Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          S. Emery
Request for Comments: 7802                                        Oracle
Obsoletes: 4402                                              N. Williams
Category: Standards Track                                   Cryptonector
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               March 2016


  A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V Generic Security
      Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism

Abstract

  This document defines the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
  Kerberos V mechanism for the Generic Security Service Application
  Program Interface (GSS-API), based on the PRF defined for the
  Kerberos V cryptographic framework, for keying application protocols
  given an established Kerberos V GSS-API security context.

  This document obsoletes RFC 4402 and reclassifies that document as
  Historic.  RFC 4402 starts the PRF+ counter at 1; however, a number
  of implementations start the counter at 0.  As a result, the original
  specification would not be interoperable with existing
  implementations.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7802.














Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
  2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
  3.  Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  Appendix A.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
  Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

  This document specifies the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism's [RFC4121]
  pseudo-random function corresponding to [RFC4401].  The function is a
  "PRF+" style construction.  For more information, see [RFC4401],
  [RFC2743], [RFC2744], and [RFC4121].

  This document obsoletes RFC 4402 and reclassifies that document as
  Historic.  RFC 4402 starts the PRF+ counter at 1; however, a number
  of implementations start the counter at 0.  As a result, the original
  specification would not be interoperable with existing
  implementations.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].






Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


3.  Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF

  The GSS-API PRF [RFC4401] function for the Kerberos V mechanism
  [RFC4121] shall be the output of a PRF+ function based on the
  encryption type's PRF function keyed with the negotiated session key
  of the security context corresponding to the 'prf_key' input
  parameter of GSS_Pseudo_random().

  This PRF+ MUST be keyed with the key indicated by the 'prf_key' input
  parameter as follows:

  o  GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
     acceptor (if any exists), or the sub-session asserted by the
     initiator (if any exists), or the Ticket's session key.

  o  GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
     initiator (if any exists) or the Ticket's session key.

  The PRF+ function is a simple counter-based extension of the Kerberos
  V pseudo-random function [RFC3961] for the encryption type of the
  security context's keys:

        PRF+(K, L, S) = truncate(L, T0 || T1 || .. || Tn)

        Tn = pseudo-random(K, n || S)

  where K is the key indicated by the 'prf_key' parameter, '||' is the
  concatenation operator, 'n' is encoded as a network byte order 32-bit
  unsigned binary number, truncate(L, S) truncates the input octet
  string S to length L, and pseudo-random() is the Kerberos V pseudo-
  random function [RFC3961].

  The maximum output size of the Kerberos V mechanism's GSS-API PRF
  then is, necessarily, 2^32 times the output size of the pseudo-
  random() function for the encryption type of the given key.

  When the input size is longer than 2^14 octets as per [RFC4401] and
  exceeds an implementation's resources, then the mechanism MUST return
  GSS_S_FAILURE and GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG as the minor status
  code.

4.  IANA Considerations

  This document has no IANA considerations currently.  If and when a
  relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols and constants is created,
  then the GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG minor status code should be
  added to such a registry.




Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


5.  Security Considerations

  Kerberos V encryption types' PRF functions use a key derived from
  contexts' session keys and should preserve the forward security
  properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.

  Legacy Kerberos V encryption types may be weak, particularly the
  single-DES encryption types.

  See also [RFC4401] for generic security considerations of
  GSS_Pseudo_random().

  See also [RFC3961] for generic security considerations of the
  Kerberos V cryptographic framework.

  Use of Ticket session keys, rather than sub-session keys, when
  initiators and acceptors fail to assert sub-session keys, is
  dangerous as ticket reuse can lead to key reuse; therefore,
  initiators should assert sub-session keys always, and acceptors
  should assert sub-session keys at least when initiators fail to do
  so.

  The computational cost of computing this PRF+ may vary depending on
  the Kerberos V encryption types being used, but generally the
  computation of this PRF+ gets more expensive as the input and output
  octet string lengths grow (note that the use of a counter in the PRF+
  construction allows for parallelization).

6.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

  [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
             Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743>.

  [RFC2744]  Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
             C-bindings", RFC 2744, DOI 10.17487/RFC2744, January 2000,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2744>.

  [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
             Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, DOI 10.17487/RFC3961, February
             2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3961>.




Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


  [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
             Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
             Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC4121, July 2005,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4121>.

  [RFC4401]  Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) API
             Extension for the Generic Security Service Application
             Program Interface (GSS-API)", RFC 4401,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC4401, February 2006,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4401>.








































Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


Appendix A.  Test Vectors

  Here are some test vectors from the MIT implementation provided by
  Greg Hudson.  Test cases used include input string lengths of 0 and
  61 bytes, and an output length of 44 bytes.  61 bytes of input is
  just enough to produce a partial second MD5 or SHA1 hash block with
  the four-byte counter prefix.  44 bytes of output requires two full
  and one partial RFC 3961 PRF output for all existing enctypes.  All
  keys were randomly generated.

  Enctype: des-cbc-crc
  Key: E607FE9DABB57AE0
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 803C4121379FC4B87CE413B67707C4632EBED2C6D6B7
          2A55E878836E35E21600D915D590DED5B6D77BB30A1F

  Enctype: des-cbc-crc
  Key: 54758316B6257A75
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: 279E4105F7ADC9BD6EF28ABE31D89B442FE0058388BA
          33264ACB5729562DC637950F6BD144B654BE7700B2D6

  Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
  Key: 70378A19CD64134580C27C0115D6B34A1CF2FEECEF9886A2
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 9F8D127C520BB826BFF3E0FE5EF352389C17E0C073D9
          AC4A333D644D21BA3EF24F4A886D143F85AC9F6377FB

  Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
  Key: 3452A167DF1094BA1089E0A20E9E51ABEF1525922558B69E
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: 6BF24FABC858F8DD9752E4FCD331BB831F238B5BE190
          4EEA42E38F7A60C588F075C5C96A67E7F8B7BD0AECF4

  Enctype: rc4-hmac
  Key: 3BB3AE288C12B3B9D06B208A4151B3B6
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 9AEA11A3BCF3C53F1F91F5A0BA2132E2501ADF5F3C28
          3C8A983AB88757CE865A22132D6100EAD63E9E291AFA

  Enctype: rc4-hmac
  Key: 6DB7B33A01BD2B72F7655CB7B3D5FA0B
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: CDA9A544869FC84873B692663A82AFDA101C8611498B
          A46138B01E927C9B95EEC953B562807434037837DDDF






Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


  Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
  Key: 6C742096EB896230312B73972FA28B5D
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 94208D982FC1BB7778128BDD77904420B45C9DA699F3
          117BCE66E39602128EF0296611A6D191A5828530F20F

  Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
  Key: FA61138C109D834A477D24C7311BE6DA
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: 0FAEDF0F842CC834FEE750487E1B622739286B975FE5
          B7F45AB053143C75CA0DF5D3D4BBB80F6A616C7C9027

  Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
  Key: 08FCDAFD5832611B73BA7B497FEBFF8C954B4B58031CAD9B977C3B8C25192FD6
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: E627EFC14EF5B6D629F830C7109DEA0D3D7D36E8CD57
          A1F301C5452494A1928F05AFFBEE3360232209D3BE0D

  Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
  Key: F5B68B7823D8944F33F41541B4E4D38C9B2934F8D16334A796645B066152B4BE
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: 112F2B2D878590653CCC7DE278E9F0AA46FA5A380B62
          59F774CB7C134FCD37F61A50FD0D9F89BF8FE1A6B593

  Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
  Key: 866E0466A178279A32AC0BDA92B72AEB
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 97FBB354BF341C3A160DCC86A7A910FDA824601DF677
          68797BACEEBF5D250AE929DEC9760772084267F50A54

  Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
  Key: D4893FD37DA1A211E12DD1E03E0F03B7
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: 1DEE2FF126CA563A2A2326B9DD3F0095013257414C83
          FAD4398901013D55F367C82681186B7B2FE62F746BA4

  Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
  Key: 203071B1AE77BD3D6FCE70174AF95C225B1CED46B35CF52B6479EFEB47E6B063
  Input: (empty string)
  Output: 9B30020634C10FDA28420CEE7B96B70A90A771CED43A
          D8346554163E5949CBAE2FB8EF36AFB6B32CE75116A0

  Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
  Key: A171AD582C1AFBBAD52ABD622EE6B6A14D19BF95C6914B2BA40FFD99A88EC660
  Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
  Output: A47CBB6E104DCC77E4DB48A7A474B977F2FB6A7A1AB6
          52317D50508AE72B7BE2E4E4BA24164E029CBACF786B




Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 7802              A PRF for the Kerberos V Mech           March 2016


Acknowledgements

  This document is an update to RFC 4402, which was authored by Nico
  Williams.  Greg Hudson has provided the test vectors based on MIT's
  implementation.

Authors' Addresses

  Shawn Emery
  Oracle Corporation
  500 Eldorado Blvd Bldg 1
  Broomfield, CO  78727
  United States

  EMail: [email protected]


  Nicolas Williams
  Cryptonector, LLC

  EMail: [email protected]






























Emery & Williams             Standards Track                    [Page 8]


You are viewing proxied material from gopher.fnord.one. The copyright of proxied material belongs to its original authors. Any comments or complaints in relation to proxied material should be directed to the original authors of the content concerned. Please see the disclaimer for more details.