Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         S. Turner
Request for Comments: 5959                                          IECA
Category: Standards Track                                    August 2010
ISSN: 2070-1721


          Algorithms for Asymmetric Key Package Content Type

Abstract

  This document describes the conventions for using several
  cryptographic algorithms with the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure,
  as defined in RFC 5958.  It also includes conventions necessary to
  protect the AsymmetricKeyPackage content type with SignedData,
  EnvelopedData, EncryptedData, AuthenticatedData, and
  AuthEnvelopedData.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5959.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.






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1.  Introduction

  This document describes the conventions for using several
  cryptographic algorithms with the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure
  [RFC5958].  The EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo is used by [P12] to encrypt
  PrivateKeyInfo [RFC5958].  It is similar to EncryptedData [RFC5652]
  in that it has no recipients, no originators, and no content
  encryption keys and requires keys to be managed by other means.

  This document also includes conventions necessary to protect the
  AsymmetricKeyPackage content type [RFC5958] with Cryptographic
  Message Syntax (CMS) protecting content types: SignedData [RFC5652],
  EnvelopedData [RFC5652], EncryptedData [RFC5652], AuthenticatedData
  [RFC5652], and AuthEnvelopedData [RFC5083].  Implementations of
  AsymmetricKeyPackage do not require support for any CMS protecting
  content type; however, if the AsymmetricKeyPackage is CMS protected
  it is RECOMMENDED that conventions defined herein be followed.

  This document does not define any new algorithms instead it refers to
  previously defined algorithms.

1.1.  Terminology

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo

  The de facto standard used to encrypt the PrivateKeyInfo structure,
  which is subsequently placed in the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
  encryptedData field, is Password Based Encryption (PBE) based on PKCS
  #5 [RFC2898] and PKCS #12 [P12].  The major difference between PKCS
  #5 and PKCS #12 is the supported encoding for the password: ASCII for
  PKCS #5 and Unicode for PKCS #12, encoded as specified in Section B.1
  of [P12].  [RFC2898] specifies two PBE Schemes (PBES) 1 and 2;
  [RFC2898] recommends PBES2 for new specification.  PBES2 with a key
  derivation algorithm of PBKDF2 using HMAC with SHA-256 [RFC5754] and
  an encryption algorithm of AES Key Wrap with Padding as defined in
  [RFC5649] MUST be supported.  AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649]
  MAY also be supported as an encryption algorithm.

3.  AsymmetricKeyPackage

  As noted in Asymmetric Key Packages [RFC5958], CMS can be used to
  protect the AsymmetricKeyPackage.  The following provides guidance
  for SignedData [RFC5652], EnvelopedData [RFC5652], EncryptedData




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  [RFC5652], AuthenticatedData [RFC5652], and AuthEnvelopedData
  [RFC5083].

3.1.  SignedData

  If an implementation supports SignedData, then it MUST support the
  signature scheme RSA [RFC3370] [RFC5754] and SHOULD support the
  signature schemes RSASSA-PSS [RFC4056] and DSA [RFC3370] [RFC5754].
  Additionally, implementations MUST support in concert with these
  signature schemes the hash function SHA-256 [RFC5754] and SHOULD
  support the hash function SHA-1 [RFC3370].

3.2.  EnvelopedData

  If an implementation supports EnvelopedData, then it MUST implement
  key transport and it MAY implement key agreement.

  When key transport is used, RSA encryption [RFC3370] MUST be
  supported and RSAES-OAEP (RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric
  Encryption Padding) [RFC3560] SHOULD be supported.

  When key agreement is used, Diffie-Hellman (DH) ephemeral-static
  [RFC3370] MUST be supported.

  Since the content type is used to carry a cryptographic key and its
  attributes, an algorithm that is traditionally used to encrypt one
  key with another is employed.  Regardless of the key management
  technique choice, implementations MUST support AES-128 Key Wrap with
  Padding [RFC5649] as the content encryption algorithm.
  Implementations SHOULD support AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding
  [RFC5649] as the content encryption algorithm.

  When key agreement is used, a key wrap algorithm is also specified to
  wrap the content encryption key.  If the content encryption algorithm
  is AES-128 Key Wrap with Padding, then the key wrap algorithm MUST be
  AES-128 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649].  If the content encryption
  algorithm is AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding, then the key wrap
  algorithm MUST be AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649].

3.3.  EncryptedData

  If an implementation supports EncryptedData, then it MUST implement
  AES-128 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649] and SHOULD implement AES-256
  Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649].







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  NOTE: EncryptedData requires that keys be managed by other means;
  therefore, the only algorithm specified is the content encryption
  algorithm.  Since the content type is used to carry a cryptographic
  key and its attributes, an algorithm that is traditionally used to
  encrypt one key with another is employed.

3.4.  AuthenticatedData

  If an implementation supports AuthenticatedData, then it MUST
  implement SHA-256 [RFC5754] and SHOULD support SHA-1 [RFC3370] as the
  message digest algorithm.  Additionally, HMAC with SHA-256 [RFC4231]
  MUST be supported and HMAC with SHA-1 [RFC3370] SHOULD be supported.

3.5.  AuthEnvelopedData

  If an implementation supports AuthEnvelopedData, then it MUST
  implement the EnvelopedData recommendations except for the content
  encryption algorithm, which in this case MUST be AES-GCM [RFC5084];
  the 128-bit version MUST be implemented and the 256-bit version
  SHOULD be implemented.  Implementations MAY also support for AES-CCM
  [RFC5084].

4.  Public Key Sizes

  The easiest way to implement the SignedData, EnvelopedData, and
  AuthEnvelopedData is with public key certificates [RFC5280].  If an
  implementation support RSA, RSASSA-PSS, DSS, RSAES-OAEP, or DH, then
  it MUST support key lengths from 1024-bit to 2048-bit, inclusive.

5.  SMIMECapabilities Attribute

  [RFC5751] defines the SMIMECapabilities attribute as a mechanism for
  recipients to indicate their supported capabilities including the
  algorithms they support.  The following are values for the
  SMIMECapabilities attribute for AES Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649]
  when used as a content encryption algorithm:

  AES-128 KW with Padding: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 08
  AES-192 KW with Padding: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 1C
  AES-256 KW with Padding: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 30

6.  Security Considerations

  The security considerations from [RFC3370], [RFC3560], [RFC4056],
  [RFC4231], [RFC5083], [RFC5084], [RFC5649], [RFC5652], [RFC5754], and
  [RFC5958] apply.





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  The strength of any encryption scheme is only as good as its weakest
  link, which in the case of a PBES is the password.  Passwords need to
  provide sufficient entropy to ensure they cannot be easily guessed.
  The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
  Electronic Authentication Guidance [SP800-63] provides some
  information on password entropy.  [SP800-63] indicates that a user-
  chosen 20-character password from a 94-character keyboard with no
  checks provides 36 bits of entropy.  If the 20-character password is
  randomly chosen, then the amount of entropy is increased to roughly
  131 bits of entropy.  The amount of entropy in the password does not
  correlate directly to bits of security but in general the more than
  the better.

  The choice of content encryption algorithms for this document was
  based on [RFC5649]: "In the design of some high assurance
  cryptographic modules, it is desirable to segregate cryptographic
  keying material from other data.  The use of a specific cryptographic
  mechanism solely for the protection of cryptographic keying material
  can assist in this goal".  Unfortunately, there is no AES-GCM or AES-
  CCM mode that provides the same properties.  If an AES-GCM and AES-
  CCM mode that provides the same properties is defined, then this
  document will be updated to adopt that algorithm.

  [SP800-57] provides comparable bits of security for some algorithms
  and key sizes.  [SP800-57] also provides time frames during which
  certain numbers of bits of security are appropriate and some
  environments may find these time frames useful.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

  [P12]       RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #12 v1.0: Personal Information
              Exchange Syntax", June 1999.

  [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC2898]   Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
              Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.

  [RFC3370]   Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.

  [RFC3560]   Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
              Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
              3560, July 2003.




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  [RFC4056]   Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056, June 2005.

  [RFC4231]   Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
              SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
              RFC 4231, December 2005.

  [RFC5083]   Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
              November 2007.

  [RFC5084]   Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
              Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 5084, November 2007.

  [RFC5280]   Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
              List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

  [RFC5649]   Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649,
              September 2009.

  [RFC5652]   Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD
              70, RFC 5652, September 2009.

  [RFC5751]   Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

  [RFC5754]   Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
              Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.

  [RFC5958]   Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August
              2010.

7.2.  Informative References

  [SP800-57]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
              Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.

  [SP800-63]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              Special Publication 800-63: Electronic Authentication
              Guidance, April 2006.





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Author's Address

  Sean Turner
  IECA, Inc.
  3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
  Fairfax, VA 22031
  USA

  EMail: [email protected]










































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