Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Sharma, Ed.

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Sharma, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9654 Netskope Inc
Obsoletes: 8954 August 2024
Updates: 6960
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension

Abstract

RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for
the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used to check
the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to
cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP
request message.

Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce
value that is longer than 32 octets. This document also modifies the
"Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the
encoding format and values for easier implementation and
understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes
updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. OCSP Extensions
2.1. Nonce Extension
3. Security Considerations
3.1. Replay Attack
4. IANA Considerations
5. References
5.1. Normative References
5.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
Acknowledgements
Author's Address

1. Introduction

The Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of
[RFC6960]. The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a
response. It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids
replay attacks. This extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954]
limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support
cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32
octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce
to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP
requester and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32
octets.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

2. OCSP Extensions

The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
[RFC6960] and the Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954].
[RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages
based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates
(see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] to
limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This
document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and
does not change the specifications of any of the other extensions
defined in [RFC6960].

2.1. Nonce Extension

The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the
requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as one of
the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the
Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce,
while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce. If the Nonce
extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
octet and can be up to 128 octets. Implementations compliant with
[RFC8954] will not be able to process nonces generated per the new
specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified
in [RFC8954].

An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document MUST
use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.

An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension MUST accept Nonce
lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. A
responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for
requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and
15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.

Responders that implement the extension in this document MUST reject
any OCSP request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or
greater than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus
as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].

The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum
Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
with older OCSP requesters that follow [RFC6960].

id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a
32-octet Nonce in hexadecimal format.

30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
c8

Here is the decoded version of the above example. Offset, Length,
and Object Identifier are in decimal.

Offset Length
0 47 : SEQUENCE {
2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
: (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
15 32 : OCTET STRING
: DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
: E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
: }
: }

3. Security Considerations

The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
[RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that
the response is the most recent response from the server and not an
old copy.

3.1. Replay Attack

The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP
responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the
request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
fields in the OCSP response.

4. IANA Considerations

For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes A.1 and A.2, IANA has assigned
the following object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):

+=======+=====================+
| Value | Description |
+=======+=====================+
| 111 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-88 |
+-------+---------------------+
| 112 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-08 |
+-------+---------------------+

Table 1

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.

5.2. Informative References

[Err5891] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.

[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules

This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the
entirety of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata ID 5891
[Err5891] as well.

Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module
replaces the module in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].

Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module
present in Appendix A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.
This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and
Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided,
the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module per the
policy of the PKIX Working Group.

A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax

<CODE BEGINS>
OCSP-2024-88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }

Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
response OCTET STRING }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
-- The format for GeneralizedTime is
-- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
-- [RFC5280]
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
-- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
-- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
-- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
-- number of unused bits] in the responder's
-- certificate)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }

-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END
<CODE ENDS>

A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax

<CODE BEGINS>
OCSP-2024-08
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
Extensions{}, EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }

AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }

Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }

sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
... }} OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
... }} OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}

RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType RESPONSE.&id ({ResponseSet}),
response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
&Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}

basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
{ BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{ sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithMD5 |
sa-rsaWithMD2,
... }},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce |
re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
... }} OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
-- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
-- (excluding the tag and length and number
-- of unused bits)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-crl |
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
CrlEntryExtensions,
... }} OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
OPTIONAL }

-- Certificate Extensions

ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }

-- Request Extensions

re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }

re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-response }

re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }

re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }

-- Response Extensions

re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }

re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }

re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }

-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END
<CODE ENDS>

Acknowledgements

The authors of this document thank Mohit Sahni for his work to
produce [RFC8954].

The authors also thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns,
Tomas Gustavsson, and Carl Wallace for their feedback and
suggestions.

Author's Address

Himanshu Sharma (editor)
Netskope Inc
2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
Santa Clara, California 95054
United States of America
Email: [email protected]
URI: www.netskope.com