Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. Hanson
Request for Comments: 9607                                     M. Faller
Category: Standards Track                                       K. Maver
ISSN: 2070-1721                   General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
                                                              July 2024


   RTP Payload Format for the Secure Communication Interoperability
                        Protocol (SCIP) Codec

Abstract

  This document describes the RTP payload format of the Secure
  Communication Interoperability Protocol (SCIP).  SCIP is an
  application-layer protocol that provides end-to-end session
  establishment, payload encryption, packetization and de-packetization
  of media, and reliable transport.  This document provides a globally
  available reference that can be used for the development of network
  equipment and procurement of services that support SCIP traffic.  The
  intended audience is network security policymakers; network
  administrators, architects, and original equipment manufacturers
  (OEMs); procurement personnel; and government agency and commercial
  industry representatives.

IESG Note

  This IETF specification depends upon a second technical specification
  that is not available publicly, namely [SCIP210].  The IETF was
  therefore unable to conduct a security review of that specification,
  independently or when carried inside Audio/Video Transport (AVT).
  Implementers need to be aware that the IETF hence cannot verify any
  of the security claims contained in this document.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9607.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
  Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
  in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Key Points
  2.  Introduction
    2.1.  Conventions
    2.2.  Abbreviations
  3.  Background
  4.  Payload Format
    4.1.  RTP Header Fields
    4.2.  Congestion Control Considerations
    4.3.  Use of Augmented RTPs with SCIP
  5.  Payload Format Parameters
    5.1.  Media Subtype "audio/scip"
    5.2.  Media Subtype "video/scip"
    5.3.  Mapping to SDP
    5.4.  SDP Offer/Answer Considerations
  6.  Security Considerations
  7.  IANA Considerations
  8.  SCIP Contact Information
  9.  References
    9.1.  Normative References
    9.2.  Informative References
  Authors' Addresses

1.  Key Points

  *  SCIP is an application-layer protocol that uses RTP as a
     transport.  This document defines the SCIP media subtypes to be
     listed in the Session Description Protocol (SDP) and only requires
     a basic RTP transport channel for SCIP payloads.  This basic
     transport channel is comparable to Clearmode as defined by
     [RFC4040].

  *  SCIP transmits encrypted traffic and does not require the use of
     Secure RTP (SRTP) for payload protection.  SCIP also provides for
     reliable transport at the application layer, so it is not
     necessary to negotiate RTCP retransmission capabilities.

  *  SCIP includes built-in mechanisms that negotiate protocol message
     versions and capabilities.  To avoid SCIP protocol ossification
     (as described in [RFC9170]), it is important for middleboxes to
     not attempt parsing of the SCIP payload.  As described in this
     document, such parsing serves no useful purpose.

  *  SCIP is designed to be network agnostic.  It can operate over any
     digital link, including non-IP modem-based PSTN and ISDN.  The
     SCIP media subtypes listed in this document were developed for
     SCIP to operate over RTP.

  *  SCIP handles packetization and de-packetization of payloads by
     producing encrypted media packets that are not greater than the
     MTU size.  The SCIP payload is opaque to the network, therefore,
     SCIP functions as a tunneling protocol for the encrypted media,
     without the need for middleboxes to parse SCIP payloads.  Since
     SCIP payloads are integrity protected, modification of the SCIP
     payload is detected as an integrity violation by SCIP endpoints,
     leading to communication failure.

2.  Introduction

  This document details usage of the "audio/scip" and "video/scip"
  pseudo-codecs [MediaTypes] as a secure session establishment protocol
  and media transport protocol over RTP.

  It discusses how:

  1.  encrypted audio and video codec payloads are transported over
      RTP;

  2.  the IP network layer does not implement SCIP as a protocol since
      SCIP operates at the application layer in endpoints;

  3.  the IP network layer enables SCIP traffic to transparently pass
      through the network;

  4.  some network devices do not recognize SCIP and may remove the
      SCIP codecs from the SDP media payload declaration before
      forwarding to the next network node; and finally,

  5.  SCIP endpoint devices do not operate on networks if the SCIP
      media subtype is removed from the SDP media payload declaration.

  The United States, along with its NATO Partners, have implemented
  SCIP in secure voice, video, and data products operating on
  commercial, private, and tactical IP networks worldwide using the
  scip media subtype.  The SCIP data traversing the network is
  encrypted, and network equipment in-line with the session cannot
  interpret the traffic stream in any way.  SCIP-based RTP traffic is
  opaque and can vary significantly in structure and frequency, making
  traffic profiling not possible.  Also, as the SCIP protocol continues
  to evolve independently of this document, any network device that
  attempts to filter traffic (e.g., deep packet inspection) may cause
  unintended consequences in the future when changes to the SCIP
  traffic may not be recognized by the network device.

  The SCIP protocol defined in SCIP-210 [SCIP210] includes built-in
  support for packetization and de-packetization, retransmission,
  capability exchange, version negotiation, and payload encryption.
  Since the traffic is encrypted, neither the RTP transport nor
  middleboxes can usefully parse or modify SCIP payloads; modifications
  are detected as integrity violations resulting in retransmission, and
  eventually, communication failure.

  Because knowledge of the SCIP payload format is not needed to
  transport SCIP signaling or media through middleboxes, SCIP-210
  represents an informative reference.  While older versions of the
  SCIP-210 specification are publicly available, the authors strongly
  encourage network implementers to treat SCIP payloads as opaque
  octets.  When handled correctly, such treatment does not require
  referring to SCIP-210, and any assumptions about the format of SCIP
  messages defined in SCIP-210 are likely to lead to protocol
  ossification and communication failures as the protocol evolves.

     |  Note: The IETF has not conducted a security review of SCIP and
     |  therefore has not verified the claims contained in this
     |  document.

2.1.  Conventions

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
  "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
  BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
  capitals, as shown here.

  The best current practices for writing an RTP payload format
  specification, as per [RFC2736] and [RFC8088], were followed.

  When referring to the Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol,
  the uppercase acronym "SCIP" is used.  When referring to the media
  subtype scip, lowercase "scip" is used.

2.2.  Abbreviations

  The following abbreviations are used in this document.

  AVP:      Audio-Visual Profile

  AVPF:     Audio-Visual Profile with Feedback

  FNBDT:    Future Narrowband Digital Terminal

  ICWG:     Interoperability Control Working Group

  IICWG:    International Interoperability Control Working Group

  MELPe:    Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced

  MTU:      Maximum Transmission Unit

  NATO:     North Atlantic Treaty Organization

  OEM:      Original Equipment Manufacturer

  SAVP:     Secure Audio-Visual Profile

  SAVPF:    Secure Audio-Visual Profile with Feedback

  SCIP:     Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol

  SDP:      Session Description Protocol

  SRTP:     Secure Real-time Transport Protocol

  STANAG:   Standardization Agreement

3.  Background

  The Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) allows the
  negotiation of several voice, data, and video applications using
  various cryptographic suites.  SCIP also provides several important
  characteristics that have led to its broad acceptance as a secure
  communications protocol.

  SCIP began in the United States as the Future Narrowband Digital
  Terminal (FNBDT) Protocol in the late 1990s.  A combined U.S.
  Department of Defense and vendor consortium formed a governing
  organization named the Interoperability Control Working Group (ICWG)
  to manage the protocol.  In time, the group expanded to include NATO,
  NATO partners, and European vendors under the name International
  Interoperability Control Working Group (IICWG), which was later
  renamed the SCIP Working Group.

  First generation SCIP devices operated on circuit-switched networks.
  SCIP was then expanded to radio and IP networks.  The scip media
  subtype transports SCIP secure session establishment signaling and
  secure application traffic.  The built-in negotiation and flexibility
  provided by the SCIP protocols make it a natural choice for many
  scenarios that require various secure applications and associated
  encryption suites.  SCIP has been adopted by NATO in STANAG 5068.
  SCIP standards are currently available to participating government
  and military communities and select OEMs of equipment that support
  SCIP.

  However, SCIP must operate over global networks (including private
  and commercial networks).  Without access to necessary information to
  support SCIP, some networks may not support the SCIP media subtypes.
  Issues may occur simply because information is not as readily
  available to OEMs, network administrators, and network architects.

  This document provides essential information about the "audio/scip"
  and "video/scip" media subtypes that enable network equipment
  manufacturers to include settings for "scip" as a known audio and
  video media subtype in their equipment.  This enables network
  administrators to define and implement a compatible security policy
  that includes audio and video media subtypes "audio/scip" and "video/
  scip", respectively, as permitted codecs on the network.

  All current IP-based SCIP endpoints implement "scip" as a media
  subtype.  Registration of scip as a media subtype provides a common
  reference for network equipment manufacturers to recognize SCIP in an
  SDP payload declaration.

4.  Payload Format

  The "scip" media subtype identifies and indicates support for SCIP
  traffic that is being transported over RTP.  Transcoding, lossy
  compression, or other data modifications MUST NOT be performed by the
  network on the SCIP RTP payload.  The "audio/scip" and "video/scip"
  media subtype data streams within the network, including the VoIP
  network, MUST be a transparent relay and be treated as "clear-channel
  data", similar to the Clearmode media subtype defined by [RFC4040].

  [RFC4040] is referenced because Clearmode does not define specific
  RTP payload content, packet size, or packet intervals, but rather
  enables Clearmode devices to signal that they support a compatible
  mode of operation and defines a transparent channel on which devices
  may communicate.  This document takes a similar approach.  Network
  devices that implement support for SCIP need to enable SCIP endpoints
  to signal that they support SCIP and provide a transparent channel on
  which SCIP endpoints may communicate.

  SCIP is an application-layer protocol that is defined in SCIP-210.
  The SCIP traffic consists of encrypted SCIP control messages and
  codec data.  The payload size and interval will vary considerably
  depending on the state of the SCIP protocol within the SCIP device.

  Figure 1 below illustrates the RTP payload format for SCIP.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                           RTP Header                          |
  +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
  |                                                               |
  |                          SCIP Payload                         |
  |                                                               |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 1: SCIP RTP Payload Format

  The SCIP codec produces an encrypted bitstream that is transported
  over RTP.  Unlike other codecs, SCIP does not have its own upper
  layer syntax (e.g., no Network Adaptation Layer (NAL) units), but
  rather encrypts the output of the audio and video codecs that it uses
  (e.g., G.729D, H.264 [RFC6184], etc.).  SCIP achieves this by
  encapsulating the encrypted codec output that has been previously
  formatted according to the relevant RTP payload specification for
  that codec.  SCIP endpoints MAY employ mechanisms, such as inter-
  media RTP synchronization as described in [RFC8088], Section 3.3.4,
  to synchronize "audio/scip" and "video/scip" streams.

  Figure 2 below illustrates notionally how codec packets and SCIP
  control messages are packetized for transmission over RTP.

  +-----------+              +-----------------------+
  |   Codec   |              | SCIP control messages |
  +-----------+              +-----------------------+
        |                                |
        |                                |
        V                                V
  +--------------------------------------------------+
  |             Packetizer* (<= MTU size)            |
  +--------------------------------------------------+
            |                        |
            |                        |
            V                        |
    +--------------+                 |
    |  Encryption  |                 |
    +--------------+                 |
            |                        |
            |                        |
            V                        V
  +--------------------------------------------------+
  |                      RTP                         |
  +--------------------------------------------------+

                     Figure 2: SCIP RTP Architecture

  * Packetizer:  The SCIP application layer will ensure that all
     traffic sent to the RTP layer will not exceed the MTU size.  The
     receiving SCIP RTP layer will handle packet identification,
     ordering, and reassembly.  When required, the SCIP application
     layer handles error detection and retransmission.

  As described above, the SCIP RTP payload format is variable and
  cannot be described in specificity in this document.  Details can be
  found in SCIP-210.  SCIP will continue to evolve and, as such, the
  SCIP RTP traffic MUST NOT be filtered by network devices based upon
  what currently is observed or documented.  The focus of this document
  is for network devices to consider the SCIP RTP payload as opaque and
  allow it to traverse the network.  Network devices MUST NOT modify
  SCIP RTP packets.

4.1.  RTP Header Fields

  The SCIP RTP header fields SHALL conform to [RFC3550].

  SCIP traffic may be continuous or discontinuous.  The Timestamp field
  MUST increment based on the sampling clock for discontinuous
  transmission as described in [RFC3550], Section 5.1.  The Timestamp
  field for continuous transmission applications is dependent on the
  sampling rate of the media as specified in the media subtype's
  specification (e.g., Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced
  (MELPe)).  Note that during a SCIP session, both discontinuous and
  continuous traffic are highly probable.

  The Marker bit SHALL be set to zero for discontinuous traffic.  The
  Marker bit for continuous traffic is based on the underlying media
  subtype specification.  The underlying media is opaque within SCIP
  RTP packets.

4.2.  Congestion Control Considerations

  The bitrate of SCIP may be adjusted depending on the capability of
  the underlying codec (such as MELPe [RFC8130], G.729D [RFC3551],
  etc.).  The number of encoded audio frames per packet may also be
  adjusted to control congestion.  Discontinuous transmission may also
  be used if supported by the underlying codec.

  Since UDP does not provide congestion control, applications that use
  RTP over UDP SHOULD implement their own congestion control above the
  UDP layer [RFC8085] and MAY also implement a transport circuit
  breaker [RFC8083].  Work in the RTP Media Congestion Avoidance
  Techniques (RMCAT) working group [RMCAT] describes the interactions
  and conceptual interfaces necessary between the application
  components that relate to congestion control, including the RTP
  layer, the higher-level media codec control layer, and the lower-
  level transport interface, as well as components dedicated to
  congestion control functions.

  Use of the packet loss feedback mechanisms in AVPF [RFC4585] and
  SAVPF [RFC5124] are OPTIONAL because SCIP itself manages
  retransmissions of some errored or lost packets.  Specifically, the
  payload-specific feedback messages defined in [RFC4585], Section 6.3
  are OPTIONAL when transporting video data.

4.3.  Use of Augmented RTPs with SCIP

  The SCIP application-layer protocol uses RTP as a basic transport for
  the "audio/scip" and "video/scip" payloads.  Additional RTPs that do
  not modify the SCIP payload are considered OPTIONAL in this document
  and are discretionary for a SCIP device vendor to implement.  Some
  examples include, but are not limited to:

  *  "RTP Payload Format for Generic Forward Error Correction"
     [RFC5109]

  *  "Multiplexing RTP Data and Control Packets on a Single Port"
     [RFC5761]

  *  "Symmetric RTP / RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)" [RFC4961]

  *  "Negotiating Media Multiplexing Using the Session Description
     Protocol (SDP)" a.k.a. BUNDLE [RFC9143]

5.  Payload Format Parameters

  The SCIP RTP payload format is identified using the scip media
  subtype, which is registered in accordance with [RFC4855] and per the
  media type registration template from [RFC6838].  A clock rate of
  8000 Hz SHALL be used for "audio/scip".  A clock rate of 90000 Hz
  SHALL be used for "video/scip".

5.1.  Media Subtype "audio/scip"

  Type name:  audio

  Subtype name:  scip

  Required parameters:  N/A

  Optional parameters:  N/A

  Encoding considerations:  Binary.  This media subtype is only defined
     for transfer via RTP.  There SHALL be no transcoding of the audio
     stream as it traverses the network.

  Security considerations:  See Section 6.

  Interoperability considerations:  N/A

  Published specification:  [SCIP210]

  Applications that use this media type:  N/A

  Fragment identifier considerations:  none

  Additional information:

     Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A
     Magic number(s):  N/A
     File extension(s):  N/A
     Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

  Person & email address to contact for further information:  Michael
     Faller ([email protected] or [email protected]) and
     Daniel Hanson ([email protected])

  Intended usage:  COMMON

  Restrictions on usage:  N/A

  Authors:  Michael Faller ([email protected] or
     [email protected]) and Daniel Hanson ([email protected])

  Change controller:  SCIP Working Group ([email protected])

5.2.  Media Subtype "video/scip"

  Type name:  video

  Subtype name:  scip

  Required parameters:  N/A

  Optional parameters:  N/A

  Encoding considerations:  Binary.  This media subtype is only defined
     for transfer via RTP.  There SHALL be no transcoding of the video
     stream as it traverses the network.

  Security considerations:  See Section 6.

  Interoperability considerations:  N/A

  Published specification:  [SCIP210]

  Applications that use this media type:  N/A

  Fragment identifier considerations:  none

  Additional information:

     Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A
     Magic number(s):  N/A
     File extension(s):  N/A
     Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

  Person & email address to contact for further information:  Michael
     Faller ([email protected] or [email protected]) and
     Daniel Hanson ([email protected])

  Intended usage:  COMMON

  Restrictions on usage:  N/A

  Authors:  Michael Faller ([email protected] or
     [email protected]) and Daniel Hanson ([email protected])

  Change controller:  SCIP Working Group ([email protected])

5.3.  Mapping to SDP

  The mapping of the above-defined payload format media subtype and its
  parameters SHALL be implemented according to Section 3 of [RFC4855].

  Since SCIP includes its own facilities for capabilities exchange, it
  is only necessary to negotiate the use of SCIP within SDP Offer/
  Answer; the specific codecs to be encapsulated within SCIP are then
  negotiated via the exchange of SCIP control messages.

  The information carried in the media type specification has a
  specific mapping to fields in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)
  [RFC8866], which is commonly used to describe RTP sessions.  When SDP
  is used to specify sessions employing the SCIP codec, the mapping is
  as follows:

  *  The media type ("audio") goes in SDP "m=" as the media name for
     "audio/scip", and the media type ("video") goes in SDP "m=" as the
     media name for "video/scip".

  *  The media subtype ("scip") goes in SDP "a=rtpmap" as the encoding
     name.  The required parameter "rate" also goes in "a=rtpmap" as
     the clock rate.

  *  The optional parameters "ptime" and "maxptime" go in the SDP
     "a=ptime" and "a=maxptime" attributes, respectively.

  An example mapping for "audio/scip" is:

    m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96
    a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000

  An example mapping for "video/scip" is:

    m=video 50002 RTP/AVP 97
    a=rtpmap:97 scip/90000

  An example mapping for both "audio/scip" and "video/scip" is:

    m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96
    a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000
    m=video 50002 RTP/AVP 97
    a=rtpmap:97 scip/90000

5.4.  SDP Offer/Answer Considerations

  In accordance with the SDP Offer/Answer model [RFC3264], the SCIP
  device SHALL list the SCIP payload type number in order of preference
  in the "m" media line.

  For example, an SDP Offer with scip as the preferred audio media
  subtype:

    m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96 0 8
    a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000
    a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
    a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000

6.  Security Considerations

  RTP packets using the payload format defined in this specification
  are subject to the security considerations discussed in the RTP
  specification [RFC3550], and in any applicable RTP profile such as
  RTP/AVP [RFC3551], RTP/AVPF [RFC4585], RTP/SAVP [RFC3711], or RTP/
  SAVPF [RFC5124].  However, as "Securing the RTP Framework: Why RTP
  Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution" [RFC7202]
  discusses, it is not an RTP payload format's responsibility to
  discuss or mandate what solutions are used to meet the basic security
  goals like confidentiality, integrity, and source authenticity for
  RTP in general.  This responsibility lies on anyone using RTP in an
  application.  They can find guidance on available security mechanisms
  and important considerations in "Options for Securing RTP Sessions"
  [RFC7201].  Applications SHOULD use one or more appropriate strong
  security mechanisms.  The rest of this Security Considerations
  section discusses the security impacting properties of the payload
  format itself.

  This RTP payload format and its media decoder do not exhibit any
  significant non-uniformity in the receiver-side computational
  complexity for packet processing, and thus do not inherently pose a
  denial-of-service threat due to the receipt of pathological data, nor
  does the RTP payload format contain any active content.

  SCIP only encrypts the contents transported in the RTP payload; it
  does not protect the RTP header or RTCP packets.  Applications
  requiring additional RTP headers and/or RTCP security might consider
  mechanisms such as SRTP [RFC3711], however these additional
  mechanisms are considered OPTIONAL in this document.

7.  IANA Considerations

  The "audio/scip" and "video/scip" media subtypes have previously been
  registered in the "Media Types" registry [MediaTypes].  IANA has
  updated these registrations to reference this document.

8.  SCIP Contact Information

  The SCIP protocol is maintained by the SCIP Working Group.  The
  current SCIP-210 specification [SCIP210] may be requested from the
  email address below.

  SCIP Working Group, CIS3 Partnership
  NATO Communications and Information Agency
  Oude Waalsdorperweg 61
  2597 AK The Hague, Netherlands
  Email: [email protected]


  An older public version of the SCIP-210 specification can be
  downloaded from https://www.iad.gov/SecurePhone/index.cfm.  A U.S.
  Department of Defense Root Certificate should be installed to access
  this website.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

  [RFC2736]  Handley, M. and C. Perkins, "Guidelines for Writers of RTP
             Payload Format Specifications", BCP 36, RFC 2736,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2736, December 1999,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2736>.

  [RFC3264]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
             with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.

  [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
             Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
             Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
             July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

  [RFC3551]  Schulzrinne, H. and S. Casner, "RTP Profile for Audio and
             Video Conferences with Minimal Control", STD 65, RFC 3551,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC3551, July 2003,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3551>.

  [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
             Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
             RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.

  [RFC4585]  Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey,
             "Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control
             Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC4585, July 2006,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4585>.

  [RFC5124]  Ott, J. and E. Carrara, "Extended Secure RTP Profile for
             Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback
             (RTP/SAVPF)", RFC 5124, DOI 10.17487/RFC5124, February
             2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5124>.

  [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
             2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
             May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

  [RFC8866]  Begen, A., Kyzivat, P., Perkins, C., and M. Handley, "SDP:
             Session Description Protocol", RFC 8866,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC8866, January 2021,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8866>.

9.2.  Informative References

  [MediaTypes]
             IANA, "Media Types",
             <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

  [RFC4040]  Kreuter, R., "RTP Payload Format for a 64 kbit/s
             Transparent Call", RFC 4040, DOI 10.17487/RFC4040, April
             2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4040>.

  [RFC4855]  Casner, S., "Media Type Registration of RTP Payload
             Formats", RFC 4855, DOI 10.17487/RFC4855, February 2007,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4855>.

  [RFC4961]  Wing, D., "Symmetric RTP / RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)",
             BCP 131, RFC 4961, DOI 10.17487/RFC4961, July 2007,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4961>.

  [RFC5109]  Li, A., Ed., "RTP Payload Format for Generic Forward Error
             Correction", RFC 5109, DOI 10.17487/RFC5109, December
             2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5109>.

  [RFC5761]  Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Multiplexing RTP Data and
             Control Packets on a Single Port", RFC 5761,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC5761, April 2010,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5761>.

  [RFC6184]  Wang, Y.-K., Even, R., Kristensen, T., and R. Jesup, "RTP
             Payload Format for H.264 Video", RFC 6184,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC6184, May 2011,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6184>.

  [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
             Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
             RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.

  [RFC7201]  Westerlund, M. and C. Perkins, "Options for Securing RTP
             Sessions", RFC 7201, DOI 10.17487/RFC7201, April 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7201>.

  [RFC7202]  Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Securing the RTP
             Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media
             Security Solution", RFC 7202, DOI 10.17487/RFC7202, April
             2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7202>.

  [RFC8083]  Perkins, C. and V. Singh, "Multimedia Congestion Control:
             Circuit Breakers for Unicast RTP Sessions", RFC 8083,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC8083, March 2017,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8083>.

  [RFC8085]  Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
             Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
             March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.

  [RFC8088]  Westerlund, M., "How to Write an RTP Payload Format",
             RFC 8088, DOI 10.17487/RFC8088, May 2017,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8088>.

  [RFC8130]  Demjanenko, V. and D. Satterlee, "RTP Payload Format for
             the Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced (MELPe)
             Codec", RFC 8130, DOI 10.17487/RFC8130, March 2017,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8130>.

  [RFC9143]  Holmberg, C., Alvestrand, H., and C. Jennings,
             "Negotiating Media Multiplexing Using the Session
             Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 9143,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC9143, February 2022,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9143>.

  [RFC9170]  Thomson, M. and T. Pauly, "Long-Term Viability of Protocol
             Extension Mechanisms", RFC 9170, DOI 10.17487/RFC9170,
             December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9170>.

  [RMCAT]    IETF, "RTP Media Congestion Avoidance Techniques (rmcat)",
             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rmcat/about>.

  [SCIP210]  SCIP Working Group, "SCIP Signaling Plan, SCIP-210".
             Available by request via email to
             <[email protected]>.

Authors' Addresses

  Daniel Hanson
  General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
  150 Rustcraft Road
  Dedham, MA 02026
  United States of America
  Email: [email protected]


  Michael Faller
  General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
  150 Rustcraft Road
  Dedham, MA 02026
  United States of America
  Email: [email protected], [email protected]


  Keith Maver
  General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
  150 Rustcraft Road
  Dedham, MA 02026
  United States of America
  Email: [email protected]