Network Working Group                                          B. O'Hara
Request for Comments: 3990                                    P. Calhoun
Category: Informational                                        Airespace
                                                               J. Kempf
                                                        Docomo Labs USA
                                                          February 2005


 Configuration and Provisioning for Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)
                          Problem Statement

Status of This Memo

  This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
  not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
  memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

  This document describes the Configuration and Provisioning for
  Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) problem statement.

1.  Introduction

  With the approval of the 802.11 standard by the IEEE in 1997,
  wireless LANs (WLANs) began a slow entry into enterprise networks.
  The limited data rates of the original 802.11 standard, only 1 and 2
  Mbps, limited the widespread adoption of the technology.  802.11
  found wide deployment in vertical applications, such as inventory
  management, point of sale, and transportation management.  Pioneering
  enterprises began to deploy 802.11, mostly for experimentation.

  In 1999, the IEEE approved the 802.11a and 802.11b amendments to the
  base standard, increasing the available data rate to 54 and 11 Mbps,
  respectively, and expanding to a new radio band.  This removed one of
  the significant factors holding back adoption of 802.11 in large
  enterprise networks.  These large deployments were bound by the
  definition and functionality of an 802.11 Access Point (AP), as
  described in the 802.11 standard.  The techniques required extensive
  use of layer 2 bridging and widespread VLANs to ensure the proper
  operation of higher layer protocols.  Deployments of 802.11 WLANs as
  large as several thousand APs have been described.





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RFC 3990                CAPWAP Problem Statement           February 2005


  Large deployments of 802.11 WLANs have introduced several problems
  that require solutions.  The limitations on the scalability of
  bridging should come as no surprise to the networking community, as
  similar limitations arose in the early 1980s for wired network
  bridging during the expansion and interconnection of wired local area
  networks.  This document will describe the problems introduced by the
  large-scale deployment of 802.11 WLANs in enterprise networks.

2.  Problem Statement

  Large WLAN deployments introduce several problems.  First, each AP is
  an IP-addressable device requiring management, monitoring, and
  control.  Deployment of a large WLAN will typically double the number
  of network infrastructure devices that require management.  This
  presents a significant additional burden to the network
  administration resources and is often a hurdle to adoption of
  wireless technologies, particularly because the configuration of each
  access point is nearly identical to the next.  This near-sameness
  often leads to misconfiguration and improper operation of the WLAN.

  Second, distributing and maintaining a consistent configuration
  throughout the entire set of access points in the WLAN is
  problematic.  Access point configuration consists of both long-term
  static information (such as addressing and hardware settings) and
  more dynamic provisioning information (such as individual WLAN
  settings and security parameters).  Large WLAN installations that
  have to update dynamic provisioning information in all the APs in the
  WLAN require a prolonged phase-over time.  As each AP is updated, the
  WLAN will not have a single, consistent configuration.

  Third, dealing effectively with the dynamic nature of the WLAN medium
  itself is difficult.  Due to the shared nature of the wireless medium
  (shared with APs in the same WLAN, with APs in other WLANs, and with
  devices that are not APs at all), parameters controlling the wireless
  medium on each AP must be monitored frequently and modified in a
  coordinated fashion to maximize WLAN performance.  This must be
  coordinated among all the access points, to minimize the interference
  of one access point with its neighbors.  Manually monitoring these
  metrics and determining a new, optimum configuration for the
  parameters related to the wireless medium is a task that takes
  significant time and effort.

  Fourth, securing access to the network and preventing installation of
  unauthorized access points is challenging.  Physical locations for
  access points are often difficult to secure since their location must
  often be outside of a locked network closet or server room.  Theft of
  an access point, with its embedded secrets, allows a thief to obtain
  access to the resources secured by those secrets.



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RFC 3990                CAPWAP Problem Statement           February 2005


  Recently, to address some, or all, of the above problems, multiple
  vendors have begun offering proprietary solutions that combine
  aspects of network switching, centralized control and management, and
  distributed wireless access in a variety of new architectures.  Since
  interoperable solutions allow enterprises and service providers a
  broader choice, a standardized, interoperable interface between
  access points and a centralized controller addressing the problems
  seems desirable.

  In currently fielded devices, the physical portions of this network
  system are one or more 802.11 access points (APs) and one or more
  central control devices, alternatively described as controllers (or
  as access controllers, ACs).  Ideally, a network designer would be
  able to choose one or more vendors for the APs and one or more
  vendors for the central control devices in sufficient numbers to
  design a network with 802.11 wireless access to meet the designer's
  requirements.

  Current implementations are proprietary and are not interoperable.
  This is due to a number of factors, including the disparate
  architectural choices made by the various manufacturers.  A taxonomy
  of the architectures employed in the existing products in the market
  will provide the basis of an output document to be provided to the
  IEEE 802.11 Working Group.  This taxonomy will be utilized by the
  802.11 Working Group as input to their task of defining the
  functional architecture of an access point.  The functional
  architecture, including descriptions of detailed functional blocks,
  interfaces, and information flow, will be reviewed by CAPWAP to
  determine if further work is necessary to apply or develop standard
  protocols providing for multi-vendor interoperable implementations of
  WLANs built from devices that adhere to the newly appearing
  hierarchical architecture using a functional split between an access
  point and an access controller.

3.  Security Considerations

  The devices used in WLANs control network access and provide for the
  delivery of packets between hosts using the WLAN and other hosts on
  the WLAN or elsewhere on the Internet.  Therefore, the functions for
  control and provisioning of wireless access points, require
  protection to prevent misuse of the devices.

  Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity requirements should
  address central management, monitoring, and control of wireless
  access points that should be addressed.  Once an AP and AC have been
  authenticated to each other, a single level of authorization allowing
  monitoring, control, and provisioning may not be sufficient.  The
  requirement for more than a single level of authorization should be



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  determined.  Physical security should also be addressed for those
  devices that contain sensitive security parameters that might
  compromise the security of the system, if those parameters were to
  fall into the hands of an attacker.

  To provide comprehensive radio coverage, APs are often installed in
  locations that are difficult to secure.  The CAPWAP architecture may
  reduce the consequences of a stolen AP.  If high-value secrets, such
  as a RADIUS shared secret, are stored in the AC, then the physical
  loss of an AP does not compromise these secrets.  Further, the AC can
  easily be located in a physically secure location.  Of course,
  concentrating all the high-value secrets in one place makes the AC an
  attractive target, and strict physical, procedural, and technical
  controls are needed to protect the secrets.

Authors' Addresses

  Bob O'Hara
  Airespace
  110 Nortech Parkway
  San Jose, CA  95134

  Phone: +1 408-635-2025
  EMail: [email protected]


  Pat R. Calhoun
  Airespace
  110 Nortech Parkway
  San Jose, CA  95134

  Phone: +1 408-635-2000
  EMail: [email protected]


  James Kempf
  Docomo Labs USA
  181 Metro Drive, Suite 300
  San Jose, CA  95110

  Phone: +1 408 451 4711
  EMail: [email protected]









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RFC 3990                CAPWAP Problem Statement           February 2005


Full Copyright Statement

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

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Acknowledgement

  Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
  Internet Society.






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