Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       R. Gagliano
Request for Comments: 6495                                 Cisco Systems
Updates: 3971                                                S. Krishnan
Category: Standards Track                                       Ericsson
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                 A. Kukec
                                                  Enterprise Architects
                                                          February 2012


    Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
                           Name Type Fields

Abstract

  SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) defines the Name Type field in the
  ICMPv6 Trust Anchor option.  This document specifies new Name Type
  fields based on certificate Subject Key Identifiers (SKIs).

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6495.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.





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RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012


Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
  2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
  3.  Name Type Fields in the ICMPv6 TA Option Defined in This
      Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  4.  Processing Rules for Routers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
  7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.  Introduction

  SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] utilizes X.509v3
  certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses
  to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the NDP
  (Neighbor Discovery Protocol).  The Trust Anchor (TA) option in
  Section 6.4.3 of [RFC3971] allows the identification of the Trust
  Anchor selected by the host.  In that same section, two name types
  were defined: the DER Encoded X.501 Name and a Fully Qualified Domain
  Name (FQDN).

  In any Public Key Infrastructure, the subject name of a certificate
  is only unique within each Certification Authority (CA).
  Consequently, a new option to identify TAs across CAs is needed.

  In [RFC6494], the certificate profile described in [RFC6487] is
  adopted for SEND.  In these documents, the Subject field in the
  certificates is declared to be meaningless and the subjectAltName
  field is not allowed.  On the other hand, the Subject Key Identifier
  (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates is defined as mandatory
  and non-critical.

  This document specifies new Name Type fields in the SEND TA option
  that allows the use of the SKI X.509 extension to identify TA X.509
  certificates.  This document also defines experimental and reserved
  Name Types values.

  Finally, this document updates [RFC3971] by changing the "Trust
  Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registration procedures from
  Standards Action to Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226].

2.  Requirements Notation

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].




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RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012


3.  Name Type Fields in the ICMPv6 TA Option Defined in This Document

  The following Name Type fields in the ICMPv6 TA option are defined:

          Name Type      Description
           0              Reserved
           3              SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
           4              SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
           5              SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
           6              SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
           7              SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
           253-254        Experimental
           255            Reserved

  Name Type field values 0 and 255 are marked as reserved.  This means
  that they are not available for allocation.

  When the Name Type field is set to 3, the Name Type field contains a
  160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string
  of the subject public key, as described in Section 4.8.2 of
  [RFC6487].  Implementations MAY support SHA-1 SKI name type.

  When the Name Type field is set to 4, 5, 6, or 7, the hash function
  will respectively be: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.
  Implementations MAY support SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
  SKI name types.

  Name Type fields 253 and 254 are marked as experimental, per guidance
  in [RFC3692].

4.  Processing Rules for Routers

  As specified in [RFC3971], a TA is identified by the SEND TA option.
  If the TA option is represented as a SKI, then the SKI MUST be equal
  to the X.509 SKI extension in the trust anchor's certificate.  The
  router SHOULD include the TA option(s) in the advertisement for which
  the certification path was found.  Also, following the specification
  defined in [RFC3971], if the router is unable to find a path to the
  requested anchor, it SHOULD send an advertisement without any
  certificate.  In this case, the router SHOULD include the TA options
  that were solicited.










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RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012


5.  IANA Considerations

  IANA has updated the "Trust Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field"
  registry to include the following values:

     +---------+--------------------------------------------------+
     | Value   | Description                                      |
     +---------+--------------------------------------------------+
     | 0       | Reserved (Section 3)                             |
     | 3       | SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)   |
     | 4       | SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |
     | 5       | SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |
     | 6       | SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |
     | 7       | SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |
     | 253-254 | Experimental Use (Section 3)                     |
     | 255     | Reserved (Section 3)                             |
     +---------+--------------------------------------------------+

       Table 1: New Name Type Field Values in the ICMPv6 TA Option

  IANA has also modified the registration procedures for the "Trust
  Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registry to Standards Action
  or IESG Approval [RFC5226].

6.  Security Considerations

  The hash functions referenced in this document to calculate the SKI
  have reasonable random properties in order to provide reasonably
  unique identifiers.  Two identical identifiers in the same validation
  path will cause the router to stop fetching certificates once the
  first certificate has been fetched.  In the case that the upward
  certificate was configured as a TA by a host, the router will send to
  this host an incomplete list of certificates, causing the SEND
  validation to fail.

  For experimental values of the Name Type field, the guidance given in
  [RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.

7.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC3692]  Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
             Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.

  [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.



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RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012


  [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
             "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

  [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
             IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
             May 2008.

  [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
             February 2012.

  [RFC6494]  Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate
             Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor
             Discovery (SEND)", RFC 6494, February 2012.

Authors' Addresses

  Roque Gagliano
  Cisco Systems
  Avenue des Uttins 5
  Rolle,   1180
  Switzerland

  EMail: [email protected]


  Suresh Krishnan
  Ericsson
  8400 Decarie Blvd.
  Town of Mount Royal, QC
  Canada

  Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
  EMail: [email protected]


  Ana Kukec
  Enterprise Architects
  46/525 Collins St
  Melbourne, VIC  3000
  Australia

  EMail: [email protected]








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