Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                        A. Dutta, Ed.
Request for Comments: 6252                                    V. Fajardo
Category: Informational                                           NIKSUN
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                  Y. Ohba
                                                            K. Taniuchi
                                                                Toshiba
                                                         H. Schulzrinne
                                                         Columbia Univ.
                                                              June 2011


    A Framework of Media-Independent Pre-Authentication (MPA) for
                  Inter-Domain Handover Optimization

Abstract

  This document describes Media-independent Pre-Authentication (MPA), a
  new handover optimization mechanism that addresses the issues on
  existing mobility management protocols and mobility optimization
  mechanisms to support inter-domain handover.  MPA is a mobile-
  assisted, secure handover optimization scheme that works over any
  link layer and with any mobility management protocol, and is most
  applicable to supporting optimization during inter-domain handover.
  MPA's pre-authentication, pre-configuration, and proactive handover
  techniques allow many of the handoff-related operations to take place
  before the mobile node has moved to the new network.  We describe the
  details of all the associated techniques and their applicability for
  different scenarios involving various mobility protocols during
  inter-domain handover.  We have implemented the MPA mechanism for
  various network-layer and application-layer mobility protocols, and
  we report a summary of experimental performance results in this
  document.

  This document is a product of the IP Mobility Optimizations (MOBOPTS)
  Research Group.

Status of This Memo

  This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
  published for informational purposes.

  This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force
  (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research
  and development activities.  These results might not be suitable for
  deployment.  This RFC represents the consensus of the MOBOPTS
  Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).  Documents
  approved for publication by the IRSG are not a candidate for any
  level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.



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  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6252.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction ....................................................3
     1.1. Specification of Requirements ..............................5
     1.2. Performance Requirements ...................................5
  2. Terminology .....................................................7
  3. Handover Taxonomy ...............................................7
  4. Related Work ...................................................11
  5. Applicability of MPA ...........................................12
  6. MPA Framework ..................................................13
     6.1. Overview ..................................................13
     6.2. Functional Elements .......................................14
     6.3. Basic Communication Flow ..................................16
  7. MPA Operations .................................................20
     7.1. Discovery .................................................21
     7.2. Pre-Authentication in Multiple-CTN Environment ............22
     7.3. Proactive IP Address Acquisition ..........................23
          7.3.1. PANA-Assisted Proactive IP Address Acquisition .....24
          7.3.2. IKEv2-Assisted Proactive IP Address Acquisition ....24
          7.3.3. Proactive IP Address Acquisition Using
                 DHCPv4 Only ........................................24
          7.3.4. Proactive IP Address Acquisition Using Stateless
                 Autoconfiguration ..................................26
     7.4. Tunnel Management .........................................26
     7.5. Binding Update ............................................28
     7.6. Preventing Packet Loss ....................................29
          7.6.1. Packet Loss Prevention in Single-Interface MPA .....29
          7.6.2. Preventing Packet Losses for Multiple Interfaces ...29
          7.6.3. Reachability Test ..................................30






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     7.7. Security and Mobility .....................................31
          7.7.1. Link-Layer Security and Mobility ...................31
          7.7.2. IP-Layer Security and Mobility .....................32
     7.8. Authentication in Initial Network Attachment ..............33
  8. Security Considerations ........................................33
  9. Acknowledgments ................................................34
  10. References ....................................................34
     10.1. Normative References .....................................34
     10.2. Informative References ...................................36
  Appendix A. Proactive Duplicate Address Detection .................40
  Appendix B. Address Resolution ....................................41
  Appendix C. MPA Deployment Issues .................................42
    C.1. Considerations for Failed Switching and Switch-Back ........42
    C.2. Authentication State Management ............................43
    C.3. Pre-Allocation of QoS Resources ............................44
    C.4. Resource Allocation Issue during Pre-Authentication ........45
    C.5. Systems Evaluation and Performance Results .................47
      C.5.1. Intra-Technology, Intra-Domain .........................47
      C.5.2. Inter-Technology, Inter-Domain .........................49
      C.5.3. MPA-Assisted Layer 2 Pre-Authentication ................49
    C.6. Guidelines for Handover Preparation ........................54

1.  Introduction

  As wireless technologies, including cellular and wireless LANs, are
  becoming popular, supporting terminal handovers across different
  types of access networks, such as from a wireless LAN to CDMA or to
  General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), is considered a clear challenge.
  On the other hand, supporting seamless terminal handovers between
  access networks of the same type is still more challenging,
  especially when the handovers are across IP subnets or administrative
  domains.  To address those challenges, it is important to provide
  terminal mobility that is agnostic to link-layer technologies in an
  optimized and secure fashion without incurring unreasonable
  complexity.  In this document, we discuss a framework to support
  terminal mobility that provides seamless handovers with low latency
  and low loss.  Seamless handovers are characterized in terms of
  performance requirements as described in Section 1.2.  [MPA-WIRELESS]
  is an accompanying document that describes implementation of a few
  MPA-based systems, including performance results to show how existing
  protocols could be leveraged to realize the functionalities of MPA.

  Terminal mobility is accomplished by a mobility management protocol
  that maintains a binding between a locator and an identifier of a
  mobile node, where the binding is referred to as the mobility
  binding.  The locator of the mobile node may dynamically change when
  there is a movement of the mobile node.  The movement that causes a




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  change of the locator may occur when there is a change in attachment
  point due to physical movement or network change.  A mobility
  management protocol may be defined at any layer.  In the rest of this
  document, the term "mobility management protocol" refers to a
  mobility management protocol that operates at the network layer or
  higher.

  There are several mobility management protocols at different layers.
  Mobile IP [RFC5944] and Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] are mobility management
  protocols that operate at the network layer.  Similarly, MOBIKE
  (IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming) [RFC4555] is an extension to the
  Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) that provides the ability to
  deal with a change of an IP address of an IKEv2 end-point.  There are
  several ongoing activities in the IETF to define mobility management
  protocols at layers higher than the network layer.  HIP (Host
  Identity Protocol) [RFC5201] defines a new protocol layer between the
  network layer and transport layer to provide terminal mobility in a
  way that is transparent to both the network layer and transport
  layer.  Also, SIP-based mobility is an extension to SIP to maintain
  the mobility binding of a SIP user agent [SIPMM].

  While mobility management protocols maintain mobility bindings, these
  cannot provide seamless handover if used in their current form.  An
  additional optimization mechanism is needed to prevent the loss of
  in-flight packets transmitted during the mobile node's binding update
  procedure and to achieve seamless handovers.  Such a mechanism is
  referred to as a mobility optimization mechanism.  For example,
  mobility optimization mechanisms for Mobile IPv4 [RFC4881] and Mobile
  IPv6 [RFC5568] are defined to allow neighboring access routers to
  communicate and carry information about mobile terminals.  There are
  protocols that are considered as "helpers" of mobility optimization
  mechanisms.  The CARD (Candidate Access Router Discovery) protocol
  [RFC4066] is designed to discover neighboring access routers.  CXTP
  (Context Transfer Protocol) [RFC4067] is designed to carry state that
  is associated with the services provided for the mobile node, or
  context, among access routers.  In Section 4, we describe some of the
  fast-handover schemes that attempt to reduce the handover delay.

  There are several issues in existing mobility optimization
  mechanisms.  First, existing mobility optimization mechanisms are
  tightly coupled with specific mobility management protocols.  For
  example, it is not possible to use mobility optimization mechanisms
  designed for Mobile IPv4 or Mobile IPv6 with MOBIKE.  What is
  strongly desired is a single, unified mobility optimization mechanism
  that works with any mobility management protocol.  Second, there is
  no existing mobility optimization mechanism that easily supports
  handovers across administrative domains without assuming a
  pre-established security association between administrative domains.



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  A mobility optimization mechanism should work across administrative
  domains in a secure manner only based on a trust relationship between
  a mobile node and each administrative domain.  Third, a mobility
  optimization mechanism needs to support not only terminals with
  multiple interfaces where simultaneous connectivity through multiple
  interfaces or connectivity through a single interface can be
  expected, but also terminals with a single interface.

  This document describes a framework of Media-independent
  Pre-Authentication (MPA), a new handover optimization mechanism that
  addresses all those issues.  MPA is a mobile-assisted, secure
  handover optimization scheme that works over any link layer and with
  any mobility management protocol, including Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6,
  MOBIKE, HIP, and SIP mobility.  In cases of multiple operators
  without a roaming relationship or without an agreement to participate
  in a key management scheme, MPA provides a framework that can perform
  pre-authentication to establish the security mechanisms without
  assuming a common source of trust.  In MPA, the notion of IEEE
  802.11i pre-authentication is extended to work at a higher layer,
  with additional mechanisms to perform early acquisition of an IP
  address from a network where the mobile node may move, as well as
  proactive handover to the network while the mobile node is still
  attached to the current network.  Since this document focuses on the
  MPA framework, it is left to future work to choose the protocols for
  MPA and define detailed operations.  The accompanying document
  [MPA-WIRELESS] provides one method that describes usage and
  interactions between existing protocols to accomplish MPA
  functionality.

  This document represents the consensus of the IP Mobility
  Optimizations (MOBOPTS) Research Group.  It has been reviewed by
  Research Group members active in the specific area of work.

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

  In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
  of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
  words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
  "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
  are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Performance Requirements

  In order to provide desirable quality of service for interactive
  Voice over IP (VoIP) and streaming traffic, one needs to limit the
  value of end-to-end delay, jitter, and packet loss to a certain
  threshold level.  ITU-T and ITU-E standards define the acceptable
  values for these parameters.  For example, for one-way delay, ITU-T



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  G.114 [RG98] recommends 150 ms as the upper limit for most of the
  applications, and 400 ms as generally unacceptable delay.  One-way
  delay tolerance for video conferencing is in the range of 200 to
  300 ms [ITU98].  Also, if an out-of-order packet is received after a
  certain threshold, it is considered lost.  According to ETSI TR 101
  [ETSI], a normal voice conversation can tolerate up to 2% packet
  loss.  But this is the mean packet loss probability and may be
  applicable to a scenario when the mobile node is subjected to
  repeated handoff during a normal conversation.  Measurement
  techniques for delay and jitter are described in [RFC2679],
  [RFC2680], and [RFC2681].

  In the case of interactive VoIP traffic, end-to-end delay affects the
  jitter value, and thus is an important issue to consider.  An end-to-
  end delay consists of several components, such as network delay,
  operating system (OS) delay, codec delay, and application delay.  A
  complete analysis of these delays can be found in [WENYU].  During a
  mobile node's handover, in-flight transient traffic cannot reach the
  mobile node because of the associated handover delay.  These
  in-flight packets could either be lost or buffered.  If the in-flight
  packets are lost, this packet loss will contribute to jitter between
  the last packet before handoff and the first packet after handoff.
  If these packets are buffered, packet loss is minimized, but there is
  additional jitter for the in-flight packets when these are flushed
  after the handoff.  Buffering during handoff avoids the packet loss,
  but at the cost of additional one-way delay.  A tradeoff between one-
  way delay and packet loss is desired based on the type of
  application.  For example, for a streaming application, packet loss
  can be reduced by increasing the playout buffer, resulting in longer
  one-way packet delay.

  The handover delay is attributed to several factors, such as
  discovery, configuration, authentication, binding update, and media
  delivery.  Many of the security-related procedures, such as handover
  keying and re-authentication procedures, deal with cases where there
  is a single source of trust at the top, and the underlying
  Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) domain elements
  trust the top source of trust and the keys it generates and
  distributes.  In this scenario, there is an appreciable delay in
  re-establishing link-security-related parameters, such as
  authentication, link key management, and access authorization during
  inter-domain handover.  The focus of this document is the design of a
  framework that can reduce the delay due to authentication and other
  handoff-related operations such as configuration and binding update.







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2.  Terminology

  Mobility Binding:  A binding between a locator and an identifier of a
     mobile terminal.

  Mobility Management Protocol (MMP):  A protocol that operates at the
     network layer or above to maintain a binding between a locator and
     an identifier of a mobile node.

  Binding Update (BU):  A procedure to update a mobility binding.

  Media-independent Pre-Authentication Mobile Node (MN):  A mobile node
     using Media-independent Pre-Authentication (MPA).  MPA is a
     mobile-assisted, secure handover optimization scheme that works
     over any link layer and with any mobility management protocol.  An
     MPA mobile node is an IP node.  In this document, the term "mobile
     node" or "MN" without a modifier refers to "MPA mobile node".  An
     MPA mobile node usually has a functionality of a mobile node of a
     mobility management protocol as well.

  Candidate Target Network (CTN):  A network to which the mobile node
     may move in the near future.

  Target Network (TN):  The network to which the mobile node has
     decided to move.  The target network is selected from one or more
     candidate target networks.

  Proactive Handover Tunnel (PHT):  A bidirectional IP tunnel [RFC2003]
     [RFC2473] that is established between the MPA mobile node and an
     access router of a candidate target network.  In this document,
     the term "tunnel" without a modifier refers to "proactive handover
     tunnel".

  Point of Attachment (PoA):  A link-layer device (e.g., a switch, an
     access point, or a base station) that functions as a link-layer
     attachment point for the MPA mobile node to a network.

  Care-of Address (CoA):  An IP address used by a mobility management
     protocol as a locator of the MPA mobile node.

3.  Handover Taxonomy

  Based on the type of movement, type of access network, and underlying
  mobility support, one can primarily define the handover as inter-
  technology, intra-technology, inter-domain, and intra-domain.  We
  describe briefly each of these handover processes.  However, our
  focus of the discussion is on inter-domain handover.




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  Inter-technology:  A mobile node may be equipped with multiple
     interfaces, where each interface can support a different access
     technology (e.g., 802.11, CDMA).  A mobile node may communicate
     with one interface at any time in order to conserve power.  During
     the handover, the mobile node may move out of the footprint of one
     access technology (e.g., 802.11) and move into the footprint of a
     different access technology (e.g., CDMA).  This will warrant
     switching of the communicating interface on the mobile node as
     well.  This type of inter-technology handover is often called
     "vertical handover", since the mobile node moves between two
     different cell sizes.

  Intra-technology:  An intra-technology handover is defined as when a
     mobile node moves within the same type of access technology, such
     as between 802.11[a,b,n] and 802.11 [a,b,n] or between CDMA1XRTT
     and CDMA1EVDO.  In this scenario, a mobile node may be equipped
     with a single interface (with multiple PHY types of the same
     technology) or with multiple interfaces.  An intra-technology
     handover may involve intra-subnet or inter-subnet movement and
     thus may need to change its L3 locator, depending upon the type of
     movement.

  Inter-domain:  A domain can be defined in several ways.  But for the
     purposes of roaming, we define "domain" as an administrative
     domain that consists of networks managed by a single
     administrative entity that authenticates and authorizes a mobile
     node for accessing the networks.  An administrative entity may be
     a service provider, an enterprise, or any organization.  Thus, an
     inter-domain handover will by default be subjected to inter-subnet
     handover, and in addition it may be subjected to either inter-
     technology or intra-technology handover.  A mobile node is
     subjected to inter-subnet handover when it moves from one subnet
     (broadcast domain) to another subnet (broadcast domain).  Inter-
     domain handover will be subjected to all the transition steps a
     subnet handover goes through, and it will be subjected to
     authentication and authorization processes as well.  It is also
     likely that the type of mobility support in each administrative
     domain will be different.  For example, administrative domain A
     may have Mobile IP version 6 (MIPv6) support, while administrative
     domain B may use Proxy MIPv6 [RFC5213].

  Intra-domain:  When a mobile node's movement is confined to movement
     within an administrative domain, it is called "intra-domain
     movement".  An intra-domain movement may involve intra-subnet,
     inter-subnet, intra-technology, and inter-technology as well.






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  Both inter-domain and intra-domain handovers can be subjected to
  either inter-technology or intra-technology handover based on the
  network access characteristics.  Inter-domain handover requires
  authorization for acquisition or modification of resources assigned
  to a mobile node, and the authorization needs interaction with a
  central authority in a domain.  In many cases, an authorization
  procedure during inter-domain handover follows an authentication
  procedure that also requires interaction with a central authority in
  a domain.  Thus, security associations between the network entities,
  such as routers in the neighboring administrative domains, need to be
  established before any interaction takes place between these
  entities.  Similarly, an inter-domain mobility may involve different
  mobility protocols, such as MIPv6 and Proxy MIPv6, in each of its
  domains.  In that case, one needs a generalized framework to achieve
  the optimization during inter-domain handover.  Figure 1 shows a
  typical example of inter-domain mobility involving two domains,
  domain A and domain B.  It illustrates several important components,
  such as a AAA Home server (AAAH); AAA visited servers (e.g., AAAV1
  and AAAV2); an Authentication Agent (AA); a layer 3 point of
  attachment, such as an Access Router (AR); and a layer 2 point of
  attachment, such as an Access Point (AP).  Any mobile node may be
  using a specific mobility protocol and associated mobility
  optimization technique during intra-domain movement in either domain.
  But the same optimization technique may not be suitable to support
  inter-domain handover, independent of whether it uses the same or a
  different mobility protocol in either domain.

























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                       +-----------------------------+
                       |      +--------+             |
                       |      |        |             |
                       |      | AAAH   ------------------|
                       |      |        |             |   |
                       |      +|-------+             |   |
                       |       |                     |   |
                       |       |  Home Domain        |   |
                       |       |                     |   |
                       +-------|---------------------+   |
                               |                         |
                               |                         |
                               |                         |
  +----------------------------|---------+ +-------------|------------+
  | Domain A                   |         | | Domain B    |            |
  |                            |         | |            +|-------+    |
  |                    +-------|+        | | +-----+    |        |    |
  |                    |        |        | | |     ------ AAAV2  |    |
  |                    | AAAV1  |        | | | AA  |    |        |    |
  |      +--------------        |        | | +|----+    +--------+    |
  |      |     |       +--------+        | |  |                       |
  |      |AA   |                         | |  |---         ----       |
  |      +--|--+                         | | /    \       /    \      |
  |         |              /----\        | || AR   |-----| AR   |     |
  |        -|--           /      \       | | \    /       \    /      |
  |       /    \         | AR     |      | |  -|--         --|-       |
  |      | AR   -----------      /       | |+--|---+  +------|------+ |
  |       \    /           \--|-/        | || AP4  |  |  L2 Switch  | |
  |        -/--         +-----|------+   | ||      |  +-|---------|-+ |
  |        /            |  L2 Switch |   | |+------+    |         |   |
  |       /             +-|-------|--+   | |        +---|--+ +----|-+ |
  | +----/-+         +----|-+   +-|----+ | |        |      | |      | |
  | |      |         |      |   |      | | |        | AP5  | |AP6   | |
  | | AP1  |         | AP2  |   | AP3  | | |        +----|-+ +------+ |
  | +------+         +------+   +--|---+ | |             |            |
  +--------------------------------|-----+ +------------ |------------+
                                 --|---------            |
                             ////            \\\\   -----|-----
                           //    +------+       ////  +------+ \\\\
                           |     | MN   ------------->|MN  |     \\\
                          |      |      |    |     |  |      |       |
                           |     +------+   |     |   +------+        |
                           \\                |   //                  |
                             \\\\            \\\/                  ///
                                 ------------   \\\\------------- ////

                     Figure 1: Inter-Domain Mobility




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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


4.  Related Work

  While basic mobility management protocols such as Mobile IP
  [RFC5944], Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775], and SIP-Mobility [SIPMM] provide
  continuity to TCP and RTP traffic, these are not optimized to reduce
  the handover latency during a mobile node's movement between subnets
  and domains.  In general, these mobility management protocols
  introduce handover delays incurred at several layers, such as layer 3
  and the application layer, for updating the mobile node's mobility
  binding.  These protocols are affected by underlying layer 2 delay as
  well.  As a result, applications using these mobility protocols
  suffer from performance degradation.

  There have been several optimization techniques that apply to current
  mobility management schemes that try to reduce handover delay and
  packet loss during a mobile node's movement between cells, subnets,
  and domains.  Micro-mobility management schemes such as [CELLIP] and
  [HAWAII], and intra-domain mobility management schemes such as
  [IDMP], [MOBIP-REG], and [RFC5380], provide fast handover by limiting
  the signaling updates within a domain.  Fast Mobile IP protocols for
  IPv4 and IPv6 networks [RFC4881] [RFC5568] utilize mobility
  information made available by link-layer triggers.  Yokota et
  al. [YOKOTA] propose the joint use of an access point and a dedicated
  Media Access Control (MAC) bridge to provide fast handover without
  altering the MIPv4 specification.  Shin et al. [MACD] propose a
  scheme that reduces the delay due to MAC-layer handoff by providing a
  cache-based algorithm.  In this scheme, the mobile node caches the
  neighboring channels that it has already visited and thus uses a
  selective scanning method.  This helps to reduce the associated
  scanning time.

  Some mobility management schemes use dual interfaces, thus providing
  make-before-break [SUM].  In a make-before-break situation,
  communication usually continues with one interface when the secondary
  interface is in the process of getting connected.  The IEEE 802.21
  working group is discussing these scenarios in detail [802.21].
  Providing fast handover using a single interface needs more careful
  design than for a client with multiple interfaces.  Dutta et
  al. [SIPFAST] provide an optimized handover scheme for SIP-based
  mobility management, where the transient traffic is forwarded from
  the old subnet to the new one by using an application-layer
  forwarding scheme.  [MITH] provides a fast-handover scheme for the
  single-interface case that uses mobile-initiated tunneling between
  the old Foreign Agent and a new Foreign Agent.  [MITH] defines two
  types of handover schemes: Pre-MIT (Mobile Initiated Tunneling) and
  Post-MIT (Media Initiated Tunneling).  The proposed MPA scheme is
  very similar to Mobile Initiated Tunneling Handoff's (MITH's)
  predictive scheme, where the mobile node communicates with the



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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  Foreign Agent before actually moving to the new network.  However,
  the MPA scheme is not limited to MIP; this scheme takes care of
  movement between domains and performs pre-authentication in addition
  to proactive handover.  Thus, MPA reduces the overall delay to a
  period close to that of link-layer handover delay.  Most of the
  mobility optimization techniques developed so far are restricted to a
  specific type of mobility protocol only.  While supporting
  optimization for inter-domain mobility, these protocols assume that
  there is a pre-established security arrangement between two
  administrative domains.  But this assumption may not always be
  viable.  Thus, there is a need to develop an optimization mechanism
  that can support inter-domain mobility without any underlying
  constraints or security-related assumptions.

  Recently, the HOKEY working group within the IETF has been defining
  ways to expedite the authentication process.  In particular, it has
  defined pre-authentication [RFC5836] and fast re-authentication
  [RFC5169] mechanisms to expedite the authentication and security
  association process.

5.  Applicability of MPA

  MPA is more applicable where an accurate prediction of movement can
  be easily made.  For other environments, special care must be taken
  to deal with issues such as pre-authentication to multiple CTNs
  (Candidate Target Networks), and failed switching and switching back
  as described in [MPA-WIRELESS].  However, addressing those issues in
  actual deployments may not be easier.  Some of the deployment issues
  are described in Appendix C.

  The authors of the accompanying document [MPA-WIRELESS] have cited
  several use cases of how MPA can be used to optimize several network-
  layer and application-layer mobility protocols.  The effectiveness of
  MPA may be relatively reduced if the network employs network-
  controlled localized mobility management in which the MN does not
  need to change its IP address while moving within the network.  The
  effectiveness of MPA may also be relatively reduced if signaling for
  network access authentication is already optimized for movements
  within the network, e.g., when simultaneous use of multiple
  interfaces during handover is allowed.  In other words, MPA is more
  viable as a solution for inter-administrative domain predictive
  handover without the simultaneous use of multiple interfaces.  Since
  MPA is not tied to a specific mobility protocol, it is also
  applicable to support optimization for inter-domain handover where
  each domain may be equipped with a different mobility protocol.






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  Figure 1 shows an example of inter-domain mobility where MPA could be
  applied.  For example, domain A may support just Proxy MIPv6, whereas
  domain B may support Client Mobile IPv6.  MPA's different functional
  components can provide the desired optimization techniques
  proactively.

6.  MPA Framework

6.1.  Overview

  Media-independent Pre-Authentication (MPA) is a mobile-assisted,
  secure handover optimization scheme that works over any link layer
  and with any mobility management protocol.  With MPA, a mobile node
  is not only able to securely obtain an IP address and other
  configuration parameters for a CTN, but also able to send and receive
  IP packets using the IP address obtained before it actually attaches
  to the CTN.  This makes it possible for the mobile node to complete
  the binding update of any mobility management protocol and use the
  new CoA before performing a handover at the link layer.

  MPA adopts the following basic procedures to provide this
  functionality.  The first procedure is referred to as
  "pre-authentication", the second procedure is referred to as
  "pre-configuration", and the combination of the third and fourth
  procedures is referred to as "secure proactive handover".  The
  security association established through pre-authentication is
  referred to as an "MPA-SA".

  This functionality is provided by allowing a mobile node that has
  connectivity to the current network, but is not yet attached to a
  CTN, to

     (i) establish a security association with the CTN to secure the
     subsequent protocol signaling, then

     (ii) securely execute a configuration protocol to obtain an IP
     address and other parameters from the CTN as well as execute a
     tunnel management protocol to establish a Proactive Handover
     Tunnel (PHT) [RFC2003] between the mobile node and an access
     router of the CTN, then

     (iii) send and receive IP packets, including signaling messages
     for the binding update of an MMP and data packets transmitted
     after completion of the binding update, over the PHT, using the
     obtained IP address as the tunnel inner address, and finally






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     (iv) delete or disable the PHT immediately before attaching to the
     CTN when it becomes the target network, and then re-assign the
     inner address of the deleted or disabled tunnel to its physical
     interface immediately after the mobile node is attached to the
     target network through the interface.  Instead of deleting or
     disabling the tunnel before attaching to the target network, the
     tunnel may be deleted or disabled immediately after being attached
     to the target network.

  Step (iii) above (i.e., the binding update procedure), in particular,
  makes it possible for the mobile node to complete the higher-layer
  handover before starting a link-layer handover.  This means that the
  mobile node is able to send and receive data packets transmitted
  after completing the binding update over the tunnel, while data
  packets transmitted before completion of the binding update do not
  use the tunnel.

6.2.  Functional Elements

  In the MPA framework, the following functional elements are expected
  to reside in each CTN to communicate with a mobile node: an
  Authentication Agent (AA), a Configuration Agent (CA), and an Access
  Router (AR).  These elements can reside in one or more network
  devices.

  An authentication agent is responsible for pre-authentication.  An
  authentication protocol is executed between the mobile node and the
  authentication agent to establish an MPA-SA.  The authentication
  protocol MUST be able to establish a shared key between the mobile
  node and the authentication agent and SHOULD be able to provide
  mutual authentication.  The authentication protocol SHOULD be able to
  interact with a AAA protocol, such as RADIUS or Diameter, to carry
  authentication credentials to an appropriate authentication server in
  the AAA infrastructure.  This interaction happens through the
  authentication agent, such as the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA).
  In turn, the derived key is used to derive additional keys that will
  be applied to protecting message exchanges used for pre-configuration
  and secure proactive handover.  Other keys that are used for
  bootstrapping link-layer and/or network-layer ciphers MAY also be
  derived from the MPA-SA.  A protocol that can carry the Extensible
  Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] would be suitable as an
  authentication protocol for MPA.









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  A configuration agent is responsible for one part of
  pre-configuration, namely securely executing a configuration protocol
  to deliver an IP address and other configuration parameters to the
  mobile node.  The signaling messages of the configuration protocol
  (e.g., DHCP) MUST be protected using a key derived from the key
  corresponding to the MPA-SA.

  An access router in the MPA framework is a router that is responsible
  for the other part of pre-configuration, i.e., securely executing a
  tunnel management protocol to establish a proactive handover tunnel
  to the mobile node.  IP packets transmitted over the proactive
  handover tunnel SHOULD be protected using a key derived from the key
  corresponding to the MPA-SA.  Details of this procedure are described
  in Section 6.3.





































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  Figure 2 shows the basic functional components of MPA.

                                       +----+
                                       | CN |
                                       +----+
                                        /
                             (Core Network)
                            /              \
                           /                \
         +----------------/--------+    +----\-----------------+
         | +-----+                 |    |+-----+               |
         | |     |        +-----+  |    ||     |       +-----+ |
         | | AA  |        |CA   |  |    ||AA   |       | CA  | |
         | +--+--+        +--+--+  |    |+--+--+       +--+--+ |
         |    |   +------+   |     |    |   | +-----+     |    |
         |    |   | pAR  |   |     |    |   | |nAR  |     |    |
         | ---+---+      +---+-----+----+---+-+     +-----+    |
         |        +---+--+         |    |     +-----+          |
         |            |            |    |                      |
         |            |            |    |                      |
         |            |            |    |                      |
         +------------+------------+    +--------|-------------+
         Current      |                 Candidate| Target Network
         Network      |                          |
                   +------+                  +------+
                   | oPoA |                  | nPoA |
                   +--.---+                  +--.---+
                      .                         .
                      .                         .
                   +------+
                   |  MN  |  ---------->
                   +------+

                   Figure 2: MPA Functional Components

6.3.  Basic Communication Flow

  Assume that the mobile node is already connected to a point of
  attachment, say oPoA (old point of attachment), and assigned a
  care-of address, say oCoA (old care-of address).  The communication
  flow of MPA is described as follows.  Throughout the communication
  flow, data packet loss should not occur except for the period during
  the switching procedure in Step 5 below, and it is the responsibility
  of link-layer handover to minimize packet loss during this period.







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  Step 1 (pre-authentication phase):  The mobile node finds a CTN
     through some discovery process, such as IEEE 802.21, and obtains
     the IP addresses of an authentication agent, a configuration
     agent, and an access router in the CTN (Candidate Target Network)
     by some means.  Details about discovery mechanisms are discussed
     in Section 7.1.  The mobile node performs pre-authentication with
     the authentication agent.  As discussed in Section 7.2, the mobile
     node may need to pre-authenticate with multiple candidate target
     networks.  The decision regarding with which candidate network the
     mobile node needs to pre-authenticate will depend upon several
     factors, such as signaling overhead, bandwidth requirement
     (Quality of Service (QoS)), the mobile node's location,
     communication cost, handover robustness, etc.  Determining the
     policy that decides the target network with which the mobile node
     should pre-authenticate is out of scope for this document.

     If the pre-authentication is successful, an MPA-SA is created
     between the mobile node and the authentication agent.  Two keys
     are derived from the MPA-SA, namely an MN-CA key and an MN-AR key,
     which are used to protect subsequent signaling messages of a
     configuration protocol and a tunnel management protocol,
     respectively.  The MN-CA key and the MN-AR key are then securely
     delivered to the configuration agent and the access router,
     respectively.

  Step 2 (pre-configuration phase):  The mobile node realizes that its
     point of attachment is likely to change from the oPoA to a new
     one, say nPoA (new point of attachment).  It then performs
     pre-configuration with the configuration agent, using the
     configuration protocol to obtain several configuration parameters
     such as an IP address, say nCoA (new care-of address), and a
     default router from the CTN.  The mobile node then communicates
     with the access router using the tunnel management protocol to
     establish a proactive handover tunnel.  In the tunnel management
     protocol, the mobile node registers the oCoA and the nCoA as the
     tunnel outer address and the tunnel inner address, respectively.
     The signaling messages of the pre-configuration protocol are
     protected using the MN-CA key and the MN-AR key.  When the
     configuration agent and the access router are co-located in the
     same device, the two protocols may be integrated into a single
     protocol, such as IKEv2.  After completion of the tunnel
     establishment, the mobile node is able to communicate using both
     the oCoA and the nCoA by the end of Step 4.  A configuration
     protocol and a tunnel management protocol may be combined in a
     single protocol or executed in different orders depending on the
     actual protocol(s) used for configuration and tunnel management.





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  Step 3 (secure proactive handover main phase):  The mobile node
     decides to switch to the new point of attachment by some means.
     Before the mobile node switches to the new point of attachment, it
     starts secure proactive handover by executing the binding update
     operation of a mobility management protocol and transmitting
     subsequent data traffic over the tunnel (main phase).  This
     proactive binding update could be triggered based on certain local
     policy at the mobile node end, after the pre-configuration phase
     is over.  This local policy could be Signal-to-Noise Ratio,
     location of the mobile node, etc.  In some cases, it may cache
     multiple nCoA addresses and perform simultaneous binding with the
     Correspondent Node (CN) or Home Agent (HA).

  Step 4 (secure proactive handover pre-switching phase):  The mobile
     node completes the binding update and becomes ready to switch to
     the new point of attachment.  The mobile node may execute the
     tunnel management protocol to delete or disable the proactive
     handover tunnel and cache the nCoA after deletion or disabling of
     the tunnel.  This transient tunnel can be deleted prior to or
     after the handover.  The buffering module at the next access
     router buffers the packets once the tunnel interface is deleted.
     The decision as to when the mobile node is ready to switch to the
     new point of attachment depends on the handover policy.

  Step 5 (switching):  It is expected that a link-layer handover occurs
     in this step.

  Step 6 (secure proactive handover post-switching phase):  The mobile
     node executes the switching procedure.  Upon successful completion
     of the switching procedure, the mobile node immediately restores
     the cached nCoA and assigns it to the physical interface attached
     to the new point of attachment.  If the proactive handover tunnel
     was not deleted or disabled in Step 4, the tunnel is deleted or
     disabled as well.  After this, direct transmission of data packets
     using the nCoA is possible without using a proactive handover
     tunnel.

  Call flow for MPA is shown in Figures 3 and 4.













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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


                                                        IP address(es)
                                                         Available for
                                                            Use by MN
                                                                  |
                          +-----------------------------------+   |
                          |     Candidate Target Network      |   |
                          |     (Future Target Network)       |   |
            MN       oPoA | nPoA     AA        CA        AR   |   |
            |         |   |  |       |         |         |    |   |
            |         |   +-----------------------------------+   |
            |         |      |       |         |         |        .
   +---------------+  |      |       |         |         |        .
   |(1) Found a CTN|  |      |       |         |         |        .
   +---------------+  |      |       |         |         |        |
            |   Pre-authentication   |         |         |        |
            |   [authentication protocol]      |         |        |
            |<--------+------------->|MN-CA key|         |        |
            |         |      |       |-------->|MN-AR key|        |
  +-----------------+ |      |       |------------------>|        |
  |(2) Increased    | |      |       |         |         |     [oCoA]
  |chance to switch | |      |       |         |         |        |
  |     to CTN      | |      |       |         |         |        |
  +-----------------+ |      |       |         |         |        |
            |         |      |       |         |         |        |
            |   Pre-configuration    |         |         |        |
            |   [configuration protocol to get nCoA]     |        |
            |<--------+----------------------->|         |        |
            |   Pre-configuration    |         |         |        |
            |   [tunnel management protocol to establish PHT]     V
            |<--------+--------------------------------->|
            |         |      |       |         |         |        ^
  +-----------------+ |      |       |         |         |        |
  |(3) Determined   | |      |       |         |         |        |
  |to switch to CTN | |      |       |         |         |        |
  +-----------------+ |      |       |         |         |        |
            |         |      |       |         |         |        |
            |   Secure proactive handover main phase     |        |
            |   [execution of binding update of MMP and  |        |
            |    transmission of data packets through AR | [oCoA, nCoA]
            |    based on nCoA over the PHT]   |         |        |
            |<<=======+================================>+--->...  |
            .         .      .       .         .         .        .
            .         .      .       .         .         .        .
            .         .      .       .         .         .        .

               Figure 3: Example Communication Flow (1/2)





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            |         |      |       |         |         |        |
  +----------------+  |      |       |         |         |        |
  |(4) Completion  |  |      |       |         |         |        |
  |of MMP BU and   |  |      |       |         |         |        |
  |ready to switch |  |      |       |         |         |        |
  +----------------+  |      |       |         |         |        |
            |   Secure proactive handover pre-switching phase     |
            |   [tunnel management protocol to delete PHT]        V
            |<--------+--------------------------------->|
   +---------------+         |       |         |         |
   |(5)Switching   |         |       |         |         |
   +---------------+         |       |         |         |
            |                |       |         |         |
   +---------------+         |       |         |         |
   |(6) Completion |         |       |         |         |
   |of switching   |         |       |         |         |
   +---------------+         |       |         |         |
            o<- Secure proactive handover post-switching phase ^
            |   [Re-assignment of Tunnel Inner Address   |        |
            |                 to the physical I/F]       |        |
            |                |       |         |         |        |
            |   Transmission of data packets through AR  |     [nCoA]
            |   based on nCoA|       |         |         |        |
            |<---------------+---------------------------+-->...  |
            |                |       |         |         |        .

               Figure 4: Example Communication Flow (2/2)

7.  MPA Operations

  In order to provide an optimized handover for a mobile node
  experiencing rapid movement between subnets and/or domains, one needs
  to look into several operations.  These issues include:

     i) discovery of neighboring networking elements,

     ii) connecting to the right network based on certain policy,

     iii) changing the layer 2 point of attachment,

     iv) obtaining an IP address from a DHCP or PPP server,

     v) confirming the uniqueness of the IP address,

     vi) pre-authenticating with the authentication agent,

     vii) sending the binding update to the Correspondent Host (CH),




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     viii) obtaining the redirected streaming traffic to the new point
     of attachment,

     ix) ping-pong effect, and

     x) probability of moving to more than one network and associating
     with multiple target networks.

  We describe these issues in detail in the following paragraphs and
  describe how we have optimized these issues in the case of MPA-based
  secure proactive handover.

7.1.  Discovery

  Discovery of neighboring networking elements such as access points,
  access routers, and authentication servers helps expedite the
  handover process during a mobile node's movement between networks.
  After discovering the network neighborhood with a desired set of
  coordinates, capabilities, and parameters, the mobile node can
  perform many of the operations, such as pre-authentication, proactive
  IP address acquisition, proactive address resolution, and binding
  update, while in the previous network.

  There are several ways a mobile node can discover neighboring
  networks.  The Candidate Access Router Discovery protocol [RFC4066]
  helps discover the candidate access routers in the neighboring
  networks.  Given a certain network domain, SLP (Service Location
  Protocol) [RFC2608] and DNS help provide addresses of the networking
  components for a given set of services in the specific domain.  In
  some cases, many of the network-layer and upper-layer parameters may
  be sent over link-layer management frames, such as beacons, when the
  mobile node approaches the vicinity of the neighboring networks.
  IEEE 802.11u is considering issues such as discovering the
  neighborhood using information contained in the link layer.  However,
  if the link-layer management frames are encrypted by some link-layer
  security mechanism, then the mobile node may not be able to obtain
  the requisite information before establishing link-layer connectivity
  to the access point.  In addition, this may add burden to the
  bandwidth-constrained wireless medium.  In such cases, a higher-layer
  protocol is preferred to obtain the information regarding the
  neighboring elements.  Some proposals, such as [802.21], help obtain
  information about the neighboring networks from a mobility server.
  When the movement is imminent, the mobile node starts the discovery
  process by querying a specific server and obtains the required
  parameters, such as the IP address of the access point, its
  characteristics, routers, SIP servers, or authentication servers of
  the neighboring networks.  In the event of multiple networks, it may
  obtain the required parameters from more than one neighboring network



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  and keep these in a cache.  At some point, the mobile node finds
  several CTNs out of many probable networks and starts the pre-
  authentication process by communicating with the required entities in
  the CTNs.  Further details of this scenario are in Section 7.2.

7.2.  Pre-Authentication in Multiple-CTN Environment

  In some cases, although a mobile node selects a specific network to
  be the target network, it may actually end up moving into a
  neighboring network other than the target network, due to factors
  that are beyond the mobile node's control.  Thus, it may be useful to
  perform the pre-authentication with a few probable candidate target
  networks and establish time-bound transient tunnels with the
  respective access routers in those networks.  Thus, in the event of a
  mobile node moving to a candidate target network other than that
  chosen as the target network, it will not be subjected to packet loss
  due to authentication and IP address acquisition delay that could
  occur if the mobile node did not pre-authenticate with that candidate
  target network.  It may appear that by pre-authenticating with a
  number of candidate target networks and reserving the IP addresses,
  the mobile node is reserving resources that could be used otherwise.
  But since this happens for a time-limited period, it should not be a
  big problem; it depends upon the mobility pattern and duration.  The
  mobile node uses a pre-authentication procedure to obtain an IP
  address proactively and to set up the time-bound tunnels with the
  access routers of the candidate target networks.  Also, the MN may
  retain some or all of the nCoAs for future movement.

  The mobile node may choose one of these addresses as the binding
  update address and send it to the CN (Correspondent Node) or HA (Home
  Agent), and will thus receive the tunneled traffic via the target
  network while in the previous network.  But in some instances, the
  mobile node may eventually end up moving to a network that is other
  than the target network.  Thus, there will be a disruption in traffic
  as the mobile node moves to the new network, since the mobile node
  has to go through the process of assigning the new IP address and
  sending the binding update again.  There are two solutions to this
  problem.  As one solution to the problem, the mobile node can take
  advantage of the simultaneous mobility binding and send multiple
  binding updates to the Correspondent Host or HA.  Thus, the
  Correspondent Host or HA forwards the traffic to multiple IP
  addresses assigned to the virtual interfaces for a specific period of
  time.  This binding update gets refreshed at the CH after the mobile
  node moves to the new network, thus stopping the flow to the other
  candidate networks.  RFC 5648 [RFC5648] discusses different scenarios
  of mobility binding with multiple care-of-addresses.  As the second





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  solution, in case simultaneous binding is not supported in a specific
  mobility scheme, forwarding of traffic from the previous target
  network will help take care of the transient traffic until the new
  binding update is sent from the new network.

7.3.  Proactive IP Address Acquisition

  In general, a mobility management protocol works in conjunction with
  the Foreign Agent or in the co-located address mode.  The MPA
  approach can use both the co-located address mode and the Foreign
  Agent address mode.  We discuss here the address assignment component
  that is used in the co-located address mode.  There are several ways
  a mobile node can obtain an IP address and configure itself.  In some
  cases, a mobile node can configure itself statically in the absence
  of any configuration element such as a server or router in the
  network.  In a LAN environment, the mobile node can obtain an IP
  address from DHCP servers.  In the case of IPv6 networks, a mobile
  node has the option of obtaining the IP address using stateless
  autoconfiguration or DHCPv6.  In some wide-area networking
  environments, the mobile node uses PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) to
  obtain the IP address by communicating with a NAS (Network Access
  Server).

  Each of these processes takes on the order of few hundred
  milliseconds to a few seconds, depending upon the type of IP address
  acquisition process and operating system of the clients and servers.
  Since IP address acquisition is part of the handover process, it adds
  to the handover delay, and thus it is desirable to reduce this delay
  as much as possible.  There are a few optimized techniques available,
  such as DHCP Rapid Commit [RFC4039] and GPS-coordinate-based IP
  address [GPSIP], that attempt to reduce the handover delay due to IP
  address acquisition time.  However, in all these cases, the mobile
  node also obtains the IP address after it moves to the new subnet and
  incurs some delay because of the signaling handshake between the
  mobile node and the DHCP server.

  In Fast MIPv6 [RFC5568], through the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages,
  the MN also formulates a prospective new CoA (nCoA) when it is still
  present on the Previous Access Router's (pAR's) link.  Hence, the
  latency due to new prefix discovery subsequent to handover is
  eliminated.  However, in this case, both the pAR and the Next Access
  Router (nAR) need to cooperate with each other to be able to retrieve
  the prefix from the target network.

  In the following paragraph, we describe a few ways that a mobile node
  can obtain the IP address proactively from the CTN, and the
  associated tunnel setup procedure.  These can broadly be divided into
  four categories: PANA-assisted proactive IP address acquisition,



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  IKE-assisted proactive IP address acquisition, proactive IP address
  acquisition using DHCP only, and stateless autoconfiguration.  When
  DHCP is used for address configuration, a DHCP server is assumed to
  be serving one subnet.

7.3.1.  PANA-Assisted Proactive IP Address Acquisition

  In the case of PANA-assisted proactive IP address acquisition, the
  mobile node obtains an IP address proactively from a CTN.  The mobile
  node makes use of PANA [RFC5191] messages to trigger the IP address
  acquisition process via a DHCP client that is co-located with the
  PANA authentication agent in the access router in the CTN acting on
  behalf of the mobile node.  Upon receiving a PANA message from the
  mobile node, the DHCP client on the authentication agent performs
  normal DHCP message exchanges to obtain the IP address from the DHCP
  server in the CTN.  This address is piggy-backed in a PANA message
  and is delivered to the mobile node.  In the case of IPv6, a Router
  Advertisement (RA) is carried as part of the PANA message.  In the
  case of stateless autoconfiguration, the mobile node uses the
  prefix(es) obtained as part of the RA and its MAC address to
  construct the unique IPv6 address(es) as it would have done in the
  new network.  In the case of stateful address autoconfiguration, a
  procedure similar to DHCPv4 can be applied.

7.3.2.  IKEv2-Assisted Proactive IP Address Acquisition

  IKEv2-assisted proactive IP address acquisition works when an IPsec
  gateway and a DHCP relay agent [RFC3046] are resident within each
  access router in the CTN.  In this case, the IPsec gateway and DHCP
  relay agent in a CTN help the mobile node acquire the IP address from
  the DHCP server in the CTN.  The MN-AR key established during the
  pre-authentication phase is used as the IKEv2 pre-shared secret
  needed to run IKEv2 between the mobile node and the access router.
  The IP address from the CTN is obtained as part of the standard IKEv2
  procedure, using the co-located DHCP relay agent for obtaining the IP
  address from the DHCP server in the target network using standard
  DHCP.  The obtained IP address is sent back to the client in the
  IKEv2 Configuration Payload exchange.  In this case, IKEv2 is also
  used as the tunnel management protocol for a proactive handover
  tunnel (see Section 7.4).  Alternatively, a VPN gateway can dispense
  the IP address from its IP address pool.

7.3.3.  Proactive IP Address Acquisition Using DHCPv4 Only

  As another alternative, DHCP may be used for proactively obtaining an
  IP address from a CTN without relying on PANA or IKEv2-based
  approaches by allowing direct DHCP communication between the mobile
  node and the DHCP relay agent or DHCP server in the CTN.  The



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  mechanism described in this section is applicable to DHCPv4 only.
  The mobile node sends a unicast DHCP message to the DHCP relay agent
  or DHCP server in the CTN requesting an address, while using the
  address associated with the current physical interface as the source
  address of the request.

  When the message is sent to the DHCP relay agent, the DHCP relay
  agent relays the DHCP messages back and forth between the mobile node
  and the DHCP server.  In the absence of a DHCP relay agent, the
  mobile node can also directly communicate with the DHCP server in the
  target network.  The broadcast option in the client's unicast
  DISCOVER message should be set to 0 so that the relay agent or the
  DHCP server can send the reply directly back to the mobile node using
  the mobile node's source address.

  In order to prevent malicious nodes from obtaining an IP address from
  the DHCP server, DHCP authentication should be used, or the access
  router should be configured with a filter to block unicast DHCP
  messages sent to the remote DHCP server from mobile nodes that are
  not pre-authenticated.  When DHCP authentication is used, the DHCP
  authentication key may be derived from the MPA-SA established between
  the mobile node and the authentication agent in the candidate target
  network.

  The proactively obtained IP address is not assigned to the mobile
  node's physical interface until the mobile node has moved to the new
  network.  The IP address thus obtained proactively from the target
  network should not be assigned to the physical interface but rather
  to a virtual interface of the client.  Thus, such a proactively
  acquired IP address via direct DHCP communication between the mobile
  node and the DHCP relay agent or the DHCP server in the CTN may be
  carried with additional information that is used to distinguish it
  from other addresses as assigned to the physical interface.

  Upon the mobile node's entry to the new network, the mobile node can
  perform DHCP over the physical interface to the new network to get
  other configuration parameters, such as the SIP server or DNS server,
  by using DHCP INFORM.  This should not affect the ongoing
  communication between the mobile node and Correspondent Host.  Also,
  the mobile node can perform DHCP over the physical interface to the
  new network to extend the lease of the address that was proactively
  obtained before entering the new network.

  In order to maintain the DHCP binding for the mobile node and keep
  track of the dispensed IP address before and after the secure
  proactive handover, the same DHCP client identifier needs to be used





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  for the mobile node for both DHCP for proactive IP address
  acquisition and for DHCP performed after the mobile node enters the
  target network.  The DHCP client identifier may be the MAC address of
  the mobile node or some other identifier.

7.3.4.  Proactive IP Address Acquisition Using Stateless
       Autoconfiguration

  For IPv6, a network address is configured either using DHCPv6 or
  stateless autoconfiguration.  In order to obtain the new IP address
  proactively, the router advertisement of the next-hop router can be
  sent over the established tunnel, and a new IPv6 address is generated
  based on the prefix and MAC address of the mobile node.  Generating a
  CoA from the new network will avoid the time needed to obtain an IP
  address and perform Duplicate Address Detection.

  Duplicate Address Detection and address resolution are part of the IP
  address acquisition process.  As part of the proactive configuration,
  these two processes can be done ahead of time.  Details of how these
  two processes can be done proactively are described in Appendix A and
  Appendix B, respectively.

  In the case of stateless autoconfiguration, the mobile node checks to
  see the prefix of the router advertisement in the new network and
  matches it with the prefix of the newly assigned IP address.  If
  these turn out to be the same, then the mobile node does not go
  through the IP address acquisition phase again.

7.4.  Tunnel Management

  After an IP address is proactively acquired from the DHCP server in a
  CTN, or via stateless autoconfiguration in the case of IPv6, a
  proactive handover tunnel is established between the mobile node and
  the access router in the CTN.  The mobile node uses the acquired IP
  address as the tunnel's inner address.

  There are several reasons why this transient tunnel is established
  between the nAR and the mobile node in the old PoA, unlike the
  transient tunnel in FMIPv6 (Fast MIPv6) [RFC5568], where it is set up
  between the mobile node's new point of attachment and the old access
  router.

  In the case of inter-domain handoff, it is important that any
  signaling message between the nPoA and the mobile node needs to be
  secured.  This transient secured tunnel provides the desired
  functionality, including securing the proactive binding update and
  transient data between the end-points before the handover has taken
  place.  Unlike the proactive mode of FMIPv6, transient handover



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  packets are not sent to the pAR, and thus a tunnel between the mobile
  node's new point of attachment and the old access router is not
  needed.

  In the case of inter-domain handoff, the pAR and nAR could logically
  be far from each other.  Thus, the signaling and data during the
  pre-authentication period will take a longer route, and thus may be
  subjected to longer one-way delay.  Hence, MPA provides a tradeoff
  between larger packet loss or larger one-way packet delay for a
  transient period, when the mobile node is preparing for handoff.

  The proactive handover tunnel is established using a tunnel
  management protocol.  When IKEv2 is used for proactive IP address
  acquisition, IKEv2 is also used as the tunnel management protocol.
  Alternatively, when PANA is used for proactive IP address
  acquisition, PANA may be used as the secure tunnel management
  protocol.

  Once the proactive handover tunnel is established between the mobile
  node and the access router in the candidate target network, the
  access router also needs to perform proxy address resolution (Proxy
  ARP) on behalf of the mobile node so that it can capture any packets
  destined to the mobile node's new address.

  Since the mobile node needs to be able to communicate with the
  Correspondent Node while in the previous network, some or all parts
  of the binding update and data from the Correspondent Node to the
  mobile node need to be sent back to the mobile node over a proactive
  handover tunnel.  Details of these binding update procedures are
  described in Section 7.5.

  In order for the traffic to be directed to the mobile node after the
  mobile node attaches to the target network, the proactive handover
  tunnel needs to be deleted or disabled.  The tunnel management
  protocol used for establishing the tunnel is used for this purpose.
  Alternatively, when PANA is used as the authentication protocol, the
  tunnel deletion or disabling at the access router can be triggered by
  means of the PANA update mechanism as soon as the mobile node moves
  to the target network.  A link-layer trigger ensures that the mobile
  node is indeed connected to the target network and can also be used
  as the trigger to delete or disable the tunnel.  A tunnel management
  protocol also triggers the router advertisement (RA) from the next
  access router to be sent over the tunnel, as soon as the tunnel
  creation is complete.







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7.5.  Binding Update

  There are several kinds of binding update mechanisms for different
  mobility management schemes.

  In the case of Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6, the mobile node performs
  a binding update with the Home Agent only, if route optimization is
  not used.  Otherwise, the mobile node performs the binding update
  with both the Home Agent (HA) and Correspondent Node (CN).

  In the case of SIP-based terminal mobility, the mobile node sends a
  binding update using an INVITE to the Correspondent Node and a
  REGISTER message to the Registrar.  Based on the distance between the
  mobile node and the Correspondent Node, the binding update may
  contribute to the handover delay.  SIP-fast handover [SIPFAST]
  provides several ways of reducing the handover delay due to binding
  update.  In the case of secure proactive handover using SIP-based
  mobility management, we do not encounter the delay due to the binding
  update at all, as it takes place in the previous network.

  Thus, this proactive binding update scheme looks more attractive when
  the Correspondent Node is too far from the communicating mobile node.
  Similarly, in the case of Mobile IPv6, the mobile node sends the
  newly acquired CoA from the target network as the binding update to
  the HA and CN.  Also, all signaling messages between the MN and HA
  and between the MN and CN are passed through this proactive tunnel
  that is set up.  These messages include Binding Update (BU); Binding
  Acknowledgement (BA); and the associated return routability messages,
  such as Home Test Init (HoTI), Home Test (HoT), Care-of Test Init
  (CoTI), and Care-of Test (CoT).  In Mobile IPv6, since the receipt of
  an on-link router advertisement is mandatory for the mobile node to
  detect the movement and trigger the binding update, a router
  advertisement from the next access router needs to be advertised over
  the tunnel.  By proper configuration on the nAR, the router
  advertisement can be sent over the tunnel interface to trigger the
  proactive binding update.  The mobile node also needs to make the
  tunnel interface the active interface, so that it can send the
  binding update using this interface as soon as it receives the router
  advertisement.

  If the proactive handover tunnel is realized as an IPsec tunnel, it
  will also protect these signaling messages between the tunnel end-
  points and will make the return routability test secured as well.
  Any subsequent data will also be tunneled through, as long as the
  mobile node is in the previous network.  The accompanying document
  [MPA-WIRELESS] talks about the details of how binding updates and
  signaling for return routability are sent over the secured tunnel.




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7.6.  Preventing Packet Loss

  In the MPA case, packet loss due to IP address acquisition, secured
  authentication, and binding update does not occur.  However,
  transient packets during link-layer handover can be lost.  Possible
  scenarios of packet loss and its prevention are described below.

7.6.1.  Packet Loss Prevention in Single-Interface MPA

  For single-interface MPA, there may be some transient packets during
  link-layer handover that are directed to the mobile node at the old
  point of attachment before the mobile node is able to attach to the
  target network.  Those transient packets can be lost.  Buffering
  these packets at the access router of the old point of attachment can
  eliminate packet loss.  Dynamic buffering signals from the MN can
  temporarily hold transient traffic during handover, and then these
  packets can be forwarded to the MN once it attaches to the target
  network.  A detailed analysis of the buffering technique can be found
  in [PIMRC06].

  An alternative method is to use bicasting.  Bicasting helps to
  forward the traffic to two destinations at the same time.  However,
  it does not eliminate packet loss if link-layer handover is not
  seamlessly performed.  On the other hand, buffering does not reduce
  packet delay.  While packet delay can be compensated by a playout
  buffer at the receiver side for a streaming application, a playout
  buffer does not help much for interactive VoIP applications that
  cannot tolerate large delay jitters.  Thus, it is still important to
  optimize the link-layer handover anyway.

7.6.2.  Preventing Packet Losses for Multiple Interfaces

  MPA usage in multi-interface handover scenarios involves preparing
  the second interface for use via the current active interface.  This
  preparation involves pre-authentication and provisioning at a target
  network where the second interface would be the eventual active
  interface.  For example, during inter-technology handover from a WiFi
  to a CDMA network, pre-authentication at the CDMA network can be
  performed via the WiFi interface.  The actual handover occurs when
  the CDMA interface becomes the active interface for the MN.

  In such scenarios, if handover occurs while both interfaces are
  active, there is generally no packet loss, since transient packets
  directed towards the old interface will still reach the MN.  However,
  if sudden disconnection of the current active interface is used to
  initiate handover to the prepared interface, then transient packets
  for the disconnected interface will be lost while the MN attempts to
  be reachable at the prepared interface.  In such cases, a specialized



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  form of buffering can be used to eliminate packet loss where packets
  are merely copied at an access router in the current active network
  prior to disconnection.  If sudden disconnection does occur, copied
  packets can be forwarded to the MN once the prepared interface
  becomes the active reachable interface.  The copy-and-forward
  mechanism is not limited to multi-interface handover.

  A notable side-effect of this process is the possible duplication of
  packets during forwarding to the new active interface.  Several
  approaches can be employed to minimize this effect.  Relying on
  upper-layer protocols such as TCP to detect and eliminate duplicates
  is the most common approach.  Customized duplicate detection and
  handling techniques can also be used.  In general, packet duplication
  is a well-known issue that can also be handled locally by the MN.

  If the mobile node takes a longer amount of time to detect the
  disconnection event of the current active interface, this can also
  have an adverse effect on the length of the handover process.  Thus,
  it becomes necessary to use an optimized scheme of detecting
  interface disconnection in such scenarios.  Use of the current
  interface to perform pre-authentication instead of the new interface
  is desirable in certain circumstances, such as to save battery power,
  or in cases where the adjacent cells (e.g., WiFi or CDMA) are
  non-overlapping, or in cases when the carrier does not allow the
  simultaneous use of both interfaces.  However, in certain
  circumstances, depending upon the type of target network, only parts
  of MPA operations can be performed (e.g., pre-authentication,
  pre-configuration, or proactive binding update).  In a specific
  scenario involving handoff between WiFi and CDMA networks, some of
  the PPP context can be set up during the pre-authentication period,
  thus reducing the time for PPP activation.

7.6.3.  Reachability Test

  In addition to previous techniques, the MN may also want to ensure
  reachability of the new point of attachment before switching from the
  old one.  This can be done by exchanging link-layer management frames
  with the new point of attachment.  This reachability check should be
  performed as quickly as possible.  In order to prevent packet loss
  during this reachability check, transmission of packets over the link
  between the MN and the old point of attachment should be suspended by
  buffering the packets at both ends of the link during the
  reachability check.  How to perform this buffering is out of scope of
  this document.  Some of the results of using this buffering scheme
  are explained in the accompanying document [MPA-WIRELESS].






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7.7.  Security and Mobility

  This section describes how MPA can help establish layer 2 and layer 3
  security association in the target networks while the mobile node is
  in the previous network.

7.7.1.  Link-Layer Security and Mobility

  Using the MPA-SA established between the mobile node and the
  authentication agent for a CTN, during the pre-authentication phase,
  it is possible to bootstrap link-layer security in the CTN while the
  mobile node is in the current network, as described in the following
  steps.  Figure 5 shows the sequence of operation.

  (1)  The authentication agent and the mobile node derive a PMK (Pair-
       wise Master Key) [RFC5247] using the MPA-SA that is established
       as a result of successful pre-authentication.  Successful
       operation of EAP and a AAA protocol may be involved during
       pre-authentication to establish the MPA-SA.  From the PMK,
       distinct TSKs (Transient Session Keys) [RFC5247] for the mobile
       node are directly or indirectly derived for each point of
       attachment of the CTN.

  (2)  The authentication agent may install the keys derived from the
       PMK and used for secure association to points of attachment.
       The derived keys may be TSKs or intermediary keys from which
       TSKs are derived.

  (3)  After the mobile node chooses a CTN as the target network and
       switches to a point of attachment in the target network (which
       now becomes the new network for the mobile node), it executes a
       secure association protocol such as the IEEE 802.11i 4-way
       handshake [802.11], using the PMK in order to establish PTKs
       (Pair-wise Transient Keys) and group keys [RFC5247] used for
       protecting link-layer packets between the mobile node and the
       point of attachment.  No additional execution of EAP
       authentication is needed here.

  (4)  While the mobile node is roaming in the new network, the mobile
       node only needs to perform a secure association protocol with
       its point of attachment, and no additional execution of EAP
       authentication is needed either.  Integration of MPA with link-
       layer handover optimization mechanisms such as 802.11r can be
       archived this way.

  The mobile node may need to know the link-layer identities of the
  points of attachment in the CTN to derive TSKs.




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         _________________        ____________________________
        | Current Network |      |           CTN              |
        |   ____          |      |                 ____       |
        |  |    |      (1) pre-authentication     |    |      |
        |  | MN |<------------------------------->| AA |      |
        |  |____|         |      |                |____|      |
        |    .            |      |                  |         |
        |    .            |      |                  |         |
        |____.____________|      |                  |         |
             .movement           |                  |(2) Keys |
         ____.___________________|                  |         |
        |   _v__                      _____         |         |
        |  |    |(3) secure assoc.   |     |        |         |
        |  | MN |<------------------>| AP1 |<-------+         |
        |  |____|                    |_____|        |         |
        |    .                                      |         |
        |    .movement                              |         |
        |    .                                      |         |
        |    .                                      |         |
        |   _v__                      _____         |         |
        |  |    |(4) secure assoc.   |     |        |         |
        |  | MN |<------------------>| AP2 |<-------+         |
        |  |____|                    |_____|                  |
        |_____________________________________________________|

               Figure 5: Bootstrapping Link-Layer Security

7.7.2.  IP-Layer Security and Mobility

  IP-layer security is typically maintained between the mobile node and
  the first-hop router, or any other network element such as SIP proxy
  by means of IPsec.  This IPsec SA can be set up either in tunnel mode
  or in ESP mode.  However, as the mobile node moves, the IP address of
  the router and outbound proxy will change in the new network.  The
  mobile node's IP address may or may not change, depending upon the
  mobility protocol being used.  This will warrant re-establishing a
  new security association between the mobile node and the desired
  network entity.  In some cases, such as in a 3GPP/3GPP2 IMS/MMD
  environment, data traffic is not allowed to pass through unless there
  is an IPsec SA established between the mobile node and outbound
  proxy.  This will of course add unreasonable delay to the existing
  real-time communication during a mobile node's movement.  In this
  scenario, key exchange is done as part of a SIP registration that
  follows a key exchange procedure called AKA (Authentication and Key
  Agreement).






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  MPA can be used to bootstrap this security association as part of
  pre-authentication via the new outbound proxy.  Prior to the
  movement, if the mobile node can pre-register via the new outbound
  proxy in the target network and completes the pre-authentication
  procedure, then the new SA state between the mobile node and new
  outbound proxy can be established prior to the movement to the new
  network.  A similar approach can also be applied if a key exchange
  mechanism other than AKA is used or the network element with which
  the security association has to be established is different than an
  outbound proxy.

  By having the security association established ahead of time, the
  mobile node does not need to be involved in any exchange to set up
  the new security association after the movement.  Any further key
  exchange will be limited to renew the expiry time.  This will reduce
  the delay for real-time communication as well.

7.8.  Authentication in Initial Network Attachment

  When the mobile node initially attaches to a network, network access
  authentication would occur regardless of the use of MPA.  The
  protocol used for network access authentication when MPA is used for
  handover optimization can be a link-layer network access
  authentication protocol such as IEEE 802.1X, or a higher-layer
  network access authentication protocol such as PANA.

8.  Security Considerations

  This document describes a framework for a secure handover
  optimization mechanism based on performing handover-related signaling
  between a mobile node and one or more candidate target networks to
  which the mobile node may move in the future.  This framework
  involves acquisition of the resources from the CTN as well as data
  packet redirection from the CTN to the mobile node in the current
  network before the mobile node physically connects to one of those
  CTNs.

  Acquisition of the resources from the candidate target networks must
  be done with appropriate authentication and authorization procedures
  in order to prevent an unauthorized mobile node from obtaining the
  resources.  For this reason, it is important for the MPA framework to
  perform pre-authentication between the mobile node and the candidate
  target networks.  The MN-CA key and the MN-AR key generated as a
  result of successful pre-authentication can protect subsequent
  handover signaling packets and data packets exchanged between the
  mobile node and the MPA functional elements in the CTNs.





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  The MPA framework also addresses security issues when the handover is
  performed across multiple administrative domains.  With MPA, it is
  possible for handover signaling to be performed based on direct
  communication between the mobile node and routers or mobility agents
  in the candidate target networks.  This eliminates the need for a
  context transfer protocol [RFC5247] for which known limitations exist
  in terms of security and authorization.  For this reason, the MPA
  framework does not require trust relationships among administrative
  domains or access routers, which makes the framework more deployable
  in the Internet without compromising the security in mobile
  environments.

9.  Acknowledgments

  We would like to thank Farooq Anjum and Raziq Yaqub for their review
  of this document, and Subir Das for standardization support in the
  IEEE 802.21 working group.

  The authors would like to acknowledge Christian Vogt, Rajeev Koodli,
  Marco Liebsch, Juergen Schoenwaelder, and Charles Perkins for their
  thorough review of the document and useful feedback.

  Author and Editor Ashutosh Dutta would like to thank Telcordia
  Technologies, and author Victor Fajardo would like to thank Toshiba
  America Research and Telcordia Technologies, for supporting the
  development of their document while they were employed in their
  respective organizations.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

  [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
             RFC 5944, November 2010.

  [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
             Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
             (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.

  [RFC3775]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
             in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

  [RFC2205]  Braden, R., Ed., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S.
             Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
             Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.






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  [RFC5380]  Soliman, H., Castelluccia, C., El Malki, K., and L.
             Bellier, "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) Mobility
             Management", RFC 5380, October 2008.

  [RFC5568]  Koodli, R., Ed., "Mobile IPv6 Fast Handovers", RFC 5568,
             July 2009.

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
             (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.

  [RFC4881]  El Malki, K., Ed., "Low-Latency Handoffs in Mobile IPv4",
             RFC 4881, June 2007.

  [RFC4066]  Liebsch, M., Ed., Singh, A., Ed., Chaskar, H., Funato, D.,
             and E. Shim, "Candidate Access Router Discovery (CARD)",
             RFC 4066, July 2005.

  [RFC4067]  Loughney, J., Nakhjiri, M., Perkins, C., and R. Koodli,
             "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)", RFC 4067, July 2005.

  [RFC5247]  Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
             Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
             RFC 5247, August 2008.

  [RFC5191]  Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
             and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
             Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.

  [RG98]     ITU-T, "General Characteristics of International Telephone
             Connections and International Telephone Circuits: One-Way
             Transmission Time", ITU-T Recommendation G.114, 1998.

  [ITU98]    ITU-T, "The E-Model, a computational model for use in
             transmission planning", ITU-T Recommendation G.107, 1998.

  [ETSI]     ETSI, "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol
             Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON) Release 3; End-to-end
             Quality of Service in TIPHON systems; Part 1: General
             aspects of Quality of Service (QoS)", ETSI TR 101
             329-1 V3.1.2, 2002.








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10.2.  Informative References

  [RFC5201]      Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., Ed., and T.
                 Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201,
                 April 2008.

  [RFC2679]      Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
                 Delay Metric for IPPM", RFC 2679, September 1999.

  [RFC2680]      Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
                 Packet Loss Metric for IPPM", RFC 2680,
                 September 1999.

  [RFC2681]      Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A
                 Round-trip Delay Metric for IPPM", RFC 2681,
                 September 1999.

  [RFC2003]      Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003,
                 October 1996.

  [RFC2608]      Guttman, E., Perkins, C., Veizades, J., and M. Day,
                 "Service Location Protocol, Version 2", RFC 2608,
                 June 1999.

  [RFC2473]      Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
                 IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.

  [RFC3046]      Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option",
                 RFC 3046, January 2001.

  [RFC4039]      Park, S., Kim, P., and B. Volz, "Rapid Commit Option
                 for the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 4
                 (DHCPv4)", RFC 4039, March 2005.

  [RFC5172]      Varada, S., Ed., "Negotiation for IPv6 Datagram
                 Compression Using IPv6 Control Protocol", RFC 5172,
                 March 2008.

  [RFC5648]      Wakikawa, R., Ed., Devarapalli, V., Tsirtsis, G.,
                 Ernst, T., and K. Nagami, "Multiple Care-of Addresses
                 Registration", RFC 5648, October 2009.

  [RFC4429]      Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection
                 (DAD) for IPv6", RFC 4429, April 2006.







Dutta, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 36]

RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  [RFC5836]      Ohba, Y., Ed., Wu, Q., Ed., and G. Zorn, Ed.,
                 "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Early
                 Authentication Problem Statement", RFC 5836,
                 April 2010.

  [RFC5213]      Gundavelli, S., Ed., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V.,
                 Chowdhury, K., and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6",
                 RFC 5213, August 2008.

  [RFC5974]      Manner, J., Karagiannis, G., and A. McDonald, "NSIS
                 Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) for Quality-of-Service
                 Signaling", RFC 5974, October 2010.

  [RFC5169]      Clancy, T., Nakhjiri, M., Narayanan, V., and L.
                 Dondeti, "Handover Key Management and
                 Re-Authentication Problem Statement", RFC 5169,
                 March 2008.

  [SIPMM]        Schulzrinne, H. and E. Wedlund, "Application-Layer
                 Mobility Using SIP", ACM MC2R, July 2000.

  [CELLIP]       Campbell, A., Gomez, J., Kim, S., Valko, A., Wan, C.,
                 and Z. Turanyi, "Design, Implementation, and
                 Evaluation of Cellular IP", IEEE Personal
                 Communications, August 2000.

  [MOBIQUIT07]   Lopez, R., Dutta, A., Ohba, Y., Schulzrinne, H., and
                 A.  Skarmeta, "Network-layer assisted mechanism to
                 optimize authentication delay during handoff in 802.11
                 networks", IEEE Mobiquitous, June 2007.

  [MISHRA04]     Mishra, A., Shin, M., Petroni, N., Clancy, T., and W.
                 Arbaugh, "Proactive key distribution using neighbor
                 graphs", IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine,
                 February 2004.

  [SPRINGER07]   Dutta, A., Das, S., Famolari, D., Ohba, Y., Taniuchi,
                 K., Fajardo, V., Lopez, R., Kodama, T., Schulzrinne,
                 H., and A. Skarmeta, "Seamless proactive handover
                 across heterogeneous access networks", Wireless
                 Personal Communications, November 2007.

  [HAWAII]       Ramjee, R., La Porta, T., Thuel, S., Varadhan, K., and
                 S.  Wang, "HAWAII: A Domain-based Approach for
                 Supporting Mobility in Wide-area Wireless networks",
                 International Conference on Network Protocols ICNP'99.





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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  [IDMP]         Das, S., McAuley, A., Dutta, A., Misra, A.,
                 Chakraborty, K., and S. Das, "IDMP: An Intra-Domain
                 Mobility Management Protocol for Next Generation
                 Wireless Networks", IEEE Wireless Communications
                 Magazine, October 2000.

  [MOBIP-REG]    Gustafsson, E., Jonsson, A., and C. Perkins, "Mobile
                 IPv4 Regional Registration", Work in Progress,
                 June 2004.

  [YOKOTA]       Yokota, H., Idoue, A., Hasegawa, T., and T. Kato,
                 "Link Layer Assisted Mobile IP Fast Handoff Method
                 over Wireless LAN Networks", Proceedings of ACM
                 MobiCom02, 2002.

  [MACD]         Shin, S., Forte, A., Rawat, A., and H. Schulzrinne,
                 "Reducing MAC Layer Handoff Latency in IEEE 802.11
                 Wireless LANs", MobiWac Workshop, 2004.

  [SUM]          Dutta, A., Zhang, T., Madhani, S., Taniuchi, K.,
                 Fujimoto, K., Katsube, Y., Ohba, Y., and H.
                 Schulzrinne, "Secured Universal Mobility for Wireless
                 Internet", WMASH'04, October 2004.

  [SIPFAST]      Dutta, A., Madhani, S., Chen, W., Altintas, O., and H.
                 Schulzrinne, "Fast-handoff Schemes for Application
                 Layer Mobility Management", PIMRC 2004.

  [PIMRC06]      Dutta, A., Berg, E., Famolari, D., Fajardo, V., Ohba,
                 Y., Taniuchi, K., Kodama, T., and H. Schulzrinne,
                 "Dynamic Buffering Control Scheme for Mobile Handoff",
                 Proceedings of PIMRC 2006, 1-11.

  [MITH]         Gwon, Y., Fu, G., and R. Jain, "Fast Handoffs in
                 Wireless LAN Networks using Mobile initiated Tunneling
                 Handoff Protocol for IPv4 (MITHv4)", Wireless
                 Communications and Networking 2003, January 2005.

  [WENYU]        Jiang, W. and H. Schulzrinne, "Modeling of Packet Loss
                 and Delay and their Effect on Real-Time Multimedia
                 Service Quality", NOSSDAV 2000, June 2000.

  [802.21]       "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
                 Networks: Media Independent Handover Services, IEEE
                 802.21-2008", a contribution to IEEE 802.21 WG,
                 January 2009.





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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  [802.11]       "IEEE Wireless LAN Edition A compilation based on IEEE
                 Std 802.11-1999(R2003)", Institute of Electrical and
                 Electronics Engineers, September 2003.

  [GPSIP]        Dutta, A., Madhani, S., Chen, W., Altintas, O., and H.
                 Schulzrinne, "GPS-IP based fast-handoff approaches for
                 Mobiles", IEEE Sarnoff Symposium 2006.

  [MAGUIRE]      Vatn, J. and G. Maguire, "The effect of using
                 co-located care-of addresses on macro handover
                 latency", 14th Nordic Teletraffic Seminar 1998.

  [MPA-MOBIKE]   El Mghazli, Y., Bournelle, J., and J. Laganier, "MPA
                 using IKEv2 and MOBIKE", Work in Progress, June 2006.

  [MPA-WIRELESS] Dutta, A., Famolari, D., Das, S., Ohba, Y., Fajardo,
                 V., Taniuchi, K., Lopez, R., and H. Schulzrinne,
                 "Media- Independent Pre-authentication Supporting
                 Secure Interdomain Handover Optimization", IEEE
                 Wireless Communications Magazine, April 2008.































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Appendix A.  Proactive Duplicate Address Detection

  When the DHCP server dispenses an IP address, it updates its lease
  table, so that this same address is not given to another client for
  that specific period of time.  At the same time, the client also
  keeps a lease table locally so that it can renew when needed.  In
  some cases where a network consists of both DHCP and non-DHCP-enabled
  clients, there is a probability that another client in the LAN may
  have been configured with an IP address from the DHCP address pool.
  In such a scenario, the server detects a duplicate address based on
  ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) or IPv6 Neighbor Discovery before
  assigning the IP address.  This detection procedure may take from 4
  sec to 15 sec [MAGUIRE] and will thus contribute to a larger handover
  delay.  In the case of a proactive IP address acquisition process,
  this detection is performed ahead of time and thus does not affect
  the handover delay at all.  By performing the Duplicate Address
  Detection (DAD) ahead of time, we reduce the IP address acquisition
  time.

  The proactive DAD over the candidate target network should be
  performed by the nAR on behalf of the mobile node at the time of
  proactive handover tunnel establishment, since DAD over a tunnel is
  not always performed.  For example, in the case of IPv6, DAD over an
  IP-IP tunnel interface is turned off in an existing implementation.
  In the case of IPv6 over PPP [RFC5172], the IP Control Protocol
  (IPCPv6) negotiates the link-local addresses, and hence DAD over the
  tunnel is not needed.  After the mobile node has moved to the target
  network, a DAD procedure may be started because of reassignment of
  the nCoA to the physical interface to the target network.  In that
  case, the mobile node should use optimistic DAD [RFC4429] over the
  physical interface so that the nCoA that was used inside the
  proactive handover tunnel before handover can be immediately used
  over that physical interface after handover.  The schemes used for
  the proactive DAD and optimistic DAD are applicable to both stateless
  and stateful address autoconfiguration schemes used for obtaining a
  nCoA.















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Appendix B.  Address Resolution

  Address resolution involves updating the next access router's
  neighbor cache.  We briefly describe these two operations below.

  During the process of pre-configuration, the MAC address resolution
  mappings needed by the mobile node to communicate with nodes in the
  target network after attaching to the target network can also be
  known, where the communicating nodes may be the access router,
  authentication agent, configuration agent, or Correspondent Node.
  There are several possible ways of performing such proactive MAC
  address resolution.

  o  One can use an information service mechanism [802.21] to resolve
     the MAC addresses of the nodes.  This might require each node in
     the target network to be involved in the information service so
     that the server of the information service can construct the
     database for proactive MAC address resolution.

  o  One can extend the authentication protocol used for pre-
     authentication or the configuration protocol used for
     pre-configuration to support proactive MAC address resolution.
     For example, if PANA is used as the authentication protocol for
     pre-authentication, PANA messages may carry attribute-value pairs
     (AVPs) used for proactive address resolution.  In this case, the
     PANA authentication agent in the target network may perform
     address resolution on behalf of the mobile node.

  o  One can also make use of DNS to map the MAC address of the
     specific interface associated with a specific IP address of the
     network element in the target network.  One may define a new DNS
     resource record (RR) to proactively resolve the MAC addresses of
     the nodes in the target network.  But this approach may have its
     own limitations, since a MAC address is a resource that is bound
     to an IP address, and not directly to a domain name.

  When the mobile node attaches to the target network, it installs the
  proactively obtained address resolution mappings without necessarily
  performing address resolution queries for the nodes in the target
  network.

  On the other hand, the nodes that reside in the target network and
  that are communicating with the mobile node should also update their
  address resolution mappings for the mobile node as soon as the mobile
  node attaches to the target network.  The above proactive address
  resolution methods could also be used for those nodes to proactively
  resolve the MAC address of the mobile node before the mobile node
  attaches to the target network.  However, this is not useful, since



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  those nodes need to detect the attachment of the mobile node to the
  target network before adopting the proactively resolved address
  resolution mapping.  A better approach would be integration of
  attachment detection and address resolution mapping update.  This is
  based on gratuitously performing address resolution [RFC5944],
  [RFC3775] in which the mobile node sends an ARP Request or an ARP
  Reply in the case of IPv4, or a Neighbor Advertisement in the case of
  IPv6, immediately after the mobile node attaches to the new network,
  so that the nodes in the target network can quickly update the
  address resolution mapping for the mobile node.

Appendix C.  MPA Deployment Issues

  In this section, we describe some of the deployment issues related to
  MPA.

C.1.  Considerations for Failed Switching and Switch-Back

  The ping-pong effect is one of the common problems found during
  handover.  The ping-pong effect arises when a mobile node is located
  at the borderline of the cell or decision point and a handover
  procedure is frequently executed.  This results in higher call drop
  probability, lower connection quality, increased signaling traffic,
  and waste of resources.  All of these affect mobility optimization.
  Handoff algorithms are the deciding factors for performing the
  handoff between the networks.  Traditionally, these algorithms employ
  a threshold to compare the values of different metrics to decide on
  the handoff.  These metrics include signal strength, path loss,
  Carrier-to-Interference Ratio (CIR), Signal-to-Interference Ratio
  (SIR), Bit Error Rate (BER), and power budget.  In order to avoid the
  ping-pong effect, some additional parameters are employed by the
  decision algorithm, such as hysteresis margin, dwell timers, and
  averaging window.  For a vehicle moving at a high speed, other
  parameters, such as the distance between the mobile node and the
  point of attachment, velocity of the mobile node, location of the
  mobile node, traffic, and bandwidth characteristics are also taken
  into account to reduce the ping-pong effect.  More recently, there
  are other handoff algorithms available that help reduce the ping-pong
  effect in a heterogeneous network environment and that are based on
  techniques such as hypothesis testing, dynamic programming, and
  pattern recognition techniques.  While it is important to devise
  smart handoff algorithms to reduce the ping-pong effect, it is also
  important to devise methods to recover from this effect.

  In the case of the MPA framework, the ping-pong effect will result in
  the back-and-forth movement of the mobile node between the current
  network and target network, and between the candidate target
  networks.  MPA in its current form will be affected because of the



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  number of tunnels set up between the mobile node and neighboring
  access routers, the number of binding updates, and associated handoff
  latency resulting from the ping-pong situation.  The mobile node's
  handoff rate may also contribute to delay and packet loss.  We
  propose a few techniques that will help reduce the probability of the
  ping-pong effect and propose several methods for the MPA framework so
  that it can recover from the packet loss resulting from the ping-pong
  effect.

  The MPA framework can take advantage of the mobile node's geo-
  location with respect to APs in the neighboring networks using GPS.
  In order to avoid the oscillation between the networks, a location-
  aware algorithm can be derived by using a co-relation between the
  user's location and cached data from the previous handover attempts.
  In some cases, location may not be the only indicator for a handoff
  decision.  For example, in Manhattan-type grid networks, although a
  mobile node is close to an AP, it may not have enough SNR (Signal-to-
  Noise Ratio) to make a good connection.  Thus, knowledge of the
  mobility pattern, dwell time in a call, and path identification will
  help avoid the ping-pong problem to a great extent.

  In the absence of a good handoff algorithm that can avoid the ping-
  pong effect, it may be required to put in place a good recovery
  mechanism so as to mitigate the effect of ping-pong.  It may be
  necessary to keep the established context in the current network for
  a period of time, so that it can be quickly recovered when the mobile
  node comes back to the network where the context was last used.  This
  context may include security association, IP address used, and
  tunnels established.  Bicasting the data to both the previous network
  and the new network for a predefined period will also help the mobile
  node to take care of the lost packets in case the mobile node moves
  back and forth between the networks.  The mobile node can also take
  certain action, after it determines that it is in a stable state with
  respect to a ping-pong situation.

  When the MPA framework takes advantage of a combination of IKEv2 and
  MOBIKE, the ping-pong effect can be reduced further [MPA-MOBIKE].

C.2.  Authentication State Management

  In the case of pre-authentication with multiple target networks, it
  is useful to maintain the state in the authentication agent of each
  of the neighboring networks for a certain time period.  Thus, if the
  mobile node does move back and forth between neighboring networks,
  already-maintained authentication state can be helpful.  We provide
  some highlights on multiple security association state management
  below.




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  A mobile node that has pre-authenticated with an authentication agent
  in a candidate target network and has an MPA-SA may need to continue
  to keep the MPA-SA while it continues to stay in the current network
  or even after it makes a handover to a network that is different from
  the candidate target network.

  When an MN that has been authenticated and authorized by an
  authentication agent in the current network makes a handover to a
  target network, it may want to hold the SA that has been established
  between the MN and the authentication agent for a certain time period
  so that it does not have to go through the entire authentication
  signaling to create an SA from scratch, in case it returns to the
  previous network.  Such an SA being held at the authentication agent
  after the MN's handover to another network is considered as an
  MPA-SA.  In this case, the authentication agent should change the
  fully authorized state for the MN to an unauthorized state.  The
  unauthorized state can be changed to the fully authorized state only
  when the MN comes back to the network and provides proof of
  possession of a key associated with the MPA-SA.

  While an MPA-SA is being held at an authentication agent, the MN will
  need to keep updating the authentication agent when an IP address of
  the MN changes due to a handover, to re-establish the new SA.

C.3.  Pre-Allocation of QoS Resources

  In the pre-configuration phase, it is also possible to pre-allocate
  QoS resources that may be used by the mobile node not only after
  handover but also before handover.  When pre-allocated QoS resources
  are used before handover, they are used for application traffic
  carried over a proactive handover tunnel.

  It is possible that QoS resources are pre-allocated in an end-to-end
  fashion.  One method to achieve this proactive end-to-end QoS
  reservation is to execute the NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)
  [RFC5974] or the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [RFC2205] over
  a proactive handover tunnel where pre-authentication can be used for
  bootstrapping a security association for the proactive handover
  tunnel to protect the QoS signaling.  In this case, QoS resources are
  pre-allocated on the path between the Correspondent Node and a target
  access router and can be used continuously before and after handover.
  On the other hand, duplicate pre-allocation of QoS resources between
  the target access router and the mobile node is necessary when using
  pre-allocated QoS resources before handover, due to differences in







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  paths between the target access router and the mobile node before and
  after handover.  QoS resources to be used for the path between the
  target access router and the mobile node after handover may be
  pre-allocated by extending NSLP to work for off-path signaling (Note:
  this path can be viewed as off-path before handover) or by
  media-specific QoS signaling at layer 2.

C.4.  Resource Allocation Issue during Pre-Authentication

  In the case of multiple CTNs, establishing multiple tunnels with the
  neighboring target networks provides some additional benefits.  But
  it contributes to some resource utilization issues as well.  A
  pre-authentication process with multiple candidate target networks
  can happen in several ways.

  The very basic scheme involves authenticating the mobile node with
  the multiple authentication agents in the neighboring networks, but
  actual pre-configuration and binding update take place only after
  layer 2 movement to a specific network is complete.

  Similarly, in addition to pre-authentication, the mobile node can
  also complete the pre-configuration while in the previous network,
  but can postpone the binding update until after the mobile node has
  moved.  Like the previous case, in this case the mobile node also
  does not need to set up the pre-configured tunnels.  While the pre-
  authentication process and part of the pre-configuration process are
  taken care of before the mobile node has moved to the new network,
  the binding update is actually done after the mobile node has moved.

  The third type of multiple pre-authentication involves all the three
  steps while the mobile node is in the previous networks, such as
  authentication, configuration, and binding update.  But, this
  specific process utilizes the highest amount of resources.  Some of
  the resources that get used during this process are as follows:

  (1)  Additional signaling for pre-authentication in the neighboring
       networks

  (2)  Holding the IP address of the neighboring networks in the mobile
       node's cache for a certain amount of time.  Additional
       processing in the mobile node is needed for storing these IP
       addresses.  In addition, this caching of addresses also uses up
       the temporary IP addresses from the neighboring routers.

  (3)  There is an additional cost associated with setting up
       additional transient tunnels with the target routers in the
       neighboring networks and the mobile node.




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  (4)  In the case of a binding update with multiple IP addresses
       obtained from the neighboring networks, multiple transient
       streams flow between the CN and mobile node using these
       transient tunnels.

  However, there are pros and cons related to sending the binding
  update after the handover.  If the binding update is sent after the
  mobile node has moved to the new network, this will contribute to the
  delay if the CH or HA is far from the MN.  Multiple binding updates
  can be taken care of in many different ways.  We describe a few of
  these update mechanisms below.

  When only pre-authentication and pre-configuration are done ahead of
  time with multiple networks, the mobile node sends one binding update
  to the CN.  In this case, it is important to find out when to send
  the binding update after the layer 2 handoff.

  In case a binding update with multiple contact addresses is sent,
  multiple media streams stem out of the CN, using the transient
  tunnels.  But in that case, one needs to send another binding update
  after the handover, with the contact address set to the new address
  (only one address) where the mobile node has moved.  This way, the
  mobile node stops sending media to other neighboring networks where
  the mobile node did not move.

  The following is an illustration of this specific case that takes
  care of multiple binding streams, when the mobile node moves only to
  a specific network, but sends multiple binding updates in the
  previous network.  The MN sends a binding update to the CH with
  multiple contact addresses, such as c1, c2, and c3, that were
  obtained from three neighboring networks.  This allows the CN to send
  transient multiple streams to the mobile node over the pre-
  established tunnels.  After the mobile node moves to the actual
  network, it sends another binding update to the CN with the care-of
  address of the mobile node in the network where the mobile node has
  moved.  One issue with multiple streams is consumption of extra
  bandwidth for a small period of time.

  Alternatively, one can apply the buffering technique at the target
  access router or at the Home Agent.  Transient data can be forwarded
  to the mobile node after it has moved.  Forwarding of data can be
  triggered by the mobile node either as part of Mobile IP registration
  or as a separate buffering protocol.








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C.5.  Systems Evaluation and Performance Results

  In this section, we present some of the results from MPA
  implementation when applied to different handover scenarios.  We
  present the summary of results from our experiments using MPA
  techniques for two types of handovers: i) intra-technology and
  intra-domain, and ii) inter-technology and inter-domain.  We also
  present the results of how the MPA can bootstrap layer 2 security for
  both roaming and non-roaming cases.  Detailed procedures and results
  are explained in [MOBIQUIT07] and [SPRINGER07].

C.5.1.  Intra-Technology, Intra-Domain

  The results for MIPv6 and SIP mobility involving intra-domain
  mobility are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.

                        Buffering    Buffering   Buffering   Buffering
                        (disabled)   (enabled)   (disabled)  (enabled)
                         & RO         & RO        & RO        & RO
                        (disabled)   (disabled)  (enabled)   (enabled)
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   L2 handoff (ms)         4.00        4.33        4.00        4.00

   L3 handoff (ms)         1.00        1.00        1.00        1.00

   Avg. packet loss        1.33           0        0.66           0

   Avg. inter-packet      16.00       16.00       16.00       16.00
   arrival interval
       (ms)

   Avg. inter-packet       n/a        45.33        n/a        66.60
   arrival time during
     handover
       (ms)

   Avg. packet jitter      n/a        29.33        n/a        50.60
       (ms)

   Buffering Period        n/a        50.00        n/a        50.00
       (ms)

   Buffered Packets        n/a         2.00        n/a         3.00


  RO = Router Optimization

                 Figure 6: Mobile IPv6 with MPA Results



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                                     Buffering      Buffering
                                     disabled       enabled
              -----------------------------------------------
              L2 handoff (ms)           4.00          5.00

              L3 handoff (ms)           1.00          1.00

              Avg. packet loss          1.50             0

              Avg. inter-packet        16.00         16.00
              arrival interval
                  (ms)

              Avg. inter-packet         n/a          29.00
              arrival time during
                handover
                  (ms)

              Avg. packet jitter        n/a          13.00
                  (ms)

              Buffering Period          n/a          20.00
                  (ms)

              Buffered Packets          n/a           3.00

                 Figure 7: SIP Mobility with MPA Results

  For all measurements, we did not experience any performance
  degradation during handover in terms of the audio quality of the
  voice traffic.

  With the use of buffering during handover, packet loss during the
  actual L2 and L3 handover is eliminated with appropriate and
  reasonable settings of the buffering period for both MIP6 and SIP
  mobility.  In the case of MIP6, there is not a significant difference
  in results with and without route optimization.  It should be noted
  that results with more samples would be necessary for a more detailed
  analysis.

  In the case of non-MPA-assisted handover, handover delay and
  associated packet loss occur from the moment the link-layer handover
  procedure begins, up to successful processing of the binding update.
  During this process, IP address acquisitions via DHCP incur the
  longest delay.  This is due to the detection of duplicate IP
  addresses in the network before the DHCP request completes.  The
  binding update exchange also experiences a long delay if the CN is
  too far from the MN.  As a result, the non-MPA-assisted handover took



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  an average of 4 seconds to complete, with an approximate packet loss
  of about 200 packets.  The measurement is based on the same traffic
  rate and traffic source as the MPA-assisted handover.

C.5.2.  Inter-Technology, Inter-Domain

  Handoff involving heterogeneous access can take place in many
  different ways.  We limit the experiment to two interfaces, and
  therefore results in several possible setup scenarios, depending upon
  the activity of the second interface.  In one scenario, the second
  interface comes up when the link to the first interface goes down.
  This is a reactive scenario and usually gives rise to undesirable
  packet loss and handoff delay.  In a second scenario, the second
  interface is being prepared while the mobile node still communicates
  using the old interface.  Preparation of the second interface should
  include setup of all the required state and security associations
  (e.g., PPP state, the Link Control Protocol (LCP), the Challenge
  Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)).  If such a lengthy process
  is established ahead of time, it reduces the time taken for the
  secondary interface to be attached to the network.  After
  preparation, the mobile node decides to use the second interface as
  the active interface.  This results in less packet loss, as it uses
  make-before-break techniques.  This is a proactive scenario and can
  have two "flavors".  The first is where both interfaces are up; the
  second is when only the old interface is up and the prepared
  interface is brought up only when handoff is about to occur.  This
  scenario may be beneficial from a battery management standpoint.
  Devices that operate two interfaces simultaneously can rapidly
  deplete their batteries.  However, by activating the second interface
  only after an appropriate network has been selected, the client may
  utilize battery power effectively.

  As compared to non-optimized handover that may result in a delay of
  up to 18 sec and loss of 1000 or more packets during the handover
  from the wireless LAN (WLAN) to CDMA, we observed 0 packet loss and a
  50-ms handoff delay between the last pre-handoff packet and the first
  in-handoff packet.  This handoff delay includes the time due to link
  down detection and time needed to delete the tunnel after the mobile
  node has moved.  However, we observed about 10 duplicate packets
  because of the copy-and-forward mechanism at the access routers.  But
  these duplicate packets are usually handled easily by the upper-layer
  protocols.

C.5.3.  MPA-Assisted Layer 2 Pre-Authentication

  In this section, we discuss the results obtained from MPA-assisted
  layer 2 pre-authentication and compare these with EAP authentication
  and IEEE 802.11i's pre-authentication techniques.  Figure 8 shows the



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  experimental testbed where we have conducted the MPA-assisted
  pre-authentication experiment for bootstrapping layer 2 security as
  explained in Section 7.  By pre-authenticating and pre-configuring
  the link, the security association procedure during handoff reduces
  to a 4-way handshake only.  Then the MN moves to the AP and, after
  association, runs a 4-way handshake by using the PSKap (Pre-shared
  Key at AP) generated during PANA pre-authentication.  At this point,
  the handoff is complete.  Details of this experimental testbed can be
  found in [MOBIQUIT07].

  +----------------------------+-----------+ +-------------+----------+
  |                                        | |                        |
  |  Home Domain       +-------++          | |                        |
  |                    |        |          | |                        |
  |                    |AAAHome |          | |                        |
  |                    +        |          | |                        |
  |                    +-----+--+          | |                        |
  |                          |             | |  Network B             |
  |   Network A              |             | |                        |
  |                        /----\          | |            /---\       |
  |                       /nAR   \         | |           /     \      |
  |                      | PAA    |--------+-+----------+ pAR   |     |
  |                       \      /         | |           \     /      |
  |                        \----/          | |            \-+-/       |
  |                           |            | |              |         |
  |             +-------------------|      | |              |         |
  |             |       IEEE 802.11i|      | |              |         |
  |           +------+          +------+   | |          +---+--+      |
  |           |      |          |      |   | |          |      |      |
  |           |AP2   |          |AP1   |   | |          |AP0   |      |
  |           +------+          +------+   | |          +------+      |
  |           +------+            +-----+  | |           +-----+      |
  |           |      |            |     |  | |           |     |      |
  |           |MN    +----------->|MN   |<+------------- |MN   |      |
  |           +------+            +-----+  | |           ++----+      |
  |----------------------------------------+ +------------+-----------+

             Figure 8: Experimental Testbed for MPA-Assisted
                   L2 Pre-Authentication (Non-Roaming)












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                       +-----------------------------+
                       |      +--------+             |
                       |      |        |             |
                       |      | AAAH   +             |
                       |      |        |             |
                       |      ++-------+             |
                       |       |                     |
                       |       |  Home AAA Domain    |
                       |       |                     |
                       +-------+---------------------+
                               |
                               |
                               |
                      RADIUS/  |
                      Diameter |
                               |
                               |
  +----------------------------+-----------+ +-------------+----------+
  |                            |           | |                        |
  | Roaming            +-------++          | |                        |
  | AAA Domain A       |        |          | |                        |
  |                    | AAAV   |          | |                        |
  |                    +        |          | |                        |
  | Network A          +-----+--+          | |  Network B             |
  |                          |             | |                        |
  |                          |             | |                        |
  |                        /----\          | |            /---\       |
  |                       /nAR   \         | |           /     \      |
  |                      | PAA    |--------+-+----------+ pAR   |     |
  |                       \      /         | |           \     /      |
  |                        \----/          | |            \-+-/       |
  |                           |            | |              |         |
  |             +-------------------|      | |              |         |
  |             |       IEEE 802.11i|      | |              |         |
  |           +------+          +------+   | |          +---+--+      |
  |           |      |          |      |   | |          |      |      |
  |           |AP2   |          |AP1   |   | |          |AP0   |      |
  |           +------+          +------+   | |          +------+      |
  |           +------+            +-----+  | |           +-----+      |
  |           |      |            |     |  | |           |     |      |
  |           |MN    +----------->|MN   |<---------------| MN  |      |
  |           +------+            +-----+  | |           ++----+      |
  -----------------------------------------+ +------------+-----------+

             Figure 9: Experimental Testbed for MPA-Assisted
                     L2 Pre-Authentication (Roaming)





Dutta, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 51]

RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  We have experimented with three types of movement scenarios involving
  both non-roaming and roaming cases, using the testbeds shown in
  Figures 8 and 9, respectively.  In the roaming case, the MN is
  visiting in a domain different than its home domain.  Consequently,
  the MN needs to contact the AAA server in the home domain (AAAH) from
  its new domain.  For the non-roaming case, we assume the MN is moving
  within its home domain, and only the local AAA server (AAAHome),
  which is the home AAA server for the mobile node, is contacted.

  The first scenario does not involve any pre-authentication.  The MN
  is initially connected to AP0 and moves to AP1.  Because neither
  network-layer authentication nor IEEE 802.11i pre-authentication is
  used, the MN needs to engage in a full EAP authentication with AP1 to
  gain access to the network after the move (post-authentication).
  This experiment shows the effect of the absence of any kind of
  pre-authentication.

  The second scenario involves 802.11i pre-authentication and involves
  movement between AP1 and AP2.  In this scenario, the MN is initially
  connected to AP2, and starts IEEE 802.11i pre-authentication with
  AP1.  This is an ideal scenario to compare the values obtained from
  802.11i pre-authentication with that of network-layer assisted
  pre-authentication.  Both scenarios use RADIUS as the AAA protocol
  (APs implement a RADIUS client).  The third scenario takes advantage
  of network-layer assisted link-layer pre-authentication.  It involves
  movement between two APs (e.g., between AP0 and AP1) that belong to
  two different subnets where 802.11i pre-authentication is not
  possible.  Here, Diameter is used as the AAA protocol (PAA implements
  a Diameter client).

  In the third movement scenario, the MN is initially connected to AP0.
  The MN starts PANA pre-authentication with the PAA, which is
  co-located on the AR in the new candidate target network (nAR in
  network A) from the current associated network (network B).  After
  authentication, the PAA proactively installs two keys, PSKap1 and
  PSKap2, in AP1 and AP2, respectively.  By doing the key installations
  proactively, the PAA preempts the process of communicating with the
  AAA server for the keys after the mobile node moves to the new
  network.  Finally, because PSKap1 is already installed, AP1
  immediately starts the 4-way handshake.  We have used measurement
  tools such as ethereal and kismet to analyze the measurements for the
  4-way handshake and PANA authentication.  These measurements reflect
  different operations involved during network-layer pre-
  authentication.

  In our experiment, as part of the discovery phase, we assume that the
  MN is able to retrieve the PAA's IP address and all required
  information about AP1 and AP2 (e.g., channel, security-related



Dutta, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 52]

RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


  parameters, etc.) at some point before the handover.  This avoids the
  scanning during link-layer handoff.  We have applied this assumption
  to all three scenarios.  Because our focus is on reducing the time
  spent on the authentication phase during handoff, we do not discuss
  the details of how we avoid the scanning.

  =====================================================================
  Types    |802.11i            | 802.11i           | MPA-assisted
           |Post-              | Pre-              | Layer 2
           |authentication     | authentication    | Pre-authentication
  =====================================================================
  Operation| Non-    | Roaming | Non-    | Roaming |Non-   | Roaming|
           | Roaming |         | Roaming |         |Roaming|        |
  ===================================================================
  Tauth    | 61 ms   |  599 ms | 99 ms   | 638 ms  | 177 ms| 831 ms |
  -------------------------------------------------------------------
  Tconf    | --      |  --     | --      | --      | 16 ms | 17ms   |
  -------------------------------------------------------------------
  Tassoc+  |         |         |         |         |       |        |
  4way     | 18 ms   |  17 ms  | 16 ms   | 17 ms   | 16 ms | 17 ms  |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------|
  Total    | 79 ms   |  616 ms | 115 ms  | 655 ms  | 208 ms| 865 ms |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------|
  Time     |         |         |         |         |       |        |
  affecting| 79 ms   |  616 ms | 16 ms   | 17 ms   | 15 ms | 17 ms  |
  handover |         |         |         |         |       |        |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------|

               Figure 10: Results of MPA-Assisted Layer 2
                      Pre- and Post-Authentication

  Figure 10 shows the timing (rounded off to the most significant
  number) associated with some of the handoff operations we have
  measured in the testbed.  We describe each of the timing parameters
  below.

  "Tauth" refers to the execution of EAP-Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  authentication.  This time does not distinguish whether this
  authentication was performed during pre-authentication or a typical
  post-authentication.

  "Tconf" refers to the time spent during PSK generation and
  installation after EAP authentication is complete.  When network-
  layer pre-authentication is not used, this time is not considered.

  "Tassoc+4way" refers to the time dedicated to the completion of the
  association and the 4-way handshake with the target AP after the
  handoff.



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  The first two columns in the figure show the results for non-roaming
  and roaming cases, respectively, when no pre-authentication is used
  at all.  The second two columns depict the same cases when IEEE
  802.11i pre-authentication is used.  The last two columns show when
  we used network-layer-assisted layer 2 pre-authentication.  When pre-
  authentication is used, only the factor Tassoc+4way affects the
  handoff time.  When no pre-authentication is used, the time affecting
  the handoff includes Tauth (the complete EAP-TLS authentication) plus
  Tassoc+4way.

  That is precisely the time affecting the handoff in the case where
  the MN moves from AP0 to AP1 in the absence of pre-authentication.
  As it is seen, these delays are not suitable for real-time
  applications.  Indeed, for the non-roaming case, we obtained a ~80-ms
  delay for re-establishing the connection with target AP1.  It takes
  about 600 ms to complete the handoff when the MN moves to a visited
  domain and the home AAA server is located far away.  However,
  network-layer pre-authentication is only affected by Tassoc+4way
  (~17 ms) involving any kind of handoff authentication.  As is
  evident, IEEE 802.11i pre-authentication provides a comparable
  benefit (~16 ms) in terms of handoff but is limited to cases when APs
  are in the same Distribution System (DS).  Additionally, network-
  layer pre-authentication leverages a single EAP authentication to
  bootstrap security in several target APs by allowing the MN to move
  among APs under the same PAA without running EAP and consequently
  without contacting the AAA server.  In this sense, it extends IEEE
  802.11r advantages over IEEE 802.11i by allowing inter-subnet and
  inter-domain and even inter-technology handoffs.

C.6.  Guidelines for Handover Preparation

  In this section, we provide some guidelines for the roaming clients
  that use pre-authentication mechanisms to reduce the handoff delay.
  These guidelines can help determine the extent of the
  pre-authentication operation that is needed based on a specific type
  of movement of the client.  IEEE 802.11i and 802.11r take advantage
  of the pre-authentication mechanism at layer 2.  Thus, many of the
  guidelines observed for 802.11i-based pre-authentication and 802.11r-
  based fast roaming could also be applicable to the clients that use
  MPA-based pre-authentication techniques.  However, since MPA
  operations are not limited to a specific subnet and involve inter-
  subnet and inter-domain handover, the guidelines need to take into
  account other factors, such as movement pattern of the mobile node,
  cell size, etc.







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  The time needed to complete the pre-authentication mechanism is an
  important parameter, since the mobile node needs to determine how
  much ahead of time the mobile node needs to start the
  pre-authentication process so that it can finish the desired
  operations before the handover to the target network starts.  The
  pre-authentication time will vary, depending upon the speed of the
  mobile node (e.g., pedestrian vs. vehicular) and cell sizes (e.g.,
  WiFi, Cellular).  Cell residence time is defined as the average time
  the mobile node stays in the cell before the next handoff takes
  place.  Cell residence time is dependent upon the coverage area and
  velocity of the mobile node.  Thus, cell residence time is an
  important factor in determining the desirable pre-authentication time
  that a mobile node should consider.

  Since the pre-authentication operation involves six steps as
  described in Section 6.3 and each step takes some discrete amount of
  time, only part of these sub-operations may be completed before
  handoff, depending upon the available delay budget.

  For example, a mobile node could complete only network discovery and
  the network-layer authentication process before the handoff and
  postpone the rest of the operations until after the handover is
  complete.  On the other hand, if it is a slow-moving vehicle and the
  adjacent cells are sparsely spaced, a mobile node could complete all
  the desired MPA-related operations.  Finishing all the MPA-related
  operations ahead of time reduces the handoff delay but adds other
  constraints, such as cell residence time.

  We give a numerical example here, similar to [MISHRA04].

     D = Coverage diameter

     v = Mobile node's velocity

     RTT = round trip time from AP to AAA server, including processing
     time for authentication (Tauth)

     Tpsk = Time spent to install keys proactively on the target APs

  If for a given value of D = 100 ft, Tpsk = 10 ms, and RTT = 100 ms, a
  mobile node needs to execute only the pre-authentication procedure
  associated with MPA, then the following can be calculated for a
  successful MPA procedure before the handoff is complete.

     2RTT + Tpsk < D/v

     v = 100 ft/(200 ms + 10 ms) = ~500 ft/sec




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  Similarly, for a similar cell size, if the mobile node is involved in
  both pre-authentication and pre-configuration operations as part of
  the MPA procedure, and it takes an amount of time Tconf = 190 ms to
  complete the layer 3 configuration including IP address
  configuration, then for a successful MPA operation,

     2RTT + Tpsk + Tconf < D/v

     v = 100 ft/(200 ms + 10 ms + 190 ms) = ~250 ft/sec

  Thus, compared to only the pre-authentication part of the MPA
  operation, in order to be able to complete both pre-authentication
  and pre-configuration operations successfully, either the mobile node
  needs to move at a slower pace or it needs to expedite these
  operations for this given cell size.  Thus, types of MPA operations
  will be constrained by the velocity of the mobile node.

  As an alternative, if a mobile node does complete all of the
  pre-authentication procedure well ahead of time, it uses up the
  resources accordingly by way of an extra IP address, tunnel, and
  extra bandwidth.  Thus, there is always a tradeoff between the
  performance benefit obtained from the pre-authentication mechanism
  and network characteristics, such as movement speed, cell size, and
  resources utilized.



























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RFC 6252                      MPA Framework                    June 2011


Authors' Addresses

  Ashutosh Dutta (editor)
  NIKSUN
  100 Nassau Park Blvd.
  Princeton, NJ  08540
  USA

  EMail: [email protected]


  Victor Fajardo
  NIKSUN
  100 Nassau Park Blvd.
  Princeton, NJ  08540
  USA

  EMail: [email protected]


  Yoshihiro Ohba
  Corporate R&D Center, Toshiba Corporation
  1 Komukai-Toshiba-cho, Saiwai-ku
  Kawasaki, Kanagawa  212-0001
  Japan

  EMail: [email protected]


  Kenichi Taniuchi
  Toshiba Corporation
  2-9 Suehiro-cho
  Ome, Tokyo  198-8710
  Japan

  EMail: [email protected]


  Henning Schulzrinne
  Columbia University
  Department of Computer Science
  450 Computer Science Building
  New York, NY  10027
  USA

  Phone: +1 212 939 7004
  EMail: [email protected]




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