Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        C. Lonvick
Request for Comments: 9662
Updates: 5425, 6012                                            S. Turner
Category: Standards Track                                          sn3rd
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               J. Salowey
                                                                 Venafi
                                                           October 2024


            Updates to the Cipher Suites in Secure Syslog

Abstract

  RFCs 5425 and 6012 describe using TLS and DTLS to securely transport
  syslog messages.  This document updates the cipher suites required by
  RFC 5245 (TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog) and RFC 6012 (DTLS
  Transport Mapping for Syslog).  It also updates the protocol
  recommended by RFC 6012 for secure datagram transport.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9662.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
  Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
  in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction
  2.  Terminology
  3.  Support for Updating
  4.  Updates to RFC 5425
  5.  Updates to RFC 6012
  6.  Early Data
  7.  IANA Considerations
  8.  Security Considerations
  9.  References
    9.1.  Normative References
    9.2.  Informative References
  Acknowledgments
  Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

  "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog"
  [RFC5425] and "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
  Mapping for Syslog" [RFC6012] describe using TLS and DTLS to securely
  transport syslog messages.  Both of these specifications require the
  use of RSA-based certificates and the use of TLS and DTLS versions
  that are not the most recent.

  Section 4.2 of [RFC5425] requires that implementations MUST support
  TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-
  implement cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  Section 5.2 of [RFC6012] requires that implementations "MUST" support
  DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347] and are also "REQUIRED" to support the mandatory-
  to-implement cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  The community is moving away from cipher suites that do not offer
  forward secrecy and towards more robust suites.

  The DTLS 1.0 transport [RFC4347] has been deprecated by RFC 8996
  [BCP195], and the community is moving to DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] and DTLS
  1.3 [RFC9147].

  This document updates [RFC5425] and [RFC6012] to prefer the use of
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 over the use of
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  This document also updates [RFC6012] by recommending a mandatory-to-
  implement secure datagram transport.

2.  Terminology

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
  "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
  BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
  capitals, as shown here.

3.  Support for Updating

  [RFC8447bis] generally reminds us that cryptographic algorithms and
  parameters will be broken or weakened over time.  Blindly
  implementing the cryptographic algorithms listed in any specification
  is not advised.  Implementers and users need to check that the
  cryptographic algorithms specified continue to provide the expected
  level of security.

  As the Syslog Working Group determined, syslog clients and servers
  MUST use certificates as defined in [RFC5280].  Since both [RFC5425]
  and [RFC6012] REQUIRED the use of TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, it is
  very likely that RSA certificates have been implemented in devices
  adhering to those specifications.  RFC 9325 [BCP195] notes that ECDHE
  cipher suites exist for both RSA and ECDSA certificates, so moving to
  an ECDHE cipher suite will not require replacing or moving away from
  any currently installed RSA-based certificates.

  [DEPRECATE-KEX] documents that the cipher suite
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, along with some other cipher suites,
  may require mitigation techniques to achieve expected security, which
  may be difficult to effectively implement.  Along those lines, RFC
  9325 [BCP195] notes that TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA does not
  provide forward secrecy, a feature that is highly desirable in
  securing event messages.  That document also goes on to recommend
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as a cipher suite that does
  provide forward secrecy.

  As such, the community is moving away from algorithms that do not
  provide forward secrecy.  For example, the International
  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has selected more robust suites
  such as TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, which is also listed
  as a currently RECOMMENDED algorithm in [RFC8447bis] for their
  deployments of secure syslog.

  Additionally, RFC 8996 [BCP195] deprecates the use of DTLS 1.0
  [RFC4347], which is the mandatory-to-implement transport protocol per
  [RFC6012].  Therefore, that transport protocol must be updated.

  Finally, RFC 9325 [BCP195] provides guidance on the support of TLS
  1.3 [RFC8446] and DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147].

  Therefore, to maintain interoperability across implementations, the
  mandatory-to-implement cipher suites listed in [RFC5425] and
  [RFC6012] should be updated so that implementations of secure syslog
  will still interoperate and provide an acceptable and expected level
  of security.

  However, since there are many implementations of syslog using the
  cipher suites mandated by [RFC6012], a sudden change is not
  desirable.  To accommodate a migration path,
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA or TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  may be used, but it is REQUIRED that
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 be preferred.

4.  Updates to RFC 5425

  The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites are REQUIRED to be
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  Implementations of [RFC5425] SHOULD offer
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 but MAY offer
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  Implementations of [RFC5425] MUST continue to use TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
  as the mandatory-to-implement transport protocol.

  As per RFC 9325 [BCP195], implementations of [RFC5425] SHOULD support
  TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS
  1.3 over earlier versions of TLS.

5.  Updates to RFC 6012

  The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites are REQUIRED to be
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  Implementations of [RFC6012] SHOULD offer
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 but MAY offer
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

  As specified in RFCs 8996 and 9325 [BCP195], implementations of
  [RFC6012] MUST NOT use DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347].  Implementations MUST use
  DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347].

  DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] implementations SHOULD support and prefer the
  mandatory-to-implement cipher suite
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.

  As per RFC 9325 [BCP195], implementations of [RFC6012] SHOULD support
  DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate DTLS
  version 1.3 over earlier versions of DTLS.

6.  Early Data

  Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
  [RFC8446] that allows a client to send data ("early data") as part of
  the first flight of messages to a server.  Early data is permitted by
  TLS 1.3 when the client and server share a PSK, either obtained
  externally or via a previous handshake.  The client uses the PSK to
  authenticate the server and to encrypt the early data.

  As noted in Section 2.3 of [RFC8446bis], the security properties for
  early data are weaker than those for subsequent TLS-protected data.
  In particular, early data is not forward secret, and there are no
  protections against the replay of early data between connections.
  Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446bis] requires that applications not use early
  data without a profile that defines its use.  Because syslog does not
  support replay protection (see Section 8.4 of [RFC5424]) and most
  implementations establish a long-lived connection, this document
  specifies that implementations MUST NOT use early data.

7.  IANA Considerations

  This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Security Considerations

  RFCs 8996 and 9325 [BCP195] deprecate an insecure DTLS transport
  protocol from [RFC6012] and deprecate insecure cipher suites from
  [RFC5425] and [RFC6012].  However, the installed base of syslog
  implementations is not easily updated to immediately adhere to those
  changes.

  This document updates the mandatory-to-implement cipher suites to
  allow for a migration from TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA to
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 without deprecating the former.
  Implementations should prefer to use
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.

  If a device currently only has TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, an
  administrator of the network should evaluate the conditions and
  determine if TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA should be allowed so that
  syslog messages may continue to be delivered until the device is
  updated to have TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

  [BCP195]   Best Current Practice 195,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
             At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:

             Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
             1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.

             Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
             "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
             Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
             (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
             2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

  [RFC4347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
             Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.

  [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
             (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

  [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

  [RFC5424]  Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC5424, March 2009,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5424>.

  [RFC5425]  Miao, F., Ed., Ma, Y., Ed., and J. Salowey, Ed.,
             "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for
             Syslog", RFC 5425, DOI 10.17487/RFC5425, March 2009,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5425>.

  [RFC6012]  Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng,
             "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
             Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6012,
             October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6012>.

  [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
             Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
             January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

  [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
             2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
             May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

  [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
             Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

  [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
             Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
             1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.

9.2.  Informative References

  [DEPRECATE-KEX]
             Bartle, C. and N. Aviram, "Deprecating Obsolete Key
             Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2", Work in Progress, Internet-
             Draft, draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05, 3
             September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
             draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05>.

  [RFC8446bis]
             Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
             Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
             ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11, 14 September 2024,
             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
             rfc8446bis-11>.

  [RFC8447bis]
             Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
             TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
             ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-09, 30 April 2024,
             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
             rfc8447bis-09>.

Acknowledgments

  The authors would like to thank Arijit Kumar Bose, Steffen Fries, and
  the members of IEC TC57 WG15 for their review, comments, and
  suggestions.  The authors would also like to thank Tom Petch, Juergen
  Schoenwaelder, Hannes Tschofenig, Viktor Dukhovni, and the IESG
  members for their comments and constructive feedback.

Authors' Addresses

  Chris Lonvick
  Email: [email protected]


  Sean Turner
  sn3rd
  Email: [email protected]


  Joe Salowey
  Venafi
  Email: [email protected]

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