Network Working Group                                          R. Sparks
Request for Comments: 4320                              Estacado Systems
Updates: 3261                                               January 2006
Category: Standards Track


            Actions Addressing Identified Issues with the
      Session Initiation Protocol's (SIP) Non-INVITE Transaction

Status of This Memo

  This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
  Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
  improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
  Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
  and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

  This document describes modifications to the Session Initiation
  Protocol (SIP) to address problems that have been identified with the
  SIP non-INVITE transaction.  These modifications reduce the
  probability of messages losing the race condition inherent in the
  non-INVITE transaction and reduce useless network traffic.  They also
  improve the robustness of SIP networks when elements stop responding.
  These changes update behavior defined in RFC 3261.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction ....................................................2
  2. Improving the Situation When Responses Are Only Delayed .........2
     2.1. Action 1: Make the best use of provisional responses .......2
     2.2. Action 2: Remove the useless late-response storm ...........3
  3. Improving the Situation When an Element Is Not Going to
     Respond .........................................................4
  4. Normative Updates to RFC 3261 ...................................4
     4.1. Action 1 ...................................................4
     4.2. Action 2 ...................................................5
  5. Security Considerations .........................................5
  6. Contributors ....................................................5
  7. Normative References ............................................6






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1.  Introduction

  There are a number of unpleasant edge conditions created by the SIP
  non-INVITE transaction (NIT) model's fixed duration.  The negative
  aspects of some of these are exacerbated by the effect that
  provisional responses have on the non-INVITE transaction state
  machines.  These problems are documented in [3].  In summary:

     A non-INVITE transaction must complete immediately or risk losing
     a race

     Losing the race will cause the requester to stop sending traffic
     to the responder (the responder will be temporarily blacklisted)

     Provisional responses can delay recovery from lost final responses

     The 408 response is useless for the non-INVITE transaction

     As non-INVITE transactions through N proxies time-out, there can
     be an O(N^2) storm of the useless 408 responses

  This document specifies updates to RFC 3261 [1] to improve the
  behavior of SIP elements when these edge conditions arise.

2.  Improving the Situation When Responses Are Only Delayed

  There are two goals to achieve when we constrain the problem to those
  cases where all elements are ultimately responsive and networks
  ultimately deliver messages:

  o  Reduce the probability of losing the race, preferably to the point
     that it is negligible

  o  Reduce or eliminate useless messaging

2.1.  Action 1: Make the best use of provisional responses

  o  Disallow non-100 provisionals to non-INVITE requests

  o  Disallow 100 Trying to non-INVITE requests before Timer E reaches
     T2 (for UDP hops)

  o  Allow 100 Trying after Timer E reaches T2 (for UDP hops)

  o  Allow 100 Trying for hops over reliable transports






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  Since non-INVITE transactions must complete rapidly ([3]), any
  information beyond "I'm here" (which can be provided by a 100 Trying)
  can be just as usefully delayed to the final response.  Sending non-
  100 provisionals wastes bandwidth.

  As shown in [3], sending any provisional response inside a NIT before
  Timer E reaches T2 damages recovery from failure of an unreliable
  transport.

  Without a provisional, a late final response is the same as no
  response at all and will likely result in blacklisting the late-
  responding element ([3]).  If an element is delaying its final
  response at all, sending a 100 Trying after Timer E reaches T2
  prevents this blacklisting without damaging recovery from unreliable
  transport failure.

  Blacklisting on a late response occurs even over reliable transports.
  Thus, if an element processing a request received over a reliable
  transport is delaying its final response at all, sending a 100 Trying
  well in advance of the timeout will prevent blacklisting.  Sending a
  100 Trying immediately will not harm the transaction as it would over
  UDP, but a policy of always sending such a message results in
  unnecessary traffic.  A policy of sending a 100 Trying after the
  period of time in which Timer E reaches T2 had this been a UDP hop is
  one reasonable compromise.

2.2.  Action 2: Remove the useless late-response storm

  o  Disallow 408 to non-INVITE requests

  o  Absorb stray non-INVITE responses at proxies

  A 408 to non-INVITE will always arrive too late to be useful ([3]),
  The client already has full knowledge of the timeout.  The only
  information this message would convey is whether or not the server
  believed the transaction timed out.  However, with the current design
  of the NIT, a client cannot do anything with this knowledge.  Thus,
  the 408 is simply wasting network resources and contributes to the
  response bombardment illustrated in [3].

  Late non-INVITE responses by definition arrive after the client
  transaction's Timer F has fired and the client transaction has
  entered the Terminated state.  Thus, these responses cannot be
  distinguished from strays.  Changing the protocol behavior to
  prohibit forwarding non-INVITE stray responses stops the late-
  response storm.  It also improves the proxy's defenses against
  malicious users counting on the RFC 3261 requirement to forward such
  strays.



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3.  Improving the Situation When an Element Is Not Going to Respond

  When we expand the scope of the problem to also deal with element or
  network failure, we have more goals to achieve:

  o  Identifying when an element is non-responsive

  o  Minimizing or eliminating falsely identifying responsive elements
     as non-responsive

  o  Avoiding non-responsive elements with future requests

  Action 1 helps with the first two goals, dramatically improving an
  element's ability to distinguish between failure and delayed response
  from the next downstream element.  Some response, either provisional
  or final, will almost certainly be received before the transaction
  times out.  So, an element can more safely assume that no response at
  all indicates that the peer is not available and follow the existing
  requirements in [1] and [2] for that case.

  Achieving the third goal requires more aggressive changes to the
  protocol.  As noted in [3], future non-INVITE transactions are likely
  to fail again unless the implementation takes steps beyond what is
  defined in [1] and [2] to remember non-responsive destinations
  between transactions.  Standardizing these extra steps is left to
  future work.

4.  Normative Updates to RFC 3261

4.1.  Action 1

  An SIP element MUST NOT send any provisional response with a Status-
  Code other than 100 to a non-INVITE request.

  An SIP element MUST NOT respond to a non-INVITE request with a
  Status-Code of 100 over any unreliable transport, such as UDP, before
  the amount of time it takes a client transaction's Timer E to be
  reset to T2.

  An SIP element MAY respond to a non-INVITE request with a Status-Code
  of 100 over a reliable transport at any time.

  Without regard to transport, an SIP element MUST respond to a non-
  INVITE request with a Status-Code of 100 if it has not otherwise
  responded after the amount of time it takes a client transaction's
  Timer E to be reset to T2.





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4.2.  Action 2

  A transaction-stateful SIP element MUST NOT send a response with
  Status-Code of 408 to a non-INVITE request.  As a consequence, an
  element that cannot respond before the transaction expires will not
  send a final response at all.

  A transaction-stateful SIP proxy MUST NOT send any response to a
  non-INVITE request unless it has a matching server transaction that
  is not in the Terminated state.  As a consequence, this proxy will
  not forward any "late" non-INVITE responses.

5.  Security Considerations

  This document makes a number of small changes to the core SIP
  specification [1] to improve the robustness of SIP non-INVITE
  transactions.  Many of these actions also prevent flooding and
  denial-of-service attacks.

  One change prohibits proxies and user agents from sending 408
  responses to non-INVITE transactions.  Without this change, proxies
  automatically generate a storm of useless responses as described in
  [3].  An attacker could capitalize on this by enticing user agents to
  send non-INVITE requests to a black hole (through social engineering
  or DNS poisoning) or by selectively dropping responses.

  Another change prohibits proxies from forwarding late responses.
  Without this change, an attacker could easily forge messages that
  appear to be late responses.  All proxies compliant with RFC 3261 are
  required to forward these responses, wasting bandwidth and CPU and
  potentially overwhelming target user agents (especially those with
  low-speed connections).

  The remainder of these changes do not affect the security of the SIP
  protocol.

6.  Contributors

  Rohan Mahy provided the Security Considerations section.












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7.  Normative References

  [1]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
       Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
       Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

  [2]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol
       (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, June 2002.

  [3]  Sparks, R., "Problems Identified Associated with the Session
       Initiation Protocol's (SIP) Non-INVITE Transaction", RFC 4321,
       January 2006.

Author's Address

  Robert J. Sparks
  Estacado Systems
  17210 Campbell Road
  Suite 250
  Dallas, TX 75252-4203

  EMail: [email protected]





























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Acknowledgement

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