Network Working Group                                       S. Santesson
Request for Comments: 4325                                     Microsoft
Updates: 3280                                                 R. Housley
Category: Standards Track                                 Vigil Security
                                                          December 2005


    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Authority Information
          Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extension

Status of This Memo

  This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
  Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
  improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
  Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
  and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

  This document updates RFC 3280 by defining the Authority Information
  Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) extension.  RFC 3280 defines
  the Authority Information Access certificate extension using the same
  syntax.  The CRL extension provides a means of discovering and
  retrieving CRL issuer certificates.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction ....................................................2
     1.1. Terminology ................................................3
  2. Authority Information Access CRL Extension ......................3
  3. Security Considerations .........................................5
  4. References ......................................................5
     4.1. Normative References .......................................5
     4.2. Informative References .....................................6












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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


1.  Introduction

  RFC 3280 [PKIX1] specifies the validation of certification paths.
  One aspect involves the determination that a certificate has not been
  revoked, and one revocation checking mechanism is the Certificate
  Revocation List (CRL).  CRL validation is also specified in RFC 3280,
  which involves the constructions of a valid certification path for
  the CRL issuer.  Building a CRL issuer certification path from the
  signer of the CRL to a trust anchor is straightforward when the
  certificate of the CRL issuer is present in the certification path
  associated with the target certificate, but it can be complex in
  other situations.

  There are several legitimate scenarios where the certificate of the
  CRL issuer is not present, or easily discovered, from the target
  certification path.  This can be the case when indirect CRLs are
  used, when the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the target
  certificate changes its certificate signing key, or when the CA
  employs separate keys for certificate signing and CRL signing.

  Methods of finding the certificate of the CRL issuer are currently
  available, such as through an accessible directory location or
  through use of the Subject Information Access extension in
  intermediary CA certificates.

  Directory lookup requires existence and access to a directory that
  has been populated with all of the necessary certificates.  The
  Subject Information Access extension, which supports building the CRL
  issuer certification path top-down (in the direction from the trust
  anchor to the CRL issuer), requires that some certificates in the CRL
  issuer certification path includes an appropriate Subject Information
  Access extension.

  RFC 3280 [PKIX1] provides for bottom-up discovery of certification
  paths through the Authority Information Access extension, where the
  id-ad-caIssuers access method may specify one or more accessLocation
  fields that reference CA certificates associated with the certificate
  containing this extension.

  This document enables the use of the Authority Information Access
  extension in CRLs, enabling a CRL checking application to use the
  access method (id-ad-caIssuers) to locate certificates that may be
  useful in the construction of a valid CRL issuer certification path
  to an appropriate trust anchor.







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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


1.1.  Terminology

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Authority Information Access CRL Extension

  This section defines the use of the Authority Information Access
  extension in a CRL.  The syntax and semantics defined in RFC 3280
  [PKIX1] for the certificate extensions are also used for the CRL
  extension.

  This CRL extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

  This extension MUST be identified by the extension object identifier
  (OID) defined in RFC 3280 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1), and the
  AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax MUST be used to form the extension value.
  For convenience, the ASN.1 [X.680] definition of the Authority
  Information Access extension is repeated below.

     id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-pe 1 }

     AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              AccessDescription

     AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE {
        accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        accessLocation        GeneralName  }

     id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-pkix 48 }

     id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-ad 2 }

  When present in a CRL, this extension MUST include at least one
  AccessDescription specifying id-ad-caIssuers as the accessMethod.
  Access method types other than id-ad-caIssuers MUST NOT be included.
  At least one instance of AccessDescription SHOULD specify an
  accessLocation that is an HTTP [HTTP/1.1] or Lightweight Directory
  Access Protocol [LDAP] Uniform Resource Identifier [URI].

  Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation
  MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to a
  certificate containing file.  The certificate file MUST contain
  either a single Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690] encoded
  certificate (indicated by the .cer file extension) or a collection of
  certificates (indicated by the .p7c file extension):




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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


     .cer   A single DER encoded certificate as specified in
            RFC 2585 [PKIX-CERT].

     .p7c   A "certs-only" CMS message as specified in RFC 2797 [CMC].

    Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing
    certificates MUST be able to accept .cer files and SHOULD be able
    to accept .p7c files.

    HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD use the
    appropriate MIME content-type for the certificate containing file.
    Specifically, the HTTP server SHOULD use the content-type
    application/pkix-cert [PKIX-CERT] for a single DER encoded
    certificate and application/pkcs7-mime [CMC] for CMS certs-only
    (PKCS#7).  Consuming clients may use the MIME type and file
    extension as a hint to the file content, but should not depend
    solely on the presence of the correct MIME type or file extension
    in the server response.

    When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to
    be obtained by the application from whatever directory server is
    locally configured.  When one CA public key is used to validate
    signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired CA certificate is
    stored in the crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes
    as specified in [RFC2587].  When different public keys are used to
    validate signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired
    certificate is stored in the userCertificate attribute as specified
    in [RFC2587].  Thus, implementations that support the directoryName
    form of accessLocation MUST be prepared to find the needed
    certificate in any of these three attributes.  The protocol that an
    application uses to access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a
    local matter.

    Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation
    SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier.  The URI MUST specify a
    distingishedName and attribute(s) and MAY specify a host name
    (e.g., ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?
    cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary).  Omitting the
    host name (e.g.,
    ldap:///cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary) has
    the effect of specifying the use of whatever LDAP server is locally
    configured.  The URI MUST list appropriate attribute descriptions
    for one or more attributes holding certificates or cross-
    certificate pairs.







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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


3.  Security Considerations

    Implementers should take into account the possible existence of
    multiple unrelated CAs and CRL issuers with the same name.

    Implementers should be aware of risks involved if the Authority
    Information Access extensions of corrupted CRLs contain links to
    malicious code.  Implementers should always take the steps of
    validating the retrieved data to ensure that the data is properly
    formed.

4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC2587]   Boeyen, S., Howes, T., and P. Richard, "Internet X.509
              Public Key Infrastructure: LDAPv2 Schema", RFC 2587, June
              1999.

  [PKIX1]     Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

  [HTTP/1.1]  Fielding,  R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

  [URI]       Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
              3986, January 2005.

  [LDAP]      Wahl, M., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory
              Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.

  [PKIX-CERT] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", RFC
              2585, May 1999.

  [CMC]       Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and J. Weinstein,
              "Certificate Management Messages over CMS", RFC 2797,
              April 2000.






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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


4.2.  Informative References

  [X.680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),
              Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,
              2002.

  [X.690]     ITU-T Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - ASN.1
              encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
              (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
              Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.

Authors' Addresses

  Stefan Santesson
  Microsoft
  Tuborg Boulevard 12
  2900 Hellerup
  Denmark

  EMail: [email protected]


  Russell Housley
  Vigil Security, LLC
  918 Spring Knoll Drive
  Herndon, VA 20170
  USA

  EMail: [email protected]






















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RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005


Full Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgement

  Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
  Internet Society.







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