Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          K. Paine
Request for Comments: 9424                                   Splunk Inc.
Category: Informational                                    O. Whitehouse
ISSN: 2070-1721                                           Binary Firefly
                                                            J. Sellwood

                                                                A. Shaw
                                      UK National Cyber Security Centre
                                                            August 2023


   Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and Their Role in Attack Defence

Abstract

  Cyber defenders frequently rely on Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) to
  identify, trace, and block malicious activity in networks or on
  endpoints.  This document reviews the fundamentals, opportunities,
  operational limitations, and recommendations for IoC use.  It
  highlights the need for IoCs to be detectable in implementations of
  Internet protocols, tools, and technologies -- both for the IoCs'
  initial discovery and their use in detection -- and provides a
  foundation for approaches to operational challenges in network
  security.

Status of This Memo

  This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
  published for informational purposes.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
  approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
  Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9424.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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  Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
  in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction
  2.  Terminology
  3.  IoC Fundamentals
    3.1.  IoC Types and the Pyramid of Pain
    3.2.  IoC Lifecycle
      3.2.1.  Discovery
      3.2.2.  Assessment
      3.2.3.  Sharing
      3.2.4.  Deployment
      3.2.5.  Detection
      3.2.6.  Reaction
      3.2.7.  End of Life
  4.  Using IoCs Effectively
    4.1.  Opportunities
      4.1.1.  IoCs underpin and enable multiple layers of the modern
              defence-in-depth strategy.
      4.1.2.  IoCs can be used even with limited resources.
      4.1.3.  IoCs have a multiplier effect on attack defence efforts
              within an organisation.
      4.1.4.  IoCs are easily shared between organisations.
      4.1.5.  IoCs can provide significant time savings.
      4.1.6.  IoCs allow for discovery of historic attacks.
      4.1.7.  IoCs can be attributed to specific threats.
    4.2.  Case Studies
      4.2.1.  Cobalt Strike
        4.2.1.1.  Overall TTP
        4.2.1.2.  IoCs
      4.2.2.  APT33
        4.2.2.1.  Overall TTP
        4.2.2.2.  IoCs
  5.  Operational Limitations
    5.1.  Time and Effort
      5.1.1.  Fragility
      5.1.2.  Discoverability
      5.1.3.  Completeness
    5.2.  Precision
      5.2.1.  Specificity
      5.2.2.  Dual and Compromised Use
      5.2.3.  Changing Use
    5.3.  Privacy
    5.4.  Automation
  6.  Comprehensive Coverage and Defence-in-Depth
  7.  IANA Considerations
  8.  Security Considerations
  9.  Conclusions
  10. Informative References
  Acknowledgements
  Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

  This document describes the various types of IoCs and how they are
  used effectively in attack defence (often called "cyber defence").
  It introduces concepts such as the Pyramid of Pain [PoP] and the IoC
  lifecycle to highlight how IoCs may be used to provide a broad range
  of defences.  This document provides suggestions for implementers of
  controls based on IoCs as well as potential operational limitations.
  Two case studies that demonstrate the usefulness of IoCs for
  detecting and defending against real-world attacks are included.  One
  case study involves an intrusion set (a set of malicious activity and
  behaviours attributed to one threat actor) known as "APT33", and the
  other involves an attack tool called "Cobalt Strike".  This document
  is not a comprehensive report of APT33 or Cobalt Strike and is
  intended to be read alongside publicly published reports (referred to
  as "open-source material" among cyber intelligence practitioners) on
  these threats (for example, [Symantec] and [NCCGroup], respectively).

2.  Terminology

  Attack defence:
     The activity of providing cyber security to an environment through
     the prevention of, detection of, and response to attempted and
     successful cyber intrusions.  A successful defence can be achieved
     through blocking, monitoring, and responding to adversarial
     activity at the network, endpoint, or application levels.

  Command and control (C2) server:
     An attacker-controlled server used to communicate with, send
     commands to, and receive data from compromised machines.
     Communication between a C2 server and compromised hosts is called
     "command and control traffic".

  Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA):
     The algorithm used in malware strains to periodically generate
     domain names (via algorithm).  Malware may use DGAs to compute a
     destination for C2 traffic rather than relying on a pre-assigned
     list of static IP addresses or domains that can be blocked more
     easily when extracted from, or otherwise linked to, the malware.

  Kill chain:
     A model for conceptually breaking down a cyber intrusion into
     stages of the attack from reconnaissance through to actioning the
     attacker's objectives.  This model allows defenders to think
     about, discuss, plan for, and implement controls to defend against
     discrete phases of an attacker's activity [KillChain].

  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs):
     The way an adversary undertakes activities in the kill chain --
     the choices made, methods followed, tools and infrastructure used,
     protocols employed, and commands executed.  If they are distinct
     enough, aspects of an attacker's TTPs can form specific IoCs as if
     they were a fingerprint.

  Control (as defined by US NIST):
     A safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system
     or an organisation designed to protect the confidentiality,
     integrity, and availability of its information and to meet a set
     of defined security requirements [NIST].

3.  IoC Fundamentals

3.1.  IoC Types and the Pyramid of Pain

  IoCs are observable artefacts relating to an attacker or their
  activities, such as their tactics, techniques, procedures, and
  associated tooling and infrastructure.  These indicators can be
  observed at the network or endpoint (host) levels and can, with
  varying degrees of confidence, help network defenders to proactively
  block malicious traffic or code execution, determine a cyber
  intrusion occurred, or associate discovered activity to a known
  intrusion set and thereby potentially identify additional avenues for
  investigation.  IoCs are deployed to firewalls and other security
  control points by adding them to the list of indicators that the
  control point is searching for in the traffic that it is monitoring.
  When associated with malicious activity, the following are some
  examples of protocol-related IoCs:

  *  IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in network traffic

  *  Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) in network traffic, DNS
     resolver caches, or logs

  *  TLS Server Name Indication values in network traffic

  *  Code-signing certificates in binaries

  *  TLS certificate information (such as SHA256 hashes) in network
     traffic

  *  Cryptographic hashes (e.g., MD5, SHA1, or SHA256) of malicious
     binaries or scripts when calculated from network traffic or file
     system artefacts

  *  Attack tools (such as Mimikatz [Mimikatz]) and their code
     structure and execution characteristics

  *  Attack techniques, such as Kerberos Golden Tickets [GoldenTicket],
     that can be observed in network traffic or system artefacts

  The common types of IoC form a Pyramid of Pain [PoP] that informs
  prevention, detection, and mitigation strategies.  The position of
  each IoC type in the pyramid represents how much "pain" a typical
  adversary experiences as part of changing the activity that produces
  that artefact.  The greater pain an adversary experiences (towards
  the top), the less likely they are to change those aspects of their
  activity and the longer the IoC is likely to reflect the attacker's
  intrusion set (i.e., the less fragile those IoCs will be from a
  defender's perspective).  The layers of the PoP commonly range from
  hashes up to TTPs, with the pain ranging from simply recompiling code
  to creating a whole new attack strategy.  Other types of IoC do exist
  and could be included in an extended version of the PoP should that
  assist the defender in understanding and discussing intrusion sets
  most relevant to them.

                            /\
                           /  \                             MORE PAIN
                          /    \                           LESS FRAGILE
                         /      \                          LESS PRECISE
                        /  TTPs  \
                       /          \                            / \
                      ==============                            |
                     /              \                           |
                    /      Tools     \                          |
                   /                  \                         |
                  ======================                        |
                 /                      \                       |
                / Network/Host Artefacts \                      |
               /                          \                     |
              ==============================                    |
             /                              \                   |
            /          Domain Names          \                  |
           /                                  \                 |
          ======================================                |
         /                                      \               |
        /              IP Addresses              \              |
       /                                          \            \ /
      ==============================================
     /                                              \       LESS PAIN
    /                   Hash Values                  \     MORE FRAGILE
   /                                                  \    MORE PRECISE
  ======================================================

                                 Figure 1

  On the lowest (and least painful) level are hashes of malicious
  files.  These are easy for a defender to gather and can be deployed
  to firewalls or endpoint protection to block malicious downloads or
  prevent code execution.  While IoCs aren't the only way for defenders
  to do this kind of blocking, they are a quick, convenient, and
  nonintrusive method.  Hashes are precise detections for individual
  files based on their binary content.  To subvert this defence,
  however, an adversary need only recompile code, or otherwise modify
  the file content with some trivial changes, to modify the hash value.

  The next two levels are IP addresses and domain names.  Interactions
  with these may be blocked, with varying false positive rates
  (misidentifying non-malicious traffic as malicious; see Section 5),
  and often cause more pain to an adversary to subvert than file
  hashes.  The adversary may have to change IP ranges, find a new
  provider, and change their code (e.g., if the IP address is hard-
  coded rather than resolved).  A similar situation applies to domain
  names, but in some cases, threat actors have specifically registered
  these to masquerade as a particular organisation or to otherwise
  falsely imply or claim an association that will be convincing or
  misleading to those they are attacking.  While the process and cost
  of registering new domain names are now unlikely to be prohibitive or
  distracting to many attackers, there is slightly greater pain in
  selecting unregistered, but appropriate, domain names for such
  purposes.

  Network and endpoint artefacts, such as a malware's beaconing pattern
  on the network or the modified timestamps of files touched on an
  endpoint, are harder still to change as they relate specifically to
  the attack taking place and, in some cases, may not be under the
  direct control of the attacker.  However, more sophisticated
  attackers use TTPs or tooling that provides flexibility at this level
  (such as Cobalt Strike's malleable command and control [COBALT]) or a
  means by which some artefacts can be masked (see [Timestomp]).

  Tools and TTPs form the top two levels of the pyramid; these levels
  describe a threat actor's methodology -- the way they perform the
  attack.  The tools level refers specifically to the software (and
  less frequently, hardware) used to conduct the attack, whereas the
  TTPs level picks up on all the other aspects of the attack strategy.
  IoCs at these levels are more complicated and complex -- for example,
  they can include the details of how an attacker deploys malicious
  code to perform reconnaissance of a victim's network, pivots
  laterally to a valuable endpoint, and then downloads a ransomware
  payload.  TTPs and tools take intensive effort to diagnose on the
  part of the defender, but they are fundamental to the attacker and
  campaign and hence incredibly painful for the adversary to change.

  The variation in discoverability of IoCs is indicated by the numbers
  of IoCs in AlienVault, an open threat intelligence community
  [ALIENVAULT].  As of January 2023, AlienVault contained:

  *  Groups (i.e., combinations of TTPs): 631

  *  Malware families (i.e., tools): ~27,000

  *  URL: 2,854,918

  *  Domain names: 64,769,363

  *  IPv4 addresses: 5,427,762

  *  IPv6 addresses: 12,009

  *  SHA256 hash values: 5,452,442

  The number of domain names appears out of sync with the other counts,
  which reduce on the way up the PoP.  This discrepancy warrants
  further research; however, contributing factors may be the use of
  DGAs and the fact that threat actors use domain names to masquerade
  as legitimate organisations and so have added incentive for creating
  new domain names as they are identified and confiscated.

3.2.  IoC Lifecycle

  To be of use to defenders, IoCs must first be discovered, assessed,
  shared, and deployed.  When a logged activity is identified and
  correlated to an IoC, this detection triggers a reaction by the
  defender, which may include an investigation, potentially leading to
  more IoCs being discovered, assessed, shared, and deployed.  This
  cycle continues until the IoC is determined to no longer be relevant,
  at which point it is removed from the control space.

3.2.1.  Discovery

  IoCs are discovered initially through manual investigation or
  automated analysis.  They can be discovered in a range of sources,
  including at endpoints and in the network (on the wire).  They must
  either be extracted from logs monitoring protocol packet captures,
  code execution, or system activity (in the case of hashes, IP
  addresses, domain names, and network or endpoint artefacts) or be
  determined through analysis of attack activity or tooling.  In some
  cases, discovery may be a reactive process, where IoCs from past or
  current attacks are identified from the traces left behind.  However,
  discovery may also result from proactive hunting for potential future
  IoCs extrapolated from knowledge of past events (such as from
  identifying attacker infrastructure by monitoring domain name
  registration patterns).

  Crucially, for an IoC to be discovered, the indicator must be
  extractable from the Internet protocol, tool, or technology it is
  associated with.  Identifying a particular exchange (or sequence of
  exchanged messages) related to an attack is of limited benefit if
  indicators cannot be extracted or, once they are extracted, cannot be
  subsequently associated with a later related exchange of messages or
  artefacts in the same, or in a different, protocol.  If it is not
  possible to determine the source or destination of malicious attack
  traffic, it will not be possible to identify and block subsequent
  attack traffic either.

3.2.2.  Assessment

  Defenders may treat different IoCs differently, depending on the
  IoCs' quality and the defender's needs and capabilities.  Defenders
  may, for example, place differing trust in IoCs depending on their
  source, freshness, confidence level, or the associated threat.  These
  decisions rely on associated contextual information recovered at the
  point of discovery or provided when the IoC was shared.

  An IoC without context is not much use for network defence.  On the
  other hand, an IoC delivered with context (for example, the threat
  actor it relates to, its role in an attack, the last time it was seen
  in use, its expected lifetime, or other related IoCs) allows a
  network defender to make an informed choice on how to use it to
  protect their network (for example, simply log it, actively monitor
  it, or outright block it).

3.2.3.  Sharing

  Once discovered and assessed, IoCs are most helpful when deployed in
  such a way to have a broad impact on the detection or disruption of
  threats or shared at scale so many individuals and organisations can
  defend themselves.  An IoC may be shared individually (with
  appropriate context) in an unstructured manner or may be packaged
  alongside many other IoCs in a standardised format, such as
  Structured Threat Information Expression [STIX], Malware Information
  Sharing Platform (MISP) core [MISPCORE], OpenIOC [OPENIOC], and
  Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC7970].  This
  enables distribution via a structured feed, such as one implementing
  Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information [TAXII], or
  through a Malware Information Sharing Platform [MISP].

  While some security companies and some membership-based groups (often
  dubbed "Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs)" or
  "Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs)") provide
  paid intelligence feeds containing IoCs, there are various free IoC
  sources available from individual security researchers up through
  small trust groups to national governmental cyber security
  organisations and international Computer Emergency Response Teams
  (CERTs).  Whoever they are, sharers commonly indicate the extent to
  which receivers may further distribute IoCs using frameworks like the
  Traffic Light Protocol [TLP].  At its simplest, this indicates that
  the receiver may share with anyone (TLP:CLEAR), share within the
  defined sharing community (TLP:GREEN), share within their
  organisation and their clients (TLP:AMBER+STRICT), share just within
  their organisation (TLP:AMBER), or not share with anyone outside the
  original specific IoC exchange (TLP:RED).

3.2.4.  Deployment

  For IoCs to provide defence-in-depth (see Section 6) and so cope with
  different points of failure, correct deployment is important.
  Different IoCs will detect malicious activity at different layers of
  the network stack and at different stages of an attack, so deploying
  a range of IoCs enables layers of defence at each security control,
  reinforcing the benefits of using multiple security controls as part
  of a defence-in-depth solution.  The network security controls and
  endpoint solutions where they are deployed need to have sufficient
  privilege, and sufficient visibility, to detect IoCs and to act on
  them.  Wherever IoCs exist, they need to be made available to
  security controls and associated apparatus to ensure they can be
  deployed quickly and widely.  While IoCs may be manually assessed
  after discovery or receipt, significant advantage may be gained by
  automatically ingesting, processing, assessing, and deploying IoCs
  from logs or intelligence feeds to the appropriate security controls.
  As not all IoCs are of the same quality, confidence in IoCs drawn
  from each threat intelligence feed should be considered when deciding
  whether to deploy IoCs automatically in this way.

  IoCs can be particularly effective at mitigating malicious activity
  when deployed in security controls with the broadest impact.  This
  could be achieved by developers of security products or firewalls
  adding support for the distribution and consumption of IoCs directly
  to their products, without each user having to do it, thus addressing
  the threat for the whole user base at once in a machine-scalable and
  automated manner.  This could also be achieved within an enterprise
  by ensuring those control points with the widest aperture (for
  example, enterprise-wide DNS resolvers) are able to act automatically
  based on IoC feeds.

3.2.5.  Detection

  Security controls with deployed IoCs monitor their relevant control
  space and trigger a generic or specific reaction upon detection of
  the IoC in monitored logs or on network interfaces.

3.2.6.  Reaction

  The reaction to an IoC's detection may differ depending on factors
  such as the capabilities and configuration of the control it is
  deployed in, the assessment of the IoC, and the properties of the log
  source in which it was detected.  For example, a connection to a
  known botnet C2 server may indicate a problem but does not guarantee
  it, particularly if the server is a compromised host still performing
  some other legitimate functions.  Common reactions include event
  logging, triggering alerts, and blocking or terminating the source of
  the activity.

3.2.7.  End of Life

  How long an IoC remains useful varies and is dependent on factors
  including initial confidence level, fragility, and precision of the
  IoC (discussed further in Section 5).  In some cases, IoCs may be
  automatically "aged" based on their initial characteristics and so
  will reach end of life at a predetermined time.  In other cases, IoCs
  may become invalidated due to a shift in the threat actor's TTPs
  (e.g., resulting from a new development or their discovery) or due to
  remediation action taken by a defender.  End of life may also come
  about due to an activity unrelated to attack or defence, such as when
  a third-party service used by the attacker changes or goes offline.
  Whatever the cause, IoCs should be removed from detection at the end
  of their life to reduce the likelihood of false positives.

4.  Using IoCs Effectively

4.1.  Opportunities

  IoCs offer a variety of opportunities to cyber defenders as part of a
  modern defence-in-depth strategy.  No matter the size of an
  organisation, IoCs can provide an effective, scalable, and efficient
  defence mechanism against classes of attack from the latest threats
  or specific intrusion sets that may have struck in the past.

4.1.1.  IoCs underpin and enable multiple layers of the modern defence-
       in-depth strategy.

  Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and Intrusion
  Prevention Systems (IPSs) all employ IoCs to identify and mitigate
  threats across networks.  Antivirus (AV) and Endpoint Detection and
  Response (EDR) products deploy IoCs via catalogues or libraries to
  supported client endpoints.  Security Incident Event Management
  (SIEM) platforms compare IoCs against aggregated logs from various
  sources -- network, endpoint, and application.  Of course, IoCs do
  not address all attack defence challenges, but they form a vital tier
  of any organisation's layered defence.  Some types of IoC may be
  present across all those controls while others may be deployed only
  in certain layers of a defence-in-depth solution.  Further, IoCs
  relevant to a specific kill chain may only reflect activity performed
  during a certain phase and so need to be combined with other IoCs or
  mechanisms for complete coverage of the kill chain as part of an
  intrusion set.

  As an example, open-source malware can be deployed by many different
  actors, each using their own TTPs and infrastructure.  However, if
  the actors use the same executable, the hash of the executable file
  remains the same, and this hash can be deployed as an IoC in endpoint
  protection to block execution regardless of individual actor,
  infrastructure, or other TTPs.  Should this defence fail in a
  specific case, for example, if an actor recompiles the executable
  binary producing a unique hash, other defences can prevent them
  progressing further through their attack, for instance, by blocking
  known malicious domain name lookups and thereby preventing the
  malware calling out to its C2 infrastructure.

  Alternatively, another malicious actor may regularly change their
  tools and infrastructure (and thus the indicators associated with the
  intrusion set) deployed across different campaigns, but their access
  vectors may remain consistent and well-known.  In this case, this
  access TTP can be recognised and proactively defended against, even
  while there is uncertainty of the intended subsequent activity.  For
  example, if their access vector consistently exploits a vulnerability
  in software, regular and estate-wide patching can prevent the attack
  from taking place.  However, should these preemptive measures fail,
  other IoCs observed across multiple campaigns may be able to prevent
  the attack at later stages in the kill chain.

4.1.2.  IoCs can be used even with limited resources.

  IoCs are inexpensive, scalable, and easy to deploy, making their use
  particularly beneficial for smaller entities, especially where they
  are exposed to a significant threat.  For example, a small
  manufacturing subcontractor in a supply chain producing a critical,
  highly specialised component may represent an attractive target
  because there would be disproportionate impact on both the supply
  chain and the prime contractor if it were compromised.  It may be
  reasonable to assume that this small manufacturer will have only
  basic security (whether internal or outsourced), and while it is
  likely to have comparatively fewer resources to manage the risks that
  it faces compared to larger partners, it can still leverage IoCs to
  great effect.  Small entities like this can deploy IoCs to give a
  baseline protection against known threats without having access to a
  well-resourced, mature defensive team and the threat intelligence
  relationships necessary to perform resource-intensive investigations.
  While some level of expertise on the part of such a small company
  would be needed to successfully deploy IoCs, use of IoCs does not
  require the same intensive training as needed for more subjective
  controls, such as those using machine learning, which require further
  manual analysis of identified events to verify if they are indeed
  malicious.  In this way, a major part of the appeal of IoCs is that
  they can afford some level of protection to organisations across
  spectrums of resource capability, maturity, and sophistication.

4.1.3.  IoCs have a multiplier effect on attack defence efforts within
       an organisation.

  Individual IoCs can provide widespread protection that scales
  effectively for defenders across an organisation or ecosystem.
  Within a single organisation, simply blocking one IoC may protect
  thousands of users, and that blocking may be performed (depending on
  the IoC type) across multiple security controls monitoring numerous
  different types of activity within networks, endpoints, and
  applications.  The prime contractor from our earlier example can
  supply IoCs to the small subcontractor and thus further uplift that
  smaller entity's defensive capability while protecting itself and its
  interests at the same time.

  Multiple organisations may benefit from directly receiving shared
  IoCs (see Section 4.1.4), but they may also benefit from the IoCs'
  application in services they utilise.  In the case of an ongoing
  email-phishing campaign, IoCs can be monitored, discovered, and
  deployed quickly and easily by individual organisations.  However, if
  they are deployed quickly via a mechanism such as a protective DNS
  filtering service, they can be more effective still -- an email
  campaign may be mitigated before some organisations' recipients ever
  click the link or before some malicious payloads can call out for
  instructions.  Through such approaches, other parties can be
  protected without direct sharing of IoCs with those organisations or
  additional effort.

4.1.4.  IoCs are easily shared between organisations.

  IoCs can also be very easily shared between individuals and
  organisations.  First, IoCs are easy to distribute as they can be
  represented concisely as text (possibly in hexadecimal) and so are
  frequently exchanged in small numbers in emails, blog posts, or
  technical reports.  Second, standards, such as those mentioned in
  Section 3.2.3, exist to provide well-defined formats for sharing
  large collections or regular sets of IoCs along with all the
  associated context.  While discovering one IoC can be intensive, once
  shared via well-established routes, that individual IoC may protect
  thousands of organisations and thus all of the users in those
  organisations.  Quick and easy sharing of IoCs gives blanket coverage
  for organisations and allows widespread mitigation in a timely
  fashion -- they can be shared with systems administrators, from small
  to large organisations and from large teams to single individuals,
  allowing them all to implement defences on their networks.

4.1.5.  IoCs can provide significant time savings.

  Not only are there time savings from sharing IoCs, saving duplication
  of investigation effort, but deploying them automatically at scale is
  seamless for many enterprises.  Where automatic deployment of IoCs is
  working well, organisations and users get blanket protection with
  minimal human intervention and minimal effort, a key goal of attack
  defence.  The ability to do this at scale and at pace is often vital
  when responding to agile threat actors that may change their
  intrusion set frequently and hence change the relevant IoCs.
  Conversely, protecting a complex network without automatic deployment
  of IoCs could mean manually updating every single endpoint or network
  device consistently and reliably to the same security state.  The
  work this entails (including locating assets and devices, polling for
  logs and system information, and manually checking patch levels)
  introduces complexity and a need for skilled analysts and engineers.
  While it is still necessary to invest effort both to enable efficient
  IoC deployment and to eliminate false positives when widely deploying
  IoCs, the cost and effort involved can be far smaller than the work
  entailed in reliably manually updating all endpoint and network
  devices.  For example, legacy systems may be particularly
  complicated, or even impossible, to update.

4.1.6.  IoCs allow for discovery of historic attacks.

  A network defender can use recently acquired IoCs in conjunction with
  historic data, such as logged DNS queries or email attachment hashes,
  to hunt for signs of past compromise.  Not only can this technique
  help to build a clear picture of past attacks, but it also allows for
  retrospective mitigation of the effects of any previous intrusion.
  This opportunity is reliant on historic data not having been
  compromised itself, by a technique such as Timestomp [Timestomp], and
  not being incomplete due to data retention policies, but it is
  nonetheless valuable for detecting and remediating past attacks.

4.1.7.  IoCs can be attributed to specific threats.

  Deployment of various modern security controls, such as firewall
  filtering or EDR, come with an inherent trade-off between breadth of
  protection and various costs, including the risk of false positives
  (see Section 5.2), staff time, and pure financial costs.
  Organisations can use threat modelling and information assurance to
  assess and prioritise risk from identified threats and to determine
  how they will mitigate or accept each of them.  Contextual
  information tying IoCs to specific threats or actors and shared
  alongside the IoCs enables organisations to focus their defences
  against particular risks.  This contextual information is generally
  expected by those receiving IoCs as it allows them the technical
  freedom and capability to choose their risk appetite, security
  posture, and defence methods.  The ease of sharing this contextual
  information alongside IoCs, in part due to the formats outlined in
  Section 3.2.3, makes it easier to track malicious actors across
  campaigns and targets.  Producing this contextual information before
  sharing IoCs can take intensive analytical effort as well as
  specialist tools and training.  At its simplest, it can involve
  documenting sets of IoCs from multiple instances of the same attack
  campaign, for example, from multiple unique payloads (and therefore
  with distinct file hashes) from the same source and connecting to the
  same C2 server.  A more complicated approach is to cluster similar
  combinations of TTPs seen across multiple campaigns over a period of
  time.  This can be used alongside detailed malware reverse
  engineering and target profiling, overlaid on a geopolitical and
  criminal backdrop, to infer attribution to a single threat actor.

4.2.  Case Studies

  The following two case studies illustrate how IoCs may be identified
  in relation to threat actor tooling (in the first) and a threat actor
  campaign (in the second).  The case studies further highlight how
  these IoCs may be used by cyber defenders.

4.2.1.  Cobalt Strike

  Cobalt Strike [COBALT] is a commercial attack framework used for
  penetration testing that consists of an implant framework (beacon), a
  network protocol, and a C2 server.  The beacon and network protocol
  are highly malleable, meaning the protocol representation "on the
  wire" can be easily changed by an attacker to blend in with
  legitimate traffic by ensuring the traffic conforms to the protocol
  specification, e.g., HTTP.  The proprietary beacon supports TLS
  encryption overlaid with a custom encryption scheme based on a
  public-private keypair.  The product also supports other techniques,
  such as domain fronting [DFRONT], in an attempt to avoid obvious
  passive detection by static network signatures of domain names or IP
  addresses.  Domain fronting is used to blend traffic to a malicious
  domain with traffic originating from a network that is already
  communicating with a non-malicious domain regularly over HTTPS.

4.2.1.1.  Overall TTP

  A beacon configuration describes how the implant should operate and
  communicate with its C2 server.  This configuration also provides
  ancillary information such as the Cobalt Strike user licence
  watermark.

4.2.1.2.  IoCs

  Tradecraft has been developed that allows the fingerprinting of C2
  servers based on their responses to specific requests.  This allows
  the servers to be identified, their beacon configurations to be
  downloaded, and the associated infrastructure addresses to be
  extracted as IoCs.

  The resulting mass IoCs for Cobalt Strike are:

  *  IP addresses of the C2 servers

  *  domain names used

  Whilst these IoCs need to be refreshed regularly (due to the ease of
  which they can be changed), the authors' experience of protecting
  public sector organisations shows that these IoCs are effective for
  disrupting threat actor operations that use Cobalt Strike.

  These IoCs can be used to check historical data for evidence of past
  compromise and deployed to detect or block future infection in a
  timely manner, thereby contributing to preventing the loss of user
  and system data.

4.2.2.  APT33

  In contrast to the first case study, this describes a current
  campaign by the threat actor APT33, also known as Elfin and Refined
  Kitten (see [Symantec]).  APT33 has been assessed by the industry to
  be a state-sponsored group [FireEye2]; yet, in this case study, IoCs
  still gave defenders an effective tool against such a powerful
  adversary.  The group has been active since at least 2015 and is
  known to target a range of sectors including petrochemical,
  government, engineering, and manufacturing.  Activity has been seen
  in countries across the globe but predominantly in the USA and Saudi
  Arabia.

4.2.2.1.  Overall TTP

  The techniques employed by this actor exhibit a relatively low level
  of sophistication, considering it is a state-sponsored group.
  Typically, APT33 performs spear phishing (sending targeted malicious
  emails to a limited number of pre-selected recipients) with document
  lures that imitate legitimate publications.  User interaction with
  these lures executes the initial payload and enables APT33 to gain
  initial access.  Once inside a target network, APT33 attempts to
  pivot to other machines to gather documents and gain access to
  administrative credentials.  In some cases, users are tricked into
  providing credentials that are then used with Ruler [RULER], a freely
  available tool that allows exploitation of an email client.  The
  attacker, in possession of a target's password, uses Ruler to access
  the target's mail account and embeds a malicious script that will be
  triggered when the mail client is next opened, resulting in the
  execution of malicious code (often additional malware retrieved from
  the Internet) (see [FireEye]).

  APT33 sometimes deploys a destructive tool that overwrites the master
  boot record (MBR) of the hard drives in as many PCs as possible.
  This type of tool, known as a wiper, results in data loss and renders
  devices unusable until the operating system is reinstalled.  In some
  cases, the actor uses administrator credentials to invoke execution
  across a large swathe of a company's IT estate at once; where this
  isn't possible, the actor may first attempt to spread the wiper
  manually or use worm-like capabilities against unpatched
  vulnerabilities on the networked computers.

4.2.2.2.  IoCs

  As a result of investigations by a partnership of the industry and
  the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a set of IoCs were
  compiled and shared with both public and private sector organisations
  so network defenders could search for them in their networks.
  Detection of these IoCs is likely indicative of APT33 targeting and
  could indicate potential compromise and subsequent use of destructive
  malware.  Network defenders could also initiate processes to block
  these IoCs to foil future attacks.  This set of IoCs comprised:

  *  9 hashes and email subject lines

  *  5 IP addresses

  *  7 domain names

  In November 2021, a joint advisory concerning APT33 [CISA] was issued
  by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and
  Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security
  Centre (ACSC), and NCSC.  This outlined recent exploitation of
  vulnerabilities by APT33, providing a thorough overview of observed
  TTPs and sharing further IoCs:

  *  8 hashes of malicious executables

  *  3 IP addresses

5.  Operational Limitations

  The different IoC types inherently embody a set of trade-offs for
  defenders between the risk of false positives (misidentifying non-
  malicious traffic as malicious) and the risk of failing to identify
  attacks.  The attacker's relative pain of modifying attacks to
  subvert known IoCs, as discussed using the PoP in Section 3.1,
  inversely correlates with the fragility of the IoC and with the
  precision with which the IoC identifies an attack.  Research is
  needed to elucidate the exact nature of these trade-offs between
  pain, fragility, and precision.

5.1.  Time and Effort

5.1.1.  Fragility

  As alluded to in Section 3.1, the PoP can be thought of in terms of
  fragility for the defender as well as pain for the attacker.  The
  less painful it is for the attacker to change an IoC, the more
  fragile that IoC is as a defence tool.  It is relatively simple to
  determine the hash value for various malicious file attachments
  observed as lures in a phishing campaign and to deploy these through
  AV or an email gateway security control.  However, those hashes are
  fragile and can (and often will) be changed between campaigns.
  Malicious IP addresses and domain names can also be changed between
  campaigns, but this may happen less frequently due to the greater
  pain of managing infrastructure compared to altering files, and so IP
  addresses and domain names may provide a less fragile detection
  capability.

  This does not mean the more fragile IoC types are worthless.  First,
  there is no guarantee a fragile IoC will change, and if a known IoC
  isn't changed by the attacker but wasn't blocked, then the defender
  missed an opportunity to halt an attack in its tracks.  Second, even
  within one IoC type, there is variation in the fragility depending on
  the context of the IoC.  The file hash of a phishing lure document
  (with a particular theme and containing a specific staging server
  link) may be more fragile than the file hash of a remote access
  trojan payload the attacker uses after initial access.  That in turn
  may be more fragile than the file hash of an attacker-controlled
  post-exploitation reconnaissance tool that doesn't connect directly
  to the attacker's infrastructure.  Third, some threats and actors are
  more capable or inclined to change than others, and so the fragility
  of an IoC for one may be very different to an IoC of the same type
  for another actor.

  Ultimately, fragility is a defender's concern that impacts the
  ongoing efficacy of each IoC and will factor into decisions about end
  of life.  However, it should not prevent adoption of individual IoCs
  unless there are significantly strict resource constraints that
  demand down-selection of IoCs for deployment.  More usually,
  defenders researching threats will attempt to identify IoCs of
  varying fragilities for a particular kill chain to provide the
  greatest chances of ongoing detection given available investigative
  effort (see Section 5.1.2) and while still maintaining precision (see
  Section 5.2).

5.1.2.  Discoverability

  To be used in attack defence, IoCs must first be discovered through
  proactive hunting or reactive investigation.  As noted in
  Section 3.1, IoCs in the tools and TTPs levels of the PoP require
  intensive effort and research to discover.  However, it is not just
  an IoC's type that impacts its discoverability.  The sophistication
  of the actor, their TTPs, and their tooling play a significant role,
  as does whether the IoC is retrieved from logs after the attack or
  extracted from samples or infected systems earlier.

  For example, on an infected endpoint, it may be possible to identify
  a malicious payload and then extract relevant IoCs, such as the file
  hash and its C2 server address.  If the attacker used the same static
  payload throughout the attack, this single file hash value will cover
  all instances.  However, if the attacker diversified their payloads,
  that hash can be more fragile, and other hashes may need to be
  discovered from other samples used on other infected endpoints.
  Concurrently, the attacker may have simply hard-coded configuration
  data into the payload, in which case the C2 server address can be
  easy to recover.  Alternatively, the address can be stored in an
  obfuscated persistent configuration within either the payload (e.g.,
  within its source code or associated resource) or the infected
  endpoint's file system (e.g., using alternative data streams [ADS]),
  thus requiring more effort to discover.  Further, the attacker may be
  storing the configuration in memory only or relying on a DGA to
  generate C2 server addresses on demand.  In this case, extracting the
  C2 server address can require a memory dump or the execution or
  reverse engineering of the DGA, all of which increase the effort
  still further.

  If the malicious payload has already communicated with its C2 server,
  then it may be possible to discover that C2 server address IoC from
  network traffic logs more easily.  However, once again, multiple
  factors can make discoverability more challenging, such as the
  increasing adoption of HTTPS for malicious traffic, meaning C2
  communications blend in with legitimate traffic and can be
  complicated to identify.  Further, some malwares obfuscate their
  intended destinations by using alternative DNS resolution services
  (e.g., OpenNIC [OPENNIC]), by using encrypted DNS protocols such as
  DNS-over-HTTPS [OILRIG], or by performing transformation operations
  on resolved IP addresses to determine the real C2 server address
  encoded in the DNS response [LAZARUS].

5.1.3.  Completeness

  In many cases, the list of indicators resulting from an activity or
  discovered in a malware sample is relatively short and so only adds
  to the total set of all indicators in a limited and finite manner.  A
  clear example of this is when static indicators for C2 servers are
  discovered in a malware strain.  Sharing, deployment, and detection
  will often not be greatly impacted by the addition of such indicators
  for one more incident or one more sample.  However, in the case of
  discovery of a DGA, this requires a reimplementation of the algorithm
  and then execution to generate a possible list of domains.  Depending
  on the algorithm, this can result in very large lists of indicators,
  which may cause performance degradation, particularly during
  detection.  In some cases, such sources of indicators can lead to a
  pragmatic decision being made between obtaining reasonable coverage
  of the possible indicator values and theoretical completeness of a
  list of all possible indicator values.

5.2.  Precision

5.2.1.  Specificity

  Alongside pain and fragility, the PoP's levels can also be considered
  in terms of how precise the defence can be, with the false positive
  rate usually increasing as we move up the pyramid to less specific
  IoCs.  A hash value identifies a particular file, such as an
  executable binary, and given a suitable cryptographic hash function,
  the false positives are effectively nil (by "suitable", we mean one
  with preimage resistance and strong collision resistance).  In
  comparison, IoCs in the upper levels (such as some network artefacts
  or tool fingerprints) may apply to various malicious binaries, and
  even benign software may share the same identifying characteristics.
  For example, threat actor tools making web requests may be identified
  by the user-agent string specified in the request header.  However,
  this value may be the same as that used by legitimate software,
  either by the attacker's choice or through use of a common library.

  It should come as no surprise that the more specific an IoC, the more
  fragile it is; as things change, they move outside of that specific
  focus.  While less fragile IoCs may be desirable for their robustness
  and longevity, this must be balanced with the increased chance of
  false positives from their broadness.  One way in which this balance
  is achieved is by grouping indicators and using them in combination.
  While two low-specificity IoCs for a particular attack may each have
  chances of false positives, when observed together, they may provide
  greater confidence of an accurate detection of the relevant kill
  chain.

5.2.2.  Dual and Compromised Use

  As noted in Section 3.2.2, the context of an IoC, such as the way in
  which the attacker uses it, may equally impact the precision with
  which that IoC detects an attack.  An IP address representing an
  attacker's staging server, from which their attack chain downloads
  subsequent payloads, offers a precise IP address for attacker-owned
  infrastructure.  However, it will be less precise if that IP address
  is associated with a cloud-hosting provider and is regularly
  reassigned from one user to another; it will be less precise still if
  the attacker compromised a legitimate web server and is abusing the
  IP address alongside the ongoing legitimate use.

  Similarly, a file hash representing an attacker's custom remote
  access trojan will be very precise; however, a file hash representing
  a common enterprise remote administration tool will be less precise,
  depending on whether or not the defender organisation usually uses
  that tool for legitimate system administration.  Notably, such dual-
  use indicators are context specific, considering both whether they
  are usually used legitimately and how they are used in a particular
  circumstance.  Use of the remote administration tool may be
  legitimate for support staff during working hours but not generally
  by non-support staff, particularly if observed outside of that
  employee's usual working hours.

  For reasons like these, context is very important when sharing and
  using IoCs.

5.2.3.  Changing Use

  In the case of IP addresses, the growing adoption of cloud services,
  proxies, virtual private networks (VPNs), and carrier-grade Network
  Address Translation (NAT) are increasing the number of systems
  associated with any one IP address at the same moment in time.  This
  ongoing change to the use of IP addresses is somewhat reducing the
  specificity of IP addresses (at least for specific subnets or
  individual addresses) while also "side-stepping" the pain that threat
  actors would otherwise incur if they needed to change IP address.

5.3.  Privacy

  As noted in Section 3.2.2, context is critical to effective detection
  using IoCs.  However, at times, defenders may feel there are privacy
  concerns with how much and with whom to share about a cyber
  intrusion.  For example, defenders may generalise the IoCs'
  description of the attack by removing context to facilitate sharing.
  This generalisation can result in an incomplete set of IoCs being
  shared or IoCs being shared without clear indication of what they
  represent and how they are involved in an attack.  The sharer will
  consider the privacy trade-off when generalising the IoC and should
  bear in mind that the loss of context can greatly reduce the utility
  of the IoC for those they share with.

  In the authors' experiences, self-censoring by sharers appears more
  prevalent and more extensive when sharing IoCs into groups with more
  members, into groups with a broader range of perceived member
  expertise (particularly, the further the lower bound extends below
  the sharer's perceived own expertise), and into groups that do not
  maintain strong intermember trust.  Trust within such groups often
  appears strongest where members interact regularly; have common
  backgrounds, expertise, or challenges; conform to behavioural
  expectations (such as by following defined handling requirements and
  not misrepresenting material they share); and reciprocate the sharing
  and support they receive.  [LITREVIEW] highlights that many of these
  factors are associated with the human role in Cyber Threat
  Intelligence (CTI) sharing.

5.4.  Automation

  While IoCs can be effectively utilised by organisations of various
  sizes and resource constraints, as discussed in Section 4.1.2,
  automation of IoC ingestion, processing, assessment, and deployment
  is critical for managing them at scale.  Manual oversight and
  investigation may be necessary intermittently, but a reliance on
  manual processing and searching only works at small scale or for
  occasional cases.

  The adoption of automation can also enable faster and easier
  correlation of IoC detections across different log sources and
  network monitoring interfaces across different times and physical
  locations.  Thus, the response can be tailored to reflect the number
  and overlap of detections from a particular intrusion set, and the
  necessary context can be presented alongside the detection when
  generating any alerts for defender review.  While manual processing
  and searching may be no less accurate (although IoC transcription
  errors are a common problem during busy incidents in the experience
  of the authors), the correlation and cross-referencing necessary to
  provide the same degree of situational awareness is much more time-
  consuming.

  A third important consideration when performing manual processing is
  the longer phase monitoring and adjustment necessary to effectively
  age out IoCs as they become irrelevant or, more crucially,
  inaccurate.  Manual implementations must often simply include or
  exclude an IoC, as anything more granular is time-consuming and
  complicated to manage.  In contrast, automations can support a
  gradual reduction in confidence scoring, enabling IoCs to contribute
  but not individually disrupt a detection as their specificity
  reduces.

6.  Comprehensive Coverage and Defence-in-Depth

  IoCs provide the defender with a range of options across the PoP's
  layers, enabling them to balance precision and fragility to give high
  confidence detections that are practical and useful.  Broad coverage
  of the PoP is important as it allows the defender to choose between
  high precision but high fragility options and more robust but less
  precise indicators depending on availability.  As fragile indicators
  are changed, the more robust IoCs allow for continued detection and
  faster rediscovery.  For this reason, it's important to collect as
  many IoCs as possible across the whole PoP to provide options for
  defenders.

  At the top of the PoP, TTPs identified through anomaly detection and
  machine learning are more likely to have false positives, which gives
  lower confidence and, vitally, requires better trained analysts to
  understand and implement the defences.  However, these are very
  painful for attackers to change, so when tuned appropriately, they
  provide a robust detection.  Hashes, at the bottom, are precise and
  easy to deploy but are fragile and easily changed within and across
  campaigns by malicious actors.

  Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) are often the
  first port of call for protection from intrusion, but endpoint
  solutions aren't a panacea.  One issue is that there are many
  environments where it is not possible to keep them updated or, in
  some cases, deploy them at all.  For example, the Owari botnet, a
  Mirai variant [Owari], exploited Internet of Things (IoT) devices
  where such solutions could not be deployed.  It is because of such
  gaps, where endpoint solutions can't be relied on, that a defence-in-
  depth approach is commonly advised, using a blended approach that
  includes both network and endpoint defences.

  If an attack happens, then the best situation is that an endpoint
  solution will detect and prevent it.  If it doesn't, it could be for
  many good reasons: the endpoint solution could be quite conservative
  and aim for a low false-positive rate, it might not have ubiquitous
  coverage, or it might only be able to defend the initial step of the
  kill chain [KillChain].  In the worst cases, the attack specifically
  disables the endpoint solution, or the malware is brand new and so
  won't be recognised.

  In the middle of the pyramid, IoCs related to network information
  (such as domains and IP addresses) can be particularly useful.  They
  allow for broad coverage, without requiring each and every endpoint
  security solution to be updated, as they may be detected and enforced
  in a more centralised manner at network choke points (such as proxies
  and gateways).  This makes them particularly useful in contexts where
  ensuring endpoint security isn't possible, such as Bring Your Own
  Device (BYOD), Internet of Things (IoT), and legacy environments.
  It's important to note that these network-level IoCs can also protect
  users of a network against compromised endpoints when these IoCs are
  used to detect the attack in network traffic, even if the compromise
  itself passes unnoticed.  For example, in a BYOD environment,
  enforcing security policies on the device can be difficult, so non-
  endpoint IoCs and solutions are needed to allow detection of
  compromise even with no endpoint coverage.

  One example of how network-level IoCs provide a layer of a defence-
  in-depth solution is Protective DNS (PDNS) [Annual2021], a free and
  voluntary DNS filtering service provided by the UK NCSC for UK public
  sector organisations [PDNS].  In 2021, this service blocked access to
  more than 160 million DNS queries (out of 602 billion total queries)
  for the organisations signed up to the service [ACD2021].  This
  included hundreds of thousands of queries for domains associated with
  Flubot, Android malware that uses DGAs to generate 25,000 candidate
  command and control domains each month (these DGAs [DGAs] are a type
  of TTP).

  IoCs such as malicious domains can be put on PDNS straight away and
  can then be used to prevent access to those known malicious domains
  across the entire estate of over 925 separate public sector entities
  that use NCSC's PDNS.  Coverage can be patchy with endpoints, as the
  roll-out of protections isn't uniform or necessarily fast.  However,
  if the IoC is on PDNS, a consistent defence is maintained for devices
  using PDNS, even if the device itself is not immediately updated.
  This offers protection, regardless of whether the context is a BYOD
  environment or a managed enterprise system.  PDNS provides the most
  front-facing layer of defence-in-depth solutions for its users, but
  other IoCs, like Server Name Indication values in TLS or the server
  certificate information, also provide IoC protections at other
  layers.

  Similar to the AV scenario, large-scale services face risk decisions
  around balancing threat against business impact from false positives.
  Organisations need to be able to retain the ability to be more
  conservative with their own defences, while still benefiting from
  them.  For instance, a commercial DNS filtering service is intended
  for broad deployment, so it will have a risk tolerance similar to AV
  products, whereas DNS filtering intended for government users (e.g.,
  PDNS) can be more conservative but will still have a relatively broad
  deployment if intended for the whole of government.  A government
  department or specific company, on the other hand, might accept the
  risk of disruption and arrange firewalls or other network protection
  devices to completely block anything related to particular threats,
  regardless of the confidence, but rely on a DNS filtering service for
  everything else.

  Other network defences can make use of this blanket coverage from
  IoCs, like middlebox mitigation, proxy defences, and application-
  layer firewalls, but are out of scope for this document.  Large
  enterprise networks are likely to deploy their own DNS resolution
  architecture and possibly TLS inspection proxies and can deploy IoCs
  in these locations.  However, in networks that choose not to, or
  don't have the resources to, deploy these sorts of mitigations, DNS
  goes through firewalls, proxies, and possibly a DNS filtering
  service; it doesn't have to be unencrypted, but these appliances must
  be able to decrypt it to do anything useful with it, like blocking
  queries for known bad URIs.

  Covering a broad range of IoCs gives defenders a wide range of
  benefits: they are easy to deploy; they provide a high enough
  confidence to be effective; at least some will be painful for
  attackers to change; and their distribution around the infrastructure
  allows for different points of failure, and so overall they enable
  the defenders to disrupt bad actors.  The combination of these
  factors cements IoCs as a particularly valuable tool for defenders
  with limited resources.

7.  IANA Considerations

  This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Security Considerations

  This document is all about system security.  However, when poorly
  deployed, IoCs can lead to over-blocking, which may present an
  availability concern for some systems.  While IoCs preserve privacy
  on a macro scale (by preventing data breaches), research could be
  done to investigate the impact on privacy from sharing IoCs, and
  improvements could be made to minimise any impact found.  The
  creation of a privacy-preserving method of sharing IoCs that still
  allows both network and endpoint defences to provide security and
  layered defences would be an interesting proposal.

9.  Conclusions

  IoCs are versatile and powerful.  IoCs underpin and enable multiple
  layers of the modern defence-in-depth strategy.  IoCs are easy to
  share, providing a multiplier effect on attack defence efforts, and
  they save vital time.  Network-level IoCs offer protection, which is
  especially valuable when an endpoint-only solution isn't sufficient.
  These properties, along with their ease of use, make IoCs a key
  component of any attack defence strategy and particularly valuable
  for defenders with limited resources.

  For IoCs to be useful, they don't have to be unencrypted or visible
  in networks, but it is crucial that they be made available, along
  with their context, to entities that need them.  It is also important
  that this availability and eventual usage cope with multiple points
  of failure, as per the defence-in-depth strategy, of which IoCs are a
  key part.

10.  Informative References

  [ACD2021]  UK NCSC, "Active Cyber Defence - The Fifth Year", May
             2022, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/ACD-The-Fifth-Year-
             full-report.pdf>.

  [ADS]      Microsoft, "File Streams (Local File Systems)", January
             2021, <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
             us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams>.

  [ALIENVAULT]
             AlienVault, "AlienVault: The World's First Truly Open
             Threat Intelligence Community",
             <https://otx.alienvault.com/>.

  [Annual2021]
             UK NCSC, "NCSC Annual Review 2021: Making the UK the
             safest place to live and work online", 2021,
             <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/
             NCSC%20Annual%20Review%202021.pdf>.

  [CISA]     CISA, "Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors
             Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities
             in Furtherance of Malicious Activities", November 2021,
             <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>.

  [COBALT]   "Cobalt Strike", <https://www.cobaltstrike.com/>.

  [DFRONT]   Infosec, "Domain Fronting", April 2017,
             <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/domain-
             fronting/>.

  [DGAs]     MITRE, "Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms",
             2020, <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1483/>.

  [FireEye]  O'Leary, J., Kimble, J., Vanderlee, K., and N. Fraser,
             "Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets
             Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive
             Malware", September 2017,
             <https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt33-insights-
             into-iranian-cyber-espionage>.

  [FireEye2] Ackerman, G., Cole, R., Thompson, A., Orleans, A., and N.
             Carr, "OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive
             Adversary", December 2018,
             <https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/overruled-
             containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary>.

  [GoldenTicket]
             Mizrahi, I. and Cymptom, "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:
             Golden Ticket", 2020,
             <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/>.

  [KillChain]
             Lockheed Martin, "The Cyber Kill Chain",
             <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/
             cyber-kill-chain.html>.

  [LAZARUS]  Kaspersky Lab, "Lazarus Under The Hood",
             <https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-
             content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/
             Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf>.

  [LITREVIEW]
             Wagner, T., Mahbub, K., Palomar, E., and A. Abdallah,
             "Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing: Survey and Research
             Directions", January 2019, <https://www.open-
             access.bcu.ac.uk/7852/1/Cyber%20Threat%20Intelligence%20Sh
             aring%20Survey%20and%20Research%20Directions.pdf>.

  [Mimikatz] Mulder, J., "Mimikatz Overview, Defenses and Detection",
             February 2016, <https://www.sans.org/white-papers/36780/>.

  [MISP]     "MISP", <https://www.misp-project.org/>.

  [MISPCORE] Dulaunoy, A. and A. Iklody, "MISP core format", Work in
             Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-dulaunoy-misp-core-format-
             16, 26 February 2023,
             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dulaunoy-
             misp-core-format-16>.

  [NCCGroup] Jansen, W., "Abusing cloud services to fly under the
             radar", January 2021,
             <https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-
             services-to-fly-under-the-radar/>.

  [NIST]     NIST, "Glossary - security control",
             <https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/security_control>.

  [OILRIG]   Cimpanu, C., "Iranian hacker group becomes first known APT
             to weaponize DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)", August 2020,
             <https://www.zdnet.com/article/iranian-hacker-group-
             becomes-first-known-apt-to-weaponize-dns-over-https-doh/>.

  [OPENIOC]  Gibb, W. and D. Kerr, "OpenIOC: Back to the Basics",
             October 2013, <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-
             research/2013/10/openioc-basics.html>.

  [OPENNIC]  "OpenNIC", <https://www.opennic.org/>.

  [Owari]    UK NCSC, "Owari botnet own-goal takeover", 2018, <https://
             webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20220301141030/
             https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/weekly-threat-report-8th-
             june-2018>.

  [PDNS]     UK NCSC, "Protective Domain Name Service (PDNS)", August
             2017, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/pdns>.

  [PoP]      Bianco, D., "The Pyramid of Pain", March 2013,
             <https://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-
             of-pain.html>.

  [RFC7970]  Danyliw, R., "The Incident Object Description Exchange
             Format Version 2", RFC 7970, DOI 10.17487/RFC7970,
             November 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7970>.

  [RULER]    MITRE, "Ruler",
             <https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358/>.

  [STIX]     OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), "Introduction to
             STIX", <https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-
             documentation/stix/intro>.

  [Symantec] Symantec, "Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets
             Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.", March
             2019, <https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/
             elfin-apt33-espionage>.

  [TAXII]    OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), "Introduction to
             TAXII", <https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-
             documentation/taxii/intro.html>.

  [Timestomp]
             MITRE, "Indicator Removal: Timestomp", January 2020,
             <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099/>.

  [TLP]      FIRST, "Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)",
             <https://www.first.org/tlp/>.

Acknowledgements

  Thanks to all those who have been involved with improving cyber
  defence in the IETF and IRTF communities.

Authors' Addresses

  Kirsty Paine
  Splunk Inc.
  Email: [email protected]


  Ollie Whitehouse
  Binary Firefly
  Email: [email protected]


  James Sellwood
  Email: [email protected]


  Andrew Shaw
  UK National Cyber Security Centre
  Email: [email protected]