Network Working Group                                            M. Kaat
Request for Comments: 2956                   SURFnet ExpertiseCentrum bv
Category: Informational                                     October 2000


             Overview of 1999 IAB Network Layer Workshop

Status of this Memo

  This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
  not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
  memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

  This document is an overview of a workshop held by the Internet
  Architecture Board (IAB) on the Internet Network Layer architecture
  hosted by SURFnet in Utrecht, the Netherlands on 7-9 July 1999.  The
  goal of the workshop was to understand the state of the network layer
  and its impact on continued growth and usage of the Internet.
  Different technical scenarios for the (foreseeable) future and the
  impact of external influences were studied.  This report lists the
  conclusions and recommendations to the Internet Engineering Task
  Force (IETF) community.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
  2. Conclusions and Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.1  Transparency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.2  NAT, Application Level Gateways & Firewalls . . . . . .  4
   2.3  Identification and Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.4  Observations on Address Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.5  Routing Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.6  Observations on Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.7  DNS Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.8  NAT and RSIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.9  NAT, RSIP and IPv6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   2.10 Observations on IPv6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
  3. Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.1 Recommendations on Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.2 Recommendations on RSIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.3 Recommendations on IPv6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.4 Recommendations on IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11



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   3.5 Recommendations on DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   3.6 Recommendations on Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   3.7 Recommendations on Application Layer and APIs. . . . . . 12
  4. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
  References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
  Appendix A. Participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
  Author's Address. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
  Full Copyright Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1. Introduction

  From July 7 to July 9, 1999 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
  held a workshop on the architecture of the Internet Network Layer.
  The Network Layer is usually referred to as the IP layer.  The goal
  of the workshop was to discuss the current state of the Network Layer
  and the impact various currently deployed or future mechanisms and
  technologies might have on the continued growth and usage of the
  Internet.

  The most important issues to be discussed were:

  o  Status of IPv6 deployment and transition issues
  o  Alternative technical strategies in case IPv6 is not adopted
  o  Globally unique addresses and 32 bit address depletion
  o  Global connectivity and reachability
  o  Fragmentation of the Internet
  o  End to end transparency and the progressive loss thereof
  o  End to end security
  o  Complications of address sharing mechanisms (NAT, RSIP)
  o  Separation of identification and location in addressing
  o  Architecture and scaling of the current routing system

  The participants looked into several technical scenarios and
  discussed the feasibility and probability of the deployment of each
  scenario.  Among the scenarios were for example full migration to
  IPv6, IPv6 deployment only in certain segments of the network, no
  significant deployment of IPv6 and increased segmentation of the IPv4
  address space due to the use of NAT devices.

  Based on the discussion of these scenarios several trends and
  external influences were identified which could have a large impact
  on the status of the network layer, such as the deployment of
  wireless network technologies, mobile networked devices and special
  purpose IP devices.







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  The following technical issues were identified to be important goals:

  o  Deployment of end to end security
  o  Deployment of end to end transport
  o  Global connectivity and reachability should be maintained
  o  It should be easy to deploy new applications
  o  It should be easy to connect new hosts and networks to the
     Internet ("plug and ping")

  By the notion "deployment of end to end transport" it is meant that
  it is a goal to be able to deploy new applications that span from any
  host to any other host without intermediaries, and this requires
  transport protocols with similar span (see also [1]).

  This document summarizes the conclusions and recommendations made by
  the workshop.  It should be noted that not all participants agreed
  with all of the statements, and it was not clear whether anyone
  agreed with all of them.  The recommendations made however are based
  on strong consensus among the participants.

2. Conclusions and Observations

  The participants came to a number of conclusions and observations on
  several of the issues mentioned in section 1.  In the following
  sections 2.1-2.10 these conclusions will be described.

2.1 Transparency

  In the discussions transparency was referred to as the original
  Internet concept of a single universal logical addressing scheme and
  the mechanisms by which packets may flow from source to destination
  essentially unaltered [1].  This traditional end to end transparency
  has been lost in the current Internet, specifically the assumption
  that IPv4 addresses are globally unique or invariant is no longer
  true.

  There are multiple causes for the loss of transparency, for example
  the deployment of network address translation devices, the use of
  private addresses, firewalls and application level gateways, proxies
  and caches.  These mechanisms increase fragmentation of the network
  layer, which causes problems for many applications on the Internet.
  It adds up to complexity in applications design and inhibits the
  deployment of new applications.  In particular, it has a severe
  effect on the deployment of end to end IP security.







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  Another consequence of fragmentation is the deployment of "split DNS"
  or "two faced DNS", which means that the correspondence between a
  given FQDN and an IPv4 address is no longer universal and stable over
  long periods (see section 2.7).

  End to end transparency will probably not be restored due to the fact
  that some of the mechanisms have an intrinsic value (e.g. firewalls,
  caches and proxies) and the loss of transparency may be considered by
  some as a security feature.  It was however concluded that end to end
  transparency is desirable and an important issue to pursue.
  Transparency is further explored in [1].

2.2 NAT, Application Level Gateways & Firewalls

  The previous section indicated that the deployment of NAT (Network
  Address Translation), Application Level Gateways and firewalls causes
  loss of network transparency.  Each of them is incompatible with
  certain applications because they interfere with the assumption of
  end to end transparency.  NAT especially complicates setting up
  servers, peer to peer communications and "always-on" hosts as the
  endpoint identifiers, i.e. IP addresses, used to set up connections
  are globally ambiguous and not stable (see [2]).

  NAT, application level gateways and firewalls however are being
  increasingly widely deployed as there are also advantages to each,
  either real or perceived.  Increased deployment causes a further
  decline of network transparency and this inhibits the deployment of
  new applications.  Many new applications will require specialized
  Application Level Gateways (ALGs) to be added to NAT devices, before
  those applications will work correctly when running through a NAT
  device.  However, some applications cannot operate effectively with
  NAT even with an ALG.

2.3 Identification and Addressing

  In the original IPv4 network architecture hosts are globally,
  permanently and uniquely identified by an IPv4 address.  Such an IP
  address is used for identification of the node as well as for
  locating the node on the network.  IPv4 in fact mingles the semantics
  of node identity with the mechanism used to deliver packets to the
  node.  The deployment of mechanisms that separate the network into
  multiple address spaces breaks the assumption that a host can be
  uniquely identified by a single IP address.  Besides that, hosts may
  wish to move to a different location in the network but keep their
  identity the same.  The lack of differentiation between the identity
  and the location of a host leads to a number of problems in the
  current architecture.




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  Several technologies at this moment use tunneling techniques to
  overcome the problem or cannot be deployed in the case of separate
  address spaces.  If a node could have some sort of a unique
  identifier or endpoint name this would help in solving a number of
  problems.

  It was concluded that it may be desirable on theoretical grounds to
  separate the node identity from the node locator.  This is especially
  true for IPsec, since IP addresses are used (in transport mode) as
  identifiers which are cryptographically protected and hence MUST
  remain unchanged during transport.  However, such a separation of
  identity and location will not be available as a near-term solution,
  and will probably require changes to transport level protocols.
  However, the current specification of IPsec does allow to use some
  other identifier than an IP address.

2.4 Observations on Address Space

  There is a significant risk that a single 32 bit global address space
  is insufficient for foreseeable needs or desires.  The participants'
  opinions about the time scale over which new IPv4 addresses will
  still be available for assignment ranged from 2 to 20 years.
  However, there is no doubt that at the present time, users cannot
  obtain as much IPv4 address space as they desire.  This is partly a
  result of the current stewardship policies of the Regional Internet
  Registries (RIRs).

  It was concluded that it ought to be possible for anybody to have
  global addresses when required or desired.  The absence of this
  inhibits the deployment of some types of applications.  It should
  however be noted that there will always be administrative boundaries,
  firewalls and intranets, because of the need for security and the
  implementation of policies.  NAT is seen as a significant
  complication on these boundaries.  It is often perceived as a
  security feature because people are confusing NATs with firewalls.

2.5 Routing Issues

  A number of concerns were raised regarding the scaling of the current
  routing system.  With current technology, the number of prefixes that
  can be used is limited by the time taken for the routing algorithm to
  converge, rather than by memory size, lookup time, or some other
  factor.  The limit is unknown, but there is some speculation, of
  extremely unclear validity, that it is on the order of a few hundred
  thousand prefixes.  Besides the computational load of calculating
  routing tables, the time it takes to distribute routing updates
  across the network, the robustness and security of the current
  routing system are also important issues.  The only known addressing



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  scheme which produces scalable routing mechanisms depends on
  topologically aggregated addresses, which requires that sites
  renumber when their position in the global topology changes.
  Renumbering remains operationally difficult and expensive ([3], [4]).
  It is not clear whether the deployment of IPv6 would solve the
  current routing problems, but it should do so if it makes renumbering
  easier.

  At least one backbone operator has concerns about the convergence
  time of internetwork-wide routing during a failover.  This operator
  believes that current convergence times are on the order of half a
  minute, and possibly getting worse.  Others in the routing community
  did not believe that the convergence times are a current issue. Some,
  who believe that real-time applications (e.g. telephony) require
  sub-second convergence, are concerned about the implications of
  convergence times of a half minute on such applications.

  Further research is needed on routing mechanisms that might help
  palliate the current entropy in the routing tables, and can help
  reduce the convergence time of routing computations.

  The workshop discussed global routing in a hypothetical scenario with
  no distinguished root global address space.  Nobody had an idea how
  to make such a system work.  There is currently no well-defined
  proposal for a new routing system that could solve such a problem.

  For IPv6 routing in particular, the GSE/8+8 proposal and IPNG WG
  analysis of this proposal ([5]) are still being examined by the IESG.
  There is no consensus in the workshop whether this proposal could be
  made deployable.

2.6 Observations on Mobility

  Mobility and roaming require a globally unique identifier. This does
  not have to be an IP address.  Mobile nodes must have a widely usable
  identifier for their location on the network, which is an issue if
  private IP addresses are used or the IP address is ambiguous (see
  also section 2.3).  Currently tunnels are used to route traffic to a
  mobile node.  Another option would be to maintain state information
  at intermediate points in the network if changes are made to the
  packets.  This however reduces the flexibility and it breaks the end
  to end model of the network.  Keeping state in the network is usually
  considered a bad thing.  Tunnels on the other hand reduce the MTU
  size.  Mobility was not discussed in detail as a separate IAB
  workshop is planned on this topic.






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2.7 DNS issues

  If IPv6 is widely deployed, the current line of thinking is that site
  renumbering will be significantly more frequent than today.  This
  will have an impact on DNS updates.  It is not clear what the scale
  of DNS updates might be, but in the most aggressive models it could
  be millions a day.  Deployment of the A6 record type which is defined
  to map a domain name to an IPv6 address, with the provision for
  indirection for leading prefix bits, could make this possible ([6]).

  Another issue is the security aspect of frequent updates, as they
  would have to been done dynamically.  Unless we have fully secured
  DNS, it could increase security risks.  Cached TTL values might
  introduce problems as the cached records of renumbered hosts will not
  be updated in time.  This will become especially a problem if rapid
  renumbering is needed.

  Another already mentioned issue is the deployment of split DNS (see
  section 2.1).  This concept is widely used in the Intranet model,
  where the DNS provides different information to inside and outside
  queries.  This does not necessarily depend on whether private
  addresses are used on the inside, as firewalls and policies may also
  make this desirable.  The use of split DNS seems inevitable as
  Intranets will remain widely deployed.  But operating a split DNS
  raises a lot of management and administrative issues.  As a work
  around, a DNS Application Level Gateway ([7]) (perhaps as an
  extension to a NAT device) may be deployed, which intercepts DNS
  messages and modifies the contents to provide the appropriate
  answers.  This has the disadvantage that it interferes with the use
  of DNSSEC ([8]).

  The deployment of split DNS, or more generally the existence of
  separate name spaces, makes the use of Fully Qualified Domain Names
  (FQDNs) as endpoint identifiers more complex.

2.8 NAT and RSIP

  Realm-Specific IP (RSIP), a mechanism for use with IPv4, is a work
  item of the IETF NAT WG.  It is intended as an alternative (or as a
  complement) to network address translation (NAT) for IPv4, but other
  uses are possible (for example, allowing end to end traffic across
  firewalls).  It is similar to NAT, in that it allows sharing a small
  number of external IPv4 addresses among a number of hosts in a local
  address domain (called a 'realm').  However, it differs from NAT in
  that the hosts know that different externally-visible IPv4 addresses
  are being used to refer to them outside their local realm, and they





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  know what their temporary external address is.  The addresses and
  other information are obtained from an RSIP server, and the packets
  are tunneled across the first routing realm ([9], [10]).

  The difference between NAT and RSIP - that an RSIP client is aware of
  the fact that it uses an IP address from another address space, while
  with NAT, neither endpoint is aware that the addresses in the packets
  are being translated - is significant.  Unlike NAT, RSIP has the
  potential to work with protocols that require IP addresses to remain
  unmodified between the source and destination.  For example, whereas
  NAT gateways preclude the use of IPsec across them, RSIP servers can
  allow it [11].

  The addition of RSIP to NATs may allow them to support some
  applications that cannot work with traditional NAT ([12]), but it
  does require that hosts be modified to act as RSIP clients.  It
  requires changes to the host's TCP/IP stack, any layer-three protocol
  that needs to be made RSIP-aware will have to be modified (e.g. ICMP)
  and certain applications may have to be changed.  The exact changes
  needed to host or application software are not quite well known at
  this moment and further research into RSIP is required.

  Both NAT and RSIP assume that the Internet retains a core of global
  address space with a coherent DNS.  There is no fully prepared model
  for NAT or RSIP without such a core; therefore NAT and RSIP face an
  uncertain future whenever the IPv4 address space is finally exhausted
  (see section 2.4).  Thus it is also a widely held view that in the
  longer term the complications caused by the lack of globally unique
  addresses, in both NAT and RSIP, might be a serious handicap ([1]).

  If optimistic assumptions are made about RSIP (it is still being
  defined and a number of features have not been implemented yet), the
  combination of NAT and RSIP seems to work in most cases.  Whether
  RSIP introduces specific new problems, as well as removing some of
  the NAT issues, remains to be determined.

  Both NAT and RSIP may have trouble with the future killer
  application, especially when this needs QoS features, security and/or
  multicast.  And if it needs peer to peer communication (i.e. there
  would be no clear distinction between a server and a client) or
  assumes "always-on" systems, this would probably be complex with both
  NAT and RSIP (see also section 2.2).

2.9 NAT, RSIP and IPv6

  Assuming IPv6 is going to be widely deployed, network address
  translation techniques could play an important role in the transition
  process from IPv4 to IPv6 ([13]).  The impact of adding RSIP support



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  to hosts is not quite clear at this moment, but it is less than
  adding IPv6 support since most applications probably don't need to be
  changed.  And RSIP needs no changes to the routing infrastructure,
  but techniques such as automatic tunneling ([14]) and 6to4 ([15])
  would also allow IPv6 traffic to be passed over the existing IPv4
  routing infrastructure.  While RSIP is principally a tool for
  extending the life of IPv4, it is not a roadblock for the transition
  to IPv6.  The development of RSIP is behind that of IPv6, and more
  study into RSIP is required to determine what the issues with RSIP
  might be.

2.10 Observations on IPv6

  An important issue in the workshop was whether the deployment of IPv6
  is feasible and probable.  It was concluded that the transition to
  IPv6 is plausible modulo certain issues.  For example applications
  need to be ported to IPv6, and production protocol stacks and
  production IPv6 routers should be released.  The core protocols are
  finished, but other standards need to be pushed forward (e.g. MIBs).
  A search through all RFCs for dependencies on IPv4 should be made, as
  was done for the Y2K problem, and if problems are found they must be
  resolved.  As there are serious costs in implementing IPv6 code, good
  business arguments are needed to promote IPv6.

  One important question was whether IPv6 could help solve the current
  problems in the routing system and make the Internet scale better.
  It was concluded that "automatic" renumbering is really important
  when prefixes are to be changed periodically to get the addressing
  topology and routing optimized.  This also means that any IP layer
  and configuration dependencies in protocols and applications will
  have to be removed ([3]).  One example that was mentioned is the use
  of IP addresses in the PKI (IKE).  There might also be security
  issues with "automatic" renumbering as DNS records have to be updated
  dynamically (see also section 2.7).

  Realistically, because of the dependencies mentioned, IPv6
  renumbering cannot be truly automatic or instantaneous, but it has
  the potential to be much simpler operationally than IPv4 renumbering,
  and this is critical to market and ISP acceptance of IPv6.

  Another issue is whether existing TCP connections (using the old
  address(es)) should be maintained across renumbering.  This would
  make things much more complex and it is foreseen that old and new
  addresses would normally overlap for a long time.

  There was no consensus on how often renumbering would take place or
  how automatic it can be in practice; there is not much experience
  with renumbering (maybe only for small sites).



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3. Recommendations

3.1 Recommendation on Namespace

  The workshop recommends the IAB to appoint a panel to make specific
  recommendations to the IETF about:

     i) whether we should encourage more parts of the stack to adopt a
        namespace for end to end interactions, so that a) NAT works
        'better', and b) we have a little more independence between the
        internetwork and transport and above layers;
    ii) if so, whether we should have a single system-wide namespace
        for this function, or whether it makes more sense to allow
        various subsystems to chose the namespace that makes sense for
        them;
   iii) and also, what namespace(s) [depending on the output of the
        point above] that ought to be.

3.2 Recommendations on RSIP

  RSIP is an interesting idea, but it needs further refinement and
  study.  It does not break the end to end network model in the same
  way as NAT, because an RSIP host has explicit knowledge of its
  temporary global address.  Therefore, RSIP could solve some of the
  issues with NAT.  However, it is premature to recommend it as a
  mainstream direction at this time.

  It is recommended that the IETF should actively work on RSIP, develop
  the details and study the issues.

3.3 Recommendations on IPv6

3.3.1
  The current model of TLA-based addressing and routing should be
  actively pursued.  However, straightforward site renumbering using
  TLA addresses is really needed, should be as nearly automatic as
  possible, and should be shown to be real and credible by the IPv6
  community.

3.3.2
  Network address translation techniques, in addition to their
  immediate use in pure IPv4 environments, should also be viewed as
  part of the starting point for migration to IPv6.  Also RSIP, if
  successful, can be a starting point for IPv6 transition.







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  While the basic concepts of the IPv4 specific mechanisms NAT and RSIP
  are also being used in elements of the proposed migration path to
  IPv6 (in NAT-PT for NAT, and SIIT and AIIH for RSIP), NAT and RSIP
  for IPv4 are not directly part of a documented transition path to
  IPv6.

  The exact implications, for transition to IPv6, of having NAT and
  RSIP for IPv4 deployed, are not well understood.  Strategies for
  transition to IPv6, for use in IPv4 domains using NAT and RSIP for
  IPv4, should be worked out and documented by the IETF.

3.3.3
  The draft analysis of the 8+8/GSE proposal should be evaluated by the
  IESG and accepted or rejected, without disturbing ongoing IPv6
  deployment work.  The IESG should use broad expertise, including
  liaison with the endpoint namespace panel (see section 3.1) in their
  evaluation.

3.4 Recommendations on IPsec

  It is urgent that we implement and deploy IPsec using some other
  identifier than 32-bit IP addresses (see section 2.3).  The current
  IPsec specifications support the use of several different Identity
  types (e.g. Domain Name, User@Domain Name).  The IETF should promote
  implementation and deployment of non-address Identities with IPsec.
  We strongly urge the IETF to completely deprecate the use of the
  binary 32-bit IP addresses within IPsec, except in certain very
  limited circumstances, such as router to router tunnels; in
  particular any IP address dependencies should be eliminated from
  ISAKMP and IKE.

  Ubiquitous deployment of the Secure DNS Extensions ([8]) should be
  strongly encouraged to facilitate widespread deployment of IPsec
  (including IKE) without address-based Identity types.

3.5 Recommendations on DNS

  Operational stability of DNS is paramount, especially during a
  transition of the network layer, and both IPv6 and some network
  address translation techniques place a heavier burden on DNS.  It is
  therefore recommended to the IETF that, except for those changes that
  are already in progress and will support easier renumbering of
  networks and improved security, no fundamental changes or additions
  to the DNS be made for the foreseeable future.

  In order to encourage widespread deployment of IPsec, rapid
  deployment of DNSSEC is recommended to the operational community.




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3.6 Recommendations on Routing

  The only known addressing scheme which produces scalable routing
  mechanisms depends on topologically aggregated addresses, which
  requires that sites renumber when their position in the global
  topology changes.  Thus recommendation 3.3.1 is vital for routing
  IPv6.

  Although the same argument applies to IPv4, the installed base is
  simply too large and the PIER working group showed that little can be
  done to improve renumbering procedures for IPv4.  However, NAT and/or
  RSIP may help.

  In the absence of a new addressing model to replace topological
  aggregation, and of clear and substantial demand from the user
  community for a new routing architecture (i.e. path-selection
  mechanism) there is no reason to start work on standards for a "next
  generation" routing system in the IETF.  Therefore, we recommend that
  work should continue in the IRTF Routing Research Group.

3.7 Recommendations on Application layer and APIs

  Most current APIs such as sockets are an obstacle to migration to a
  new network layer of any kind, since they expose network layer
  internal details such as addresses.

  It is therefore recommended, as originally recommended in RFC 1900
  [3], that IETF protocols, and third-party applications, avoid any
  explicit awareness of IP addresses, when efficient operation of the
  protocol or application is feasible in the absence of such awareness.
  Some applications and services may continue to need to be aware of IP
  addresses.  Until we once again have a uniform address space for the
  Internet, such applications and services will necessarily have
  limited deployability, and/or require ALG support in NATs.

  Also we recommend an effort in the IETF to generalize APIs to offer
  abstraction from all network layer dependencies, perhaps as a side-
  effect of the namespace study of section 3.1.

4. Security Considerations

  The workshop did not address security as a separate topic, but the
  role of firewalls, and the desirability of end to end deployment of
  IPsec, were underlying assumptions.  Specific recommendations on
  security are covered in sections 3.4 and 3.5.






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RFC 2956            1999 IAB Network Layer Workshop         October 2000


References

  [1]   Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, February
        2000.

  [2]   Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", Work in
        Progress.

  [3]   Carpenter, B. and Y. Rekhter, "Renumbering Needs Work", RFC
        1900, February 1996.

  [4]   Ferguson, P and H. Berkowitz, "Network Renumbering Overview:
        Why would I want it and what is it anyway?", RFC 2071, January
        1997.

  [5]   M. Crawford, A. Mankin, T. Narten, J.W. Stewart, III, L. Zhang,
        "Separating Identifiers and Locators in Addresses: An Analysis
        of the GSE Proposal for IPv6", Work in Progress.

  [6]   Crawford, M., and C. Huitema, "DNS Extensions to Support IPv6
        Address Aggregation and Renumbering", RFC 2874, July 2000.

  [7]   Srisuresh, P., Tsirtsis, G., Akkiraju, P. and A. Heffernan,
        "DNS extensions to Network Address Translators (DNS_ALG)", RFC
        2694, September 1999.

  [8]   Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
        2535, March 1999.

  [9]   M. Borella, D. Grabelsky, J. Lo, K. Tuniguchi "Realm Specific
        IP: Protocol Specification", Work in Progress.

  [10]  M. Borella, J. Lo, D. Grabelsky, G. Montenegro "Realm Specific
        IP: Framework", Work in Progress.

  [11]  G. Montenegro, M. Borella, "RSIP Support for End-to-end IPsec",
        Work in Progress.

  [12]  M. Holdrege, P. Srisuresh, "Protocol Complications with the IP
        Network Address Translator", Work in Progress.

  [13]  Tsirtsis, G. and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address Translation -
        Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766, February 2000.








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RFC 2956            1999 IAB Network Layer Workshop         October 2000


  [14]  Gilligan, R. and E. Nordmark, "Transition Mechanisms for IPv6
        Hosts and Routers", RFC 2893, August 2000.

  [15]  B. Carpenter, K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4
        Clouds", Work in Progress.














































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Appendix A. Participants

  Harald Alvestrand           [email protected]
  Ran Atkinson                [email protected]
  Rob Austein                 [email protected]
  Steve Bellovin              [email protected]
  Randy Bush                  [email protected]
  Brian E Carpenter           [email protected]
  Vint Cerf                   [email protected]
  Noel Chiappa                [email protected]
  Matt Crawford               [email protected]
  Robert Elz                  [email protected]
  Tony Hain                   [email protected]
  Matt Holdrege               [email protected]
  Erik Huizer                 [email protected]
  Geoff Huston                [email protected]
  Van Jacobson                [email protected]
  Marijke Kaat                [email protected]
  Daniel Karrenberg           [email protected]
  John Klensin                [email protected]
  Peter Lothberg              [email protected]
  Olivier H. Martin           [email protected]
  Gabriel Montenegro          [email protected]
  Keith Moore                 [email protected]
  Robert (Bob) Moskowitz      [email protected]
  Philip J. Nesser II         [email protected]
  Kathleen Nichols            [email protected]
  Erik Nordmark               [email protected]
  Dave Oran                   [email protected]
  Yakov Rekhter               [email protected]
  Bill Sommerfeld             [email protected]
  Bert Wijnen                 [email protected]
  Lixia Zhang                 [email protected]

Author's Address

  Marijke Kaat
  SURFnet ExpertiseCentrum bv
  P.O. Box 19115
  3501 DC  Utrecht
  The Netherlands

  Phone: +31 30 230 5305
  Fax: +31 30 230 5329
  EMail: [email protected]






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RFC 2956            1999 IAB Network Layer Workshop         October 2000


Full Copyright Statement

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