Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       E. Jasinska
Request for Comments: 7947                                    BigWave IT
Category: Standards Track                                    N. Hilliard
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                     INEX
                                                              R. Raszuk
                                                           Bloomberg LP
                                                              N. Bakker
                                               Akamai Technologies B.V.
                                                         September 2016


                  Internet Exchange BGP Route Server

Abstract

  This document outlines a specification for multilateral
  interconnections at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).  Multilateral
  interconnection is a method of exchanging routing information among
  three or more External BGP (EBGP) speakers using a single
  intermediate broker system, referred to as a route server.  Route
  servers are typically used on shared access media networks, such as
  IXPs, to facilitate simplified interconnection among multiple
  Internet routers.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947.














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Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection  . . . . . . . .   3
    1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  2.  Technical Considerations for Route Server Implementations . .   4
    2.1.  Client UPDATE Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
    2.2.  Attribute Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
      2.2.1.  NEXT_HOP Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
      2.2.2.  AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
        2.2.2.1.  Route Server AS_PATH Management . . . . . . . . .   5
        2.2.2.2.  Route Server client AS_PATH Management  . . . . .   5
      2.2.3.  MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
      2.2.4.  Communities Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
    2.3.  Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection   6
      2.3.1.  Path Hiding on a Route Server . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
      2.3.2.  Mitigation of Path Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
        2.3.2.1.  Multiple Route Server RIBs  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
        2.3.2.2.  Advertising Multiple Paths  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
      2.3.3.  Implementation Suggestions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
  3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
  4.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
    4.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
    4.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
  Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12











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1.  Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection

  Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) provide IP data interconnection
  facilities for their participants, typically using shared Layer 2
  networking media such as Ethernet.  The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
  [RFC4271], an inter-Autonomous System (inter-AS) routing protocol, is
  commonly used to facilitate exchange of network reachability
  information over such media.

  While bilateral EBGP sessions between exchange participants were
  previously the most common means of exchanging reachability
  information, the overhead associated with dense interconnection can
  cause substantial operational scaling problems for participants of
  larger IXPs.

  Multilateral interconnection is a method of interconnecting BGP
  speaking routers using a third-party brokering system, commonly
  referred to as a route server and typically managed by the IXP
  operator.  Each multilateral interconnection participant (usually
  referred to as a "route server client") announces network
  reachability information to the route server using EBGP.  The route
  server, in turn, forwards this information to each route server
  client connected to it, according to its configuration.  Although a
  route server uses BGP to exchange reachability information with each
  of its clients, it does not forward traffic itself and is therefore
  not a router.

  A route server can be viewed as similar in function to a route
  reflector [RFC4456], except that it operates using EBGP instead of
  Internal BGP (IBGP).  Certain adaptions to [RFC4271] are required to
  enable an EBGP router to operate as a route server; these are
  outlined in Section 2 of this document.  Route server functionality
  is not mandatory in BGP implementations.

  The term "route server" is often used in a different context to
  describe a BGP node whose purpose is to accept BGP feeds from
  multiple clients for the purpose of operational analysis and
  troubleshooting.  A system of this form may alternatively be known as
  a "route collector" or a "route-views server".  This document uses
  the term "route server" exclusively to describe multilateral peering
  brokerage systems.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
  "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
  [RFC2119].



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2.  Technical Considerations for Route Server Implementations

  A route server uses BGP [RFC4271] to broker network reachability
  information amongst its clients.  There are some differences between
  the behavior of a BGP route server and a BGP implementation that is
  strictly compliant with [RFC4271].  These differences are described
  as follows.

2.1.  Client UPDATE Messages

  A route server MUST accept all UPDATE messages received from each of
  its clients for inclusion in its Adj-RIB-In.  These UPDATE messages
  MAY be omitted from the route server's Loc-RIB or Loc-RIBs, due to
  filters configured for the purpose of implementing routing policy.
  The route server SHOULD perform one or more BGP Decision Processes to
  select routes for subsequent advertisement to its clients, taking
  into account possible configuration to provide multiple Network Layer
  Reachability Information (NLRI) paths to a particular client as
  described in Section 2.3.2.2 or multiple Loc-RIBs as described in
  Section 2.3.2.1.  The route server SHOULD forward UPDATE messages
  from its Loc-RIB or Loc-RIBs to its clients as determined by local
  policy.

2.2.  Attribute Transparency

  As a route server primarily performs a brokering service,
  modification of attributes could cause route server clients to alter
  their BGP Decision Process for received prefix reachability
  information, thereby changing the intended routing policies of
  exchange participants.  Therefore, contrary to what is specified in
  Section 5 of [RFC4271], route servers SHOULD NOT by default (unless
  explicitly configured) update well-known BGP attributes received from
  route server clients before redistributing them to their other route
  server clients.  Optional recognized and unrecognized BGP attributes,
  whether transitive or non-transitive, SHOULD NOT be updated by the
  route server (unless enforced by local IXP operator configuration)
  and SHOULD be passed on to other route server clients.

2.2.1.  NEXT_HOP Attribute

  The NEXT_HOP is a well-known mandatory BGP attribute that defines the
  IP address of the router used as the next hop to the destinations
  listed in the NLRI field of the UPDATE message.  As the route server
  does not participate in the actual routing of traffic, the NEXT_HOP
  attribute MUST be passed unmodified to the route server clients,
  similar to the "third-party" next-hop feature described in
  Section 5.1.3. of [RFC4271].




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2.2.2.  AS_PATH Attribute

  AS_PATH is a well-known mandatory attribute that identifies the ASes
  through which routing information carried in the UPDATE message has
  passed.

2.2.2.1.  Route Server AS_PATH Management

  As a route server does not participate in the process of forwarding
  data between client routers, and because modification of the AS_PATH
  attribute could affect the route server client BGP Decision Process,
  the route server SHOULD NOT prepend its own AS number to the AS_PATH
  segment nor modify the AS_PATH segment in any other way.  This
  differs from the behavior specified in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC4271],
  which requires that the BGP speaker prepends its own AS number as the
  last element of the AS_PATH segment.  This is a recommendation rather
  than a requirement solely to provide backwards compatibility with
  legacy route server client implementations that do not yet support
  the requirements specified in Section 2.2.2.2.

2.2.2.2.  Route Server client AS_PATH Management

  In contrast to what is recommended in Section 6.3 of [RFC4271], route
  server clients need to be able to accept UPDATE messages where the
  leftmost AS in the AS_PATH attribute is not equal to the AS number of
  the route server that sent the UPDATE message.  If the route server
  client BGP system has implemented a check for this, the BGP
  implementation MUST allow this check to be disabled and SHOULD allow
  the check to be disabled on a per-peer basis.

2.2.3.  MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute

  MULTI_EXIT_DISC is an optional non-transitive attribute intended to
  be used on external (inter-AS) links to discriminate among multiple
  exit or entry points to the same neighboring AS.  Contrary to
  Section 5.1.4 of [RFC4271], if applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a
  route server, this attribute SHOULD be propagated to other route
  server clients, and the route server SHOULD NOT modify its value.

2.2.4.  Communities Attributes

  The BGP Communities [RFC1997] and Extended Communities [RFC4360]
  attributes are intended for labeling information carried in BGP
  UPDATE messages.  Transitive as well as non-transitive Communities
  attributes applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a route server SHOULD
  NOT be modified, processed, or removed, except as defined by local





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  policy.  If a Communities attribute is intended for processing by the
  route server itself, as determined by local policy, it MAY be
  modified or removed.

2.3.  Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection

  While IXP participants often use route servers with the intention of
  interconnecting with as many other route server participants as
  possible, there are circumstances where control of path distribution
  on a per-client basis is important to ensure that desired
  interconnection policies are met.

  The control of path distribution on a per-client basis can lead to a
  path being hidden from the route server client.  We refer to this as
  "path hiding".

  Neither Section 2.3 nor its subsections form part of the normative
  specification of this document; they are included for information
  purposes only.

2.3.1.  Path Hiding on a Route Server

                              ___      ___
                             /   \    /   \
                          ..| AS1 |..| AS2 |..
                         :   \___/    \___/   :
                         :       \    / |     :
                         :        \  /  |     :
                         : IXP     \/   |     :
                         :         /\   |     :
                         :        /  \  |     :
                         :    ___/____\_|_    :
                         :   /   \    /   \   :
                          ..| AS3 |..| AS4 |..
                             \___/    \___/

    Figure 1: Per-Client Policy Controlled Interconnection at an IXP

  Using the example in Figure 1, AS1 does not directly exchange prefix
  information with either AS2 or AS3 at the IXP but only interconnects
  with AS4.  The lines between AS1, AS2, AS3, and AS4 represent
  interconnection relationships, whether via bilateral or multilateral
  connections.

  In the traditional bilateral interconnection model, per-client policy
  control to a third-party exchange participant is accomplished either
  by not engaging in a bilateral interconnection with that participant
  or by implementing outbound filtering on the BGP session towards that



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  participant.  However, in a multilateral interconnection environment,
  only the route server can perform outbound filtering in the direction
  of the route server client; route server clients depend on the route
  server to perform their outbound filtering for them.

  Assuming the BGP Decision Process [RFC4271] is used, when the same
  prefix is advertised to a route server from multiple route server
  clients, the route server will select a single path for propagation
  to all connected clients.  If, however, the route server has been
  configured to filter the calculated best path from reaching a
  particular route server client, then that client will not receive a
  path for that prefix, although alternate paths received by the route
  server might have been policy compliant for that client.  This
  phenomenon is referred to as "path hiding".

  For example, in Figure 1, if the same prefix were sent to the route
  server via AS2 and AS4, and the route via AS2 was preferred according
  to the BGP Decision Process on the route server, but AS2's policy
  prevented the route server from sending the path to AS1, then AS1
  would never receive a path to this prefix, even though the route
  server had previously received a valid alternative path via AS4.
  This happens because the BGP Decision Process is performed only once
  on the route server for all clients.

  Path hiding will only occur on route servers that employ per-client
  policy control; if an IXP operator deploys a route server without
  implementing a per-client routing policy control system, then path
  hiding does not occur, as all paths are considered equally valid from
  the point of view of the route server.

2.3.2.  Mitigation of Path Hiding

  There are several approaches that can be taken to mitigate against
  path hiding.

2.3.2.1.  Multiple Route Server RIBs

  The most portable method to allow for per-client policy control
  without the occurrence of path hiding is to use a route server BGP
  implementation that performs the per-client best path calculation for
  each set of paths to a prefix, which results after the route server's
  client policies have been taken into consideration.  This can be
  implemented by using per-client Loc-RIBs, with path filtering
  implemented between the Adj-RIB-In and the per-client Loc-RIB.
  Implementations can optimize this by maintaining paths not subject to
  filtering policies in a global Loc-RIB, with per-client Loc-RIBs
  stored as deltas.




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  This implementation is highly portable, as it makes no assumptions
  about the feature capabilities of the route server clients.

2.3.2.2.  Advertising Multiple Paths

  The path distribution model described above assumes standard BGP
  session encoding where the route server sends a single path to its
  client for any given prefix.  This path is selected using the BGP
  path selection Decision Process described in [RFC4271].  If, however,
  it were possible for the route server to send more than a single path
  to a route server client, then route server clients would no longer
  depend on receiving a single path to a particular prefix;
  consequently, the path-hiding problem described in Section 2.3.1
  would disappear.

  We present two methods that describe how such increased path
  diversity could be implemented.

2.3.2.2.1.  Diverse BGP Path Approach

  The diverse BGP path proposal as defined in [RFC6774] is a simple way
  to distribute multiple prefix paths from a route server to a route
  server client by using a separate BGP session from the route server
  to a client for each different path.

  The number of paths that may be distributed to a client is
  constrained by the number of BGP sessions that the server and the
  client are willing to establish with each other.  The distributed
  paths may be established from the global BGP Loc-RIB on the route
  server in addition to any per-client Loc-RIB.  As there may be more
  potential paths to a given prefix than configured BGP sessions, this
  method is not guaranteed to eliminate the path-hiding problem in all
  situations.  Furthermore, this method may significantly increase the
  number of BGP sessions handled by the route server, which may
  negatively impact its performance.

2.3.2.2.2.  BGP ADD-PATH Approach

  [RFC7911] proposes a different approach to multiple path propagation,
  by allowing a BGP speaker to forward multiple paths for the same
  prefix on a single BGP session.  As [RFC4271] specifies that a BGP
  listener must implement an implicit withdraw when it receives an
  UPDATE message for a prefix that already exists in its Adj-RIB-In,
  this approach requires explicit support for the feature both on the
  route server and on its clients.






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  If the ADD-PATH capability is negotiated bidirectionally between the
  route server and a route server client, and the route server client
  propagates multiple paths for the same prefix to the route server,
  then this could potentially cause the propagation of inactive,
  invalid, or suboptimal paths to the route server, thereby causing
  loss of reachability to other route server clients.  For this reason,
  ADD-PATH implementations on a route server should enforce a send-only
  mode with the route server clients, which would result in negotiating
  a receive-only mode from the client to the route server.

2.3.3.  Implementation Suggestions

  Authors of route server implementations may wish to consider one of
  the methods described in Section 2.3.2 to allow per-client route
  server policy control without path hiding.

  Recommendations for route server operations are described separately
  in [RFC7948].

3.  Security Considerations

  The path-hiding problem outlined in Section 2.3.1 can be used in
  certain circumstances to proactively block third-party path
  announcements from other route server clients.  Route server
  operators should be aware that security issues may arise unless steps
  are taken to mitigate against path hiding.

  The AS_PATH check described in Section 2.2.2 is normally enabled in
  order to check for malformed AS paths.  If this check is disabled,
  the route server client loses the ability to check incoming UPDATE
  messages for certain categories of problems.  This could potentially
  cause corrupted BGP UPDATE messages to be propagated where they might
  not be propagated if the check were enabled.  Regardless of any
  problems relating to malformed UPDATE messages, this check is also
  used to detect BGP loops; removing the check could potentially cause
  routing loops to be formed.  Consequently, this check SHOULD NOT be
  disabled by IXP participants unless it is needed to establish BGP
  sessions with a route server and, if possible, should only be
  disabled for peers that are route servers.

  Route server operators should carefully consider the security
  practices discussed in "BGP Operations and Security" [RFC7454].









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4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

  [RFC1997]  Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities
             Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

  [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
             Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

  [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
             Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
             February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

4.2.  Informative References

  [RFC1863]  Haskin, D., "A BGP/IDRP Route Server alternative to a full
             mesh routing", RFC 1863, DOI 10.17487/RFC1863, October
             1995, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1863>.

  [RFC4223]  Savola, P., "Reclassification of RFC 1863 to Historic",
             RFC 4223, DOI 10.17487/RFC4223, October 2005,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4223>.

  [RFC4456]  Bates, T., Chen, E., and R. Chandra, "BGP Route
             Reflection: An Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP
             (IBGP)", RFC 4456, DOI 10.17487/RFC4456, April 2006,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4456>.

  [RFC6774]  Raszuk, R., Ed., Fernando, R., Patel, K., McPherson, D.,
             and K. Kumaki, "Distribution of Diverse BGP Paths",
             RFC 6774, DOI 10.17487/RFC6774, November 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6774>.

  [RFC7454]  Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
             and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
             February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.






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  [RFC7911]  Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
             "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7911>.

  [RFC7948]  Hilliard, N., Jasinska, E., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
             "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server Operations", RFC 7948,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC7948, September 2016,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7948>.

Acknowledgments

  The authors would like to thank Ryan Bickhart, Steven Bakker, Martin
  Pels, Chris Hall, Aleksi Suhonen, Bruno Decraene, Pierre Francois,
  and Eduardo Ascenco Reis for their valuable input.

  In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the developers of
  BIRD, OpenBGPD, Quagga, and IOS whose BGP implementations include
  route server capabilities that are compliant with this document.

  Route server functionality was described in 1995 in [RFC1863], and
  modern route server implementations are based on concepts developed
  in the 1990s by the Routing Arbiter Project and the Route Server Next
  Generation (RSNG) Project, managed by ISI and Merit.  Although the
  original RSNG code is no longer in use at any IXPs, the IXP community
  owes a debt of gratitude to the many people who were involved in
  route server development in the 1990s.  Note that [RFC1863] was made
  historical by [RFC4223].























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Authors' Addresses

  Elisa Jasinska
  BigWave IT
  ul. Skawinska 27/7
  Krakow, MP  31-066
  Poland

  Email: [email protected]


  Nick Hilliard
  INEX
  4027 Kingswood Road
  Dublin  24
  Ireland

  Email: [email protected]


  Robert Raszuk
  Bloomberg LP
  731 Lexington Ave
  New York City, NY  10022
  United States of America

  Email: [email protected]


  Niels Bakker
  Akamai Technologies B.V.
  Kingsfordweg 151
  Amsterdam  1043 GR
  Netherlands

  Email: [email protected]















Jasinska, et al.             Standards Track                   [Page 12]