measured


Average
NaCl Mass
(pg)


Average
EL0 Mass

^(ug)


Average
Density
±Std.Dev.

(g/cc)


Average. .
Diameter**'
±Std.Dev.








Flathead






1 to 3


TFNB-29


4tol0


0,06


0.08


1.28t0.1


57*6


7 to 9 -


u£*33i 50tt> 5 2


0.42


0.62


1.29*0.01


112*2


11 to 12


'TAG^O 10


0.94


1.20


1.35±0.05


129*16


15 to 18


YAG-40


3to4


0.50


0.69


1.34*0.08


121*6


Totals




67 to 76






1.30*0.01










Havaho






1 to 3


TPNB-13


5to20


7.77


7.94


1.38*0.04


272±14


3 to 5


YAG-39


9tol4


7.62


4.49


1.50*0.1


229*24


5 to 6


LST-611


H


1.61


1.83


1.41*0.04


166±6


7 to 9


YAG-40


4tol0


1.25


1.08


1.45*0.04


142*22


9 to 10


YAG-40


5to23


o.u


0.60


1.31*0.02


110+5


10 to 11


YAG-40


lltol5


0.66


0.50


1.43*0.03


111±4


11 to 12


YAG-40


33


0.30




1.32*0.01


94**


12 to 13


YAG-40


28


0.31


0.31


1..37±0.01


96±2


13 to U


YAG-40


6


0.17


0.27


1.28*0.02


86*7


14 to 15


YAG-40


5


0.10


0.18


1.30±0.03


75*2


15 to 18


XAG-40


13toU


0.06


0.32


1.15*0.02


84*4


Totals


133 to 182






1.35±0.01





(a) The diameter of the spherical slurry droplet at the time of arrival



UNCLASSIFIED

AD232901




CAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL FALLOUT PARTICLES



Research and Development Technical Report US NRDL- TR - 386



17 September 1958



J. L. Mackin
P.E. Zigman
D.L. Love
D. MacDonald



U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY



SAN



FRANCISCO



2 4



CALIFORNIA



ONCUSSIFIEI



TABLE 2 (ZUNI, barge YFNB-29; see Table B8 in WT-1317)



Weight, Activity, and Fission Values for the Sized Fraction* From the 10DX

SampI* (YFNB29/ 17 km from ZUNI)

Sise Weight Fissions

Bang* Gram* Percent Percent Total per Bras
(p) ef Total of Total (id*) (10»)



>iooo 37.70


41.8


15.8


21.




500-1000 If 1.91




1*6.0


60.




250- 500 4.97


5.5


19.8


26.


li


100- 250 3.51


3.9


10.7


Ik.




50- 100 0.60


0-9




3.0




<50 1.38


1.5


n


7.1


5.1


Total 90.27






131.


X.5



TANS W (ZUNI: BIKINI /HOW ISLAND, YFNB29, YAG40; TABLE 3.9 IN WT-1317)

Mean Values for Several Quantities, for Altered and Unaltered Particles



i i 1 1. 1 1 1 1 - »■ 1 1. ■ i, —

Melted coral sand Unmelted coral sand



Quantity Altered Unaltered

Ko. of " * No. of

^^^^ Samples Value Samples . Value

fiep/gaCxlO 1 *) & 3-8 * 3.1 9 0.090 + 0^2>

Ba£W>-B value 5 0.090 + 0.068 8 2.1 + 1.2

SxS9-B value 7 0.018 + 0.010 10 O.65 + 0.17

The data of Table k show that the value of fissions/gran vaa much
larger la the altered particles than in the unaltered particles. The R
value data Indicates that the altered particles vera markedly depleted la
Ba^-Lalto, whereas the unaltered particles vera enriched in Bal^-La 11 *

R values



With respect to fractionation of radionuclides it has long been
accepted that the mass €9 and mass 11*0 chains vhich exist for long time
periods ss nchle gases, halogens and alkali metals* would condense late
and therefore disproportionate with respect to less volatile, elements*
0a the basis of long-lived gaseous precursors it would be predicted that
the altered or salted particles would exhibit low R values for both chains,
with the 89 smaller, of the two* This was verified by the mean B values
given in Table 4, which were 0.090 and 0.018 for the 140 and 89 chains,
respectively. The corresponding values for the unaltered particles of 2.1
and O.65 indicate that this latter class of particles nay be important as
a scavenger of these nuclides.

It is also of Interest to compare R values obtained in this study
with values obtained on gross fallout samples. The latter data gave Ba^^O
R values and Sr^ R values of 0.10 and 0.04 respectively** in the lagoon
samples. The low R values for the gross sample from the lagoon area are
similar to B values obtained with altered particles and suggests a lagoon
fallout composed primarily of altered particles. This suggestion is sup-
ported by the WHIM sample fission/gram data (described above) •

* BaJ-W is formed by the decay of the radioelements Xe 1 ^ (16-eec half-
life) and Csl* j£6-sec half -life); Srv9 i 8 fonasd by the decay of the
redioelements £ro9 (3.16-ain half -life) and Rb°9 (15.4-min half-lif e) .

** p.D. LaRiviere> USEHDL, personal communication.




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



POLICY GUIDANCE
FOR

THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (NUWEP) (U)



DOD/DFOISR
TCm$ECRETCO?
Copy No
Case No.
T.S.



TV



fcument No. /



OCTOBER 1980



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



ncpDODucnoH or ti ii o documcht
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cxccpt with pcnM i ooioN or THE
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Clawified by USO(P)
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Extended by USD(P)
Reason 2-3Q1C S, 6 & 7, DoO 5200.VR



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3



IV, STRATEGY FOR EMPLOYMENT
A. Flexibility

(U) The U.S. must have the capability to respond appropriately and
effectively to any level of Soviet aggression, over the continuum of
nuclear weapon employment options, ranging from use of a small number of
strategic and/or theater nuclear capable weapon systems In a contingency
operation, to a war employing all elements of our nuclear forces In
attacks against a broad spectrum of enemy targets. The ability to
respond with selectivity to less than an all-out Soviet attack In keeping
with the needs of the situation Is required In order to provide the
National Command Authorities (NCA) with suitable alternatives, strengthen
deterrence, and enhance the prospects of limiting escalation of the
conflict. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to
design employment plans on short notice In response to the latest and
changing circumstances. To advance the goal of flexibility, planning
will provide an objective-oriented series of building block options for
the employment of nuclear weapons In ways that will enable us to employ
them consonant with our objectives and the course of the conflict.

J^ef As It evolves, the building block approach should provide
plans which satisfy a hierarchy of targeting objectives and which will
provide the NCA an Improved capability to employ nuclear weapons effectively
In as measured and controlled a manner as feasible in case of a limited
conflict. It should provide complementary elements which can be combined
In an Integrated and discrete manner to provide larger and more comprehensive
plans for achieving politico-military objectives In specific situations.
The building block approach places emphasis on the Individual elements,
their objective utility, and our ability to employ them separately or In
total. However, this does not Imply that the total plan be finely
divisible—practical realities cannot be Ignored. The desire for enhanced
flexibility In employment must be balanced by practical consideration of
the Increased complexity incurred In planning and operations, the need
to avoid compromising the effectiveness and workability of the larger
options, and the need to maintain a responsive decisionmaking and force
execution process.



Gorbachev's Economic Program:
Problems Emerge



CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999




DDB-1 900-1 87-88
June 1988



6



The Economic Slowdown
Trends in Soviet GNP, 1965-85
Average annual percentage growth



4 -



2 —




1966-70



1971-75



1975-80



1981-86



A Heavy Defense Burden

The Ratio of Selected Soviet to US
Cumulative Weapons Production, 1975-85




ICBMs and
SLBMs



Cruise
Missiles



Fighter
Aircraft



Tanks



Figure 1. Gorbachev's Domestic Imperative



THX WH1TC MOUSE



SC

s»eRBe» s engrave

January 17, 1983 ./^./ftf

H&Uonat SccwuXy Peow«n wt'wrnm. iC C356

D**«etive AtuwbCA 75 frO. Tftn t^ Hi a aii se toff

u.s. relations with ths ussr cs>

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three
elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal
pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism*
and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict recioroeitv
outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. task* are: Y '

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by

competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet
Union in all international arenas — particularly in the
overall military balance and in geographical regions of
priority concern to the United States. This will remain
the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the
process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more plura-
listic political and economic system in which the power of

^*Jni«i e ?^ r 2i i ? 9 . eUt€ " 9"duaUy reduced. The U.S.
recognises that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the
internal system, and that relations with the USSR should
therefore take into account whether or not they help to
thi * * nd capacity to engage in

To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to

IIU «u* 9 J eWSnt * Vhieh ***** enhance U.S. interests

and which are consistent with the principle of strict
reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when
the Soviet Union is in the midst of a procesiof political
succession. (S) *

cle2r?v r t «°miS« e,,l ^ t . fehiS thr *« fold strategy, the U.S. must convey
vou?d I^L^; ™ unacceptable behavior will incur costs that
cl*i; ?Z 9 * ? y 9 ht the 4am * ***** the ™« aake

Jzfi *° the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior
«W 2™* t *. th * Possibility of an East-West relationship that
pirTL*f* n ? *"P orta,lt benefits for the Soviet Union. It is
the i»^!liL 1,RPOrt !S t **** this ae ***9* conveyed clearly during
time for f ^!rn^ J ' Since * his may * particularly opportune
lessors ™ ** t0 ****** the P° lici * s °* Breihnev^s



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LA-14066-H
History



UNCLASSIFIED



Tracing the Origins of the W76:
1966-Spnng 1973 (U)

Betty I. Perkins
November 3, 2003





Derived from: LA^OQQ, Rev. B f 9/02



^Los Alamos

NATIONAL LABORATORY
Los Alamos NM 87545




iu



UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

7. Yield: The Confetti Argument

Agnew felt that the yield of the W68 was too low to be really effective. In addition, in terms
of the overall total yield available from all the W68 warheads, the W68 design was very costly in
terms of the amount of required special nuclear materials.

In an April 1972 TWX to Assistant Director for Safety and Liaison (Division of Military
Application) Colonel Robert T. Duff, Agnew reported that he was worried about maintaining the
U.S. nuclear deterrent Agnew noted, "It occurs to me that as we go to lower and lower yields in
our strategic missile warheads and the Soviet Union builds up a better and bett er rivij dafepsg
position, the reality of this deterrent may become questionable,

mm

If the Soviet leadership believes
TffiCEhen our strategic deterrcfirmirhavrio^ deaTof its force. If our MIRV trend
continues we'll be threatening to throw confetti at a potential aggressor. Confetti has high
penetration and survivability but little deterrent power." 281

In a letter dated October 10, 1972, to Giller. at that time Assistant General Manager for
National Security, Agnew again noted several reasons why low yield warheads might not be the
best solution for maximizing the deterrence capability of the stockpile. He reported that
considering the number of required submarines and the low efficiency in their use of special
nuclear material, the low-yield warheads weie not very cost effective. Moreover, Agnew pointed
out that for the Hiroshima device, the effects on Hiroshima in terms of loss of substantial
buildings and the people in them "wasn't all that impressive." In terms of loss of life, the USSR
had lost more than ten million people in WWIL Although the Soviets had an extensive civil-
defense network in place, even if that did not work to reduce loss of civilian lives, the Soviets
might not mind losing a few people, Agnew wrote, " Again, to me, to continue to increase
warhead numbers at the cost of a decrease in yield per warhead could eventually lead to no
deterrence in the minds of those we hope to deter." Agnew stated, "I feel very strongly that we
should endeavor to convince the DoD that what they should have on the next round is a mix of
yields.

(b)(3)

8. Capability

Agnew in his August 10, 1972, letter to Camm pointed out that the Los Alamos group had
been developing suitable technology applicable to the new strategic missile warheads. He wrote,
"In summary then, we have been working very hard to provide the very latest technology in
warhead designs incorporating the most advanced minimum weight hardening techniques to
provide an optimum warhead for the next round of strategic missile warheads, In fact, our work
has been of such outstanding quality that we have been invited by Admiral Levering Smith to



ft M. Agnew, University of California, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, to
BY3/Colonel Robert T. Duff, US AF, Assistant Director for Safety and liaison, Division of Military
Replication USAEC, Wash., D.C. (SRD) (Apri l 14, 1972), pp. 1-U1 1 , Drawer 56, Fol der 1 of 4^.



UNCLASSIF



1 T
JL



UNCLASSIFIED

3, Reservoir Designs to Provide Minimum Helium in the Boost Gas

In a March 1969 memo, primary designer R. Canada outlined the problems that were the
result ofthe formation of 3 He from the decay of ttV rritjnm uyri in the primary's boost gas.

<b«3)

The yielcTot a boosted primary isaegraded as lAUuiii is uiuveriul
to "He both by the loss oTtne^ource of 14-MeV neutrons and also by the decrease of the pre-
boost multiplication rate caused by the high cross-section for neutron capture which is
characteristic of 3 He." He went on to add, "In a conventional boosted single-stage device the
tritium produced by 3 He appears too late in the bomb's explosion to contribute to tiie yield, and
the temperature does not flet hig h enough to produce significant 3 He + D fusion."



<to>(3>



291 R, Canada to Distribution, Subject: ^He in Weapons," W-4-2518 (SRD) (March 10, 1969), 5 pp., A99-0I9,
199-13.



LA-14066.H



CLASSIC iiiJL)



rv-59



■ Tup - Se cr r f



1974 CIA report on emerging USSR superiority:

ME 11-3/8-74 Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict



SUMMARY



THE USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC
SITUATION

1. The Soviets are pressing ahead with a
broad range of programs for the near-tenn
deployment of much improved offensive sys-
tems for intercontinental conflict In addition
they are gradually improving their deployed
strategic defenses, and are vigorously pursuing
the development of advanced technology ap-
plicable to strategic forces.

— In offensive forces, they are focusing on
improving the accuracy, flexibility, and
survivability of their ICBMs and SLBMs
and on MIRVing their ICBMs. Four
new ICBMs, three with MIRV payloads,
are being flight tested. A mobile version
of one of the missiles probably is being
developed* Hardened launch control cen-
ters are being constructed at missile com-
plexes, and a standby airborne command
post for the Strategic Rocket Forces prob-
ably now is operational. New classes of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile subma-
rines with long-range missile systems con-
tinue under construction, and a new
multipurpose bomber is starting to be de-



ployed. Additional ICBMs and SLBMs
are in the preflight stages of research and
development

— In defensive forces, the Soviets are im-
proving the capability of forces already
deployed and are developing new sys-
tems. Older fighter-interceptors and sur-
face-to-air missile systems are being
phased out gradually as improved equip-
ment is introduced. Current research and
development activity includes programs
for antisubmarine warfare, an antiballis-
tic missile system which can be deployed
much more rapidly than the one now
operational, an endoatmospheric bal-
listic missile interceptor, and the applica-
tion of lasers to strategic defense.

% These developments follow a series of
large-scale deployment programs over the past
ten years which have provided the Soviets
with a reliable deterrent and have brought
about world recognition of the USSR's status
as a superpower roughly on a par with the
US. Through these earlier programs, the USSR
has largely eliminated previous US quanti-
tative advantages in strategic offensive forces.



TC5 063093-74/1



6

T o p Sec r e t



Figure 1



Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces

ICBM and SLBM Launchers Defensive Forces

thousands thousands (Not Additive)




r ^ r




THE DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C 20505



APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM



MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of National Intelligence Estimate

11-3/8-76 , "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Conflict Through the Mid-1980s"

FROM George 8ush



1. The attached National Intel! igence Estimate is the\
official appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence. This
Estimate , including its italicized statements of differing views
by members of The National Foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted
and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US
Intelligence Community and was approved by me with the advice of
the Board.

2. The judgments arrived at in this Estimate were made
after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit of alternative
views from the various elements of the Community and from panels
of experts from outside government on a few selected subjects.

The assembling of the panels of outside experts, and the consider-
ation of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose
of which was to determine whether those known for their more
somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present
the evidence in a sufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical
judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached
document. The views of these experts did have some effect. But
to the extent that this Estimate presents a starker appreciation
of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the
latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence
has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet
programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields.

NIE 11-3/8-76 Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
Through the Mid-1980s

~ ~ "019305"



J op Secr e t *

Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces



Figure 1



ICBM and SLBM Launchers

thousands
2.5




Soviet



1966 68



On-Line Missile Weapons*

thousands
6r



1 -




Soviet



-1 L



_l L



1966 68



70



72



74



76



On-Line Missile Throw Weight

nwBJoo. pounds
10



p million kilograms




1966



thousands
10



•8



Defensive Forces
(Not Additive)



Soviet SAM
Launchers



Soviet
Interceptors




US Interceptors
\



__US SAM

1966 68 70 72 74 76 Launchers
Intercontinental Bombers
and On-Line Bomber Weapons

(NotAddHfve)



4 h
3

2
1



US Bomber
Weapons



US Bombers




1966 68



Soviet
, Bomber
Weapons

_ Soviet
'6 Bombers



On-Line Equivalent Megatons

thousands (m^^s and Bombers)



8



6




J 1_



1966 68



70



72



74



J I

76



* Excludes IC8M a'fo launchers under construction or conversion sod SLBM launchers on SSSNs
undergoing sea trials, conversion, or shipyard overhaul. Missile payloads composed of MRVs [which are not
independently targetabte) are counted as one RV.



5CCRLT



17



•TCS $53 121 - 70/ i



top- Secret



NTE 11-3/8-80 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Late 1980s



mmBrn^t

ClAMBIORlCflL-




PART ONE — KEY JUDGMENTS



PREFACE

These Key Judgments consist of two sections. This year the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence has added his own key judgments (section A),
which have not been coordinated with the Intelligence Community. He
does not hold major disagreements with the key judgments coordinated
by the Intelligence Community agencies (section B) or with the basic
analysis in the Estimate. He does not believe, however, that the findings
in section B adequately emphasize those areas of key importance to the
President and his; principal advisers on foreign policy. His key judg-
ments, therefore, address what the basic Estimate tells us about the
following four issues of cardinal importance to US policy on strategic
forces:

— How the strategic capabilities of the two sides compare.

— What actions the Soviets may take as they view the comparative
strengths of the strategic forces.

— Whether and how the balance of strategic forces prompts the
Soviets to pursue strategic arms control agreements with the
United States.

— Whether or not the advantages that the Soviets seem to have in
ICBMs through 1986 would induce or pressure them to exploit
what they might perceive as a "window of opportunity" before
those advantages may be erased toward the end of this decade.



A. KEY JUDGMENTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Soviet Perceptions of the Strategic Environment

1. The comprehensive nature of Soviet strategic offensive and
defensive programs, the emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on ca-
pabilities to fight a nuclear war, and assertions that general nuclear war
can be won indicate that some Soviet leaders hold the view that victory
in general nuclear war is possible. The Soviets assert that a general
nuclear war will probably be brief, but we believe that they have



A-l
op Seen.!



Fig lire J

Comparison of Soviet and US Forces for Intercontinental Attack,
1970-80



Number of Delivery Vehicles



2.000




2,000



1,300



1,000



500



J I ' ' ' t I ' 1 I T ^



1970 72 74 76 78 30

Midyear



J



ir



■ Top GlulI



1



res cccc'wj/:



A-5



3ALUHTHblE CBORCTBA MATEPHAJIOB



3KCn03MUHOHHyK> A03y pdAHdLlMM OC/ia6/lHK)T

BABoe Maiepna/ibi tojiujhhoh





6emoH- 12



KupnuH-11



epyHm- 12



depeeo-10



3





FOR EXTERNAL PUBLICATION



Radio Moscow in Mandarin to China, Nov. 3, 1978.

"However, the fact is that China's digging deep tunnels can never pro-
tect the Chinese masses from nuclear bombing or even protect them from
conventional heavy bombs."

**********

Radio Moscow World Service in English, Nov. 16, 1978

"The U.S. Administration is going to launch a 5-year program of civil
defense. - - - The only real safety for the Americans is strengthening
friendship with the Soviet Union, not bomb shelters."

FOR INTERNAL PUBLICATION

Moscow Voyennyye Znaniya in Russian No. 5, May 1978, p. 33.

"It is appropriate to say that we still meet people who have an incor-
rect Idea about defense possibilities. The significant Increase in the
devastating force of nuclear weapons compared with conventional means of
attack makes some people feel that death 1s inevitable for all who are
in the strike area. However, there is not and can never be a weapon
from which there Is no defense. With knowledge and the skillful use of
contemporary procedures, each person can not only preserve his own life
but can also actively work at his enterprise or institution. The only
person who suffers is the one who neglects his civil defense studies."



Robert Scheer

with Enough

S HOVELS '

Reagan,Bush
& Nuclear War

"Dig a hole, cover it with a couple
of doors and then throw three
feet of dirt on top... It's the dirt
that does it... if there are
enough shovels to go around,
everybody's going to make it'.'

—IK. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces



"President Ronald Reagan had been in office less
than a year when he approved a secret plan for the
United States to prevail in a protracted nuclear war
This secret plan, outlined in a so-called National
Security Decision Document, committed the United
States for the first time to the idea thut a global
nuclear wur cun be won!'

With these words Robert Scheer, the distin-
guished national reporter for the Los Angeles
Times, begins this astonishing revelation of how
a handful of Cold Wur ideologues— led by the
President himself— have reversed the longstand-
ing American assumption that nuclear war means
mutual suicide.

Robert Scheer's aim in With Enough Shovels is
to expose the deadly course on which we are now
embarked, a course thut categorically rejects the
strategic assumptions thut prevailed from Presi-
dents Eisenhower through Carter and thut sus-
tained the Nixon-Kissinger program of detente— a
program which our current lenders call "appease-
ment!'



Leon Gourg




i



SOVIET STRATEGY




USSR
CIVIL DEFENSE



With a Foreword by
AMBASSADOR FOY D. KOHLER



LEON GOURE is a Professor of International Studies and Director of
Soviet Studies at the Center for Advanced International Studies at the
University of Miami. A graduate of New York University, Columbia
University School of International Affairs and Russian Institute, and
Georgetown University, he is the author of Civil Defense in the Soviet
Union, The Siege of Leningrad, and Soviet Civil Defense 1969-70. He
has also co-authored Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War
to Peaceful Coexistence, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet
Strategy, and Soviet Penetration of Latin America among others.



1st printing
2nd printing



April 1976
August 1976



Civil defense youth training




CHART 4— Schematic Diagram of the Relocation of Dispersed
Workers and Evacuated Persons and Plants.




Foreword

by Foy D. Kohler



Dr. Leon Goure has devoted many years of study to Soviet civil defense and
other war-survival policies and activities in the USSR. The area was one of his
specialties while serving as a Senior Analyst for the RAND Corporation from
1951 to 1969, and he has continued his researches since joining the University
of Miami in 1969 as Director of Soviet Studies and Professor in the Center for
Advanced International Studies.

xi

As a part of our work program for this larger undertaking, the Center has
held a series of special conferences wherein we have subjected our methodol-
ogy and research findings to critical review by outside experts, including au-
thoritative academic and governmental specialists on Soviet affairs and high-
ranking policy-action officers from Defense, State and other agencies directly
concerned with U.S. -Soviet relations.

At two of these conferences, special attention has been given to the Soviet
war-survival problem: One in June 1975 included an exploration of how war-
survival capabilities fit into the Soviet appraisal of the present and future
"correlation of world forces." The second, held in January 1976, included a
thorough examination of the implications for U.S. security interests and U.S.
policy choices of what Moscow is actually doing in the war-survival area.
xii

Nearly all of the experts at our conference viewed the reasoning behind the
overkill concept as "absurd." One cited as an example an article in the April 6,
1975 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which the author argued that with its
present stockpile of nuclear weapons the U.S. could destroy the world's popu-
lation "twelve times over." The author's calculation was arrived at by multi-
plying the casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the total
number of kilotons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and then dividing by the number
of people living in the world. Such a calculation was characterized as com-
pletely misleading. Leaving aside such questions as how many U.S. weapons
would survive a Soviet attack on this country and how many of the residue
could be delivered on target, "it implies that means can be devised to collect
the entire target population into the same density as existed in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and keep them in a completely unwarned and hence vulnerable pos-
ture. A statement of identical validity is that the world's inventory of artillery
shells, small arms ammunition, or for that matter, kitchen knives or rocks can
kill the human population several times over."

xiv



It was recalled that more than 10 billion pounds of TNT was dropped on
Germany, Japan and Italy during World War II. This equalled more than 50
pounds for every man, woman and child in the three countries. Arithmetically
considered, the result should have been the total annihilation of one and all of
these. During the Vietnam War, more than 25 billion pounds of TNT were
dumped on North and South Vietnam (15 billion by air and some 10 billion by
other means) for an average of some 730 pounds for each of a total population
of 34 million and an average of 3,000 pounds for each person in prime target
areas; yet the U.S. was unable to kill enough people or to disrupt economic life,
transportation and communications sufficiently to even avoid a humilitating
defeat in the war.

xv

The basic issue, it was agreed, is how Moscow intends to exploit the situa-
tion politically. The Soviet risk calculations and ability to use its military power
for political purposes are already being increasingly influenced by Moscow's
perceptions of asymmetries between the U.S. and Soviet war-survival versus
assured destruction capabilities. According to Moscow's view, these asymmet-
ries are of great strategic significance for making Soviet power credible as a
deterrent and as an instrument of policy. Soviet spokesmen have given clear
indication of their awareness of the lack of a war-survival program in the U.S.
as well as of the vulnerability of the U.S. arising from the high degree of concen-
tration of its population and industry in a few areas of the country. It is inevita-
ble, therefore, that the Soviet leadership will perceive this asymmetry between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. as altering the balance of forces in Moscow's
favor, and as affecting the credibility of the respective strategic deterrence and
war-fighting postures of the two countries.

In effect, with its growing war-survival capability, the Soviet Union could
well conclude that the U.S. threat of "massive retaliation" has no credibility
except as an act of sheer desperation. In crisis situations, this factor could
decisively influence both sides' risk calculations and consequently their rela-
tive ability and willingness to hold a hard line. The Soviet Union could confront
the U.S. with its ability to keep Soviet population and resource losses within
acceptable limits, all the more so if it carries out the evacuation of its cities, as
against the certainty of U.S. losses of 50 percent or more of its population and
of a very large portion of its industry. This would place the U.S. at a great
disadvantage in the management of the crisis and in its negotiations with the
Soviet Union. Instead of a "balance of terror" which equally restrains both
sides, the "terror" would be mainly on the part of the U.S. and, faced with the
possibility of national "suicide," the public reaction to it would be likely to
deprive the President of any flexibility in his policy choices in dealing with
Moscow.

xvi



C00012335



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



WASHINGTON 23, D. C.



CIA 12 March 1962



1 2 MAR mi



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence



SUBJECT



MILITARY THOUGHT ; "Some Factors Affecting the
Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation", by
Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov



1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought " (" Voyennaya Mysl ") published by the
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.



Following Is a verbatim translation of an article titled
"Sense Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation",
written "by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the i960 Second Issue of a special
version of Voyenpaya Mysl ( Military Thought ) which is classified
TOP SECBffiT by the Soviets and is issued irregularly.



Weakening the nuclear strength of an opposing grouping of the
enemy and depriving him of his capability to use nuclear weapons is one
of the most important tasks, whose correct solution ensures the success
of the offensive operation as a whole.



The mass utilization of nuclear weapons in short periods of time
is the only way to achieve decisive destruction of the fire power of
an opposing enemy grouping, destruction of his main nuclear/missile
and aviation means, and also disruption of the control of troops and
the disorganization of work of the rear services.




Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)



* * *



* ♦ *



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rPAJKAAHCKAH
OBOPOHA



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h cpeAHero cnen,HajibHoro o6paaoBa-
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BbicmBX vh66hi>iz 8aBeAeeHfi»




H3flATEJIbCTB0
«BbICUIAfl fflKOJIA*
Mockbi - 1970



CIVIL DEFENSE
(Grazhdanskaya Oborona)

A uthors

P. T. Yegorov, I. A. Shlyakhov, and N. I. Alabin

Publishing House for Higher Education

(Vysshaya Shkola)

Second Edition, Moscow (1970), 500,000 copies



The presence of apertures in walls (windows, doors) has an influence
on the destruction of buildings and structures since the wave, easily
destroying them, penetrates quickly into the building, and the reflected
pressure [outside] is compensated by the overpressure within.

36

In addition, nuclear blasts create electromagnetic fields, which generate
surges in underground lines and in high-wire lines and radio station
antennas, and also generate radio waves propagated over a wide area.
The induced current and voltage may be propagated by wires over a
wide area and cause damage to insulation, electrical and radio equip-
ment may burn out, and personal injuries may occur. It is necessary to
implement engineering technical measures in civil defense in order to
provide protection from secondary damage.



54



3. Methods of Protecting the Population
by Dispersal and Evacuation



3.1 Organization and Planning of Dispersal and Evacuation

During the Great Patriotic War [World War II] , to protect productive
capacity, we transported entire enterprises, including their workers and
employees, to the deep rear from areas of direct combat; that is, we
evacuated industry. The evacuation of people, enterprises, and capital
equipment was directed by the Soviet [Council] on Evacuation, which
was organized by a decree of the CC of the CPSU and by the Council of
People's Commissars of the 24th of June, 1941.

Under the direction of the government, all national departments and
administrations organized special sections and commissions on evacua-
tion. On-site, the evacuations were supervised by Party and Soviet
organs. A priority system for evacuating enterprises, people and material
goods was established.

The first enterprises to be evacuated were large ones with defense
significance. (The evacuation included workers, employees and their
families, and factory equipment.) From July through November 1941,
over 1000 industrial enterprises moved into the interior of the country.
Evacuation from the forward areas of the Don Basin, Stalingrad, and
the northern Caucasus was also conducted in the summer of 1942.

A characteristic feature of the evacuation of that time was that it took
place over 1000 kms. from the front lines, into areas inaccessible — at
the time — to enemy attack. However, this evacuation was only partial
in character, since a significant part of the population remained in the
territory occupied by the German-fascist invaders.

Under conditions of a nuclear missile war, civil defense must solve the
problem of defending the population through a series of measures, which
include dispersal and evacuation of people from cities that are likely
to be targets of missile strikes by the enemy.

72



CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR



HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON
DEFENSE PRODUCTION
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



APRIL 28, 1076



Printed for the dm of the
Joint Committee on Defense Production




74-307



O 3. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON t 1976



HEARING ON CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND LIMITED

NUCLEAR WAR



WEDNESDAY APRIL 28, 1976

U.S. Senate and
U.S. House op Representatives,
Joint Committee on Defense Production,

Washmgton, B.C.

The committee met at 10 :05 a.m. in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Hon. William Proxmire, vice chairman of the subcommittee,
presiding.

Present: Senators William Proxmire and John Sparkman.

Senator Proxmire. The committee will come to order.

Today's hearing inaugurates a review by the Joint Committee on
our Nation's civil preparedness. It is the first such congressional review
in over two decades.

By civil preparedness, we mean those mainly civilian measures by.
which we seek to protect the lives and property of our citizens.

This is the first function of any government. A government which
cannot meet this fundamental test of defending its people and the
national treasure is not likely to survive for very long.

In subsequent hearings, the committee will examine the adequacy
of Federal, State, and local preparedness programs, including plans
for fallout shelters, strategic evacuation, preparedness exercises and
drills, civil defense stockpiles, and continuity of government. Like-
wise, the Joint Committee will inquire into the organization of the
Government for preparedness. It will also review the Nation's indus-
trial and economic preparedness in terms of the defense industrial base.

This is an especially timely undertaking. Over the past 2 years the
United States nas been moving from a declared nuclear policy of
mutual assured destruction to one of flexible response, or limited
nuclear war.

In the minds of some eminent strategists, this implies a lowering
of the nuclear weapons threshold, a quickening of the trigger finger
on the missile launch console, and an increased probability of un-
controlled nuclear conflict.

But to other equally qualified experts, this shift in strategic doc-
trine, this shift to larger numbers of more flexible, or more versatile
and accurate weapons and control systems does not undermine deter-
rence of nuclear war; instead, it enhances deterrence.

Well, it cant be both ways and whenever you have such a complete
divergence in expert opinion, it is time for a careful review of the facts.

(l)



2



These hearings are also timely in that there are increasing rumors
of a civil defense gap, with the Soviet Union well in the lead.

In this year's annual report, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated
that, and I quote:

An asymmetry has developed over the years that bears directly on onr stra-
tegic relationship with the Soviets and on the credibility of onr deterrent postnre.
For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their
civil defense effort which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of urban popu-
lations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of shelters in out-
lying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the
Soviet population. The importance the Soviets attach to this program at present
is indicated not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in Its
support, but also by the appointment of a deputy minister of defense to head
this effort

Now, the term "asymmetry" used by the Secretary sounds to a non-
expert like me like a four-bit word for "gap." We have heard a great
deal over the years about gaps that never materialized or proved
unimportant. Yet we have spent a lot of money to eliminate the non-
existent or the insignificant. It is for tliis reason that the committee
last week published the declassified text of the 1957 Gaither Report
which invented the first missile gap.

3

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND MEMBER OF THE
SALT DELEGATION

Mr. Nitze. Mr. Chairman, my interest in the questions which this
committee is discussing began in 1944 when I was asked to be a direc-
tor of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The required qualification
of the directors was that they have no prior knowledge of military
strategy or of air power, and could thus be presumed to be unbiased
in appraising the effects of the immense U.S. strategic air effort in
World War II. I spent the next 2 years in Europe and then in the
Pacific in intensive work, in association with what I believe to have
been the best talent available to this country, to try to understand
something about both subjects. In the Pacific portion of the survey,
as Vice Chairman, I was in effective command of the operation, includ-
ing the detailed study of the effects of the weapons used at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.

Since that time much has changed. Weapons have increased in yield
and missiles now have an intercontinental range. But these changes

are hardly as revolutionary as the changes brought about by the role
of effective air power in World War II and of the introduction of
nuclear weapons in its closing phase. After all, the largest number
of our nuclear reentry vehicles today are Poseidon warheads, each of
which has an equivalent megatonnage less than twice that of the
weapons used at Hiroshima ana Nagasaki.

At Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was no air-raid warning and
very few people availed themselves of the crude civil defense racili-
ties which were available. Most of those that did, even at ground zero,
in other words, directlv under the explosion, which was at the optimum
height of burst, survived. The trains were operating through Hiro-
shima 2 days after the explosion.



5

Let me paraphrase from an interchange I had in 1960 with Colonel
Lincoln, head of the faculty at West Point, on this subject :

The Russians are careful students of Clausewitz. I do not believe
they would ever ignore either the danger that a war once started
might escalate to the full violence which the pure theory of war might
indicate; on the other hand, they would never forget that war is a
tool of policy and that every effort must be made to avoid letting it so
escalate. 1



i In this connection the following quotation from Communist of the Armed Forces in
November 1975 is pertinent : "The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation
of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in
military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile
weapons leave war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond
the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its con-
tinuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary."

On the other hand, I can well imagine that they might consider a
controlled nuclear conflict in which significant military targets, but
not urban-industrial targets, are the initial objects of attack, if they
thought war unavoidable.

In conclusion, I would like to comment on this committee's print
containing the Gaither Report of 1957.

I have now read that report for the first time in nearly 20 years. I
am impressed — especially m light of the information then available
to the Gaither committee — by the care and comprehensiveness of that
committee's examination of the problems assigned to it for study. I
note in contrast the cavalier imprecision reflected in the foreword pre-
pared by this committee's staff.

It is not true that the Gaither Report ignored arms control, nor is it
true that the report spoke of U.S. strategic inferiority as then a fact
To the contrary, the Gaither Report described the United States as
then "capable of making a decisive attack on the U.S.S.R." In view
of SAC's vulnerability "to a surprise attack in a period of lessened
world tension," the Gaither Report also noted the U.S.S.R.'s capability
to make "a very destructive attack on this country."

The report then observed, "As soon as SAC acquires an effective
'alert' status, the United States will be able to carry out a decisive
attack even if surprised," and it anticipated that juncture "as the best
time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-a-
vis Russia mijgjht never be so strong again."

In attempting to disparage the Gaither committee's analysis, the
staff foreword cites a subsequent estimate "* * * that at the time of the
Gaither Report the Soviet Union probably had fewer than a dozen op-
erational ICBMs." In fact, at the time of the Gaither Report — only a
few weeks after the sputnik launching — the Soviet Union obviously
had no operational ICBMs. The Gaither Report made no assumption
to the contrary. Indeed, it postulated 1959 as the probable year the
Soviet Union would first have operational ICBMs ; in fact, they first
became operational in 1960. What was crucial at the time was not only
the question of how many ICBMs would be operational when, but
even more importantly the question of the speed with which the U.S.
Air Force could achieve adequate early warning facilities and an
appropriate alert posture.

The Gaither Report focused attention on those questions.



9



STATEMENT OF HERMAN KAHN, DIRECTOR, HUDSON INSTITUTE

10

It is not true that the Democrats raised the issue of a missile gap
against the Republican administration. That was a Republican state-
ment. The Republicans predicted the Russians would have 300 missiles
by 1960. But at the same time, the Republican administration said this
wouldn't make any difference, because we had 2,000 bombers and they
were more important than 300 missiles.

The great contribution of the Gaither Report, as Paul just said, was
to make clear that if the Soviets had 300 missiles and we did not have
any kind of warning system, then we might not have 2,000 bombers,
because they could be destroyed by a surprise attack while still on the
ground.

I also made clear, that while the Soviets probably would not have
300 operational missiles in 1960, if they did have them, we would be in
trouble — that is, despite the predictions by the Republican administra-
tion we did not think they had such a force — but we were not sure.

What does one do when the other side may be able to do something in
the near future and if one waits until he is certain before reacting,
it is too late, while if one reacts early it may turn out to have been
unnecessary?

11

Let me also make a remark about a release I saw from this committee
which listed a series of predicted gaps which did not occur. In at least
half the cases, people were rather clear that the gap might not occur,
but they were not sure.

[Additional remarks :]

But they felt they had to worry about it ahead of time and even make some
preparations because they could not afford to wait until all the facts were in.

Let me ask a question : What do you do if the other side exhibits a
weapon system and has the production capability? You are not quite
sure what he is going to do. Do you wait until he does it or do you worry
about it?

In general this is a very complicated issue. In some cases, we almost
have to make preparations ahead of time, even though they may be
wasted. In other cases, we should wait until we are more sure ; in still
other cases, one just hopes for luck. But one should not, in my judg-
ment, downgrade responsible officials who get concerned under such
circumstances.

I might also draw attention to some studies clone by Albert Wohl-
stetter. It is pointed out in these studies that in most cases, we have
underestimated rather than overestimated U.S.S.R. future capability.
I will ask that this report be sent to the committee.

If you look at the record, there has been more a problem of under-
estimation than overestimation. This is true in terms of the number of
missiles the Soviets have had over time and in terms of Soviet capa-
bility on all kinds of other issues. We tend to remember the discussion
when some hysterical people overstate the problem ; then it turns out to
be wrong. I would argue this is not at all the characteristic problem.



12



Probably an even better prototype for the situation we are thinking
about is pre- World War II. After World War I, much of the world
became sick of war, and war became "unthinkable" to most people,
particularly in the victorious "Allied Powers." Strategists and pub-
licists talked about poison gas and knock-out blows; they thought all
the capital cities would be destroyed by poison gas in the first few days
of a war. They did not understand the idea of limitations in warfare —
of mutual deterrence even after hostilities have broken out.

When Hitler got elected in 1933, people became interested in larger
defense budgets. Then he marched into the Ehineland and, of course,
defense budgets increased slightly. Then there was the Anschlus and
then Munich, and more substantial increases in military budgets.
With the invasion of Czechoslovakia, everybody got deeply con-
cerned. Then, finally, there was the invasion of Poland, the formal
declaration of war and then 7 months of more or less "phony
war." As a result there was opportunity on both sides for 7
months' of full-time war production, before the war really opened up.

We would argue that similar possibilities should be considered
today. Nobody is interested in jumping into a nuclear war today.
Nobody is going to want to execute the usual picture of nuclear war,
in which each side presses every button and goes home. It is extraor-
dinarily difficult to believe such a scenario.

It might happen. But I would be willing to bet, if this were a bet-
ting matter, 50 to 1 against it.

On the other hand, the situation might arise in which there was a
declaration of war, followed by a phony war, or a serious confronta-
tion in which there were credible threats of war. By the way, in such
a confrontation, the following dialog tends to occur.

Both sides are saving to the other side, "There is absolutely nothing
at risk which justifies this terrible danger to which we are subjecting
each other and the rest of. the world. It is clear that whatever we
are arguing about is simply not worth the risk of a thermonuclear
war. Therefore, one of us has to be reasonable-and it isn't going to
be me."

13

Finally, a last point. When we write scenarios for nuclear war, we
find it difficult to write a credible scenario which doesn't involve
months or weeks of warning. I would guess we are as good at writing
scenarios as anybody in the world. We have certainly written as many.

I want to warn the committee, on the other hand, that when we
looked at World War I, we didn't find that scenario plausible. The
mere fact we can't write a plausible scenario for a war doesn't mean it
can't occur, because one can find historical examples to the contrary.

Nevertheless, every scenario we write for nuclear war involves days,
weeks or months of tension. Evacuation, last moment mobilizations
are extraordinarily possible. By the way, evacuations occur not as a
result of secret intelligence or in any attempt to try to outrun the
missiles or the bombers. The New York Times and the Washington
Post provide the warning perhaps days before the attack. People or
governments then get frightened and decide to decrease their vulner-
ability to attack. The idea is, can you exploit such warning if it is
printed in the papers ?



21



TYPICAL STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION SCENARIOS

Of the four scenarios given below, the first two are history, the third used to
be the great fear of NATO, and the fourth is probably the great fear of the War-
saw Pact.

1. The "phony war," 1940 (5 months) :

(a) Pre-crisis arms competition (UK, France, Germany and the U.S.S.R.K

(b) A major series of political-military crisis —
Militarization of the Rhineland (1836) ;
Anschluss (Austria) (1938) ;

Sudeten crisis (1938-39) ;
War in Poland (1939).

(c) De-escalation and negotiation (antagonists began a rapid buildup fearing
a resumption of full scale conflict) .

2. Korea (195KWS3) :

(a) Pre-war politico-military crises —
Soviet invasion of Iran (1946) ;

Soviet takeover of East European nations (1945-48) ;

Berlin blockade (1948) ;

Soviet intervention in Turkey and Greece ;

Soviet military buildup, post WW-IL

(b) Major turnabout in U.S. policy —

Factor of four increase in defense expenditures in 18 months ;
Massive emphasis on strategic preparedness, especially active defense.

3. Successful Soviet attack on W. Berlin and subsequent de-escalation.

4. Uprising in East Germany gets out of control and escalates.

22

CHARACTERISTICS OF A SPECIAL MOBILIZATION SCENARIO : A FORMAL DECLARATION OF

WAR BY THE U.S.

1. The declaration would have solemn and especially great significance for our
enemies, allies, and neutrals.

2. The information transferred would have :

(a ) Unambiguous factual content of great importance ;
Ob) Undeniable implications and symbolism ;

(c) Highly uncertain interpretations or implications.

3. Its existence would preempt "ordinary" crisis negotiation and deny the
stability of any recent fait accompli.

4. In some extreme crises it could be temporizing — a declaration is not a spasm
response — and lead to deescalation of actual fighting.

5. But it implies a rapid response to any increased use of force.

6. It tends to force a decision by allies to cooperate actively.

7. It would justify many peripheral actions (blockades, interdiction, property
confiscation, internment of hostile aliens, etc.).

8. It would tend to unify the national response — and increase defense spend-
ing enormously through mobilization.

9. It would convey the unambiguous message that a format peace treaty will
be required to settle all the important issues.

ROLE OF RESEARCH FOR MOBILIZING ACTIVE DEFENSES

1. Missile defense probably would be the most important and expensive effort.

2. Lead-time reduction becomes extremely important.

3. A program is required to facilitate rapid massive procurement of mutually
^reinforcing systems —

Boost phase interception ;
Mid course interception ;
Terminal interception.

4. A capability may soon be needed to support a war in space.

5. A capability is required for integration into other— ihigh priority strategic
mobilization programs —

Air defense ;
Civil defense.

Major research objective: design systems which are highly effective,
mutually supporting and which can be rapidly deployed at high levels of
expenditure.



Appendix I



Paul Henry Nitze

In the spring of 1969, Paul Henry Nitze was appointed the representative of
the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union ; a position he held until June 1974, at
which time he resigned.

Mr. Nitze resigned from his duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense on January
20, 1969, a position he had held since July 1, 1967, succeeding Cyrus R. Vance.

Mr. Nitze was serving as 57th Secretary of the Navy when he was nominated
by former President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 10, 1967, to become Deputy
Secretary of Defense. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on June
29, 1967.

The late President John F. Kennedy nominated Mr. Nitze to be Secretary of
the Navy on October 14, 1963. At that time he was serving as Assistant Secretary
of Defense (International Security Affairs), having assumed that position on
January 29, 1961. He began his duties as Secretary of the Navy on November
29, 1963.

Graduated "cum laude" in 1928 from Harvard University, Mr. Nitze subse-
quently joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon Read and Com-
pany. In 1941, he left his position as Vice President of that firm to become
financial director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

From 1942-1943, he was Chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board
of Economic Warfare, until named as Director of Foreign Procurement and
Development for the Foreign Economic Administration.

During the period 1944-1946, Mr. Nitze was Vice Chairman of the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey. He was awarded the Medal of Merit by Presi-
dent Truman for service to the nation in this capacity.

For the next seven years, he served with the Department of State, beginning
in the position of Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy.
In 1948, he was named Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs. In August, 1949, he became Deputy Director of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff, and Director the following year.

Mr. Nitze left the federal government in 1953 to become President of the
Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C., a position he held
until January 1961.

Mr. Nitze is Chairman of the Advisory Council of The Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., and also serves on the
Board of Trustees of the University. He holds memberships on the Board of
Directors of Schroders, Inc., in New York, and Schroders, Ltd., in London, The
American Security and Trust Company of Washington, D.C., Northwestern
Mutual Life Mortgage and Realty Investors of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is
Chairman of the Board of the Aspen Skiing Corporation.



Herman Kahn

Herman Kahn was born in Bayonne, New Jersey, in 1922. He received a B.A.
from UCLA in 1945 and an M.S. in physics from the California Institute of
Technology in 1948. He was associated with the Rand Corporation before becom-
ing in 1961 the principal founder and director of the Hudson Institute, a re-
search organization studying public policy issues, with headquarters in Croton-
on-Hudson, N.Y. His international reputation as a strategic warfare analyst
or, as the New Republic put it, one of "the prophets of strategic reality," is based
on his work at the Institute and on his books: On Thermonuclear War (1960),
Thinking about the Unthinkable (1962), On Escalation (1965 and, revised Pelican

(77)



143



Statement op E. P. Wigner 1 for the Joint Committee on Defense

Production

1 Dr. Wiener is a Nobel Laureate and an emeritus professor of physics at Princeton
University and hns lonp been associated with civil defense issues. He edited a 1968 study
Who Speaks for Civil Defense t

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

This writer became convinced of the possible effectiveness of civil
defense measures when he served as a member of the General Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

144

Are the U.S.S.R. and China the onlv countries with elaborate and
well developed civil defense systems? No — most of the peace-loving
countries also have such systems, based on blast shelters, and their
yearly expenditures per person on such defense is about 15 times greater
than ours. This has been, so far, about 400 per person a year. Inciden-
tally, the Swiss civil defense repeats our President Kennedy's message :
(Civil defense) "is insurance we trust, will never be needed" — its
greatest accomplishment is, according to the Swiss, that it will not
have to be used, that it will divert the aggressive instincts of possible
opponents.

It is easy to conclude that an effective civil defense is not only desir-
able, it is also possible.

IS CIVIL DEFENSE NECESSARY?

What is the principal danger that threatens us in the present absence
of an effective civil defense ? It is the possibility of the U.S.S.R. evacu-
ating its cities, dispersing their population, and then making demands
on us, under the threat of a nuclear attack, approximating those made
by Hitler or Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich pact. This left
Czechoslovakia essentially defenseless.

145

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CIVIL DEFENSE

The argument which we heard after the U.S.S.R. civil defense efforts
became generally apparent was that our installation of protection for
our people would only induce the U.S.S.R. to augment its aggressive
capability. We now know that such augmentation took place even
though we did not organize a vigorous civil defense effort. One of the
two arguments we now hear, the civil defense is too expensive, seems
almost ridiculous. If Switzerland, Sweden, etc., even China, can afford
the more costly, the blast shelter method, we with the highest per capita
national wealth, can also surely afford the defense of our people. The
other argument, in the words of one of the most learned opponents of
civil defense, S. Drell, is that it would lead to an "escalation of the ap-
prehension from the mood of today, vis-a-vis the dangers of a nuclear
exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union." Should the appre-
hension of the danger not be greater now, where we have no effective
defense, than it would be when we have such defense? Or is it pro-
posed that we should lull the common people into ignorance of the true
situation? It is remarkable also that the U.S.S.R. is not criticised for
fostering the "apprehension" of its own people. One must conclude
that the varying arguments against civil defense have little validity.



146



A FEW PROPOSALS RELATED TO OUR DEFENSE

The first change I would advocate is to stop maintaining that a
nuclear war would be the end of mankind. Such a statement may give
the impression to an opponent that he can achieve anything by threat-
ening with a nuclear war. After all, he would argue, tlie opponent (that
is us) will make any sacrifice to avoid the "end of mankind". Hence, if
he is threatened with extinction he will give in, particularly if the
threat comes from a party which does not believe that the war precipi-
tated by him will lead to the "end of mankind". Instead of such a
blatantly incorrect statement, it would be better to subscribe to Chuy-
kov's doctrine that "knowledge and the skillful use of modern protec-
tive measures" will make it possible to provide effective protection. At
least, we could adhere to Kissinger's earlier (1957) statement : "While
it (civil defense) cannot avert the traumatic effect of vast physical
destruction, its efficient operation may make the difference between the
survival of a society and its collapse."

The second measure which I consider to be urgent is to establish
better contact with the people at large. This makes it desirable for
DCPA to expand its staff by the employment of people who can es-
tablish a contact with the population at large, who can speak and write
the truth convincingly. One of the functions of these advisors would
be to help the high schools to give instruction on the nature of nuclear
explosions and the defense against the effects of these. This is a subject
which is foreign to most present high school teachers, and the advisor
could and should help them to acquire the necessary knowledge. After
all, the Federal Government now intends to support the local schools
and can well suggest that these contribute to the protection of the
country. The high school instruction on civil def ense — obligatory in
the TJ.S.S.R. — would be very useful since, after all, we learn best when
we are young and we learn most non-elementary facts from our teach-
ers. But even more generally, the establishment of a close contact be-
tween those who protect our freedom, and those whose freedom is pro-
tected, would be very desirable ; and acquainting people at large with
the methods and effectiveness of. civil defense would provide an avenue
toward this goal. It may not be easy to find people who know about
the methods and effectiveness of civil defense and who are also able
and interested in communicating this and much other knowledge to
the people at large, but every effort should be made to find such people
and support them.

The last suggestion I wish to make is that the DCPA budget should
certainly not be cut. It should steadily be increased until, in a few years,
it reaches the per capita level of other peace-loving and non-expansion-
ist countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, etc. For reasons
given in the rest of mv statement, this would be of decisive importance
for maintaining a valid, widely endorsed, and vigorous defense effort
for our country — and it would support all freedom-directed nations.
Their independence does depend to a certain degree on our strength
and our ability to stand up for them. The examples of Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland — to mention only a few — show that such in-
dependence does not come freely.

Let me end on a bit more hopeful tone which is. however, as sincere
as wasthe rest of my statement. This is the hope that an effective civil
defense may not only protect our country and our freedoms, but it may



(Gross exaggerations, assuming Nevada desert type terrain with
no thermal shadows by city skylines , no duck and cover, no clothing
and fraudulent blast effects data which ignores Hiroshima's evidence)